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"CINCPAC Command History, 1966" consists of Volumes I and II published by Commander in Chief Pacific; and Annexes "A" and "B" published by COMUSMACV and COMUSMACTHAI respectively.

The separate elements of the history are classified according to content and distributed on the basis of a need to know. An index will be separately distributed for addition to Volume II and will cover all elements of the history.
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CHAPTER I

THE STATE OF READINESS OF UNITED STATES FORCES

(S) "... our forces in Vietnam have been rapidly increased this last year... United States forces have also been increased in Taiwan, the Philippines, and Thailand to support operations in Vietnam. While these increased forces are mostly positioned with respect to the war in Vietnam, we still must support our allies around the whole perimeter of the West Pacific and maintain adequate reserves capable of rapid deployment when and where needed."

(U) This Chapter describes CINCPAC's forces and certain actions to plan for their employment to carry out United States policies. Related items are included in Chapter II, which describes CINCPAC's role in carrying out the Military Assistance Program; and in Chapter III, which reports CINCPAC actions associated with his position as United States Military Adviser to the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, and with politico-military events pertaining to his command. Additionally, CINCPAC's mission to counter Communist aggression in Southeast Asia is treated in Chapter IV, published separately as Volume II of this History.

UNITED STATES FORCES DURING 1966

PACOM - WIDE MILITARY STRENGTH

(S) Military personnel strength in PACOM rose from 641,825 on 1 January 1966 to 872,296 at the close of the year. All Services showed increases. Comparative strengths of the component services as well as PACOM were as follows:

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<th>31 Dec 66</th>
<th>Change</th>
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<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>213,911</td>
<td>335,385</td>
<td>+ 121,474</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>255,999</td>
<td>276,843</td>
<td>+ 20,844</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marine Corps</td>
<td>74,210</td>
<td>102,331</td>
<td>+ 28,121</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>97,705</td>
<td>157,737</td>
<td>+ 60,032</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>641,825</td>
<td>872,296</td>
<td>+ 230,471</td>
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(S) The major areas of concentration of military sponsors and dependents and the changes during the year are indicated in the following table:

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<td></td>
<td>31 Dec 66</td>
<td>Change</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hawaii</td>
<td>48,183</td>
<td>- 7,049</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>35,412</td>
<td>+ 250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korea</td>
<td>56,329</td>
<td>- 469</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marianas</td>
<td>13,620</td>
<td>+ 6,004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Okinawa</td>
<td>43,110</td>
<td>+ 4,906</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>24,763</td>
<td>+ 2,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taiwan</td>
<td>8,081</td>
<td>+ 2,849</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>34,489</td>
<td>+ 21,347</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>390,568</td>
<td>+ 206,254</td>
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</table>

(U) Further information regarding military personnel strength is in the table "Pacific Command Personnel."

PERSONNEL STRENGTHS OF MAAG AND SERVICE ADVISORY GROUPS

(U) The personnel strength of these groups is shown in the table entitled "MAAG and Service Advisory Groups Personnel."

FORCE DISPOSITION

(U) The dispositions of PACOM forces and available forces are depicted in the following illustrations. Deployments to and within Southeast Asia are discussed in Chapter IV.
1. COMMANDER IN CHIEF PACIFIC (CINCPAC): CINCPAC is the Commander of a unified command comprising all forces assigned for the accomplishment of his missions. His general area of responsibility for the conduct of normal operations is the Pacific Ocean, including the islands therein (less Aleutians), the Bering Sea, the eastern Indian Ocean area, Japan, the Republic of Korea, and the countries of Southeast Asia. CINCPAC exercises operational command of assigned forces through his component commanders, the commanders of subordinate unified commands, and the commanders of joint task forces (when established). CINCPAC is accredited as the U.S. Military Advisor/Representative to the following organizations:
   d. Japanese-American Security Consultative Committee: Member and Principal Adviser on military defense matters to the Chairman of the U.S. Representation.

2. PACOM COMPONENT COMMANDERS:
   b. Commander in Chief U.S. Pacific Air Forces (CINCPACAF). The component commanders are responsible for accomplishing such operational missions and tasks as may be assigned by CINCPAC. The PACOM component commands consist of the respective component commanders and all those individuals, units, detachments, organizations or installations under their command which have been assigned to the operational command of CINCPAC. Other individuals, units, detachments, organizations or installations may operate directly under the component commander in his service role, and should contribute to the mission of CINCPAC as appropriate.

   Component commanders' responsibilities for the Military Assistance Program are prescribed in CINCPAC Instruction 490-1 (current revision).

3. COMMANDERS OF UNMEDITATED UNIFIED COMMANDS: There are five subordinate unified commands in the PACOM:
   a. United States Forces, Korea (USFK), commanded by Commander United States Forces, Korea (COMUS Korea), Seoul, Korea.
   b. United States Forces, Japan (USFJ), commanded by Commander United States Forces, Japan (COMUS Japan), Fuchu Air Station, Japan.
   c. United States Taiwan Defense Command (USTDC), commanded by Commander United States Taiwan Defense Command (COMUS TAIWAN), Taipei, Taiwan.
   d. United States Military Assistance Command Thailand (USMACV) commanded by Commander United States Military Assistance Command Thailand (COMUSMACV), Bangkok, Thailand.
   e. United States Military Assistance Command Vietnam (USMACV) commanded by Commander United States Military Assistance Command Vietnam (COMUSMACV), Saigon, Republic of Vietnam.

4. REPRESENTATIVES OF THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF PACIFIC (CINCPACREP):
   CINCPACREPs are established in certain areas where no subordinate unified command has been established and where significant forces of two or more Services are stationed. There are four:
   a. Commanding General, U.S. Army Ryukyu Islands/IX Corps in the CINCPAC Representative Ryukyu (CINCPACREP Ryukyu), Fort Buckner, Okinawa.
   b. Commander Naval Forces Marianas in the CINCPAC Representative Marianas (CINCPACREP Marianas), Agana, Guam.
   c. Commander Naval Forces Philippines in the CINCPAC Representative Philippines (CINCPACREP Philippines), Sangley Point, Philippines.
   d. USAF Liaison Officer to Australia is the CINCPAC Representative Australia (CINCPACREP Australia), American Embassy, Canberra, Australia.

5. CHIEFS OF MILITARY ASSISTANCE ADVISORY GROUPS (MAAG): Military Assistance Programs are in effect and have been established in the PACOM area under Chiefs as follows:
   b. Military Assistance Advisory Group, Japan - Tokyo, Japan.
   e. Military Equipment Delivery Team, Burma - Rangoon, Burma.

   Exceptions:
   1. COMUS Korea performs the MAP functions for Korea - Seoul, Korea.
   2. USFJ performs the MAP functions for Laos - Vientiane, Laos.
   3. USAF performs the MAP functions for Laos - Vientiane, Laos.
   4. USAF performs the MAP functions for Laos - Vientiane, Laos.
   5. USAF performs the MAP functions for Laos - Vientiane, Laos.
   6. USAF performs the MAP functions for Laos - Vientiane, Laos.
   7. USAF performs the MAP functions for Laos - Vientiane, Laos.
   8. USAF performs the MAP functions for Laos - Vientiane, Laos.
   9. USAF performs the MAP functions for Laos - Vientiane, Laos.
   10. USAF performs the MAP functions for Laos - Vientiane, Laos.

6. SINGLE SENIOR MILITARY REPRESENTATIVES (COORDINATING AUTHORITIES):
   The Secretary of Defense has directed CINCPAC to designate a Single Senior Military Representative in each country or area within the Pacific Command where U.S. military personnel are on duty. The Single Senior Military Representatives are:
   b. Japan-Commander U.S. Forces Japan.
   c. Ryukyu Islands-Commander in Chief Pacific Representative, Ryukyu Islands.
   d. Taiwan and Penghu-Commander Taiwan Defense Command.
   e. Marianas-Commander in Chief Pacific Representative, Marianas.
   f. Philippines-Commander in Chief Pacific Representative, Philippines.
   g. Philippines-Commander in Chief Pacific Representative, Philippines.
   i. Thailand-Commander, U.S. Military Assistance Command, Thailand.
   j. Indonesia-Commander, Defense Liaison Group, Indonesia.
   k. Burma-Commander, Military Equipment Delivery Team, Burma.
   l. Myanmar-Commander in Chief Pacific Representative, Australia.

SOURCE: 15

FOREGROUND
# SUBORDINATE UNITED COMMANDS AND CINC PAC REPRESENTATIVES

## FAR EAST REGION - KEY PERSONNEL

**AS OF 31 DECEMBER 1966**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNITED NATIONS COMMAND/UNITED STATES FORCES KOREA</th>
<th>U.S. MILITARY ASSISTANCE COMMAND, VIETNAM</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>CINCUNCEUSFK</strong></td>
<td><strong>Commander</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CINUS</td>
<td>Gen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spec Assn (Mil Aff &amp; CHPROVMAAC Korea)</td>
<td>Deputy Commander</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spec Asst/Armistice Aff &amp; Sp Mbr UNCMAC</td>
<td>Joint Secretary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DCOUS</td>
<td>Col</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DCOUS J+2</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>DCOUS J+3</td>
<td>Col</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DCOUS J+4</td>
<td>Capt</td>
</tr>
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<td>DCOUS J+5</td>
<td>Capt</td>
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<td>Chel, Armistice Aff Div &amp; Spec UNCMAC</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>U.S. FORCES JAPAN</strong></td>
<td><strong>Commander</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LTG</td>
<td>Seth J. MCKEE, USAF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RAdm</td>
<td>Eugene P. WILKINSON, USN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Col</td>
<td>Paul J. MALINE, USA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Col</td>
<td>Robert B. MOLLOY, USA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Col</td>
<td>Buddy A. STROZIER, USAF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capt</td>
<td>Thomas D. CUNNINGHAM, USN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Col</td>
<td>Robert S. BURG, USA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Col</td>
<td>Robert G. RUSHFORTH, USA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capt</td>
<td>Felix P. BALLINGER, USN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capt</td>
<td>Robert W. MICHELS, USAF</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**USMACV/USMAC, THAILAND**

| Commander | MG | Richard C. STILLWELL, USA |

See Personnel Staff Listing under Military Assistance Advisory Groups

**CINCPAC REPRESENTATIVE, RYUKYUS**

| CINCPACREP Ryukyu/CS 605/US/US CORE | RAdm | Ferdinand T. UNGER, USA |

**CINCPAC REPRESENTATIVE, PHILIPPINES**

| CINCPACREP Philippines/COMNAVPHIL | RAdm | Hermann J. KOSSLER, USN |

**CINCPAC REPRESENTATIVE, MARIANA-BONIN ISLANDS**

| CINCPACREP MARIBOR/COMNAV MARIANAS | RAdm | Horace V. BIRD, USN |

**CINCPAC REPRESENTATIVE, AUSTRALIA**

| CINCPACREP Australia | Col | Berton H. BURNS, USAF |

**SOUTHEAST ASIA TREATY ORGANIZATION**

| US MILADREP, SMPO, Bangkok | Col | Willis J. ADAMS, USA |

*(A) Acting *(R) Ordered to Report *(D) Ordered Detached

*As of 15 November 1966*
## U.S. Military Assistance Advisory Groups
### Far East Region - Key Personnel
#### As of 31 December 1966

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Chief</strong></td>
<td>MG</td>
<td>James R. WINN, USA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CoS</td>
<td>Col</td>
<td>Charles D. CORNVALE, USAF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AcoS Plans/Prog</td>
<td>LCol</td>
<td>Max GOODMAN, USA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ch Army Sec</td>
<td>Col</td>
<td>Jack B. LOOKEY, USA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ch Navy Sec</td>
<td>Capt</td>
<td>Phillip W. PORTER, USA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ch AF Sec</td>
<td>Col</td>
<td>David GORDON, USA</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Military Assistance Advisory Group Korea (ROK)</th>
<th>Military Assistance Advisory Group China</th>
<th>Defense Liaison Group Indonesia</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Chief</strong></td>
<td>MG</td>
<td>Raymond R. MARLIN, USA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CoS</td>
<td>Col</td>
<td>Charles J. PARSONS, Jr., USA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2dS</td>
<td>Maj</td>
<td>Ernest W. SMITH, USA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ch Plans Div</td>
<td>Capt</td>
<td>William R. EASTON, USA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ch Log Div</td>
<td>Col</td>
<td>Woodrow J. STEINHEIM, USA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sr ADG ROK (ROK)</td>
<td>Col</td>
<td>Aaron E. BLENNETT, USA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adv Op</td>
<td>Col</td>
<td>Harris R. DROESCH, USA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Controller</td>
<td>Col</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sr ADG ROK Natl</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>War College</td>
<td>Col</td>
<td>Edward STRONGIN, USA</td>
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**Source:** JT

(A) Acting  (R) Ordered to Report  (D) Ordered Detached
# AVAILABLE FORCES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CINCUSARCAP</th>
<th>CINCPACFLT</th>
<th>CINCPACAF</th>
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<tr>
<td>1 Army Hq</td>
<td>12 Engr Bn (Cmbt)</td>
<td>2 Numbered Fleets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Corps Hq</td>
<td>12 Engr Bn (Const)</td>
<td>9 Attack Carriers (CVA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Field Force Sq</td>
<td>1 Arty Gp (AD)</td>
<td>4 ADW Support Carriers (CVC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Hqs U.S. Army Spt</td>
<td>3 Mike-</td>
<td>5 Carrier Air Wings 5 (CWV)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Inf Div</td>
<td>8 Hercules Bn (+)</td>
<td>4 Carrier ADW Air Groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Air Mobile Div</td>
<td>8 Hawk Bn</td>
<td>8 Cruiser Types</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Abn Brigades</td>
<td>3 Arty Gp</td>
<td>59 Submarine Types</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Inf Brigades</td>
<td>1 Sergeant Bn</td>
<td>124 Destroyer Types</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Missile Cnd (AT)</td>
<td>5 8&quot; How Bn</td>
<td>2 Carrier ADW Sqn (VW)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Logistical Cnd</td>
<td>1675 Gun Bn</td>
<td>90 Amphibious Warfare Types</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Engr Bde</td>
<td>1555 Gun Bn (+)</td>
<td>76 Patrol Ships Types</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Arty Bde (AD)</td>
<td>7 105mm How Bn</td>
<td>43 Mine Warfare Ships</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Corps Artv</td>
<td>1 Honest John Bn</td>
<td>1 Photo Sqn (VRP)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Field Force Artv</td>
<td>2 Little John Bn</td>
<td>2 SOGUS Station</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Special Forces Gp (-)</td>
<td>3 Tgt Acq Bn</td>
<td>119 Auxiliary Ships 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Engr Gp (Cmbt)</td>
<td>2 Avn Bde</td>
<td>8 HNHC B %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Engr Gp (Const)</td>
<td>2 Avn Gp</td>
<td>1 Fleet Marine Force (Including 2 MARDIV/MING Teams, 1 MEB and 1 MAR Bde)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- 8 Atlantic Fleet DD Augmented
- 1 Atlantic Fleet Unit Augmented
- 4 Sub Lant Flt Augmented
- 3 Numbered Air Forces / 1 Air Div
- 13 Tac Flt Sqs (F-15)/ 13 Tac Flt Sqs (F-16)
- 15 Tac Flt Sqs (F-4)/ 13 Tac Flt Sqs (F-16)
- 7 Tac Bomb Sqs (B-57)/ 1 Tac MSL Gp (MAC)
- 3 Air Cnds Ftr Sqs (F-16)
- 1 Air Cnds Conv Sqs (C-130/T28/20G/MRC12)
- 1 Air Cnds Spr Cnds Sqs (AC-130)
- 1 Air Cnds Fire Spr Cnds Sqs (AC-130)
- 1 Air Cnds Pyro Spr Sqs (UGG/USG)
- 1 Air Cnds Flt (A-6)
- 1 Air Cnds Def Sqs (MC-121)
- 1 Tac Air Sup Sqn (B-52)
- 13 Tac Flt Sqs (F-15)
- 12 Ftr Intg Sqn (F-16)
- 12 Trp Car Sqs (C-130)
- 1 Air Flt Sqs (CT-130)
- 1 Air Cnds Cont Sqn (EC-125)
- 1 Comp Bn Sqn (C-130/E3578)
- 2 Tac Ech Sq (RF-101)
- 6 Tac Ech Sq (RFAC)/ 2 Tac Ech Sq (XOQ/8C)

### IN PACOM BUT NOT ASSIGNED TO CINCAPAC

#### Usasa Units in Pacific

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Army Natl Guard Units</th>
<th>Army Reserve Units</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Mike-Hercules Bn (+)</td>
<td>1 Inf Bn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Inf Bde (2 Inf Bns)</td>
<td>1 CA Gp</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11-165mm How Bn</td>
<td>1 Engr Const Bn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Arty Gp (AD)</td>
<td>1 Corps Gp (AD)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### MAJOR AUGMENTATION FORCES WHICH MAY BE AVAILABLE IN EMERGENCY

See Part 1 of Annex A (Joint Strategic Capability Plan (JSOP)).  

See Part 1 of Annex A (Joint Strategic Capability Plan (JSOP)).
## PACIFIC COMMAND PERSONNEL
### SERVICE - CATEGORY - COUNTRY
#### AS OF DECEMBER 31 1966

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>GRAND TOTAL</th>
<th>MILITARY</th>
<th>U.S. CIVILIANS</th>
<th>LOCAL HIRE CIVILIANS</th>
<th>DEPENDENTS</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>USA</td>
<td>USN</td>
<td>USMC</td>
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<td>VIETNAM</td>
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<td>244172</td>
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<td>WAKE ISLAND</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| 7th FLEET   | 63799    | 63799 | 63799 | 63799 | 63799 | 63799 | 63799 | 63799 | 63799 | 63799 | 63799 |
| SUB TOTAL   | 1190369  | 144357 | 335385 | 156111 | 94424 | 157727 | 20778 | 10667 | 1015 | 135 | 9861 | 151273 | 81128 | 25195 | 3567 | 41583 | 176667 | 64750 | 38552 | 7664 | 64595 |
| CONSOS      | 127093   | 127093 | 127093 | 127093 | 127093 | 127093 | 127093 | 127093 | 127093 | 127093 | 127093 |
| GRAND TOTAL | 121848   | 872256 | 335385 | 276443 | 182331 | 157727 | 20778 | 10667 | 1015 | 135 | 9861 | 151273 | 81128 | 25195 | 3567 | 41583 | 176667 | 64750 | 38552 | 7664 | 64595 |

* Strengths from 29 September 1966 Weekly report due to discontinuation of monthly report.
* **Strengths from CONUSMACHTAI Troop list and Strength Report.

**SOURCE:** 11
## MAAG AND SERVICE ADVISORY GROUPS PERSONNEL

### PACIFIC COMMAND AUTHORIZED AND ASSIGNED - BY SERVICE - CATEGORY - GROUP

AS OF 31 DECEMBER 1966

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CATEGORY</th>
<th>ARMY</th>
<th>NAVY</th>
<th>M C</th>
<th>AIR FORCE</th>
<th>TOT MIL</th>
<th>U.S. CNV</th>
<th>TOT US PER</th>
<th>LOCAL HIRE</th>
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<td>61/60</td>
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<td>JUSMAC PHIL</td>
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<td>MEDT BURMA</td>
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<td>136</td>
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<td>95</td>
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<td>58</td>
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<tr>
<td>GRAND TOTAL</td>
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<td>231</td>
<td>78/78</td>
<td>504</td>
<td>465</td>
<td>2,268</td>
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</table>

*Strength from COMUSMAC THAI Troop List and Strength Report.*

**SOURCE:** 11
DEPLOYMENT OF MAJOR GROUND UNITS

AS OF 15 MAY 1966

VIETNAM
- 1st INF DIV
- 21st INF DIV
- 1st CAV DIV (ARVN)
- 1st BNC, 1st ARN DIV
- 173rd AIR BDE (SEP)
- 5th SPEC FORCES GRP
- 1st LOG COMB
- 101st ENGR BDE
- 91st ARRT GRP (AD)
- 81st MI BK
- 115th ARTY (HAVN)
- 89th WP GP
- 43rd MED GRP
- 41st TAN TERN COMD
- U DMZ
- 3rd MAR DIV (REMF)
- 1st MAR DIV (REMF)
- 3 HEMCO

KOREA
- 1ST MAC FMF
- 1ST CORPS
- 31st INF COMMAND
- 1ST MLN BK, 1ST ARTY (LITTLE JOHN)
- 1ST BNC DIV (AD)
- 30th ARTY BDE (AD)
- 211th MLN BK, 1ST ARTY (HAVN)
- 1ST MLN BK, 65TH ARTY (HAVN)
- 11th MLN BK, 1ST ARTY (HAVN)
- 6th MLN BK, 3RD ARTY (HAVN)

OKINAWA
- 1ST MAC FMF
- 1ST CORPS
- 211th INF COMMAND
- 1ST MLN BK, 51ST ARTY (LITTLE JOHN)
- 1ST BNC DIV (AD)
- 30th ARTY BDE (AD)
- 211th MLN BK, 65TH ARTY (HAVN)
- 1ST MLN BK, 65TH ARTY (HAVN)
- 11th MLN BK, 1ST ARTY (HAVN)
- 6th MLN BK, 3RD ARTY (HAVN)

THAILAND
- 9th LOG COMB
- 7th FLTL
- 1 MAR DET and 1 HMM
- AFLTRAT (SFL)

OAHU
- 200th ARTY GRP (Air Del) (HARRG)
- 1ST MLN BK, 41ST ARTY (HAVN)
- 2nd MLN BK, 111TH ARTY (HAVN)

SOURCE: J3 B

SECRET
DEPLOYMENT OF MAJOR NAVAL AIR & SHIP UNITS

AS OF 15 MAY 1966

SOURCE: 138
DEPLOYMENT OF MAJOR AIR FORCE

FLYING & MISSILE UNITS
AS OF 15 MAY 1966

-SECRET-

SOURCE: 13B

-SECRET-
DEPLOYMENT OF MAJOR AIR FORCE
FLYING & MISSILE UNITS
AS OF 15 MAY 1966

SOURCE: J3B
DEPLOYMENT OF MAJOR AIR FORCE
FLYING & MISSILE UNITS
AS OF 15 JANUARY 1967

KADENA
315th AFR DIV
10th TAC FTR WG
29th TAC FTR SQ
446th TAC FTR SQ
47th TAC FTR SQ
158th TAC RCV SQ
4252nd ANG (BAC)
426th TAC WFL GP
ACR/LEH
14th F105
25 F105

OSAN (Korea)
12th STRIKE 10 F105
ACR/LEH
2 HN-43

KUNSAN (Korea)
12th STRIKE 10 F105
ACR/LEH
2 HN-43

NAHA
51st TAC WG
826th FTR INTP SQ
374th TAC
274th TAP CAR (M) SQ
251st TAP CAR (M) SQ
414th TAP CAR (M) SQ
87th TAP CAR (M) SQ
33rd AWR RES SQ
ACR/LEH
5 HN-43

CLARK
90th TAP CAR (M) SQ
24th TAP CAR (M) SQ
235th TAP CAR (M) SQ
10th TAP CAR (M) SQ
23rd TAP CAR (M) SQ
26th TAP CAR (M) SQ
31st TAP CAR (M) SQ
4 HN-43

TAINAN
496th AWR RES SQ
4 HN-43

CHING CHUAN KANG
7th STRIKE 10 F105
308th TAP CAR (M) SQ
506th TAP CAR (M) SQ
774th TAP CAR (M) SQ
16 F105
2 HN-43

ANDERSEN
6th STRIKE 10 F105
504th FMS RES SQ
4 HN-43

HICKAM
64th ARCS
64th AIR RES SQ
16 F105
25 F105
90th TAP CAR (M) SQ
28th TAP CAR (M) SQ
16 F105
6 CR-30
414th TAC
504th TAP CAR (M) SQ
16 F105
2 CR-30

SOURCE: JSB

Numbers of aircraft indicate U.S. authorization
COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS IN THE PACIFIC COMMAND

(U) The command structure for United States military forces in the Pacific has undergone an accelerating evolutionary development over an extended period. The changes since 1957 have been noted in previous editions of the CINCPAC Command History, but there has been a gap regarding what took place prior to that time. The following material has been prepared from limited sources and presents the major changes which have culminated in a command relationship unique in military history.

(U) The unified command structure in the Pacific goes back to World War II, when two such organizations were formed to push the Pacific offensive to the Japanese home islands. The first joint staff in the area was that of the Commander in Chief, Pacific Ocean Area (CINCPOA), under Fleet Admiral (then Admiral) Chester W. Nimitz. His staff was composed of Army, Navy, Army Air Force, Marine Corps, Coast Guard, and Public Health Service personnel. The intelligence section was headed by an Army brigadier general, plans and operations by a Navy rear admiral, and logistics by an Army major general. Component forces were assigned to CINCPOA for execution of battle plans and relocation in the event of changes in strategy.

(U) The second unified command was that of the Commander in Chief, Southwest Pacific Area, headed by General of the Army (then General) Douglas MacArthur. When the General waded ashore on the east coast of Leyte Island in the Philippines on 20 October 1944 and called upon the Filipinos to "rise and strike," he had under his control 738 Navy ships, 194,000 troops of the Sixth Army, and the planes of the Combined Allied Air Forces. Then, following the Japanese surrender, General MacArthur, who had been elevated to five-star rank in January 1945, assumed the titles of Commander in Chief, Far East (CINCFE), and Supreme Commander Allied Powers (SCAP). At one time friction between these two commanders brought President Roosevelt to Hawaii to resolve their differences.
(U) The traditional division of military responsibilities in the Pacific has been described as follows:

"After Dewey fought the battle of Manila Bay, the division of command was evidenced by headquarters in Manila and Honolulu. During World War II, the Manila headquarters roamed about quite a bit. After the war, it came to rest in Tokyo."

(U) The postwar Pacific Command was born 1 January 1947 when United States Armed Forces stationed throughout the world were placed under unified commands according to specific geographic areas of responsibility.

(U) Three commands were established for the Pacific area: the Far East Command with General of the Army Douglas MacArthur as Commander in Chief Far East (CINCFE), the Pacific Command with Admiral John H. Towers as Commander in Chief Pacific (CINCPAC), and the Alaska Command with Major General H. A. Craig as Commander in Chief Alaska (CINCAL).

(U) CINCFE exercised unified command over all US Forces in Japan, Korea, the Ryukyus, Philippines, Marianas, and Bonins.

(U) CINCPAC was to exercise unified command over all US naval forces in the Pacific except those reporting to CINCFE and to CINCAL (the latter included forces under the command of Commander Alaskan Sea Frontier) and over all Army and Army Air Forces in his area of command. Admiral Towers, CINCPAC/CINCPOA, assumed

2. Because of developments in the Korean conflict, the Chief of Naval Operations notified the JCS on 12 Feb 51 that he considered it imperative that responsibility for the security of the Marianas and the Bonin-Volcano Islands and "operational control of facilities and local forces therein revert to the Pacific Command, and that CINCPAC exercise unified command over all forces allocated to him, including forces assigned to the Marianas and Bonins." The JCS approved the recommendation and the transfer was effected a week later, on 16 Apr 51. Richard, United States Naval Administration of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands (OCNO, 1957) III, p 177

1 Jan 47)

20
the title of Commander in Chief Pacific and Commander in Chief US Pacific Fleet (CINCPAC/CINCPACFLT).

(U) The Pacific Command (PACOM), consisting of Navy, Army, and Air Forces was to "organize, plan, and conduct training to maintain the security of the United States island positions in the Pacific..., support the Far East and Alaskan Commands, conduct operations including the protection of sea and air communications in order to defend the United States against attack through the Pacific Ocean, and be prepared for further operations in the event of war." 1

(U) Under the new unified command arrangement, the channel of military command and direction ran from the Commander in Chief to the Secretary of Defense, thence to the Secretary of the Service serving as executive agent for the command, then to the head of the Service, and finally to the unified command commander. Executive agents in the Pacific were: for CINCPAC, the Department of the Navy; for CINCFE, the Department of the Army.

(U) On 18 July 1947 President Truman commissioned Admiral Louis E. Denfeld, CINCPAC/CINCPACFLT since February 1947, as High Commissioner of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands.

(U) Admiral Denfeld integrated his additional High Commissioner tasks with his CINCPAC/CINCPACFLT duties, and utilized his staff members who had already been trained and experienced during the period of military government (Navy) of the Trust Territory, previously called the Japanese Mandated Islands.

(U) The offices of CINCPAC/CINCPACFLT and High Commissioner were separate and distinct, although certainly of considerable mutual interest. 2

1. Richard, Trust Territory, II, pp 102, 103 citing CINCPAC OPLAN 1-47
2. Richard, III, p 48
3. On 8 Jan 51 Admiral Radford was relieved as High Commissioner of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands and replaced by Mr. Elbert D. Thomas, ex-Senator of Utah. (Richard, III, pp 1101, 1102)
(U) When the North Koreans invaded South Korea in the summer of 1950, the JCS directed the military operation through CINCFE/Commander in Chief United Nations Command (CINCUNC). The CINCPAC role was purely that of support.

(U) In mid-1956 the JCS directed CINCPAC and CINCFE to submit a coordinated broad outline plan for orderly transfer of the Far East Command to the Pacific Command. The plan was submitted in October, and on 28 December 1956 the JCS approved the plan that called for the disestablishment of the Far East Command and the movement of the United Nations Command from Japan to Korea. The outline plan, as approved by the JCS, provided for the orderly and economical reassignment of the CINCFE area, forces, and responsibilities to CINCPAC.²

(U) On 1 July 1957 the Far East Command was disestablished and CINCPAC absorbed the duties and responsibilities of CINCFE. The United Nations Command was moved to Korea where General Decker, the Commander of United States Forces, Korea (a CINCPAC subordinate unified command commander) was designated Commander in Chief United Nations Command, a title previously held by General MacArthur and his successors as CINCFE.³

(U) The historical division of command of US Forces in the Pacific was thus terminated. In an action corollary to the enlargement of the Pacific Command, individual Service component commanders in chief for the Army, Navy, and Air Force forces in the Pacific were established with headquarters in Oahu. The command structure was as follows.

(U) CINCPAC, as Commander in Chief US Pacific Fleet, was his own Navy component commander (CINCPACFLT). Commander in Chief of the US Army, Pacific (CINCUSARPAC) was General Isaac D. White; Commander in Chief Pacific Air Forces (CINCPACAF) was General Laurence S. Kuter.

1. JCS 1259/377, 31 Dec 56, which cited JCS 1259/366
2. JCS 1259/378, 28 Dec 56, which cited CJCS Memo 1259/354, 4 Jun 56 and Sec Def Memo JCS 1259/357, 21 Jun 56
(U) The magnitude of CINCPAC's unified command responsibilities made it advisable, as early as 1956, that he be disassociated from direct command of the Pacific Fleet. 1 Accordingly, the CNO completed new terms of reference under which the Deputy CINCPACFLT would relieve Admiral Stump of Fleet duties. 2 The CINCPAC staff was thereafter separated from the CINCPACFLT staff and moved, on 26 October 1957, to a new headquarters building at Camp H. M. Smith on the heights above Pearl Harbor; 3 Camp Smith also housed the headquarters of CCGFMFPAC. The actual change was announced by a January 1958 message passed by the CNO to CINCPAC (DTG 132204Z).

"The President today approved changing the positions CINCPAC/CINCPACFLT to CINCPAC and Deputy CINCPACFLT to CINCPACFLT. This change effective this date."

1. JCSM-1039-56, Encl to JCS 1259/377, 31 Dec 56
2. CNO Memo to JCS ser 0129P60, 20 Apr 56, Subj: "Command of the US Pacific Fleet" cited in JCS 1259/377, 22 Apr 57
   Subj: Disestablishment of the Far East Command and the Movement of the United Nations Command to Korea (U)
3. The CINCPAC staff numbered 206 officers and 255 enlisted personnel. There were seven flag and general officers.
This page not used.
US BASES IN THE RYUKYU ISLANDS

(5) In 1966 CINCPAC continued to stress to the JCS the importance of maintaining US control in the Ryukyu Islands. Under the Japanese Peace Treaty following World War II, all powers of administration, legislation, and jurisdiction over the Ryukyus were granted to the United States, but Japan retained residual sovereignty over the islands. Some of the northern islands had been returned to Japan in 1954, and both the Japanese and Ryukyuans had agitated for and urged greater home rule and, ultimately, restoration of all of the islands to Japan. These strategic islands, however, housed many extremely valuable US military installations.

(5) In the summer of 1966, the Interdepartmental Regional Group/Far East completed a study, "Our Ryukyu Bases," addressing the problem of future US base requirements and possible return of control to the Government of Japan.1,2 The Group recommended various actions to expand Ryukyu autonomy, and to increase Japanese participation in

2. (C) The study was one of the products of an interdepartmental organization created in 1965. For further background on this organization, see JCS PM 158, CPRS 0260-66, which was summarized in J5 Brief 372 of 14 November 1966. The President, through National Security Action Memorandum 341, established a new interdepartmental organization for the direction, coordination, and supervision of all US activities overseas. The Secretary of State was assigned authority and responsibility for such interdepartmental activities, except for the activities of US military forces under an area military commander, or other military activities the President elected to conduct through military channels. To assist the Secretary in performing these duties, a Senior Interdepartmental Group was established. Chaired by the Under Secretary of State, it was composed of the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Administrator of the AID, the Director of the CIA, the Chairman of the JCS, the Director of the USIA, and the Special Assistant to the President for National Security. In addition, to assist the Assistant Secretaries of State, Interdepartmental Regional Groups were established to correspond to each of the five State Department geographic bureaus. Each had a representative from the same agencies as the Senior Group. Executive Chairmen of the groups had full powers of decision, unless a non-concurring member requested review of a decision by higher authority. The JCS established appropriate policy to support the interdepartmental organizations in Policy Memo 158.
Ryukyuan affairs. These recommendations, the study noted, were to be considered within the broad framework of maintaining the essential integrity of US administration and operational capability of the US bases.

In response to a JCS request for comments on the study, CINCPAC repeated his previous position that,

"As long as the United States has a responsibility for maintaining peace and freedom in the Far East, and as long as communist states continue their aggressive opposition to our objectives, the United States must maintain a strong position in the Western Pacific. For this purpose we must have unrestricted use of our bases on Okinawa, which we could not ensure if Japan were to assume full administration of the Island."  

He further recommended no transfer of administrative authority over the Ryukyus unless further studies indicated the feasibility and desirability of such transfer.

CINCPAC interpreted the report to imply that the Ryukyu bases will be less important after the end of the Vietnam War. He recommended that the report be reworded to eliminate this possible interpretation and emphasize the essential requirement for these bases for continued defense against other communist threats both during and subsequent to the war in Vietnam. CINCPAC believed that the types of administrative functions the study stated could be turned over to Japan were too sweeping. Turnover of such controls could infringe on areas such as public utilities, ports, airfields, transportation, and communications facilities vital to continued unrestricted operations of these bases. He also cited the difficulty of recovering these functions from the Japanese in emergency situations. CINCPAC recommended that the doctrine stated by the JCS should continue to prevail and that the objective should be to continue to guarantee full and unfettered US military operating rights in the Ryukyus.

1. CINCPAC 072032 Z Aug 66; Point Paper, J5111, 14 Sep 66
2. CINCPAC 190855 Z May 66
3. JCSM 900-65, 23 Dec 65
(§) On 13 September the Senior Interdepartmental Group approved the recommendations contained in the Regional Group's study and asked the US Ambassador to Japan and the High Commissioner of the Ryukyus to prepare a plan for carrying out the actions recommended in the report. The Senior Group also requested further study of the feasibility and implications of a transfer to Japan of all administrative authority; and it asked for a further examination of the current and proposed military activities in the Ryukyus, the possible impairment to each military function if administrative control was transferred, and the cost of moving each military function to the next best location.

(§) CINCPAC was asked to comment and provide the detailed information requested on military activities plus an estimate of the cost of relocating the military units to other areas within the Pacific. He forwarded the requested information on 16 December. Commenting on the possible return of control of the Ryukyus to Japan, CINCPAC told the JCS that in his view any diminution or loss of US operating rights in the Ryukyus, or the relocation of major combat forces to other areas, would have an adverse impact on US defensive strategy in the Pacific. Okinawa, he continued, had been developed into an extensive complex of military installations that constituted an operational and support base of major dimensions not duplicated elsewhere in the Far East.

CONSTRUCTION OF NEW ARMY, NAVY, MARINE FACILITIES ON OKINAWA

(§) In 1966, CINCPAC considered that requirements for a Marine Corps airfield, a Navy harbor, and an Army ammunition storage facility on Okinawa were essential construction needs, and each Service was preparing appropriate plans. The Marine jet airfield was to be at Kushi Wan, a coral reef to be reclaimed on the east coast.

1. STATE 62978/102100Z Oct 66
2. JCS 6726/282348Z Oct 66
3. CINCPAC ltr 3121, ser 000534, Subj: Our Ryukyus Bases, 16 Dec 66
4. Point Paper, J4215, 13 Jun 66
near Marine Camp Schwab. Construction awaited funding. The airfield was to be immediately across a small bay (Oura Wan) from the proposed Army ammunition storage site, construction of which was scheduled to begin early in 1967.

(5) The new Oura Wan munitions storage complex, in conjunction with other existing facilities on Okinawa, was expected to accommodate all Army and some Marine storage requirements. CINCPAC had indicated that ammunition storage facilities on Okinawa must accommodate all planned requirements, including recent upward revisions in munition stockage objectives.

(6) A study to select the site for the new harbor facility to support amphibious forces on Okinawa, prepared by a Navy architect and engineer, was received in May 1966 and was being evaluated by CINCPACFLT. The facility was not yet funded.

IMPLEMENTATION OF OMEGA NAVIGATION SYSTEM PROPOSED

(5) Early in 1966 CINCPAC expressed his support for high priority implementation of the OMEGA Navigation System in the Pacific and Indian Ocean areas. OMEGA was a very low frequency hyperbolic navigation system that would provide worldwide coverage with only eight ground stations. One reason CINCPAC had endorsed the OMEGA system was the lack of land in the PACOM (or land to which the United States had access) that was available for installation of the large number of transmitting stations required for a complete LORAN network. LORAN required 96 master-slave sets to provide worldwide coverage; only 26 were operational by 1966. CINCPAC did not believe extension of LORAN coverage in the Pacific was economically feasible.

(6) In May the JCS stated the requirement for OMEGA, and CINCPAC reiterated his support for the system in December.

1. Point Paper, J471, 13 Jun 66
2. CINCPAC 240145Z Feb 66
3. JCSM 315-66, 10 May 66
4. CINCPAC 071238Z Dec 66
The Institute of Defense Analyses, however, concluded that the OMEGA system did not meet accuracy requirements for POLARIS, air bombardment, counterinsurgency, or anti-submarine warfare.¹

(§) The Deputy Secretary of Defense transmitted those conclusions on a memorandum that recommended elimination of OMEGA from the 1966 Navigation Plan, not because the system would not enhance military capability, but because it was not "cost-effective" when compared to other possible solutions, such as the refitting of ships with inertial and manual "low-cost" navigation satellite receivers. LORAN would therefore continue to be the primary general purpose navigation system in the Pacific until ships were retrofitted with satellite receivers.

(§) There were still significant gaps in LORAN coverage, and the JCS asked CINCPAC for review of the coverage and his comments.² At the end of the year CINCPAC was preparing his reclama to the Secretary of Defense's decision to eliminate OMEGA from the 1966 Navigation Plan.

US NAVAL COMMUNICATIONS STATION, NORTH WEST CAPE, AUSTRALIA

(U) In 1966 construction continued on a US Navy Communications Station that was being established on North West Cape, Australia. Communication with submarines had not been adequate in the Western Pacific and Indian Ocean areas, and the station was intended to correct this deficiency. Slated to cost over $73 million, the elaborate installation was started in late 1963 and was scheduled for completion in 1966, but construction difficulties had caused delay. The station was to consist of three distinct areas totaling 8,500 acres: the very low frequency transmitter area, the high frequency transmitting and support area, and the high frequency receiving area. The very low frequency transmitter facility was expected to be operational in March 1967. Completion of the high frequency transmitting and receiving facilities was expected to require

2. JCS 122229Z Dec 66
two to five months beyond that time. High frequency radio point-to-point service with 3 voice and 16 radio teletype channels was planned to interconnect North West Cape with other US Naval Communications Stations at Asmara, Guam, and the Philippines, and the Australian Communications System at Canberra.¹

¹ Point Paper, J6111, 11 Apr 66
COMMUNIST FORCE STRENGTH CHANGES

UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

(9) Air defense and tactical air capabilities increased by the addition of later model fighter aircraft. Soviet Navy force capabilities improved as a result of equipping conventional destroyers with surface-to-air missile (SAM) armament, increasing the anti-submarine warfare effectiveness of both newly constructed and modernized surface ships, and constructing advanced types of submarines.

(9) Changes in Soviet ground force strength reflected the upgrading of two tank divisions located in the Transbaykal Military District from the "possible" to the "accepted" category in order of battle holdings. One unidentified rifle division in the Far East Military District was deleted from order of battle holdings after reanalysis determined that the troops involved were members of a previously accepted unidentified tank division located in the same area. Although some materiel improvements may have been made within Soviet Far Eastern units, there was no evidence of any significant troop moves during the past year.

COMMUNIST CHINA

(9) Communist China continued to accord high priority to missile and nuclear development. China's fifth nuclear device detonation took place in December. A high priority program to develop a new missile system, probably an intercontinental ballistic missile system, was evident. Work also appeared to be continuing on a medium range ballistic missile that China had been testing for several years.

(9) Of the 22 surface-to-air missile sites known to exist in China late in 1966, only one was located in Southern China. It was expected that future SA-2 installations would also be placed in areas of most vital national interest rather than be used for peripheral air defense. Development of an SA-2 surface-to-air missile system was moving slowly.

1. Significant changes are reflected in the table entitled "Communist Military Strength Changes During 1966."
### COMMUNIST MILITARY STRENGTH CHANGES DURING 1966

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>USSR (Far East)</th>
<th>COMMUNIST CHINA</th>
<th>NORTH KOREA</th>
<th>NORTH VIETNAM</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>GROUND</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>As Of Dec 1966</td>
<td>Changes During Yr</td>
<td>As Of Dec 1966</td>
<td>Changes During Yr</td>
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<tr>
<td>Line Divisions*</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>+ 1</td>
<td>Personnel: 2,325,600</td>
<td>+ 10,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>NAVY</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Major Aircraft:</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jet Hy Bn:</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>- 5</td>
<td>Personnel: 197,000**</td>
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<td>- 58</td>
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<td><strong>STRAT RKT FORCES</strong></td>
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<td>Missile Launchers (Reevaluation)</td>
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<td>51</td>
<td>- 10</td>
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<tr>
<td>MRBM</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>- 4</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**FOOTNOTES:**
- Line divisions: brigades include infantry (regular, motorized, mechanized), armored (tank), airborne (parachute), and cavalry divisions.
- **Includes 125,900 personnel assigned to AGL, SAM, and AAA units.
- ***Includes 1,400 personnel in AG, and SAM units. Does not include 10,000 personnel in three AAA divisions subordinate to Army Artillery Command, but under operational control of Air Force for air defense.
Chinese ground forces continued to show some progress in divisional type weapons and the Air Force registered an increase in the number of its aircraft. Additional MIG-19 aircraft were acquired.

The Navy remained essentially a coastal defense force, but China demonstrated a growing shipbuilding technology and capability despite shortages of high quality steel and other items necessary to construct modern ships. Construction emphasis was still on submarines and small patrol craft, but two new SO-1 type large guided missile patrol boats were completed, and two new destroyer escorts were completed with others under construction in 1966.

NORTH VIETNAM

North Vietnam's Army strength increased significantly in 1966. Some of these troops were used to bring existing units up to full strength and some were used to fulfill increased manpower requirements in the greatly expanded air defense system. Surface-to-air missiles were deployed in key areas. Radar support was well balanced and consisted of early warning, ground control intercept, antiaircraft artillery fire-control, and surface-to-air missile acquisition and control radars. The increased sophistication, proficiency of operators, and mobility (or apparent mobility) of some of this equipment added problems in locating and destroying it, or even applying successful electronic measures to counter its effectiveness. The size and complexity of these systems was additionally enhanced by effective operational use of electronic counter-countermeasures.

Modern jet aircraft operated from Phuc Yen, Kep, and Gia Lam, with possibly 40 jet fighters on standby in Southern China.

NORTH KOREA

The USSR provided new aircraft and ground equipment to North Korea as a result of a 1965 military aid agreement. Operational deployment of SA-2 surface-to-air missiles, which was first observed in 1963, had expanded to nine sites by the end of 1966.
COMMANDER IN CHIEF PACIFIC AND STAFF

Diagram of organizational chart showing relationships and personnel within the Pacific Command.
ACTIVITIES TO IMPROVE THE CINCPAC STAFF ORGANIZATION

THE CINCPAC STAFF

(☞) The accelerating 1966 tempo of PACOM activity and CINCPAC's increasing responsibilities maintained a persistent pressure on the available resources of staff personnel. Obtaining timely manpower support was a continuing problem, in part because procedures were essentially unchanged from peacetime. This required a continuing manipulation of on-board personnel and levies on the Services for temporary duty personnel to meet the ever-increasing workload.

(☞) This situation did not enhance CINCPAC's capability to accomplish his mission, and it tended to degrade the Services' capabilities to meet their requirements, which were also increasing. The extent of changes within the CINCPAC staff is portrayed in the following tables entitled "Status of CINCPAC Joint Manpower Program" and "Growth of CINCPAC Staff Divisions."

### STATUS OF CINCPAC JOINT MANPOWER PROGRAM

<table>
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<tr>
<th></th>
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<th>Approved Effective 1 Jul 67</th>
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<td>1,128</td>
<td>1,175</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Command and Control System Group</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>146</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PACOM Map Data Center</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>37</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Airborne Command Post</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PACOM ELINT Center (Component furnished)</td>
<td></td>
<td>149</td>
<td>151</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>714</td>
<td>1,515</td>
<td>1,590</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**GROWTH OF CINCPAC STAFF DIVISIONS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DIVISION</th>
<th>1 JANUARY 1966</th>
<th>31 DECEMBER 1966</th>
<th>Percent Change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>OFF</td>
<td>ENL</td>
<td>CIV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CINCPAC</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chief of Staff</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DC of S, Ops</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DC of S, Mil Assist, Log, Admin</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint Secretariat</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personnel Div</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intelligence Div</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operations Div</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Logistics Div</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plans Div</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comm &amp; Elect Div</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Performance Eval Group</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comptroller</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legal Affairs</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Affairs</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protocol</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medical</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JSTPS</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cmm &amp; Control System Group*</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Def Lan Gp, Indonesia</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>395</td>
<td>452</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cmm &amp; Control System Group</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abn CP</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PACOM Map Data Center</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>GRAND TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>445</td>
<td>486</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Removed from JTD and included in total below for 31 Dec 66 calculation.
UNCLASSIFIED

INCREASES IN THE CINCPAC JOINT TABLE OF DISTRIBUTION (JTD)

(U) CINCPAC JTD authorizations at the beginning of 1966 totaled 910 spaces. Various changes throughout the year resulted in an increase of 218 spaces for an end-year total of 1,128. These changes resulted from both a requirement to have programmed spaces approved earlier than scheduled and the addition of spaces as a result of an unprogrammed requirement caused by mission changes. Early in the year it was determined to augment the Data Communications Terminal as a result of a requirement placed on CINCPAC to forward certain data to higher headquarters. The JCS approved the action in February 1966. ¹

(U) Also in February the JCS approved the establishment of both the Western Pacific Transportation Office (WTO) with an authorized strength of 20² and the Special Operations Center, Pacific Command (SOCPAC) with a strength of 22. ³ The WTO had been operating with temporary duty personnel, but with the ever-increasing workload involved in air and sealift transportation, a permanent activity was required with sections operating in Yokohama and Tachikawa, Japan and in the RVN.

(U) In April the JCS, at CINCPAC's request, approved the deletion of the Command and Control System Group from the CINCPAC JTD and established it as a separate JTD activity of CINCPAC. It was authorized 67 spaces; 37 were transferred from the CINCPAC JTD and 30 new spaces were authorized for a total of 24 officers, 14 enlisted, and 29 civilians. ⁴ In July the JCS approved 53 additional spaces for a total of 120 spaces. ⁵ Additionally in April, the JCS approved an increase of 87 billets originally programmed for FY 68. These spaces were throughout the staff. ⁶

¹ JCS 3521/091632Z Feb 66
² JCS 3558/092139Z Feb 66
³ JCS 4798/251936Z Feb 66
⁴ JCS 8109/081723Z Apr 66
⁵ JCS 5931/052130Z and 5933/052151Z Jul 66
⁶ JCS 9583/282102Z Apr 66
PROJECTED MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS

(U) On 21 January 1966, CINCPAC submitted his projected manpower requirements for FY 68 through FY 72. This submission reflected a total requirement of 1,183 personnel for FY 68 and a projected requirement of 1,192 through FY 72.

KEY STAFF OFFICER RANK INCREASES

(☐) On 18 February 1966 Admiral Sharp recommended upping the rank of his Assistant Chiefs of Staff and certain other senior staff officers. One reason was that the expanded military effort and buildup in Southeast Asia had caused added CINCPAC responsibilities and missions. Also the staff numbered almost 1,000 officers and men, a total that approximated mobilization strength. CINCPAC therefore considered that the increased responsibilities of the Assistant Chiefs of Staff were sufficient to require experience and capacities normally associated with officers of higher rank.

(☐) The recommended changes included making the Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations an Air Force brigadier general (07) position to help carry the greatly increased management workload. To maintain Service balance in key Operations Division positions, the Deputy for Operational Plans and Analysis would be changed to an Army colonel vice an Air Force colonel, and the billet would be redesignated as Assistant Deputy for Operational Plans and Analysis. The Deputy for Current Operations would remain a Navy captain (06) but be redesignated as Assistant Deputy for Current Operations.

(☒) Admiral Sharp considered that upgrading the Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff for Plans billet to an Army brigadier general was justified by the increased planning task imposed on CINCPAC as a result of the additional requirements and deployments originating in the Southeast Asia situation.

1. CINCPAC ltr ser 054, Subj: Joint Manpower Requirements FY 68, 21 Jan 66
2. CINCPAC 180145Z Feb 66; JCS 7109/282016Z Mar 66
(C) The staff structure reflected in CINCPAC's recommendations and subsequent approval by the JCS was as follows:

**Assistant Chiefs of Staff**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Service</th>
<th>Rank</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Personnel</td>
<td>USA</td>
<td>Brigadier General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intelligence</td>
<td>USAF</td>
<td>Major General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operations</td>
<td>USMC</td>
<td>Major General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deputy Assistant</td>
<td>USAF</td>
<td>Brigadier General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Logistics</td>
<td>USA</td>
<td>Major General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plans</td>
<td>USN</td>
<td>Rear Admiral (upper half)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deputy</td>
<td>USA</td>
<td>Colonel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communications</td>
<td>USAF</td>
<td>Major General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Electronics</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**STAFF REORGANIZATIONS AND AUGMENTATIONS**

(U) CINCPAC's effort to obtain optimum value from the limited manpower resources available to him resulted in numerous minor staff reorganizations in 1966. Some new organizational elements were established and some old ones augmented, reflecting the rapidly increasing diversity and volume of staff work. The more significant of these new or modified organizational elements are described below.

**Joint Secretariat**

**Headquarters Personnel Branch and Area Clearance Office**

(U) Two new staff elements were formed under the Joint Secretariat with the transfer of certain functions from the Personnel Division. ¹ The new Headquarters Personnel Branch consisted of Army, Navy, and Air Force sections to advise on and coordinate all military personnel actions concerning the CINCPAC staff. ² Branch personnel coordinated all staff requests for manpower or organizational changes with the Personnel Division, and then requisitioned, coordinated

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1. JI Memo/0166-66, 5 Aug 66
2. Also concerning military personnel assigned to the Defense Liaison Group in Indonesia and the Military Equipment Delivery Team in Burma.
assignments for, and oriented new military personnel. The branch was responsible for personal services and personal affairs matters, as well as awards, decorations, or other commendations originating in or referred to CINCPAC.

(U) The new Area Clearance Office coordinated travel authority clearance for the increasing number of visitors to PACOM, and maintained and coordinated changes to the Foreign Clearance Guide.

Personnel Division

(U) As a result of a Chief of Staff memo in May 1966, a study was made to identify those internal administrative and personnel functions being performed by the Personnel Division that could be transferred to the Joint Secretariat. After considerable study and coordination a proposal was made on 5 August to reorient the functions and duties of the Personnel Division and reassign certain administrative support tasks to the Joint Secretariat.

(U) Admiral Sharp approved the proposed reorganization on 17 August 1966, thereby relieving the Personnel Division of all personnel actions involving CINCPAC staff military personnel and allowing it to devote full time and attention to its primary missions. The transfer of administrative personnel and tasks, and the establishment of a Plans and Policy Branch, a Personnel Operations Branch, a Manpower Management Branch, and a Civilian Personnel Branch were completed on 1 September 1966.

Intelligence Division

Mapping, Charting, and Geodesy (MC & G) Branch Formed

(U) MC & G requirements in PACOM, particularly in Southeast Asia, more than doubled in the 18 months prior to May 1966. The complexity of MC & G problems created by the rapidly changing situation in PACOM required a staff modification.
(U) On 20 September 1966 an MC & G Branch was established in the Intelligence Division, partially staffed by personnel of the MC & G/Air Target Materials Section of the Target Intelligence Branch, which it replaced. The new branch provided the staff capability for CINCPAC to direct MC & G and related oceanographic activities in PACOM in accordance with a Defense Department directive. To further assist CINCPAC and his staff, the branch maintained a current and comprehensive map catalog library and samples of MC & G products and materials available on the PACOM area.

Operations Division

Special Operations Center, Pacific Command (SOCPAC)

SOCPAC was established in Okinawa as part of the CINCPAC Operations Division at the end of 1965. The initial manning of this facility was by temporary duty personnel who were to be replaced by permanent personnel at a later date as spaces were authorized.

During the review of the CINCPAC proposed JTD for SOCPAC, the JCS raised the question of adequate Navy representation at the policy level. CINCPAC's comments were solicited and after consulting his component commanders, he proposed certain changes that would place a Navy-Marine officer vice an Army officer as chief of the SOCPAC Logistics Plans Section. Additionally, the SOCPAC deputy commander position would be manned on a rotational basis by Air Force or Navy-Marine personnel. This arrangement was approved by the JCS on 25 February 1966.

1. CINCPAC Staff Notice 3800, 28 Oct 66; J2 History, Oct 66
2. DOD Directive 5105.27, Defense Intelligence Agency - Mapping, Charting, and Geodesy
3. CINCPAC Command History 1965, p 516
4. CINCPAC 192221Z Jan 66; CINCPACFLT 310332Z Dec 65; CINCUSARPAC 322/070258Z Jan 66; JCS 251936Z Feb 66
PACOM Environmental Group Established

(U) CINCPAC in September 1966 established in his Operations Division staff an Environmental Group for the Pacific Command to centralize and coordinate all meteorological and oceanographic matters of concern to him. As the Army, Navy, Air Force, and the Environmental Science Service Administration (ESSA)¹ were all involved in environmental services, CINCPAC wanted standardization and cooperation, wherever possible, in the interest of economy and efficiency.

(U) The Environmental Group, while encouraging free exchange of information among the component commands and non-military agencies, was charged with keeping CINCPAC's interests in the foreground. Membership in the group consisted of a CINCPAC-designated chairman and one member and one alternate member each from CINCUSARPAC, CINCPACFLT, CINCPACAF, and the ESSA (one ESSA representative to be from the Weather Bureau, the other from the Coast and Geodetic Survey).² The group also had three committees, which concerned themselves with communications, automatic data processing, and climatology. The new group had no specific connection with the JCS Joint Meteorological Committee as previous CINCPAC meteorological elements had had.

(U) The data the scientists collected and analyzed often had both military and civil applications. ESSA services, for example, served civil purposes primarily, but often also helped fulfill military requirements. Free exchange of information stimulated all collectors while avoiding duplication of effort. In 1966 for example, a worldwide tropical analysis was in progress, a study of all ocean areas from the equator to 20° North. The Air Force, Navy, and Weather Bureau were all collecting data that would have vast military and commercial applications.

(U) Collection procedures and equipment had become more and more sophisticated, but of particular use to the environmental scientist was the development of computers to process, analyze, and relate tremendous amounts of isolated information.

1. An agency of the Department of Commerce.
2. CINCPACINST 5420.9E, 20 Sep 66
Cooperation, as stimulated by the Environmental Group, was particularly useful in the case of the most violent weather feature of the Pacific, the typhoon. When a weather satellite found an incipient typhoon, Air Force and Navy aircraft observed and reported its severity, course, and speed. If it approached a foreign country, the US Weather Bureau directly warned that country of the danger, just as US Forces or installations were alerted. Cooperation among all interested agencies concerning typhoons continued to improve.

The Environmental Group had been directed to conduct an annual typhoon conference (the first scheduled for early 1967) and an annual oceanographic conference. The group was also directed to review and discuss environmental matters that would be significant in policy making and advise CINCPAC or his component commanders as necessary.

Research and Development Section Established

The work required of CINCPAC's research and development advisor had increased to such an extent that on 10 April CINCPAC proposed to the JCS that a Research and Development Section be formed. Following an exchange of messages with the JCS, CINCPAC was authorized to create such a section, to be headed by an 06, a position specifically designated as rotational among the Services. The initial Section Chief was an Army colonel; other members were to be one 05 from each of the other three Services.

A description of some of the activities of the section is contained in other parts of this Chapter entitled "Research and Development Activities in CINCPAC and COMUSMACV" and "Deseret Test Center Activities."

1. CINCPAC 100137Z Apr 66
2. JCS 6507/122053Z Jul 66
3. The Navy and Marine officers had not arrived at CINCPAC Headquarters by the end of 1966; they were expected early in 1967.
Joint Reconnaissance Center Augmented

(1) In July it became a matter of urgency to augment CINCPAC's Joint Reconnaissance Center and Associated Intelligence Capability to provide a single authority for the integration of all reconnaissance operations in PACOM. This would provide a capability for a 24-hour Reconnaissance Center operation, and furnish the manpower to manage and provide direction for reconnaissance performed within PACOM.

(1) The augmentation was approved by the JCS on 30 November and resulted in a net increase of 22 personnel spaces.1

Escape and Evasion Officer Billet Added

(1) Acting in response to a CINCPAC request, the JCS authorized the addition of an Escape and Evasion Officer billet in the Air Operations Branch. This officer was responsible for staff actions pertaining to evasion, escape, and personnel recovery operations in Southeast Asia conducted under the direction of the Joint Personnel Recovery Center in Vietnam. He was also responsible for the joint service aspects of survival, evasion, resistance, and escape requirements in PACOM.

Airborne Command Post Communications Officer Spaces Added

(2) In response to a CINCPAC request,2 on 8 March the JCS authorized the addition of nine communications officer spaces for the Airborne Command Post. This established a total authorization of 24 Army, 19 Navy, 26 Air Force, and 8 Marine spaces for a total of 77.3 JTD additions were also approved subsequently for one Air Force 06 and one 05 plus one civilian.4,5

1. JCS 6443/112259Z Jul 66; CINCPAC 210141Z Sep 66; JCS 9223/302231Z Nov 66. By early February 1967 a sufficient number of officers was in place to commence continuous operation of the Joint Reconnaissance Center.
2. CINCPAC 082239Z Jun 65
3. JCS 5548/081522Z Mar 66
4. JCS 9905/031625Z May 66
5. JCS 8697/233058Z Nov 66
Logistics Division

Munitions Branch

(U) Concurrent with the delegation of authority to CINCPAC to exercise control over air munitions in PACOM, ¹ CINCPAC established a Munitions Branch (J47) to perform associated functions. The branch was manned initially with personnel drawn from other Logistics Division branches and with temporary duty personnel provided by the Services, pending approval of JTD additions by the JCS and Service manning action. The branch was organized as follows:

Munitions Control Section: (U) This section was charged with the task of monitoring distribution of air munitions and taking action to redistribute in-theatre and production munitions assets to meet CINCPAC allocations.

Plans and Procedures Section: (U) This section was charged with the task of developing the means to obtain required munitions information inputs, data handling capabilities, and report preparation, taking maximum advantage of existing automatic data processing capability.

Transportation Section: (U) This section was charged with the task of monitoring the shipment of and obtaining information on air munitions from pipeline origin to destination.

Logistic Readiness Center (LRC): (U) The LRC served as a focal point of logistic information inputs, receiving information from numerous sources and displaying it for staff use. The bulk of its effort was devoted to supporting the management of air munitions. Initially operating on a 24 hour-a-day basis, by the end of the year the LRC was operating on a normal work schedule.

Transportation Branch Established

(U) The growing volume and importance of transportation activity in the PACOM resulted in creation of a Transportation Branch on 17 November 1966. ² Personnel from the former Transportation Section of Logistics Plans Branch formed the new branch, which consisted of

1. JCS 142345Z Apr 66
2. J4 History, Nov 66
Surface and Air Transportation Sections and a Plans and Special Projects Section. The new branch monitored activities of the WTO, the Pacific Movements Priority Control Agency, the PACOM Household Goods Management Agency, and the PACOM Joint Transportation Board, among other staff work.

**PACOM Joint Transportation Board (JTB) Established**

(U) In August CINCPAC established the PACOM JTB to assure optimum use of all theater transportation resources in meeting CINCPAC objectives. Patterned after similar organizations in the JCS and EUCOM, the newly established JTB began to review PACOM transportation capabilities and requirements including both Military Sea Transport Service and Military Airlift Command resources in the theater. The first JTB meeting was held at CINCPAC Headquarters on 22 September.

(U) The JTB maintained a continuing review of the existing and predicted balance between capabilities and requirements in air and surface transportation, concentrating on attempting to forecast problems so that corrective action could be taken rapidly. CINCPAC encouraged other agencies, including the WTO, the PACOM Movement Priorities Control Agency, transportation operating agencies, and component and subordinate unified commands, to take any and all corrective action necessary to work out operating or planning problems. In a similar sense CINCPAC urged all PACOM agencies to bring to the JTB those problems that they could not resolve.

(U) CINCPAC directed high level participation on the board by component and subordinate commands. CINCPAC's Assistant Chief of Staff for Logistics was chairman; other members included CINCPAC's Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations and the principal logistics officers of the component and subordinate commands.

(U) The second JTB meeting was held 10 November 1966 and the third meeting was scheduled for 19 January 1967.

1. CINCPAC 172353Z Aug 66
2. CINCPACINST 4600.5, 18 Aug 66
3. CINCPAC 220404Z Oct 66
AID Representation at WTO

(Official) As a result of detailed discussions in Yokohama between Agency for International Development (AID) and WTO personnel, CINCPAC recommended to the JCS\(^1\) that AID Washington defer assignment of liaison personnel to CHWTO on a full time basis. He had determined that current essential liaison and coordination could be accomplished by part time service from the AID Far East Regional Logistics representative.\(^2\) Information received informally from the JCS indicated that AID, Washington concurred in the CINCPAC recommendation.

Procurement Officer Billet Established

(U) Under the provisions of JCS Publication 2, CINCPAC was responsible for procurement policies within PACOM. At the beginning of 1966, however, there was no staff element specifically tasked to perform this function. Meanwhile, concurrent with the troop and construction increases in Southeast Asia, the level and scope of offshore procurement were greatly expanded to compensate for the time lag in the CONUS supply systems and to use the most available sources for supply items needed to meet urgent operational needs.

(U) With JCS approval, CINCPAC established in May a Procurement Officer position (Army, 05).\(^3\) This officer was responsible for monitoring, supervising, and coordinating the activities of CINCPAC's newly established General Purchasing Agency System, which is discussed in greater detail later in this Chapter.

Plans Division

Plans Analysis Branch Established

(Official) The Plans Analysis Branch was established during 1966 to serve as central coordinating agency for the development, maintenance, and utilization of a computer-assisted planning operation. Cognizance of this branch included actions and projects which cut across the board.

1. CINCPAC 210108Z Aug 66
2. J4 History Aug 66
3. CINCPAC 082020Z May 66; JCS 2827/251533Z May 66

53
into the functions and responsibilities of all Plans Division branches and sections, but in a capacity not previously utilized or available, i.e., computerization of plans.

(‡) A year's planning and programming experience had revealed a need for computerization of the maze of material in order to provide for continuous updating and to display trends and indicators of progress in a format understandable for plans analysis.

(‡) The branch was initially headed by a Navy 06, but the Service could be rotated if desired.¹

Comptroller

Special Programs Branch Established

(U) In July 1966 the Secretary of Defense initiated a program to counter inflationary trends in South Vietnam. Quantity ceilings and annual targets were established for Defense Department piaster expenditures to include both official expenditures for materials and services and the accommodation rates of exchange for personal spending. CINCPAC was charged with management of this Piaster Spending Reduction Program, which also required establishment and maintenance of a reporting system to meet PACOM needs and Defense Department reporting requirements. To develop a capability to analyze information and formulate policies and decisions necessary to reduce piaster spending in South Vietnam, CINCPAC established a Special Programs Branch in the Office of the Comptroller.

(U) Nine additional personnel were required. Authority for these additional spaces was requested on 30 July and approved by the JCS on 13 September.²

(U) The Piaster Spending Reduction Program had two distinct aspects: the first consisted of measures taken to reduce piaster spending; the second was a reporting system to monitor the program's effectiveness. Some of the measures implemented in 1966 to reduce piaster spending

1. CINCPAC 082020Z May 66; JCS 2827/251533Z May 66
2. JCS 2502/131958Z Sep 66
included: reduction of in-country procurement of materials in direct support of the US effort; movement of US personnel from private housing into US-supported cantonments; encouragement of increased participation in the Personal Savings Program, US Bond purchases, and out-of-country rest and recuperation; and an increase in the availability of military exchange merchandise.

(Ø) CINCPAC furnished reporting instructions in December.\(^1\) The reporting system provided the several levels of command with management-type information to permit them to administer the program more effectively. Since the program's institution, the combined effort at all levels of command had resulted in a gradual reduction of per capita plaster expenditures despite a constant increase in troop strength.

**Medical**

**Medical Staff Changes**

(Ø) There was a time when much of the CINCPAC/CINCPACFLT staff was integrated, but most of these arrangements terminated in 1957 with the move of the CINCPAC staff to Camp H. M. Smith. The joint aspect of health and medical problems of the PACOM was relatively small, so the CINCPACFLT medical staff continued to provide medical staff support to CINCPAC without detriment or undue burden to either command.

(Ø) The health and medical problems associated with the expanded Southeast Asia buildup were of such magnitude, however, that in March 1966 CINCPAC recommended early augmentation of the medical staff. This was approved by the JCS in late April, thus providing multi-service representation on the CINCPAC medical staff.\(^2\)

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1. CINCPAC 070016Z Dec 66
2. CINCPAC 172312Z Mar 66; JCS 9583/282102Z Apr 66
KEY STAFF PERSONNEL CHANGES

DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF FOR MILITARY ASSISTANCE, LOGISTICS, AND ADMINISTRATION

(U) Rear Admiral George Washington Pressey's long and distinguished service ended with his death on 21 April 1966 after a short period of illness. Admiral Pressey was graduated from the United States Naval Academy in June 1932. He graduated from the Armed Forces Staff College in 1947 and the National War College in 1954. His honors included the Distinguished Service Medal (posthumously awarded), the Legion of Merit with gold star in lieu of a second award, the Bronze Star with combat "V" and gold star in lieu of a second award, and the Navy Commendation Medal with combat "V." Admiral Pressey's service medals included the China ribbon with star, American Defense with afloat device, Asiatic-Pacific ribbon with eleven stars, American Theater, European-African Theater, World War II Victory, Navy Occupation Medal for Europe, National Defense Service Medal, Korean Theater with three stars, United Nations Medal, Philippine Liberation Medal with one star, and the Korean Presidential Unit Citation.

(U) Brigadier General Frank C. White, USA, acted as Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Assistance, Logistics, and Administration from 22 April until relieved by Rear Admiral Nels C. Johnson, USN, on 16 May. Admiral Johnson's previous assignment was with the Joint Staff of the JCS.

ASSISTANT CHIEFS OF STAFF

(U) Colonel John C. Barney, Jr., USA, relieved Colonel C. E. Stuart, USA, as Assistant Chief of Staff for Personnel on 14 July. Rear Admiral Ralph W. Cousins, USN, relieved Rear Admiral Donald Gay, USN, as Assistant Chief of Staff for Plans on 31 October.

JOINT STRATEGIC TARGET PLANNING STAFF

(U) Captain Howard S. Moore, USN, relieved Rear Admiral Joseph A. Japp, USN, as CINCPAC Representative on 27 May.
DIRECTOR OF PROTOCOL

(U) Colonel Peter H. Hahn, USMC, relieved Colonel John W. Ireland, USMC, on 25 July.

POLITICAL ADVISER

(U) Minister Norman B. Hannah departed 19 July, and Deputy Political Adviser Charles C. Flowerree acted as Political Adviser until Minister Robert A. Fearey assumed this post on 4 August.

MEDICAL OFFICER

(U) Rear Admiral John S. Cowan (MC), USN, relieved Rear Admiral Walter Welham (MC), USN, on 6 September.

PACIFIC COMMAND OPERATIONS LIAISON OFFICE

(U) Captain W. E. Clark, USN, relieved Colonel Francis E. Wingett, USAF, as Officer in Charge on 18 August.
CINCPAC ACTIVITIES TO IMPROVE COMMAND FACILITIES AND COMMAND AND CONTROL PROCEDURES

CINCPAC ALTERNATE COMMAND CENTERS REDESIGNATED

(6) CINCPAC redesignated the alternate command centers in July to provide them with more meaningful names. Functions did not change, nor did the name of the CINCPAC Command Center at Camp Smith. The command center [redacted] became the CINCPAC Alternate Command Center. The Guam facility, which was maintained by COMNAVMIANAS for CINCPAC, was redesignated the CINCPAC Emergency Alternate Command Center. BLUE EAGLE, the flying command post, was renamed the CINCPAC Airborne Command Post. 2

BLUE EAGLE, THE CINCPAC AIRBORNE COMMAND POST SYSTEM

(9) The Airborne Command Post for CINCPAC, code name BLUE EAGLE, achieved the milestone of 10,000 hours of continuous airborne watch on 25 November 1966, and continued to advance in capability and effectiveness. 3

(8) BLUE EAGLE, a highly survivable command and control system capable of receiving direction from the next higher echelon of authority and directing PACOM forces [redacted] in a general war, 4 was designated the primary alternate command element for CINCPAC by Admiral Sharp on 15 January 1966. 5

(9) During routine operations (Defense Readiness Conditions (DEFCON) 5 and 4) each of the nine authorized Battle Staff Teams

1. The Kunia facility was formerly known as the CINCPAC Operations Center or CINCPAC Advance. The Guam facility was formerly called the Pacific Alternate Command and most recently the Primary Alternate Command Center. BLUE EAGLE was called the Primary Emergency Alternate Command Post prior to the July change.
2. CINCPAC 020236Z Jul 66
3. CINCPAC Command History 1965, p 31; J3 History, Nov 66
4. [redacted]
5. CINCPAC ltr ser 0083, Subj: CY 66 Command, Control and Communications Review, submission of, 15 Jan 66

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consisted of six officers and two enlisted men, headed by an O6 as Battle Staff commander. An average of three deployments a month were conducted to Western Pacific support facilities in Japan, Okinawa, and the Philippines. Under DEFCON 3, increased alert and scheduling of additional back-up aircraft was to be initiated with the possibility of a general or flag officer being ordered aboard by CINCPAC. Under DEFCON 2 or higher, a general or flag officer would be ordered aboard and consideration would be given to the dispersal of aircraft and battle staffs. The feasibility of ingress to the Airborne Command Post by a general or flag officer on short notice, and emergency deployment to the primary dispersal airfield at Hilo, Hawaii were initially demonstrated in a successful drill on 17 June 1966. 1

(5) As part of a continuing program to improve the communications capability of the five EC-135P aircraft assigned, one was sent to CONUS for installation of a secure teletype. After this installation it returned to Hawaii on 13 July. 2 All five aircraft were scheduled to be equipped with secure teletype by March 1967. Secure voice and low frequency and very low frequency capabilities were also planned.

COMMAND CENTER BUILDING, CAMP SMITH

(U) There was substantial progress toward realizing the new three-story Command Center requested by CINCPAC in December 1965. 3 The project was authorized and funded in March 1966, design was completed 16 May, and the construction contract was awarded 27 July. Ground breaking took place on 10 August, and for the balance of the year the cramped space available at the site was crowded with construction crews and heavy equipment.

(U) At the end of the year it was expected that the new facility would be ready for occupancy in July 1967. This event would be.

1. J3 History, Jun 66
2. J3 History, Jul 66
3. CINCPAC Command History, 1965, pp 33-34
welcomed because of the facility improvement and improved working conditions, as well as for the reduction of pressure on other staff areas in the headquarters buildings.

HAWAIIAN TELEPHONE COMPANY SERVICE BUILDING

(1) Sufficient space to house commercial communications equipment for support of CINCPAC and the Commanding General, FMFPAC was not available. The Hawaiian Telephone Company negotiated a contract with the Defense Commercial Communications Office in 1966 to construct a suitable building near the new Command Center building. Construction was expected to be completed by 15 March 1967.

AUTOMATIC PROCESSING OF COMMAND AND CONTROL INFORMATION

(1) Automatic data processing of command and control information had been under development at CINCPAC since planning began in 1959 for the arrival of the first computer at Kunia in May 1961. Many problems associated with the development of an efficient data processing system had arisen, but by 1966 the CINCPAC staff and personnel of the Fleet Operations Control Center had overcome most deficiencies and created an effective ten-computer operation.

(1) CINCPAC's Fleet Operational Control Center at Kunia was one of the Navy-supported centers whose activities from 1959 to December 1965 were the subject of a 1966 General Accounting Office study.

1. J6 History, Dec 66
2. CINCPAC's Alternate Command Center was located at Kunia, Oahu, about 18 miles from CINCPAC's Headquarters at Camp H. M. Smith. The Kunia facility contained the Fleet Operations Control Center, which manned and operated CINCPAC's principal automatic data processing equipment (and his only such equipment until 1966). The Navy's Command Systems Support Activity provided technical support for CINCPAC's data processing operation. CINCPAC had planned for many years to move his Headquarters to Kunia, but in August 1965 the House Appropriations Committee denied construction funds and the idea was dropped. Plans for improvement of the facilities at CINCPAC's Camp Smith Headquarters have been undertaken instead. (CINCPAC Command History, 1965, p 33; 1964, p 29; 1963, p 23; and 1962, p 15)
3. Nine computers were located at Kunia; one was at Camp Smith.
The JCS asked CINCPAC to comment on the findings and recommendations of this study. His response provided a review of the many recent improvements in his staff's data processing activities.

Program development had presented many problems during the infancy of the Kunia installation. Usually the problems were caused by lack of knowledge or lack of coordination between the CINCPAC staff officer who had a program requirement and the civilian contractor or other program developer, who might "talk over" the program, but who then executed it without further consultation. Too frequently the result was an inadequate or unsatisfactory product. Some projects were outdated before they were completed; some took so long to complete that they were no longer even required; for some the requirement had changed so drastically that the usefulness of the product was significantly diminished. For some projects, manual computation methods actually took less time and effort than was required to accumulate detailed data to put in an automated system, and such manual methods should have been employed.

It was not until about May 1963 that an enlarged PACOM Command and Control System Group on CINCPAC's staff began making dramatic improvements in the management and control required for such complex systems. Because of this group, a CINCPAC staff officer who initiated a program in 1966 had the benefit of professional evaluation before the program was developed. Cost of the proposal was compared to its benefits as an initial step in a feasibility study. Prior to approval of a project for development, the initiator knew the time and manpower that would be required, and the relative priority it would have.

Each CINCPAC staff division had a knowledgeable coordinator for automatic data processing who took an active part in project planning. These coordinators were also involved in data base construction and in information acquisition and maintenance.

1. JCS 8633/231530Z Nov 66
2. ADMINO CINCPAC 060417Z Dec 66
3. CINCPACINST 5230.3, CINCPAC ADP Program, Policy and Guidance for Implementation
An increasing number of programs could be designed and executed completely at the Hawaii facility, and less often was there a need to use the services of commercial contractors or the Navy Command Systems Support Activity. By 1966, projects turned over to the Operations Control Center were normally completed and usable in not more than six months. The Command and Control System Group assigned to each job a project leader, who monitored progress closely. The Group also closely supervised the work of commercial firms under contract to the Navy Command Systems Support Activity.

The General Accounting Office study noted problems associated with the planning for and use of the Kunia computers and their associated equipment. Early in the development of the Operations Control Center the AN/FYK-1 Data Processing System was less than fully effective, largely because contractors failed to deliver the necessary system control programs envisioned in the original concept for the operation. In 1965 and 1966 many actions were taken to improve the operation of the AN/FYK-1, including acquisition of disc utilization programs and of additional tape drives, a tape certifier, a tape cleaner, and a tape degausser as well as improvements to the system's software. These improvements increased the number of tasks that could be performed each day and reduced the number of abnormal terminations and reruns.

CINCPAC installed a new IBM 1410 system at Camp Smith in the fall of 1966. The inadequacies of the AN/FYK-1 contributed to the need for the new command and control system, but other principal reasons for its acquisition were the physical distance of Camp Smith from Kunia, increased activity in Southeast Asia that required a greatly increased volume of data to be quickly processed, an increased load on the computer system at Kunia, and the compatibility of CINCPAC's new equipment with that at the National Military Command Center.

At Kunia, workload nearly exceeded capability, with approximately 85 major information systems in production in 1966. The size and complexity of the data bases for existing programs were constantly increasing, often phenomenally. The 1966 data base,
estimated at about 11.4 billion characters, was projected to increase annually by 5 billion characters.

(?) Problems associated with inadequately trained personnel for the AN/FYK-1 system had been largely resolved. Pre-assignment training programs had been formulated for analysts/programmers, operators, and maintenance personnel, and by November 1966 only fully trained personnel were working on the AN/FYK-1. The General Accounting Office recommended conversion of some positions from military to civilian assignments. Experience at Kunia had shown, however, that civilians in the highly competitive and under-crowded data processing field had not demonstrated a job stability that would contribute to greater continuity of the operation. CINCPAC therefore did not believe that civilization would provide any appreciable increase in work force stability.

(?) Most of the findings and recommendations in the General Accounting Office report had long before been acknowledged and mostly corrected by CINCPAC and his staff. At the end of 1966, automatic data processing operations were timely and effective.

(U) One example of the use of computers by the CINCPAC staff is described later in this Chapter, "Automatic Data Processing of Logistic Planning Requirements."
JOINT PLANNING PROGRAM

JOINT LONG-RANGE STRATEGIC STUDY FY 77-86

The JCS prepared certain basic joint planning documents annually: a strategic plan for objectives and another for capabilities, an intelligence estimate for planning, a research and development objectives document, and a strategic study. The last named of these, the Joint Long-Range Strategic Study, was the document in which the JCS presented their views on the anticipated threat to the United States and utilization of US military power during a 10-year period that began 10 years from the time the study was prepared. The Joint Long-Range Strategic Study FY 77-86, prepared in 1966, contained items of special PACOM interest that were to be considered by CINCPAC and his staff and component commanders in the preparation of longer-range policies, programs, estimates, and plans, particularly recommendations for the Joint Strategic Objectives Plan FY 69-76. Highlighted below are some of those items of special CINCPAC interest.

A diffusion of alliances and groupings of nations would continue, to include a progressive widening of the Sino-Soviet rift, a weakening of NATO, and a SEATO "with little meaning" by 1980 but for which, by that time, no satisfactory substitute was considered practicable.

A rate of population growth in Asia and Oceania that would continue to exceed the rate of economic growth, providing numerous opportunities for continued conflict, which Communist China would continue to exploit for its expansion.

A world power structure that would consist of two "super" powers, the United States and the USSR; two formidable lesser power centers, Western Europe and Communist China; and three nations with the potential to become formidable powers: India, Brazil, and Japan. Japan, by 1980, would be a strong, prosperous, and assertive nation seeking increasing military self-sufficiency and independence.

1. JCS PM-85, 23 Sep 66, CPRS 210-66
2. JCS 1920/18, 27 Jul 66, CPRS 000582-66
The three specific priority threats defined were, first, the USSR's strategic nuclear war posture and surprise attack capabilities. Second, Communist China as a disruptive element in underdeveloped countries and a military threat in Asia. A weak economic base, however, would prevent significant growth of China's conventional land, sea, or air forces. China's ICBM capability was not greatly emphasized in the study, but it was considered that it could be a "hostage-seeking threat on a global basis." Third, the susceptibility of the world's underdeveloped areas to USSR and Chinese communist subversion efforts.

Tasks and roles for US military power included the following:

Military forces would have secondary roles in "non-war" diplomatic, economic, and sociological-political activities.

The United States should strive for a preeminent military role in the increasingly important ocean areas.

Uncertainties in US-USSR or USSR-Communist China relationships in a possible US-Communist China confrontation required a China-oriented strategic nuclear deterrent and ICBM defense that would pose no threat to the USSR.

Increased US presence in the Indian Ocean areas might become necessary prior to 1980.

A major US military role in Asia would continue to be needed because of the threat from Communist China and the weakness and lack of cohesiveness of the non-communist Asian states.

While the most serious specific threat to the United States would continue to be intercontinental nuclear warfare, it was the kind of warfare least likely to occur. Insurgency would remain the form most likely to be encountered through the 1980 decade.
JOINT STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES PLAN FY 69-76

The Joint Strategic Objectives Plan (JSOP) was the key document in which the JCS presented their strategic appraisal of the threat to the United States, translated national security objectives and policies into military objectives, and defined the strategic concepts and force levels required to fulfill the objectives and meet the threat. It was the basic planning document for the Services and the unified and specified commands and it had an important relationship to the upcoming defense budget. It also provided advice to the Secretary of Defense for development of the Department's budget and provided justification for mid-range major force objectives. The JSOP for FY 69-76 was to be published in two volumes. Volume I contained the current strategic concepts to be used for development of US force recommendations that would be published in Volume II early in 1967.

Several items or concepts in Volume I were of particular interest to CINCPAC. There was no significant change in the statement of national or military objectives. Deterrence, collective security, and flexible response were stated to be the basic elements of the national strategic concept. Flexible response was stressed in terms of the application of clear and controllable force increments that could be increased or decreased as necessary in any degree or level of warfare. For Asia, the basic tenet of US military strategy was containment. Minimum overall defense requirements in the event of war with Communist China or the USSR were stated, but a more forward defense line on the Asian continent itself was also envisioned. The plan reflected the growing Chinese communist threat, assessed the Sino-Soviet rift, and gave increased recognition to conditions in Asia as they affected the interests and security of the United States.

1. JCS PM-84, 23 Sep 66, CPRS 210-66
2. An annual publication, the JSOP covered an eight-year period beginning on 1 July two years subsequent to the fiscal year in which it was prepared.
Volume II, Analysis and Force Tabulations, encompassed all US Forces worldwide, but did not distribute them geographically. For this reason, while CINCPAC rationale and risk statements were reflected in the published document, specific CINCPAC force proposals were not identifiable.\footnote{1}

Annex J (Free World Forces), JSOP 69-76

Annex J provided a current estimate of PACOM Free World major force levels required to support US national objectives. From these force levels could be derived the military basis for the establishment of a US position on military assistance, and, as appropriate, the development of US and applicable allied mid-range plans.\footnote{2}

CINCPAC's 1966 submission\footnote{3} of Annex J did not vary a great deal in content from the FY 68-75 proposed Annex J. There were adjustments of forces reflecting updating or modernization of equipment, particularly within the forces of those countries directly involved with the United States in the conflict in Southeast Asia. The most noticeable changes to the new Annex J were the requirements for CINCPAC to assign to certain of the PACOM Free World countries a relative standing as to their importance to the execution of US military strategy, and to establish military assistance\footnote{4} priorities to PACOM Free World countries and their forces requiring US military assistance.

\footnote{1}{Additional material on the JSOP 69-76 is maintained in the CINCPAC History Branch file 66-2.}
\footnote{2}{SM-648-66, 6 Aug 66, CPRS 00427-66}
\footnote{3}{CINCPAC ser 001742, 26 Oct 66}
\footnote{4}{JCS 102159Z Oct 66}
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JOINT STRATEGIC CAPABILITIES PLAN FY 67

The Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) for FY 67 contained major revisions and significant changes to the FY 66 plan. The JSCP was the planning directive from the JCS to the commanders of unified commands for the execution of military tasks and conduct of operations. It was revised once a year and was effective for one fiscal year. Highlighted below are some of the FY 67 plan revisions and changes of particular interest to CINCPAC. 1

In the statement of the threat, North Vietnam's capability and willingness to commit sizeable land forces against US Forces were recognized.

The discussion of the communist attitude toward war indicated that Soviet military leaders were showing an increasing interest in developing a capability for distant operations. Differences in USSR and Chinese communist military dogma were highlighted. Specific Chinese communist objectives were added, and the fact that the Chinese communists were making a major nuclear effort was emphasized.

According to the plan, the conflict in Southeast Asia reduced US strategic alternatives in the deployment of general purpose forces. The manner in which operations would be conducted in Southeast Asia was delineated more clearly than before. During general war, the internal defense of Korea and Southeast Asia would be accomplished principally by previously deployed US Forces, with the assistance of allied and indigenous forces.

CINCPAC tasks, particularly those pertaining to Southeast Asia, were expanded in number and detail. Indonesia, which had been dropped from the FY 66 plan, was added to the list of countries for which CINCPAC must prepare a plan for support of internal uprisings and revolutions. CINCPAC must also plan to support pro-Western elements in Indonesia to resist communist control. Plans were also

1. J5/Memo/00040-66; Subj: Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan, FY 67; 2 Feb 66
ALTERNATIVE US MILITARY STRATEGIES FOR COMMUNIST CHINA

In January 1966 the Chairman of the JCS directed his Special Studies Group to evaluate the military feasibility of limited-objective offensives against the China Mainland as alternatives in countering a Chinese invasion of Southeast Asia.

On 31 March, CINCPAC directed that a similar study be conducted within PACOM by an ad hoc study group, and that it be completed prior to the CJCS study so that it might contribute to that group's deliberations. Following a 14 June briefing by his committee, CINCPAC referred the study to his component commanders, whose major recommendations were included in the report that was forwarded to the JCS on 19 July.

The CINCPAC committee's study reflected the following thoughts. The problem was to develop and evaluate alternate strategies for limited-objective offensive operations against Communist China in response to intervention in Southeast Asia by significant Chinese forces. The objectives were limited to causing the withdrawal of those forces, not the defeat or surrender of China. US Force requirements were developed within the concepts of the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan, and allowed for retention of US capability to fulfill force commitments elsewhere in the world.

It was assumed that the USSR would not respond with military forces and that Japan would permit the use of US bases there for logistic purposes. It was also assumed that there would be restraints, just as there were restraints in the Vietnam War. Targeting constraints and a piecemeal US buildup in Vietnam had been at least partly the result of

1. CINCPAC Memorandum 00186-66, 31 Mar 66
2. The committee was headed by Colonel E. J. Hanigan, Jr., USAF, of CINCPAC's Plans Division.
3. CINCPAC ltr ser 000296, 19 Jul 66
4. The CJCS study was keyed to an arbitrary date, 1 July 1967, for the initiation of the communist invasion. The CINCPAC study group believed that because the southwest monsoon season was normally at its height in early July, a more realistic date would be October 1967, and they planned accordingly.
the US belief that certain other courses of action might trigger overt Chinese intervention. The study considered that China's invasion caused the transfer of those restraints, and that following such an invasion the United States would modify its war efforts to preclude possible overt military intervention by the USSR. The result would be that the United States would continue its adherence to a political strategy employing military means, and not implement a purely military, war-winning strategy.

(TS) The group considered the containment of the Chinese offensive as a prerequisite for any course of action to be contemplated or selected. China had to be convinced it could not win and had to be impressed with the ever-increasing cost to itself of such action.

(TS) There were two basic methods by which the Chinese could be caused to withdraw once they committed themselves: forcing them back across their border by offensive ground and air action, or punishing them to such an extent that their decision makers reevaluated their action and ordered their forces withdrawn. The group considered four courses of action:

1. A counteroffensive in Southeast Asia and Southern China. While a sustained counteroffensive would be an assured means of forcing withdrawal, it could not be initiated immediately unless forces had been prepositioned. It was not considered within US capabilities in the time frame of the study without seriously degrading US posture to meet NATO commitments.

2. An air campaign against "value" targets throughout Mainland China. This action could be conducted concurrently with containment and other offensive operations. It took advantage of US technology to threaten China proper immediately and directly and to influence China's leaders. It used minimal US Forces, demonstrated US intent clearly, presented a sense of urgency, presented the possibility of further escalation at US option, and avoided an immediate drawdown of US Forces from other commitments.

3. [Blackout]
It was not a sufficient overall objective but in conjunction with other actions could provide important subsidiary benefits.

4. A ground offensive on Mainland China. The disadvantages of such a course of action were so great the study group concluded that it was an undesirable possibility.

(25) The CINCPAC committee's study concluded with the following recommendations. The group recommended containment of the offensive through rapid deployment of forces supported by an extensive air interdiction campaign against the enemy in both Southeast Asia and Southern China as a first priority task. Simultaneously, immediate initiation of an air campaign against "value" targets was recommended as an effective means of illustrating to China's leaders the cost of their action. Concurrently, CONUS forces and resources for a sustained counteroffensive had to be mobilized. Seizure of Hainan Island could make important contributions and should be considered. The group recommended improving lines of communication in Thailand and improving PACOM air, sea, and amphibious lift capabilities. 1 Consideration should be given to the feasibility of maintaining a corps-sized Army force in a high state of readiness for deployment to the PACOM for contingency purposes. These latter efforts would not only enhance ability to meet overt invasion successfully, but contribute additional deterrent to any possible Chinese adventures in Southeast Asia.

(26) On 17 November at Camp Smith, members of the CJCS Special Studies Group briefed CINCPAC and his component commanders and their staffs on that group's report on alternative strategies against China. The situation the CJCS study described was an overt Chinese invasion on 15 November 1967 at five points from Western Thailand

1. Logistic limitations were one of the primary constraints in all of the strategies developed.
across to the Vietnam Demilitarized Zone that involved 19 Chinese and North Vietnamese divisions. US Force deployments were based on a Defense Department approved schedule. Soviet intervention was ruled out, and while strategies were developed using conventional weapons, consideration was given to the effects on force requirements if nuclear weapons were used. ¹

(76) The CJCS group developed three alternative strategies and explained their rationale with each:

1. Offensive air and naval operations against China while conducting a defensive holding operation in Southeast Asia. This, they concluded, would make aggression prohibitive to the Chinese in view of their short and long range national objectives. This strategy could be executed within programmed active forces plus Air National Guard tactical units.

2. An air and naval campaign against China with an invasion of Mainland South China together with a defensive holding operation in Southeast Asia. This would achieve the shock effect of attacking China on its own territory, but it would require forces much greater than programmed active forces.

3. An air and naval campaign against Mainland South China and an invasion of North Vietnam together with a defensive holding operation in Southeast Asia. This strategy provided a means of achieving campaign objectives during a single dry season and early reunification of Vietnam. It could be executed mostly within programmed active forces, with some additional amphibious shipping and Air National Guard tactical units.

(78) Each of the three non-nuclear strategies, the study concluded, would cause withdrawal of Chinese forces from Southeast Asia.

¹ Both of these concepts had also been in the CINCPAC study.
TOP SECRET

After the briefing, CINCPAC sent his preliminary views of the study to the JCS, and these were incorporated in the JCS comments forwarded to the Secretary of Defense on 7 December. The JCS expressed many reservations about the study. Among them were problems caused by shortages, resulting from the Vietnam conflict, that would restrict the availability of materiel to support the proposed strategies. They considered the estimated time phasing of the various strategies optimistic in view of production lead times required; decisions to begin production of some items would have to be made from six months to a year before the items were needed. The JCS stated that the relative military feasibility and acceptability of the strategies required further careful assessment, particularly in relation to the study assumptions, but they considered that the study contained valuable material for consideration in the continuing review and development of alternatives to counter a possible Chinese invasion in Southeast Asia.

On 31 December, CINCPAC elaborated and expanded on his preliminary comments, pointing out that three broad areas of the study warranted close scrutiny:

1. The postulated situation that existed at the time of overt intervention. Features of the postulated situation that were questioned were: (a) the low intensity insurgency threat in South Vietnam; (b) the ineffective deployment of Chinese communist forces against the proposed lodgement in South China; and (c) the ease with which the Chinese communist air threat was eliminated. In the CINCPAC view, these features collectively impinged so materially on force requirements

1. CINCPAC 190435Z Nov 66
2. Once again, the CINCPAC staff cited logistic problems for all alternatives. All strategies depended on accelerated procurement from an expanded US industrial base, and there were other deficiencies that would have to be anticipated well in advance of instituting any strategic response. CINCPAC's Logistics Division again suggested improvements to Thailand's LOC to support US Forces. (J4 Memo 000103-66, 2 Dec 66)
3. JCSM 744-66, 7 Dec 66
4. CINCPAC ltr 3010 ser 000554, 31 Dec 66
and envisioned military operations that danger existed in acceptance of
the study as a basis for determining strategy.

2. The friendly logistic impact with respect to existing and
projected assets. CINCPAC believed the study should address in
greater detail the logistic support necessary for the holding operation
in Thailand and the US amphibious operations in strategies 2 and 3
described above.

3. The probability of achieving the stated purpose through
implementation of the three proposed strategies. CINCPAC felt the
study did not clearly discuss the elements of the strategy that would
produce the cessation of hostilities nor did it place enough significance
on leaving the United States and allies in an acceptable position. The
damage and punishment inflicted on the Chinese communist forces and
homeland in the three strategies appeared to be well within that which
the Chinese would have planned on when they assessed the acceptability
of intervention.

(FO) CINCPAC concluded that the study should be used with
cautions in planning US strategy in the event of Chinese overt large-
scale aggression in Southeast Asia.

USE OF JAPAN BASES

They emphasized that the request had no
significance other than to continue a program to improve the general
war capabilities of the National Military Command System.

(FO) CINCPAC replied in March.² His summary paragraph
stated:

1. 
2. CINCPAC 041040Z Mar 66

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CINCPAC's summary statement was quoted verbatim in the Discussion Section of a JCS paper published later in 1966.
ADDITIONAL CINCPAC OPLANS PUBLISHED

CINCPAC published two operations plans that were new in 1966. CINCPAC was tasked by a JCS plan to coordinate operations for supplementary data collection when PACOM forces were used and activities fell in CINCPAC's geographic area of responsibility.

Similarly, OPLAN 76-66, Supplementary Collection Operations Against Foreign Missile and Space Associated Activities (C), was based on a JCS plan that directed CINCPAC to support the agencies regularly charged with information collection when the foreign missile and space activity was beyond the capability of those agencies. PACOM forces may be diverted from their normal missions to augment national space and missile efforts.

MORE DETAILED LOGISTICS ANNEXES TO OPLANS PROPOSED

The JCS believed that there was a need for greater detail in the logistic annexes to OPLANS. If more detail were added, they felt, the annexes could be appraised for logistic feasibility and used by the Services to assist in determining materiel requirements for US and allied forces. To accomplish this, they proposed to revise their Policy Memorandum 66.1 The new requirement would mean major modification of existing annexes to CINCPAC OPLANS and supporting plans. Additional details proposed by the JCS included essential logistic support, constraints, instructions for coordination of support rendered by the Services and Defense Department agencies, coordination of logistics arrangements of component and supporting commanders, basic data to permit plan evaluation, and base and LOC capabilities and deficiencies. The proposed scope and format were like those of the

Logistic Annex to the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan. The JCS requested CINCPAC's comments or recommendations. CINCPAC replied in December. He recommended expanding the general guidance to ensure that the scope and content of logistic support were adequately described and that the essential tasking of subordinate commanders was mentioned. He wanted the revised format to provide for inclusion of a list of publications and references, for a statement of the scope and objectives of the annex, for a concept of the logistic support for that plan, and for assignment of responsibilities. He also asked for addition of inter-Service supply aspects and for the addition of information on the extent of allied force capability to provide their own maintenance support and the estimated US maintenance support that would be required.

CHANGES IN OPLAN REVIEW CYCLE AND "PACKAGE REVIEW"

(U) The JCS provided new guidance on the preparation and review of military plans in their Policy Memo 144 of 13 September. Among the changes of particular interest to CINCPAC were those that revised the schedule for plans updating and review. The CINCPAC staff had been rewriting or updating OPLANS on their publication anniversary, which scheduled work throughout the year. The new schedule required that "certain selected plans" that were to be designated in the annual Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP), which was expected to be published in December, were to be submitted or updated by approximately 15 April, with related supporting plans required by about 1 May. The suspense dates were tightened for CINCPAC's incorporation in his OPLANS of changes or revisions directed by the JCS, and for his review and response to supporting OPLANS prepared by commanders of other unified or specified commands. The major emphasis on planning

1. CINCPAC 142301 Z Dec 66
2. CPRS 199-66. PM 144 was last revised on 4 May 65. CINCPAC Instructions in the 003020.1 and 003121.1 series provided guidance to his component and subordinate commanders and to his staff on these matters.
would thus be early in the year, beginning in 1967.

(U) The memo also stated that the JCS could be requested to review new or potentially controversial assumptions or operational concepts early in the planning process to minimize possible wasted effort. While such JCS review would be expedited, it "will not be used as a basis to delay submission dates."

(U) The memo directed CINCPAC to notify the JCS if the forces indicated in the JSCP were inadequate to execute his assigned mission. If so, he was to recommend specific changes to his mission to bring it within the capabilities of those forces. The JCS would review the recommendations and advise him in each case.

(U) Also included was a proposed "Operation Plans Package Review," a review of selected plans to determine whether the concurrent execution of all or portions of the package was feasible, suitable, and could be adequately supported.

(☐) On 25 October the JCS announced the first such package and asked CINCPAC's comments on the plans selected for review, which included one plan from USCINCEUR, one from USSOUTHCOM, and CINCPAC's Comprehensive Deployment Program for 1967. CINCPAC replied on 16 November, concurring with the inclusion of his Comprehensive Deployment Program and indicating that his OPLANS 25 and 27 should serve as the basis to assess the related impact of grant aid and combat support requirements.

(☐) Responses from all commanders of unified and specified commands were being considered by the JCS in preparation of the JSCP for FY 68. The review was intended to satisfy requirements for logistic appraisals and movement capabilities studies for JSCP FY 68 forces.

(☐) The first OPLANS Package Review conference was scheduled for 12 December. Early in December the JCS furnished the agenda for the conference, a proposed scenario, a tentative phased task listing, and draft procedures for the logistics appraisal. These instructions


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reflected the additional detail and time compression required in response to Policy Memo 144, and indicated that maximum use of automatic data processing would be required, particularly for logistics data.  

1. A related discussion of the application of automatic data processing techniques to logistic support of OPLANS appears elsewhere in this Chapter; see "Automatic Data Processing of Logistic Planning Requirements."

2. JCS 2363/51-5, Subj: CINCSTRIKE/USCINCMEAFSA OPLAN 512 (Revised), 11 May 66

3. JCS 2363/47-11, Subj: Review of CINCSTRIKE/USCINCMEAFSA OPLAN 531 and Changes 1 and 2 thereto, 17 May 66
CINCPAC tasks in support of USCINCSO OPLANS were specified in CINCPAC OPLAN 82, republished in October 1966.

ANNUAL PACOM RECONNAISSANCE CONFERENCE

During a PACOM General War Reconnaissance Conference in 1961, the idea of pre-scheduling photographic sorties on a free-time basis was first recommended. Since then, forces were committed and sorties pre-scheduled for all force generation levels of the Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP). Annual PACOM conferences had continued to plan and coordinate the use of reconnaissance assets and maximize target coverage.

1. CINCPAC ltr ser 000447, 24 Oct 66
2. CINCPAC 152325Z Apr 66
3. 
CINC PAC directed his PACOM Operations Liaison Officer (POLO) to hold the fifth annual PACOM Reconnaissance Conference at Fuchu Air Station, Japan on 25 October 1966. 1, 2

Conferees were particularly interested in the impact the new JCS CRP would have on planning within PACOM. CRP-4 was found to be generally in the format of Annex H to the CINC PAC General War Plan; consequently only minor changes were made to Annex H. A significant additional reconnaissance requirement was generated by a CRP annex. Appropriate CINC PAC assets were committed on a pre-planned basis.

1. CINC PAC 271837Z Sep 66. Representatives attended from CINC PAC, the PACOM Operations Liaison Office, CINC PAC FLT, CINC PAC A AF, COMUS Korea, 8th Army, 7th Fleet, 5th AF, 7th AF, 13th AF, 460th Tactical Reconnaissance Wing, and the National Security Agency.
2. POLO ltr 5050 ser 0007, PACOM Reconnaissance Conference, 10 Nov 66, CINC PAC 0001509-66
3. The number of targets covered increased from 138 in 1965 to 200.
INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION

CINCPAC elements participated in various intelligence collection efforts throughout PACOM. In some programs CINCPAC contributed some of his assets to work jointly with forces of other commanders, such as CINCSAC, but in most cases CINCPAC sponsored and directed the entire program.

CLICKBEETLE (C)

CLICKBEETLE was the name assigned to a CINCPAC-directed operations off the coasts of the USSR and North Korea. Begun in 1965, it continued throughout 1966 with six patrol operations by USS BANNER (AKL-25). These technical research operations often provided valuable information, particularly on enemy anti-submarine warfare activities and techniques. On some occasions BANNER was subjected to Soviet or Chinese ship harassment. On 24 June, as a result of such harassment by the Soviet AGI ANEMOMETER, the ships collided. BANNER was unharmed, the Soviet ship was slightly damaged. CINCPAC recommended that the State Department lodge a strong formal protest with the USSR for this undue interference with a US Navy ship on the high seas.

During a patrol in mid-November, BANNER was surrounded by approximately 800 Chinese communist motor and sail fishing vessels. As BANNER withdrew somewhat, it was followed by 6 and later 10 metal-hull trawlers who stayed generally 300 to 500 yards away, but who approached as close as 75 yards. BANNER withdrew about 10 miles under this threat and, at CINCPAC's direction (through Navy channels) continued its patrol from the new position, with instructions to withdraw still farther if the harassment continued. The Chinese boats departed in a few days and there was no further incident.

1. CINCPAC Command History, 1965, p 40; J3 History, Feb-Aug and Oct 66
2. CINCPAC 242320Z Jun 66
3. CINCPAC Command Center Briefing Notes, 15 Nov 66
4. CINCPAC 150405Z Nov 66
 Particularly in connection with CLICKBEETLE operations, the CINCPAC staff continued to study the problems of an illegal Soviet claim to all waters of the Peter the Great Bay (Zaliv Petra Velikogo). The USSR claimed that this large and important bay (Validivostok was on its shores) was "historic" and that all waters inside a straight line from the mouth of the Tumen River to Mys (Cape) Povorotnyy were internal Soviet waters. The USSR also claimed that a 12-mile Soviet territorial sea covered the area just south of that straight line and was therefore Soviet water also. The United States had officially protested these claims to the USSR.

JCS policy required CLICKBEETLE collectors to approach no closer than at least 13 nautical miles from Soviet claimed territory, and also to observe the 12-mile Soviet territorial sea restriction.

CINCPAC then concluded that repeated approaches up to but not beyond that line might be counter-productive to the US cause, as they could lend credence to Soviet claims. Accordingly, the JCS were requested to approve terms of reference for CLICKBEETLE collectors that provided that they would operate in a random manner about 25 miles south of the line connecting the river and the cape in order to preclude Soviet interpretations of US movements as de facto recognition of the claim. Periodic excursions toward the line would be permitted when lucrative targets of opportunity presented themselves. The JCS approved those terms of reference.

1. Point Paper, J73, 25 Mar 66
2. [Redacted]
3. [Redacted]
4. CINCPAC 020310Z Apr 66
5. JCS 7633/041750Z Apr 66
Other special operations were conducted in PACOM. Special technical research operations were performed by USS OXFORD (AGTR-1) and USS JAMESTOWN (AGTR-3) off the China Mainland and off the coasts of South Vietnam and Cambodia. Occasionally CINCPAC directed other ships as a special assignment, on an "as available" basis.

ELUSIVE ELK

ELUSIVE ELK was the name of the program for surveillance by US aircraft or ships in PACOM. Observations were made periodically throughout 1966. CINCPAC directed the activity of two especially configured destroyer escorts, USS CHARLES E. BERRY (DE-1035) and USS McMORRISS (DE-1036), which usually spelled one another on these assignments.

In June, CINCPAC implemented emergency communications procedures between SAC aircraft on ELUSIVE ELK assignment and the destroyer escort on station to satisfy reporting requirements. ¹

On 19 September 1965, CINCPACFLT had reaffirmed his need for four appropriately configured destroyer escorts to meet requirements for simultaneous coverage. This requirement was met by transferring two destroyer escorts of the same class from CINCLANTFLT resources in May 1966.

CHILI PEPPER

1. CINCPAC 100540Z Jun 66
2. CINCPACFLT 190537Z Sep 65
NUCLEAR SHIP VISITS TO ASIAN PORTS

(C) To achieve greater flexibility in deployment of nuclear warships, and to make their arrival and stay in foreign Asian ports more routine. CINC PAC worked to educate the people in the countries to be visited.
(3) Some officials of Asian governments continued to find political implications on which to base objections to these visits, however. USS ENTERPRISE (CVAN-65) and USS BAINBRIDGE (DLGN-25) on a Pacific cruise early in 1966 were rarely permitted to enter foreign ports. Most visits were postponed, for a variety of reasons.
(3) Attempts to conduct visits however, were unfruitful.  

(4) On 5 October, representatives of CINCPAC, CINCPACFLT, the Chief of Naval Operations, the State Department, and the US Embassy, Tokyo met at CINCPACFLT Headquarters to determine alternative approaches to the Japanese Government concerning port visits in Japan.  

(3) Nevertheless, a visit to Yokosuka by SNOOK that was proposed for 25 October to 1 November was postponed by Japan.  

CINCPAC withdrew the visit request.  

(C) In spite of these setbacks, CINCPAC continued to press for normalization. The final proposals he submitted in 1966 were for a visit to Sasebo in late November by the

1. AMEMB TOKYO to STATE 4216/031008Z Jun 66; USNAVINSERVO Japan 030905Z Jun 66  
2. AMEMB TOKYO 240903Z Aug 66  

7. J3 History, Oct 66  
8. CINCPAC 271850Z Sep 66; STATE 70977/212212Z Oct 66;  
CINCPAC 242330Z Oct 66
LONG BEACH (CGN-9) and to Yokosuka in early December by ENTERPRISE and BAINBRIDGE. The Secretary of State anticipated some difficulties in arranging for these visits. He envisaged first an exchange of notes, followed by the visit of a single [redacted] surface ship to Sasebo, perhaps in November or December. All visits were postponed pending completion of this aide-memoire.
PEACETIME NUCLEAR WEAPONS OPERATIONS, PROTECTION, AND SAFETY

Recent improvements in CINCPAC's peacetime nuclear weapons operations, protection, and safety programs reflected the degree of continuing PACOM emphasis on such programs, which stemmed directly from the continuing concern by Admiral Sharp during a period when the tempo of non-nuclear operations had been steadily on the increase. 3

CINCPAC published guidance for his component commanders on peacetime nuclear matters, and his staff conducted periodic detailed surveys to insure that his directives were being followed.

CINCPAC continuously emphasized safety programs to assure complete understanding and implementation of approved safety rules. Other directives and programs concerned safety controls for PACOM Command and Control facilities; 4

A CINCPAC Instruction published in November 1966 formalized guidance on actions to be taken in PACOM. 5

CINCPAC had overall responsibility
Department of Defense Survey

(2) During March and April, the Department of Defense conducted a survey.

(C) The findings and conclusions of the survey team were as follows:

"In all commands and units surveyed: (a) There was compliance with applicable nuclear weapon system safety rules. (b) There was a high level of command emphasis and interest in compliance with nuclear weapon system safety rules and in an effective nuclear safety program."
and Korean Forces properly. Improvements and additions would permit direct access of large tankers and preclude possible disruption of the supply. Because large tankers could not use the Inchon facility, POL products were being trans-shipped from Sasebo, Japan in smaller tankers, a much more expensive system.

At a CINCPAC POL meeting on 21 and 22 February, the conferees discussed the operational difficulties related to these inadequate and rapidly deteriorating facilities at the US Army POL Terminal at Inchon. Subsequently, CINCPAC directed COMUS Korea and the Commanding General, Eighth Army to study the problem jointly. Although the study was to include several matters, all were related to the basic Inchon problem, from which all other Korean POL problems stemmed. CINCPAC and COMUS Korea representatives met in Seoul on 23 and 24 May to discuss the objectives of the study.

Study results, submitted in three increments, indicated that COMUS Korea and the Eighth Army commander preferred commercial operation of the bulk POL terminal at Inchon to military operation and they found that it was technically feasible. CINCPAC concurred. A meeting in Seoul in December was attended by representatives of CINCPAC, COMUS Korea, CINCUSARPAC, and the Eighth Army Commander. At that meeting requirements were firmed and an informal quotation of cost

1. Point Paper, J441, 15 Nov 66
2. Attending in addition to CINCPAC staff members were representatives of CINCPAC's component and subordinate unified commanders, major PACOM POL installation agencies, and Washington agencies.
3. CINCPAC ltr 4020 ser 00621, 15 Apr 66
4. CINCPAC 022347Z Apr 66
5. (C) The General Accounting Office (GAO) also alluded to the Inchon problem in a 29 June draft report on "Potential Savings Through Improved Management Practices Over the Supplying of Bulk Petroleum Requirements for Korea." Status of the overall problem as related to this GAO study was reported to the Secretary of Defense.
6. COMUSKOREA ltrs USFK-DJ (SAPOK) Subj: CINCPAC/COMUSK 23-24 May 66 POL Conference, 4 Aug 66; 2 Sep 66; and 7 Nov 66
7. ADMINO CINCPAC 040431Z Oct 66
8. CINCPAC 150426Z Nov 66
for possible commercial operation of a new POL terminal at Inchon to support US Forces was secured from the Korea Oil Corporation. ¹ A Military Construction Program study of the project was also prepared for cost comparison. All data was forwarded through Army channels to the Department of the Army for review, evaluation, and funding.

1. (C) The Korea Oil Corporation (KOCO) had offered to build and operate a new terminal at Inchon and provide POL support to US and Korean Forces, as well as to the civilian economy. KOCO was 75% owned by the Korean Government, 25% by the Gulf Oil Company.
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT ACTIVITIES

RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT ACTIVITIES BY CINCPAC AND COMUSMACV

(U) In 1966, CINCPAC and his staff were involved in many ways with the direction, organization, and coordination of research and development agencies and activities throughout PACOM.

(§) At the beginning of the year, the Joint Research and Test Activity (JRATA) continued to function in Vietnam. It was composed of the Army Concept Team in Vietnam, the Air Force Test Unit-Vietnam, the Navy Research and Development Unit, and the Defense Department's Advance Research Projects Agency - Research and Development Field Unit (ARPA-RDFU). In addition there were 23 civilian scientists in Saigon attached to the JRATA, and there was an ARPA-RDFU in Bangkok with 110 military and civilian scientific personnel attached. The civilians were from such organizations as the Rand Corporation, the Research Analysis Corporation, and Stanford Research Institute and were working on contract with the Government.

(§) In response to JCS questions about the use of scientific techniques to help with the war, General Westmoreland in December 1965 said that the flow of information from CONUS development agencies to the staffs of his field commanders was excellent and that the JRATA and its Service test units also provided an extensive and continuous source of information. When he was asked whether there was adequate scientific talent placed in the field to work under military commanders to analyze problems and use modern technology in their solution, General Westmoreland explained that he had had numerous visits from the research and development community to address a particular problem and that his every request for assistance had provided the best talent available in addition to that regularly assigned in JRATA.

(§) CINCPAC also remained vitally interested in research and development activity for Southeast Asia. On his staff CINCPAC had an eight-man Scientific Advisory Group with a broad background collectively in engineering and the physical sciences. There was close coordination
between this group and the CINCPAC Research and Development Advisor.

(8) The Research and Development Advisor formulated the CINCPAC position on requirements for new developments or recommended improvement to existing weapons systems. He kept abreast of appropriate activities and progress throughout the research and development community and passed this knowledge along to the CINCPAC staff and component and subordinate commands. He coordinated proposed research, development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E) projects and recommended the continuance or termination of RDT&E projects for Southeast Asia. The JCS required that all proposed RDT&E projects for Vietnam have CINCPAC approval. ¹

(8) Workload expanded greatly, and in April CINCPAC asked the JCS for authorization to replace the advisory or coordinator billet in his Operations Division with a Research and Development Section. ² Permission to form the four-officer section was granted by the JCS in July. ³

(8) CINCPAC also continued negotiations throughout the spring and summer with the Director of Defense Research and Engineering (DDR&E) to decide arrangements and terms of reference for scientific consultants from that agency that were to be placed on the CINCPAC and COMUSMACV staffs to provide still further knowledge and liaison capability. ⁴

(8) Meanwhile, on 29 June, COMUSMACV recommended that the JRATA be disestablished. ⁵ He asked that the military test units be

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1. Point Papers J3A1, 30 Dec 65; J317, 25 Mar 66
2. CINCPAC 100137Z Apr 66
3. JCS 6507/122053Z Jul 66
4. JCS 6921/220030Z Mar 66; CINCPAC 170810Z Apr 66; COMUSMACV 13924/221224Z Apr 66
5. COMUSMACV 22242/290240Z Jun 66
assigned to his component commanders. He had had no component commands in 1964 when the Joint Agency was formed. He said that most of the research activities of the units were Service matters and that the component commanders were in a position to absorb and assist the test units. He also noted that there was wide variation in the amount of resources, emphasis, and exploitation of the test units by the Services.

(¶) COMUSMACV recommended that the ARPA-RDFU be reassigned to his Operations staff section. The COMUSMACV staff would continue to supervise research and development activities to avoid Service duplication and controversies over role or mission.

(¶) CINCPAC had no objection to the disestablishment proposal and so informed the JCS. CINCPAC also pointed out to the JCS that the projected arrival at CINCPAC of a scientific consultant from the office of the Director of Defense Research and Engineering and the anticipated augmentation of the Research and Development Section of the CINCPAC staff would provide increased capabilities and activities for scientific research and development in unified channels. The high level scientific advisors would provide CINCPAC with information and advice that would expand his capability to identify and define operational problem areas on which the efforts of the research and development community might be focused. The Research and Development Section would increase CINCPAC's capability to exercise his responsibilities as unified commander in connection with the major expansion of the RDT&E effort in PACOM anticipated under the impact of increased combat operations in Southeast Asia.

(¶) CINCPAC believed that COMUSMACV would be experiencing a similar intensification in research and development activity, with expanded supervisory, review, and recommendation functions in areas of joint concern.

(¶) The JCS and the Secretary of Defense approved the JRATA disestablishment with the function of Headquarters JRATA to be assigned

1. CINCPAC 090346Z Aug 66
to the COMUSMACV staff, the Service test units going to the Service commanders, and the ARPA-RDFU to be assigned to COMUSMACV. JRATA was officially deactivated by COMUSMACV on 15 November.  

(¶) A Director of Defense Research and Engineering scientist, Dr. W. G. McMillan, arrived at COMUSMACV Headquarters on 21 September to become General Westmoreland's scientific consultant. After the disestablishment of JRATA, the former Director of JRATA became the deputy to Dr. McMillan and several other JRATA personnel also assisted him. On 4 December, the ARPA-RDFU that had been assigned to COMUSMACV's Operations Division was placed under Dr. McMillan's control.  

(¶) A CINCPAC Instruction, which had implemented not only the JRATA establishment but also the responsibilities, policies, and procedures for RDT&E in Vietnam needed revision in view of the organization's disestablishment. The CINCPAC staff recommended that the new instruction cover all PACOM areas as well as Vietnam. The JCS requested that CINCPAC delineate in his revised instruction the COMUSMACV responsibility to insure that research and development and combat development activities there were kept to a minimum consistent with supporting the war effort and to provide for necessary coordination and exchange of information among the Services. The revised CINCPAC instruction was being prepared at the end of the year.  

(¶) CINCPAC's research and development advisory program was implemented in December after lengthy negotiation of the terms of reference for representatives of the Director of Defense Research and Engineering with that agency through the JCS and the Secretary of Defense.  

(¶) CINCPAC instructed all of his component, unified, and subordinate commanders on this advisory program in December.  

1. JCSM 787-66, CPRS 0228-66  
2. COMUSMACV 48190/031059Z Nov 66  
3. Point Paper, J3A3, 6 Jan 67  
4. JCS 2349/21-3, CPRS 251-66; OSD DEF 2974/171648Z Sep 66  
5. CINCPACINST 03920.1, Conduct of a Research and Development Advisory Program within the Pacific Command, 22 Dec 66
The program provided that highly qualified technical specialists furnished by the Director of Defense Research and Engineering would be integrated as civilian consultants into research and development activities in PACOM. Some features of the instruction included: one civilian consultant was to be at CINCPAC's Headquarters;\(^1\) one civilian (Dr. W. G. McMillan) and one 06 military consultant were to be assigned to COMUSMACV; one civilian and one 06 military consultant might later be assigned to COMUSMACTHAI; and the military consultant billets were to rotate among the Services.

\((\sigma)\) The senior civilian consultant was to have direct access to the commander and staff to which he was assigned and the consultants were to work closely with all research and development and scientific advisory staff sections. All staff sections were to provide any requested relevant technical or operational data and information to the consultants. Authorization for direct communication between the consultants and the Director of Defense Research and Engineering for the exchange of information and data was noted. Reports produced or services provided by the consultants were advisory only. If CINCPAC or his subordinate unified commanders took command action as a result of such a report or advice, the appropriate action was to be taken through regular command channels.

STUDIES AND ACTIVITIES OF CINCPAC'S SCIENTIFIC ADVISORY GROUP

\((\sigma)\) The Scientific Advisory Group had a broad mission that permitted its members to study a wide range of things or activities in light of their various professional scientific and engineering disciplines. They were not limited to a study of the design or improvement of military equipment or materiel, nor were they limited to analysis of military operations. Rather, they provided advice to CINCPAC and his staff on a combination of these and other matters. They worked to identify

1. He was expected to arrive early in 1967.
military "hardware" requirements or improvements, and recommended improved operational techniques. As a result of monitoring PACOM operational activity, particularly that in Southeast Asia, the group generated most of its own projects, which were quite varied in 1966. Some of the studies that resulted in published reports are briefly highlighted below.  

A continuing study, begun late in 1965, of the effectiveness of STEEL TIGER/BARREL ROLL operations compared the results of those air operations with intelligence reports of truck movements and ground operations in Laos. Initially, they found there was little correlation between the two and that air operations were thus not as fruitful as they could be. The group was directed to continue this study throughout 1966. Some recommendations made as a result of these studies were adopted, and others were in the process of being implemented.

The group studied the sea infiltration of enemy forces into South Vietnam and operations to counter it. Through an analysis of MARKET TIME activity they were able to cite some of the more significant trends, they determined the maximum number of infiltrators that would be detected, and they were able to assist in assessing the effectiveness of the program.

The group studied the Combat Operations Reporting System (COACT) in which each of the Services reported on air operations in South Vietnam. They sought to determine how well COACT reflected the actual situation as it was known to exist. They found the system was

1. Information on the projects was furnished for the History during consultation with Mr. Roy F. Linsenmeyer, Chief of the Scientific Advisory Group.
2. Throughout this discussion of the Scientific Advisory Group, references will pertain to the group's Working Papers for 1966 by number and date. Pertinent to STEEL TIGER/BARREL ROLL operations studies were Working Papers 5-66, Jan 66, (S) and 9-66, 7 Feb 66 (S)
3. Working Papers 4-66, Jan 66 (S); 26-66, Nov 66 (S)
not accurate in some respects and recommended changes to improve it. The changes were essentially concerned with target analysis and target objectives, not damage assessment.¹

(5) The Laos and North Vietnam Route Package 1 air interdiction programs were examined to measure sortie effectiveness, leading to recommendations for optimum sortie allocation to these programs.²

(6) A study of cable bridges in North Vietnam was under way at the end of the year. As a substitute for bombed bridges on their supply routes, the North Vietnamese began constructing suspension bridges made only of cables attached to concrete anchorages. Deck sections could be installed over the cables at night, or when needed, and then taken away. The bridges were hard to locate, much less bomb. The study also uncovered knowledge of large shipments of cable from Japan, and the group hoped to recommend State Department aid to discourage such shipments.³

(7) The group studied methods of locating pulse radars, particularly to determine more precise locations of SA-2 (surface-to-air) missile sites. Airborne electronic devices gathered signals from the FAN SONG radars associated with the SA-2. The problem was to locate the radars in real-time from a distance of 60 to 100 miles and pinpoint them within a quarter-mile of their actual location. The study discussed types of errors influencing a system that measured the difference in time of radar pulse arrival between any two stations. The group worked out mathematical concepts and techniques and a suggested system to be pursued to improve accuracy. The results and recommendations were forwarded to the Director of Defense Research and Engineering.⁴

(8) To gain better knowledge of enemy truck movements for tactical air operations against them, the group early in the year worked

1. Working Paper 6-66, Jan 66 (S)
2. Working Papers 13-66, Apr 66 (S); 17-66, Jul 66 (S); 18-66, 30 Jul 66 (S); 19-66, 26 Aug 66 (S); and 27-66, Nov 66 (S)
independently on the invention of a device that sensed magnetic disruption. When emplaced near a road, the device could detect and report truck movement automatically and was to be able to call in air strikes while the trucks were still close by. Later in the year the group discovered that CONUS research and development agencies were working on various seismic devices to detect personnel infiltration, and the group caused these efforts to be expanded to the truck detection role. The group continued to study plans for the test and use of such devices.

(5) The group studied the cost effectiveness of reactivating and employing a battleship for shore bombardment of both North and South Vietnam. They studied the targets in range, compared air or battleship effort required, and interdiction possibilities. This was the basic study leading to the use of naval gunfire against coastal targets.

(5) Defoliation and foliage burning operations were studied. These were operations designed to inhibit movement of Viet Cong or North Vietnamese Army forces and uncover their bases and supply dumps or lines. Incendiary action was at first considered unfeasible because the foliage was 90 percent water. Chemical defoliation efforts prior to the burning, however, turned the foliage into potential fuel. Research was continuing in this area.

(5) Trends in combat losses of jet aircraft in North Vietnam were determined by the group in a study that compared combat attrition caused by all ground weapons during the May to September period in 1965 with the same period in 1966. Effectiveness of enemy surface-to-air missiles for the period August 1965 to September 1966 was also described in the study.

(5) The group studied pilot recovery potential for pilots of A-1, A-4, and F-105 aircraft downed in North Vietnam and Laos between February 1965 and September 1966, and measured survival radio performance. The group recommended improvements for search and

1. Working Paper 11-66, 3 May 66 (S)
2. Working Paper 12-66, 16 May 66 (S)
rescue procedures and recommended research and development activity to increase radio performance. ¹

(§) A study of decreasing activity in Vietnamese Armed Forces operations in the September-December 1966 period examined the conjecture that the Viet Cong-North Vietnamese Army Forces appeared to be reverting to guerrilla warfare as a result of their repeated failures and serious losses in larger unit engagements. Based on limited examination of data available, the paper concluded that there might have been some change in enemy tactics, but that cyclic variations in both friendly and enemy Vietnamese operation patterns had been observed in the past. The recent decline could be part of another cycle, or the beginning of a new trend. The total question of enemy plans to revert to guerrilla war in the future was beyond the scope of the study. ²

(¶) The group worked with other CINCPAC staff groups to develop indicators to measure the success and progress of the Revolutionary Development Program. They also compared South Vietnamese economic cycles or activity with political events and military action. ³ They studied the attitudes of South Vietnamese civilians toward US Forces and tried to assess the impact US Forces had on key officers in the South Vietnamese Armed Forces. ⁴

(¶) The group gathered data to try to assess the attitudes of the people of North Vietnam. This information came from letters from North Vietnam, and from interviews with prisoners of war, businessmen, or others who had firsthand knowledge. Attitudes toward food shortages, economic and transportation difficulties, or other hardships were measured to try to put together a profile of the war and its effect on the people of the North.

2. Working Paper 29-66, 31 Dec 66 (S)
4. Working Paper 16-66, 10 Jun 66 (S)
CINCPAC COMMUNICATIONS ACTIVITIES

AUTOMATIC DIGITAL NETWORK (AUTODIN)

(C) On 10 August a new UNIVAC 1004, Set 2 compound data terminal became operational. It transmitted information from a punched tape or punched card. During 1967 an additional unit, a UNIVAC 1004, Set 5 was to be installed and it would have the added capability of handling magnetic tape. The terminal was linked to the Manual Data Relay Station at Hickam Air Force Base. In February 1967, however, it was to be connected with the Automatic Electronic Switching Center, operated by the Navy Communications Station, Honolulu, Hawaii and thus became an Automatic Digital Network (AUTODIN) terminal (part of the Defense Communications System network).

(C) The Automatic Electronic Switching Center was to connect to CONUS switches and Manual Data Relay Centers at North Camp Drake, Japan, Clark Air Base in the Philippines, and Fort Buckner, Okinawa. Automatic switches in Southeast Asia were scheduled to become operational by 1967 or 1968. These switches were to be located at Clark Air Base, Nha Trang and Saigon in Vietnam, and Khorat, Thailand.

(C) Modernization of CINCPAC's Communications Center was begun in September 1966 and would provide more space for the AUTODIN operation and microwave equipment.

SECURE VOICE COMMUNICATIONS

(C) A second terminal of the interim Automatic Secure Voice Communications system was installed at CINCPAC Headquarters and became operational on 15 October. This second line terminated on the TALK QUICK switchboard, and all TALK QUICK subscribers could use it. The first line, which had been operational since October 1965, connected to the North American Air Defense Command switch.

1. CINCPAC Command History, 1965, p 44
2. Cards processed per month had more than tripled by the end of the year (to 226,262 cards per month).
3. The Set 2 machine was to be retained to back up the Set 5.
4. CINCPAC Command History, 1965, p 45; J6 History, Dec 66
and thus had permitted direct dialing between CINCPAC Headquarters and subscribers in Washington, the Air Defense Command, and Europe. The TALK QUICK system connected CINCPAC with Southeast Asia subscribers and others in the Western Pacific.

AUTOVON SUBSCRIBER REQUIREMENTS AND PRIORITIES

(7) CINCPAC's staff prepared an Automatic Voice Network Subscriber List for the PACOM during an April-May conference and workshop at Camp Smith. The JCS subsequently asked CINCPAC to review the list. On 24 August CINCPAC answered with recommendations to reduce those subscribers assigned FLASH precedence to an IMMEDIATE or lower priority. These recommendations would insure adequate communications in the event of an emergency because the number of trunk lines available to distant switches, command centers, and joint switchboards would not be blocked by too many high priority subscribers. This same principle applied to high-frequency back-up facilities. In the PACOM the highest communications priority, FLASH OVERRIDE, was reserved for CINCPAC.

COMMAND AND CONTROL ALERTING-CONFERENCING VOICE NET

(7) In January CINCPAC assumed operation of the new Command and Control Alerting-Conferencing Net installed by the Hawaiian Telephone Company at Camp Smith. CINCPAC thus had a capability for complete automatic preemption of five submarine cable circuits, which extended to locations in Japan, Korea, Okinawa, Taiwan, and the Philippines. Another circuit seizure capability was added in November that allowed CINCPAC to preempt the circuit from CINCUSARPAC to the Commanding General, US Army, Vietnam. Additional circuits were scheduled to be added to the alerting-conference net in 1967.

2. CINCPAC Command History, 1965, p 45; J6 History, Dec 66
AUTOMATIC VOICE NETWORK

(U) All during 1966, planning and preparation for the installation of the Automatic Voice Network (AUTOVON) switch in Hawaii and for provision of its associated circuits continued. The Overseas AUTOVON Area Cutover Coordinating Committee, Pacific was established on 17 August 1966. These actions were predicated on the following switch activation schedule: Hawaii, June 1967; Guam and the Philippines, November 1967; and Japan, Okinawa, and Taiwan, April 1968.

(U) On 20 December 1966, however, the Defense Communication Agency\(^1\) announced that, at the contractor's request,\(^2\) the target date for activation of the Hawaii switch was being deferred until November 1968, and the other Pacific area switch activations deferred to unspecified later dates. The delay was attributed to Government changes in performance specifications subsequent to the initiation of the design, and to extensive interface problems, which were both in the common control system of the switch and between the common control system and various other functioning elements of the switch.

(U) As of the end of 1966, a November 1968 initial switch activation date appeared credible to the CINCPAC staff.

COMMUNICATIONS SATELLITES

(U) The number and sophistication of communications satellites orbiting over the Pacific area in 1966 reflected the continuing progress toward achievement of an alternate wideband communications system throughout the PACOM, \(\text{long a CINCPAC goal.}\) Undersea cables still carried most of the voice and teletype traffic between CINCPAC Headquarters and the Western Pacific,\(^3\) but the satellites provided

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1. DCA 522/7075/2014212 Dec 66
2. Automatic Electric Company
3. The Defense Communications Agency had, in addition to its satellite programs, plans to back up the cable system in an emergency by the transfer of certain vital teletype circuits to high frequency radio, but the efficiency of this proposal was questionable. (DCEM 7750, 17 Feb 66 (C))
a highly reliable alternate communications path when they were in proper orbit and when ground terminals were installed. Both Defense Department and commercial satellites were in limited operation.

SYNCOM

(9) The Defense Communications Agency's (DCA) synchronous communications satellites (SYNCOM II AND III) remained aloft and effective. SYNCOM II had been up since July 1963 and SYNCOM III since August 1964. Satellite life expectancy was uncertain; SYNCOM II had been expected to expire in March 1965 but was still going strong. Ground terminals were located in Hawaii, at Clark Air Base in the Philippines, and in Saigon, with a smaller experimental terminal at Bang Pla, Thailand. SYNCOM III could provide 1 secure voice channel and 16 secure teletype channels between Hawaii and Southeast Asia in the event of a submarine cable failure.

(9) SYNCOMs II and III were also used by one very mobile terminal. The first permanently installed shipboard terminal was the AN/SSC-2 installed aboard USS ANnapolis (AGMR-1) before its 5 August 1966 departure on a patrol in the Southeast Asia combat zone. On 18 August the first message relayed by satellite from an operationally deployed ship was passed to the Navy's Communication Station in Honolulu through SYNCOM III. Throughout the year this continued to be a highly reliable route for the transmission of operational messages.

Initial Defense Communications Satellite Project

(9) The DCA, which had proposed a complete system of alternate Pacific communications by satellite in a December 1965 memorandum, was conducting another, more sophisticated program. The Defense Communications Satellite Program was being developed in two parts:

1. CINCPAC Command History, 1964, p 130
2. J6 History, Dec 66
3. A six-foot parabolic antenna was mounted on the ship's superstructure.
4. J6 History, Dec 66
5. DCA Memo for the Secretary of Defense, Communications Satellite/ Capability in the Far Pacific, 15 Dec 65 (C)
nearing operational phase was the Initial Defense Communications Satellite Project (IDCSP) and scheduled to follow in about three years was the Advanced Defense Communications Satellite Project. 1

(◊) The initial successful IDCSP launch on 16 June 1966 placed 7 satellites in equatorial orbit approximately 18,000 nautical miles from the earth. 2 Each had a slightly different velocity vector for the achievement of a dispersed belt of satellites around the equator. The second launch in August failed to achieve orbit. The launch of 7 additional satellites scheduled for January 1967 was expected to provide an 80 to 95 percent satellite availability between Pacific stations, with each subsequent successful launch contributing additional availability.

(◊) Installation of IDCSP ground terminals in Hawaii, the Philippines, and Saigon and Nha Trang in Vietnam was completed in 1966. By the summer of 1967, Guam and Okinawa were scheduled to receive terminals and Hawaii was scheduled to receive a second terminal. 3

Commercial Satellites

(◊) In October 1966 the first commercial communications satellite for the Pacific area, LANI BIRD I (INTELSAT II), was launched by the Comsat Corporation. It failed to achieve the synchronous orbit planned for it, and traveled in a highly elliptical path that restricted the number of hours a day it was effective in the Pacific. The DCA established a program to test Lani Bird’s capability to relay secure voice, data, and teletype transmissions into other Government-owned and commercial segments of the Defense Communications System.

1. JCSM 543-66, CPRS 00462-66
2. J6 History, Dec 66
3. CINCPAC had repeatedly stressed to the DCA the need for early installation of a terminal on Guam and the requirement for an IDCSP link from Guam to North West Cape, Australia. The Philippines was to have a commercial satellite terminal in addition to the IDCSP facility, but no such commercial installation was planned for Guam. The IDCSP, therefore, would provide the only practical alternate wideband path through Guam. In addition, CINCPAC had submitted, and the JCS had validated, the requirement for the IDCSP link from Guam to North West Cape to relay POLARIS low frequency broadcasts. CINCPAC 051859Z Aug 66; MJCS 234-66, 29 Aug 66; CINCPAC 180326Z Nov 66).
Large fixed Comsat ground stations were being installed on Oahu, at Brewster Flats, Washington, and other CONUS locations to replace temporary terminals by mid-1967. The transportable units were then to be moved to Thailand, Japan, and the Philippines in support of the APOLLO program and CINCPAC's urgent requirements.

Advanced Defense Communications Satellite Project

The Advanced Defense Communications Satellite Project (ADCSP), which was scheduled to provide substantial improvements in satellite capability, was still in the planning stage. The concept of operation of the satellite was studied and defined by a special committee composed of representatives of the JCS, the DCA, and the Services. Their report was then reviewed by a committee of eminent authorities on satellite communications, and submitted to the JCS.

In September the JCS asked CINCPAC to review and update his ADCSP requirements, using as a basis his current operational concepts and the frame of reference for the ADCSP system defined by the special committee. In addition, CINCPAC was asked to plan for ground terminal deployment and to study other DCA facilities to determine which could be deactivated when the ADCSP became operational.

The November letter transmitting the revised requirements to the JCS included a statement of CINCPAC's desires on ADCSP development. The early achievement of a high quality military communications satellite capability that provided channels in quantity and continuous operation he considered an urgent requirement. Such a capability would have been of inestimable value in support of operations.

1. JCSM 543-66, CPRS 00462-66
2. JCSM 699-66, CPRS 0196-66
3. CINCPAC ltr ser 001901, The Advanced Defense Communications Satellite Project Requirements, 19 Nov 66
4. JCSM 543-66, CPRS 00462-66
5. JCSM 699-66, CPRS 0196-66
in Southeast Asia, he said, even if sophisticated secure control circuits, anti-jam protection, and nuclear survivability features were not provided. Recognizing that a worldwide ADCSP-type system might some day be called upon to resist enemy spoofing, jamming, or direct attack, CINCPAC nevertheless urged that the program be vigorously pursued with the most simple and uncomplicated design schemes that could be devised. CINCPAC preferred a soon-in-operation, high quality system with reasonable protection to a spoof-proof, jam-proof, highly protected facility in the 1980's.

EMERGENCY AIR MESSENGER SERVICE

(C) CINCPAC had no alternate wideband trunk routing communication system in certain areas of the Western Pacific. Accordingly, in February 1966 the JCS asked that CINCPAC consider his need for a plan for emergency air message delivery service in the event such service was needed, with particular reference to Vietnam. The JCS stated that although plans had been prepared for the transfer of vital teletype circuits from the cable to backup radio in the event of an emergency, the efficiency of the transfer was questionable and provision of any communications backup was many months away. 1

(C) Two courier systems that could provide backup for electrical type communications were already operating in PACOM. One was the Armed Forces Courier System (ARFCOS), which used passenger and cargo space on both military and civilian aircraft. The other, begun in March 1966, was a Command Pouch System, which operated only between CINCPAC and COMUSMACV, and which was designed more specifically for material other than messages, and only material classified Secret and below.

(C) Studying the matter, CINCPAC found that although the war in Vietnam highlighted CINCPAC's need for backup communication, this was not just a PACOM problem. There was a worldwide need for emergency air messenger service wherever alternate wideband trunk

1. DCEM 7750, 17 Feb 66 (C)
routing was not available. It was CINCPAC's opinion that ARFCOS offered the most logical means for such emergency communication. Within an hour after loss of cable or wideband trunk communication, the emergency air delivery service could be activated at any affected relays. Courier service could be dispatched from either the major communications collection points or from relays nearest the disruption every six hours, or more frequently if the urgency of the traffic warranted. CINCPAC noted that commanders at each echelon planned for and reacted with their own resources in this type of emergency.  

(6) CINCPAC therefore concluded that it was not necessary to have a specific PACOM plan for emergency air messenger service, and so informed the JCS.  

(6) The JCS concurred with the CINCPAC conclusion, and in response stressed several points. ARFCOS service was available only along regularly scheduled routes. The system was limited by the aircraft and courier personnel available, both of which might have to be drawn from other resources if schedules were to be maintained. The ability of ARFCOS to meet a six-hour dispatch schedule, therefore, depended on local factors.  

(6) Thereafter, CINCPAC instructed his component commanders and COMUSMACV and COMUSMACTHAI that continuous coordination between the activity needing emergency service and the local Courier Transfer Section would be mandatory, and that CINCPAC must be informed of all essential matters affecting the ability to provide emergency air messenger service.  

CINCPAC COMMUNICATIONS CENTER  

(6) Teletype message traffic continued its spiraling increase in 1966 as the average number of messages processed monthly by the

1. CINCPAC ltr ser 0454, 11 May 66
2. JCS, J6M 197-66, 17 Jun 66
3. CINCPAC ltr ser 0645, 30 Jun 66
# MESSAGE DELIVERY TIME

1 OCTOBER 1966 — 31 DECEMBER 1966

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**NOTES:**

1. No entry indicates lack of sampling in the Computer Data Base.

**SOURCE:** J63
Communications Center rose to more than 57,000, about 15 percent over the 1965 average. Command messages, the messages routed to the CINCPAC staff for action or information, increased about 30 percent, which increased the actual workload for the center more than the 15 percent total message increase. FLASH and IMMEDIATE command messages increased by 56.7 percent and comprised approximately 1.3 percent of the messages routed to the staff. The incidence of Top Secret and Secret messages increased by about 26 percent. Average message length was up nearly 25 percent, indicating that the trend continued to be toward more and longer messages.

Modernization of CINCPAC's Communications Center was begun in September 1966 to provide better conformity with all requirements for electronic communications security. As both secure lines (called red lines) and non-secure lines that carried encrypted traffic (called black lines) terminated in the center, specific guidance that had been developed by the Navy was being followed in the modernization program to guarantee protection for both kinds of circuitry.

CASUALTY REPORTING FROM VIETNAM

As personnel casualties increased in South Vietnam, it became apparent in January 1966 that the large volume of individual personnel casualty reports was overburdening CINCPAC's communications facilities. In addition, the casualty records maintained at CINCPAC duplicated those maintained by the component commands. Therefore, CINCPAC tasked his component commanders to provide him with their consolidated weekly and monthly casualty statistics. This permitted deleting CINCPAC from the distribution of administrative messages pertaining to personnel.

1. This upward trend is revealed in monthly averages for a few recent years: 24,164 in 1961; 33,869 in 1963; and 49,390 in 1965.
2. J6 History, Dec 66
3. BUSHIPS Instr 011100.12C
4. J1 History, May 66
5. CINCPAC Inst 3040.1, 28 Feb 66; CINCPAC 012258Z May 66
casualties while retaining a source of such statistics. A significant
decrease in PRIORITY message traffic was noted by the Communications
Center as a direct result of this action.

IDENTIFICATION, FRIEND OR FOE (IFF)-GENERAL WARTIME
PROCEDURES

(5) Following informal US-UK discussions, 1 the JCS recommended
that CINCPAC implement IFF special wartime procedures in accordance
with Allied Communications Publication 160, US Supp-1, April 1966. 2
In response, CINCPAC recommended that existing procedures for the
use of IFF Mark X (Selective Identification Feature) in the PACOM
continue in effect. He also stated that the use of special wartime
procedures in PACOM would impair air defense posture at the most
critical time; also, problems would be encountered in training indigenous
personnel while at the same time maintaining a secure procedure for
implementation in a general war. 3

WESTPACNORTH INFORMATION UTILIZATION PROGRAM

(5) The Western Pacific North (WESTPACNORTH) Information
Utilization Program was to provide for compatibility among the air
warning and control systems operating in the WESTPACNORTH Region;
the implementation directive was signed on 11 February 1966 by the
Deputy Secretary of Defense. In response to a JCS request, CINCPAC
provided inputs as a basis for a JCS concept of operations for
WESTPACNORTH. 4 From 22 to 25 August a users conference was held
in Tokyo, Japan to develop a draft WESTPACNORTH Management
Program. 5 As of the end of the year, CINCPAC was preparing a review
of the draft WESTPACNORTH Integration Test Plan. His comments
were to be submitted to the Electronics Systems Division by 1 February
1967.

1. CINCPAC ltr 2380 ser 000331, 12 Aug 66
2. JCS 2934/162216Z Sep 66
3. CINCPAC 280356Z Oct 66
4. CINCPAC 122230Z Apr 66
5. CINCPAC 5400 ser 0966, 3 Oct 66
6. Hq Electronics Systems Division (Air Force Systems Command),
ESSGT, letter, 16 Dec 66. See also p 262

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LOGISTICS ACTIVITIES

AUTOMATIC DATA PROCESSING OF LOGISTIC PLANNING REQUIREMENTS

(U) CINCPAC had been conducting capabilities planning conferences since August 1965 to determine the amount of materiel and supplies it would be necessary to move to support both troops in place and additional forces for planned deployment to Southeast Asia. During the January-February 1966 conference, the need for automatic computer assistance to determine those requirements was established. In March a contract to develop such an assistance program was awarded to the Planning Research Corporation through the Navy Command Systems Support Activity. Tests of the program's results during the Force Requirements Conference at CINCPAC Headquarters in June indicated that the speed and accuracy of the computer method had tremendous advantages over the hand computation methods used before. The old methods took from two to three weeks; the computer reduced this time to a matter of hours, which permitted the logistics planner to evaluate his information concurrently with the forces planner.

(U) Methods used in making the computations were not altered, they were just automated. Experience had proved that logistic support requirements could be estimated using a factor method. This method applied troop strength against predetermined factors to assess resupply and support requirements. That is, if one man required so many pounds of certain classes of supplies for one day, the total supply requirement could be determined based on the total number of troops.

1. Conferences in addition to CINCPAC staff members regularly included representatives of the JCS Joint Staff, the Service Headquarters, CINCPAC's component commanders, COMUSMACV, and COMUSMCTHAI.
2. See "Requirements versus Capabilities, CINCPAC's Evaluation" in Chapter IV for an account of the conference.
3. CINCPAC forwarded to the JCS a logistic annex as part of a conference document "CINCPAC Capability Programs for CY 66 for Continuation of Military Operations in Southeast Asia and the Western Pacific and for Deployment of Additional US Forces, Personnel, and Material to PACOM", in CINCPAC ltr 3010 ser 00055, 12 Feb 66.
(U) The first requirement, therefore, was for an accurate troop strength list that revealed the geographic location of troops in place and troops scheduled to be deployed. For this program, each troop location was assigned a port of support in Vietnam (there were eight); in offshore locations, data was computed by country only, e.g., the Philippines, Okinawa. When all of the data was collected and furnished to the computer, the calculations revealed total personnel, by port of support, by month and by Service, for the planning period under consideration.

(U) This data could then be computed in another program that determined port requirements, expressed in tonnages per month. This was actually the principal program of the system. Information on eight major categories of support were added for this computation. These categories were resupply, the material of all types required by troops in combat or support assignments, considering their diverse requirements by Service or deployment area; supply buildup, the accumulation of supply reserves; unit equipment, the materiel integral to a specific organized military unit and included in its authorized Table of Organization and Equipment (TOE); construction tonnage; special projects tonnage, the tonnage that could not be assessed against specific units; Military Assistance Program tonnage; Agency for International Development tonnage; and air munitions.

1. Military forces already deployed in Vietnam formed the computer's base for additional troop introductions. All troops in country were included in the force conversion calculations.

2. In May 66 CINCPAC tasked his component commanders and COMUSMACV to review resupply planning factors to determine their applicability for the June Forces Requirements Conference. He also requested other data to aid in computation of tonnage requirements projected for new force requirements. Replies were received in May. CINCPAC 0703482 May 66; CINCUSARPAC GPO-PL 10173/130402 Z May 66; ADMIN CINCPACFLT 190127 Z May 66; CINCPACAF DMLW 45438/122032 Z May 66; COMUSMACV ltr ser 0601, 15 May 66

3. Not all of the categories of support were automated. The major and most complex categories, resupply and supply buildup, were automated in 1966. Plans included possible automation of unit equipment and construction tonnages. The other categories were still hand computed.
(U) Information on these eight categories massed together might also require computation against intra-coastal or retro-grade shipping factors, which were percentage measures of the additional movement of supplies that could be necessary from their port of arrival, either to some other place in Vietnam or back out of Vietnam to CONUS or other offshore locations.

(U) The total of the eight categories of supply support, considered with intra-coastal or retro-grade factors if necessary, was then compared to port capability, which was estimated by the logistic planner for each port or country for each month. The result of this comparison was a report that provided a time-phased expression of the capability of each location to accept the total estimated supply requirement in support of the force in place and under consideration. The final port requirement report contained two types of information. The first summarized all eight categories of support by port or country and by month over the planning period. This was useful in determining the capability of that individual port or country at a particular time; it also indicated which categories of support had the greatest requirement. The second part of the report added all months to provide a summary of the total planning requirement.

(U) The computer also furnished summary data on personnel tabulations and port requirements graphically. Another smaller, separate program computed personnel evacuation and replacement requirements.

(U) The great mass of data, then, when gathered and summarized, provided a graphic display of capability versus requirement at each location under consideration. Not only did these aid in assessing total impact, they enabled the logistics planner to expeditiously notify the force planner of considerations or constraints that might affect his plans. The summaries also provided a convenient tool for the transportation

1. Additional calculations were required for aircraft and small boats, which were not measured by tonnage as all other requirements were, but by type, as they often required special shipping or handling equipment.
planner to use to measure his specific movement requirements in support of the force under consideration.

(U) The mutual, timely, and more accurate planning by specialists in logistics, transportation, and force deployment that was possible as a result of computerization greatly enhanced CINCPAC's capabilities planning activities.

(U) During the week of 11 July the methodology, logic, and format of the Logistic Support Requirements program were briefed to members of the JCS staff, including the Director for Logistics of the JCS. Accomplishments of the briefings included an affirmation that the program would satisfy JCS staff requirements for detailed information required in support of future force deployment plans, a determination that CINCPAC's computer programs concerning logistics didn't contradict or duplicate other related efforts, and encouragement that CINCPAC should continue to explore and develop new applications of computer systems to problems in logistic support.

(U) The computer program was again used in support of a CINCPAC Capabilities Conference in October. Updated information was provided to all concerned, including staff representatives from the JCS and the Services.

GENERAL PURCHASING AGENCY SYSTEM FOR WESTERN PACIFIC ESTABLISHED

(U) CINCPAC established a General Purchasing Agency System in June 1966 to coordinate procurement and consolidate US purchases made in various Western Pacific countries, particularly those purchases made in support of the war in Southeast Asia. The objective of the new system was to minimize competition for supplies and services among the elements of the Defense Department or between that Department and other US Government purchasing agencies.

2. CINCPAC 010600Z Oct 66; J4 History, Oct 66
3. Point Paper, J4226, 19 Nov 66
4. CINCPAC 092153Z Mar 66
(U) Prior to this CINCPAC control, there had been cases of competition among US Contracting Offices for sources of supply (including inter-Service competition), a resulting inflationary price escalation, only perfunctory compliance with statutory and regulatory requirements, and failure to exploit competition among sellers to the best advantage of the United States.

(U) A CINCPAC Instruction of 17 June provided guidance for the establishment and operation of General Purchasing Agencies, which were then created in Korea, Japan, Okinawa, Taiwan, the Philippines, Thailand, and Vietnam. The agencies were under operational control of CINCPAC's subordinate commanders or representatives in those countries.

(U) The General Purchasing Agencies were not actually purchasing or buying agencies. Procurement remained a Service responsibility. The new agencies were tasked to study local economic environment and develop programs to achieve desired domestic economic stability commensurate with operational requirements.

(U) The agencies were charged to: insure cooperation among all US procurement activities; prevent competition among US agencies whenever practicable; coordinate local purchase with the overall supply program of the command or area; and maintain liaison and exchange information with the other General Purchasing Agencies.

(U) In addition to the seven General Purchasing Agencies that were established, CINCPAC created Branch Procurement Offices in Singapore and Hong Kong; these are discussed below.

(U) CINCPAC planned to convene conferences among members of the agencies and branch offices about every six months to exchange information and discuss mutual problems. The first such conference was held at CINCPAC Headquarters on 8 and 9 September. Representatives of all agencies and branch offices and of the component commands met

1. CINCPAC Instruction 4200.2, General Purchasing Agency System Within the Pacific Command
2. CINCPAC 090344Z Jul 66
with CINCPAC staff members and were oriented on the status of implementation of the new program. A second meeting was scheduled to be held early in 1967.

The Branch Procurement Offices in Singapore and Hong Kong were created and designed to satisfy special needs. Availability of material in Singapore to meet increased requirements in Southeast Asia had increased the purchasing activities of numerous PACOM organizations there. As most of the Singapore purchasing was done by the Air Force, CINCPAC assigned responsibility for the establishment and operation of the office to CINCPACAF. Through the US Embassy, the branch office established liaison with the Singapore Economic Development Board and the Singapore Port Authority.

All PACOM procurement agencies were required to submit their requests for any Singapore purchases to the branch office for assistance and, if necessary, liaison with local Government agencies. Purchase requests from any such activity could also be submitted with a request that the Singapore office effect procurement, and inspect and accept material acquired. In 1966 the office's staff was still formulating its operating procedures. By 1 January 1967 it was expected to be fully operational with a strength of nine, including specialists in procurement, transportation, and supply.

The Hong Kong Branch Procurement Office was also charged with reviewing all purchases or recruitment actions that were contemplated to be made in or from Hong Kong. CINCPAC assigned responsibility for establishment and operation of that office to CINCPACFLT. A potential danger existed in Hong Kong: the Defense Department could have placed orders with firms there that might, in turn, have placed subcontracts with sources in or controlled by Communist China. CINCPAC investigated procedures used by the Services, however.

1. Point Paper, J4226, 19 Nov 66
2. Point Paper, J4226, 9 Nov 66
and concluded that on the whole the procedures used had been effective in assuring compliance with the Trading With the Enemy Act and the regulations that implemented it.\textsuperscript{1} CINCPAC's Instruction of 17 June required that all contracting officers assure that contractors and subcontractors obtain advance clearance from the Hong Kong office for any procurement or recruitment in Hong Kong.

NEW PROCUREMENT AGENCIES AND PROCUREMENT ACTIVITIES

(U) In addition to CINCPAC's new General Purchasing Agency System, several other agencies associated with US military procurement in foreign countries were established in 1966. These agencies were involved in the actual purchase of foreign goods or services.

Taiwan

(U) In February CINCPAC was urged by the US Ambassador to Taiwan and COMUSTDC, as well as Army procurement authorities in PACOM, to establish in Taiwan a branch purchasing office of the US Army Procurement Agency, Japan.\textsuperscript{2} Many items that were being purchased in Japan for shipment to Vietnam were available for purchase in Taiwan, he was told. Establishment of a branch purchasing office in Taiwan would shorten air and sealift distance by half and would also lower costs. In addition, it would broaden the industrial base from which the United States made overseas purchases and, because of competition among sellers, would significantly reduce prices.

(U) CINCPAC agreed that such a branch office was needed and on 28 April directed CINCUSARPAC to establish one. The new branch became fully operational in 1966.

\begin{enumerate}
\item CINCPAC 170311Z May 66
\item USARJ 210750Z Feb 66; AMEMB TAIPEI TO CINCPAC 188/280955Z Feb 66; Point Paper, J4221, 3 May 66
\end{enumerate}
Philippines

(☐) Philippine Government officials and businessmen were aware that the United States made substantial purchases in foreign countries. They wanted an opportunity to supply their products, and wanted the United States to establish an office in Manila that would not only accept their offers but also be a source of information on US requirements. The US Ambassador, therefore, recommended to the Secretary of State that a procurement office be opened in Manila.

(U) To explore and evaluate the Ambassador's recommendation, CINCPAC formed a team headed by his representative in the Philippines to determine the most effective means of assuring that Philippine firms were afforded the opportunity they sought. The team met on 6 July in the Philippines; they recommended establishment of a Manila procurement information center to be operated by the USAF Branch Procurement Office. CINCPAC directed the establishment of this information center by CINCPACAF, as an interim measure, but he also recognized the need for a Joint Service Procurement Office, and in July he directed his component commanders to establish such an activity. On 8 August the US Military Procurement Information Center opened for business.

Australia

(U) Although the magnitude of US purchases in Australia for military needs had been about $23 million in FY 65 and the same again in FY 66, a decision to establish a procurement office there had been deferred by Defense Department officials until they observed a clearer need for one. These officials were concerned whether Australia could fully compete with US and other country sources in matters of quality, cost, and timeliness of delivery.

1. Point Paper, J4226, 12 Sep 66
2. AMEMB MANILA 040135Z Jun 66; AMEMB MANILA 301020Z Jun 66
3. CINCPAC 182337Z Jun 66
4. CINCPACREP PHIL 072245Z Jul 66
5. CINCPAC 162133Z Jul 66
6. Point Paper J4221, 13 Jul 66
During a 25 April meeting between the US Deputy Secretary of Defense and Australia's Defense Secretary Sir Edwin Hicks, Deputy Secretary Vance suggested that a procurement team from Japan be sent to insure that Australia was given full opportunity to participate in US procurement programs in support of Vietnam.  

In May the US Ambassador to Australia announced his desire to expedite establishment of a purchasing office there. In June CINCPAC directed that a procurement team be formed to visit Australia. The team consisted of representatives from CINCPAC, his component commands, the Commanding General, US Army Japan, and was headed by the commanding officer of the US Army Procurement Agency, Japan.  

After their 26 July – 3 August visit, team members agreed that assignment of a procurement specialist to Australia would be beneficial to both Governments. CINCPAC concurred and recommended that such a procurement officer be sent to Australia. The team concluded that Australia would probably not be too successful in obtaining short-term emergency orders to satisfy Vietnam needs. The Australians were more interested in providing military items that were in somewhat common use between Australian and US Forces in order to maintain their defense production and support capability. The Australian Department of Supply gave the team a list of items they wanted to supply on a regular basis.

Korea

A Defense Department team surveyed military procurement in Japan and Korea in January to assure that Korean sources were being given full opportunity to compete for US purchases. The team found that the Army was by far the predominant buyer of Korean-produced supplies, and that Army concurrent solicitation procedures established in 1965 provided good assurance of full opportunity for Korea.

1. Agreed Minute, Deputy Secretary Vance/Secretary Hicks Meeting on US-Australia Cooperative Logistics, Washington, DC, 25 Apr 66
2. USARMA CANBERRA U-25-66/020137Z May 66
3. CINCPAC 150516Z Jul 66
4. CINCPAC 122320Z Sep 66
5. Point Paper, J4221, 24 Jun 66
Some question did exist, however, whether major opportunities for sales in Vietnam were being fully exploited. As a follow-up, in March the team surveyed Defense Department procurement in Vietnam and determined that no procuring activity there had any Korean firms on its bid list.

The Secretary of State advised in March that the US commitment on Defense Department procurement in Korea (in partial return for Korean troop support in Vietnam) was framed in very general terms. The Secretary of Defense therefore suggested an annual procurement ceiling of $75 million to satisfy this commitment. In May, he directed the Army to purchase uniforms and other clothing from Korea, provided that Korea had the production capability, could meet specifications and delivery dates, and would sell at prices equal to or lower than those of other Far East sources. In addition, he directed that orders for the following specific items were to be placed with Korean sources (provided that they were to be purchased from non-US sources): jungle shoes, tents, duffle bags, shelter halves, electrolytic copper wire, and uniforms and other clothing for Korean and Vietnamese Forces in Vietnam.¹

CONSOLIDATION OF ARMY LOGISTICAL CENTER WITH ARMY DEPOT, JAPAN

(U) Action began in 1966 to consolidate the US Army Logistical Center, Japan (USALCJ) with the US Army Depot, Japan (USADJ) at Sagami. After all stocks were removed from the USALCJ, the Tokorozawa installation was to become a contingency facility.²

(U) Consolidation was originally recommended in the spring of 1965 by a Department of the Army team studying means of reducing the gold flow.³

1. Deputy Secretary of Defense Memo to Department of the Army, 23 May 66 (S)
2. DA ltr AGAM-P (M) (23 Sep 66) LOG/SM-SPSB 9826, Transfer of US Army Logistical Center, Japan to Department of the Army, 27 Sep 66 (U)
3. CPRS 0001899-65; Point Paper, J4312, 4 May 66
Although both CINCUSARPAC and CINCPAC had originally non-concurred with the proposal, both, after further study, withdrew their objections. The actual transfer was approved by the Secretary of Defense in July 1966. He stipulated that the Department of the Army assume responsibility for programming, budgeting, and funding the activity. The transfer of ownership of stock was effective 1 July 1966, but actual physical movement was not expected to be completed until 30 June 1967.

(U) The long-range objective of the consolidation was to adopt a single common supply system for the support of US, Vietnamese, and other Free World Forces in Vietnam, and for the support of the Military Assistance Program (MAP) in PACOM. The consolidated depot would permit continuous review of asset requirements and availability. The MAP would benefit by being removed from the requirement for budgeting and programming for the operation of a duplicative logistic facility. MAP-recipient supply procedures were unchanged; requisitions were to be handled as in any CONUS Army Depot.

(U) The USALCJ inventory was to be retained as a separate entity for control purposes to assure minimum disruption of support for forces in Vietnam or of the MAP, but a revised consolidated system was to be in use for all stocks by 1 July 1967.

MILITARY AIRLIFT COMMAND REPRESENTATIVES REQUESTED FOR PACOM

(U) Admiral Sharp, in a late December message to General Estes, Commanding General of the Military Airlift Command (MAC), remarked

1. CINCPAC 040740Z May 65
2. CINCPAC 020258Z Apr 66
3. SEC DEF 5688/021943Z Jul 66
that the need for improved MAC-PACOM liaison had become evident in view of the increasing intermix of operations between the two intra-theater airlift systems.\(^1\) The requirement for closer liaison had been highlighted by a CINCPAC review of total theater airlift requirements, by the findings of the PACOM Joint Transportation Board, and because of a disparity between the commands in the use of technical terms and methods of computing operating statistics.\(^2\)

(U) The Admiral stated that the assignment of qualified MAC representatives at CINCPAC's Headquarters and at the Western Pacific Transportation Office at Tachikawa Air Base in Japan would quicken response to growing intra-theater airlift requirements and prove mutually beneficial by accelerating solutions to matters of joint PACOM-MAC concern.

(U) The representative assigned to CINCPAC's Headquarters could provide inter-command coordination and liaison; technical advice to CINCPAC, his staff, and his component commanders; assistance to the CINCPAC staff in addressing MAC airlift matters; and reliable guidance and information for use of the PACOM Joint Transportation Board.

(U) The representative in Japan could provide coordination and liaison to insure optimum use of intra-theater airlift capability; joint review of airlift requirements in order to apply total PACOM airlift resources prior to requests for MAC support by the Services, and standardization of procedures for the control and use of intra-theater airlift.

\(^1\) CINCPAC 272239Z Dec 66
\(^2\) In July 66 the JCS, to insure that theater airlift capability was fully exploited, implemented a procedure that required CINCPAC to verify that any requests for Special Assignment Airlift Missions (SAAM), which were submitted from PACOM through Service channels to the MAC, could not be satisfied by aircraft assigned or organic to PACOM. CINCPAC was also required to designate a SAAM priority. CINCPAC, in turn, named the Chief of his WestPac Transportation Office to act for him in any such matters that pertained to SAAM requirements west of Guam. JCS 6731/142120Z Jul 66; CINCPAC 270114Z Jul 66
(U) In response to Admiral Sharp's proposal, General Estes agreed to assign a senior military representative to the 61st Military Airlift Wing at Hickam Air Force Base with duty as MAC Liaison Officer, CINCPAC Headquarters. The decision to provide a MAC liaison officer at the Western Pacific Transportation Office was deferred pending later review of this requirement.

LOC CAPABILITY STUDY - INDONESIA AND MALAYSIA

(0) In response to a JCS requirement, a CINCPAC staff committee prepared an LOC Capability Study of Indonesia and Malaysia. The study, which was completed in April, determined the maximum number of US Armed Forces that could be supported in Malaysia and Indonesia, and described specific logistic limitations that could prejudice US military operations in those countries.

1. MAC MACCO 35054/311632Z Dec 66
2. JCS Memo DJSM-1413-65, 26 Nov 65; CINCPAC ltr 4000 ser 000141, 11 Apr 66
PERSONNEL ACTIVITIES

DESIGNATION OF SERVICE RESPONSIBILITY FOR MANNING MAAG CHIEF POSITIONS

(U) In June the JCS provided new selection procedures and factors to be used in recommending the Service to fill key positions within the MAAGs, MAP Missions, MILGPs and Defense Attaches. 1 Annually, after submission of the Military Assistance five-year plan CINCPAC was to recommend to the JCS the Service that was to be responsible for manning Chiefs of MAAG and MAP Mission positions due for rotation within the second succeeding 12-month period. Where appropriate CINCPAC was to submit recommendations concurrently as to the Service to man the deputy chief of staff position. Other key MAP positions would continue to be considered during the normal review of Joint Tables of Distribution.

SERVICE RESPONSIBILITY FOR MANNING POSITIONS OF CHIEF AND CHIEF OF STAFF, JUSMAG PHILIPPINES

(U) In August CINCPAC recommended to the JCS that the Army continue as the Service responsible for manning the position of CHJUSMAG Philippines, and the Air Force continue as the Service responsible for manning the position of Chief of Staff. 2 Nomination of an Army general officer as next CHJUSMAG Philippines was received in November. 3

SERVICE RESPONSIBILITY FOR MANNING POSITIONS OF CHIEF AND CHIEF OF STAFF, MAAG CHINA

(U) In September CINCPAC recommended to the JCS that the Army continue as the Service responsible for manning the position of CHMAAG China, and the Air Force continue as the Service responsible for manning the position of Chief of Staff. 4 Approval of this recommendation was received in November. 5

1. JCS Memo SM-508-66, 25 Jun 66
2. CINCPAC 282343Z Aug 66
3. DA 791047/191706Z Nov 66
4. CINCPAC 070505Z Sep 66
5. JCS 9065/291730Z Nov 66
CONTINUED PERSONNEL STRENGTH REDUCTION IN MAAG CHINA

On 3 June 1966 the JCS approved the 1 July 1967 Joint Manpower Program (JMP) for MAAG China effective 1 July 1966 as recommended by CINC PAC. The Joint Table of Distribution for FY 67 and 68 contained in the JMP authorized a total strength of 814, a decrease of 75 from the previous year. This reduction, based on a manpower survey conducted internally by MAAG China in the fall of 1965, continued the CINC PAC program of personnel strength reductions based on increasing Chinese self-sufficiency.

CIVILIANIZATION PROGRAM

Phase 1

(U) At JCS direction, in the fall of 1965 CINC PAC submitted a list of military manpower spaces from PACOM joint activities that could be converted to civilian spaces during January to June 1966, July to December 1966, and January to June 1967. Spaces were chosen for their time frames based on rotation dates of incumbents to minimize personnel turbulence. CINC PAC's submission bore the caveat that several months lead time had to be provided because of the necessity for CONUS recruiting and obtaining security clearances. On 27 June 1966 CINC PAC was informed that only the July to December 1966 program had been approved, and that it was desired that every effort be made to accomplish conversion of the 123 spaces assigned PACOM by 31 December. CINC PAC informed the JCS that every effort would be made, but that considerations expressed in earlier correspondence were still applicable.

1. JCS 3516/031452Z Jun 66
2. CINC PAC ltr ser 973, 18 Mar 66
3. CINC PAC ltr ser 001678-65, 30 Nov 65
4. MJCS-161-66, 23 Jun 66
5. ADMINO CINC PAC 042050Z Jul 66
(U) As forecast, delays in conversions resulted from the requirement for CONUS recruiting and obtaining security clearances for US citizens in-country. Other difficulties stemmed from the necessity for substituting spaces between activities to reflect changes in manpower documents occurring between submission of the program in 1965 and approval in 1966, and from the delay in approval of the USMACTHAI-JUSMAGTHAI Joint Table of Distribution. In December, the JCS informed CINCPAC that relief in the form of extending the time period for conversion was under consideration. By 31 December 1966, 36 spaces had been converted and the program of recruiting and conversion of spaces continued.

Phase 2

(U) In August, the JCS informed CINCPAC of a Phase 2 follow-on civilian substitution program and requested that CINCPAC identify military spaces recommended for conversion to civilian spaces during FY 68. CINCPAC's recommendations were submitted to the JCS in early September. In late November, the JCS advised CINCPAC of approval of a program totaling 32 spaces to be converted during FY 68.

FUND DRIVES FOR VOLUNTARY HEALTH AND WELFARE AGENCIES

(U) In June 1966 the Secretary of Defense established a Defense Department Overseas Combined Federal Campaign to be conducted beginning in FY 67. Single combined solicitation to be conducted in March and April of each year was to replace three separate campaigns.

1. CINCPAC 142116Z Jan 67
2. JCS 9663/062029Z Dec 66
3. JCS 1498/312117Z Aug 66
4. CINCPAC 092040Z Sep 66
5. MJCS-342-66, 29 Nov 66
6. DOD Instruction 5035.5, DOD Overseas Combined Federal Fund-Raising Campaign, 14 Jun 66
formerly conducted for the benefit of the American National Red Cross, American Overseas Agencies, and National Health Agencies. The Overseas Combined Federal Campaign-Pacific was established in August 1966 with the appointment of a PACOM coordinating committee. Plans for the inaugural campaign of spring 1967 were made during a conference at Camp Smith on 21 and 22 November 1966. Representatives of the Secretary of Defense, CINCPAC, his component commanders, CG FMFPAC, and the recipient agencies participated.

BOY SCOUT CONFERENCE

(U) At the request of the National Council of the Boy Scouts of America, and with the concurrence of the Secretary of Defense and the military departments, CINCPAC hosted a conference of Boy Scout executives and leaders from the National, Aloha, and Far East Councils on 10 November 1966. The conference was attended by representatives of CINCPAC's component commanders, CG FMFPAC, and COMUS Japan. Discussion of problems of operation and support of Boy Scout activities, particularly those serving military dependents, resulted in improved methods of administration and support and renewed mutual pledges of cooperation.

CREDIT UNIONS

(U) Prior to 1966, Credit Unions operated in overseas areas without Defense Department supervision. Commanders furnished guidance based on their respective Service regulations and there was a variance in operating procedures from one area to another. On 3 March 1966 the Defense Department issued a directive to bring all overseas Credit Unions under common regulations. CINCPAC implemented these instructions and tasked his component commanders and CINCPACREPs with the responsibility for establishing and monitoring Credit Unions.

1. CINCPACINST 5340.1, DOD Overseas Combined Federal Fund-Raising Campaign-Pacific, 13 Aug 66
2. CINCPAC ltr ser 594, 26 Jan 67
3. DOD Directive 1000.10, 3 Mar 66
4. CINCPACINST 5381.1, 19 Aug 1966
Subsequently a Defense Department task group visited PACOM and informally indicated that certain changes to the Defense Department directive would be recommended during 1967.
FIELD PRESS CENSORSHIP CONFERENCE

A policy of voluntary press censorship continued to be followed in Vietnam. Secretary of Defense McNamara, however, requested that preparations be made in order that a field press censorship program could, if required, be imposed within 90 days of receipt of orders. A planning conference to develop such a program was held at CINCPAC 24 to 26 May 1966. Representatives from the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs, CINCPAC, COMUSMACV, and CINCPAC's component commands attended. A directive for the Secretary of Defense was prepared at the conference for use in Vietnam in the event field press censorship should be applied there. The plan also included all of Southeast Asia and appropriate third countries in its scope.

PUBLIC AFFAIRS ACTIVITIES DURING PRESIDENTIAL VISITS

News that President Johnson would meet in Hawaii on 6 February with South Vietnam's Premier Nguyen Cao Ky and Chief of State Nguyen Van Thieu arrived very shortly before the meeting. CINCPAC's Public Affairs Office had only 32 hours to develop a system for accrediting 450 news correspondents, which had to be coordinated with the Secret Service; to establish a Press Center at Camp Smith with adequate communications services; and to arrange for continuous liaison with the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs and other interested agencies.

The newsman were accredited in time to cover the arrival of the President at the airport, and the Camp Smith Press Center was fully operational when the conference began. The press center had 70 telephone lines to Honolulu and facilities for direct long distance dialing, which was a unique service in Hawaii where direct long distance dialing

1. CINCPAC Command History, 1965, p 55
2. J74 History, May 66
3. J74 History, Feb 66

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to the Mainland was not yet routinely commercially available. The component commanders assisted by providing public affairs personnel to maintain full-time manning of the press center and the CINCPAC Public Affairs Office. The Fleet Marine Force, Pacific Photo Laboratory was also available full-time to provide emergency service to news photographers.

(U) The expedited planning and effective operation of the Public Affairs Office during the conference were noted by the White House Press Secretary and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs.

(U) Eight months later, President Johnson stopped in Hawaii again, this time accompanied by Mrs. Johnson, enroute to the Seven Nation Conference in Manila in October. CINCPAC was directed to provide logistic support for the White House press corps throughout the President's Pacific trip. By special request of a Presidential staff member, the CINCPAC Public Affairs Officer went to Manila to assist in press arrangements there.

(U) The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs later provided copies of the procedures developed by CINCPAC during the two Presidential visits to the commanders of other unified and specified commands and the military departments.

ASIAN JOURNALISTS VISIT PACOM

(U) Members of the foreign press were periodically hosted by CINCPAC in order that they might help to improve the understanding of the peoples of Asia regarding US military policy and objectives in the PACOM. Sometimes these tours were initiated by Admiral Sharp, as was the case with a group of 10 Filipino newsmen who were hosted for a nine-day June-July tour of Okinawa, Guam, and Hawaii. In other instances, journalists from nations, protectorates, or colonies throughout the Pacific area visited CINCPAC and PACOM military

1. J74 History, Oct 66
2. CINCPAC Command History, 1964, p 57
3. J74 History, Jul 66
installations as part of more extensive tours of military, governmental, civic, and cultural facilities throughout the United States. On these tours visitors usually stayed in Hawaii about four or five days. One such group of journalists visited CINCPAC in January, another group of 20 in September. These longer tours were sponsored jointly by the State and Defense Departments and the US Information Agency.

MOBILE PUBLIC AFFAIRS TEAM

(U) The CINCPAC Mobile Public Affairs Team, which was established in the CINCPAC staff early in 1966, carried out its first operational assignment. In February the three-man team was dispatched to Vietnam on a 33-day shakedown mission. They compiled a photo report of the Vietnamese agrarian economy, farming methods, marketing, transportation, port activity, and construction techniques, as well as taking a series of aerial photos. Copies of all color slides were given to COMUSMACV for use in briefings. Originals of the slides and all motion picture film were retained at CINCPAC Headquarters to develop a film library. In March, the team was ordered to Korea, Japan, and Okinawa to photograph artillery operations, civic action, combat patrolling, hospital facilities, and repair facilities.

NBC- TV ARMED FORCES DAY SPECIAL PROGRAM

(U) NBC-TV filmed a CINCPAC sequence for inclusion in its 1966 Armed Forces Day hour-long special program "The Anatomy of Defense," which was telecast on 21 May. The telecast opened with a regular meeting of Defense Secretary McNamara and the JCS in Washington. A question was raised regarding a current happening in the Vietnam War. For an immediate reply, a phone call to Admiral Sharp (the scene shifted to CINCPAC Headquarters), who had the answers for Washington on the airstrike results. In addition to shots of the

1. J74 History, Jan, Sep 66
2. CINCPAC Command History, 1965, p 55
3. J74 History, Mar 66
4. J74 History, Apr 66
Vietnam war, activities under CINCPAC direction in Korea and Thailand were shown. The "anatomy" of the title concerned the structure and relationships of command from the President to the Secretary of Defense to the JCS to the unified and specified commanders. In addition to the CINCPAC segment, leaders and activities of other commands around the world were shown. This was the first television network coverage of all unified and specified commands.
CHAPTER II
CINCPAC ACTIONS INFLUENCING THE STATE OF READINESS
OF ALLIED NATIONS IN THE PACOM AREA

"...the proposed fiscal year 1967 Military Assistance Program
calls for...

-Effective coordination between economic and military
  programs. There will be no change in existing
  policy and procedures for coordinating military
  assistance with economic assistance and foreign
  policy.
-Greater emphasis on civic action programs for nation
  building.
-Emphasis on training and education of foreign military
  personnel.
-Continued shift from grant aid to military sales
  whenever possible."

Robert S. McNamara
Secretary of Defense, March 1966

(6) Important changes in the worldwide Military Assistance Pro-
gram (MAP) were initiated in late 1965 and 1966. Some of these changes
were variant expressions of past efforts to achieve efficiency and econ-
omy. The proved value of longer-term programming was recognized
in the expressions of a need for longer-term funding. There were numer-
ous indications of closer coordination of military and economic assistance.
Civic action in the MAP and MAP training received greater emphasis,
and the effort to shift from grant aid to military sales became more im-
portant.

($) An important instrument of change was the reappraisal of the
FY 67-71 MAP, which was completed in 1965 by the staff of Deputy
Assistant Secretary of Defense Townsend Hoopes. The findings of the
Hoopes study greatly influenced the primary document on the worldwide
MAP, namely, the "Memorandum to the President on Military Assistance
Program FY 1967-71," which was submitted on 3 December 1965. The
provisions of this memorandum were in turn incorporated in the Defense
Department's draft update of Part I of the Military Assistance Manual
(MAM), which elaborated in greater detail the magnitude and charac-
ter of the five-year plan.

1. CINCPAC Command History, 1965, p 78
MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT ON MAP FY 67-71

The 3 December 1965 memorandum to the President contained the following conclusions that were particularly relevant to PACOM: the undiminished Soviet military threat was qualified by Soviet intentions, whereas the communist Chinese threat was growing in terms of both intent and capability. Thus the center of gravity had shifted eastward resulting in an increase in the relative importance of PACOM countries (plus India) to US defense. Concurrently the character of the threat had also changed in that nuclear and large-scale conventional war became more latent while insurgency-type conflict became more active. This created a general need, particularly in underdeveloped countries, to reduce MAP emphasis on external defenses and increase the emphasis on internal security. Of PACOM countries, the Philippines and Thailand required greater emphasis on internal defenses, and the Republics of Korea and China needed greater emphasis on external defenses. Major emphasis on both internal and external defenses was considered necessary for Vietnam and Laos. The rationale for shifting the assistance to a country from the MAP to the regular budget of the Defense Department was described in the memorandum, and it was recommended that Vietnam be moved from MAP to the Defense Department. The Secretary of Defense also recommended that economic aid and military assistance be handled by separate legislation.

The conclusions contained in the 3 December memorandum were clearly reflected in the Defense Department’s draft update of Part I of the MAM. On 6 December the JCS requested that CINCPAC review the draft and provide comments and recommendations. CINCPAC referred the JCS to a detailed study of the draft of the Hoopes reappraisal, which had been submitted in 1965. He also noted other studies of closely related problems, including the following: (1) anticipated military risks during FY 67-71; (2) force levels to offset military risks; (3) funding

1. CINCPAC 270734Z Jul 65
2. CINCPAC 041950Z Oct 65
3. CINCPAC 301210Z Nov 65
levels for PACOM countries; and (4) recommendations regarding US Force objectives in support of the Joint Strategic Objectives Plan.

(9) CINCPAC studied the proposed changes to Part I of the MAM and again made recommendations that reflected concern about reducing MAP-supported forces. CINCPAC made the following specific comments concerning PACOM countries:

Republic of China

(9) CINCPAC did not concur in reduction of the amphibious, armored, and artillery capabilities of Chinese forces. He considered that these reductions would result in force imbalance and unacceptable deficiencies in firepower and mobility. Reduction in the Chinese force levels from 612,000 to 458,000, including a reduction of Army and Marine ground forces to 300,000, was opposed as tactically unsound, undesirable in terms of manpower available for employment with US or allied forces, and an action that could be taken as a sign of weakening US resolve. CINCPAC pointed out that the reduced ceiling would not only jeopardize investment type improvements, it would also hinder China's MAP Transfer Program and other self-sufficiency efforts, such as increased internal defense budgeting, the Foreign Military Sales effort, and the program to expand in-country productivity. The concern of CINCPAC and the Country Team about the risks and disadvantages that would result from the deterioration of Chinese military capabilities during future years is discussed more fully later in this Chapter.

Republic of Korea

(6) CINCPAC had reservations about reducing Korean ground forces from 18 to 15 divisions. He recommended reconsideration and clarification of the assumption that one of the two US divisions

1. CINCPAC 050355Z Oct 65
2. CINCPAC 1tr ser 00378, 25 Oct 65
3. CINCPAC 210240Z Dec 65
would be withdrawn from Korea. Noting the Joint Strategic Objectives Plan force requirement of 18 divisions, CINCPAC stated that Korea was already 5 divisions short of the minimum force required to contain a North Korean and Chinese communist assault, the threat of which had not decreased. He pointed out that the decision to charge the cost of offshore procurement of MAP Transfer items to the country program had the effect of reducing Korean MAP ceilings. CINCPAC urged that the new increases in MAP ceilings be considered in light of this effect. The impact of this problem on the overall program is described in detail in the Korea section of this Chapter.

Philippines

(§) CINCPAC agreed with the emphasis in the draft MAM on internal security in the Philippines but, because of SEATO commitments and the threat in the southern islands, he considered it desirable to develop greater combat capability for at least two of the battalion combat teams. CINCPAC also believed that at least two squadrons equipped with F-5 jet aircraft were needed in the Philippine Air Force. These jet tactical fighter squadrons were, in CINCPAC's view, required for air-ground roles in internal security and counterinsurgency. CINCPAC emphasized the US need for base rights and Philippine support in Vietnam, and the threat in the South; he urged a program that would in effect add $11 million to that proposed by the Defense Department.

Thailand

(§) CINCPAC concurred that Thailand could be viewed as oriented primarily to internal defense, but he recommended that Thailand be capable of conducting holding operations in the event of attack in order to retain the LOCs and bases required by US or SEATO Forces. CINCPAC also recommended that the MAP should generally not support Thai external defense forces at the expense of counterinsurgency, which should have priority. Further, CINCPAC noted that the draft MAM tied increases in Thai MAP ceilings to quid pro quo Thai action in non-military matters. CINCPAC considered that the MAP should be based on
Thai capability to man, use, and maintain equipment and facilities, and that non-military matters should be handled through the State Department.

JCS Comments

(§) In February the JCS also reviewed the draft update of Part I of the MAM. The JCS position generally paralleled that of CINCPAC. The JCS, however, emphasized that existing US Force commitments pointed up the danger of relying too heavily on US Forces and reducing indigenous forces. The JCS also urged that the interdependence of the Joint Strategic Objectives Plan and the MAM be specifically included in the MAM. They noted that no planning guidance had been included to assist in the intended increase in credit assistance and military sales. The JCS recommended a closely-coordinated program that contained grant aid, credit assistance, and military sales that would result in individual country annual packages that furthered attainment of force objectives. The fundamental JCS point was that the Joint Strategic Objectives Plan should continue to be the document that furnished strategic guidance to unified commanders for the US position with respect to military assistance.

FY 67-72 MAP REVIEW BY CINCPAC

(§) Following receipt in February of the Secretary of Defense's dollar guidelines for the period ending in FY 72, the PACOM MAAGs and Country Teams began the task of adjusting their programs accordingly. The Secretary of Defense noted that the guidelines were to be considered program targets rather than fixed ceilings and were subject to change if justification existed. It was also noted that the ceilings for Laos would be increased if the war in Vietnam continued beyond June 1967. CINCPAC prepared and forwarded instructions and guidance for the MAAGs to assist them in updating their country

1. JCSM-73-66, 3 Feb 66
2. SECDEF 121958Z Feb 66
Military Assistance Plans. 1

(6) Although the annual spring update of country programs at CINCPAC Headquarters was cancelled, it was recognized that a visit of CINCPAC personnel to MAP countries during preparation of the FY 67-72 Plan would be mutually beneficial. Accordingly, small teams from the CINCPAC staff were sent to each country to assist in updating the country Military Assistance Plans. 2

(6) In March CINCPAC received the Defense Department approved Part I of the MAM. 3 Included in this key document on MAP objectives were major revisions including several policy changes. To assist the MAAGs in developing their FY 67-72 Military Assistance Plans, the revised Part I was republished as the CINCPAC MAM, with certain parts amplified considerably. 4 One of the changes in the revised MAM was the lessening of dependence on the Joint Strategic Objectives Plan for general guidance on plans and programs. Guidance was added on (1) the worldwide strategic framework within which MAP must operate during the plan years; (2) the relationship between US and indigenous forces; and (3) MAP support for external defense forces as against support for internal forces. 5

(6) Several chapters in the MAM were completely revised. A new training chapter emphasized the high priority that was to be given to future training programs. The new civic action chapter followed Defense Department guidance on nation building. The PACOM Country Logistics Improvement Plan was explained in greater detail in a new chapter that emphasized developing the plan as a combined host country-US effort.

(6) A section was added to furnish guidance on Foreign Military Sales, and military sales references and documentary authorities were included. It appeared, however, that the MAAGs would in the future

1. CINCPAC 220447Z Feb 66
2. CINCPAC 162328Z Mar 66
3. OASD/ISA ltr I-21, 288/66, 10 Mar 66
4. CINCPAC ltr ser 00633, 16 Apr 66
5. J5/Memo/00212-66, 4 Apr 66
require more detailed policy and procedural guidance for orderly expansion of military sales activity.

(8) During his review of FY 67-72 MAP, CINCPAC supervised the expansion of the narrative sections of the country Military Assistance Plans. It was pointed out to the MAAGs that the Secretary of Defense's International Security Affairs regional directors, members of the JCS, and staff officers relied heavily on the narrative portion for briefings, backup material, and program justifications submitted to the Executive Branch and Congressional committees.

(8) After the FY 67-72 MAP was submitted by CINCPAC, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs requested that the JCS review not only the CINCPAC plan but those of other unified commanders. The JCS concluded that the FY 67-72 MA plans did not provide adequate funding for essential military needs or for the attainment of Joint Strategic Objectives Plan FY 68-75 force levels. The JCS concluded that Congressional proposals for further fund reductions and restrictions on the MAP would seriously impair national military strategy in support of foreign policy objectives.

FY 67 MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM

(8) On 1 February, President Johnson presented the foreign aid program to Congress. The President departed from previous procedures by forwarding the economic and military aid programs in separate legislation. The FY 67 MAP was transmitted to Congress as the Military Assistance and Sales Act of 1966. Important features of the military aid request were: (1) a request for five-year fund authorizations for the MAP; (2) obligational authority for $917 million for FY 67; and (3) a request for authority to furnish aid to Indonesia on the basis of a Presidential determination.

(8) Legislative action on foreign aid was slow, with considerable House and Senate interaction. In late summer the Secretary of

1. J03/Memo, 4 May 66
2. ISA Memorandum 1-10278/66, 25 Jul 66 (S)
SECRET

Defense took steps to fund essential items of the FY 67 MAP under the provisions of continuing resolution authority.  

§ On 9 September Congress completed action on a consolidated military and economic aid authorization bill. The Foreign Assistance Act was passed in the form of an amendment to the existing Act of 1961. The major military aid provisions of the new Act were: (1) to authorize $875 million for FY 67 MAP; (2) to restrict the number of countries receiving military assistance to not more than 40, exclusive of those receiving only CONUS training; and (3) to restrict assistance to a country making in-country sales under PL 480.

§ After Congress authorized the aid, necessary appropriation legislation could be finalized. Congress then passed the Foreign Assistance and Related Agencies Bill for FY 67 at a level of $792 million. This amount was expected to have a considerable adverse effect on the PACOM MAP. CINCPAC expected that most of the reduction would have to be absorbed by the MA Program for the Republic of China.

PROPOSED CHANGES IN MILITARY ASSISTANCE PLANNING RESPONSIBILITIES

§ In November 1965 the Secretary of Defense requested JCS comments on the Executive Review of Overseas Programs (EROP). This review was an experiment based on the hypothesis that if the Chiefs of Missions were free to control the allocation of all resources employed by the United States, they would be able to achieve more effective use of these resources in their countries. In the first review experiment, which concerned 13 countries throughout the world, the Ambassadors particularly criticized the MAP and several other programs. The JCS, in a preliminary report, considered that the EROP concepts

1. SECDEF 052252Z Aug 66
2. JCS 2315/373, Executive Review of Overseas Programs - Guatemala, Mexico, Venezuela, and Colombia.
3. Only four of these studies were made available to the JCS for study and comment.
4. The JCS later commented that in each of the program areas that the Ambassadors criticized, the broader regional and worldwide aspects of the programs were overlooked.
represented such a radical departure from existing tried and accepted planning and programming procedures that study in depth was warranted, and that all such reports should be reviewed before the Defense Department took a position. The JCS pointed out that there were military responsibilities that could not be addressed purely in the context of an individual country, and that the annual MAP, which was designed to achieve five-year objectives, could not be effectively edited for an individual country on a single-year basis.

(7) The JCS subsequently provided the Secretary of Defense with their views and conclusions on the EROP. They stressed to the Secretary that a fresh start was needed before implementation of the EROP recommendations. They concluded that adoption of the recommendations in the experimental study could result in State Department control over most Defense Department activities in foreign countries, except command. They stated that the concept of a comprehensive country review program had validity only if it encompassed all major US overseas operations, provided adequate safeguards for the regional and functional aspects of these operations, and clearly defined agency responsibilities. The JCS commented that the initial experiment was arbitrary and hurried and not sufficiently participated in by all interested agencies. They recommended, therefore, that changes to Defense Department programs for FY 67 recommended as a result of the experiment be disapproved.

(2) CINCPAC advised the JCS that he did not agree with a system that placed control of MAP programming under the country Ambassadors and the State Department. CINCPAC stated that MAP-supported forces and facilities figured heavily in US military plans and programs in PACOM. He cited the mutually supporting nature of MA plans and US military plans and the need for their development, approval, and implementation through military channels to insure their correlation with one another and to maintain sufficient and balanced forces to implement

1. JCS 2315/381, Executive Review of Overseas Programs, 9 Dec 65
2. CINCPAC 070358Z Dec 65; CINCPAC 160318Z Dec 65

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them. CINCPAC endorsed the Country Team concept, in which US Ambassadors participated in program developments, but which also permitted consideration of area or worldwide military requirements unknown to individual Ambassadors. He thought the individual country approach was too narrow when planning for the allocation of funds.

(§) The State Department, nevertheless, continued and intensified its participation in planning and programming in foreign affairs. The EROP, which had been renamed the Foreign Affairs Programming System (FAPS), was the subject of a June 1966 State Department message to all diplomatic and consular posts. It described the planning-budgeting-programming system to be formulated by the Department. An Advisory Group was created. The Stanford Research Institute was to provide staff resources and participate jointly with the Advisory Group and the State Department Regional Bureau being studied. The State Department described the system as giving increasing scope and flexibility to an already effective Country Team concept.

(§) If the FAPS program continued as planned by the State Department, programming procedures would begin with the Department's guidance to the Ambassador, who, in consultation with in-country agency representatives, would develop a country program, also using the Department's new planning and programming techniques. The State Department approved program would then be returned to the Ambassador for budget translation and submission to the Bureau of the Budget through agency channels. Only then would CINCPAC be informed of current plans for the MAP.

(§) The State Department's FAPS was not the only program that

1. JCS 4383/151502Z Jun 66
2. The group was chaired by Dr. Charles Hitch, former Defense Department Comptroller, who had helped devise that Department's programming system.
3. The first area slated for consideration was Latin America, to be followed by Africa, but the implementing message stated that over the next several years "virtually every Chief of Mission will become involved in these new developments of planning and programming."

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recommended changes in MAP responsibilities. Following the MAP reappraisal by Deputy Assistant Defense Secretary Hoopes, other studies of the MAP have been completed. The Economic and Political Studies Division of the Institute for Defense Analyses in September 1965 published "The Military Assistance Planning Process, Critique and Recommendations," a study prepared on contract at the request of Assistant Secretary Hoopes.

(6) The study contained recommendations for the shifting of MAP planning and programming responsibilities, tending to centralize them in the Office of the Secretary of Defense's Assistant for International Security Affairs (OSD/ISA). The commanders of unified commands would be limited in their duties to making comments (to a proposed OSD/ISA Guidance and Review Directorate) on the Force Structure Plan, participation in implementation as requested by the OSD/ISA's Office of the Director of Military Assistance (ODMA), provision of technical services at the MAAG's request, and participation on coordinating committees.

(6) In January 1966 another study on the MAP was circulated. This was a report of the Secretary of Defense's MAP Audit Division that contained recommendations to reduce the role of the unified command commanders in MAP planning and implementation. The report stimulated comments from various such commanders. They all stressed that the report tended to compartmentalize each country, while regional judgment and experience and intimate knowledge of the threat were most important to insure that sound military plans resulted from the general national policy guidance received. They agreed that the proposed redefinition of their roles would adversely affect MAP administration and the ability of the commander to discharge his assigned military responsibilities and functions.

(6) CINCPAC specifically non-concurred with numerous recom-

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1. CINCPAC Command History, 1965, p 78
mendations in the study; some of these recommendations and CINCPAC's remarks are listed below. CINCPAC felt that the recommendations to reduce the MAP automatic data processing system of the unified command commanders and transfer the function to the ODMA overlooked the primary purpose of the system, which in the CINCPAC concept was a program management technique, not an accounting function. Regarding removal of the unified command commanders from the planning function, with MAAG recommendations to be forwarded directly to the ODMA, CINCPAC stated that the unified command commanders must advise the MAAGs on country programs and plans to insure that regional requirements were reflected and supported in individual country plans. The study included the provision that the unified command commanders' evaluations and recommendations be presented to the ODMA in the form of "position papers." CINCPAC stated that the "position paper" kind of responsibility implied that the commander would not be permitted to coordinate directly with a MAAG when plans were being formulated, and that such relegation of the unified command commander would lead to a diffusion of MAP requirements and a loose federation of military capabilities to meet objectives. The recommendation to reduce the unified command commander's existing level of involvement in the development phase of the country program led CINCPAC to reply:

"Only through active participation in the full program management process of guidance, planning, preparation, review, implementation, and inspection can the unified command adequately support the MAP and ensure coordination with regional and unilateral contingency plans. Token involvement would serve to fragment and weaken the military assistance system." 

On one point both CINCPAC and the study agreed: existing MAP procedures and controls for more efficient processing of program deviation actions should be strengthened. CINCPAC disagreed, however, with the means by which the study proposed to do this, which was by eliminating the unified commands from the chain of command for this part of the program.

(U) In summary, CINCPAC said that the procedures discussed
in the Audit Division recommendations would eliminate essential military direction, guidance, coordination, and execution from the military assistance system, relegating the unified command commander to spectator status. His existing position and responsibilities were essential and proper. He had a serious and direct concern in the development and maintenance of effective military establishments in the individual countries in his area. Intimate knowledge of indigenous military forces, including their training, equipping, and readiness, was of vital importance to the area military commander who would employ such forces in combat. An isolation of the unified command commander from the MAP would eliminate the single most effective liaison with allied military forces in his area of responsibility, with a concomitant degradation not only of the MAP but of the overall US military effort as well.

FOREIGN MILITARY SALES PROGRAM

(U) Foreign Military Sales (FMS) became the new name for the Military Assistance Sales (MAS) program in 1966. The MAS program had been intensified in 1965 by the Department of Defense, which had pointed out the many benefits to be derived from such a program. It was noted that the program would strengthen the defense forces of the Free World by selling materiel to meet force and equipment goals, that it would preserve and extend US military influence, and that it would assist in offsetting the foreign exchange costs of maintaining the US position abroad. The sales effort would also help achieve such mutually beneficial goals as standardization of equipment, joint acceptance of strategic and tactical concepts and doctrine through the use of common equipment, augmentation of allied military forces complementary to

1. SECDEF 8186/022218Z Aug 66

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US Forces, and interchangeability of materiel, service, and logistic facilities. 1

(C) CINCPAC, commenting on the FMS program, acknowledged that most PACOM countries did not have highly developed economies and that the military sales effort must carefully consider the economy of the prospective buyer. In September 1965 CINCPAC stated:

"We are engaged in a military self-help program in the underdeveloped PACOM MAP countries. The goal is to progressively shift procurement of light and/or unsophisticated military items and services to the host country, thereby permitting the United States to concentrate future military assistance on major investment items. If our efforts are to be successful and also result in satisfied customers, a carefully planned and highly selective sales effort is necessary." 2

(U) The concept of self-help mentioned by CINCPAC was repeatedly stressed in the April 1966 foreign assistance hearings before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. David E. Bell, Administrator of the Agency for International Development, stated that,

"The key to successful development assistance is self-help and a cooperative relationship between donors and recipients.... The President has made it clear that we will not provide major assistance to those nations that do not help themselves."

1. (U) Included in the FMS program were various types of cooperative logistic support that could be provided by the United States. These could vary from one-time direct procurement services to full support, in which case all logistic functions were performed by the United States for the recipient country. FMS of spare parts, for example, could be regularized and provided on a full-support basis under a Cooperative Supply Support Arrangement between the US Defense Department and that of the customer country. In those cases, the United States purchased, stored, managed, and issued spare parts in response to the customer's request, using the US logistic system and providing support similar to that furnished US Forces.

2. CINCPAC 140010Z Sep 65
Secretary of Defense McNamara stated that in the FY 67 military assistance proposal "...we are placing greater emphasis on self-help by those we aid and on shifting, where possible, from grant aid to military sales."

(7) Specific FMS or sales negotiations are discussed later in this Chapter in the MAP sections for each of the countries affected in 1966. In those countries FMS was part of a larger MAP program that may in previous years have taken the form of grant aid or cost-share programs. Several PACOM countries, however, received military assistance from the United States only through the FMS program. Those countries were Australia, New Zealand, and Singapore. They came under new MAP arrangements in 1966, by which the US Defense Attaches in those countries were assigned MAP-related activities, a departure from their normal duties. The new assignments and the terms of reference that governed them are discussed below. Malaysia is also included in the discussion here because of similar Defense Attaché arrangements, although most of the small MAP in Malaysia involved grant aid training rather than FMS.

(7) Prior to 1965, the US Military Attaches in Australia, New Zealand, and Malaysia carried out MAP-related activities by operating directly with their respective military service departments. Most of this activity concerned military sales negotiations. CINCPAC was kept informed when it was considered appropriate by the Attaches, the Services, or the Secretary of Defense.

(7) In October 1965, the JCS forwarded to CINCPAC new terms of reference (TOR) for Defense Attaches administering the MAP. The new TOR stated that with respect to the MAP the Defense Attache was the representative of the Secretary of Defense and was responsible to the commander of the unified command. The terms authorized the

1. FMS activities are the responsibility of the MAAGs in those countries to which MAAGs are assigned. FMS are handled in Indonesia by the Defense Liaison Group and in Burma by the Military Equipment Delivery Team.
2. SM-963-65, 14 Oct 65
Defense Attaches direct communication with the Services on non-policy matters, with information to the unified command commander as appropriate. It was stipulated that additional personnel required as a result of MAP responsibilities would be furnished by CINCPAC.

(9) CINCPAC requested advice through the JCS as to which PACOM Defense Attaches were designated to perform the MAP duties. In reply, the Secretary of Defense informed CINCPAC that the Defense Attaches in Australia, New Zealand, and Malaysia were so designated. In October 1966, the Secretary of Defense also designated the Defense Attache in Singapore, who was to have the same authority and command channels as the other three Attaches.

(9) In accordance with a request from the JCS, CINCPAC forwarded the general TOR to the Defense Attaches, who assisted CINCPAC in drawing up detailed TOR for submission to the Secretary of Defense for approval. After receiving the recommended TOR from the three Defense Attaches, CINCPAC forwarded them with minor changes for JCS and Secretary of Defense approval. This coordination was completed when the JCS approved and returned the TOR.

Australia

(9) The new TOR resulted in a change in responsibilities in Australia. In mid-1964 the USAF Liaison Officer to Australia was also designated CINCPACREP. The USAF Liaison Officer position was established primarily to facilitate the transfer of B-47 aircraft. Later this officer was responsible for coordinating the F-111 sale for the Air Force. Subsequently, he assumed responsibility for other military sales matters.

1. CINCPAC 050355Z Nov 65
2. SECDEF 7074/232318Z Nov 65
3. SECDEF 6408/261617Z Oct 66
4. CINCPAC ltrs ser 001789, 001790, and 001791, 16 Dec 65
5. CINCPAC ltr ser 0447, 5 May 66
(f) Australia had never received MAP grant aid, but MAP-appropriated funds had been used in credit financing for the substantial purchases made by Australia under FMS procedures. On 9 February 1965 Secretary McNamara and Australian Defense Minister Paltridge signed a Cooperative Logistic Arrangement, which expressed Australia's determination to purchase military equipment and services from the United States during the 1 January 1965 - 30 June 1968 period, which would likely involve expenditure of $350 million. The agreement was neither an order for a specific defense item or service, nor a credit as such. Rather, it provided the basis for Australia to negotiate firm orders and arrange credit that might be required. 1

(f) By authority of the new TOR, the Defense Attache became the senior US official for military sales. 2 He was assisted by the Service attaches who continued to handle administrative, technical, and non-policy matters. In response to a request by the Defense Attache, CINCPAC stated that the USAF Liaison Officer, in his capacity as the CINCPACREP, had performed an all-Service military sales function. As CINCPACREP, however, this officer was not and would not be assigned any military sales responsibility by CINCPAC. 3 The detailed TOR for Australia were forwarded in February and returned with Defense Department approval in June. 4 Later in the year, additional personnel requirements were furnished by the Defense Attache. On 2 November, CINCPAC forwarded to the JCS a recommendation for one officer and two senior NCOs to support the FMS program in Australia.

1. Point Paper, J5311, 14 Jul 66
2. In Australia and New Zealand the Defense Attaches were specifically assigned two other MAP-related duties in addition to their FMS assignments. They were to promote standardization of equipment essential to successful combined operations in time of emergency (even if the equipment was procured from non-US sources). They were also to work in close liaison with US exchange officers assigned to the Australian or New Zealand forces.
3. USDAO Canberra 00805/302300Z Dec 65; CINCPAC 070439Z Jan 66
4. CINCPAC ltr ser 0177, 26 Feb 66; CINCPAC ltr ser 0578, 14 Jun 66
New Zealand

(?) As in Australia, MAP responsibilities of the Defense Attaches were largely limited to the military sales effort. The amplified TOR submitted by the Defense Attache in Wellington required only minor changes and were approved in June.

Malaysia

(?) Most of the small MAP in Malaysia involved training rather than sales of equipment. Since it was mostly Air Force training, the US Air Attache was heavily involved. He assisted in programming USAF MAP training for the Royal Malaysian Air Force for FY 67-71. In January the Air Attache informed CINCPAC that his MAP duties supported his intelligence effort. Defense Intelligence Agency agreement to continued MAP activity was requested through Air Force channels.

(?) Meanwhile, in February, the Defense Attache forwarded his draft of detailed TOR. He pointed out that he had made an effort to restrict his MAP duties to those he then performed, without additional personnel. He went on to state that any expansion of MAP responsibilities would require personnel augmentation. Accordingly, provisions for additional personnel were included in the draft forwarded by the Defense Attache and approved by CINCPAC.

(?) Thereafter, the Defense Attache requested the assignment of a qualified NCO to his office to handle the added work of military sales. On 2 November CINCPAC submitted the requirement to the JCS for approval.

1. See footnote 2 on preceding page.
2. CINCPAC ltr ser 0176, 26 Feb 66; CINCPAC ltr ser 0579, 14 Jun 66
3. USAIRA Kuala Lumpur 060852Z Jan 66
5. 1st In USDAO Malaysia, 29 May 66 to CINCPAC ltr ser 0240, 15 Mar 66
(U) In May the TOR for Malaysia MAP responsibilities were returned with Defense Department approval.  

Singapore

(Ø) The Singapore Attache was limited to responsibilities for FMS activities. General TOR were furnished by CINCPAC in December, and a draft of specific TOR to be recommended by the Singapore Attache was requested by CINCPAC and expected in early 1967.

Influence on Military Sales

(Ø) The new arrangement for carrying on MAP responsibilities enhanced CINCPAC's ability to influence the type of military sales offered to Australia and New Zealand and improved the tie-in of sales with approved force objectives. It was too early to foresee any changes in work load or organization of the offices of the Defense Attaches in New Zealand or Singapore, but, as indicated above, the workload had increased in Australia and Malaysia and efforts were initiated to increase the staff of the Defense Attaches.

SELF-HELP PROGRAMS

(Ø) The President's February legislative proposal for the FY 67 MAP called for greater emphasis on self-help. Self-sufficiency was to be furthered by conditioning military aid upon commitments from recipient countries to make maximum contributions to the common defense.

(Ø) In line with this objective CINCPAC encouraged and assisted many countries in PACOM in self-help efforts. There were wide variations, however, in self-help capabilities of PACOM countries. Some indication of the scope of CINCPAC's problems was evident in a comparison of the little progress made in the Philippines with the high degree of self-sufficiency of Japan. Japan drew only small amounts of MAP funds and had assumed responsibility for virtually all cost of

1. CINCPAC ltr ser 0447, 5 May 66
2. CINCPAC ltr 5400 ser 01221, Subj: TOR for US Defense Attache, Singapore, 6 Dec 66
its defense forces. The slow progress made in achieving self-help in the Philippines was the result of a number of factors. The Philippine Government was unable to collect sufficient revenue to sustain rational budgetary procedures for the defense program. Other problems typical of underdeveloped countries pertained, including a lack of technological capability, administrative mismanagement, and social disorganization.

In the Republic of Korea numerous domestic and industrial capabilities were established, expanded, or planned for future improvement. The progress in expanding the production capabilities of the Army Arsenal and the wheeled vehicle rebuilding program are described elsewhere in this Chapter. Korea also increased ship, aircraft, and jet engine overhaul capabilities. Indicative of the initiative was the effort to develop a combat ration suitable for Korean troops in Vietnam. Expanded procurement of Korean manufactured uniforms, clothing, shoes, and field equipment was being considered.1

Self-financed defense expenditures of the Republic of China had increased 50 percent in the last 5 years to about 70 percent of the total defense effort. China continued to increase its ability to manufacture, overhaul, or rebuild a wide range of military supplies and equipment, including vehicles, ships, aircraft, engines and small arms. The Chinese continued to carry out effective LST overhaul and high speed transport activation programs. In 1966 arrangements were initiated to begin a cooperative effort to produce wheeled vehicles for Chinese military requirements.

Thailand had the capability to manufacture, repair, rebuild, and overhaul some military equipment. Among self-help projects the Government undertook were the manufacture of glass, batteries, pharmaceuticals, textiles, and leather goods. A factory to manufacture small caliber ammunition was established with Military Assistance support.

To further self-help efforts, the Department of Defense signed a contract in October with Porter International Company to

1. Point Paper, J4221, 24 Jun 66
study self-help defense programs. One object was to examine the extent those programs could replace MAP grant programs. The PACOM countries to be studied were the Republics of Korea and China. The Porter study would determine the feasibility of forming private US investment corporations to trade with and provide loans and technical services to MAP countries. The ultimate objective was in-country production of general purpose vehicles, communications equipment, ammunition, and the development of maintenance services.

MAP AND AID RELATIONSHIPS

During the past 10 years both MAP and Agency for International Development (AID) programs in PACOM underwent significant changes. In the mid-1950's 70 percent of the total assistance in the Far East went into economic programs and only 30 percent went into the MAP. In contrast, by FY 66 economic programs had dropped to about a third of the assistance, and the MAP and Military Assistance Service Funded (MASF) each accounted for another third, although the MAP was slightly greater than MASF. There was also a geographic shift. In the mid-1950's AID funding was concentrated on the Republic of Korea. In FY 66 the AID program emphasis shifted to Vietnam, Laos and Thailand. The magnitude of distribution under the three programs in FY 66, in millions of dollars, was as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>AID</th>
<th>MAP</th>
<th>MASF</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>211.0</td>
<td>118.9</td>
<td>473.3</td>
<td>803.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korea</td>
<td>109.3</td>
<td>157.5</td>
<td></td>
<td>266.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laos</td>
<td>45.0</td>
<td>63.4</td>
<td></td>
<td>108.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>20.3</td>
<td>44.4</td>
<td></td>
<td>64.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td></td>
<td>93.8</td>
<td></td>
<td>93.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burma</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td></td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>21.9</td>
<td></td>
<td>24.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Far East area</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td></td>
<td>10.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congressional</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>AID add-on</td>
<td>89.0</td>
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<td>89.0</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>479.0</strong></td>
<td><strong>514.4</strong></td>
<td><strong>473.3</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,466.7</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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1. MACTHAI/JUSMAG Fact Book, 1 Jul 66, CPRS 003550
2. SEC STATE 080120Z Oct 66. Other countries to be studied in this worldwide assessment were Greece, Turkey, Iran, India, and Pakistan.
The high concentration of AID assistance in the countries most directly involved or threatened militarily underscored the immediacy of AID's security mission, and the close relationship between Military Assistance and AID objectives. The appropriate allocation of scarce resources between military and economic demands in PACOM required ever closer coordination at the country, CINCPAC, and Washington levels.

Illustrative of increased MAP-AID coordination was the participation of AID representatives from the Missions and from Washington in the annual CINCPAC MAP review, April to June 1965. The State Department cited the mutual benefits that resulted from this coordination and asked the Missions to insure that CINCPAC received distribution of all messages of interest on the MAP. CINCPAC thereafter informed his subordinate commanders and the MAAG chiefs of the continuing need for complete understanding and close coordination of matters of mutual interest to AID and MAP. CINCPAC requested that AID missions be placed on distribution for messages to CINCPAC on subjects of mutual AID-MAP interest.

In February 1966 the Secretary of Defense informed CINCPAC that AID representatives again desired to participate in planning the FY 67-72 MAP. CINCPAC welcomed this interest and in reply noted that the AID participation in the 1965 CINCPAC MAP review was most beneficial. Since the annual spring review at CINCPAC Headquarters would not be held, CINCPAC suggested that the AID representative participate in the country-level discussions at the same

1. State Cir 15/082155Z Jun 65
2. CINCPAC 150201Z Jun 65
3. SECDEF 4453/211848Z Feb 66
4. CINCPAC 090351Z Mar 66
time that CINCPAC representatives were in-country. The representatives were also invited to Hawaii to participate during the CINCPAC staff review of the country MAP submissions.

(7) CINCPAC invited AID representatives to discuss a number of aspects of the assistance program that had most direct relevance to the MAP. He suggested that discussions of AID plans and forecasts for local generated currency and support of country military budgets in PACOM countries would be helpful. Other subjects of mutual interest that CINCPAC suggested for discussion were AID support of the following: (1) the forces in Laos; (2) the Mu Ban Samaki project\(^1\); (3) civil aviation advisors; (4) internal security and police forces; (5) construction of military significance; (6) the commercial consumables programs; and (7) projects developed jointly by the AID and MAP or military agencies.

(7) Since the arrangement of a July 1963 Participating Agency Agreement between the AID and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Installations and Logistics, AID had been permitted to negotiate directly with the Services for teams to perform foreign assistance projects. AID paid for equipment depreciation, supplies, and personnel temporary duty costs. The Services provided basic pay and allowances. AID use of defense resources outside of the MAP was beneficial to AID because of cost economy and the problems in recruiting civilians to perform some tasks. Also, in certain circumstances, it had been considered politically advantageous to separate an AID project from MAP connections and perform it with Service personnel under contract to AID and not in uniform. Service personnel benefited from the experience in a foreign environment.

STRATEGIC MOBILITY PROJECTS FOR MAP-AID FUNDING

(9) The purpose of Strategic Mobility Projects was to support

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1. A Lao version of the village resettlement effort.
and improve US mobility posture, in areas covered by the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan, by the most economical and effective means of funding by either AID or MAP or a combination of both. Projects selected were those that contributed to: (1) expediting deployments specified in contingency plans; (2) furthering the development of airfields, ports, roads, and rail lines; and (3) improving cargo and POL handling facilities for both air and sealift.

(5) In 1965, at the request of the JCS, CINCPAC identified projects from all PACOM areas that CINCPAC considered important to US strategic mobility objectives and that he considered eligible for MAP or AID funding. In July 1966 the Secretary of Defense directed a review of projects not previously considered. CINCPAC forwarded an interim reply and requested additional suggestions from his subordinate commanders. These additional suggested projects were also forwarded to the JCS. Projects recommended by PACOM commanders included an improved highway and rail system in Vietnam, a POL pipeline in Korea and improvements to a POL pipeline system in Taiwan, improvement of airfields and LOCs in Southeastern Laos, and road and rail improvements to support the Sattahip complex in Thailand.

(9) At the request of the Secretary of Defense, the JCS provided a list of recommended Strategic Mobility Projects for FY 68. The JCS selection criteria were that the project be: (1) eligible for MAP-AID funding; (2) compatible with the FY 67 Presidential legislative program for military and economic aid; (3) in compliance with authoritative Defense Department guidelines for the FY 67-71 MAP; and (4) consistent with JCS Military Strategy, FY 68-75. These very selective

1. CINCPAC Command History, 1965, p 88
2. JCS 7592/262053Z Jul 66
3. CINCPAC 072140Z Aug 66; MACV 28671/171258Z Aug 66
4. CINCPAC 300459Z Aug 66
5. JCS 1057/252328Z Aug 66; CINCPAC 092308Z Sep 66
6. JCSM-582-66, Strategic Mobility Work Projects Recommended for MAP and/or USAID Funding, 14 Sep 66

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criteria resulted in the elimination of numerous projects of interest to CINCPAC. The construction the JCS recommended was for road and rail net improvements in Thailand to support the Sattahip complex, and improvement of the primary and alternate main supply routes in Korea. The JCS recommended 100 percent MAP-AID funding of the Thailand projects and 50 percent MAP-AID funding of the Korea projects.

(9) In October the Secretary of Defense disapproved the JCS-recommended MAP-AID funded Thailand and Korea projects. The implications of this decision were that an additional load would be placed on the MAP in Korea. Unless ceilings were raised, planned modernization programs would have to be deferred. Ultimately the decision might also affect Service funded military construction programs, particularly in Thailand.

TRANSFER OF RESPONSIBILITY FOR SUPPORT OF ALLIED FORCES

(9) In the 3 December 1965 Memorandum to the President, the Secretary of Defense elaborated on reasons for shifting the military assistance to a country at war from the MAP to the regular budget of the Defense Department. Early in the year the JCS began to consider procedures for transferring the responsibility for support of allied

1. JCS 570/585-11, 1 Oct 66
2. The Secretary of Defense stated that the MAP was designed to provide deterrence and a capacity for initial defense against aggression, not to underwrite sustained military hostilities anywhere. An effort to finance the ever-growing Vietnam effort out of finite MAP appropriations would, he said, if continued, seriously distort the purposes of the MAP and endanger US interests in other parts of the world. The Secretary cited the precedent set at the onset of the Korean War when funding was transferred from the MAP to the US Army budget, resulting in a consolidated supply system that provided field commanders with maximum flexibility in the allocation of resources and more efficient procurement. The Secretary recommended that the transfer of funding should apply only to Vietnam. He stated that he did not agree with the recommendation by the JCS that Thailand and Laos should also be placed in the "open hostilities" category and funded in the same separate manner.

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forces in Vietnam from the MAP to Service budgets. CINCPAC studied
and commented on details of logistics, funding, and organizational
aspects of the transfer proposal. 1

(§) In February an initial concept for the transfer of responsibili-
ties was developed by the JCS with assistance from representatives of the
Secretary of Defense, the military services, CINCPAC, and COMUS-
MACV. 2 The concept called for the elimination of MAP channels in
Vietnam and the establishment of programming, budgeting, and funding
for allied forces by the military services. Programming would origi-
nate with COMUSMACV and be passed to CINCPAC components for
action, then to CINCPAC for review, and, finally, to the Services.

(§) The complexities of the changes in procedures required care
and coordination in order that funding arrangements were smoothly
transferred without a planning void and without impairing the capabilities
of COMUSMACV. 3 CINCPAC provided comments on the JCS concept, 4
and a discussion of procedures that would help avert problems in the
future management of the MAP training program. 5

(§) On 26 March the Secretary of Defense directed implementation
of the transfer of responsibilities for support in Vietnam. 6 CINCPAC
thereafter informed the PACOM agencies concerned that in accordance
with JCS instructions new Vietnam requirements would be routed to the
appropriate military department instead of the Secretary of Defense. 7
CINCPAC, however, cautioned that no other change in supply program-
ming procedures would be made without CINCPAC and COMUSMACV
concurrence. Draft procedures for implementing the transfer of support
were prepared by the PACOM components. 8 It appeared that the transfer

1. CINCPAC 210221Z Jan 66; CINCPAC 241135Z Jan 66
2. JCS 3275/051740Z Feb 66. After CINCPAC and other comments
   were processed, it was published as JCS SM 352-66, 25 Apr 66.
3. CSAF 76803/162229Z Mar 66; PACFLT 060428Z Apr 66; COMUS-
   MACV 231527Z Mar 66
4. CINCPAC 160250Z Feb 66
5. CINCPAC 110200Z Mar 66
6. SECDEF 7059/261640Z Mar 66
7. CINCPAC 010426 Apr 66
8. CNO 012246Z Apr 66; DA 042211Z Apr 66; CSAF 252312Z Mar 66
of certain functions from the CINCPAC staff to the staffs of the components would have to be gradual and the components would require the continued use of the CINCPAC MAP Data Center. Also, CINCPAC continued to retain certain planning and programming tasks, including responsibility for changes in force structure, force composition, and the introduction of new or different equipment.

(*) At a May conference, representatives of COMUSMACV requested that CINCPAC continue in the programming channel until the plans of the military departments were approved.¹ A July review of the proposed implementing plans of the military departments indicated a wide diversity of procedures and lack of provisions for management data. Therefore, in July, at CINCPAC's request, the JCS called a conference in Washington to review the development by the Services of their implementing plans.² At this meeting it was concluded that the CINCPAC management data base for Vietnam would continue to be maintained until the Services and COMUSMACV no longer required it.³ It was also decided that Service procedures should not adversely affect COMUSMACV's in-country procedures and that the long-range plan for the Services should include arrangements to provide COMUSMACV with adequate management data.

(*) To more properly align support procedures with the new responsibilities, CINCPAC revised program channels on 20 August.⁴ The new channel was from COMUSMACV to the CINCPAC component commands for action, then to the military departments for approval and action. CINCPAC was continued as information addressee for all program actions. Thus, it was expected that the accuracy of CINCPAC's management data base would be preserved, and CINCPAC's

¹. COMUSMACV 311927Z Jun 66  
². JCS 7163/202116Z Jul 66  
³. JCS 012154Z Aug 66  
⁴. CINCPAC 202245Z Aug 66
capability to provide program management data to COMUSMACV and to the CINCPAC component commands would be retained. ¹

(¶) The conversion from the MAP to the Services was the responsibility of the respective PACOM component commands. The military department budgets were extended not only to cover support of the Republic of Vietnam's Armed Forces (RVNAF) and Free World Military Assistance Forces (FWMAF) but also to include "related costs," such as for equipping replacement units in FWMAF countries that were activated to compensate for deployments to Vietnam. At the end of the year the transfer of responsibility for support of allied forces in Vietnam had progressed smoothly with a minimum of impairment of support of US, RVN, and FWMA Forces.

(¶) In the November 1966 "Draft Memorandum for the President on the Military Assistance Program FY 68-72," the Secretary of Defense recommended that the Thailand and Laos MAPs also be transferred to the regular defense budget.² This request was the basis for legislative action necessary to transfer support responsibility for these two forward defense countries to military service budgets.

LOGISTIC SUPPORT OF ALLIED FORCES

(¶) The problem of acquiring more complete and accurate logistic data on allied forces, including those of MAP and non-MAP countries, continued to require attention. In October 1966 the JCS requested that CINCPAC provide information on sources of logistic data on allies, along with an assessment of the adequacy of the information and actions taken to improve sources of information.³ CINCPAC advised the JCS that the primary source for MAP-supported countries was the MAP data generated by planning and programming military assistance and the annual Country Logistics Improvement

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1. It was a CINCPAC staff officer who coined the name for the new arrangement: Military Assistance Service Funded (MASF, which on the staff was pronounced massive).
2. JCS 2458/157, 7 Nov 66; JCS 7715/102337Z Nov 66
3. JCS 6719/282326Z Oct 66
Plan (CLIP) reports. ¹  CINCPAC noted that the JUSMAGs and MAAGs were the best sources for logistic data on allies most likely to require logistic support, and that the CLIP reports afforded the greatest potential for more detailed reporting.  CINCPAC advised the JCS that the CLIP program and reports would be reviewed, improved, and expanded as necessary. For non-MAP supported countries CINCPAC cited other sources, including special intelligence reports, General Purchasing Agency data, and reports from other US agencies including attaches.

RELEASE OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION

(§) In order that the MAAGs might carry out long-range MAP planning in close coordination with officials of the recipient country, it was necessary that some classified information be released to foreign officials. In September 1965 CINCPAC requested more latitude in the release of information concerning items, quantities, and services programmed in MAP for future years. ² The Secretary of Defense approved CINCPAC's recommendation and noted that an amendment to Part II of the MAM on procedures was forthcoming. The Secretary approved release of information to the extent necessary for planning, subject to a clear understanding by recipient-country officials that the release of the information did not constitute a commitment on the part of the United States. ³ He also stated that dollar values of items would be released only when essential to country planning and that dollar ceilings were not releasable. ⁴

(§) By mid-1966 CINCPAC had updated guidance in Part II of the CINCPAC MAM. There was, however, a delay in the updating of the Defense Department's MAM. Thus, there was some lack of

1. CINCPAC 160422Z Nov 66
2. CINCPAC ltr ser 2497, 17 Sep 65
3. SECDEF 2262/222035Z Sep 65
4. SECDEF 3530/0716442Z Oct 65
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clarity. For example, in May CHMAAG China requested guidance on the coordination of MAP planning with the Chinese Government. CINCPAC's reply cited the above mentioned Defense Department messages, on which the CINCPAC MAM was based. CHMAAG China was informed that close and continuing long-range in-country MAP planning was possible as outlined in the guidance. CINCPAC emphasized that although release policy permitted considerable latitude, the final determination of timing and type of MAP planning information released was a prerogative of the Country Team.

COST REDUCTION PROGRAM

(U) A report for the second quarter of the MAP FY 66 Cost Reduction Program was submitted to the ASD/ISA in February 1966. Total savings of $4.9 million were considered by CINCPAC to be valid cost reductions. The largest saving was effected by improved management of equipment maintenance. Additional large savings were made by an increased utilization of facilities and services for production and repair of components and spare parts. In June CINCPAC published more complete and updated guidance in the form of an Instruction for the component commands, unified subordinate commands, and the advisory groups. Cost figures for the balance of FY 66 were being revalidated at the end of 1966 and exact savings had not yet been determined.

1. CHMAAG China ltr, 19 May 66
2. CINCPAC 4900 ser 2281, 14 Jun 66
3. CINCPAC ltr 4900 ser 538, 18 Feb 66
4. CINCPACINST 7720.1A, 9 Jun 66
SECTION B - AREA-WIDE ACTIVITIES

AIRCRAFT MODERNIZATION

Phase Out of T-37s and HH-43Fs and Their Replacements

(1) The Secretary of Defense informed CINCPAC early in the year that production of T-37 jet trainer aircraft and the HH-43F rescue helicopter would be phased out. This necessitated a quick decision on whether or not to deviate FY 66 funds in any PACOM MA Programs to provide these aircraft. 1 CINCPAC requested recommendations from COMUS Korea and CHMAAG China concerning their programs.

(2) COMUS Korea indicated that he did not want to deviate FY 66 funds to provide either the T-37 or the HH-43. 2 He noted that both of the aircraft were in the FY 67 program, but that consideration was being given to deleting both from the MA Plan and shortfalls. He considered that acquisition of the T-37 would be too expensive. 3 What was required in the MAP training program in Korea was a low-cost prop-driven craft of the T-34 or T-41 type. Also, plans called for programming F-5B aircraft in FY 71-72 to replace the T-33 aircraft being used in the Korean Air Force.

(3) When advised of the early phase out of the T-37 and HH-43 aircraft, CHMAAG China reconfirmed the need for suitable replacement jet trainers and rescue helicopters, but informed CINCPAC that because of budgetary limitations and other higher priorities the FY 66 program funds could not be deviated. 4

(4) CINCPAC thereafter informed OASD/ISA that he did not desire to deviate for the T-37 or HH-43 aircraft. He also requested the Air Force Chief of Staff (CSAF), whose agency was responsible for the decision to phase out the T-37 and HH-43, to recommend suitable substitutes for the China program. 5

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1. SECDEC 5083/012226Z Mar 66
2. COMUSKOREA 100736Z Mar 66
3. COMUSKOREA 251017Z Mar 66
4. CHMAAG China MAGAF-O 3217/080955Z Mar 66
5. CINCPAC 110508Z Mar 66
The CSAF replied that there was no suitable substitute for the T-37, but that sufficient T-33 aircraft would become excess beginning in the third quarter of FY 66.¹ He stated that if T-33 aircraft were not desired he recommended that the T-37 aircraft be retained in the FY 67 programs. OASD/ISA concurred in this recommendation.

(CHMAAG China did not program T-37 aircraft in FY 67 because of limited funds.² He continued to study the possibility of using the T-33, but deferred a decision until the availability of the T-37 was clarified and the program review was complete. The T-37 was finally removed from consideration.

In March the CSAF informed CINCPAC and the MAAGs that HH-19B helicopters would be becoming excess to USAF requirements in sufficient numbers to meet the search and rescue helicopter requirements of Korea and China. If the MAAGs desired, the excess HH-19Bs could be programmed instead of the HH-43s which were scheduled for production phase out.⁴ When asked by CINCPAC in August to recommend a suitable replacement for the HH-43, the CSAF recommended that the excess HH-19B helicopters be programmed for China.⁵

CINCPAC reiterated the view that the HH-19B was not a suitable substitute search and rescue craft and asked the CSAF to comment on the UH-1D as a substitute.⁶ CSAF replied that the UH-1D was not a search and rescue type helicopter, but that with appropriate modifications it could be substituted for the HH-19B. He also implied that the HH-43 was still available to MAP. CINCPAC promptly asked the CSAF to clarify this matter.⁷ The CSAF advised that it was doubtful if HH-43F helicopters would be available for MAP procurement beyond the second quarter of FY 68.⁸ In view of this, CINCPAC recommended to CHMAAG China that he consider programming the UH-1D in lieu of the HH-43F.⁹

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1. CSAF AFMSM/A 76438/152227Z Mar 66
2. CINCPAC 1804362Z Mar 66
3. CHMAAG CHINA MGOP-OPS 3249/281029Z Mar 66
4. CSAF 150010Z Mar 66
5. CSAF AFMSM/A 88709/182124Z Aug 66; CINCPAC 130200Z Aug 66
6. CINCPAC 240135Z Aug 66
7. ADMINO CINCPAC 020336Z Sep 66
8. CSAF 082109Z Sep 66
9. CINCPAC 140354Z Sep 66
(6) CHMAAG China concurred in CINCPAC's recommendation and stated that programming action would be taken to include UH-1D aircraft to replace HH-43Fs to satisfy search and rescue requirements. He also obtained additional information on costs, recommended configuration, and projected delivery time.  

T-28 Requirements and Replacements

(6) In January the Secretary of Defense reported that because the T-28A was not available in Service inventories, a one-time commercial procurement would be made for those aircraft approved for the FY 66 program. The aircraft were to be specified by country. The Secretary indicated that the one-time procurement would meet the requirement for 22 aircraft in FY 66, for 27 in FY 67, and a portion of the FY 68 requirement for 22 aircraft. The limited availability of the T-28A during this period increasingly affected the requirements for the T-28D. As the T-28A would not be available to the MAP after FY 68, there would then be a problem of providing a follow-on aircraft for the 4th quarter of FY 68 and after.

(6) In June CINCPAC recommended that the OV-10A and AT-37 aircraft be considered as replacements for the T-28 and for the Vietnamese Air Force's A-1. He also recommended that an operational evaluation be made of the aircraft selected to replace the A-1. CINCPAC was concerned about OV-10 prices and the realities of MAP ceilings. Subject to resolution of these problems, he stated that OV-10s would be programmed for Thailand and Laos. A recommended OV-10 program was drawn up and submitted by CINCPAC to the JCS and Secretary of Defense in August. The plan called for programming the OV-10s into Thailand first, and the redistribution of Thai

1. CHMAAG CHINA MGAF - MA 9243/300921Z Sep 66
2. CSAF AFSMSDA 87898/252055Z Nov 66
3. OSD/ISA 1214/082055Z Jan 66
4. The AT-37 was a replacement for the T-37, which was being phased out of production. The newer AT-37 used the same airframe, but had different engines and other modernizations.
5. CINCPAC 152300Z Jun 66
6. CINCPAC 130157Z Jul 66
7. CINCPAC 172359Z Aug 66
T-28s to Laos. Laos would then receive the OV-10s in FY 71.

In August the JCS stated that they favored the AT-37, and recommended that this aircraft be procured if combat evaluation tests proved it to be satisfactory. They recommended that procurement of the OV-10 be deferred until the outcome of operational tests was known. The Secretary of Defense asked CINCPAC for information and recommendations on the substitution of the AT-37 for the OV-10 in the Laos MA Program. CINCPAC recommended that selection of the replacement for the T-28 be held in abeyance until test programs proved whether the OV-10 or the AT-37 was the more suitable aircraft. CINCPAC recommended accelerating the test programs to insure that a satisfactory aircraft was introduced into the PACOM MAP countries on a timely basis.

On 15 November two research and development specialists designated by the Defense Department briefed CINCPAC and his staff on the capabilities of the OV-10 and the AT-37. CINCPACAF favored the substitution of the AT-37 for the T-28 in Thailand if combat evaluation of the AT-37 was satisfactory. COMUSMACTHAI had reservations about shifting to the AT-37 instead of the OV-10 because of the limited amount of operational data on the AT-37. COMUSMACTHAI considered that being a pure jet the AT-37 would be limited in its compatibility on missions with Thai Air Force composite squadrons. He desired that the decision on the aircraft to replace the T-28 be withheld until combat evaluation of the OV-10 was completed. Further, if the OV-10 proved operationally unsatisfactory, then Thailand should retain the T-28. CINCPAC continued to study the problem at the end of the year.

1. JCS Memo 549-66, 30 Aug 66
2. OSD DEF 2427/122251Z Sep 66
3. CINCPAC 240505Z Sep 66
5. At COMUSMACTHAI's request and because of Thai sensibilities, the aircraft was known in Thailand as the A-37 to avoid the "trainer" connotation.
6. CINCPACAF 170145Z Sep 66
7. COMUSMACTHAI 160630Z Sep 66
F-5 Aircraft Program

(§) The introduction of F-5A/B aircraft into PACOM MAP countries began in 1965 and proceeded as scheduled in 1966. There continued to be a worldwide demand for F-5s and a two-year lead time was required from funding to delivery. The Secretary of Defense kept close control over the worldwide program and examined each request for additions or deletions individually.

(§) Additions of F-5s to the inventories of some PACOM MAP countries in 1966 are listed below. For a discussion of any significant developments in the F-5 programs in Vietnam or Thailand, see Annexes A and B to this History.

(§) In Korea, where 178 F-5s were programmed through FY 71, 55 were delivered by the end of 1966. The first 24 of these had been delivered in 1965. The on-hand and funded aircraft would fill three tactical fighter squadrons and provide for attrition. The F-5 program was being accelerated in Korea. One new squadron a year was scheduled for FY 67 to FY 72, except in FY 70 when two squadrons were planned. Korea was expected to have 10 F-5 squadrons on hand or funded by FY 72.

(§) In China, 10 F-5A aircraft were delivered on 8 October 1966. These filled the unit equipment authorization for the 1st Tactical Fighter Squadron, the first squadron to convert to F-5s. The squadron had 16 F-5As and 2 F-5Bs. One of the nine F-5As delivered in 1965 was lost in a February 1966 accident.

(§) In the Philippines, the second increment of F-5s arrived on 11 June 1966, bringing the total received to 22. None were programmed for FY 66. Three F-5s had been funded for FY 67, but these were subsequently deleted. Two tactical fighter squadrons were planned for by the end of FY 72.

1. CINCPAC Command History, 1965, p 98
2. Point Paper, J5331, 27 Jun 66
3. J4333 Memo 0016-66, 9 Dec 66
4. J4 History, Oct 66
5. Point Paper, J5333, 14 Mar 66
HAWK MISSILE IMPROVEMENT PROGRAM

(§) In September the US Army Missile Command sent a briefing team to the Republics of Korea and China to describe the improved HAWK missile program and to conduct working sessions on possible programming and cost estimates.¹

(§) After their visit, COMUS Korea informed CINCPAC that conversion from the basic to the improved HAWK system would improve Korean air defenses and simplify logistic support.² He also pointed out that the modification would require additional investment funds of approximately $16 million. Another obstacle to conversion that he noted was the fact that the MARK XII IFF system, which was the major contributing factor to improvement of the basic HAWK system, was not releasable to foreign nationals.

(§) Paradoxically, large cost increases were forecast for the basic HAWK program even if no improvements were made. According to the Missile Command team, support costs of the basic system would increase by approximately three times after US Forces converted to the newer HAWK system.³

(§) COMUS Korea stated that the cost of either retaining or converting the HAWK system would seriously impair the MAP for Korea unless a ceiling increase was provided. Absorption of the added costs within ceilings was severely limited, he said, by the following factors: (1) the force improvements attending the Korean forces deployment to Vietnam; (2) the estimated $32.5 million cost of MAP Transfer suspension through FY 68; and (3) price increases in the Korean MAP. He recommended further cost studies and clarification of the relaesability problem before a decision was made regarding conversion.

1. USAMICOM/222/66/221401Z Aug 66; USAMICOM 223/66/241345Z Aug 66
2. COMUSKOREA 130821Z Oct 66
3. This cost increase would stem from reduced requirements and would occur sometime after September 1967 when US production of the improved HAWK was scheduled to begin.
(El CHMAAG China also sent his reaction and recommendations to CINCPAC. He said there was no question of the desirability of acquiring the improved HAWK configuration, but that funds were not available to support either the conversion or the increasingly costly basic HAWK system. He pointed out that the recurring annual cost of $12 million for continued production and support of the basic HAWK system would be prorated among those countries that continued to require it. He recommended that FY 70 MAP ceilings for China be increased $7.6 million in order to accommodate conversion to the improved HAWK system.

PACOM WHEELED VEHICLE FLEETS

(El Following World War II the PACOM vehicle fleet was maintained by periodic rebuilding of the vehicles in Japan. In 1956 a large program was initiated to replace the vehicles rather than to continue to rebuild them. The relatively low cost of Japanese manufactured vehicles was the deciding factor in implementing the vehicle exchange program. The exchange of old vehicles for Japanese manufactured vehicles continued through 1962 despite reductions that began to develop in 1960 because the balance of payments was unfavorable to the United States. The 1962 MAP completed the replacement of World War II general purposes vehicles in PACOM with the major exceptions of approximately 28,000 vehicles in the Republic of China and approximately 3,000 1/4-ton trucks in the Republic of Korea. Termination of Japanese vehicle procurement thus created a requirement to provide interim support for the aging Chinese and Korean fleets to eventually replace them with new vehicles.

Maintenance of the Chinese and Korean Vehicle Fleets

(C) In May 1963 CINCPAC initiated an interim effort to support China's vehicle fleet by cannibalizing the estimated 6,000 excess

1. CHMAAG CHINA 140803Z Oct 66
2. DA919094 090600Z Mar 57
3. DEC DEF 987768/232243Z Dec 60
vehicles on Taiwan to maintain the authorized fleet. This in-country overhaul effort was not very successful. High-mortality parts of the excess vehicles had been used up and the Chinese were slow to suspend use of the vehicles that were excess to MAP support ceilings. CHMAAG China was instructed to emphasize maintenance and to examine the possibility of in-country manufacture to ease the growing parts shortage.

A five-year life of type program was established to provide MAP-owned World War II repair parts that were in excess of other PACOM needs. Developed in coordination with CINCUSARPAC and the CHMAAGs, the program was approved by the Secretary of Defense in late 1963. The Commanding General, US Army Japan was instructed to ship a five-year life of type requirement of repair parts to China for the authorized fleet. The schedule and composition of the shipment were arranged by the Army's Logistic Center in Japan (USALCJ) and CHMAAG China. Redistribution procedures and funding details were arranged as the program proceeded. Implementation of the program was slow, however. After considerable exchange of messages in early 1964, CINCPAC authorized shipment of some 4,000 World War II vehicles from Korea to USALCJ for processing. Actual cannibalization began in September 1964 and by April 1965 approximately 1,900 vehicles had been processed through USALCJ.

In May 1965 Korea became concerned over the need to support its own fleet of World War II vehicles until their replacement, scheduled for FY 71, and refused to release additional 1/4-ton trucks. COMUS Korea requested and received CINCPAC authorization to retain 600 excess 1/4-ton trucks for cannibalization support of the 1,500 authorized vehicles. CINCPAC directed that the remaining balance of some 700

1. CINCPAC 102326Z May 63
2. CINCPAC 270344Z Sep 63
3. OSD DEF 948630/162347Z Dec 63
4. CINCPAC 272321Z Dec 63
5. CINCPAC 040105Z Feb 64
6. CINCPAC 032300Z Jun 64
7. COMUSKOREA 52120/190835Z May 65, CG EUSA 96195/181029Z May 65
1/4-ton trucks be shipped to USALCJ. COMUS Korea thereafter proposed that Korea be permitted to retain the 3/4-ton and 2 1/2-ton trucks remaining in Korea for normal property disposal.

(□) The value of MAP-owned World War II spare parts shipped to China by mid-1965 was approximately $7 million.

(□) Late in 1965 the Defense Department approved a program that would extend support of "less than standard A" material. This would enable a large majority of the Chinese World War II fleet to continue to operate beyond the 1970 life of type schedule. ¹

(□) In March 1966, as a supplement to the earlier five-year spare parts program, repair parts for maintenance for two additional years were authorized.² In the July 1966 Cooperative Logistics Agreement for Vehicle Modernization, the Chinese agreed that as new vehicles were delivered they would declare World War II vehicles excess and cannibalize them for support of the remaining World War II vehicles until modernization was complete. Under predicted attrition rates, all Chinese World War II vehicles would be unserviceable by the end of FY 73.³

1. CINCPAC 241903Z Dec 65; CHMAAG CHINA MGARLS 1127/040907Z Jan 66
2. CINCPAC 140016Z Mar 66
3. Point Paper, J4342, 3 May 66
Replacement of China's Vehicle Fleet

(ceased) Concurrently with interim maintenance programs, CINCPAC and CHMAAG China considered longer-range means to replace China's World War II vehicle fleet, an effort that CHMAAG China felt must be initiated before 1969. CINCPAC advised CHMAAG China that MAP dollar ceilings as projected early in 1964 would probably not be sufficient to pay for replacement. The estimated MAP cost of replacing the fleet with MAP M600 series vehicles was between $100 million and $120 million. CINCPAC favored in-country commercial production of replacement vehicles because it would be cheaper and would stimulate China's economy. He requested that CHMAAG China estimate the existing and potential capability to manufacture replacement vehicles in Taiwan. CHMAAG was also asked to consult with the US Ambassador and the AID with the view that AID study local vehicle production and consider the possibility of supporting the program.

(ceased) The primary vehicle production facility in Taiwan was the Yue Loong Motor Company, which was engaged in assembly of components purchased in Japan and the United States. The AID studied the Yue Loong factory, with the cooperation of CHMAAG China, and concluded that the company was deficient in equipment, quality control, and management, and that it had no capability to manufacture general purpose military vehicles. The company did have the potential to turn out some types of non-tactical military vehicles, however, if it were expanded and if it had another $2 million worth of tools and machinery. AID could provide no funds to further this project. AID was willing, however, to provide management and technical assistance, but probably not beyond mid-1965 when AID was scheduled to phase out in Taiwan.

(ceased) CHMAAG China recommended that a beginning be made by replacing non-tactical vehicles with commercial vehicles produced or

1. CINCPAC 100610Z Jan 64
2. One of the cheaper possible selections.
3. CINCPAC 200229Z Dec 63
4. CHMAAG China ltr MGGD-L Subj: In-Country Vehicle Manufacture Capability, 9 Apr 64; CHMAAG CHINA MGG-L 6220/060245Z May 64
assembled by the Yue Loong Company. CINCPAC replied that in order to plan the overall replacement program additional information on production and costs would be needed. 1 CHMAAG China continued to study the problem, and in August 1964 notified CINCPAC that the procurement of non-tactical vehicles through the Yue Loong Company appeared feasible. He requested CINCPAC approval to contact Ministry of Defense officials and representatives of the Yue Loong Company.

(3) CINCPAC approved the use of commercial vehicles and concurred in additional CHMAAG exploratory efforts to this end. Discussion with appropriate Chinese officials was approved, providing that it was understood by all that China and not the MAP would fund the vehicle procurement. 2

(6) In November 1965 Chinese officials showed their continued interest in the still unsolved replacement problem by requesting cost and availability data for the acquisition through Foreign Military Sales of some $2.7 million worth of machinery and tools to expand Taiwan's capability for vehicle manufacture or assembly. 3

(9) Meanwhile, in September 1965, the Department of the Army had proposed an "assembly and co-production" program, which was designed to be less expensive than replacement with CONUS-assembled Army standard vehicles. In addition to the advantages of economy, the program would further the MAP objective of developing China's capability for local production and assembly of vehicles. 4 The Army's suggestion was supported by CHMAAG China as a favorable alternative to earlier proposals to use Taiwan production facilities. 5 CINCPAC considered the Army's proposal and recommended a thorough analysis of Taiwan capabilities to determine whether various types of vehicles could be acquired within a reasonable time. 6

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1. ADMINO CINCPAC 222215Z Apr 64
2. CHMAAG China ltr MGGD-L, Subj: In-Country Vehicle Manufacture Capability, 6 Aug 64 (C); CINCPAC ltr 4900 ser 0634 Subj: In-Country (GRC) Vehicle Manufacture, 18 Aug 64
3. CHMAAG China ltr MGLOG-L, Subj: GRC MAS Purchases, 4 Nov 65
4. DA ltr LOG/D3 12651, 1 Sep 65
5. CHMAAG China ltr MGGD-L, Subj: DA Proposed Truck Assembly and Co-Production Program, 13 Oct 65
6. CINCPAC ltr 4900 ser 0772, 4 Nov 65

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The Department of the Army submitted cost and availability data for the proposed assembly and co-production program. The data concerned the more sophisticated and higher priced US Army standard M-series vehicles. CINCPAC noted that the average quoted prices of unassembled general purpose vehicles were approximately 44 percent higher than the same type of MAP standard M600 series vehicles already assembled.

CINCPAC also considered the possibility of obtaining replacement vehicles by barter arrangements with Japan or by rebuilding used standard M-series vehicles from US Forces.

During the early months of 1966 the United States and China continued to study the vehicle replacement problem. Pertinent data was furnished China to assist in analysis of all possible replacement programs. CINCPAC worked closely with CHMAAG China and the Country Team on the problem.

On 13 July the United States and China finally signed a Cooperative Logistics Agreement for Vehicle Modernization that provided for a 10-year program of cooperative production and assembly of 18,300 general purpose vehicles. China selected US Army standard trucks instead of the cheaper M600 series vehicles.

Additional salient features of the agreement were as follows. At a cost of approximately $80 million, and with an eight-year credit arrangement, China would purchase all of the vehicle components that could not be manufactured in Taiwan. The in-country assembly of vehicles and the manufacture of components would be accomplished primarily in Government facilities, with the stipulation that civilian business would be used to the maximum extent possible in order to benefit the economy. The United States would furnish on a reimbursable basis.

1. DA ltr LOG/D3 15542, 2 Dec 65
2. CINCPAC 150212Z Dec 65
3. CINCPAC 020525Z Nov 65
4. CINCPAC 1st End 4900 ser 0300, 12 Apr 66 on DA ltr LOG/D3 3933, 18 Mar 66
5. CHMAAG CHINA 270525Z Jun 66
6. The final negotiations for the Cooperative Logistics Agreement were handled by a Defense Department team headed by Mr. Frank Fedir, Director of Far East Negotiations and Financial Affairs, OSD/ISA.
basis such services as purchasing, technical, and managerial help. The program would commence with construction of an assembly plant, warehouse, shop, and administration facilities, and $3 million worth of new capital equipment was to be installed. Production was to begin in FY 68 with China then manufacturing 15 percent of the needed vehicle components, which should increase to a maximum of 60 percent by the end of the eighth year of production.

(,) Secretary of Defense McNamara, who signed the Agreement for the United States, sent both the agreement and a personal letter to Minister of Defense Chiang Ching-kuo to CINCPAC for transmittal.¹

(,) Six M35A2 2 1/2-ton trucks were inspected in Taiwan on 19 December by top Chinese officials, who were favorably impressed with the vehicles and the progress of the vehicle modernization program. ²

Replacement of Korea's Vehicle Fleet

(,) As the buildup in Vietnam progressed, the number of vehicles increased to an extent that COMUSMACV became concerned that in-country maintenance facilities were becoming overtaxed. He stated that the future capability to rebuild automotive components would not be adequate without some outside assistance.³ CINCUSARPAC proposed a plan that would help relieve the pressure on RVN vehicle support facilities. ⁴ The plan centered on OSP-J (Offshore Procurement-Japan) 1/4-ton vehicles in units of the RVN or Free World Military Assistance Forces. He proposed transporting economically repairable trucks from the RVN to Korea where they would be rebuilt and retained as replacements for the 1,500 World War II 1/4-tons that had been of concern to CINCPAC and other commanders. Also the plan took cognizance of the fact that Korea, with the largest quantity of OSP-J vehicles, should undertake to rebuild and retain additional OSP-J vehicles of all types from the RVN. This proposal would solve 75 to 85 percent of Korea's attrition replacement requirements.

1. SEC DEF 152224Z Jul 66
2. CHMAAG CHINA 210331Z Dec 66
3. COMUSMACV 300112Z Nov 65; COMUSMACV 130850Z Mar 66;
   COMUSMACV 180642Z Apr 66
4. CINCUSARPAC 34981/151914Z Dec 65
CINCPAC requested comments from COMUSMACV and COMUS Korea.\textsuperscript{1} COMUSMACV concurred and recommended that all Korean general purpose vehicles in the RVN that required rebuilding be returned to Korea to be rebuilt and retained.\textsuperscript{2}

COMUS Korea reported that the Government was reluctant to accept the replacement plan and indicated that if it were implemented Korea expected that the cost of labor, overhead, and repair parts would be MAP funded.\textsuperscript{3} CINCPAC advised COMUS Korea that the MAP should not fund labor and overhead, but parts costs only.\textsuperscript{4} CINCPAC considered that the rebuilding-retention program would be beneficial to Korea in that MAP programming of repair parts to rebuild vehicles gained at no cost would be more economical than programming new replacement vehicles. The program would also utilize idle production facilities in Korea and provide the means for expanding and developing automotive manufacturing and rebuilding capabilities.

In July COMUS Korea reported that Korean officials agreed to accept 1,500 reparable OSP-J 1/4-ton vehicles as replacements for the 1,500 World War II vehicles.\textsuperscript{5} The Korea-United States agreement for the rebuilding program limited MAP funding to the cost of transportation and repair parts used.\textsuperscript{6} CINCPAC anticipated that Korea would agree to an extension of the rebuilding and retention program to provide annual attrition vehicles if rebuilding of the first increment was accomplished satisfactorily.

In a related matter COMUS Korea informed CINCPAC in February that there was considerable concern about the condition of the vehicle fleet and an evident decline in the tactical transportation capability of Korean Forces.\textsuperscript{7} COMUS Korea requested that the MAP ceiling for general purpose vehicles be increased in accordance with

\textsuperscript{1} CINCPAC 240027Z Dec 65; CINCPAC 020726Z Feb 66; CINCPAC 010456Z Apr 66
\textsuperscript{2} COMUSMACV 280241Z Jan 66
\textsuperscript{3} COMUS KOREA 130320Z Apr 66; COMUS KOREA 210950Z Feb 66
\textsuperscript{4} CINCPAC 222334Z Apr 66
\textsuperscript{5} COMUS KOREA 55511/290110Z Jul 66
\textsuperscript{6} CINCPAC 010456Z Apr 66
\textsuperscript{7} COMUS KOREA 250815Z Feb 66
implied US quid pro quo commitments in connection with troop deployments to the RVN. One implied commitment, according to COMUS Korea, was to provide 100 percent TOE vehicles for the three Ready Reserve Divisions. Another was to promptly restore the tactical capability the Army lost by the deployment of troops to the RVN.

(C) CINCPAC authorized COMUS Korea to program an additional 4,873 general purpose vehicles for Korea. This was possible by the following provisions: all vehicles deployed to the RVN would be deducted from country assets; the number of personnel deployed to the RVN would be discounted in computing the country ceiling; vehicles would be authorized for the three Ready Reserve Divisions using a mobility factor of 40 percent;¹ and all World War II vehicles (including those still serviceable) would be excluded from country assets.² Input based on these new criteria was programmed.

(Q) On the national level there was also concern about transportation in Korea. In July the Country Team stressed the need to improve the deteriorating transportation posture.³ The Country Team suggested that there could be some relief if excess vehicles of the US Forces Korea and the MAP were made available by increasing Korea's priority in bidding on these vehicles. CINCPAC concurred with this procedure, except for OSP-J vehicles.⁴ The Secretaries of State and Defense also concurred and approved it for the period extending until 31 December 1968.⁵

Standardization of MAP Vehicles in PACOM

(Q) The need for an economical and standardized general purpose vehicle for MAP countries had long been seriously considered by CINCPAC and the Defense Department. In late 1964 the Secretary of Defense pointed out that the FY 65 worldwide grant aid MAP contained over 8,000 general purpose vehicles (1/4, 3/4, and 2 1/2-ton) costing

¹ CINCPAC MAM, Chapter IV, Section C
² CINCPAC 030244Z Mar 66
³ AMEMB SEOUL 100855Z Jun 66
⁴ CINCPAC 190130Z Jul 66
⁵ SEC STATE 272116Z Sep 66

SECRET
$23 million. Severe limitations in MAP funds prompted the Secretary to study the types of vehicles provided by MAP and to propose two possible ways to reduce costs. One was to substitute lower cost commercial vehicles for heavier tactical vehicles, as had been considered by CINCPAC and CHMAAG China. The other proposal was to develop a low-cost, austere vehicle with military capabilities. CINCPAC was asked to provide projected quantities of general purpose vehicles required for FY 66-75, enumerated by country, fiscal year, and vehicle type. CINCPAC prepared a vehicle requirement study in two increments. One increment included the vehicles that could be accommodated within the general dollar ceiling guidelines; the other consisted of a detailed breakout of valid vehicle requirements that could not be accommodated within MAP ceilings. A separate submission was made describing future vehicle requirements in Vietnam.

(1) As the scope and tempo of operations in Vietnam increased in 1965, the need for standardization of MAP vehicles in PACOM became more apparent. By 1966 there were four different types of wheeled vehicles in use by the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF) and the Free World Military Assistance Forces (FWMAF). These were the OSP-J, World War II, MAP standard M600 series, and US Army standard vehicles. Except for US Army standard vehicles, none of the vehicles of allied units were compatible with those used by US units, and the advantages of common support were precluded.

(1) In June 1966, CINCPAC established a vehicle standardization committee composed of representatives of his component commands, subordinate unified commands, and the MAAGs. CINCUSARPAC hosted a June conference of this committee. The committee recommended that the MAP standard M600 vehicle be dropped and the US Army standard vehicle be selected for tactical use in PACOM MAP countries and for use by RVNAF and FWMAF units in the RVN. CINCUSARPAC, COMUS

1. OSD DEF 002144/210013Z Nov 64; SEC DEF 101514Z Nov 64
2. CINCPAC 302228Z Dec 64; CINCPAC 052322Z Jan 65
3. CINCPAC 062257Z Jan 65
Korea, and COMUSMACV did not agree with the committee recommendation: they favored relying on the OSP-J vehicle as the PACOM standard vehicle. CINCPAC did not concur in the dissenting recommendation for the following reasons: procurement of the OSP-J vehicle would have an adverse effect on the US balance of payments; the continued use of the OSP-J perpetuated the logistic problems of a mixed fleet; and US manufacturers had the capability to meet all existing vehicle requirements. In a report to the JCS, CINCPAC strongly recommended selection of the US Army standard vehicle.

The JCS considered the problem in concert with the Services and in November informed CINCPAC that due to the magnitude of the standardization proposal certain aspects required further study. CINCPAC was asked to expand consideration beyond the current Vietnam aspects of the problem and to develop tentative future MAP vehicle programs for all PACOM countries. This was being done at the end of the year.

WAR RESERVE AMMUNITION IN MAP COUNTRIES

The primary purpose of prepositioned war reserve ammunition assets was to permit rapid logistic response and support of initial combat operations until adequate resupply could be effected. Ammunition was costly and the amounts required to constitute an effective reserve stock required heavy budgetary support. Thus, the determination of what constituted an adequate war reserve level continued to present itself in the form of related problems of: (1) shortfall MAP programming of war reserve ammunition, (2) establishment for planning purposes of the rate of combat expenditure of ammunition, and (3) the number of days of combat provided for until resupply could be effected.

Shortages of ammunition reserves continued to exist in Korea,

1. CINCUSARPAC ltr GPLO-MM, 22 Jun 66; COMUSMACV 021507Z Jun 66
2. CINCPAC 290145Z Aug 66
3. JCS 252205Z Nov 66

SECRET
China, Thailand, and the Philippines. By March 1966 the accumulated shortfalls in the 1967 MA Programs were as indicated below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>FY 67 MAP ($ in millions)</th>
<th>Shortfall ($ in millions)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Korea</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>54.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>4.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>.2</td>
<td>6.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4.1                       65.5

The reasons for these shortages were varied. There were instances of inadequate storage space, deficient in-country maintenance capabilities, and low priorities given ammunition in the competition for MAP dollars, particularly against such urgent needs as force modernization, maintenance, and training.

The Vietnam Support Expediting Task Force (FLAG POLE), as a result of an action associated with Korean forces in Vietnam, had reported to the Secretary of Defense that ammunition on hand in Korea for their Army was less than the amount required to sustain operations until resupply, and that the situation would continue until MAP priorities or funding were adjusted to provide additional stocks. The JCS then furnished their views to the Secretary on this reported shortage. The JCS explained that the calculation of the amount of ammunition required by the Korean Army to sustain combat operations until D plus 45 (or resupply) was computed at one-half the daily combat expenditure rate anticipated for US Forces in Korea, which produced the apparent "shortage". The JCS stated that CINCPAC and the Commanding General, Eighth Army had recommended that the war reserve ammunition level for the Korean Army and Marine Corps be computed at the same daily rate as that for US Forces. The JCS concurred with this recommendation.

1. Point Paper, J434I, 10 Mar 66
2. JCSM 3-66, Ammunition for ROK Divisions in Korea, 6 Jan 66
3. The calculation rate had been established for the same reasons cited above for shortfalls.
(6) The JCS continued, however, that if ammunition were
maintained at the higher level, current storage was inadequate and
could result in a joint US-Korean shortage at about D plus 15 and a
serious limitation on employment of combat units. CINCPAC and the
Commanding General, Eighth Army had recommended that a 45-day
level of supply be maintained in Korea and that a 30-day safety level
be prepositioned in Japan if space permitted. Adequate storage
facilities in Korea would cost about $9 million. The JCS concurred
with the concept of maintaining a 45-day level in Korea but not with
providing a 30-day safety level in Japan through the MAP.

(6) The JCS recommended to the Secretary that Korean combat
ammunition requirements be computed the same as for US troops. They
further recommended a 45-day supply level for all types of ammunition
for active Army and Marine divisions and a similar 15-day supply for
the Ready Reserve Divisions. These levels were to be achieved and
supported by a one-time expenditure of $113 million as a supplemental
appropriation to FY 66 MAP. ¹ The JCS also recommended that if the
MAP increase was not feasible that funds be provided by the Department
of the Army to stock and store the required ammunition.

(6) The Secretary of Defense approved the recommendation to
compute Korean combat ammunition requirements the same as for US
Forces, but limited ammunition war reserves in Korea to a 30-day
stock level. ²

(6) CINCPAC was tasked with providing cost data to support
the approved supply level, and with providing justification for com-
puting requirements based on weapons authorized instead of weapons
on hand. ³ CINCPAC responded that the total cost of bringing the war
reserve and basic loads up to the proper level would be $63,184,100

1. CINCPAC had calculated a cost of $625 million, providing for the
same supply levels listed above plus a 30-day safety level for those
forces plus rear area security divisions. Very small appropriations
were provided in the MAP modernization packages approved early in
1966 in connection with the Korean force commitment to Vietnam.
The FY 66 program included $1 million to raise ammunition reserve
levels and the FY 67 package contained another $2 million.
2. JCS 2236/092047Z Sep 66
3. JCS 8177/172011Z Nov 66

SECRET
exclusive of storage facility construction costs.\(^1\)

(\(\phi\)) The problems of war reserve ammunition in the Republic of China were similar to those in Korea. CHMAAG China submitted a request for an increased ammunition reserve level in Taiwan, but CINCPAC delayed action on the request until the Secretary of Defense ruled on the Korean recommendations and appropriations. In November the JCS advised that additional data would be requested from CINCPAC to develop requirements for other key defense allies such as China.\(^2\)

REDISTRIBUTION OR DISPOSAL OF MAP PROPERTY

(\(\phi\)) MAP property that was no longer needed for the purpose for which it had been furnished was required to be reported to the MAAG for disposition action.\(^3,4\) Disposition was accomplished in several ways. The materiel could be redistributed to meet other requirements in the MAP or in US military departments or agencies, it could be sold by a US property disposal agency, or it could be released to the host country subject to security trade controls to prevent it from being acquired by communist countries.

(\(\psi\)) Accounts of significant MAP property redistribution or disposal actions in 1966 are furnished in the pertinent MAP country sections, which follow in this Chapter.

PERFORMANCE EVALUATION GROUP INSPECTIONS

(\(\phi\)) CINCPAC's Performance Evaluation Group (PEG) visited most of the PACOM MAP countries in 1966 to inspect MAP activities and effectiveness. The PEG was assisted on these visits by officers drawn from the staffs of CINCPAC and his component commanders.

(\(\psi\)) The Republic of Vietnam, although a MAP recipient, was last inspected by the PEG in 1963. With COMUSMACV's concurrence, CINCPAC held evaluations of MAP activity in Vietnam in abeyance.\(^5,6\)

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1. CINCPAC 302115Z Nov 66
2. JCS 8177/172011 Nov 66
3. The requirement is specified in Section 506 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961.
4. Point Paper, J4342, 25 Mar 66
5. CINCPAC 180018Z Jun 66
6. COMUSMACV 231535Z 66
COMUSMACV stated that the transfer to the Services of responsibility for support of the RVNAF and FWMAF in Vietnam required policies and procedures that varied considerably from MAP procedures, just as the MACV organization for Military Assistance varied from the conventional MAAG. Also, CINCPAC MAP evaluation techniques required records and management procedures often unavailable in Vietnam. It was expected that CINCPAC evaluation of MAP activities would probably continue to be held in abeyance until the conclusion of hostilities, at which time it was expected that support for Vietnamese and FWMA Forces would revert from the Services to CINCPAC.

(5) Some general observations made by the PEG after 1966 inspections are highlighted below.

Thailand

(7) Prior to the PEG inspection, COMUSMACTHAI had developed a comprehensive "Concept for Mutual Thai/US Development and Improvement of the Royal Thai Armed Forces." The concept was described by the PEG as an imaginative, comprehensive, and logical approach to the problems of establishing closer cooperation and coordination between COMUSMACTHAI/CHJUSMAGTHAI personnel and their counterparts in the Thai Armed Forces, particularly concerning contingency and military assistance planning matters. Implementation of the concept, which would further vital US-Thai objectives was being watched with interest by CINCPAC, the JCS, and the Defense Department. The concept included a statement of the threat, establishment of mutual military objectives, description of a 10-year force objectives structure for the Thai Armed Forces, and a comprehensive program to attain the objectives established. Thai representatives had responded favorably to the plan, which stressed bilateral cooperation.

(8) The PEG also noted that logistics in the Thai Armed Forces continued to need the most improvement.

1. CINCPAC ltr 5040 ser 00299, Evaluation of MAP in Thailand, 23 Feb 66
2. CINCPAC Command History, 1965, p 168

(SECRET)
Philippines

(2) The Philippine Armed Forces appeared to be gradually improving and there was cause for some optimism that the new administration would support strong measures to effect further improvement. Major Philippine personnel problems involved the detail of military personnel to other governmental agencies, excessive turnover of chiefs of services, overstaffing of major headquarters, and a promotion policy based almost entirely on seniority.

(2) Deficiencies in the logistic system continued. Supply and maintenance operations appeared to be slightly improved over 1965, but there was no substantial improvement in the overall logistic readiness condition of the Armed Forces since the last report.

China

(2) Current US dollar guidelines and new policy guidance imposed on the China MAP required drastic changes to CHMAAG plans for support of China's Armed Forces. The CHMAAG and the Country Team believed that the new guidelines failed to meet actual requirements based on the threat within the PACOM area, and CHMAAG had asked for additional MAP support.

(2) The Chinese had increased and improved their self-sufficiency in some areas for all Services, but long-standing personnel problems throughout the Armed Forces remained unsolved. The capability of all Services, but particularly the Army, was severely hampered by critical shortages of equipment and by obsolete vehicles, the support and maintenance of which were becoming increasingly difficult. The allocation of training ammunition was insufficient for effective training. China's Country Logistic Improvement Plan was considered to be the most thorough of any PACOM country.

1. CINCPAC ltr 5040 ser 00642, Evaluation of MAP in Philippines, 19 Apr 66
2. CINCPAC Command History, 1965, p 168
3. CINCPAC ltr 5040 ser 001149, Evaluation of MAP in China, 14 Jul 66
Japan

(S) The Japanese applied their limited defense funds to the acquisition of major military end items and neglected supporting items. MAAG personnel, who enjoy a trust, confidence, and influence with their Self-Defense Force counterparts, were urged to emphasize to the Japanese the need to plan and program for supporting items, particularly ammunition, and services on a timely basis. MAAG logistics assistance was increasingly being directed toward the acquisition and support of the more complex equipment and systems being introduced into the Japanese inventory.

(§) Reduction in MAAG strength continued, but MAAG personnel and the PEG were apprehensive that reductions beyond those forecast would jeopardize Foreign Military Sales potentials.

(§) The MAAG considered the budget for its orientation and influence training programs inadequate.

Korea

(§) Korea provided a most tangible and dramatic example of MAP effectiveness in 1966 when about 45,000 well-trained, fully-equipped, and highly-effective troops were deployed to aid the US effort in Vietnam. Much advisory effort had been devoted to preparation for this endeavor. Facilities and programs for providing replacement personnel for Vietnam were also commendable. Combat experience gained in Vietnam was being fed back into the system, and the Marine Corps particularly was considered in a high degree of combat readiness.

(§) Supply problems in all Services were noted, although much of the difficulty in obtaining spare parts stemmed from shortages at the US Army's Logistic Center in Japan. Spare part shortages affected maintenance of LVT-3Cs, for example, which resulted in deterioration of the Marine Corps' combat effectiveness for amphibious warfare, and the HAWK Battalion was only 50 percent operationally ready. The shortage of engineer equipment (bulldozers, graders, etc) had seriously affected

1. CINCPAC ltr 5040 ser 001742, Evaluation of MAP in Japan, 28 Oct 66
2. CINCPAC ltr 5040 ser 002071, Evaluation of MAP in Korea, 20 Sep 66
3. The ROK Marine Corps made noteworthy preparations for PEG inspections, which they considered one of their most important annual events. This attitude resulted in the excellent appearance of the Corps and was gratifying to PEG team members.
the Army's engineer maintenance and construction effort. The Air Force's maintenance program, however, showed excellent progress toward an eventual goal of a complete in-country maintenance capability.

EMPHASIS ON YOUTH

(?) The Secretary of Defense in 1964 emphasized to the JCS the importance of military personnel overseas seeking out and working with youthful elements of foreign societies, with special attention to those possessing leadership potential. ¹ A memorandum outlining this policy was forwarded to CINCPAC by the Assistant Secretary of Defense who directed that it be disseminated to the Chiefs of MAAGs and Missions with instructions to cooperate to the fullest extent with Country Teams and to use every means available to make the program a success. ² This guidance was forwarded to all elements in PACOM for action. ³ Further guidance from the Director of Military Assistance was provided and forwarded by CINCPAC in early 1965. ⁴

(?) In March 1965 the Secretary of Defense informed CINCPAC of a planned survey by the Inter-Agency Youth Committee. CINCPAC furnished two representatives to accompany the survey team as requested by the committee. ⁵, ⁶ In March 1966 CINCPAC again emphasized the significance of the foreign youth program and requested that the subordinate commands evaluate the nature and extent of military programs designed to identify and influence potential leaders and to report on such

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1. Secretary of Defense Memo, Significance of Youthful Elements in Foreign Societies; Responsibilities of DOD Personnel, 23 Jun 64 (C)
2. Assistant Secretary of Defense Memo I-9713/64, 10 Jul 64
3. CINCPAC ltr 1500 ser 1967, 4 Aug 64
4. CINCPAC ltr 1500 ser 070, 6 Feb 65
5. The Inter-Agency Youth Committee was formed in Washington in 1962. In April 1965 representatives of the committee made a survey trip to overseas areas including the Philippines and the Republic of Korea in the Far East. The trip reinforced the view that the US military establishment had a significant role to play in implementing the potential leadership policy, but that the performance of US military personnel was at that time uneven. The surveyors found instances in which US military personnel clearly understood the policy and were taking effective steps to implement it. In other places, however, they reported unawareness of the policy and instances where officers exhibited little sympathy toward the policy.
6. OSD 200118Z Mar 65; CINCPAC 262358Z Mar 65
activities. Results of this evaluation were forwarded to the JCS with suggestions to expand and improve the activities. ¹

(2) The JCS in July furnished policy and guidance on the use of military resources overseas in working with the youth of foreign societies. ² The JCS paper supported and implemented the policy generated in these matters by the President and the Secretary of State, but emphasized that performance of military duties remained the primary mission and that the manner and extent of participation in youth program activities must not jeopardize the standing of US military personnel in the host country. The procedures the JCS recommended were already substantially in effect in the PACOM.

(U) The Chief of CINCPAC's MAP Training Branch attended the State Department's Regional Youth Conference at Manila, 17 and 18 November 1966. ³ He addressed the conference on "Military-Related Programs," and distributed copies of related CINCPAC instructions. ⁴ No similar documents existed in AID or State Department channels and the conferees gave the impression that CINCPAC's documents, which were favorably received, would serve as a pattern for such instructions. The relatively large number of students reached by Military Assistance training programs was noted. In FY 68, AID and State Department grantee programs would send 174 prospective students to CONUS for training, while over 4,000 were programmed through the MAP for the same period.

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1. CINCPAC ltr 4950 ser 0380, 23 Apr 66; CINCPAC ltr 4950 ser 0396, 26 Apr 66; CINCPAC ltr 4950 ser 0417, 29 Apr 66; CINCPAC ltr 4950ser 0437, 2 May 66
2. JCS SM-561-66, Joint Policy and Guidance on the Use of US Military Resources to Influence Youthful Elements in Foreign Societies
4. CINCPAC Instruction 4950.1, An Informal Program for Foreign Military Trainees and Visitors in the United States; CINCPAC Policy Instruction 04950.3, Influence of Youthful Elements
SECTION C - COUNTRY ACTIVITIES

REPUBLIC OF KOREA

"South Korea, although under an armistice, still faces the threat of 21 North Korean line divisions plus 4 infantry brigades in position for rapid movement south. In addition, under optimum conditions, the Chinese Communists can reinforce the North Koreans with 34 divisions in 10 days. Lack of modern equipment is the most serious limitation on Korean forces. The Army needs artillery, modern communications, vehicles, and heavy equipment. The Air Force needs an all-weather capability. More than 90 percent of South Korea's naval ships are over 20 years old. The Military Assistance Program for FY 67 will provide limited improvements for Korea forces. These improvements include fighter aircraft and helicopters for the Air Force. The Army will improve its firepower, communications, and mobility. In the Navy, one patrol craft has been programmed as a replacement ship to improve the anti-submarine warfare and sustained patrol capability. The TIGER Division, which arrived in South Vietnam last October, has performed very well. The additional brigade and division now being readied for deployment will also be equipped with the best infantry equipment. When these units arrive in Vietnam, the Republic of Korea will have contributed over 40,000 personnel to the war. These forces testify to the effectiveness of our Military Assistance Program."

Admiral U.S.G. Sharp
29 March 1966
**Korea**

**AS OF 1 JANUARY 1967**

### BASIC INFORMATION

- **AREA:** 38,000 SQ MILE
- **POPULATION:** 29.1 MILLION
- **ANNUAL GROWTH:** 2.5%
- **ADAPABLE LAND PER CAPITA:** 0.2 ACRE
- **LITERACY RATE:** 85%
- **LIFE EXPECTANCY:** 47 YEARS
- **GROSS NNP (PND 1964/5):** $3.1 BILLION
- **PER CAPITA:** $105
- **DEFENSE BUDGET SELF-FINANCED:** 1966
  - **AS % OF GNP:** 1.7%
  - **AS % OF BUDGET:** 10.1%

**PRESIDENT:** GEN Pak Chong Hui, ROKA (Ret)

**PRIME MINISTER:** GEN Chang Il Kwon, ROKA (Ret)

**DEFENSE MINISTER:** LTGEN Lim Sung Un, ROKMC (Ret)

**CHIEF OF STAFF:** GEN Chang Cheng Chuk

**ARMY**

- 15 INF DIV, 3 RES DIV, 7 RES NEAR AREA SECURITY DIV, 10 EAVN BUS, 3 SPECIAL FORCES GROUP, 2 NIK BNS, 3 BAVN BUS, 6 8TH BNS, 10 NED ARTY BNS, 33 ENG COMBAT BNS

**NAVY**

- 1 DD, 3 DE, 20 PATROL, 19 SHIPS, 20 PATROL BOATS, 11 EAVN BUS, 11 MINESWEEPERS, 1 SEAPORT, 1 EAF PATROL BOATS

**AIR FORCE**

- 8 TACTICAL FTR SQN, 2 AWK FTR-INTC SQN, 2 TRANSPORT SQN, 2 RECON SQN, 1 TAC CONTROL SQN, 1 NECO SQN, 8 AAGM SQN

### OVERALL OBJECTIVE

- PROTECT NORTH KOREA AGAINST...

### U.S. DIPLOMATIC MISSION

- **U.S. AMBASSADOR:** RADM Winthrop C Brown
- **U.S. FOREIGN COMMISSIONER:** MR. JOEL BERNESTEIN
- **CONSUL KOREA:** GEN CHARLES W. DIMMEL, USA
- **CHIEF PROVINCIAL:** REED BAY D. HAMILL, USA

### Map Objective

- Map of Korea showing major force objectives, total country forces, and combat capability.

**MAJOR FORCE OBJECTIVES**

- 2 ARMY, 1 CORPS BND, 15 INF DIV, 9 RES NEAR AREA SECURITY DIV, 10 EAVN BUS, 3 SPECIAL FORCES GROUP, 2 NIK BNS, 3 BAVN BUS, 6 8TH BNS, 10 NED ARTY BNS, 33 ENG COMBAT BNS

**TOTAL COUNTRY FORCES**

- 2 ARMIES, 1 CORPS BND, 15 INF DIV, 9 RES NEAR AREA SECURITY DIV, 10 EAVN BUS, 3 SPECIAL FORCES GROUP, 2 NIK BNS, 3 BAVN BUS, 6 8TH BNS, 10 NED ARTY BNS, 33 ENG COMBAT BNS

**COMBAT CAPABILITY**

- MAINTAIN INTERNAL SECURITY AND EFFECTIVELY REPEL AGGRESSION FROM NORTH KOREA, ASSUMING ADEQUATE LOGISTICAL AND AIR SUPPORT FROM OUTSIDE SOURCES.

- WITH THE EXCEPTION OF SOME COUNTERFEEDER ABILITIES OF THE KOA NAVY TO PERFORM AN ASSIGNED MISSION IS CONSIDERED SATISFACTORY, THE KOA NAVY NAVES ARE CONSIDERED COMPARE TO PROVIDE REPAIR IN SIZE EQUALS FORCES FOR APHERRED AIR AND LORC SIZE FORCES, IF LIF & OTHER SUPPORT IS PERMI AVAILABLE.

- FORCES IF BEING OPERATIONALY READY TO SUPPORT ARMED FORCES, AND CONDUCT FTR AIR AND LIMITED AER DEFENSE MISSIONS.

**SOURCE:** JS 12.PA1

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**SECRET**
Republic of Korea (ROK) Support in Vietnam - The Price

During negotiations for the second deployment of ROK troops to Vietnam the United States made certain commitments to the ROK Government to increase military assistance. These were contained in a letter sent from Ambassador Brown to the ROK Foreign Minister on 4 March. The United States agreed to provide substantial items of equipment over the next several years for the modernization of ROK Forces. The United States also agreed to finance all costs for the deployment of additional forces to Vietnam, and to equip, provide for the training, and finance the complete replacement of those troops.

Most of these commitments concerned costs associated with the Vietnam war and as such were Service funded, but part of the modernization program was included in the MAP.

The US was to provide the following support:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Estimated Cost ($ in millions)</th>
<th>FY 66</th>
<th>FY 67</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Support of the ROK in Vietnam</td>
<td>43.2</td>
<td>180.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equipment for deployed troops</td>
<td>12.9</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Activations, training in the ROK</td>
<td>23.0</td>
<td>3.0 (training)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C-54 transport aircraft</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>0.2 (operations)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Modernization packages</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>10.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equipment for ROK Army Arsenal</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total for FY 66 and FY 67 = 288.9

The US commitment described the military assistance to be furnished for modernization: "To provide over the next few years substantial items of equipment for the modernization of Republic of Korea Forces in Korea." Korean Minister of Defense Kim Sung-eun interpreted this to mean that the United States intended to provide much more modernization in a shorter period than was actually intended. The ROK Government was never told the dollar amount of these modernization additions, and in one "shopping list" Minister Kim included $168 million for modernization. He desired that the modernization include new and

1. Point Paper, J5331, Subj: USG "Quid Pro Quo" Commitments to ROKG and Costs, 27 Jun 66
2. Point Paper, J5331, Subj: Two $10 Million Modernization Add Packages (FY 66 & 67), 27 Jun 66
expensive weapons such as 16 F-4D aircraft, 6 S-2A anti-submarine warfare aircraft, 2 attack transports (APA), and replacement of M-1 rifles with the M-16. The US Government did not interpret the modernization clause to include complete new equipment for ROK Forces; the "substantial items of equipment" were programmed to cost $10 million each year in FY 67 and FY 68 in addition to that equipment contained in the MAP Plan.

(7) During his visit to Korea in May, Admiral Sharp reported, he had "explained the reality of the current MAP ceilings, particularly with respect to the difficulty we will have in getting expensive new systems into a program which already has high priority for providing necessary equipment to ROK troops in RVN and those being activated as replacement forces in Korea."

(7) The Secretary of Defense directed specific additions to the FY 66 and 67 modernization packages for Korea, including supply operations costs and anti-infiltration equipment. COMUS Korea prepared his recommended modernization packages in March, and in June the staffing of the two packages was completed by CINCPAC. CINCPAC recommended major items and their costs as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Cost ($ in millions)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>FY 66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F-5 aircraft (4)</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-infiltration equipment</td>
<td>.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barracks and hospital construction</td>
<td>1.00</td>
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<tr>
<td>War reserve ammunition</td>
<td>.15</td>
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<tr>
<td>Signal equipment</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vehicles</td>
<td>1.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small arms</td>
<td>1.97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naval shipyard equipment</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supply operations costs</td>
<td>.85</td>
</tr>
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</table>

FY 67 and FY 68 Military Assistance Programs

(7) The $160 million approved for the Korean FY 67 MAP included approximately $29.5 million for investments, $111.3 million for operating costs, and $19.2 million for supply operations costs. Significant major end items were programmed to cost $15.9 million for the Army, $13.7

1. CINCPAC 200208Z May 66
million for the Air Force, and $5.4 million for the Navy and Marines.\(^1\)

(\(\$\)) The Secretary of Defense also approved a dollar guideline of $160 million for FY 68 planning purposes.

(\(\$\)) The FY 67 program was later increased by $3 million.\(^2\) Despite this increase, CINCPAC was informed by the Secretary of Defense in November 1966 that due to recent price changes the FY 67 program was $1.8 million over ceiling and the FY 68 program $1.97 million over ceiling.\(^3\) The $1.97 million over ceiling for FY 68, however, was automatically reduced by $1 million because of a decrease in supply operations costs. During the staffing of program adjustments requested of CINCPAC and COMUS Korea by the Secretary of Defense, it developed that the $3 million addition was for "special activities" and was not for use or programming by COMUS Korea or CINCPAC. Program adjustments were submitted to the Secretary of Defense in November for use in preparation of the Defense Department's Congressional Presentation document.\(^4\)

**FY 67-72 Military Assistance Program**

(\(\$\)) The FY 67-72 dollar guidelines for the ROK MAP were established early in the year by the Secretary of Defense at an annual level of $160 million. COMUS Korea submitted his adjusted program, which CINCPAC reviewed and forwarded to the Secretary of Defense on 6 June 1966.\(^5\) Some of the items in this longer-range program were partially funded in the FY 67 modernization package addition. The major investment items, quantities, and costs approved by CINCPAC were as follows:

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1. Point Paper, J5331, 5 May 66
2. Point Paper, J5331, 18 Nov 66
3. SEC DEF 7896/150015Z Nov 66; SEC DEF 7913/151555Z Nov 66
4. CINCPAC 242035Z Nov 66; CINCPAC 292217Z Nov 66
5. Korea MAP Plan Book FY 67-72
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Cost($ in millions)</th>
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</thead>
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<tr>
<td>Vehicles</td>
<td>655</td>
<td>4.3</td>
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<tr>
<td>M-88 tank recovery vehicles</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>11.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trailers</td>
<td>3,050</td>
<td>4.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OH-23G helicopters</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>3.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engineer and signal equipment</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arsenal construction</td>
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<td>16.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>War reserve ammunition</td>
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<tr>
<td>F-5 aircraft</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>89.7</td>
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<tr>
<td>UH-1D helicopters</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1.8</td>
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<td>CH-46A helicopters</td>
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<td>5.5</td>
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<td>Airfield construction</td>
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<td>Barracks construction</td>
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<td>Patrol ships</td>
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<td>12.3</td>
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<tr>
<td>LVTs</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>5.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>224.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**MAP Transfer Program Suspension**

(1) Under the MAP Transfer (MA) Program, Korea was to assume fiscal responsibility for a progressively larger share of the cost of commercial consumables for its Armed Forces. The program was suspended for FY 66 and 67 as part of the quid pro quo package for the dispatch of Korean troops to Vietnam. The initial suspension was to continue as long as at least two Korean divisions were in Vietnam, but for planning purposes the suspension applied only for FY 66 and 67.

(2) In August COMUS Korea requested authority to plan on the basis that MAPT suspension would continue for FY 68. CINCPAC favorably endorsed this request. The Secretary of Defense granted the authority to plan on that basis, but he stipulated that no indication be given to the ROK that the United States was prepared to continue the offshore procurement of MAPT suspended items after FY 67. The Department of State and the AID concurred in this decision and COMUS Korea was so informed.

(3) One aspect of the MAPT suspension that caused the Country

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1. CINCPAC Command History, 1965, p 119
2. COMUSKorea UK 55949/200335Z Aug 66
3. CINCPAC 222329Z Aug 66
4. SECDEF 1127/262014Z Aug 66
5. ADMINO CINCPAC 310030Z Aug 66
Team and CINCPAC continuing concern was the decision to charge the cost of offshore procurement of transfer items against the overall annual MAP ceiling for Korea.\(^1\) Despite increases in the MAP dollar ceilings, the total impact of suspension during the planned period of FY 67 to 72 would require a shift of some $71 million from investment to operating costs. Additional increases in supply operating costs would result in a total of $100 million, which would offset the increased annual dollar ceilings. The $20 million in modernization add-on packages in the FY 66 and 67 programs partly compensated for the MAPT suspension in those two years. CINCPAC was concerned about FY 68 and later years.

\((\varnothing)\) At an inter-agency MAP review held in Washington in September, the ASD/ISA indicated that he considered that the adverse effect of MAPT suspension on Korea investment would be no more then $4 to $5 million annually. As COMUS Korea and CINCPAC viewed it, an average of $18 to $20 million would be lost to investment annually.\(^2\)

\((\varnothing)\) In October CINCPAC asked COMUS Korea to restudy the financial impact of MAPT suspension. CINCPAC continued to be concerned that suspension beyond FY 68 would seriously degrade COMUS Korea's plans for force improvement and modernization. Later in October COMUS Korea furnished revised information in three increments, as requested.\(^3\) The restudies of the impact of MAPT suspension and of the anticipated MAP shortfall for FY 67 and FY 72 were used by CINCPAC in preparation of replies to the Secretary of Defense.\(^4\) The third requested data increment, a complete study that included recommendations for alleviating the adverse effect of continued MAPT suspension, was under study by the CINCPAC staff at the end of the year. CINCPAC was preparing another request to the Secretary of Defense for reconsideration of the problem and recommending either an increase in the MAP ceiling or another funding source for the suspended items.

1. CINCPAC 14214Z Jul 65
2. Point Paper, J5331, 12 Oct 66
3. CINCPAC 012013Z Oct 66
4. COMUSKOREA UK 56391/080520Z Oct 66; CINCPAC 152041Z Oct 66; COMUSKOREA UK 56542/250530Z Oct 66; CINCPAC 311900Z Oct 66

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C-54 Aircraft for the ROK Air Force

(9) In October 1965 the Secretary of Defense proposed that four C-54 Skymaster aircraft be given to the ROK to provide an air transport service for direct support of Korean forces in Vietnam and as part of the quid pro quo for participation in Vietnam. A package type addition to the FY 66 MAP was initiated for $1.28 million to provide for the cost of the aircraft, concurrent spares, spare engines, support equipment, aerospace ground equipment, and training of personnel.

(9) It was intended to assign the aircraft to the 5th Special Air Mission Detachment to be located eventually at Taegu Air Base. The aircraft would be used for air evacuation of Korean casualties from Vietnam to Korea, and to airlift high priority cargo and personnel.

(9) In March the Secretary of Defense assigned a high priority to the C-54 project and concurred in assigning a required delivery date of 1 July for the aircraft. As the US Air Force Chief of Staff (CSAF) made arrangements for reconditioning and reconfiguring the aircraft, the Air Force Advisory Group in Korea made plans for training ROK Air Force (ROKAF) personnel and providing other support for the project. A transition and maintenance training team was sent to Osan Air Base, where they established an intensive 16-week course in the operation and maintenance of the C-54 for ROKAF personnel who were qualified on the C-46 aircraft. In succeeding weeks it appeared that there would be slippage on the delivery of the equipment, but when reminded of the priority of the project, CSAF rescheduled the work on the aircraft and obtained maximum effort from the contractor, Gary Aircraft Company of Victoria, Texas.

(9) The four C-54s were delivered in July by US pilots of the 4440th Aircraft Delivery Group and were transferred to the ROKAF.

On 19 September an inaugural flight from Kimpo Air Base to Saigon

1. AMEMB Seoul A352, 9 Mar 66 (Encl 5) (S)
2. The C-54 project was identified as ROK MAP in support of Vietnam in a new procedure, applicable to support of FWMAF in Vietnam.
3. ADMINO CINCPAC 020425Z Mar 66
4. SEC DEF 5443/050008Z Mar 66
5. 6146 AFAG 040625Z Mar 66
6. COMUSKOREA 260220Z Apr 66; Point Paper, J4333, 3 May 66

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was successfully completed.

C-46D Aircraft for the ROKAF

(5) Acquisition of C-119 aircraft by the Chinese Air Force made C-46D aircraft available for redistribution to the ROK. Eight of these were delivered during June, and another four arrived in Korea in August.1 The aircraft were assigned to the newly activated 6th Air Transport Squadron at Taegu Air Base and completed the equipment required for this second transport squadron in the ROKAF. This completed the Joint Strategic Objectives Plan requirement for two air transport squadrons in the ROKAF.

F-86F Aircraft in the ROKAF

(5) In April COMUS Korea again requested authority to activate two interceptor squadrons in the ROKAF using F-86F aircraft that remained in Korea after being replaced by F-5 aircraft.2 He proposed that one squadron be activated in FY 67 and one in FY 68. CINCPAC requested that the ASD/ISA approve these activations, which would bring the ROKAF air defense squadrons up to the Joint Strategic Objectives Plan level of four.3 The Washington response to requests to retain two squadrons of the F-86F aircraft was delayed.

(5) The Hoopes reappraisal of MAP4 had declared that, because of planned USAF wartime support, the ROKAF did not need the all-weather fighter interceptor squadrons and that the two F-86D fighter interceptor squadrons would not be replaced.5 Meanwhile, Minister of Defense Kim Sung-eun requested that the F-86F aircraft be retained6 and that 16 F-4D interceptors be provided over the next four years to counter the threat of MIG-17s and MIG-21s in the larger North Korean Air Force. Minister Kim emphasized the inadequacy of the two "outworn"

F-86D squadrons. COMUS Korea did not agree with the proposed

1. D46 AFAG C-00346/010705Z Jul 66; 5AF DOT 00406/150728Z Aug 66
2. COMUSKOREA UK 54683/010420Z Apr 66
3. CINCPAC 0603342 Apr 66; CINCPAC 220347Z Apr 66
4. CINCPAC Command History, 1965, p 78
5. Point Paper, J5331, 27 Jun 66
6. Minister Kim wanted to form three more tactical fighter squadrons rather than the two fighter interceptor squadrons desired by COMUS Korea and CINCPAC.
provision of F-4D interceptors because of purchase and maintenance costs. Both COMUS Korea and CINCPAC preferred the F-86F as an interim interceptor to be replaced incrementally by a properly armed F-5 aircraft.

In July the Secretary of Defense informed CINCPAC that the matter of the retention of F-86Fs had been discussed with Defense Minister Kim during his visit to Washington and that Minister Kim should be advised that the request was disapproved.\(^1\) The Secretary of Defense stated that the merits of the proposal were outweighed by the age of the F-86Fs and the need to expend limited MAP dollars to fill other critical investment and operation and maintenance requirements. CINCPAC notified COMUS Korea of this decision and informed him that the manner and timing of the disclosure of this decision to ROK officials was left to the discretion of the Country Team.\(^2\) Minister Kim was notified by letter on 10 September,\(^3\) and action was taken in Korea to reallocate the MAP funds that had been earmarked for the retention of the F-86F aircraft.\(^4\)

**Requirement for Large Helicopters**

During the negotiations for the deployment of additional ROK troops to Vietnam, Minister of Defense Kim Sung-eun included a request for 12 CH-46A helicopters for the ROKAF in FY 67. He again made the request in an aide-memoire dated 19 May 1966 that he presented to Admiral Sharp. The ROK wanted the larger helicopter to provide year-round logistic support of radar sites on isolated mountain tops.

COMUS Korea stated that for reasons of economy the CH-46A was an unlikely choice,\(^5\) and that the six UH-1Ds programmed in FY 67 were an acceptable alternative, particularly as the US Eighth Army could assist in the lift to the radar sites. COMUS Korea did retain six CH-46As in the FY 71 program, believing that experience with the UH-1s

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1. SEC DEF 6557/131406Z Jul 66
2. CINCPAC 200251Z Jul 66
3. COMUSKOREA UK 56219/220338Z Sep 66
4. ADMINO CINCPAC 232105Z Sep 66
5. A CH-46 cost $750,000 compared with $319,000 for the UH-1.
would eventually persuade the Koreans to abandon their desire for the larger, more complex, and more expensive helicopter.

(5) Minister of Defense Kim again requested the CH-46As in an aide-memoire presented on 19 June to Admiral Sharp. Admiral Sharp pointed out to the Minister that there was a pressing need for all available helicopters in Vietnam. COMUS Korea, who was present during this discussion, added that even US needs in Korea for this type of aircraft could not be met because of the war. CINCPAC supported COMUS Korea on the substitution of UH-1Ds for CH-46As in the FY 67 MAP.

(5) During Minister Kim's June visit to Washington he discussed the helicopter problem with the CSAF. 1 Thereafter, CSAF went through Air Force channels to the Air Force Advisory Group in Korea to determine if the requested expedited delivery of two UH-1s was essential. After the Air Force Advisory Group reaffirmed the need, CSAF requested CINCPAC's comments and recommendations on the subject. CINCPAC asked COMUS Korea to reevaluate his position. After a study of local assets, COMUS Korea stated that Eighth Army could provide some support and that expedited delivery of two UH-1s was not required. CINCPAC notified the CSAF, 2 who requested that Minister Kim be notified of this arrangement. COMUS Korea did so by letter on 10 September.

(5) Just prior to his reassignment, the departing COMUS Korea, General Dwight E. Beach, requested that the US Army funded FY 67 modernization package be deviated to provide three UH-1s for the ROK Army for command and control, counter-infiltration, and support of missile and radar sites. 3 CINCPAC supported this request in a message to the Secretary of Defense. 4 These aircraft were in addition to those requested for the Air Force.

(5) The CSAF visited Korea shortly after General Bonesteel assumed command as COMUS Korea. He discussed the issue of the expedited helicopters with the new chief in Korea, who made it a point

1. Point Paper, J5331, 18 Nov 66
2. CINCPAC 092331Z Aug 66
3. COMUSKOREA UK 55987/260020Z Aug 66
4. CINCPAC 100049Z Oct 66
to state that Eighth Army helicopters could provide support of remote ROKAF aircraft control and warning sites only on an emergency basis. Thereafter he informed CINCPAC of his concern that the necessary support could not be provided, particularly during the coming winter.\(^1\)

\(^1\) At CINCPAC's request, COMUS Korea once again reexamined his helicopter assets and capabilities. COMUS Korea replied that he considered it essential that immediate action be taken to increase the helicopter capability in Korea, both in modern aircraft and pilots.\(^2\) Considering continued shortages of US pilots, he recommended a sensible buildup in both the ROK Air Force and Army. He asked for early approval and delivery of at least two of the UH-1Ds for the Air Force, and CONUS training for pilots and maintenance personnel. He also continued to support the requirement for three UH-1Fs for the Army.

\(^2\) CINCPAC\(^3\) requested the support of the JCS in obtaining early approval from the Secretary of Defense for expedited delivery of two UH-1Fs to the ROKAF. As of 1 January 1967 no decision had been received concerning those requests.

**ASW-Type Ships for the ROK Navy**

\(^5\) During the 4 March Washington discussions of increased Korean support in Vietnam, Minister of Defense Kim stated that there was an immediate need for one destroyer (DD) and one destroyer escort (DE) to strengthen the anti-infiltration capability of the ROK Navy.\(^4\) COMUS Korea concurred, but considered that funding limitations precluded earlier programming than that in the Joint Strategic Objectives Plan.\(^5\) CINCPAC concurred in COMUS Korea's views and noted that the cost of reactivation of a DD was $4.2 million and of a DE, $2.6 million. Relevant also was the lead time of two years and the need for Congressional Ship Loan Legislation. CINCPAC also agreed with COMUS Korea that the ROK anti-infiltration capability had been greatly improved by the

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1. CSAF 251637Z Oct 66
2. COMUSKOREA UK 56666/070820Z Nov 66
3. CINCPAC 282241Z Nov 66
4. Point Paper, J432, 24 Jun 66
5. The ROK Navy had three DEs and one DD on operational status and in 1966 two APDs recently purchased from the US were reactivated for operations. Annex J of the FY 68-75 JSOP included a requirement for an additional DD and three DEs to be programmed by FY 72.
addition of 12 fast patrol boats and the high speed transports (APD). They both considered that the replacement of obsolete minesweepers, modernization of naval facilities, and the procurement of more fast patrol boats and radars were more urgent than expedited acquisition of the DD and DE.

(5) The ROK Minister of Defense also requested that the Navy be provided with two attack transports (APA) to support the Korean contingent in Vietnam. Pointing out that eventually the ROK would have a force of 45,000 men in Vietnam, the Minister stated that the attack transports were a "minimum and absolute requirement."

(6) The movement and support of the ROK Forces in Vietnam was accomplished mainly by US Military Sea Transport Service resources.\(^1\) For this reason and because of fund limitations, COMUS Korea considered that the two APAs could not be justified.\(^2\) CINCPAC agreed, but he also felt that as long as an unfilled force objective\(^3\) existed, the requirements for the APAs should not be easily dismissed and should be studied further. He noted that the US Navy intended to decommission APAs as the new amphibious transport dock was phased in, and he wanted to consider the possibility of making a straight transfer to the ROK Navy of one of the APAs due for decommissioning. This would reduce fund requirements to a minimum and would depend primarily on the ability of the ROK Navy to man and operate the APA.

(6) In June officials from the ASD/ISA office and the ROK Minister of Defense discussed current MAP planning for ROK acquisition of DEs and the programming that called for one DE in each of the years 1970, 1971, and 1972.\(^4\) The Minister of Defense was told that the ROK Navy didn't need additional DDs or DEs because they were too large, too expensive, and too difficult to obtain from Congress. In October the ASD/ISA requested that CINCPAC validate the requirement for more

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1. The ROK Navy did, however, have two medium landing ships and three tank landing ships operating in Vietnamese waters.
2. Point Paper, J432, 1 Sep 66
3. A deficiency existed in the ability of the ROK Navy to lift a Marine Corps Regimental Landing Team as required by the Joint Strategic Objectives Plan. Two APAs would in effect fill this requirement.
4. Point Paper, J5331, 18 Nov 66
destroyer-type ships. He also noted the expense of the programmed DEs and asked CINCPAC to consider what other type ships might be acceptable to perform the ROK naval mission. 1

(3) In an interim reply CINCPAC noted that the three destroyer-type ships were included in Annex J to the Joint Strategic Objectives Plan (JSOP), FY 68-75, and had been revalidated by COMUS Korea and CINCPACFLT as firm requirements for the next (FY 69-76) JSOP. 2 CINCPAC notified the Secretary of Defense that the study of alternative types of ships would continue. 3 He considered it possible to substitute one attack transport, which could support the ROK Forces in Vietnam in addition to normal training, for three LSTs. Another possibility was the substitution of one attack transport for one LSM and one LST. Of particular interest was the possible substitution of three APDs for the three DEs in the current program. In this connection CINCPAC noted that the ROK Navy had recently done an outstanding job of activating two US reserve APDs 4 at Chinhae at an estimated MAP saving of about $2 million each.

(3) In November COMUS Korea recommended that three APDs be obtained for activation in Korea in early FY 68. 5 COMUS Korea was considering the feasibility of enhancing the counter-infiltration capability of the APDs by mounting two 36-foot fast boats on each transport. The APD would thus be an allweather radar platform and fire support mother-ship for fast boats. An additional advantage was that allocation of APDs did not require Congressional Ship Loan Legislation.

(3) In response to a CINCPAC query, the Chief of Naval Operations stated that three APDs could be made available for activation in Korea. 6 COMUS Korea requested approval for substituting three APDs for the three DEs and included them in his proposed FY 68 MAP. 7 CINCPAC concurred

1. SEC DEF 4557/060005Z Oct 66
2. CINCPAC 190241Z Oct 66; CINCPACFLT 122058Z Oct 66; COMUSKOREA 5644/150530Z Oct 66
3. CINCPAC 082011Z Oct 66; CINCPAC 012013Z Oct 66
4. Ltr Ch US Navy Advisory Gp to ROK Navy, CNAG/40;Jac 9000 ser 725, Subj: ROK Navy Activation of APDs, 2 Oct 66 (U)
5. COMUSKOREA 56744/160658Z Nov 66
6. CNO 252118Z Oct 66
7. CONAVCOMP USNAVADVGP ROKN ltr ser 0064, 2 Dec 66, with PROVMAAG-K 1st End, 27 Dec 66
in the COMUS Korea request, as did the Chief of Naval Operations, who stated that the three APDs would be available in FY 68 and that towing would be arranged upon receipt of FY 68 funding.²

Anti-Infiltration Program

(§) In 1966 North Korea increased the tempo of its land and sea infiltration of the ROK. Coming across and around the Demilitarized Zone were an increased number of aggressive North Korean armed agent escorts. There were increased instances of fire fights and murders of ROK citizens.

(§) As part of the negotiations for additional ROK Forces for Vietnam and included in the two MAP $10 million modernization packages was authority for anti-infiltration improvements in the amount of $6 million in FY 66 and an estimated $1 million in FY 67. A US-ROK Joint Study Group was formed to determine the MAP and AID support levels.

(§) In March an interim report of the group reaffirmed the need for the anti-infiltration items contained in the modernization packages. This study also identified additional anti-infiltration equipment, which would cost $851,000 in FY 66 and $101,000 in FY 67. These items included barrier material, searchlights, infra-red equipment, communications, and patrol boat equipment. COMUS Korea and the Ambassador approved these requirements.³ CINCPAC also favored the additional equipment and recommended to the JCS that the request be approved in addition to the two modernization add-on packages.⁴

(§) The Secretary of Defense disapproved the provision of the additional equipment and directed that funding for anti-infiltration must be included in the two modernization packages.⁵ COMUS Korea accordingly revised the two modernization packages to include one fast patrol boat and direction finding equipment costing $570,000 in FY 66 and infra-red equipment, shotguns, radars, and boat building equipment costing $360,000 in FY 67.

1. CINCPAC 232340Z Nov 66
2. CNO 251917Z Nov 66
3. COMUSKOREA 54521/150630Z Mar 66
4. CINCPAC 190116Z Mar 66
5. SEC DEF 252015Z Mar 66
Late in the year the initial report on the Military Radar Coverage Project was completed. The estimate of cost was substantial. It was not clear how this project would be funded and particularly how much the funding would satisfy the US commitment to "contribute to" the cost of the anti-infiltration project.  

ROK Army Arsenal Expansion

In 1965 COMUS Korea proposed and began preparing for an expansion of the ROK Army Arsenal. Architectural and engineering studies were made with the objective of increasing the production capability to equal the total annual ROK requirement for small arms training ammunition. The program was included in the March 1966 agreements between the United States and the ROK, which has provided for additional ROK Forces for Vietnam. The United States agreed to support the expansion, and $3 million was included in the regular FY 67 and FY 68 programs for this purpose.

Korea was offered a choice of the excess ammunition production machinery, which was stored in St. Louis. A Korean officer visited the storage site and tagged the machinery he wanted. Shortly thereafter much of the machinery for Korea was repossessed by the US Army to meet urgent small arms requirements in Vietnam. This delayed somewhat the arsenal expansion project. In April COMUS Korea attempted to clarify the availability of excess machinery in order

1. The US agreed to "contribute to filling the requirements determined by our two Governments to be necessary, following completion of a joint US-ROK study, for the improvement of the anti-infiltration capability." (Ambassador Brown's 4 Mar 66 letter to the ROK Foreign Ministry)

2. Annual small arms training requirements for the ROK have shifted upward since work was begun in 1954 to establish the Army Arsenal in Pusan with MAP funds. Production begin in 1959 with an annual output of 10 million rounds of .30 caliber and 2.5 million rounds of .50 caliber ammunition. Requirements were then on the order of 90 million .30 caliber and 2.5 million .50 caliber rounds. In 1964 annual production of .30 caliber rounds was increased to 20 million rounds. By late 1966 the total annual training requirements were for 124 million .30 caliber rounds and 3 million .50 caliber rounds.
to establish a firm requirement for new machinery. ¹

(2) The Secretary of Defense confirmed that most of the excess machinery desired by Korea would be needed by the United States. ² To compensate the Korean program, the Army was requested to take prompt action to make other equipment available. A team of Department of the Army ammunition production specialists and Army Materiel Command representatives visited Korea in July, studied the plant lay-out, and prepared a list of new machinery to be procured by the Army for delivery prior to July 1968. ³ The Army ordered the new equipment and funded it as "related costs."

(4) When the arsenal expansion is completed the facility should provide ROK Forces with 62 percent of their .30 caliber ammunition and 100 percent of their .50 caliber ammunition. It was anticipated that beginning in 1969 it would cost 20 cents to produce 1 round of .50 caliber and 5 cents to produce 1 round of .30 caliber ammunition in Korea. This was in comparison to a cost of 30 cents per round of .50 and 8 cents per round of .30 caliber ammunition obtained from CONUS sources. It was estimated that this would result in an annual saving of about $2 million.

New Aircraft Control and Warning (AC&W) System

(3) The ROK air defense network had long been a part of the Pacific Air Defense System and was designated as the Korea Sector of the Western Air Defense Region. The AC&W or ground environment portion of this system was used primarily for early warning and secondarily for the control of ROK and US fighter aircraft. The planned new AC&W system consisted of eight radar sites of the ROCK TOP and TOP LEVEL projects, three additional perimeter sites, and point-to-point communications including several troposcatter and microwave links (including those provided by the BLUE FORTUNE project described in the next item in this Chapter).

(5) CINCPAC approved the AC&W system in 1962 and funding was

1. COMUSKOREA 150342Z Apr 66
2. SEC DEF 062035Z May 66
3. COMUSKOREA 270450Z Jun 66

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These projects ran into numerous problems and were considerably delayed. The contracts for construction were let just prior to the decision to reduce considerably the FY 64 MAP. The fully automated AC&W system was originally planned at a cost of $120 million; this was progressively reduced to a $17.5 million manual system. The fund reductions required design changes. Contractual problems followed, including premature action on the contract, continued design changes, further reduction in funds, and finally default on the contract. There were numerous agencies involved during this problem period when attempts were being made to balance the requirements for immediate economy against the longer-range economy of building a usable system that could in the future be upgraded at least to semi-automation and integrated with the WESTPAC North Air Defense Region.

In June 1966 the Secretary of Defense asked CINCPAC for information about his actions respecting contract changes in the AC&W system, changes that were followed by contract termination and delays in the project. The Secretary stated that the information was needed to respond to a General Accounting Office recommendation that would place certain responsibilities of CINCPAC and his component commanders in a single Defense Department agency. CINCPAC's reply contained the following background. In December 1963 CINCPAC first became aware of proposed changes that could cause delays and, despite an exchange of messages and coordination, the project still did not proceed satisfactorily. In early 1964 CINCPAC pointed out to COMUS Korea the importance of settling on a definite design requirement, and in March COMUS Korea proposed a final design for the system. After

1. SEC DEF 101710Z Jun 66
2. CINCPAC 070337Z Jun 66; CINCPAC 160140Z Jun 66
3. CINCPAC 262041Z Feb 64
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lengthy negotiations with COMUS Korea, CINCPAC published final design criteria.\(^1\) At the same time CINCPAC requested approval of a FY 64 MAP deviation from the ASD/ISA.

(\(\phi\)) In July 1964 the Army Corp of Engineers began action to have the changes incorporated into the design. In November the original contractor, Peterson-Sharpe, submitted an unsatisfactory contract modification proposal. After an impasse developed, his contract was terminated at the convenience of the Government. This was a result of design changes after the contract was awarded and reluctance on the part of the contractor to proceed with construction.

(\(\phi\)) On 11 January 1965 all sites of the ROCK TOP and TOP LEVEL projects were combined into one construction package, and on 11 March a new contract was awarded to Stolte, Inc. On 5 April construction was resumed.

(\(\phi\)) Site construction of the basic ROCK TOP-TOP LEVEL sites was completed in mid-1966 and construction of the three perimeter sites was completed by November. It appeared that the new AC&W system would be operational in the spring of 1967.

AC&W Microwave Network Support - Project BLUE FORTUNE

(\(\phi\)) The BLUE FORTUNE project provided a microwave communications network to support the new Korean AC&W system. BLUE FORTUNE was to be a solid state, microwave, line of sight system, the latest in the state of the art in the Far East. It was MAP funded through FY 63 for a total of $5.2 million.

(\(\phi\)) Considerable delay was encountered in getting the BLUE FORTUNE program going. Fund reductions necessitated changes to the ROCK TOP-TOP LEVEL programs, which BLUE FORTUNE supported, and there was difficulty in getting communications channelization requirements firmed up by the users. In July 1964 CINCPAC directed COMUS Korea to expedite completion of the BLUE FORTUNE channelization requirements.\(^2\)

1. CINCPAC 020336Z May 64
2. CINCPAC 220040Z Jul 64

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CONFIDENTIAL
(F) Contractors were advised of the project in December 1964 and prospective bidders performed pre-bid surveys in February 1965. 1, 2

(F) A fixed-price contract for approximately $2.2 million was awarded to the Philco Company on 25 October 1965. 3 As the contract sum was considerably less than the amount funded, several improvements were possible. These would greatly enhance the flexibility and survivability of the system and provide for a substantial increase in subscribers. Contract amendments providing for the improvements were issued by the Pacific Ground Environment Electronic Installation Agency on 25 April and 23 June 1966. 4

(F) The original contract provided for the system to be operational by 30 January 1967. 5 This date would not be met because of contract amendments and difficulties encountered in installation, and it appeared at the end of the year that June 1967 was the earliest that operation of the system could be expected.

ROK Army and Ministry of Communications Microwave System

(U) The ROK Army-Ministry of Communications project under development in Korea was a fixed commercial-type microwave system with a capacity of 240 channels. 6 Draft specifications were completed

1. Bidders were the Collins, RCA, Federal, Page, Adler, and Philco Companies.
2. CINCPACAF 182020Z Jan 65
3. OCAMA OCPHC 121856/262139Z Oct 65
4. PACGEELA 180010Z Jun 66
5. AFLC MCOCP 05492/201439Z Oct 65
6. CINCPAC Command History, 1965, p 132; 1963, p 98. The ROK Army-Ministry of Communications system was originally planned as two separate projects until State Department inspectors rendered the opinion in 1963 that the projects were redundant. Progress was halted for 15 months until the Army and the Ministry of Communications systems were combined and an Eighth US Army request for an alternate communications system was dropped. In September 1964 the Defense Department approved the combined ROK Army-Ministry of Communications project and assigned to the Army the responsibilities for preparing the specifications and administering the contract. (The earlier duality of the system continued to be reflected in the responsibility of the Army for the eastern part of the system and the Ministry of Communications for the western area of Korea.) AID funding support for the Ministry of Communications part of the system was provided by a loan agreement signed with the ROK on 8 December 1964 for $8 million.
in July 1965 under the supervision of the US Department of the Army, and the contract was let in December 1965 to Collins Radio Company of Dallas, Texas.\(^1\) During 1966 the Ministry of Communications and the ROK Army completed construction of the sites. Equipment installation by the contractor was scheduled to be completed in 1967.

**Proposed Integration of Microwave Systems**

\((\#)\) CINCPAC's MAP Performance Evaluation Group, after their 1966 inspection in Korea, noted that the BLUE FORTUNE and ROK Army-Ministry of Communications microwave systems were under construction and that the US Eighth Army's BACKBONE System was being improved.\(^2\) The group noted that the overall long lines capability for Korea would be enhanced as to alternate routing, survivability, and reliability if these systems were integrated. They recommended that COMUS Korea develop a program for integration of these systems to allow for appropriate circuit use within each system by US and ROK Forces.

\((\#)\) COMUS Korea replied that plans were being formalized for cross-utilization of the circuits of the three systems. Complete integration could not be achieved, he reported, because the systems were funded by several different agencies and there were restrictions governing their use because of this funding. When construction was completed and accepted by the funding agencies, plans formulated by COMUS Korea would be implemented and the systems cross-utilized as much as possible.

**Sale of Excess Property**

\((\#)\) In early 1965 COMUS Korea requested authority to use and locally manage the funds generated from the sale of excess MAP property to provide further military assistance to the Korean defense effort.\(^3\) The Secretary of Defense disapproved the request because of statutory requirements that proceeds from the sale of excess property must be turned over to the US Treasury. The Secretary of Defense approved the concept, however, and favored new legislation that would permit the

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1. Point Paper, J615, 4 May 66
2. CINCPAC ltr ser 002071, Evaluation of Military Assistance Program for Korea, 20 Dec 66
3. COMUSKOREA ltr 21 Jan 65
establishment of local accounts for these funds. He stated that meanwhile, depending on a determination of the best interest of the US Government, a portion of the receipts generated by the sale of MAP excess property could be used for ROK Forces. An account would have to be established, and expenditures would be subject to joint US-Korean agreement. In April the Secretary informed COMUS Korea that the proposed FY 66 Foreign Assistance Act would permit the proceeds from the sale of MAP property to revert directly to MAP appropriations. Thus, a program began to evolve that permitted local use of funds derived from the sale of excess MAP property and that placed the management and programming of these funds within the MAP.

(9) In January 1966 the Ambassador to Korea was authorized to make available for the use of the ROK Government during FY 66 and 67 up to 90 percent of the proceeds from the sale of MAP excesses; the remaining 10 percent was to be returned in dollars for MAP administrative costs. In April COMUS Korea stated that a US commitment had been made to Korean officials on the use of funds generated by the sale of MAP excess property. Instead of negotiating a memorandum of understanding or amending the existing agreement, COMUS Korea requested that he be authorized to inform the ROK Minister of Defense by letter of implementing details.

(9) The Secretary of Defense approved the proposed letter with minor changes, thus clearing the way for the use of funds generated in Korea. The funds would be used for troop welfare projects that were jointly approved by COMUS Korea and Korean officials.

(9) Proceeds from the sale of MAP excess equipment after 1 November 1965 were transferred to the MAP appropriation in mid-1966. The ROK Minister of Defense was informed of the new procedure and advised to submit project proposals for funding. A policy directive was published on 24 August. As of October the special fund for construction

1. OSD 061908Z Mar 65
2. Joint DEF/STATE/AID 082140Z Jan 66
3. COMUSKOREA 021000Z and 230453Z Apr 66
4. COMUSKOREA 081736Z Apr 66; CINCPAC 232238Z Apr 66; OSD 261457Z Apr 66; COMUSKOREA 020800Z May 66; OSD 072342Z Jun 66
projects had accrued a total of $416,985. COMUS Korea stressed to Korean officials that the turn-in of excess MAP material would bring about increased managerial and financial benefits to the ROK defense organization. At the end of the year the Minister of Defense was refining his list of desired projects for coordination with COMUS Korea.

**Armed Forces Assistance to Korea**

(7) Armed Forces Assistance to Korea (AFAK) had been initiated in 1953 and had proved to be one of the most successful military civic action programs in PACOM. But AFAK developed increasingly serious funding difficulties, and in 1965 the Country Team in Korea attempted to solve the funding problems by using local currency generated by PL 480.

(7) PL 480 proved to be an unsatisfactory source of funds, most particularly because the expenditure of such funds required ROK Government approval. Thus COMUS Korea was placed in the embarrassing position of having to solicit the permission of ROK officials to fund US Armed Forces civic action projects. His position was made more difficult by the fact that PL 480 funds were an important source of funds for the ROK defense budget and Korean officials were reluctant to spend them on other projects. There were indications that in the future such funds would be progressively reduced. Additionally, the 1965 AFAK projects were not authorized until September, and this delay inhibited planning.

(7) COMUS Korea informed CINCPAC of the funding problem as it had developed by late 1965, and stated that action to establish an AFAK funding source was required promptly in order to plan the FY 67 civic action program. CINCPAC asked the JCS to consider the problem and recommended that AFAK be funded through the AID or the Defense Department.

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1. COMUSKOREA 57136/0510552 Jan 67
2. The program was originally funded by AID and shifted to MAP in 1963. See CINCPAC Command History, 1964, p 198
3. COMUSKOREA 53505/0701552 Nov 65; COMUSKOREA 53655/290917Z Nov 65
4. COMUSKOREA 54273/140825Z Feb 66
5. CINCPAC 230332Z Nov 65; CINCPAC 190247Z Feb 66
COMUS Korea and CINCUSARPAC continued at mid-year to be concerned about a funding source and at CINCPAC's request CINCUSARPAC made an abortive exploratory effort to support AFAK in FY 67 by Department of the Army collateral activities funds. The JCS continued to study possible methods of solving the problem through Defense Department sources.

In October COMUS Korea's representative informed CINCPAC that the Country Team had agreed to use PL 480 funds to support AFAK again in 1967. CINCPAC considered that AFAK was an effective civic action program that merited high-level support to assure a stable source of funds.

1. COMUSKOREA 170308Z May 66; CINCUSARPAC 192100Z Sep 66
2. JCS 271434Z May 66
3. Telecon 21 Sep 66 LTC Hale of COMUS Korea and Cdr H. N. Kay of CINCPAC
4. CINCPAC 010355Z Oct 66
REPUBLIC OF CHINA

(5) "The Republic of China Armed Forces... tie down an estimated 16 communist divisions on Mainland China. Nationalist China is a major link in our defense strategy. The bases, airfields, and early warning capabilities there are valuable in supporting our requirements. An example is the Kung Kuan (Ching Chuan Kang) Air Base, from which three C-130 transport squadrons support our efforts in Vietnam.... Chinese communist actions in the Taiwan Straits are being monitored very closely. In recent months, there have been several encounters between Nationalist and Chinese communist forces.... In the future, we will emphasize modernization of naval and air forces to provide more effective patrol and anti-submarine operations as well as improved air defense. The Army requires modernization to maintain its effectiveness."

Admiral U.S.G. Sharp
29 March 1966

Military Assistance Program Reductions

(5) The dollar guidelines for military assistance of the Republic of China had been adjusted steadily downward by the Department of Defense since 1963. This trend had a lengthy background in US efforts to encourage reorganization and reduction of the Chinese Armed Forces in order to improve quality and reduce costs.

(5) The FY 66 program was reduced in late 1965 from $104 million to $94.5 million.1,2 The FY 67 program was subsequently reduced from $107.9 million to $96 million.1 The long-range FY 68-72 MA Plan was approved in February for the following amounts3 which included supply operations costs (in millions):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FY 68</th>
<th>FY 69</th>
<th>FY 70</th>
<th>FY 71</th>
<th>FY 72</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$95</td>
<td>$90</td>
<td>$70</td>
<td>$70</td>
<td>$70</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(5) Additional impetus for cutbacks was imparted by the reappraisal of military assistance conducted in 1965 by Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Townsend Hoopes, who recommended a more efficient and

1. Including supply operations costs.
2. SEC DEF 4930/252007Z Oct 65
3. CINCPAC 162039Z Feb 66
REPUBLIC OF CHINA

AS OF 1 JANUARY 1967

BASIC INFORMATION

- Area: 14,000 sq mi
- Crossland Prod: $2.9 billion
- Population: 13.5 million
- Per Capita: $222
- Annual Growth: 3.2%
- Literacy Rate: 90%
- Life Expectancy: 67 years
- Normal Land Per Capita: 0.2 acre
- Govt Exp: 52.8%

OVERALL OBJECTIVE

TO DEFEND TAIWAN AND THE PENGUIN FROM COMMUNIST ATTACK AND TO RETAIN APPROPRIATE U.S. BASE RIGHTS ON ROC TERRITORY.

U.S. DIPLOMATIC MISSION

- U.S. Ambassador: Howard W. Toner
- U.S. Aid Director: Mr. Gerald H. Tonti
- Chief, MAC: NGEN D.M. Johnson, USA

MAP OBJECTIVE

- General objectives are:
  - To maintain PRC armed forces sufficient in combination with available U.S. forces, to defend Taiwan, the Penguins, and the offshore islands.
  - To maintain a climate in which the U.S. will continue to enjoy existing and, if required, additional overflight, staging and base rights.

MAJOR FORCE OBJECTIVES

- ARMY
  - 110PB, 14AA BN, 24PB DIV, 14TH DIV, 24PB CAV BN, 120TH INF BN, 2 ST CAV BN, 120TH INF BN
- NAVY
  - 1200/46, 28 PATROL SHIPS, 14 INCH, 10 INCH, 24 BRIG, 32 T/L, 135 T/L, 135 T/L, 135 T/L, 135 T/L
- AIR FORCE
  - 2 FTR ENTC LAST(AM), 11 TAC FTR SQN, 10 TAC RECON SQN, 10 TAC FTR SQN, 10 TAC ANG SQN, 10 TAC ANG SQN, 10 TAC ANG SQN, 10 TAC ANG SQN, 10 TAC ANG SQN

TOTAL COUNTRY FORCES

- 2 ARMS, 120PB BN, 24PB DIV, 14TH DIV, 24PB CAV BN, 120TH INF BN

COMBAT CAPABILITY

- MAINTAIN INTERNAL SECURITY AND CONDUCT EFFECTIVE GROUND DEFENSE OF TAIWAN, THE PENGUINS AND OFFSHORE ISLANDS AGAINST SMALL SCALE ATTACK IF PROVIDED ONSIDE AIR, NAVAL AND LOGISTIC SUPPORT. COULD CONTRIBUTE APPROX 30/15 TO COLLECTIVE DEFENSE EFFORT. WELL-ORGANIZED AND COMBAT READY.

- THE OVERALL ABILITY OF THE CHINESE NAVY TO PERFORM ITS ASSIGNED MISSION IS CONSIDERED FAIR. THE CHINESE NAVY IS CONSIDERED CAPABLE OF CONDUCTING SIMPLE GAS AIR OPERATIONS, PROVIDES THE REQUIRED AI-NATIONAL SUPPORT, INCLUDING AIRLINES SHIPING, ARE AVAILABLE.

- FORCE COMBAT READY. THE AIR FORCE HAS DEMONSTRATED ITS ABILITY TO PERFORM ITS PRIMARY FUNCTION, AIR DEFENSE OF TAIWAN, UNDER DAY TIME CONDITIONS. THE LIMITED ALL-WEAPON DEFENSE CAPABILITY HAS IMPROVED SINCE THE P-340C SQUADRON BECAME OPERATIONAL. AIR DEFENSE AGAINST A LOW ALTITUDE THREAT REMAINS A PROBLEM. CAPABLE OF PROVIDING FIGHTER COVER FOR NAVAL OPERATIONS IN THE AREA AND TACTICAL SUPPORT FOR AN ARMY CORPS.

SOURCE: J5, J2, PA1
smaller Chinese force, with increasing reliance on US Force deployments for future contingencies.

(9) The Country Team became concerned with the cumulative effect on China of the reductions of military assistance, and with evidence that the overall defensive capability of the Armed Forces had stopped improving and begun to decline. The Country Team noted specifically that the proposed reductions through 1970 would provide only support and maintenance costs and no investment improvements. After citing numerous risks and disadvantages that would result from the deterioration of Chinese military capability during future planning years, the Country Team urged that either the cutbacks be reconsidered or that US objectives and the role expected of the Chinese in theater strategy be reevaluated.  

(9) The State and Defense Departments, in reply to the Country Team, quoted parts of the 10 March 1966 MAM. They noted that strength levels should be determined by the most effective types of forces that can be maintained by the MAP country and by US capabilities to augment those forces. With due regard for political aspects, MAP should take greater account of the increased mobility and combat power of US general purpose forces. They therefore considered that the Chinese Air Force and Navy strength should remain as it was but with a reduced amphibious capability. They stated that planning would be based on reductions, mostly of the Army, that would bring Chinese forces down from their strength of 612,000 to 458,000 at the end of FY 71. They stated that the United States should make it clear to the Chinese that the United States was not prepared to underwrite modern Chinese forces at their existing level and that the new guidelines were sufficient for: (l) the operating costs of reduced force levels; (2) the replacement of F-86F and C-46 aircraft; and (3) provision of an average of approximately $6 million per year from FY 67 to 71 for investment in the Army, Navy, and Marine Forces.

(9) The Country Team, however, continued to be concerned about

1. TAIPEI to STATE 837/041015Z Feb 66
2. STATE to TAIPEI 884/092350Z Mar 66
several basic policy issues discussed in the joint State and Defense Department message.\(^1\) In April the Country Team called attention to evidence that the nature of the Chinese communist threat had changed, and that changing US requirements were not consistent with reductions. The reductions in any case, they noted, had resulted in growing Chinese dissatisfaction with dependence on the United States and the growing disparity in strength and capabilities between the forces of Nationalist and Communist China. They indicated that there was little prospect of the Republic of China reducing its force levels, regardless of the action taken by the United States in MAP support. The Country Team also suggested that the National Policy Paper and Joint Strategic Objectives Plan be reviewed.

\(^{(5)}\) In March a lengthy conversation took place between Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs William P. Bundy, President Chiang Kai-shek, and Minister of National Defense Chiang Ching-Kuo.\(^2\) The top Chinese leaders reiterated the theme of return to the Mainland, expanded on their concern about the imminent threat posed by the communist Chinese regime, and urged a great increase in Military Assistance.\(^3\) This request for a large increase in basic MAP investment items had implications for the continuing fundamental Washington objective of maintaining the military effectiveness of the Chinese forces and at the same time increasing Chinese efficiency by reducing strengths and MAP funds.

\(^{(6)}\) As the discussion between the Country Team and the Defense Department developed and as it became increasingly difficult to reconcile the impact of reduced ceilings with the risks, CINCPAC concluded that a fresh approach was required. He asked CHMAAG China to restudy MAP needs for China based on the reduced ceilings and the concerns

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1. TAIPEI to STATE 1140/161427Z Apr 66
2. STATE to CINCPAC 200100Z Mar 66
3. Specifically, the Chinese officials wanted improved radar and AC&W systems, naval increases, accelerated conversion to F-5 aircraft, improved US support of the Chinese Air Force, improvement of the wheeled vehicle fleet, expansion of Foreign Military Sales, and assistance in expanding the use of arsenal facilities.
expressed by the Country Team. CHMAAG China was asked to take a new look at the threat, the adequacy of Chinese forces and equipment, the support required by US Forces, and the overall risks and consequences of the reduced funding levels. The study by CHMAAG China and the Country Team was completed in August, and was being reviewed by the CINCPAC staff at the end of the year.

In November the JCS forwarded to CINCPAC the Draft Memorandum for the President on the Military Assistance Program FY 68-72, which contained the proposal that the downward pressure on force levels continue in the China program, and that the FY 68 MAP be reduced from $95 million to $90 million.

In response, CINCPAC stated that the reduction to $90 million in FY 68 would not provide for the necessary modernization of the reduced Chinese forces as specified by MAM guidance. As stated in CINCPAC's submission on the proposed MAM for FY 67-71, much of the material delivered to China was old and was fast becoming operationally unreliable and logistically unsupportable. CINCPAC recommended ceilings of $95 million for FY 68 and FY 69 and $70 million a year for the remainder of the plan period.

FY 67 and FY 68 Military Assistance Programs

The FY 67 MAP was approved by the Secretary of Defense in March at a reduced level of $96 million. The ceiling included $51.3 million for operating costs, $10.5 million for supply operations costs, and an estimated $34.2 million for investment items. The principal investment items provided by the FY 67 MAP were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Air Force</th>
<th>Cost ($ in millions)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>F-5 aircraft (33) (including 6 attrition)</td>
<td>22.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J-85/GE-13 jet engines (17)</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aircraft spares and support equipment</td>
<td>15.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. ADMNO CINCPAC 050254Z Mar 66
2. COMUSTDC ltr ser 00109, Force Requirements Study, 10 Aug 66
3. JCS 2458/157, 7 Nov 66; JCS 7715/102337Z Nov 66
4. CINCPAC 162200Z Nov 66
5. CINCPAC 210240Z Dec 65
6. Point Paper, J5332, 14 Mar 66
Investment items (continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Navy and Marines</th>
<th>Cost ($ in millions)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Minesweeper (1)</td>
<td>2.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wheeled vehicles (6)</td>
<td>.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LSTs (rehabilitated) (4)</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>105mm towed howitzers (6)</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spare parts for ships</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ammunition</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Army</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Wheeled vehicles (99)</td>
<td>.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communications equipment</td>
<td>.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combined Service Force equipment</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(precision tools)</td>
<td>2.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missile support</td>
<td>4.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Less than $50,000.

(‡) In November, the Secretary of Defense directed a further reduction of the FY 67 MAP from $96 million to $90 million.\(^1\) Price increases had also occurred since plans were formulated, and a total reduction of $7.5 million was necessary to stay within dollar ceilings.\(^2\) The Secretary of Defense stated that a reduction in F-5 aircraft was authorized for the ceiling adjustment requirement. CHMAAG China and CINCPAC concurred in deletion of six F-5s from the FY 67 program.

(‡) A similar programming situation existed for the FY 68 MAP. In November the Secretary of Defense reduced the dollar ceilings from $95 million to $90 million. Some items in the FY 68 program had also been affected by price increases and the total FY 68 reduction required was $5.5 million.

(‡) To reduce the programs for both FY 67 and FY 68 to meet the new guidelines, CHMAAG China and CINCPAC recommended deletion of the following items: the 6 F-5s, missile spare parts, the minesweeper plus ship spare parts, 53 M14A1 tanks, ammunition, aircraft spare parts, and communications equipment. These deletions amounted to the required $13 million, shared among the Army ($3.1 million), the Navy ($3.5 million), and the Air Force ($6.4 million).

(‡) CINCPAC forwarded his recommendations to the Secretary of

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1. SEC DEF 151558Z Nov 66
2. Point Paper, J5332, 12 Dec 66

SECRET
Defense on 23 November and 5 December. They were still being processed at the end of the year.

Foreign Military Sales Program

(5) The potential for Foreign Military Sales (FMS) to the Republic of China continued to be of great interest to both the United States and China. The largest, and in many respects the most advantageous for both countries, was the sale of surplus high speed attack transports (APD). This program provided needed anti-submarine warfare (ASW)-type ships at a slight cost to the MAP and a moderate cost to China. Another important development in the FMS program was the July agreement for a cooperative production effort to replace aging World War II wheeled vehicles. The Chinese Government initiated a determined effort to purchase the assistance and equipment required for an electronic countermeasures capability and domestic production of modern small arms. These larger FMS programs and efforts are described in greater detail elsewhere in this Chapter.

(5) The list of weapons and production equipment submitted in 1965 by the Chinese Ministry of Defense was refined by CHMAAG China by early 1966 to some 36 items. The items on the list were mostly items that had been included in previous years but deleted by successive ceiling reductions. Prominent on the list were shop and shipyard equipment desired to increase the productive capability of the Combined Service Forces. The required price and availability information requested was for planning purposes and had not been incorporated in a letter of offer by the end of 1966.

(5) In early 1966 China took delivery on 100 new LVTs, which were purchased directly from US suppliers and shipped to Taiwan disassembled and labeled spare parts. It appeared that these were purchased to provide sealift for the newly activated Second Marine Division, and that China was contemplating the purchase of additional LVTs. The sale of

1. CINCPAC Command History, 1965, p 141
2. CHMAAG CHINA 240841Z Jan 66; CINCPAC 260113Z Jan 66
3. CINCPAC 190413Z Jan 66; CHMAAG CHINA 010501Z Feb 66
4. Point Paper, J5332, 14 Mar 66
such vehicles through FMS procedures, however, would require consideration of priorities to be accorded items funded by China's defense budget, and possibly a reconsideration of US policy, which limited increases in China's amphibious lift capabilities.

Purchase of S-2A ASW Aircraft

Negotiations for the sale of a squadron of nine ASW aircraft were completed in March. The S-2A patrol aircraft were offered from excess US Navy stocks at a price of approximately $3.2 million. The FMS credit arrangement covered the cost of the aircraft, rehabilitation and delivery expenses, spares, and training for both ground and air crews.

Just prior to the sale the Defense Department made an effort to avoid future uncertainties about the sensitive problem of MAP support for the S-2A squadron in later years. The Secretary of Defense requested that CINCPAC confirm that Chinese officials understood that the United States had not made any commitment to provide follow-on support for the squadron and that the possibility existed that MAP would not be able to fund such support. Accordingly, CINCPAC asked CHMAAG China to confirm the understanding of the Chinese in the matter. CHMAAG China complied, but he also informed the Chinese Government that since the S-2A squadron was a force objective, he would recommend that some future MAP support be provided.

In June CINCPAC requested approval of additional manning in the MAAG to provide advisory support for the S-2A program. JCS approval was received and by September the ASW advisors had been assigned to the program.

Operationally the ASW aircraft must be employed with the Navy, but as the Chinese Navy had no air arm it was necessary to make initial arrangements for the Chinese Air Force to provide support.

1. Point Paper, J5332, 14 Mar 66
2. SECDEF 02212/012353Z Mar 66
3. CINCPAC 110504Z Mar 66; CHMAAG CHINA MGOP-OPS 337/090831Z Mar 66
4. CINCPAC 070343Z Jun 66
5. JCS 35316/031452Z Jun 66; CHMAAG CHINA 270201Z Sep 66
and training. The aircraft were assigned to a new tactical unit of the Air Force while the Navy retained operational control. Details of Service responsibilities in this arrangement were being worked out. At the end of the year, the S-2As were enroute by sealift to Taiwan.

The acquisition of the S-2A squadron would significantly extend China's surface ASW capabilities. As soon as the S-2A aircraft became operational they could patrol a much larger area and respond more rapidly to contact reports than was possible before. The S-2A squadron could also detect and attack surface targets under marginal visibility conditions.

Purchase of APDs Through FMS

The Chinese Government continued to show a high interest in acquiring additional US Reserve Fleet high speed transports (APD) for in-country activation and duty with the Chinese Navy. In March 1966 China requested approval of the sale of the last 5 of 11 ships originally requested. The Country Team in Taipei recommended that the request be approved.

In April the US Navy had only 16 Reserve Fleet APDs that could be made available to the MAP, while there were requests from various countries for 21. The Secretary of State informed CINCPAC and the Country Team that a survey of the availability of APDs for worldwide requirements indicated that the possibility of approving the Chinese request for five ships was remote. CINCPAC was asked to provide an assessment of the military importance of the five vessels in the context of the latest MAM guidance. CINCPAC's reply concluded with the recommendation that the sale be approved. Taking a similar view the Country Team strongly supported the sale and cited the urgent need for the five additional ships to counter the growing Chinese communist naval threat and to replace obsolete patrol craft that were ready for scrapping.

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1. CINCPAC 070913Z Oct 66
2. COMFAIR San Diego 282207Z Dec 66
3. STATE to TAIPEI 903, 14 Mar 66
4. TAIPEI to STATE 1025/240303Z Mar 66
5. STATE to TAIPEI 1108/290053Z Apr 66
6. CINCPAC 072234Z May 66
7. TAIPEI to STATE 1257/110932Z May 66
The Country Team pointed out that during the past year the Chinese communists, with their sizable submarine fleet, had added SWATOW and SHANGHAI class gunboats to their fleet and were expected to procure high speed missile surface craft. The Country Team informed Washington that China had tended to consider that the United States had already agreed in principle to the sale of the five APDs, and that a refusal to sell coming on the heels of the decision to withdraw F-104 aircraft might be interpreted as a lessening of US interest and commitment, and that such refusal might result in an adverse reaction on the part of the Chinese.

(8) In June the Secretary of State informed the Chinese Embassy in Washington that the United States was prepared to sell a replacement for the APD that was sunk off the California coast while enroute to Taiwan.1 Thereafter the Secretary of State also informed Taipei that approval for the sale of two more APDs would soon be given.2

(9) By the end of the year only 3 additional APDs were needed to fill out the original Chinese request for 11. Four ships had been fully activated in Taiwan. The replacement for the sunken APD and the damaged APD that had been accompanying the sunken ship were under tow enroute to Taiwan. The final two ships that had been purchased were also in tow enroute to Taiwan. Discussions reportedly were under way between the Chinese and the United States regarding purchase of the final three APDs.3

Provision of Destroyer and Destroyer Escort

(8) The Chinese Navy had only 4 destroyers (DD) and 5 destroyer escorts (DE), although the Joint Strategic Objectives Plan requirements called for a total of 12 such ASW-type vessels. The last Ship Loan Legislation, enacted on 5 November 1965, did not, as was customary, include authorization for the loan or sale of any naval vessels to China.

1. STATE to TAIPEI 1269/032430Z Jun 66
2. STATE to TAIPEI 752/012347Z Jul 66
3. Ltr Ch, Navy Sec, MAAG CHINA to CNO; MGN/A/F/24; ga 9000 ser 040, Subj: APD Activation and Conversion to Chinese Navy PF's, 29 Nov 66
however. After Congressional visits to PACOM in late 1965, Congress passed an amendment authorizing the loan of one DD and one DE to China. ¹

(1) In February the Secretary of Defense requested comments from CINCPAC and CHMAAG China on a proposal to fund both the DD and the DE in FY 67. ² In reply, CHMAAG China stated that the DD was urgently needed by the Chinese Navy, but that funding it in FY 67 would result in a $3.1 million reduction in the already seriously reduced MAP support and would necessitate deletion of other critical items. ³ He strongly recommended that additional funds be provided to cover the cost of the DD, and that no further deletions be made in the FY 67 program.

(2) CINCPAC concurred with CHMAAG China and pointed out that the need for a DD was emphasized by the loss of three Chinese Navy PC/PCE ships in the Taiwan Straits in 1965. ⁴ He recommended an increase of $2.9 million in the FY 67 MAP to cover the initial cost of the DD. He stated that if additional funds were not available, one F-5 aircraft and $2.2 million worth of machinery for the fuse plant in China must be deleted from the FY 67 program.

(3) The method of funding the DD in FY 67 was under consideration by the Secretary of Defense for several weeks; in May he requested that CINCPAC submit a deviation action to cover the cost of the DD and still remain within the established FY 67 guidelines. ⁵ CHMAAG China initiated the deviation action in accordance with CINCPAC's request and in accordance with the suggestion by CINCPAC that one F-5 and the fuse plant machinery be deleted. ⁶

(4) In July, the Secretary of Defense requested that CINCPAC provide comments concerning a question by Congressman Mendel Rivers as to why both the DD and DE, which were authorized by Ship Loan Legislation, were not programmed and funded in FY 67. Congressman Rivers was also interested in whether Taiwan shipyards could

1. CNO 262156Z Jan 66
2. SEC DEF 4566/231923Z Feb 66
3. CHMAAG CHINA MGPO-OPS 331/030059Z Mar 66
4. ADMINO CINCPAC 250125Z Feb 66; CINCPAC 152325Z Mar 66
5. SEC DEF 1241/061746Z May 66
6. CINCPAC 102055Z May 66
accommodate the DD and DE activations along with the LST rehabilitation and the APD activation-conversion programs. CINCPAC replied that programming of the two destroyer-class vessels in FY 67 was not accomplished because of priorities on air defense and the need to insure modest improvement and support requirements in all Chinese military services. In addition he pointed out that programming the DD in FY 67 without increasing the ceiling would further retard the improvement of Chinese ground forces. It was also noted that the Taiwan shipyards could not handle an expedited program to activate the destroyers.

During the subsequent months the decision was made in Washington to activate one DD at the Boston Naval Shipyard and the Chief of Naval Operations authorized austere activation and overhaul at a cost to MAP of $2.9 million. The USS KIMBERLY (DD 521) was the ship selected. It was expected to be ready for transfer to Taiwan on 31 May 1967.

Ship Loan Program

Through diplomatic channels, China requested five-year extensions on the loan of a landing ship dock and a gasoline tanker and the transfer of title of a high speed transport. The Secretary of Defense proposed to approve the request, subject to CINCPAC concurrence. As these Chinese Navy ships partly fulfilled force requirements, CHMAAG China and CINCPAC concurred.

Production of the M14 Rifle and M60 Machinegun

China had in the past inquired about the possibility of purchasing M14 rifles and M60 machineguns. In April CHMAAG China advised that

1. CINCPAC 080502Z Jul 66
2. CINCPAC 102204Z Jul 66
3. CNO 232105Z Nov 66
4. Ltr CNO, OP-43H1/ab ser 0131P43, Subj: Preparation of USS KIMBERLY, DD 521 for Transfer to ROC for loan under PL 89-398, 25 Nov 66
5. SEC DEF 4912/281259Z Feb 66
6. CHMAAG CHINA MGOP-OPS 3180/030759Z Mar 66; CINCPAC 052336Z Mar 66
7. Point Paper, J4314, 3 May 66
the Chinese had decided to manufacture the new model rifle and machinegun in the arsenals of their Combined Service Forces. This decision was unilateral, but implied that US cooperation would be forthcoming. Since the small arms production was evidently to be funded mostly by non-MAP sources, CINCPAC asked the Country Team for an assessment of the probable impact of the project on the Taiwan economy.

In May the Chinese Ambassador in Washington requested that the United States sell his country 10 M14 rifles and 10 M60 machineguns. The opinion of the Country Team reflected concern about the Chinese decision for various economic and military reasons, and the Team attempted to dissuade the Chinese from the undertaking. On 2 June, however, the Secretary of State informed the US Ambassador in Taiwan that refusal at that time would be politically undesirable, and that despite reservations the United States would provide the requested weapons and data.

The CHMAAG urged the Chinese to consider a number of factors that made the manufacture of a new family of small arms undesirable at that time. General Lai Ming-tang, Chief of the Combined Service Forces, was advised that large US firms had encountered production difficulties with the M14 even though their manufacturing plants were equipped with complex and expensive precision equipment. Particularly difficult was the manufacture of the M14 bolt and receiver out of material that was highly sensitive to heat processing. General Lai was further advised that the manufacture in Taiwan of sufficient M14 and M60 weapons for Chinese infantry forces would take 15 years and would cost from $40 to $50 million.

General Lai thanked CHMAAG China for the favorable US response to his request and gave assurance that the Chinese were not planning to produce the weapons on a large scale. He stated, however, that they were interested in establishing a small arms production capability on Taiwan.

1. CHMAAG CHINA 290745Z Apr 66
2. CINCPAC 042122Z May 66
3. JCS 2554/202126Z May 66; CHMAAG CHINA 220759Z May 66
4. SEC STATE 280225Z Jun 66
In October CHMAAG China forwarded a Chinese request that a team headed by General Lai be allowed to visit US facilities associated with the production of the M14 and the M60. The Chinese also asked for pertinent technical data. The Department of the Army made arrangements for the tour of US facilities, during which the visitors were provided with technical data packages.

In December, the JCS stated that China had sent a letter to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense stating a desire to establish China's capability for manufacture of the M14s and M60s within the next two years. China anticipated production of 6,000 rifles and 1,200 machineguns, and requested US consent so that it could begin production, and also requested additional technical production information.

CINCPAC observed that China had previously been discouraged from undertaking this project, principally for economic reasons. As it was apparent that these considerations did not dissuade China, and as political considerations now overrode those economic aspects, CINCPAC agreed that China should pursue the project.

Electronic Countermeasures Survey

Early in 1966 China was negotiating with the Bendix Corporation in an effort to develop an electronic countermeasures (ECM) capability. The contract under consideration was to provide assistance to a newly established institute of science in the Ministry of Defense. The objective was to develop an ECM capability to interdict Chinese communist radar. Bendix had proposed that as a first phase a Bendix team would go to Taiwan for 6 months to determine what equipment would be required to jam 17 Chinese communist radar sites. The survey phase would be followed by a second phase aimed at developing an ECM capability that was informally estimated to cost about $5 million.

China asked CAS to act as executive agent for the US Government and to secure US approval of the contemplated contract with the

1. CHMAAG CHINA 07075Z Oct 66
2. DA 141541Z Oct 66
3. JCS 2487/301708Z Dec 66
4. Point Paper, J513, 5 May 66
Bendix Corporation. The Chinese also contacted COMUSTDC and CHMAAG and requested extensive MAP support for ship and airborne ECM.

The Country Team deliberated on the Chinese moves and recommended to the Secretary of State that be informed of US Government opposition to providing the Chinese with any ECM equipment and be dissuaded from performing the initial survey. The Country Team recommended that CAS inform the Chinese Government of the US position and that the Embassy, COMUSTDC, and CHMAAG dissuade them, pointing out the high costs and temporary nature of the advantages gained and the danger of provoking the Chinese communists into dangerous countermeasures.

The Country Team requested authorization to offer the services of a special team to help improve the utilization and location of existing Chinese radar and communications equipment. Such a team would also advise the Government on additional equipment available through FMS procedures that would provide limited ECM to cope with simple radar on Chinese communist patrol craft.

CINCUSARPAC and CINCPACFLT concurred with the recommendations of the Country Team, but CINCPACAF recommended that the United States support the attempts initiated earlier by the Chinese to develop an ECM capability and that a team be offered to consult with the Chinese on all aspects of defensive ECM. CINCPAC recommended that the views of the Country Team be accepted and so informed Washington. The JCS also supported the Country Team recommendation in a 2 May memorandum to the Secretary of Defense.

In August the Secretary approved the dispatch of a tri-Service team to Taiwan, but with a mission that differed from that initially proposed by the Country Team. The mission given the team was to make

1. JCS policy as stated in May 64 was to "ensure that the Republic of China's forces are not instructed in tactical doctrine, technical procedures, or equipment specifications incident to planning, mounting, and executing an ECM offensive."
2. CHMAAG CHINA 140905Z Mar 66
3. AMEMB TAIPEI 1413/180435Z Jul 66
4. TAIPEI 1130/150725Z Apr 66
5. CINCPAC 072147Z May 66; CINCPAC 082306Z Aug 66
6. SEC DEF 1218/2717422Z Aug 66

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a precise determination of specific Chinese ECM capabilities, and to provide assistance to the CHMAAG in formulating specific recommendations consistent with US policy limitations and ECM support capabilities of the US military departments. Upon completion of the survey the team was to submit a report to the CHMAAG, who would forward it with Country Team comments. CINCPAC was requested to provide the team by drawing qualified personnel from the Services.

(7) CINCPAC completed arrangements for the ECM team, including selection of personnel, funding, and briefings. The team completed its survey work in late November after spending six weeks in Taiwan. A debriefing was held at CINCPAC on 2 December and an advance copy of the team report was presented for preliminary CINCPAC staff work while the Country Team and CHMAAG China completed their recommendations.

(7) The team recommended general improvement of Chinese ECM capabilities by providing equipment and training in concepts, doctrine, and tactics. The report noted that if the recommendations of the team were to be carried out, an exception to existing national policy would have to be made. 1 At the end of the year CINCPAC had not received the recommendations of CHMAAG China based on the survey team report. He would consider the recommendations of CHMAAG China before he made his own recommendations.

C-119G Aircraft Delivery

(7) The China Air Force (CAF) transport fleet was made up mostly of older C-46 aircraft, which had a poor air-drop capability and dubious life expectancy. In 1965, the Secretary of Defense offered C-119G aircraft on an as-is basis at minimum cost. 2 The Chinese had operated a squadron of C-119s for several years and had the capability to maintain and support this type of aircraft. Thus, in accordance with CINCPAC's recommendation, 12 C-119Gs were provided as an add-on to the FY 66 MAP. 3

1. J3 Memo, GRC ECM Survey Team Report 5 Dec 66 (S)
2. CINCPAC Command History, 1965, p 94
3. ADMINO CINCPAC 262322 Z Nov 65
The USAF delivered the 12 transports to Taiwan between April and June. They were assigned to the 6th Troop Carrier Squadron at Ping Tung Air Base where they replaced an equal number of C-46D aircraft. In accordance with MAP terms, the C-46Ds were redistributed to the Republic of Korea.

In November the USAF Chief of Staff (CSAF) stated that additional C-119G aircraft would be available for MAP countries. CINCPAC requested that a number of these C-119Gs be provided to China on an as-is, where-is basis and at no cost to the MAP. CSAF confirmed that 37 were available for China in FY 68 and an additional 32 in FY 69. These aircraft would completely replace all of the C-46Ds in the six CAF transport squadrons.

AGM-12B Missile Capability for CAF F-100 Aircraft

A modification project to fit CAF F-100A/F aircraft with the AGM-12B (BULLPUP) air-to-ground missile was completed in July 1966. The work was done in-country by CAF personnel with some supervisory and technical assistance from the USAF and the North American Aviation Company. As a result, the fleet of 68 F-100A/Fs was capable of carrying and firing the AGM-12B missile, which increased the capabilities of these strike aircraft, particularly in close support missions.

In July, 50 AGM-12B missiles were allocated to the CAF from assets within PACOM. Provided by FY 65 MAP funds, they were shipped from Okinawa and delivered in September.

The Secretary of Defense established a 60-day War Reserve Materiel authorization level of 5 AGM-12B for each F-100A/F; this would have been 340 missiles, based on the 1966 inventory. It was CINCPAC's policy, however, that this 60-day reserve would not be kept in country and that the missile inventory would be limited to the 50 already in Taiwan. In an emergency, CINCPAC would allocate

1. CSAF AFSMSA 86514/172049Z Nov 66
2. CINCPAC 230120Z Nov 66
3. CSAF 282037Z Nov 66
4. CHMAAG CHINA 280807Z Jul 66
5. CINCPAC 090400Z Jul 66
6. CHMAAG CHINA 150801Z Sep 66
additional missiles from PACOM assets and deliver them expeditiously, by airlift if necessary.¹

**F-104A/B Aircraft**

(7) Consideration was given in 1965 to a long-standing Chinese request to retain a squadron of F-104A/B aircraft that had earlier been tagged for exchange for F-104Gs and release through the MAP to Pakistan.² The Secretary of Defense replied that additional funds would not be available to support the aircraft in the Chinese inventory and requested that the aircraft be placed in flyable storage until disposition was arranged.³

(7) In February 1966 the Department of Defense recommended certain options that would permit their retention, and authorized $2.1 million from FY 67 MAP deviations for support of the aircraft.⁴ At the same time CHMAAG China proposed that the F-104A/B aircraft be added to existing F-104G squadrons as an increase of the unit equipment authorization.⁵ When the CHMAAG reviewed the Defense Department proposed options in the light of reductions in MAP funds, however, he recommended that the aircraft not be retained.⁶

(7) CINCPAC nevertheless considered that the increased tensions in the Taiwan Straits justified their retention by temporarily increasing unit equipment authorizations. He therefore requested that the Secretary of Defense provide funds in addition to FY 66 ceilings for support of the aircraft without changing the existing F-5 program.⁷ The Secretary approved the suggested concept of retention, but made no provision for support funds.

(7) In March the Secretary of Defense reintroduced a related problem, the retention of the one F-86D squadron in the CAF.⁸

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1. ADMINO CINCPAC 290359Z Nov 66; J4 History, Nov 66
2. CINCPAC Command History, 1965, p 147
3. SEC DEF 5136/272007Z Sep 65
4. TAIPEI to STATE 837/041015Z Feb 66; SEC DEF 8108/081557Z Feb 66
5. CHMAAG CHINA MGAFA-9 9312/101033Z Feb 66
6. CHMAAG CHINA MGPO-OPS 138/150739Z Feb 66
7. CINCPAC 220046Z Feb 66
8. SEC DEF 5696/092147Z Mar 66
He urged that all necessary steps be taken to phase out the F-86D squadron and to reduce the total fighter strength from 15 to 14 squadrons. After this message was received, CINCPAC decided to retain the F-104s temporarily and to urge that CHMAAG China take action to accelerate the phase out of the F-86D squadron and to reduce F-86F activity in order to provide resources for increased F-104 activities.\textsuperscript{1} CHMAAG China was requested to bring the F-104A/B aircraft up to "fully operationally ready" condition as soon as possible using maximum MAP deviation and requisitioning action. He began to take these actions, meanwhile informing CINCPAC that China intended to concentrate the F-104A/B aircraft in one squadron.\textsuperscript{2} This plan was not approved by CINCPAC.\textsuperscript{3}

\textsuperscript{(5)} In April the Secretary of Defense informed CINCPAC that the 18 F-104A/B aircraft in Taiwan had been sold to Jordan, and that the terms of sale required an earlier withdrawal than had been anticipated.\textsuperscript{4} CHMAAG China was requested to cancel upgrading action on the aircraft and delete FY 67 support funds, but await additional guidance from the State Department and the ASD/ISA before informing Chinese officials of the intended withdrawal.\textsuperscript{5} This information brought other expressions of concern from the Country Team about probable Chinese reaction. Of particular concern was the timing of the decision—directly after the Chinese had become engaged in the effort to improve the condition of the aircraft and shortly after the Chinese Minister of Defense had agreed to the release of the F-86D squadron.

\textsuperscript{(6)} The Country Team also forwarded statements made by Chinese officials conveying their concern about the weaknesses of Taiwan air defense.\textsuperscript{7} Chinese leaders requested an augmentation of three US fighter squadrons during the months of May and June. CINCPAC advised the JCS that this was not justified by the imminence of a Chinese communist attack, but he pointed out some advantages of providing the requested

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1. CINCPAC 142305Z Mar 66  
2. CHMAAG CHINA MGAF-0-3238/190845Z Mar 66  
3. CINCPAC 300306Z Mar 66  
4. SEC DEF 8654/152241Z Apr 66  
5. CINCPAC 200451Z Apr 66  
6. TAIPEI to STATE 1196/270845Z Apr 66  
7. COMUSTDC 280614Z Apr 66
temporary augmentation. The deployment would provide US crew training, assure the Chinese of the firmness of the US stance, and compensate to a degree for the Chinese disappointment occasioned by MAP reductions and the F-104 withdrawals. He recommended that, in any case, the Chinese be notified promptly of the decision to recall the F-104s.

(9) In May, Minister of Defense Chiang Ching-kuo called on US officials and questioned the manner in which the F-104 aircraft withdrawal had been handled and requested that the decision be reversed. Admiral Sharp, being on a visit to Taiwan, discussed the matter with Minister Chiang and noted that the action, though unexpected, was in accordance with previous guidance and the trade-off agreement. He also pointed out that if the F-104s had been retained the CAF would likely have lost an F-5 squadron in later years.

(9) A few days later Minister Chiang visited the Embassy and suggested some arrangements for withdrawal of the F-104s that would avoid "unfavorable consequences." He asked that his Government be allowed to retain the F-86F aircraft and strongly urged speeding up the F-5 deliveries. Chiang also asked that China be allowed to train the Jordanian pilots. The Country Team recommended against prolonging the adverse reaction being caused by further delays, and against China training the pilots from Jordan. They urged that the F-104s be shipped out as soon as possible.

(9) On 1 June the Embassy was authorized to inform the Chinese that the F-104A/B aircraft would be removed as programmed.

(9) The project of transferring the aircraft was supervised by the USAF Chief of Staff and assigned the name STRETCH RUN. One aircraft was airlifted on 13 July to the Lockheed plant at Palmdale for use as the reconditioning prototype. Preparation for shipment of the remaining 17 was completed by the CAF in mid-August, and the aircraft were placed aboard a carrier for return to the United States on 20 September.

1. CINCPAC 070313Z May 66
2. TAIPEI to STATE 1258/110759Z May 66
3. TAIPEI to STATE 300330Z Apr 66
4. TAIPEI to STATE 1352/300332Z May 66
5. STATE to TAIPEI 1250/010015Z Jun 66
6. CSAF AFSMSDA 93712/032212Z Jun 66
7. CHMAAG CHINA 210341Z Oct 66

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Retention of F-86F Aircraft

The CAF had nine F-86 squadrons, eight of which were composed of F-86F aircraft and one that was the all-weather interceptor squadron of F-86Ds. Plans called for the conversion of the eight squadrons from F-86Fs to F-5 aircraft in a modernization program that was established with the provision that F-86Fs would be declared excess when the replacement F-5s arrived. Chinese officials, however, had long expressed concern over a decline in combat capability during the conversion period, and had repeatedly attempted to gain approval to retain their F-86Fs. CHMAAG China and CINC PAC had generally favored approving this.

The decision to withdraw F-104A/B aircraft promptly brought a renewed Chinese request concerning the F-86Fs. During the unfavorable climate generated by the resolution of the F-104 problem, Minister Chiang asked that China be allowed to keep the F-86Fs. The Country Team requested authority to permit China to retain 25 of them throughout the conversion period, and asked for US recognition and support for a Combat Crew Training Unit made up of aircraft on loan from all of the F-86F wings. They considered that this arrangement was an acceptable means of retention that would not require extensive action by the JCS to revise the Joint Strategic Objectives Plan structure. CINC PAC concurred, but the JCS questioned the need for such a training unit and implied that approval could open the way for future additional pressure to increase the number of CAF squadrons. A joint State and Defense Department decision nevertheless approved retention of the 25 aircraft in a Combat Crew Training Unit during the period of conversion to F-5s.

Phase Out of F-86D Aircraft

The one squadron of 14 F-86D aircraft was to be phased out at the end of FY 66. It had been agreed to phase out the all-weather interceptors when the three F-104G squadrons became operational because the

1. CINC PAC Command History, 1965, p 148
2. TAIPEI to STATE 1352/300332Z May 66
3. CINC PAC 030518Z Jun 66; JCS 032109Z Jun 66
4. STATE to TAIPEI 1317/141042Z Jun 66
F-104s possessed an all-weather capability and it would not be economical in manpower or logistics to maintain either the single F-86D squadron or the two types of aircraft having essentially the same mission.

The lengthy discussion of the F-104A/B aircraft, considerations of available MAP support and force ceilings led the Defense Department to request comment on the F-86D phase out. The Secretary of Defense noted that no F-86F support was programmed after 30 June and that no request for disposition instruction had been received. Thereafter CHMAAG China advised the CAF to initiate the phase out. He also informed the Defense Department that China had not yet confirmed the release of the F-86Ds.

Shortly after the United States agreed to the temporary retention of the F-104A/Bs, China agreed to the release of the F-86Ds. In June the USAF Chief of Staff recommended to CINCPAC that the F-86Ds be redistributed to the Philippine and Korean Air Forces at no cost to the recipient country MA Programs. The Chief of Staff established a delivery program and provided information on the transfer to those concerned.

In July CINCPAC requested that the ASD/ISA issue MAP orders for the redistribution. The eight in the best condition were to bring the Philippine F-86D squadron up to full strength; six were delivered in November and the final two in December. Delivery of the other six aircraft to Korea was completed in November.

Retention of Light Infantry Division Equipment

In January CHMAAG China discussed with Chinese officials the scheduled withdrawal of MAP support for the 6 light infantry divisions which, with their equipment, had been maintained in excess to the 15

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1. SEC DEF 5696/092147Z Mar 66
2. CHMAAG CHINA 180729Z Mar 66
3. CSAF 081956Z Jun 66
4. CSAF 291619Z Jul 66
5. CINCPAC 220119Z Jul 66
6. CHJUSMAGPHIL 150342Z Nov 66; CHMAAG CHINA 220345Z Nov 66; CHMAAG CHINA 060319Z Dec 66
7. 6146 AFAG/151422Z Nov 66

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Forward Look Divisions authorized in Annex J of the Joint Strategic Objectives Plan. Minister of National Defense Chiang Ching-kuo agreed to a graduated phase out of MAP support. Two divisions were to be phased out each year, beginning on 1 July 1966 and finishing by July 1968. Min Chiang indicated, however, that China intended to retain the divisions on active status, non-MAP supported, and requested authority to retain the equipment assigned to them. CHMAAG China entertained this request favorably, and pointed out to CINCPAC that most of the equipment was obsolete and probably not urgently required in PACOM. CHMAAG China considered that, since the Chinese had clearly indicated that even if MAP support were withdrawn the units would not be deactivated, it would not be in the US interest to refuse the request.

(2) CINCPAC informed the JCS of the Chinese request and recommended that, in the best interests of US-Chinese relations, it be approved.2

(2) In March CHMAAG China followed up with information that Minister Chiang was keenly interested in the US decision on the equipment and had asked CHMAAG China to follow up on the request.3 The JCS advised of their affirmative recommendation and of action being taken by the ASD/ISA and the State Department.4 In April the ASD/ISA approved the concept and authorized CHMAAG China to inform Minister Chiang that the United States had no objection to the retention of the MAP equipment assigned to the light divisions, with the exceptions of the wheeled vehicles and communications equipment that had previously been earmarked for redistribution to MAP-supported Chinese units.5

Formation of the Second Marine Division

(2) Early in the year CINCPAC received a full discussion from CHMAAG China describing Chinese action to form the 2d Marine Division as a second division in the Marine Corps.6 CINCPAC recommended to

1. CHMAAG CHINA 3313/160721Z Mar 66
2. CINCPAC 111940Z Feb 66
3. CHMAAG CHINA 160721Z Mar 66; CINCPAC 192106Z Mar 66
4. JCS 670/232013Z Mar 66
5. JCS 8060/082044Z Apr 66; CINCPAC 120238Z Apr 66
6. CINCPAC Command History, 1965, p 153; CHMAAG CHINA ltr
   MGOP, 25 Jan 66

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the JCS that the United States accede to the combination of an Army division with the 1st Marine Brigade to form a second marine division. \( ^1 \) The JCS were also asked to reflect this change in Annex J to the Joint Strategic Objectives Plan, FY 68-75.

\( \exists \) The JCS approved the reorganization and modified Annex J. \( ^2 \) As a result of these actions and decisions, the 10,700-man 81st Division was combined with the 1st Marine Brigade to compose the 2d Marine Division, having a strength of approximately 16,200. In mid-1966 it appeared that steps were being taken to form a corps headquarters for amphibious operations. These changes almost doubled the amphibious capability of the Marine Corps. \( ^3 \)

\( \exists \) There were, however, indications of possible future problems stemming from the formation of the additional Marine division. In February, for example, the Country Team noted that reduced funding levels would permit the support and maintenance of only the men and no new equipment. It was noted that even if the Government used its own funds to purchase the necessary LVTs, the funds available to MAP would be sufficient only to maintain the preexisting Army state of readiness of the covertred troops. \( ^4 \)

**Federal Aviation Authority Technical Assistance**

\( \exists \) Technical assistance provided by the Federal Aviation Authority (FAA) had contributed to the safety of all air operations in the Taiwan air traffic control area. This assistance was provided by the AID until that organization withdrew from China in 1964. During FY 65 and FY 66 the service was funded in an ad hoc manner by exceptions in the MAP. \( ^5 \)

\( \exists \) CINCPAC recommended to the Secretary of Defense in early 1966 that the FAA advisory service be funded in FY 67 and beyond by the FAA or the USAF. \( ^6 \) The Secretary of Defense considered that it was too

1. CINCPAC ltr ser 00283, 18 Feb 66
2. JCS 5763/011930Z Jul 66
3. CINCPAC Command Center Briefing Notes, 24 Sep 66
4. CHMAAG CHINA 010501Z Feb 66
5. Point Paper, J5332, 3 May 66
6. CINCPAC 260433Z Feb 66
late to shift FY 67 funding responsibility to the Air Force. Further, he stated that if the FAA service was essential in FY 67 then it must be funded from PACOM ceilings, and if the requirement continued beyond FY 67 then CINCPAC should take action through Air Force channels for funding.

(2) It was determined through CINCPACAF that there was a valid and continuing military requirement for the FAA service but that the Air Force did not have funds for FY 67. The Air Force, however, began to give consideration to the future use of Air Force civilian personnel to provide air traffic control advisory service, and it was noted that this had been done in other countries. CINCPAC asked CINCPACAF to insure Air Force funding in FY 68 and beyond. Meanwhile, CHMAAG China made the necessary adjustments to fund the advisor through the China MAP for one more year.

1. SEC DEF 5811/102242Z Mar 66
2. CINCPAC 162323Z Mar 66; CINCPACAF ltr DOCOF, 21 Apr 66
3. CINCPAC 032216Z May 66
4. CHMAAG CHINA 120251Z May 66
Current applicable nuclear weapon system safety rules were available. Personnel were fully knowledgeable of the rules and understood the importance and mandatory character of the rules. There were effective systems of inspection and/or monitoring fully capable of assuring compliance with nuclear weapon safety and security program which included adequate implementation of human reliability and personnel clearance requirements, complete, tested emergency evacuation and destruction planning, and adequate custodial and accountability procedures.

"Effective use of the guard force, and appropriate access controls provided satisfactory security at all locations."

DEFENSE DEPARTMENT SUPPORT OF SPACE FLIGHT RECOVERIES

The JCS requested comments on CINCPAC's capability to support space flight recovery operations scheduled from 1967 to 1971. Both ships and aircraft were required in support of each mission and subsequently in support of the Manned Orbiting Laboratory program.

CINCPAC planned aircraft support on the assumption that the aircraft then in use in Southeast Asia would not be available and that any stand-down of normal search and rescue requirements in PACOM was unacceptable. He therefore recommended that the additional 19 HC-130 aircraft required to insure adequate coverage would increase his already established need for HC-130s by 18 in FY 67 and 4 more in FY 68.

For surface vessel support of the programs, CINCPAC recommended fleet augmentation. To provide a stable, well-trained, immediately available force, and also to reduce any adverse impact on fleet operations, he recommended a force dedicated to the recovery program. He asked for augmentation of the Pacific Fleet by a primary recovery ship, possibly an auxiliary aircraft transport from the Reserve Fleet; two destroyers, also from the Reserve Fleet; and an oiler to be taken from other than CINCPACFLT assets.

1. JCS 3636/J5/032240Z Jun 66
2. CINCPAC 200250Z Jul 66
(☉) Toward the end of the year the Secretary of Defense asked
the Defense Department's Manager for Manned Space Flight Support
Operations to convene a study group comprising representatives of
the National Aeronautics and Space Agency (NASA), the JCS, the Navy,
and the Air Force to determine force augmentation requirements.  

(☉) The conferees were unable to reach agreement. Defense
Department personnel recommended establishment of a dedicated
recovery force. NASA representatives held the divergent view that the
dedicated force cost more than it was worth. They argued that CINCPAC
and CINCLANT could support planned recovery operations, in 1967 at
least, with their present forces. They held that technical problems in
the program could delay planned flights and that military requirements
might be reduced in Vietnam, making additional general purpose forces
available.

(☉) The Study Group report forwarded to the Defense Department
on 8 December 1966 concluded that Manned Space Flight Recovery
Support during 1967-1970 should be provided in much the same fashion
as it had been, but that the unified command commanders' requests for
relief should be answered by proceeding with activation of USS LAKE
CHAMPLAIN as the primary recovery ship and by employing two seaplane
tenders as specialized secondary recovery ships. The Defense Department's
Manager for Manned Space Flight Operations recommended to the Secretary
of Defense that the Services be directed to plan accordingly, and that the
Defense Department initiate negotiations with NASA regarding the
allocation of funding responsibilities. The Manager further recommended
that $1.6 million be reprogrammed in FY 67 and $30 million be added to
the FY 68 budget.

(☉) Establishment of a dedicated recovery force would be delayed
until the Secretary of Defense decided the matter.

DETERIORATING US POL STORAGE FACILITIES IN KOREA

(☉) Additional POL storage and improvement of existing facilities
in Korea, particularly those at Inchon, were required to support US

1. JCS 2283/375-4, 17 Nov 66; JCS 2283/375-6, 12 Dec 66
JAPAN

"Japan has made progress, with our assistance and within its constitutional and political limits, in building its Self-Defense Forces which now are almost wholly self-supported. The Japanese maintain their own internal security, provide security for US and Japanese military facilities, and in coordination with the US, contribute to defense against external aggression. The Japanese Air Self-Defense Force has assumed responsibility for the air defense of Japan. However, improvements in air defense as well as anti-submarine warfare capability are still required."

Admiral U.S.G. Sharp
29 March 1966

The Japanese Third Defense Buildup Plan

The Japan Defense Agency (JDA) forwarded to COMUS Japan a preliminary draft of the Japanese Third Defense Plan for the "five-year" period April 1967 to April 1971, which was originally scheduled for approval by the National Defense Council and the Cabinet in mid-1966. This schedule was delayed by the Cabinet, particularly the Finance Minister, who was unwilling to approve a long-range defense plan until a long-range national economic plan had been developed.

There were fundamental problems involved in this delay of legislative approval of the plan. There was an increased desire on the part of the Japanese, including those in industry and in the governing party, to develop the industrial base and make Japan self-sufficient in the production of arms and equipment. Parallel with this desire for self-sufficiency was an increased desire to modernize the Japanese forces. The Japanese lacked sufficient research and development facilities, however, and this was one prime reason that domestically-produced weapons systems were more expensive than those produced in America. Underlying all of these pressures was the resistance to increases in defense appropriations.

References:
1. COMUSJAPAN 160550Z Apr 66; Point Paper, J5333, 3 May 66

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JAPAN

AS OF 1 JANUARY 1967

BASIC INFORMATION

AREA: 143,000 SQ.MI.
PUBLICATION: 100 MILLION
ANNUAL GROWTH: .95
ARABLE LAND PER CAP: 0.2 ACRE
LITERACY RATE: 97%
LIFE EXPECTANCY: 67 YEARS
GROSS NAT. PROD. 1967 (E): $595.5 BILLION
PER CAPITA: $955
DEFENSE BUDGET 1967 (E) SELF FINANCED: $1,146 MILLION
AS % OF GDP: 1.25
AS % OF TOTAL BUDGET: 8.05

EMPEROR - Hirohito
PRIME MINISTER - Eisaku Sato
MINISTER FOREIGN AFFAIRS - Takeo Miki
DIR-GEN JAPAN DEFENSE AGENCY (JDA)
Kenshichi Hashuda
CHAIRMAN, Joint STAFF COUNCIL (JDA)
Gen Yoshio Aisawa, ARMY
CHIEF, GROUND STAFF SGD - Gen Seichi Yoshida, ARMY
CHIEF, MARITIME STAFF MSD -
Adm Takeuchi, NAVY
CHIEF, AIR STAFF, JASSOF - Gen Hirokuni Hata, ARMY
DIR-GEN, MARITIME SAFETY AGENCY - Mitsuo Sato

OVERALL OBJECTIVE

U.S. DIPLOMATIC MISSION

TO RETAIN U.S. BASES AND FACILITIES
WITH ATTENDENT RIGHTS (PORT
ACCESS AND OVERFLIGHT); AND
ASSIST ALL EFFORTS TO PROMOTE
AMERICAN INFLUENCE;
U.S. AMBASSADOR: 
Ron U. Alexis Johnson
CHIEF, MAC: 
Michael L. Riddle, Jr.

MAP OBJECTIVE

General objectives are:
(A) To draw the Japanese into assumption of larger
responsibility for the security of Asia.
(B) To assist in the qualitative improvement of
Japanese forces.
(C) To elicit an increase and an improved allocation
of Japanese defense expenditures.
(D) To maintain a climate in which the U.S. will
continue to enjoy existing, and if required,
additional overflight, staging, and base rights.

MAJOR FORCE OBJECTIVES

TOTAL COUNTRY FORCES

ARMY

12 INF DIVS, 6 HAWK BNS, 3 TANK BNS, 1 MANU-1.
IZED DIV, 1 SCHOOL BDE, 3 AAA BNS, 16 ARTY BNS
1 ABN BDE, 3 ENG BNS

NAVY

5 CGMS, 50 DESTROYER/CORvette TYPES, 10 PATROL
SHIPS, 10 35, 44 MINE sweepers, 7 LST/LSM, 10
KSM PAT SQNs, 4 HELO SQNs, 3 STRAT
SURVEY ENCE UNITS, 10 RFS, 1 SAR SQN

AIR FORCE

12 A/F BNS, 2 TRANSPORT SQNs, 4 RECON
SON, 6 TAC FTR SQns, 11 SAR DETACHMENTS, 6
NIKE, 1 WEATHER RECON SQn, 1 AW SQn

12 INF DIVS, 1 MECH DIV, 1 ABN BDE, 1 ARTY
BDE, 1 AAA GP, 3 ENG BDE, 2 HAWK BNS, 2
AAA BNS (SEPARATE FROM DIV), 1 TANK GR

MAINTAIN INTERNAL SECURITY AND CONDUCT LIMITED
DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS

LIMITED ABILITY TO ESCORT COASTAL CONVOYS; 1 ASW
SON OPERATIONAL EFFECTIVE; GOOD MINE SWEETING
CAPABILITY; HIGH DEGREE OF READINESS.

GOOD UNDER VFR CONDITIONS; AWX CAPABILITY GROWING.
SMALL SIZE AND AIRCRAFT FIRE CONTROL SYSTEM LIMITS
CAPABILITY. CAPABLE OF PROVIDING TACTICAL SUPPORT
FOR BOTH GROUND AND NAVAL FORCES.

SOURCE: JCS 12, PA1

*As of 1 November 1966
The general concepts of the draft plan were compatible with the missions and requirements for forces in the Joint Strategic Objectives Plan for FY 68-75. An increase in the defense budget to two percent of the Gross National Product by 1971 was consistent with US desires. The plan called for modernization and replacement of US-made weapons, equipment, and supplies with those made in Japan. Despite emphasis on internal procurement, CHMAAG Japan considered the continuing limitations in research and development would result in increased US FMS during the period of the plan. He stated that the Japanese would likely procure from the United States such major components as electronics items, large gun mounts and barrels, aircraft engines and landing gear for the CX transport, tank transmissions, and follow-on spares. Major items likely to be purchased were NIKE systems, E-2A aircraft, and F-5 trainer aircraft.

The plan called for the following improvements in Japanese military capabilities: (1) ground forces to be increased by 8,500 to a total of 180,000 men; (2) air defense to be improved by the introduction of an advanced interceptor to replace the F-86D and the activation of additional NIKE and HAWK missile battalions under the Base Air Defense Ground Environment System; and (3) maritime capability to be expanded by the addition of ASW aircraft and helicopters and the construction of 70 warships (70,000 tons), including 18 destroyers, 23 patrol craft, and 6 submarines. The plan did not present clear priorities but contained flexible sequences that could be arranged in deference to internal administrative and political problems. CHMAAG Japan recommended the following order of priorities: elimination of ammunition shortages, filling out of understrength units, acquiring US electronic equipment for ASW and air defense radar intercept control, development of new aircraft, and construction of new surface ships.

The US Ambassador agreed with CHMAAG Japan's assessment of the JDA draft plan and requested that CINCPAC provide it to the Secretary of State.

Late in the year CHMAAG Japan reported that the Japanese

1. AMEMB TOKYO 160303Z Apr 66

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National Defense Council had given qualified approval of the plan. The types of equipment and material in the plan were approved, but quantities and total expenditures were not.  

The Changing Japan Military Assistance Program

(♀) The objectives of the MAP for Japan were to maintain the US-Japanese alliance, which granted the United States overflight and base rights in Japan, and to create a Japanese defense force capable of maintaining internal security and contributing with US Forces to the deterrence of communist aggression in the area.

(♀) Grant aid to Japan was inaugurated in 1954 with a modest half-million dollar program. The MAP increased to a $131 million high in 1958. The growing economy increased the capability of the Japanese Government to assume a larger part of military expenditures. Therefore, after 1958 emphasis was shifted to cost-share programs, and by 1960 all but a minor portion of the MAP was on that basis. The cost-share programs were designed to strengthen Japanese defenses and to influence the development of defense plans and programs in a manner beneficial to US interests in the Far East. The cost-share arrangements with Japan were formal government-to-government agreements covering such matters as finances, technical support, release of security information, and arrangements with the producing industries. All MAP funding of the agreements, except for training, was completed at the end of FY 65. The major weapons systems provided by cost-share arrangements and the US portion of the costs were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Item, and Quantity</th>
<th>US Cost ($ in millions)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td>T-33 Aircraft, 100</td>
<td>39.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>F-86F Aircraft, 70</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td>P2V Aircraft, 42</td>
<td>43.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>F-104 Aircraft, 200</td>
<td>75.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>NIKE Battalions, 1</td>
<td>18.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>HAWK Battalions, 2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>TSQ Battalion Opn Centers, 4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. CHMAAG JAPAN 060720Z Dec 66

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Year, Item, and Quantity   US Cost ($ in millions)
1964 Base Air Defense Ground Environment System  9.0
1965 Base Air Defense additions  5.0

In addition to the assistance provided by these formal agreements, the United States furnished support for the naval shipbuilding program and the HSS-2 helicopter production program. The Japanese Ministry of Defense funded and constructed the ships and helicopters while the United States furnished selected ASW components. The last grant aid-provided ASW equipment was in the FY 64 MAP.

Military Assistance Program Levels

In FY 67 the Japan MAP consisted entirely of training, partly in support of prior commitments and partly a limited amount of orientation and influence training. The program was originally planned at $423,750 and later refined and implemented at $378,400, of which $155,500 was for the commitment training, $203,900 was for the orientation and influence training, and $19,000 was for training support.

The commitment training was part of the technical support of the cost-share NIKE-HAWK agreement and provided the services of 11 contract technical service personnel. Missile commitment training was originally scheduled to terminate at the end of FY 67, but the program was extended to December 1967 because of equipment delivery delays. Three of the contract field service representatives were to be retained in Japan for six months of FY 68.

Personnel of the 2d HAWK Battalion completed CONUS training in September 1966. Their battalion was to receive an operational mission by August 1967, thus anticipating their operational readiness target date of 31 December 1967. This would terminate MAP training in support of the SAM program.

Since 1964 the emphasis in training had shifted toward orientation visits. This grant aid training served to acquaint key Japanese officers and officials with US methods and procedures and to demonstrate

1. Point Paper, J32, 26 Sep 66

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US equipment. It also helped to influence Japanese officers to accept US operational procedures and to shape the Japanese forces in the US pattern. There were senior officer visits that served to expose the visitors to US procedures, administration, and management. The visitors were made acquainted with such functions as operations, logistics, and medical services. Another type of orientation training was schooling in advanced warfare techniques such as that offered at the Service colleges. The third type was advanced training of senior officers in certain specialties followed by an orientation tour.

The MAP for the years FY 68-71 was developed on the basis of Secretary of Defense dollar guidelines, and it was to provide commitment training and a very limited amount of orientation and influence training. As of 3 May 1966, the Secretary had established a ceiling of $400,000 for FY 67, $200,000 for FY 68, and $100,000 for each year thereafter. Late in 1966, however, he deleted all MAP grant aid training from the program after FY 67. It was decided that the State and Defense Departments would investigate some means to provide funds from other sources for continuation of a minimal influence and orientation training program. CINCPAC believed that not less than $300,000 worth of grant aid a year for such training was very necessary for FY 68 and later years.

Foreign Military Sales Program

With the completion of grant aid to Japan and the subsequent phase out of cost-share programs, the United States sought alternative ways to continue to influence the Japanese military establishment and to provide the Japanese with weapons systems that would contribute to mutual defense. To these ends CINCPAC maintained a high interest in FMS. A number of arrangements were part of or corollaries to the FMS effort. In addition to direct military orders, there were supply support arrangements, co-production, barter, and licensing agreements. These "sales" were furthered by limitations of Japanese research and

1. SEC DEF 7896/150015Z Nov 66; SEC DEF 301829Z Dec 66
2. CINCPAC 140437Z Oct 66

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development and the large costs of this basic requirement for the production of weapons systems. The Japanese resisted the purchase of complete weapons systems and expensive items, and the emphasis shifted to co-production and licensing arrangements.

Base Air Defense Ground Environment

(9) In accordance with the government-to-government agreement signed on 4 December 1964, Japan and the United States worked to upgrade the manual AC&W air defense system to a semi-automatic ground environment. The cost-share agreement for the Base Air Defense Ground Environment (BADGE) system provided for a US management support team, plus follow-on to the basic BADGE, and technical support arrangements.

(6) The governments exchanged notes on 18 June 1965 on the cost-sharing of the additions program, which completed negotiations for the second package for follow-on support. The arrangement was for $5 million for the United States and $15 million (US) in Japanese funding. On the same day the Defense Department and the JDA signed a Technical Arrangement to implement the provisions of the notes related to the BADGE additions program.

(6) During 1965 and early 1966, CHMAAG Japan in coordination with the JDA completed work statements for the additions program. Japanese and US contractors were selected. A military sales case was established for the sale of required equipment through the FMS program.

(7) The BADGE system was originally scheduled to be operational in March 1968, but it appeared that the date would slip to about March 1969. Several factors were involved: there was a delay in establishing the FMS case for antennas, which resulted in the antennas arriving during the winter rather than during good construction weather; in addition to a shortage of highly skilled personnel, there was a shortage of funds to hire contractor personnel and to procure special site-test equipment.

1. CINCPAC Command History, 1964, p 183
2. Point Paper, J613, 30 Sep 66
3. For political and funding reasons the JDA was still using 1968 as the operational date.
SECRET

(3) There were several additional contracts associated with the BADGE system being considered or negotiated. These included production of the F-104J data link; provision of training and school equipment; production of the target/intercept simulators; follow-on improvements necessary to correct deficiencies in the basis BADGE system; and improvements to make the BADGE system compatible with US air defense systems in the Northwest Pacific area.

(4) For Japanese political reasons the program to interface BADGE with US systems was called the WESTPACNORTH Information Utilization Program. It provided for the integration of the Japanese BADGE with the US Navy Tactical Data System, the Ryukyu Air Defense System, and the Korea Air Defense System into one defense environment. It was intended that integration would be achieved by full digital exchange of information between systems and voice and teletype between automated and manual systems. The compatibility was scheduled to be accomplished in January 1969.

(5) The estimated cost of this digital compatibility was $12.3 million including $1.15 million added to the BADGE program and funded by the Japanese Government. The Secretary of Defense approved the interface program on 11 February 1966 and designated the Air Force as executive agency of the WESTPACNORTH Information Utilization Program.

(6) Indications were that Japan might wish to initiate a separate technical arrangement for the program. The United States preferred not to negotiate a separate agreement as WESTPACNORTH was covered in the BADGE agreements already signed. Renegotiating the issue could be costly and would likely delay the program. Details of the compatibility program were under study by the USAF Chief of Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations at the end of the year.

Surface-to-Air Missile Systems

(5) The MAP-sponsored surface-to-air missile system for the

1. Point Paper, J613, 30 Sep 66

SECRET
Japanese forces consisted of two NIKE and two HAWK battalions.  

(7) The first NIKE battalion was provided by MAP grant aid in the FY 61 program. It was operational and positioned for protection of the Tokyo-Yokohama industrial complex.

(7) The second NIKE battalion was provided under a 26 April 1963 Japan-US cost-share agreement. With minor exceptions the equipment for this battalion had been delivered by the end of 1966. The unit was positioned for protection of the Kokura-Fukuoka industrial complex. Its personnel had completed training and undergone service firing practice. It was estimated that the unit would become fully operational in early 1967.

(8) The military sales support of the NIKE system was not very satisfactory and the sales support agreement expired in March 1965. No support was available for the NIKE system until May 1965 when the CHMAAG Japan and the JDA negotiated a supply support arrangement, which functioned satisfactorily in 1966 and was expected to be continued.

(8) The two HAWK battalions were also included in the 26 April 1963 cost-share agreement. The first battalion was operational and assigned to the Chitose-Sapporo area. The second HAWK battalion was planned for protection of the Tokyo area. A site survey revealed that the US-controlled Tama Ammunition Depot represented the optimum location for the HAWK battalion, but co-location of the HAWK battalion and the ammunition depot was ruled out for safety reasons.  

2. The HAWK battalion was to be located at a temporary site until a suitable alternate location for the ammunition storage area could be made available, and the battalion moved to Tama.  

(9) Efforts to arrange for the establishment in Japan of HAWK and NIKE training schools continued. Negotiations were completed in early 1966 to provide the required training equipment and additional CONUS training by military sales.

(9) Two other offers had been made to the JDA. Additional

1. The JDA assigned the NIKE units to the Air Self-Defense Forces and the HAWK units to the Ground Self-Defense Forces.
2. CINCUSARPAC 030051Z Aug 66
3. See "Tama Ammunition Depot and Akishima Golf Course" on page 336
surplus NIKE battalions were offered at an attractive price. If accepted, the support of those battalions would probably increase the scope of the existing NIKE supply support arrangement. Also in late 1965 the United States offered a supply support arrangement for conventional HAWK equipment in the Japanese ground forces. This support was to be channeled through the US Army Logistic Center, Japan. Both offers remained under consideration during 1966. It appeared likely that the latter offer would be accepted and that HAWK support would begin in 1967.

### Barter Acquisition of NIKE Battalions

During early 1965 discussion of possible co-production of the NIKE system, the United States made an offer to barter the equipment for two NIKE battalions in exchange for goods and services. In February 1966 a joint State-Defense-Treasury Department team visited Japan and presented JDA officials with data on alternative methods that could be employed to fill Japanese requests for NIKE battalions from US sources. Two NIKE battalions were offered through FMS, barter, Army excess sale, or co-production. The option date of this offer was 15 June. On 29 June, JDA officials requested an extension of the option to 30 days after the Third Defense Buildup Plan had been approved by the Government. In July, the Secretary of Defense notified the JDA that an extension of the option date to 30 September was granted. At the end of the year, however, the Japanese had not yet made a decision on the NIKE acquisition and the final decision continued to be contingent on the results of the approval of the Third Defense Buildup Plan and particularly the JDA budget for Japan Fiscal Year (JFY) 67. As the situation appeared at the end of the year, COMUS Japan considered that the Third Defense Buildup Plan would provide for the purchase through FMS of NIKE ground equipment for three battalions, and for co-production of NIKE missiles. It was important that the Japanese co-produce NIKE missiles to further public acceptance of a non-nuclear missile.

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1. CPRS 003609, Atch 7
2. CHMAAG JAPAN 110726Z Feb 66
Co-production of HAWK Missiles

(5) A study to determine the feasibility of co-production of HAWK missile equipment had been initiated by the JDA early in 1965. In connection with this study, the JDA completed a survey of US production facilities in May 1966. Technical agreements between US and Japanese companies were completed more expeditiously than those for the NIKE system, in part because there was no excess HAWK equipment to introduce the complicating problem of possible alternate methods of acquisition. The prime US contractor, the Raytheon Company, and the Mitsubishi Electric Company drafted a technical agreement, which was subject to the overall government-to-government agreement that was being negotiated at the end of the year. By October, Mitsubishi had financed a $350,000 pre-production survey with Raytheon.

(5) It appeared that the JDA included the co-production of equipment for four HAWK battalions in the Third Defense Buildup Plan. Third Defense Buildup planning, however, appeared to be from 10 to 15 percent less than required. This would force the JDA to squeeze the HAWK co-production program in an undesirable manner.

TARTAR Support Arrangements

(5) Lengthy and interrupted negotiations continued for an agreement that would provide the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force with support for the TARTAR weapons system. After completion late in 1965 of the NIKE support agreements, TARTAR support was taken up again. The Japanese reviewed the latest US draft, which would provide support for the Japanese TARTAR system similar to that provided the US Navy. The Japanese officials favored the processing of requisitions for TARTAR support through the MAAG Japan rather than through US Navy channels.

1. CPRS 003609, Atch 6
2. In 1965, 36 missiles were provided for the newly commissioned guided missile destroyer AMATSUKAZE. CINCPAC Command History, 1965, p 183
3. CPRS 003609, Atch 8
Low-Level Air Defense Weapons

(9) The conventional low-level air defense weapons furnished during past years to Japan under the MAP were rapidly becoming unsupportable and outdated. The JDA, in seeking a system of low-level weapons to complement the NIKE-HAWK missile system, began a study to determine the best weapons.1 Funds were allocated for the procurement of the Swiss Oerlikon 35mm L90 gun and the United States was asked for information about the REDEYE and CHAPARRAL missiles and the VULCAN gun system. In May the United States offered to sell 30 REDEYE missiles, but the offer was still under consideration by the Japanese at the end of the year.

Modernization of Aircraft

(9) Aircraft supplied to Japan under the MAP, including T-6, T-33, F-86F, and C-46, were becoming increasingly obsolescent.2 This was recognized by Japanese officials who had reflected the need for aircraft modernization in the Third Defense Buildup Plan. The three most likely methods for the modernization were: (1) local design and production; (2) co-production with a foreign contractor; and (3) FMS arrangements. The Japanese appeared to be leaning toward in-country production of transport and trainer aircraft. This would be more costly than acquisition through FMS, but the Japanese were willing to absorb the extra cost for the benefit to industrial technology and stimulation of the Japanese aircraft industry.

(9) As for the sophisticated jet fighter interceptor, co-production with a US contractor appeared to be the most likely means. There were not enough engineers and the Japanese industrial state-of-the-art would not permit in-country development and construction of an aircraft that would be a substantial improvement over the F-104J.

(9) For an airborne early warning (AEW) aircraft, the Japan Air Self-Defense Force was considering in-country production of an airframe, possibly using the transport to be locally produced, and acquisition of

1. CPRE 003609, Atch 5
2. CPRE 003609, Atch 10
a US-produced avionics package or use of US technology to manufacture avionics in Japan.

(8) The Air Self-Defense Force had been interested in acquiring four F-5B aircraft (which could be used as an operational trainer and as a tactical fighter\(^1\)), but the requirement for them was deleted in 1965 by the JDA during budget reviews.\(^2\)

(8) Early in 1966 the Japanese evidenced interest in the F-5 configured for use as an advanced trainer for pilot transition from T-33 type aircraft to F-104J fighter interceptors. In March a team of Japanese officers reviewed the flight training program at the USAF Air Training Command with the object of considering the introduction of an advanced trainer, such as the F-5, into the Japanese training curriculum. The F-5 was not included in the JFY 66 budget, but CHMAAG Japan reported that Japanese training proposals included the F-5 in the JFY 68 inventory.

STOL Seaplane Development

(8) For several years the Shin-MeIwa Industrial Company headed a group doing research on the development of a large seaplane with short takeoff and landing (STOL) characteristics and an open sea operating capability.\(^3\) The resultant PXS STOL seaplane being developed by the Japanese was intended for use as the major ASW aircraft during the 1970-1980 period. This Japanese program was the only large seaplane research and development program in the world at the time and incorporated new concepts in seaplane technology including automatic stabilization equipment, boundary layer control, and dipping sonar.

(8) Under a Data Exchange Agreement for Seaplanes, the Japanese were receiving considerable assistance from the US Navy through CHMAAG Japan. Initially the United States provided technical design data pertaining to STOL hydrofoils and seaplanes. An engineering study team from the United States visited the Japanese group, and one Grumman UF-1 Albatross was transferred to Japan for conversion into

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1. For political reasons, discussions of possible Japanese acquisition of the F-5 referred to the aircraft as the F-38B.
2. MAAG Japan, Fact Sheet, 1 Feb 66
3. CPRS 003609, Atch 18

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a 3/4-scale prototype test bed of the production design.

(4) By early 1966, under either the original Data Exchange Agreement or separate indemnity agreements, large quantities of airborne ASW electronic installation drawings were transferred to the JDA. In addition, the United States provided engines, propellers, instruments, sonar, ASW avionics, and a wide range of aviation spare parts.

(4) In January the Japanese Ministry of Finance approved a $7 million allocation for construction of the first and second prototypes of the seaplane. The final design was approved by the JDA early in the year, detailed blueprints for the first prototype were drawn, and production of the first prototype began in September.

(7) Although the US Navy had no formal requirement for the large STOL seaplane, its potential as an ASW weapon and as a possible search and rescue aircraft were of interest. It was expected that a great deal of technical data not available to the United States would be gained in return for the assistance being given.

ASW Aircraft Extended Use and Modernization Programs

(5) The Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) had two types of ASW aircraft, the MAP-supplied S-2A Tracker and the P2V-7 Neptune. The P2Vs were manufactured in Japan through a very successful MAP cost-share production and licensing arrangement.1 For its ASW needs Japan was developing a modernized P2V-7 (its prototype was called the GK-210) in addition to the FXS STOL seaplane. Until both were fully operational, it was desired to extend the life of ASW aircraft on hand.2 Efforts included a fatigue testing program utilizing US Navy donated airframes. The Navy was also assisting in preparing test plans, providing extensive technical advice, and giving on-the-scene assistance.3 Actual fatigue tests on the S-2A were begun in June 1966.

1. MAAG Japan Fact Sheet, 1 Feb 66
2. The first S-2A ended its service life in July.
3. CPRS 003609, Atch 19
(§) The P2V modernization program was funded by Japan in 1965. The US Chief of Naval Operations then approved the allocation of one of the cost-share Neptunes to be converted into the GK-210 prototype.

(§) The GK-210 was test flown in late 1966, and evaluation tests continued. If tests proved the modernization successful, 68 aircraft were planned for delivery by FY 72.

1. Modernization would provide the P2V-7 Neptune with the following features: an airborne ASW electronics package and crew arrangement compatible with the US Navy P2, P3, and P5 series of ASW aircraft. The radar would be replaced to reduce the size of the radome. The reciprocating engines would be replaced with turboprop (T64-GE-10) engines and the J34 jet engine would be replaced with the Japanese J3-IHI-7 jet engine. The fuselage would be elongated by 51 inches, the rudder surfaces enlarged, and the landing gear strengthened.
Drone Anti-Submarine Helicopter System

(S) Deliveries began in 1965 and continued in 1966 on the Drone Anti-Submarine Helicopter (DASH) systems, which were provided for installation on two destroyers under construction by the JMSDF and scheduled for completion in early 1967 and 1968. The DASH system

1.
2.
3.
4.
was provided by the MAP and was funded in FY 63 and FY 64. Major components to be provided were three QH-50C helicopter drones, drone control equipment, NC-2 attack plotter, radar repeater, and spare support equipment. The JMSDF planned to acquire an additional drone through FMS procedures. Construction of a shore-based training and maintenance facility for DASH operations was completed in 1966; control equipment for it was purchased through FMS.

Defense Data Exchange Program

JDA objectives in research and development were to generate original designs in order to manufacture and procure as much military equipment as possible within Japan. The JDA's Technical Research and Development Institute had developed capably engineered equipment despite an inadequate budget of $13 million annually. The United States was interested in cost reduction, quality, suitability, standardization of Japanese equipment with that of the United States, and in US access to JDA research developments. Due to the disparity between the United States and Japan in the size of research and development facilities, the arrangements continued to favor the Japanese. The barrier of the Japanese language and the greater freedom of US scientists to publish their research findings were additional reasons that the flow of information continued to favor the Japanese. It was also a continuing problem to further cooperative machinery, while at the same time maintaining security limitations and avoiding disruption of potential FMS.

The arrangement on data exchange of 15 November 1962 established the means for the Defense Department and the JDA to exchange development information on a wide range of subjects. All three Services were involved, but Navy sponsored projects were more active and appeared to have the most appeal to the JDA.

In addition to the Defense Data Exchange Program, the United

1. AmEmb Tokyo Itr A-1524, 27 Jun 66
2. The authority and objective of the Defense Data Exchange Program were outlined in DOD Instruction 2015.4, Subj: Mutual Weapons Development Data Exchange Program and Defense Development Exchange Program, 5 Nov 63
3. MAAG Japan, Fact Sheet, 1 Feb 66

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States had tried for several years to conclude an Agreement for Cooperative Research Projects. Such an agreement was concluded in June 1966. It outlined machinery for joint development projects. It also favored the JDA more than the Defense Department, and would continue to do so until the Japanese funded military research and development more equitably.

Still another means of furthering cooperative exchange of scientific developments was a program to exchange scientists. During FY 66, four JDA scientists were placed in Defense Department laboratories. Living expenses were funded by the Defense Department for the first increment of this program. Follow-up was slow, in part because of the unwillingness of the JDA to appropriate funds. CHMAAG Japan continued attempts to encourage greater reciprocity and more active Japanese contributions in research and development.

Operations Research Training Assistance

General Amano, Chairman of the Japanese Joint Staff Council, requested on 28 July 1966 that Admiral Sharp send the Chief of the CINCPAC Scientific Advisory Group for a two-week visit to the JDA to assist operations research specialists in Japan. Of particular interest to the Japanese was operations research on the joint staff level. In response, CINCPAC sent his Operations Research Chief to Japan where a series of lectures and discussions was held with Japanese defense officials. The following subjects were discussed: post-World War II developments and contributions of operations research to Service and joint planning and operations; operations research and systems analysis of military problems and systems analysis of budgeting in the Department of Defense; the US Civil Service system for establishing operations research groups and recruiting qualified analysts; and the activities of the CINCPAC Scientific Advisory Group in the support of CINCPAC and his staff.

1. Point Paper, J3Al, 23 Sep 66
2. Mr. Roy F. Linsenmeyer
Release of Classified Information and Equipment

(5) Obtaining US clearance for the release of certain equipment to Japan continued to be difficult and time consuming. For example, a year and a half was required to complete the release action on performance data for US aircraft that were intended for use in the Japanese semi-automatic air defense system. A shopping list of electronic countermeasures training equipment that was necessary to exercise Japanese air defense elements was requested by the JDA. Such a list was provided to CHMAAG Japan, but he was told by the Defense Department that release of equipment on the list must be determined on a case-by-case basis.

(5) Of particular concern had been the problem of releasing the airborne early warning (AEW) aircraft and equipment or the avionics package only. The United States had recommended that the Japanese have an AEW capability, the Japanese had accepted the recommendation and the Secretary of Defense had proposed that CHMAAG Japan pursue the sale of E-2A aircraft. The release of the aircraft and its equipment had not been resolved, however. CHMAAG Japan also had a proposal by Hughes Aircraft Company for US production of an avionics package suitable for use with a Japanese produced aircraft. Authority for discussion with the Japanese of the Hughes Company proposal had not been received.

(5) CINCPAC suggested the development of an approved shopping list of modern military equipment that could be released to Japan and that would fill a vital role in the defense of Japan. CINCPAC believed that such a list could be developed from a Secretary of Defense-directed Air Defense Study of Japan, conducted by the USAF.¹

(5) In August 1965 the JDA Maritime Staff Officer submitted a formal request for permission to manufacture a Japanese version of 18 US airborne ASW electronics packages. CHMAAG Japan recommended to the Chief of Naval Operations that the request be approved and cited the advantages of building up Japan as an off-shore supply source for US Forces. He also favored developing the Japanese state-of-the-art

¹. OSD Memorandum OSD/ISA I-17714/65, 22 Dec 65
and insuring that Japanese airborne ASW capability would be compatible with US Navy systems.

In March 1966, the CNO approved Japanese manufacture of four of the items requested. Since then the Japanese Maritime Staff Office repeatedly requested information on the release of authority to manufacture additional packages. The Japanese used several sources, including the MAAG Japan, diplomatic channels, and direct contact with the US manufacturer, to learn as much as possible about the equipment in order to further negotiations for Japanese production.

Phase-Down of MAAG Japan

The phasing out of the grant aid aspect of the Japan MAP brought about numerous manpower surveys and studies of the MAAG Japan. The basic organization, an office of the Chief and three Service sections, had remained unchanged since its establishment in 1954. The manpower levels, however, had steadily decreased from 650 US personnel and 552 Japanese nationals to 131 US personnel and 145 Japanese in 1964. Through FY 65 the MAAG operated under the Joint Manpower Program (JMP) for FY 65-69 approved by the JCS.

In September 1965 the General Accounting Office (GAO) completed a study of MAAG Japan. The GAO stated that savings of about $1 million could have been made in FY 64 if the Defense Department had taken action to phase the MAAG down commensurate with the reduced scope of the MAP for Japan, and that the MAAG was performing functions of doubtful need or those that could be performed by other organizations. They recommended that action be taken to reduce the staff, to eliminate or transfer functions, and to terminate activities as soon as possible. The Defense Department forwarded the GAO study to CINCPAC and CHMAAG Japan and requested comments from CINCPAC.

In late December 1965 CINCPAC asked CHMAAG Japan to restudy the problem of MAAG Manning levels as raised by the GAO study.

1. GAO Draft Report - Review of Manpower Utilization to Administer the Military Assistance Program, Japan, 30 Sep 65
2. SEC DEF 3151/012056Z Oct 65; SEC DEF 5362/292158Z Oct 65
3. CHMAAG JAPAN 100722Z Nov 65; CINCPAC 290209Z Dec 65; CINCPAC 292359Z Dec 65
On 18 December 1965 the Secretary of Defense directed that CINCPAC reappraise MAAG operations and recommend future functions, organization, and manning level. The CINCPAC restudy was accomplished in January 1966 with representatives from the JCS, CHMAAG Japan, and CINCPAC's component commanders in attendance at CINCPAC Headquarters. The results were forwarded to the ASD/ISA on 22 February. CINCPAC pointed out that MAAG Japan had important contacts and rapport with the JDA and JDSF not possessed by other US headquarters in Japan. He noted the fact that MAAG Japan was the focal point of Japanese military officials on a wide range of matters including MAP training, ASW, the NIKE-HAWK program, BADGE, F-104 modernization, FMS, cooperative logistics, marketing assistance, and research and development. CINCPAC recommended that MAAG Japan be retained as a separate entity with a strength of 80 US personnel in FY 67, phasing down to 64 US personnel in FY 68. The reduction to 80 US personnel from 127 would result in a saving of $665,000. The total annual support of an 80-man MAAG was computed at $766,738 (exclusive of military pay and allowances). Japan was expected to contribute approximately $624,936 of this expense leaving a net expense to the United States of $141,802.

In April the JCS informed CINCPAC that the ASD/ISA had approved the continuation of MAAG as recommended by CINCPAC. A reduced strength of 64 US military and 16 civilian personnel, and 89 Japanese nationals, was approved and provisions were made for a further reduction of 16 military spaces in CY 67. It was requested that the initial reductions be accomplished by 1 July 1966 and that a CINCPAC-recommended Joint Manpower Program (JMP) be submitted.

1. SECDEF 181712Z Dec 65
2. CINCPAC 220150Z Feb 66
3. JCS 9456/271930Z Apr 66
4. The additional 16 military spaces had been authorized for the NIKE-HAWK advisory effort.
CHMAAG Japan was informed, and with the assistance of a CINCPAC representative the proposed 1 July 1966 manpower program was prepared and forwarded to the JCS, who approved it in June. The 1 July JMP reduced the MAAG by 32 US military, 15 US civilian, and 50 Japanese national spaces from the previous year's authorization.

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1. CINCPAC 291945Z Apr 66; CHMAAG Japan ltr ser 0281, 26 Apr 66; CINCPAC ltr ser 0442, 4 May 66
2. JCS 4565/162133Z Jun 66
PHILIPPINES

"The Philippines play an essential role in Western Pacific defense. Our current operations in Southeast Asia receive support from Philippine bases. Unhampered use of these bases is a key factor in our ability to prosecute the war in Vietnam. There are serious deficiencies in the economic situation and in law and order in the Philippines. President Marcos wants to deal with these weaknesses. He is planning action against the smuggling and tax evasion that sap the country's economic life blood. . . he desires to organize seven additional engineer units for use in civic action projects. Of major importance, he has also committed himself to the deployment of a 2,000-man Civic Action Group to South Vietnam."

Admiral U.S.G. Sharp

29 March 1966

Philippine Support in Vietnam - The Price

During Vice President Humphrey's visit to the Philippines in December 1965, President Marcos launched what was to become an intensified effort to secure more military and economic assistance from the United States. Initially President Marcos' requests tended to be rather general, but during the early months of 1966 they took more definite shape. He emphasized that "immediate and dramatic" US military assistance was required to dissipate adverse political reaction against him and against the United States arising from his efforts to send troops to Vietnam.

On 4 February 1966, he submitted a list of military items desired, which was expanded on 17 February. Some of the requested items had already been programmed in the MAP in FY 66 and prior years, but he wanted delivery accelerated. Some additional items he wanted delivered right away and some were requested for FY 67.

1. MANILA to STATE 1316/020020Z Jan 66
2. CHJUSMAGPHIL 181000Z Feb 66
# PHILIPPINES

## AS OF 1 JANUARY 1967

### BASIC INFORMATION

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<td>DEFENSE DOLLAR EQUVALENT (HE)</td>
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### MAJOR FORCE OBJECTIVES

#### ARMY
- 2 REP DIV, 1 SPEC FORCES (P)
- 1 REP ARTILLERY (G)
- 1 REP ENGINEER (G)
- PHIL CONCERNARY (10,000)

#### NAVY
- 24 FLEET SHIPS, 6 LST, 2 LCU, 1 POLAR SQN, 2 SEA BIRDS, 1 SEAL SQN

#### AIR FORCE
- 2 TACTICAL FIGHTER SQNS, 2 TACTICAL SQUADS, 1 PGM SQUAD, 1 CONVOY SQUAD

### TOTAL COUNTRY FORCES

<table>
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<th>Total Country Forces</th>
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<td>1 LIGHT FWD DIV, 1 REP FOR DIV, 1 BF DIV, 3 BATT SQN, 10 INTELL SQN, 1 REP RESCUE SQN, 3 REP FIGHTER SQN, 1 CP SQN</td>
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### COMBAT CAPABILITY

- MAINTAIN INTERNAL SECURITY, OFFER LIMITED RESISTANCE TO EXTERNAL ATTACKS AND CONTRIBUTE HEAVILY TO DEFENSE CAPABILITIES

### OVERALL OBJECTIVE

- TO INCREASE THE EFFICIENCY OF THE PHILIPPINE ARMED FORCES TO ENCOURAGE PHILIPPINE MILITARY SUPPORT OF SEATO AND TO MAINTAIN U.S. OPERATED MILITARY INSTALLATIONS IN THE PHILIPPINES

### U.S. DIPLOMATIC MISSION

- U.S. AMBASSADOR: H.W. Mc. BLAIR, JR.
- U.S. AIR DIRECTOR: MR. WESLEY C. BARNES
- CHIEF, JUSMAC: MAJ GEN JAMES R. WINN, USA

### MAP OBJECTIVE

General objectives are:

1. To support the overarching U.S. policy objective of maintaining U.S. base rights in the Philippines.
2. To develop and maintain military/paramilitary forces that are organized, trained and equipped to assure, as their primary mission, the internal security of the Philippines.
3. To support a capability to deploy limited Philippine forces within the SEATO area for mutual defense tasks.

### SOURCE

J2, PA1, J5
Although President Marcos had emphasized that his domestic political situation made it essential that he not appear to be in the position of receiving increased assistance as a payment for sending Philippine troops to Vietnam, the requests and the US response to them took the form of compensation for the Philippine contribution. Immediate delivery of some of the requested items and additions to the MAP were concessions the United States made for the Vietnam support.

Another reason for favorable consideration of the President's requests was that he was advocating reforms and programs desired by the United States. In addition to increasing the military budget (long a Philippine weakness), his domestic programs included improved tax collection, increased civic action programs to improve the lot of the peasants, an anti-smuggling campaign, and other strengthening of law and order through better laws and enforcement. Collectively these programs would improve the operational readiness of the Armed Forces and the internal security of the Philippines.

After submitting the military assistance "shopping list," the President commented on several of his requests in meetings with US diplomatic representatives on 24 and 25 February. Among military items, he stressed the need for small naval craft and the equipping of engineer battalions. He said he was increasingly concerned about the Indonesian infiltration and subversion threat in the South, for which he needed patrol boats. He also needed boats for anti-smuggling activities. He wanted the engineer battalions equipped in his effort to combat potential resurgent Huk activity. Peasants in self-help projects, he said, were to be aided by engineer battalions constructing road, irrigation, and school projects the Government had never been able to

1. AMEMB MANILA to STATE 1792/260539Z Feb 66
2. This pretense was later acknowledged and abandoned. STATE to MANILA 1509/192300Z Feb 66; CINCPAC 011355Z Mar 66; STATE to MANILA 1650/090200Z Mar 66
3. Point Paper, J5333, 25 May 66
4. AMEMB MANILA to STATE 1792/260539Z Feb 66. The President met with Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs William P. Bundy and Ambassador William McCormick Blair, Jr. on 25 February. The day before, he had met with Ambassador Blair's deputy and the CHJUSMAG Philippines.
provide. He also asked again about $28 million in "special" funds and veterans' claims against the United States, both of which he was reminded were Congressional matters. He then asked for more publicity on the recently concluded relinquishment by the United States of some military base lands. He thought not enough public attention had been called to the relinquishment.

(5) A brief summary of the military assistance items requested in February, including delivery status at the end of 1966, follows. Many of the requested items were delivered. Six of the Swiftcraft patrol boats were delivered with eight more programmed in FY 67. Equipment to fill out shortages in the three existing engineer battalions was delivered in 1966. Equipment for the planned fourth and fifth battalions was programmed in the FY 67 MAP with delivery anticipated by 30 June 1967. Material for equipping the other five planned battalions had not yet been programmed; this matter was under consideration by the State and Defense Departments.

(6) A number of aircraft were delivered, including 10 F-5s, 14 U-17As for the Air Force and 2 more for the Navy, and 2 UH-34D helicopters. In 1966, 36 M-79 grenade launchers were delivered, as were 10 M-113 armored personnel carriers. The one radar simulator already on order was delivered, as were the 13 2 1/2-ton trucks already programmed.

(5) Weapons to equip a Constabulary Battalion Combat Team had been requested, and 33 M60 machineguns were delivered. The 908 M14 rifles required for the same purpose were scheduled for delivery in FY 67.

(6) One destroyer escort, which was already on order, was scheduled for delivery in December 1967, and one minesweeper that was being converted into an escort ship was scheduled for delivery in

2. CINCPAC had estimated the cost of equipping these five proposed battalions at $8.34 million plus $.5 million for spare parts.
3. J5 History, Dec 66
4. The M-113s had been requested by CHJUSMAG Philippines, not President Marcos.
July 1967. The second escort ship that had been requested was deleted from the program in favor of the Swiftcraft.

Three cranes, a tractor, and five forklifts were on order with uncertain delivery dates. No decision had been made on the request for improved radar for Navy vessels. President Marcos apparently became convinced that none of the radar available would improve the capability of his ships. Electronics equipment for an AC&W site was considered a long lead time item with little contribution to immediate programs. It was tentatively scheduled for FY 72.

FY 67 Military Assistance Program

The MAP ceiling for FY 67 was established at $22 million, of which approximately $10 million was for investments, approximately $10 million for operating costs, and about $2 million for supply operations. Approximate amounts by Services were: Army, $4 million; Navy, $8 million; Air Force, $8 million; and the Marines, less than $50,000.

The urgent Philippine requirement for activating and equipping engineer construction battalions subsequently made changes in the FY 67 program necessary. CINCPAC recommended deleting three F-5s from the FY 67 program to provide MAP funds for four engineer battalions. The Secretary of Defense, however, directed support of five battalions, by deletion of the three F-5s and other additional items to be determined by CINCPAC. CINCPAC deleted the F-5s and one motor gunboat.

Meanwhile, price changes in the summer of 1966 had increased the cost of other programmed items by $785,000.

CHJUSMAG Philippines then requested a deviation deleting one escort ship (a PCE) plus its spare parts and substituting for it eight Swiftcraft. The escort ship was to have cost $2.35 million

1. CINCPAC 031640Z Aug 66
2. SEC DEF 1422/302202Z Aug 66
3. The three engineer construction battalions already in existence suffered from material shortages; the other two were planned additional battalions.
4. CINCPAC 142208Z Sep 66
and the Swiftcarts cost $1.58 million. The difference was to be used to reduce the FY 67 MAP to the $22 million authorized ceiling.\(^1\) CINCPAC concurred and forwarded the proposed deviation to the Secretary of Defense.\(^2\)

**FY 67-72 Military Assistance Program**

\(\S\) Dollar guidelines for the Philippine Military Assistance Program provided annual ceilings of $22 million through FY 72. During development of the FY 67-72 plan, emphasis was shifted from external defense of the Philippines to forces organized for increased internal security.\(^3\)

\(\S\) Funds for the following were included in the FY 67-72 plan: the second squadron of F-5 aircraft;\(^4\) a Composite Commando Squadron to air transport Army and Constabulary personnel and supplies; considerable maintenance equipment and tools for all Services; commercial consumables (POL, tires, batteries, etc.) in the first years of the plan;\(^5\) replacement of four old submarine chasers with newer escort craft; two inshore minesweepers, a fuel oil barge, and a water barge in later years of the plan; and overhaul of all major ships. Other parts and services were provided at approximately the same level as in previous years.

**Changes to the FY 68 Military Assistance Program**

\(\S\) Regular Military Assistance planning for a five-year period provided a means of outlining longer-range goals and objectives for a country program. Changes to specific annual programs, however, were frequently necessary, for varied reasons. For example, price

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1. CHJUSMAGPHIL 170220Z Oct 66; CHJUSMAGPHIL 170630Z Oct 66
2. CINCPAC 022250Z Nov 66
3. Point Paper, J5333, 13 Jun 66
4. Two F-5 squadrons were planned, with all F-86D and F-86F aircraft to be phased out.
5. This expense was to be gradually transferred to the Philippine defense budget, however, with that Government funding all commercial consumables after FY 69.
changes in the summer of 1966 increased the cost of items programmed in the FY 68 MAP by $900,000. Deletions had to be sought to keep the program within authorized ceilings.

As these specific price increases were mainly in the Navy program, one motor gunboat and the overhaul of one medium landing ship were removed from the FY 68 program.

CINCPAC took this action in preparation for the August Inter-Agency Review of the MAP, which was held in Washington. During that review, the International Security Agency took the position that the Philippine MAP should provide only one F-5 aircraft squadron, not two.

In September, CINCPAC recommended that consideration be given to the indefinite postponement of programmed F-5 deliveries, with the money to be diverted to the procurement of aircraft or other material more compatible with the counterinsurgency effort. CINCPAC asked CHJUSMAG Philippines to submit such a program change to the FY 68 MAP. CHJUSMAG Philippines deleted the F-5s and recommended substitution of two UH-IDs, three C-47s, additional aircraft spare parts, war reserve fuel tanks, and tactical communications equipment for the Air Force. For the Navy, he added fuel oil, support equipment, and training.

Still further changes in planning were necessary. The United States was considering President Marcos' request for five engineer construction battalions in addition to the three already in existence and the two new battalions for which equipment was programmed in FY 67. The Secretary of Defense requested that CINCPAC plan for equipping the additional five battalions on the basis of a hypothetical increase in the FY 68 MAP from $22 million to $26 million. The increase provided less than half the funds CINCPAC estimated would be necessary, and further program deviations were required. The deadline for submitting

1. J5 History, Nov 66
2. CINCPAC 022335Z Nov 66; CINCPAC 160413Z Nov 66
3. CHJUSMAGPHIL 210510Z Nov 66
4. CHJUSMAGPHIL 210330Z Nov 66
5. J5 History, Dec 66
6. SEC DEF 142237Z Dec 66
the program change to the Secretary of Defense did not allow CINCPAC
time to consult CHJUSMAG Philippines. CINCPAC therefore deleted
two escort ships from the FY 68 program, submitted the recommendation
to the Secretary of Defense, and then advised CHJUSMAG Philippines
of the change. At the end of the year, no decision had been made in
Washington as to whether the additional five engineer battalions would
actually be equipped by the MAP.

Swift Patrol Craft

(3) President Marcos took steps early in 1966 to reduce smuggling
in the Philippines. Efforts were initiated to tighten laws and the off-
shore anti-smuggling mission was transferred from the Customs Bureau
to the Coast Guard branch of the Philippine Navy. To increase the
effectiveness of the Coast Guard, President Marcos requested that the
United States provide additional patrol craft and accelerate the delivery
of a destroyer escort (DE) and an escort craft (PCE) that were in the
FY 66 MAP. 1

(4) The US Ambassador in Manila asked whether two Swift patrol
boats, which were then at Subic Bay enroute to Vietnam, could be
diverted to the Philippines in response to President Marcos' request. 3
When asked by the JCS to comment on this proposal, CINCPAC recom-
mended that two of four Swiftcraft due to arrive at Subic about 15
February be diverted to the Philippines. 4 On 16 February Washington
authorized the turnover of two Swiftcraft with the funding to be absorbed
in the FY 66 MAP. 5 CINCPAC asked that the total commitment to
MARKET TIME in Vietnam remain unchanged and that replacements for
the diverted craft be made up from later production. He also recom-
mended that the US Navy train the Philippine crews at Subic Bay. One

1. CHJUSMAGPHIL 181000Z Feb 66
2. The Swiftcraft was a 50-foot aluminum hulled, high-speed, shallow
draft boat equipped with radar and two .50 caliber machineguns.
It was ideal for use in the anti-smuggling operations being conducted
in the Philippines.
3. MANILA to STATE 111035Z Feb 66
4. JCS 122051Z Feb 66; CINCPAC 140529Z Feb 66
5. STATE 162347Z Feb 66
CINCPAC proviso for the diversion was that appropriate reprogramming of FY 66 MAP could be accomplished and that Philippine officials not be given the impression that the diversion was the first installment on greater support. CHJUSMAG Philippines drew up a training program and preparations were made for prompt transfer of the Swiftcraft.

(9) On 11 March two Swift patrol boats were officially transferred to the Philippines at Subic Bay. The transfer ceremony was attended by an unusually high-ranking Philippine delegation headed by the President.

(9) Commenting on the Philippines' request for additional military assistance and actions the United States should take in relation to deployment of a Philippine Civic Action Group to Vietnam, CINCPAC recommended that the United States provide four additional Swiftcraft to the Philippines through Service funding. The State Department authorized Ambassador Blair to inform the Philippine Government that, contingent upon the deployment of the Civic Action Group to Vietnam, the United States would provide, among other things, four additional Swiftcraft.

The matter was coordinated with COMUSMACV in order that diversion of the Swiftcraft to the Philippines would have a minimum effect on the important MARKET TIME patrol of Vietnamese waters. The four additional Swiftcraft were turned over to the Philippines on 31 August 1966.

(9) Arrangements to increase the number of small fast patrol boats in the Philippine Navy continued and in October CHJUSMAG Philippines requested a deviation of the FY MAP that would delete a PCE and its concurrent spare parts and add another eight Swiftcraft. CINCPAC forwarded the deviation to the Secretary of Defense. The Secretary of Defense stated in November that deliveries would start 8 to 10 months after funding.

1. CINCPAC 190400Z Feb 66
2. CHJUSMAGPHIL 271000Z Feb 66; CHJUSMAGPHIL 010820Z Mar 66
3. CHJUSMAGPHIL 181000Z Feb 66; CINCPAC 011355Z Mar 66
4. STATE 1871/092245Z Apr 66; STATE 1872/092200Z Apr 66
5. CINCPAC 120432Z Apr 66; COMUSMACV 161952Z Apr 66
6. CHJUSMAGPHIL 170220Z Oct 66; CHJUSMAGPHIL 170630Z Oct 66
7. CINCPAC 022250Z Nov 66
8. SEC DEF 252308Z Nov 66
(9) Toward the end of the year it appeared that President Marcos was not pleased with the Swiftcraft delivery schedule. He specifically requested early delivery of two to four of the eight programmed, and requested that the first arrive not later than 15 February 1967. In response to a CINCPAC request, the US Chief of Naval Operations reviewed the delivery schedule and forecast deliveries starting in July 1967 at the rate of two per month.

Subic Bay to Clark POL Pipeline
(9) Clark Air Base was supplied with POL by means of a tank truck operation from the Bataan Ocean Petroleum Terminal. The terminal was not only old and in need of extensive repairs but the land leases were due to expire in June 1967 and the owners indicated that they would be against any long lease extension. Thus, an alternative system to resupply Clark Air Base had to be planned, negotiated, funded, and constructed to preclude possible hindrance of air operations through Clark.

(9) CINCPACAF FY 66 construction requirements included a POL pipeline from the Navy Base at Subic Bay to Clark Air Base. In January 1966 Congressman Robert L. F. Sikes visited the Philippines and expressed interest in getting the POL pipeline constructed by commercial interests rather than the US Government. ESSO Standard had at one time shown an interest in constructing a pipeline to Clark, but ESSO notified the Defense Department that the offer was withdrawn because the project was not economically sound. This decision was confirmed in a letter from ESSO Standard Eastern Inc. to the Secretary of Defense on 14 January 1966.

(9) In February, CINCPACAF advised CINCPAC that the Defense Department Comptroller had deleted the pipeline construction funds from the USAF FY 66 Supplemental Military Construction Program.

CINCPACAF stated that the support of tactical aircraft at Clark and the

1. CHJUSMAGPHIL 080250Z Dec 66; MANILA to STATE 3548/100313Z Dec 66
2. ADMINO CINCPAC 102146Z Dec 66
3. CNO 292152Z Dec 66
4. COMNAVBASE SUBIC 090316Z Jan 66
5. CINCPACAF 272022Z Jan 66

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large number of MAC aircraft through that base demanded the supply dependability of the POL pipeline. He requested CINCPAC's assistance in the matter.\(^1\) CINCPAC promptly established the Subic Bay-Clark pipeline as a FLAG POLE item.\(^2\)\(^3\) The JCS favored the priority and continued action to obtain approval.\(^4\)

\((\text{C})\) On 7 March the Subic Bay-Clark POL pipeline was approved by the Secretary of Defense. Funding was to be handled by reprogramming within the FY 66 Supplemental Military Construction Program.\(^5\) The Secretary of State noted the urgency of the requirement and requested that the Ambassador in Manila seek agreement in principle to construction and pipeline rights from the Philippine Government. Ambassador Blair met with President Marcos, who gave his approval for the project.\(^6\)

\((\text{C})\) During April the Country Team and Philippine representatives made progress on preliminaries such as the route survey.\(^7\) CINCPAC offered staff assistance if required and provided the CINCPACREP with copies of other existing pipeline agreements for use in drafting the agreement with the Philippine Government.\(^8\) Funding difficulties at the Washington level persisted however, and CINCPACAF sent an urgent request for funds to the Air Force Chief of Staff in order to procure items with a long lead time.\(^9\) The Chief of Staff replied that the pipeline plans were being reviewed by the Secretary of Defense.\(^10\) CINCPAC followed up with a message to the JCS citing the FLAG POLE priority of the project and requesting every effort for immediate funding.\(^11\)

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1. CINCPACAF 050308Z Feb 66
2. CINCPAC 090115Z Feb 66
3. FLAG POLE items were priority supply items needed for direct support of operations in Vietnam.
4. JCS 112352Z Feb 66
5. Estimated cost of the pipeline was $3.9 million plus $2.25 million for easements and private property.
6. SEC STATE 072355Z Mar 66
7. MANILA to STATE 300805Z Mar 66; MANILA to STATE 011044Z Apr 66
8. 13 AF CLARK 070210Z Apr 66
9. CINCPAC 050111Z Apr 66
10. CINCPACAF 160408Z Apr 66
11. CSAF 251749Z Apr 66
12. CINCPAC 300435Z Apr 66
On 12 May the project was funded in the amount of $4.05 million and by the end of that month the Officer in Charge of Construction, Western Pacific (US Navy) received authorization to negotiate a sole source contract\(^1\) with construction to begin in early August 1966. \(^2\) The project was then closed as a FLAG POLE item. \(^3\)

\(\emptyset\) The draft of the proposed government-to-government agreement on the POL pipeline construction was coordinated with the CINCPACREP Philippines and forwarded to the State Department for approval. \(^4\) After Washington approved the draft, \(^5\) the US Ambassador and the Philippine Foreign Affairs Minister exchanged diplomatic notes governing the installation and operation of the pipeline. \(^6\)

\(\emptyset\) As the year came to an end, pipeline construction was well under way and prospects for meeting the 30 June 1967 operational date appeared good.

**T-28 Aircraft**

\(\emptyset\) In mid-1965 CHJUSMAG Philippines informed CINCPAC of the need in the Philippine Air Force for additional T-28 aircraft in its basic trainer fleet. He stated that 10 to 12 were needed over the period FY 67 to FY 71. As he requested, CINCPAC provided information required for planning. \(^7\) The Air Force Logistic Command, answering CHJUSMAG Philippines' question about the cost of T-28A aircraft, stated that T-28As were not available and suggested that T-28Ds be programmed instead. \(^8\) The Air Force Chief of Staff also informed CHJUSMAG Philippines that T-28As were not available from USAF or US Navy inventories and that the ASD/ISA was studying future T-28A requirements. He suggested that Philippine Air Force requirements be

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1. With Hood International.
2. CSAF 122055Z May 66; CINCPACREP PHIL 261211Z May 66
3. CINCPAC 150221Z Jun 66
4. MANILA to STATE 070725Z Jun 66; AMEMB MANILA ltr A-1037, 26 Jun 66, Subic-Clark Pipeline Agreement
5. SESTATE 111630Z Aug 66
6. AMEMB MANILA ltr 154, 26 Aug 66
7. CHJUSMAG Philippines ltr 4 Jun 65, Subj: Availability and Configuration of T-28B Aircraft; CINCPAC 230414Z Jun 65
8. AFLC 05766/281734Z Oct 65
submitted through normal unified channels to the Secretary of Defense.  

After the receipt in late 1965 of firm T-28A cost data from the Air Force Chief of Staff, CHJUSMAG Philippines submitted a change request to the FY 66 MAP that would add two T-28As. CINCPAC approved this change and forwarded the program addition to the ASD/ISA.  

The Secretary of Defense reported in January that because the T-28A was no longer available in Service inventories a one-time procurement would be made. These aircraft were specified by country however, and the two required by the Philippines had to be added to the original order.  

CHJUSMAG Philippines asked CINCPAC about the availability of T-28A aircraft to meet additional Philippine Air Force requirements of one in FY 66, three in FY 67, and four in FY 68. CINCPAC forwarded the latest guidance from the Secretary of Defense and, after calling attention to the nonavailability of the aircraft in Service inventories, recommended that the Philippine MAP continue to reflect the T-28A aircraft requirements. CINCPAC also informed the CHJUSMAG that he was studying the programming of follow-on aircraft for the T-28s in PACOM.  

CHJUSMAG Philippines requested consideration of the advisability of deviating the FY 66 MAP for two more T-28As in addition to the two that were approved. He stressed that he did not desire to allocate funds to T-28s unless they were available, as the Philippine program could not afford to lose the magnitude of funds involved if the T-28s were not available after having been programmed. The ASD/ISA indicated that there was a slight possibility that one T-28A might be provided from the planned one-time buy of all suitable T-28As available on the commercial market. If this one aircraft did  

1. CSAF 93996/232039Z Nov 65  
2. CHJUSMAGPHIL JPAF-PL 1016/212304Z Jan 66  
3. CINCPAC 962026Z Jan 66  
4. OSD 1214/082055Z Jan 66  
5. SEC DEF 1806/171855Z Jan 66  
6. CHJUSMAGPHIL JPAF-PL 1017/212304Z Jan 66  
7. CINCPAC 250115Z Jan 66  
8. CHJUSMAGPHIL JPAF-PL 1030/210516Z Feb 66  
9. SEC DEF 4790/251732Z Feb 66
materialize, CHJUSMAG Philippines would be informed in sufficient time to fund it in the FY 67 program. The ASD/ISA also concurred in earlier CINCPAC guidance that the Philippine plan years continue to carry T-28A requirements with the understanding that except for possible intra-theater redistribution, T-28As would not be available. The additional T-28A did not become available for the Philippines.

Overhaul of Philippine Navy Ships

(5) Overhauls and ASW modifications for major ships of the Philippine Navy continued to be done at the US Navy Ship Repair Facility, Guam, because of an overload of US Navy work at the US Ship Repair Facility at Subic Bay, which was normally used to overhaul Philippine ships. The only Philippine Navy ship repair facility was at Cavite.

(6) Philippine Navy use of Guam ship repair facilities had a number of disadvantages. Significantly, the higher cost of doing the repair work in Guam put a serious drain on MAP funds. Among the factors that made the Guam cost higher was a labor and overhead cost of $28 per man day at Guam compared with $2.50 per man day at the Cavite Ship Repair Yard. Logistic support costs for repairs scheduled at Subic Bay were minor while those costs for repairs scheduled at Guam were significant. In addition, overseas pay and allowances had to be paid during the work period on Guam, but not in the Philippines. Another disadvantage at Guam was that requirements for work on US ships had increased to the extent that work on Philippine ships was delayed. By April the completion dates of work on five Philippine ships had slipped an average of six months.

(7) The US Navy Bureau of Ships Management Office studied the problem and determined that the Cavite Ship Repair Yard could perform major ship overhauls and ASW modifications required by the Philippine Navy if personnel were added to the Cavite work force.

(8) The hiring of additional workers for a particular repair job, however, was considered only a temporary solution. The real need was for stabilization of the work force at Cavite by advance, steady

1. Point Paper, J432A, 8 Apr 66

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scheduling of repair work and the proper allocation of funds to maintain the work force. In the past, erratic scheduling had resulted in repeated cycles of hirings and layoffs. During the layoffs the workers found jobs at Subic or even Guam and were not available at Cavite the next time they were needed.

CINCPAC favored increasing the JUSMAG Philippines JTD to provide additional US Navy personnel to assist the Philippine Navy in scheduling and accomplishing their overhaul programs. Advance planning and scheduling of repair and procurement of necessary spare parts were necessary because of long delays in delivery. The US Navy as well as foreign supply systems often had trouble supplying parts for much of the obsolete equipment in use. Under the MAP, the United States was required to provide repair parts, but the needed parts were often already deleted from the Navy supply system and even the manufacturer was often out of stock. Special order retooling and manufacture was slow and very expensive. To alleviate this situation, the US Navy sometimes substituted newer parts for those that contained unrepairable components.

At Cavite, the new overhaul planning schedule began with the Philippines' PS-25, and ex-US Navy submarine chaser. The US Navy furnished substitute engines and associated equipment for which spare parts were still available to replace the ship's obsolete engines. Overhaul of the PS-25 was rescheduled from October 1966 to January 1967 to allow for advance planning and material delivery. As part of the Navy's effort to provide management guidance for MAP ship overhauls, a proposed new timetable would provide for material planning to begin eight months before overhaul was scheduled. It was hoped that the PS-25 would be the first of a series of Philippine ships to be overhauled that would benefit from this advance planning.

1. Consultation with Captain J. D. Bailey (USN) and Lieutenant Colonel John W. Gerwig (USAF) of the CINCPAC Staff.

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CINCPAC believed that the overhaul of Philippine ships at Cavite should result in considerable monetary savings, improved state of material readiness of the Philippine Navy, and greatly increased self-sufficiency in maintenance.

**Long Line Communications System (FORESIGHT SIERRA)**

Problems were resolved and progress made on project FORESIGHT SIERRA, the long lines communications system for the Philippine Armed Forces (AFP). The purpose of this joint service project was to progressively link military installations located throughout the islands, including US installations. Early in the year a revision of FY 66 MAP was approved in principle for the installation of tropo-scatter equipment to link Clark Air Base, Southern Luzon, and Mactan Air Base on Cebu. At the request of CHJUSMAG Philippines, CINCPAC held a conference in March to discuss requirements with representatives of interested agencies.

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1. The AFP long lines project had been under construction since 1959. When completed the system would be a multichannel voice and teletype common user link for command and control and administrative traffic of Armed Forces Headquarters, Service and subordinated commands, and selected key provinces. As planned there were to be 5 tape relay centers and 17 communications centers built around a backbone of VHF links (12 to 24 channel) extending 700 miles north and south through the Philippines. The key to the system was a single hop tropo in the center which would join Southern Luzon with the Visayas to the south. (The use of VHF over this center portion of some 320 miles of water and scattered islands would be logistically impractical.) As of May 1966 $3.5 million MAP dollars had been expended. Most of the buildings and facilities were complete and equipment was on MAP order. Completion of the entire long lines system was predicated on the completion of the central tropo link between Luzon and Cebu, which was funded.

2. CHJUSMAGPHIL 070030Z Jan 66; CINCPAC 091919Z Mar 66

3. Attending the conference were representatives from CHJUSMAG Philippines, CINCPACAF, 13th Air Force, US Army Strategic Communications Command, and the Pacific Ground Environment Electronic Installations Agency.
Representatives of the 13th Air Force and the AFP each expressed a need for 12 voice and teletype channels. These and other requirements were combined and it was determined that a 60-channel facility would be required. The Army Strategic Communications Command estimated that this would cost $5 million, but CHJUSMAG Philippines had allocated only $2 million for the troposcatter link.

After the conference CINCPAC pointed out to CINCPACAF that CHJUSMAG Philippines was willing to deviate the $2 million to support CINCPACAF in the construction of a permanent system if CINCPACAF agreed to provide the remaining $3 million. CINCPAC mentioned past guidance from the Secretary of Defense that restricted MAP duplication of communications facilities programmed through other sources. The Air Force Chief of Staff advised CINCPACAF that any permanent AFP link from Clark to Mactan should be accomplished under the MAP, and any Air Force participation would depend on the allocation of channels.

In May CHJUSMAG Philippines summarized the problems involved stating that the AFP long lines system did not include the link from Clark to Mactan and that this was a US requirement to meet urgent operational needs of the 13th Air Force. The Air Force was invited to participate as a means of satisfying its requirements. As for the possible Air Force use of leased commercial circuits, CHJUSMAG Philippines pointed out that existing communications were marginal on Luzon and practically non-existent from Luzon to the southern islands. He stated that the two civil systems, the Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company and the Bureau of Telecommunications, were incomplete, making little progress, and had subscriber forecasts that far exceeded potential capabilities. It was for these reasons that the MAP-sponsored AFP long lines system was planned to preclude the use of leased circuits.

1. OSD 050104Z Dec 64
2. CSAF 012214Z Apr 66
3. CHJUSMAGPHIL 050150 May 66
CHJUSMAG Philippines reported that the $5 million cost of the proposed plan had been reevaluated by a competent firm and an estimate of $2.43 million was submitted for the completion of the project. Accordingly, he was prepared to identify $2.1 million of MAP funds and 1.6 million of local currency to finance the completion of the proposed tropo link. The Country Team concurred in this plan to complete the long lines project and it was sent to CINCPAC for review and forwarding to the ASD/ISA if appropriate.

Sale of Excess MAP Property

Little progress was made in the lengthy negotiations between the United States and the Philippines on the use of proceeds from the sale of excess MAP property in the Philippines. Since 1964 the CHJUSMAG, acting on Defense Department instructions, had frozen action on all excesses declared by the Philippines. Subsequently, Philippine officials refused to report additional excesses. Negotiations through the Department of State continued in an effort to reach agreement on a formula for the division of the net proceeds from the sales. The last tentative proposal by the United States called for the Philippines to receive 90 percent and the United States 10 percent through FY 66.

In November the US Ambassador informed Washington that it was highly unlikely that the Philippines would accept the 90-10 arrangement. The Country Team meanwhile stated that MAP excess material valued at approximately $7 million had accumulated in unprotected storage where it was deteriorating at a rapid rate. The Ambassador and CHJUSMAG Philippines requested authorization to dispose of the excess property before its value diminished and to place the funds on deposit pending the outcome of the negotiations. Washington approved this request.

1. Page Communications Engineering Incorporated.
2. CHJUSMAGPHIL 070300Z Jul 66
3. CINCPAC Command History, 1965, p 158; Point Paper, J4341, 8 Apr 66
4. MANILA to STATE 140955Z Nov 66
5. STATE to MANILA 260229Z Nov 66
INDONESIA

"Following the abortive coup d'etat of last September 30, Indonesia's trend toward the communist camp was arrested by the Indonesian military. There is reason to hope that the Army will gradually swing the Indonesians further away from communism, reduce the confrontation of Malaysia, and create a favorable climate for US-Indonesian relationships. We have no military assistance planned for Indonesia in FY 67. It is worth noting, however, that many of the military leaders in Indonesia have been trained in the US under the Military Assistance Program, an investment from which we stand now to realize some political return."

Admiral U.S. G. Sharp
29 March 1966

Resumption of Military Assistance

Following President Sukarno's loss of power toward the end of 1965, the United States carefully considered the renewal of aid to Indonesia, aid that had ended by February 1965. As control of the Government shifted into the hands of more moderate leaders, CINCPAC developed his position on the resumption of aid. This position was incorporated by the JCS in a policy recommendation they sent to the Secretary of Defense as a draft memorandum to the Secretary of State.

1. Up until 1965 the United States had provided Indonesia with $675 million in economic grants and loans (largely food) and $66 million in military assistance, which had heavily emphasized counterinsurgency and civic action. The most effective part of the MAP had been the training of Armed Forces personnel. In addition to aid from the United States, Indonesia had received $1.6 billion worth of goods from the USSR. The Soviet program, however, was plagued with problems about the types and quality of equipment furnished, its maintenance, and repayment funding. Point Paper, J5113, 25 Mar 66
2. CINCPAC 220415Z Dec 65
3. JCSM 909-65, Aid to Indonesia, 30 Dec 65

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INDONESIA
AS OF 1 JANUARY 1967

BASIC INFORMATION

AREA: 730,850 SQ MI
POPULATION: 105.6 MILLION
GROSS NATL. PROD. (1965E): $ 8.4 BILLION
POPULATION

PER CAPITA: $ 75

PERCENTAGE

12.3% DEFENSE BUDGET MARKED

1.6% MILITARY EXPENSES

ARABLE LAND PER CAPITA: 0.12 ACRE

46% OF GOVERNMENT FUNDED

LITERACY RATE: 55%

55% OF POPULATION

LIFE EXPECTANCY: 72 YEARS

OVERALL OBJECTIVE

CONTINUED AVAILABILITY TO
THE U.S. AND ITS ALLIES OF
SEA AND AIR ROUTES
BETWEEN PACIFIC AND
INDIAN OCEAN AREAS.

U.S. DIPLOMATIC MISSION

U.S. AMBASSADOR

HOM. MARSHALL GREEN

DEP. CONTROLLER USAID

MR. ALFRED C. CHRISTIAN

CHOLSD

COL. EDWARD J. MILLER

USMC

MAP OBJECTIVE

MC OBJECTIVE

TOTAL COUNTRY FORCES

MAJOR FORCE GUIDELINES *

ARMY

108 INF BN, 3 PARA/COMANDO BN, 3 PARA BN, 17 HP

BNS, 8 ARMOR BNS, 16 FA BN, 1 REG BN, 20 AAA BNS,

10 ERC BN, 1 MOBILE BRIG RANGER REGT, 37 MOBILE

BRIG BN

NAVY

1 CL, 8 DD, 10 DE, 12 DD, 82 PATROL, 15 RHEI, 10 AMPHIB,

19 AUR, 10 NAVAL AIR CORPS (10 INF BN, 1 AMPHIB TANK BN,

8 PA BN, 1 AAA BN, 1 ROCKET BN, 1 MOBILE AMG VEH BNS,

2 AMG SQN (GARRETT), 1 HELO SQN, 1 TUG UNIT

AIR FORCE

2 LITTLE SUN, 2 MEDIUM SQN, 1 FTR/RW/STRIKE SQN, 7

FTR/INTERC SQN, 3 TRANS SQN, 1 RECON SQN, 1 AIR

RESCUE, 1 HELO SQN, 5 SQN, 1 SAM, 1 VIF, 1 TYP, 4

1 AAA BNS, 14 SAM BNS/5 TECH (SUPPORT) BNS

MAINTAIN INTERNAL SECURITY AND EFFECTIVELY REPEL MINOR INCURSIONS BUT NOT A MAJOR ATTACK. LAUNCH AN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE IN BRIGADE STRENGTH.

PARTIALLY SUPPRESS EMICING AND SUPPORT A TWO BATTALION SIZE LANDING FORCE. CONDUCT ONLY TOWED SUBMARINE INTERDICTON AND ASH OPERATIONS. INDONESIAN NAVIES ARE CAPABLE OF PROVIDING BATTALION SIZE LANDING FORCES FOR AMMUNITION ASSALTS.

FORCES IN ING WERE OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY TO CONDUCT OFFENSIVE BOMING OPERATIONS AND VFR AIR DEFENSE OPERATIONS FOR A LIMITED PERIOD AND TO SUPPORT MINOR GROUND OPERATIONS.

*NEW MAP OBJECTIVES AND MAJOR FORCE GUIDELINES,
RELATED TO RESURFACING OF MAP, NOT YET ESTABLISHED.

SOURCE: 1512.PA1

-SECRET
The JCS recommended that the United States not provide military aid at first, but be prepared to provide limited quantities of food and medicine. The JCS also recommended that before overt aid was given certain issues be resolved, including the confrontation with Malaysia, expropriated US assets, and illegal Indonesian maritime claims.

§ As the political climate shifted and confrontation was terminated, Indonesian officials addressed a series of informal requests for assistance to US officials in Djakarta. These feelers in their totality amounted to a request for resumption of a civic action-oriented military assistance program. A variety of items were requested including LSTs, spare parts for some ships and C-130 aircraft, textbooks, training aids, CONUS military training, aerial surveys, technical support, and civic action assistance. The Indonesian requests continued to be only exploratory in nature, however. In September, Ambassador Marshal Green, in reply to a State Department query, stated that a letter request by General Hartono of 11 July had not been considered an official request for resumption of assistance. The Ambassador noted that the required written request endorsed by the Minister of Foreign Affairs had not yet been forthcoming.

§ Informal discussions between Indonesian officials and US officials, including the Chief of the Defense Liaison Group (CHDLG), became more frequent and the types of aid requested became more specific. In late June the CHDLG had detailed discussions with Indonesian officers regarding the Navy-Marine civic action effort. The Indonesians envisioned crop production on three large farms, LST or LCU-type ships to transport and support personnel engaged in civic action programs, and ships to support fishing operations. The scale of their recommendations was

1. SEC STATE 190029Z Apr 66; DJAKARTA to CINCPAC 171/270505Z May 66; CHDLG INDONESIA 16075Z Jun 66; CHDLG INDONESIA 220425Z Jun 66; CHDLG INDONESIA 220835Z Jun 66; CHDLG INDONESIA 050735Z Jul 66
2. Major General Hartono, who was the G-4 in the Indonesian Army, was coordinator for all foreign military assistance to Indonesia.
3. CHDLG INDONESIA 120450Z Sep 66
4. CHDLG INDONESIA 050735Z Jul 66
5. When the US MAP was withdrawn from Indonesia, the MAAG was removed. In its place, the Defense Liaison Group had represented the United States and, with the renewal of assistance, performed MAAG-type planning functions.

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such that the CHDLG felt constrained to caution the Indonesian officers, who were far too optimistic about the amount of military assistance they might receive.

(7) In response to a JCS request, CINC PAC commented on assistance that might be provided to Indonesia for civic action. He recommended that at the appropriate time a small team of officers and Agency for International Development (AID) representatives be sent to Indonesia to appraise the situation. The team could determine the best type and amount of support required, the ability of the Indonesians to implement the program, and the status of equipment already in the country. 1

(8) The JCS incorporated some of CINC PAC's views in a recommendation to the Secretary of Defense that a MAP-AID training program oriented toward civic action be initiated, that spare parts be provided, and, when appropriate, a military-AID team be sent to insure compatibility of the effort with the overall US program. 2

(9) In August the State Department took note of the formal end of the confrontation and stated that the Department considered it appropriate for the United States to remove export restrictions for some items. 3 The restrictions had been imposed on 20 May 1965. The Ambassador in Djakarta recommended proceeding with short term assistance including rice and cotton (to be provided under PL 480), spare parts and raw material (to be provided under loan arrangements), training, and textbooks. He also recommended that the United States continue to go slow with military assistance.

(9) Preparations continued for the implementation of the short term assistance. The CHDLG informed CINC PAC that Ambassador Green concurred with a CINC PAC recommendation to dispatch two or three temporary representatives to Djakarta to work with the CHDLG on the tentative program. The Ambassador passed the action to the CHDLG and expressed his personal appreciation to Admiral Sharp. 4

1. CINC PAC 180343 Jun 66
2. JCSM-473-66, Military Assistance to Indonesia
3. STATE 36515/270258Z Aug 66
4. CHDLG INDONESIA 230810Z Aug 66
Later in August the Secretary of Defense's views on Indonesian aid were clarified. The only MAP requirement for Indonesia, he stated, was for non-combatant training of Indonesians in US Service schools. The Secretary believed that support for any civic action programs should be funded by AID rather than the MAP. He expressed willingness to lend US Armed Forces technical personnel to assist in a civic action program, provided that the expenses were borne by AID or some other non-MAP source. The JCS informed CINCPAC of these views and noted that in light of this information CINCPAC might wish to reconsider the need to send representatives to Djakarta. 1

By October the Secretary of Defense had approved an FY 67 Military Assistance Training Program for Indonesia in the amount of $375,000. 2 Shortly thereafter the JCS informed CINCPAC that the State and Defense Departments had no objection to the negotiation of cash sales of engineering construction equipment and related material for use in civic action programs. The CHDLG requested that a representative who was knowledgeable in Foreign Military Sales matters be sent to the DLG to provide guidance. 3

The Defense Department evidenced some reluctance to have a CINCPAC representative visit Indonesia; a caution was issued concerning discussions of excess equipment that could be used for civic action programs unless such equipment was in fact available. 4 From 14 to 24 November a representative of CINCPAC visited Indonesia and conferred with principal members of the Country Team and key Indonesian officials. 5, 6

1. JCS 301922Z Aug 66
2. SEC DEF 4190/302202Z Sep 66; SEC DEF 4541/052258Z Oct 66
3. CHDLG INDONESIA 030715Z Nov 66
4. SEC DEF 082341Z Nov 66
5. The CINCPAC representative was Colonel John P. M. Hughes, USA.
6. Memorandum of 6 Dec 66, J532, Trip Report
When the Draft Memorandum for the President on the FY 68-72 MAP was submitted in November it contained a provision for an Indonesian grant aid program of $6 million beginning in FY 68. The resultant Defense Department message directing the submission of proposals for this program arrived in Djakarta during the visit of the CINCPAC representative, who was thus able to assist the CHDLG in preparing a program submission. The CINCPAC representative recommended that the FY 68 program be planned for $10 million, giving consideration to supply operations costs and additional critical requirements and to allow for normal cost increases.

In late November the in-country staffing of the proposed FY 68 program was completed. It was approved by Ambassador Green and sent to CINCPAC. The program emphasized civic action in the form of training, equipment, and transportation. Most of the equipment was earmarked for the Indonesian Army to support it as the dominant force in political and social change. The CHDLG stressed that a military requirement did exist for Indonesia MAP. He pointed out that a significant insurgency threat remained, and the situation absolutely required improved transportation facilities.

A problem developed in the FY 67 MAP training effort that came to the attention of a member of the CINCPAC representative's team. Approximately 50 percent of the Army's portion of the MAP training authorization was for CONUS career course training.

1. Guidance furnished by the Secretary of Defense for the development of the FY 68 program indicated that emphasis should be placed on spare parts for the civic action type equipment previously furnished under the MAP, and replacement parts or equipment used in military-sponsored civic rehabilitation projects, particularly those relating to communications or transportation. SEC DEF 7977/152232Z Nov 66
2. SEC DEF 150015Z Nov 66
3. A preliminary program had just previously been drawn up by the Ambassador and submitted to Washington through State Department channels. The CINCPAC representative considered that the initial proposal to the State Department was based on invalid assumptions, had excluded training requirements, and had not taken into account supply operations costs.
4. CHDLG INDONESIA 220500Z Nov 66
5. J32/Memo/021-66, 19 Dec 66
Army absolutely refused to accept this type of training despite numerous attempts on the part of DLG personnel and the visiting CINCPAC staff officers to persuade them to do so. The Indonesian Army considered that key officers attending lengthy career courses in the United States would be out of the country at the very time they were required for civic action and counterinsurgency operations. As an alternative, the Indonesians requested several short civic action-oriented skill courses. When the US Department of the Army was questioned about its capability to fulfill this request, it indicated that Indonesian students could be accommodated in most of the skill courses requested. The Indonesian Navy and Marine Corps had no objection to the programmed CONUS career course training for their officers.

(§) From the various discussions of resumption of assistance to Indonesia it appeared that there was a divergence of views of the role of the MAP and the AID in the renewed program. Both the State and Defense Departments favored assisting Indonesia for the moment through the AID rather than the MAP (except for training.) An FY 67 AID budget of $66 million was planned. The Chief of AID in Indonesia took the position that it would not be proper to make money and material available to the Indonesian Armed Forces for civic action projects. The views of Ambassador Green, however, were similar to those of CINCPAC: that in addition to the AID program a MAP was required to support the Armed Forces so progress and stability in Government would be assured. The Country Team also agreed with CINCPAC that there was a military justification for a MAP in Indonesia. In addition, it was clear that Indonesian officials preferred civic action assistance through military rather than civilian channels.
Grant Aid Training and Foreign Military Sales Agreement

A MAP for Malaysia was initiated in FY 65 with a grant aid training program funded for approximately $100,000. The Army program of $32,000 and the Air Force program of $60,000 were mostly for CONUS training in the basic military skills and orientation. The emphasis on Air Force pilot training to assist in building up Malaysia's new Air Force continued in FY 66 when Malaysia MAP was increased to $200,000.

In March 1965 negotiations were started for a Foreign Military Sales agreement with Malaysia. The agreement reached in 1966 generally provided for $4 million in credit sales at 3 percent over a 10-year period. Since the Malaysians were receiving Commonwealth military aid it took time to ascertain what part of their material needs could be met from that source. This led to delays in definitizing the list of items that the Malaysian Government wished to purchase from the United States. Other factors that made for delay in assembling the list were the administrative inexperience of the Malaysians and lack of planning. Nevertheless, by August 1966 a list was definitized for the purchase of approximately $3.5 million worth of items for the use of Malaysian Armed Forces. A large part of the purchase list consisted of communications maintenance and support equipment.

In April 1966 CINCPAC informed the Defense Attache in Malaysia that since the Malaysian MAP was established with dollar guidelines a Country MA Plan Book would be required. He noted that...

1. The US Military Assistance of Malaysia was initiated after Prime Minister Rahman visited Washington in July 1964 and asked President Johnson for assistance. The Malaysia MAP was designed to provide a tangible gesture of US support for Malaysia without involving the US in such problems as the Indonesia-Malaysia dispute and without undertaking new commitments in Southeast Asia. The Department of Defense guidance on the program limited US grant aid to training, and stipulated that US aid would complement and not substitute for United Kingdom and Commonwealth assistance. The operational effectiveness of the Malaysian Armed Forces was contingent on the presence of substantial numbers of "seconded" Commonwealth officers and specialists.

2. USDAO KUALA LUMPUR 050030Z Aug 66
3. KP 4 833/39 Vol 2 (2Y), ltr 4 Aug 66
4. CINCPAC 152240Z Apr 66
since the Malaysia MAP was limited to training, the plan book would contain a minimum number of narratives and tables, and that a CINCPAC representative would provide assistance in order to hold the work load to a minimum.

BURMA

MAP - Phase II Continuation

(9) The Burma Military Assistance Program in 1966 was a continuation of Phase II, a 1961 agreement that provided for not more than $43 million in military assistance over a four or five year period. At the request of the Burmese, who wanted to preserve their neutral stance and image by obtaining military assistance through a "sales" program, the United States agreed to accept "token" payments. By the end of FY 65, Burma had paid $6 million. The last part of the $43 million was programmed as follows: $4 million in FY 66, $3.7 million for FY 67, and $3.6 million for FY 68. 1 These programs were to provide for "token sales" of follow-on spare parts for equipment purchased in FY 65 or prior years, permitting the "token sales" to be gradually phased out. The United States intended that after FY 65 all major end items that the Burmese required would be sold on a true dollar basis.

(S) Since FY 66, only spare parts to support major end items previously provided and some training had been included in the Burma MAP. When the Burmese were advised of the policy to phase out the token sales program, they demonstrated no surprise or other sentiments.

(S) In mid-1966 CINCPAC and the Country Team directed their attention to the question of what policy should be followed in regard to the future of the MAP in Burma. Faced with the policy of not providing any major end items during FY 66 to 68 and the termination of the 1961 Agreement in FY 68, several questions arose, including: whether or not

1. These program ceilings were confirmed by the 4 November 1966 Draft Memorandum for the President on the Military Assistance Program FY 68-72.
### BURMA
**AS OF 1 DECEMBER 1966**

#### BASIC INFORMATION
- **Area**: 262,000 sq. mi.
- **Population**: 24,000,000
- **Gross National Product**: $1.6 billion
- **Annual Growth**: 1.5% per capita
- **Agricultural Land per Capita**: 1.6 acres
- **Defense Budget**: $100 million
- **Literacy Rate**: 60% as % of total government expenditure
- **Life Expectancy**: 35 years as % of GNP: 1.0%

#### MAJOR FORCE GUIDELINES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>ARMY</strong></th>
<th><strong>NAVY</strong></th>
<th><strong>AIR FORCE</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>99 INF &amp; LT INF BN, 3 ARMY BN, 1 ARMoured BN, 1 MORTAR BN, 1 ARMoured BN</td>
<td>1 Patrol Ship, 29 Patrol Boats</td>
<td>1 TAC FTR Sqn, 2 TRANS Sqn, 2 HELO Sqn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 INF DIV (comp of subordinate units possibly including 6 INF BN, 9 LT INF BN) drawn from existing units not confirmed; 90 INF BN, 9 LT INF BN</td>
<td>1 FF, 1 MG, 1 BCT, 1 YP, 5 MTR, 12 FBRC, 6 PCC, 4 SS, 8 YAC, 10 BPC, 1 AGCC, 1 AOC, 1 AP, 4 ICM, 12 LCT, 2 YAC, 2 YAC, 1 YU</td>
<td>2 TRANS Sqn, 2 HELO Sqn, 1 TAC FTR Sqn, 1 TAC CONT Sqn</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### TOTAL COUNTRY FORCES

- **Combat Capability**
  - **Army**: Not yet capable of fully securing internal peace and order, unable to offer sustained effective resistance to direct attack by China and no significant capability beyond Burma borders.
  - **Navy**: Capable of giving light support to the army, discouraging piracy, and conducting indogate patrol duties.
  - **Air Force**: Capable of performing its primary mission of maintaining internal security by supporting the army and navy, negligible air defense capability against air attack by major power.

#### MAP OBJECTIVES
- General Objectives are:
  1. To help assure Burma's continued independence.
  2. To demonstrate, in conjunction with AID's police assistance and other U.S. programs, U.S. support for the independence, unity and internal security of Burma.
  3. To establish U.S. influence in the Burmese armed forces.
  4. To provide an alternative for Burma to military aid from Communist countries.

#### SOURCE: J5, J2, PAI
to continue the MAP beyond FY 68 and at what levels, the status of the Military Equipment Delivery Team (MEDT), and the possibility that the Burmese would turn to other sources for their requirements.  

(9) In June, the CHMEDT visited CINCPAC Headquarters to present the views of the Country Team on continuation of the MAP, or alternatively, the phase out of the MEDT in the event the program was not continued beyond FY 68. CHMEDT later forwarded to CINCPAC a study he had made on the question of MAP continuation.  

(6) In August, US Ambassador H. A. Byroade proposed a follow-on program for Burma. The Ambassador proposed that the MAP continue to sell selected major items at prices that were competitive, particularly with prices of the communist countries. The Ambassador proposed a sales program on a scale of about $8 million to $10 million annually. It would entail only a short term agreement, which would be subject to the requests of the Burmese and would have considerable flexibility in pricing. CINCPAC concurred and forwarded a recommendation to the JCS and the Secretary of Defense that this concept be approved. CINCPAC noted that the continuation of Burma’s neutrality, despite its exposed geographic position and relative weakness, was partially attributable to the MAP. CINCPAC also noted that the US MEDT was the only foreign military mission permitted in Burma and that it provided an excellent channel in which to exert US influence on the military-oriented leadership of the country.  

(9) In November CINCPAC recommended that a modest grant aid program should be continued if the $8 to $10 million annual credit sales program proposed by the Country Team was not feasible.  

1. No official MAAG existed in Burma. The Burmese did not want or tolerate any official advisory activities by the MEDT, but they did ask for and get assistance, primarily in supply matters. This assistance was furnished by the MEDT on an unofficial basis.  
2. CHMEDT AMEMB BURMA 090200Z May 66  
3. CHMEDT Burma S66-66, 10 Jun 66, CPRS 002516  
5. CINCPAC 052233Z Oct 66  
6. CINCPAC 162200Z Nov 66
3) Late in the year Burmese officials asked for price and availability data on a sizable amount of hardware. The items included aircraft, helicopters, ships, radar, and air navigation equipment. The reason for this request was not immediately apparent, but the US Ambassador requested that the information be provided. Doing so was considered to be in the interest of the United States and would not constitute a commitment. 1

1. USDAO RANGOON 190951Z Dec 66; CHMEDT AMEMB BURMA 200900Z Dec 66; CSAF 232126Z Dec 66; RANGOON 857/280815Z Dec 66; RANGOON 867/290700Z Dec 66
CHAPTER III
CINCPAC ACTIONS CONCERNING RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN THE
UNITED STATES AND OTHER COUNTRIES

CINCPAC ACTIVITIES IN SUPPORT OF SEATO

MILITARY ADVISERS CONFERENCE 24 (MA 24C)

(TS) MA 24C was held in Canberra on 23 and 24 June 1966. The
first item on the agenda was the progress report by the Chief of the
Military Planning Office (CMPO). As was customary, the Secretary
General, Lieutenant General Jesus Vargas, was invited to be present
during this portion of the meeting. Secretary General Vargas commented
that communist subversion continued in Thailand and East Pakistan and
that local Communist Party activities had been stepped up in the
Philippines. He pointed out countermeasures being taken by those
countries and the increased emphasis on counter-infiltration in SEATO.
He reported on funding aspects of SEATO exercises and the increasing
civic action facet in the exercises. He informed the Military Advisers
that the new headquarters building was scheduled for completion in
July 1967. 1

(TS) The Military Advisers considered an agenda item concerning
updating of MPO Plan 8/63, a Plan to Assist the Royal Thai Government
to Counter Communist Insurgency in Thailand (TS). It had been agreed
at MA 23C that the plan should be updated and in April the CMPO had
provided the Military Advisers with a rewritten draft, MPO Plan 8/66. 2
In this respect, the JCS approved Admiral Sharp's position on identification
of the "appointed nation" for the plan, the designation of the nationality
of the commander, and considerations of force declarations. 3

(TS) At MA 24C the draft of Plan 8 was approved with a number
of minor changes. In response to the Thailand Military Adviser's
request, requirements were increased by two brigade groups;

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1. CINCPAC 262300Z Jun 66
2. MS/605/1/66, 15 Apr 66
3. CINCPAC 030516Z Jun 66; JCS 092219Z Jun 66
the Military Advisers requested that the MPO study the adequacy of the forces required for the defense of airfields. They recommended to the SEATO Council that: (1) Thailand be approved as the "appointed nation"; (2) the United States be appointed to designate the SEATO Field Force Commander; and (3) the Council assess the insurgency situation and give timely notice of implementation of Plan 8.

(75) The SEATO exercise schedule for 1966 to 1968 and the exercise forecast for 1968 to 1971 were reviewed.

(75) CINCPAC considered that MA 24C was productive in that MPO Plan 8 was approved and forwarded to the Council for required action. All Military Advisers agreed that required actions should be expedited and effort made to avoid any delay in completing the plan.

MILITARY ADVISERS CONFERENCE 25 (MA 25C)

(75) MA 25C was held in Bangkok on 7 and 8 December. 1 Secretary General Vargas spoke to the first session on SEATO progress and stressed the continuing need to combat communist subversion, infiltration, and insurgency. The CMPO remarked that more and more officers of member nations had demonstrated increased interest in SEATO matters by visiting the MPO when they were in Southeast Asia. Under existing arrangements the number of visits had become burdensome. To accommodate the increase, the Military Advisers approved a proposal that added a third SEATO orientation tour each year.

(75) MPO Plan 4/66, as amended by Change 1, was approved. All significant US-proposed changes were adopted. Because the changes included increases in force requirements, the CMPO was directed to reexamine the logistic methodology pertaining to the plan and initiate any necessary action.

(75) Change 1 to MPO Plan 8/66 was approved. The change was required as a result of reports of the Intelligence and Intelligence Assessment Committees. Force requirements were not changed. The Thailand Military Adviser announced that Field Marshal Thanom was

1. CINCPAC 081010Z Dec 66; J5/Memo 000336-66, Point Papers for US MILAD, 26 Nov 66

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NETWORK OF REGIONAL DEFENSE ARRANGEMENTS

Legend:
- NATO
- SEATO
- CENTRAL TREATY ORGANIZATION
- SEPARATE BI-LATERAL AGREEMENTS (INCLUDES REP. OF PHIL.)
- ANZUS PACT INCLUDES: AUSTRALIA, NEW ZEALAND AND UNITED STATES

Source: J73
SEATO ORGANIZATION

SEATO COUNCIL

MILITARY ADVISERS

COUNCIL REPS

SPECIALIST COMMITTEES

CHIEF, SNPO

HEAD OF SECRETARIAT

SECRETARIAT STAFF

LOGISTICS DIVISION

PLANS DIVISION

COMMUNICATIONS ELECTRONICS DIVISION

INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

ORGANIZATION TRAINING AND STANDANDIZATION DIVISION

EXECCUTIVE STAFF

DPPO (NII)

HEAD OF ADMINISTRATION

HEAD OF PLANNING

MIL. ADVISERS REPRESENTATIVES COMMITTEE

CSTY GEN

CSO

RSO

PIO

CULTURAL RO

ECONOMIC O.

CENTRAL SERVICES

ABBREVIATIONS

DPPO-PUBLIC INFORMATION OFFICE

RSO-RESEARCH SERVICE OFFICE

CSO-COUNTER SUBVERSION OFFICE

PWG-PERMANENT WORKING GROUP

IAC-INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT COMMITTEE

SNPO-SEATO MILITARY PLANNING OFFICE

CEE-COMMITTEE OF ECONOMIC EXPERTS

CIGEL-COMMITTEE ON INFORMATION, CULTURAL EDUCATION AND LABOR

CULTURAL RO-CULTURAL RELATIONS OFFICE

LAS INDIVIDUALS, THE MILITARY ADVISERS' REPRESENTATIVES ARE THE REPRESENTATIVES IN THE RPO OF THEIR RESPECTIVE MILITARY ADVISERS.

SOURCE: JS
designated Force Commander, and Admiral Sharp announced that COMUSMACHTAI was designated Field Force Commander. The United States made tentative force declarations in support of the plan, as did the United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, and Thailand. The Philippines made no declarations at the meeting because of other commitments.

At MA 24C the MPO had been directed to study the division of responsibility for the defense of airfields and force requirements for MPO Plan 8/66. During MA 25C the Thailand representatives insisted that the chain of command for this airfield defense be compatible with that already extant in the plan. The split in responsibility for static and area defense would be maintained, and coordination would be accomplished through consultation and liaison between Thai authority at airfields and the local SEATO commander. All Military Advisers agreed with the proposal and the conclusions of the study were amended accordingly.

At a September SEATO Plan 4 Air Component Commanders Conference the Thailand delegates had asked for SEATO air support for Thai Armed Forces operating under national command. The matter could not be resolved and was referred to MA 25C. It was agreed at MA 25C to amend CRSFF.OPPLAN 4/64 to read "provide close air support, tactical air reconnaissance, and troop carrier support for operations of Central Region SFF, and within capabilities of Thai national forces operating against the enemy in the Central Region."

Also at the Air Component Commanders Conference the Thailand delegates had raised the question of the appointment of Thai Air Force or Navy officers as commanders of SEATO air bases in Thailand. This question was also referred to MA 25C, where it was decided that Thai Air Force or Navy officers should be commanders on all air bases in Thailand on which SEATO air forces were deployed.

The CMPO commented that France and Pakistan had failed to revise country studies assigned to them, and that these studies were one to three years out of date and thus of questionable value as planning documents. France had been assigned studies on Cambodia,
North and South Vietnam, and Laos. Pakistan had been assigned studies on Afghanistan, the Sinkiang and Tibet areas of China, and Pakistan. The Military Advisers directed the CMPO to write to the French and Pakistan Military Advisers requesting them to relinquish their responsibility, after which other member nations would take over preparation of the studies.

Admiral Sharp assessed the work of MA 25C in a post-meeting report to the JCS by stating that it was the most productive of the five meetings he had attended as the US Military Adviser. It was conducted, he reported, in an atmosphere of progress and a desire for positive results. The cooperativeness of all was apparent in the face of several potentially sensitive issues. While each member was positive and clear in stating his position on these matters, compromises permitted approval of current matters and agreement on further studies to be conducted to improve existing plans.

MOVEMENTS CONFERENCES - AIR COMPONENT COMMANDERS CONFERENCE

A Movements Conference was held at the SEATO MPO in Bangkok 17 to 21 January 1966. CINCPAC, his component commanders, and COMUSMACTHAI were represented. COMUSMACTHAI provided the chairman and chief delegate. Objectives of the conference were to improve movement organization and procedures and to develop integrated movement tables for SEATO Plan 4. The conferees reorganized certain planned Base Area Command movement organizations to align them more effectively with existing capabilities within Thailand. This opened the question of the complete reorganization of movement agencies within the Air Component Command. Such a review and reorganization was requested by the USMILADREP and approved by the US Military Adviser.

The only agenda item that was not completed was the development of integrated movement tables, which were consolidated tables that reflected intra-theater air and sealift capabilities of all

1. Prior to the conference a US unilateral preparatory conference was held 13 to 15 Jan 66.
2. USMILADREP SMPO 210530Z Mar 66
3. CINCPAC 072035Z Apr 66
member nations and were needed to support SEATO plans. The steering
committee recommended the convening of a second movements conference
in mid-May to prepare the required tables.

In preparation for the second conference, Admiral Sharp
obtained movement data from the Commander, 315th Air Division, the
JCS, the National Military Command Center, and the Military Airlift
Command (MAC). A preliminary conference was held at Camp H. M.
Smith, Hawaii in mid-April. ¹ At that meeting, movement tables were
drawn up, all units designated for Plan 4 were verified, and final
destinations and closure dates determined. Attending this session were
representatives of CINCPAC's component commands, the MAC, III
and IX Corps, and the 315th Air Division. The updated information
was put on automatic data processing listings in preparation for the
second meeting.

The SEATO Second Movements Conference was held in
Bangkok 16 to 20 May. Representatives from CINCPAC, his component
commands, the MAC, COMUSMACV, and the 13th Air Force worked
with delegates from member nations on an agenda that included:
consolidation of movement tables, physical restrictions on military
movements, ways of overcoming shortfalls in movement capability,
aircraft beddown, airfield capabilities and acceptance rates, and facilities
for improvement and integration of tactical air control systems.²
Consolidation of the movement tables was not completed.

During the Second Movements Conference it was recommended
that COMUSMACV convene an Air Component Commanders Conference
as soon as possible. It was considered that such a conference was
needed to update force allocations and airfield capabilities, and to take
account of new concepts and tactical air control problems that had
developed incidental to the increase in air activity in Thailand since the
last conference in 1964. September would be the best time for the
conference,³ and Admiral Sharp requested that COMUSMACV make

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1. CINCPAC ltr ser 00380, 7 Mar 66; CINCPAC 142125Z Apr 66
2. Report of CCRSFF (D) Movement Conference, SEATO Log 711-66,
   May 66

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conference arrangements with the Commander, 13th Air Force. Instructions were issued to solicit agenda items through the USMILADREP to insure member nations participation. Subsequently, a US preliminary conference was held in mid-September and the agenda as proposed by the US Military Adviser was submitted to the CMPO. ¹

(3) The Air Component Commanders Conference convened at SEATO headquarters in Bangkok 19-23 September.² All agenda items were completed. Two proposals were initiated by Thailand under "other business." One was to appoint Royal Thai Air Force officers as base commanders at all Thai air bases, and the second was to provide SEATO air support to Royal Thai Government Forces operating under national command. The proposals could not be resolved and were referred to the Military Advisers Conference to be held in December.³

(3) During the SEATO Second Movements Conference in May it had been recommended that all air movement data relative to the support of Plan 4 be converted to an automatic data processing format compatible with a JCS system.⁴ By August the initial machine run of this conversion, which included airlift movement data for all member nations, was completed by the MAC. Individual listings were forwarded to the USMILADREP in Bangkok for dissemination to member nations for review and comment prior to a final printout of a permanent mechanized airlift document. The subject was considered in a separate meeting, not as an agenda item, during the September Air Component Commanders Conference, but the printout was not finalized.

(3) Sea movement table formats were still being prepared in October by member nations, after which they were to be converted to

1. CINCPAC 122359Z Jul 66; CINCPAC 020339Z Aug 66
2. Delegates representing CINCPAC the component commands, 13th Air Force, and the 315th Air Division participated in a unilateral US conference preceding the SEATO conference.
4. COMUSMACV 221210Z Aug 66
preliminary machine listings by CINCPAC. The US Military Adviser recommended that a SEATO Movement Tables Working Group convene in January 1967 to finalize, correct as necessary, and print in final form all Plan 4 movement tables.¹

FORCE COMMITMENTS TO OPLAN 4

(25) Prior to MA 24C there were indications that the Philippine Military Adviser intended to raise the subject of force commitments in support of Eastern Region SEATO Field Force OPLAN 4.² This matter had been raised at MA 20C by the Philippines³ and discussed out of session at MA 21C.⁴ CINCPAC reviewed the problem and reported to the JCS that the forces required by the Philippine assessment were very high and that the matter was sensitive because there were indications that the Philippines might use this to force the French into a position of making a positive statement regarding their future with SEATO. It could be a delicate matter not only because of Philippine sensitivity but because it could open the door to the question of continued French participation in SEATO.⁵ The JCS concurred in CINCPAC's decision that the United States would make a positive commitment that was parallel to forces declared in United States-Philippine mutual defense plans.⁶ The matter was resolved at MA 24C with the United States reaffirming its declaration paralleling that in the United States-Philippines Mutual Defense Board Plan, and the United Kingdom stating it might be able to provide some maritime air assistance.

SEATO FORCE COMMANDER

(27) In September General Dwight Edward Beach, CINCUSARPAC, was selected by the JCS for the position of Commander, SEATO Force (Designate) for SEATO Plans 4, 6, and 7 for planning purposes.¹

1. CINCPAC 191945Z Oct 66
2. USMILADREP 130600Z Apr 66; J5142 Point Paper, 18 Apr 66
3. CINCPAC 111100Z Apr 64
4. CINCPAC 182135Z Oct 64
5. CINCPAC 062118Z Jan 65
6. JCS 102215Z Feb 65; CINCPAC 190137Z Feb 65
7. CINCPAC 130126Z Sep 66
General Beach replaced General John K. Waters, USA, who had occupied the position since 1964. It was JCS policy that this position should be filled by the CINCUSARPAC.

FRANCE'S POSITION IN SEATO

(2) At a press conference on 25 March, Philippine Secretary of Foreign Affairs Ramos told newsmen that the Philippine Government intended to "invite" the French to discuss the functions of SEATO in relation to the communist threat at the next SEATO Ministerial meeting. The Philippine press thereafter discussed an alleged Philippine intention to call France on the carpet regarding its SEATO role and to press the question of whether France should be allowed to continue in SEATO. Ramos' statement and the press discussions were interpreted as a desire on the part of the Philippine Government for clarification of what might be expected from France should SEATO be confronted with a more direct challenge by communism. Thailand officials also gave indication that they were contemplating some kind of action that would indicate displeasure at French obstructionism in SEATO, but Australian Council Member Hasluck appealed to Thai Council Member Thanat to modify this approach.

(3) The US Ambassador to France, Charles E. Bohlen, considered that even nominal French participation in SEATO had the advantage of giving the impression of at least some degree of French cooperation with the allies in Southeast Asia. Ambassador to Thailand Martin, however, considered that the nominal or special membership of the French was not consistent with Asian interests and gave them special opportunity to cause mischief, and that French withdrawal would not hurt SEATO.

1. CINCPAC 072105Z May 64
2. JCS 012347 Dec 61
3. MANILA to STATE 2035/290938Z May 66
4. BANGKOK to STATE 2047/310633Z Mar 66
5. PARIS to STATE 6503/041755Z Mar 66
6. BANGKOK to STATE 2098/051017Z Apr 66
Admiral Sharp had considered that the French contributed little to SEATO and that their withdrawal might benefit the organization. In any case it was his view that their withdrawal would not be a loss from the military standpoint.

(U) France was represented only by an observer at the annual Council of Ministers meeting held in Canberra in June.

PAKISTAN'S POSITION IN SEATO

Since the 1965 SEATO Council meeting, Pakistan had engaged India in a border war, as a result had suffered the suspension of US Military Assistance Program aid, and had begun to acquire arms from Communist China. Although possibly finding it awkward to have an arms agreement with Communist China while being a member of the anti-communist SEATO alliance, Pakistan apparently had no immediate intention of leaving the alliance.

Pakistan continued nominal participation in SEATO activities in 1966. Its role and continued participation, it appeared, depended on its relations with the United States and Communist China, and probably would not be influenced by whatever France did in this regard. The Pakistan Government was unwilling to publicly recognize much interest in Southeast Asia, but many Pakistanis privately acknowledged the powerful effect the outcome of the struggle in Vietnam would have on the extent of Chinese influence and pressure on Pakistan and the Asian subcontinent generally.

Pakistan's Foreign Minister had been expected to attend the June SEATO Council meeting in Canberra, but he went on "medical leave" the week before the meeting and the Pakistan delegation was headed by the High Commissioner to Australia.

Pakistan nevertheless participated in the Council meeting and subscribed to a large part of the final communique, although

1. RAWALPINDI to STATE 537/150535Z Apr 66
2. The communique was relatively strong, reaffirming SEATO support of US policies in Vietnam and calling on both SEATO members and non-members to increase their aid to South Vietnam.
specifically reserving its position on certain paragraphs dealing with Vietnam and Laos, as it had in 1965. Pakistan also went on record as viewing the situation in Vietnam with deep concern, and urged a settlement of the armed conflict on the basis of the 1954 Geneva Accords.

The Council representative informed the Secretary General that Pakistan would not be able to host the next SEATO Council meeting as it had been scheduled to do. 1

SEATO EXERCISE SEA IMP (PX-32)

SEA IMP was a SEATO maritime exercise conducted in the South China Sea and the Gulf of Thailand, between the ports of Manila and Bangkok, from 19 May to 9 June 1966. The United States and the United Kingdom jointly sponsored SEA IMP and Thailand was the host nation. 2 The exercise was directed by the UK's Flag Officer Second in Command, Far East Fleet; the deputy was the US Commander, Patrol Force Seventh Fleet. 3

A pre-planning conference of the sponsoring nations was held in September 1965, during which tentative force lists were drawn up and decisions made on such factors as aggressor nuclear weapons and missiles. 4

SEA IMP was designed to give intensive training in convoy escort, convoy antisubmarine measures, and naval interception at designated rendezvous. The exercise was a valuable opportunity for ships from SEATO nations to practice working together over a considerable period. The results achieved were most satisfactory. The efficiency of the force improved steadily as the exercise progressed.

SCHEDULED SEATO EXERCISES

The position of the United States at MA 24C was that the SEATO exercise program agreed to at MA 23C should continue in effect as planned.

1. BANGKOK to STATE 2756/120827 Z Jun 66
2. Participating forces were also provided by Australia, New Zealand, and the Philippines.
3. Point Paper J316, 5 May 66
4. Point Paper J312, 15 Oct 65
with the consideration that the scope of each exercise should be reexamined before plans were actually final. This was necessary because US commitments for future SEATO exercises remained tentative and would be contingent on the situation in Southeast Asia at the time of the exercise.\(^1\)

\(\textbf{(2)}\) Pre-planning conferences were held in 1966 for some proposed exercises. PX 34, Naval Control of Shipping, was scheduled for February 1967. The United States and United Kingdom, co-sponsors, held a pre-planning conference at Pearl Harbor 5 to 8 July 1966, attended also by representatives of Australia, New Zealand, and the MPO.\(^2\)

\(\textbf{(5)}\) For PX 29 a pre-planning conference was held in Bangkok 16 and 17 August. Exercise 29, to test the concept of operations and logistic support at SEATO Field Commanders level in the Central Region, was scheduled for March 1967.\(^3\) This was later postponed to 15 to 28 May 1967.

\(\textbf{(2)}\) SEATO MPO PX 35, primarily a test of Eastern Region SEATO Field Forces plans, was scheduled for March 1967 under co-sponsorship of the United States and the Philippines.\(^4\)

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1. Point Paper, J316A, 5 Apr 66
2. J3 History, Jul 66
3. J3 and J4 Histories, Jul 66
4. Point Paper, J316, 24 Aug 66
POLITICAL - MILITARY ACTIVITIES

AUSTRALIA

Status of Forces Agreement

In April, Australia came under consideration as an additional rest and recuperation (R&R) location. As Article I of the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) only included US military personnel "in Australia in connection with activities agreed upon by the two governments," and since R&R was not such an agreed activity, it became apparent that diplomatic overtures to this effect would be required prior to establishment of Australia as an R&R location. The matter was under study by the CINCPAC staff at the end of the year.

REPUBLIC OF CHINA

Status of Forces Agreement

The US-China SOFA, which was negotiated in 1965, became effective on 12 April 1966. An important aspect of implementation concerned the composition of the Joint Committee. For a number of months the United States had urged that the Joint Committee be composed of military personnel, while the Chinese had held to their preference for diplomatic-level representation. The Country Team decided firmly that the United States would have military membership, and on 12 April Brigadier General T. H. Watkins, USAF, the Chief of Staff of the USTDC was appointed as US Chief Representative. Shortly thereafter the State Department supported the Country Team in this action by approving the concept of military composition. Meanwhile, China appointed Dr. Tang Wu of the Chinese Foreign Affairs Office.

Another SOFA aspect that had required considerable attention was the implementation of criminal jurisdiction provisions, particularly.

1. CINCPAC 290531Z Apr 66
2. CINCPAC Command History, 1965, p 234
3. SEC STATE 1109/290119Z Apr 66

CONFIDENTIAL
the exercise of the right of recall of waiver. An agreed minute to the
SOFA provided that China would waive, in favor of the United States,
their primary right of jurisdiction granted by Article XIV, unless China
recalled the waiver. The waiver could be recalled in cases where the
exercise of jurisdiction was of special importance to the Chinese. The
Embassy in Taipei sought to establish a procedure that called for
notification of China only in those cases in which the United States
determined that China might recall. This determination was to be based
on the US assessment of the culpability of the individual. 1 Reasoning
that such a procedure might result in the exposure of US personnel to
Chinese jurisdiction for an indefinite time, the Secretary of State directed
that notification to China be routine, not based on US evaluation of
sufficiency of evidence, and be made in all cases where US personnel
were involved in or in any way connected with an incident. 2

Buildup of US Personnel

(2) The rapid buildup of US military personnel, particularly
at Ching Chuan Kang Air Base near Taichung, caused the US Embassy
to be concerned about accommodations, absorption, and control. 3
The Deputy Chief of Mission urged the Air Force to expand ancillary
facilities, fill out complements of air police and legal personnel, and
authorize dependents as soon as possible.

(2) CINCPAC requested that CINCPACAF and COMUSTDC
evaluate the situation and provide comments on the problems raised by
the Embassy. 4 Both CINCPACAF and COMUSTDC replied that planning
and development of Ching Chuan Kang were proceeding satisfactorily.
Neither commander considered additional off-base facilities necessary
except for three club annexes. 5 The Embassy reviewed the problem in
light of those replies and informed CINCPAC that plans for off-base
facilities were satisfactory. 6

1. TAIPEI 310900Z Aug 66
2. STATE 45455/122334Z Sep 66
3. TAIPEI to STATE 864/120532Z Feb 66
4. CINCPAC 122342Z Feb 66
5. CINCPACAF 170303Z Feb 66; COMUSTDC 150932Z Feb 66
6. TAIPEI 185/190440Z Feb 66
PHILIPPINES

Arming of Patrol Aircraft

G CINCPACFLT expressed concern that patrol aircraft operating from Sangley Naval Air Station were not armed. These aircraft were supporting YANKEE TEAM and Seventh Fleet operations in Vietnam and were vulnerable in the event of attack by the enemy. Accordingly, CINCPACFLT recommended to CINCPAC that action be taken to arrange an agreement with the Philippine Government permitting defensive ASW arming of the patrol planes.1, 2

Ambassador Blair considered that the aircraft should be quietly armed and that President Marcos be informed about the matter when a suitable opportunity presented itself.3

A joint State-Defense Department message stated that it was preferable to continue the established practice of notifying the Philippine Chief of State regarding base use that could later embarrass the Philippine Government politically.4 CINCPAC thereafter informed CINCPACFLT that upon receipt of notification from CINCPAC that President Marcos had been consulted, arming of the patrol craft was authorized. CINCPAC cautioned that the matter was to be handled in such a manner that Philippine nationals and other unauthorized persons would not be aware of the arming of the aircraft.5

1. CINCPACFLT 062331Z Mar 66
2. The Bohlen-Serrano Memorandum of Agreement of 1959 stated that combat operational use of Philippine bases by the US for operations other than those conducted in accordance with the US-Philippine Mutual Defense Treaty would be subject to prior consultation.
3. MANILA 260430Z Mar 66; MANILA 130156Z Apr 66; CINCPACREP PHIL 250635Z Mar 66
4. STATE 1797/010015Z Apr 66
5. CINCPAC 050338Z Apr 66
National Policy Paper

(C) CINCPAC staff representatives participated in the March 1965 conference held in Manila to assemble the first draft of the National Policy Paper on the Philippines. At the request of the JCS, additional formal comment was provided in August 1965.  

(S) CINCPAC's formal comments recommended removal of passages concerning prior consultation with the Philippine Government on use of bases, and modified the implication that the United States should readily accept 25-year base tenure. Other suggestions concerned steps

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2.  
3.  JCS 8342/162031Z Aug 65; CINCPAC 232302Z Aug 65; CINCPAC 261003Z Aug 65
needed to counter divisive elements in the Philippines, the need for a vigorous US public information service program, and measures to counter excessive labor demands on US bases. ¹

The JCS included most of CINCPAC’s recommendations when the Paper was forwarded to the Secretary of Defense. Late in 1965 the Secretary of Defense advised the State Department that the Paper was generally acceptable, and forwarded the changes recommended by CINCPAC and the JCS. The final version of the Philippine National Policy Paper was issued by the State Department in March 1966.

THAILAND

Status of Forces Agreement

Until 1966 the United States had been reluctant to enter into a SOFA with Thailand. In May 1964 Thailand had submitted a draft SOFA of the NATO type to the United States. CHJUSMAG Thailand, US Ambassador Martin, and CINCPAC agreed that the draft was suitable for negotiations, but none were started.

Since this 1964 Thai request, the United States concluded NATO or similar type agreements with the Republics of the Philippines, China, and Korea. Each of these countries had relatively recently been granted rights that were similar to those being sought by Thailand.

Meanwhile, the only formal agreement governing the status of US military personnel in Thailand was the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement of 17 October 1950, which provided that US personnel required in Thailand to discharge responsibilities under the agreement operated as part of the Embassy and enjoyed the same privileges and immunities accorded to other accredited Embassy personnel. By an exchange of letters between the US Ambassador and the Thai Minister, immunities were extended to all COMUSMACThai personnel (which was interpreted to include all US military forces "deployed" in Thailand). R&R personnel were not considered either MAAG or "deployed" forces.

¹ Point Paper, J5122, 9 Apr 66
There were both advantages and disadvantages to US military forces for entering into a SOFA with Thailand. On the positive side, the US authority to exercise courts martial jurisdiction would be established and the status of R&R and other non-MAAG personnel would be clarified. Many other problems, including facilities, bases, security, labor, claims, and clearance for entrance and exit could be normalized. In all, a SOFA would regularize and strengthen the US-Thai relationship.

There would also be disadvantages. Probably the most undesirable aspect was the inevitable extension of Thai criminal jurisdiction over numerous US personnel. Additionally, under a SOFA, the Thai would exercise more control over claims, labor, customs, and similar affairs.

CINCPAC's position on the Thai SOFA had been to observe carefully, and be ready to negotiate promptly so US military privileges in Thailand and the general US negotiating position not be endangered by US reluctance. Thus, in June 1966, when the Thai Government publicly requested a US-Thai SOFA, CINCPAC recommended that the US take the initiative, agree to begin negotiations on the 1964 Thai draft, and strive to reach a SOFA on an expedited basis. This course was adopted and the Thai Government was advised of US willingness to negotiate.

Preparation of a US draft agreement was begun in July. A legal representative of the CINCPAC staff visited Thailand in October (and again in December) to assist in the US draft preparation and to assist in preparing for the negotiations. The draft agreement was presented to the Thai negotiators in November.

1. CINCPAC 160141Z Jun 66
2. BANGKOK to STATE 1219/291153Z Jul 66
3. Captain J. B. McDevitt, USN
4. COMUSMACTHAI ltr Subj: US-Thai SOFA Negotiations, 28 Nov 66 (C)
REPUBLIC OF KOREA

Status of Forces Agreement

Agreement on all major SOFA issues was reached in 1965 during President Pak's State Visit to Washington. Early in 1966, however, there were indications that Korean political considerations would delay the 82nd Negotiation Meeting and the signing of the SOFA. Korean officials reportedly felt that consideration of the SOFA by their National Assembly concurrently with the request for additional troops for Vietnam would jeopardize the Free World Military Assistance Force commitment. 1

Nevertheless, work on the negotiations for the 82nd session continued and by the end of January both sides had informally approved the subjects negotiated. 2 During February the troop issue precluded SOFA action, and by the end of March there was still no date set for the 82nd session. 3 The head Korean negotiator stated "in confidence" that the Foreign Minister was considering reopening the SOFA negotiation to iron out remaining differences of opinion on criminal jurisdiction, civil claims, and labor provisions. It appeared, however, that the real reason for the consideration of reopening was to enable the Foreign Minister to regain some of the prestige he had lost within his Government during the last stages of the negotiations for additional troops for Vietnam. 4

On 9 June, Korea did request reopening of the SOFA negotiations on certain phases of the Article covering criminal jurisdiction, labor, and claims. As to criminal jurisdiction, Korea insisted on obtaining the same NATO-Netherlands waiver formula as the Philippines used, 5 instead of the German formula which had been agreed upon earlier. The US Ambassador and COMUS Korea concurred in this request and

1. SEOUL to STATE 716/110935Z Jan 66
2. STATE to SEOUL 784/291545Z Jan 66
3. SEOUL to STATE 916/190405Z Feb 66
4. SEOUL to STATE 1085/290300Z Mar 66
5. CINCPAC Command History, 1965, pp 229-233

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on 11 June CINCPAC endorsed their request, provided that the action
did not produce any unmanageable problems with respect to the China
SOFA and that due regard be accorded to the US Ambassador to Tokyo's
cconcern regarding disclosure of the confidential US-Japan arrangement
on waiver. 1

On 25 June the State Department approved a modified NATO-
Netherlands formula and minor changes in the labor and claims articles
proposals. 2 The proposal changed the waiver formula from the German
to the NATO-Netherlands formula, with a requirement for an exchange
of diplomatic notes of understanding similar to those accompanying a
1959 agreement with Pakistan. It was to be mutually understood that
it was not to be necessary for the United States to request a waiver in
each case and that it would be taken for granted that the Korean Govern-
ment had waived its primary right of jurisdiction except when that
Government determined in a specific case that it was of particular
importance that it exercise jurisdiction.

The proposal also envisioned an Agreed Understanding in the
Joint Agreed Summary of the 82d Negotiating Session which would
state that the phrase "of particular importance" meant specific cases
in which Korea, after careful examination, deemed its exercise of
jurisdiction imperative. An already agreed illustrative list of offenses
was also to be set forth, as well as a requirement for written notification
by Korea to the United States within 15 days of its desire to exercise
jurisdiction under the understood criteria.

This proposal was agreed to at the 82d Negotiating Session
on 8 July and the SOFA was signed at Seoul on 9 July. Secretary of
State Rusk representing the United States. 3

The processing of claims was to be transferred from US
Forces to Korean authorities. For the Seoul Special City area this
transfer was to take place 6 months after the SOFA was effective; for the

1. CINCPAC 110137Z Jun 66
2. STATE to SEOUL 1409/251950Z Jun 66
3. SEOUL 158/090235Z Jul 66
remainder of Korea, the transfer was to take place 12 months after ratification. These provisions would require Korean authorities to begin to investigate and process claims in August 1967. Late in 1966, however, COMUS Korea reported that Korea was not taking any action to establish an effective claims organization. CINCPAC sent a message to COMUS Korea advising him of the urgency of early Korean action to prepare for orderly transfer of claims responsibility. The purpose of the message was to urge early action.

One of the administrative provisions of the SOFA was that a US-Korea Joint Committee would be established. On 21 September 1966 COMUS Korea published an organization and mission directive which provided that agreements reached in the Joint Committee were binding on both countries. It failed to note the relationship of the Joint Committee to the US Ambassador. The Secretary of State advised the Ambassador in Seoul that Joint Committee agreements were not binding on the United States and were subject to review and possible reversal at Government level. He also advised the Ambassador that the directive should indicate that the US representative to the Joint Committee was responsible to and received policy guidance from the Ambassador. COMUS Korea modified the directive and incorporated those changes.

COMUS Korea’s proposed instruction on implementing the criminal jurisdiction portion of the SOFA was being reviewed by CINCPAC and his component commanders at the end of the year.

JAPAN

Status of Forces Security Consultative Committee

In September 1965 CINCPAC suggested to US Ambassador Edwin O. Reischauer that the establishment of a small subcommittee

1. CINCPAC 022251Z Dec 66
2. COMUS Korea Pol. Dir. 5-5, Subj: Civil Relations of Government Affairs, 21 Sep 66
3. SEC STATE 70049/202213Z Oct 66
of the Security Consultative Committee (SCC) would be an excellent means of strengthening the SCC. In a subsequent exchange of letters between the Ambassador and Admiral Sharp, it was decided not to establish such a subcommittee but rather to hold small informal meetings with Japanese defense and Foreign Office officials. In April Ambassador Reischauer forwarded to CINCPAC memoranda of conversation of two informal meetings of the SCC, one held in early February and another in April. Subjects discussed at the meetings included: Japanese public attitudes toward defense; the Japanese contribution to the defense of the Ryukyu Islands; reversion of Okinawa to Japanese control; changes in the US use of the Kanto Mura Housing Area, the Atsugi Naval Air Station, and the Mito Bombing Range; 

At the April meeting it was agreed that the collection of intelligence on Communist China was a contribution for which Japan was well suited.

Use of Military Payment Certificates

Informal discussions held during 1966 indicated that CINCPAC's component commanders, COMUS Japan, and the US Treasury Department all continued to desire that US dollars be substituted for Military Payment Certificates in Japan. Additionally, officials of the Japanese Ministry of Finance generally favored allowing US Forces to use US dollars. Ministry officials, however, strongly urged controls on US dollars to prevent them from reaching unauthorized persons. The US Ambassador proceeded slowly because of political factors. CINCPAC favored continuing these discreet negotiations for the elimination of Military Payment Certificates from Japan.

US Air Base Utilization

Changes in the size and composition of two USAF tactical fighter squadrons and one US Marine fighter attack squadron resulted in the reduction of US tactical aircraft in Japan in 1966. This reduction generated renewed concern about the inability of the United States to

1. Point Paper, J513, 6 May 66
2. Point Paper, J721, 5 May 66

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justify retention of current air base facilities, and ultimately about the future air posture of US Forces in Japan.

In June, the US Ambassador informed the Secretary of State of this concern and recommended that the State and Defense Departments study future US air base and air defense requirements in Japan. ¹ Specifically, CINCPAC studied (1) the degree to which the United States expected Japan to take over its own air defense and whether the United States should try to retain some part of the air defense responsibility; (2) the kind of air units, in addition to air defense units, if any, the United States wanted to maintain in Japan as of 1971-76; (3) the optimum location of such air or air defense units from a military viewpoint; and (4) the administration facilities, including airfields for administration and logistic use, that would be needed and where they should be located.

CINCPAC informed the JCS that in a study of this nature the conclusions reached on post-Vietnam War forces and bases in the Asian periphery would be considered speculative. A study of the problem would nevertheless be accomplished under postulated conditions, and the conclusions would be forwarded to the JCS. ² Work on the study was still in progress at the end of the year.

**Noise Suppression at Atsugi Naval Air Station**

³ The problem of noise emanating from US jet air bases in Japan was first raised by the Japanese before the SCC in 1962. ³ Thereafter the USAF corrected the problem at Yokota Air Base by installing large sound suppressors and by in-flight noise abatement action. Jet noise from Atsugi Naval Air Station remained a problem, and in September COMUS Japan pressed for early installation of sound suppressors at the station. ⁴ The US Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) placed the Atsugi noise suppression requirement on the FY 67 Military Construction Program, but the Secretary of Defense subsequently deferred the project. ⁵

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1. TOKYO to STATE 4365/140843Z Jun 66
2. CINCPAC 040819Z Jul 66
3. COMUS Japan, Fact Sheet, 2 Apr 64
4. Point Paper, J4215, 4 May 66
5. CNO ltr OP-442E/rh ser 2001 P 44, 6 Jan 66

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In April Ambassador Reischauer informed the State Department that a high Japanese official had requested his help in accomplishing the project as soon as possible. The corrective action taken at Yokota Air Base was cited by the Ambassador as a factor that made the continuing delay inadvisable. CINCPACFLT requested that the CNO take appropriate funding action immediately. In addition, CINCPAC asked the JCS to help expedite funding. In July the CNO notified CINCPAC that authority to proceed with the noise suppression installation at Atsugi had been received.

**Mito Air-to-Ground Range**

(7) For a number of years local Japanese had pressured both the US and the Japanese Governments to release the USAF air-to-ground bombing range at Mito. In 1965 the range, which was used by both the Air Force and the Navy, was judged inadequate to support aircraft training requirements in Japan because of the buildup of surrounding civilian communities and because of the planned construction of an atomic reactor adjacent to the range. It was the responsibility of the Japanese Government to provide an acceptable alternative facility or to assure continued availability of the Mito range. US officials maintained a position of willingness to cooperate fully in accepting a reasonably satisfactory alternate range site.

(8) In September 1964 the Japanese informally requested that the United States study the acceptability of a new location on the southern tip of Nii-Jima (Island). After an exhaustive study, COMUS Japan evaluated the Nii-Jima site as unacceptable without major alterations. Early in 1966 Ambassador Reischauer recommended that the United States accept Nii-Jima as an alternate site despite the three to six year period that reportedly would be required to prepare the site. CINCPAC concurred in the need for an alternate site to Mito, and requested that COMUS Japan undertake discussions with Japanese officials for the exchange of the Mito facility for a more suitable one.

1. AMEMB TOKYO 220909Z Apr 66  
2. CINCPAC 022215Z May 66; CINCPACFLT 280233Z Apr 66  
3. CNO 111910Z Jul 66  
4. CINCPACAF ltr DOOT 5-0235, 6 Dec 65; CINCPACFLT 012209Z Jan 66  
5. TOKYO to STATE 271018Z Jan 66  
6. CINCPAC 092359Z Feb 66
After several exchanges between US and Japanese representatives, the US in March agreed in principle to accept a substitute range at Nii-Jima if the terrain could be properly modified by the Japanese Government. Thereafter COMUS Japan sent a draft consideration of the technical requirements involved in the conversion of Nii-Jima into a satisfactory air-to-ground range. COMUS Japan indicated that it would be the basis for the initial US negotiating position. The Commander Naval Forces, Japan considered the problem from the standpoint of naval air requirements and forwarded comments and recommendations on the Nii-Jima site to CINCPACFLT.

At the end of the year negotiations continued. It appeared that a minimum of two years would be required by Japan to complete budgeting, real estate acquisition, and other actions necessary for the transfer of the range from Mito to Nii-Jima.

**Fuji-McNair Maneuver Area**

The Fuji-McNair Maneuver Area was the only facility in the Far East that was adequate for large-scale maneuvers, including tank and artillery firing. US utilization of the area had declined, however, while use by the Japanese Self-Defense Forces had become intensive. Thus, the US favored returning control of the area to the Japanese Government under an arrangement that would pass control to the Japan Defense Agency (JDA). The United States desired a detailed entry and use agreement for future access to the area if it was required.

In 1962 a draft agreement for return of the Fuji area was developed by a joint US-Japanese working group of the Facilities Subcommittee of the SCC. According to that agreement the United States would retain a base camp of about 200 acres plus full maneuver and firing rights to the remainder of the area for a certain number of days each year. The draft provided that the area would pass to the

1. US Forces Japan, Fact Sheet, 13 Jun 66
2. COMUS Japan USLAC-FP ltr, Subj: Alternate for Mito Air-to-Ground Range, 27 Apr 66
3. COMNAVFOR JAPAN 220150Z Jun 66
4. COMUS Japan Fact Sheet, 20 Aug 65
A Japanese official indicated serious concern about the political consequences of reactivating Tama.\(^1\) COMUS Japan accordingly recommended to CINCPAC that the Japanese Government be officially notified of the plan to reactivate Tama in order to determine if indeed there was official objection. COMUS Japan also recommended that if notification was to be given to the Japanese it be determined whether assurance could be given that the HAWK site could be accommodated at Tama and whether an alternate golf course site could be provided at Tokorozawa.\(^2\)

By mid-year the pressure had increased for a clear decision on the use of Tama. The CHMAAG made it clear that the loss of Tama as a HAWK site would seriously degrade the air defense capability of the Japanese forces in the Tokyo area.\(^3\) CINCUSARPAC and the Commanding General, US Army Japan ruled out the possibility of co-location of the missile site and ammunition storage for safety reasons.\(^4\) CINCUSARPAC proposed to inform the Japanese Government that the United States would consider any suitable alternative sites for ammunition storage that were offered by the Japanese.

In September, COMUS Japan requested prompt resolution of the status of Tama. He expressed serious concern over the possible denial of the Tama facility to the Japanese and noted that the Director General of the JDA, Mr. Kambayashi, planned to raise the subject on his visit to the United States in October.\(^5\)

At CINCPAC's request, CINCUSARPAC reviewed the munitions storage requirements and alternatives to the use of Tama.\(^6\) He subsequently proposed and CINCPAC agreed to reactivate the Hiro Standby Ammunition Storage Facility and to cancel the request for activating Tama.\(^7,8\)

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1. COMUS Japan, J4 Memo of Record, 22 Jun 66, Subj: Discussion between J4, USFJ, and Mr. Kanegae, DFAA, 21 Jun 66 (C)
2. COMUS Japan USLAC 06117/240716Z Jun 66
3. CHMAAG Japan 080720Z Aug 66
4. CINCUSARPAC 030051Z Aug 66
5. COMUS Japan 090842Z Sep 66
6. CINCPAC 160405Z Sep 66
7. CINCUSARPAC 010428Z Oct 66
8. CINCPAC 070331Z Oct 66
Claim to Control of International Waters

Since 1960 Indonesia had extended claims that would restrict access to its territorial waters and limit the right of innocent passage, contrary to recognized international law. In 1962, the Indonesian Government requested advance notice for transit of all foreign warships. The United States and other nations had renounced Indonesia's claims and restrictions, but with a few exceptions informal notification of intended warship transit had been provided as a courtesy, though not in recognition of Indonesia's claim.

The Defense Attache in Djakarta reported in April 1966 that the Indonesian Foreign Ministry disseminated to foreign embassies a note and application forms for clearance of foreign ships entering waters claimed by Indonesia. The clearance forms were applicable to warships and merchant ships and were to be submitted one week prior to transit. Thereafter, the US Embassy informed Washington that the new Government of Indonesia apparently did not plan to press for compliance, and recommended that the United States ignore the December note. The Secretary of State subsequently concurred in Djakarta's recommendation.

CINCPAC over a long period of time had recommended that the United States take a clear stand against the Indonesian restrictions. In this vein CINCPAC pointed out to the JCS that the seven day notification requirement as applied to both merchant and warships would represent an expansion of illegal Indonesian claims. CINCPAC recommended that the serious implications of the Indonesian action be examined with a view toward insuring an early, clearcut, and firm US stand against such restrictions.

1. USDAO DJAKARTA 080040Z Apr 66
2. CINCPAC 100142Z Apr 66
**GLOSSARY OF TERMS**

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<td>ABNCP</td>
<td>Airborne Command Post</td>
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<tr>
<td>AC&amp;W</td>
<td>Aircraft Control and Warning</td>
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<td>ADCSP</td>
<td>Advanced Defense Communications Satellite Project</td>
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<td>AEW</td>
<td>Airborne Early Warning</td>
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<td>Air-to-Ground Missile</td>
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<td>ASD</td>
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<td>ASW</td>
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<td>AUTODIN</td>
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<td>BADGE</td>
<td>Base Air Defense Ground Environment</td>
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<td>CAA</td>
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<td>CHICOM</td>
<td>Chinese Communists</td>
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<td>CJCNS</td>
<td>Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff</td>
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<td>CLIP</td>
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<td>NATO</td>
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The separate elements of the history are classified according to content and distributed on the basis of a need to know. An index will be separately distributed for addition to Volume II and will cover all elements of the history.
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CHAPTER IV

ACTIONS TO COUNTER COMMUNIST AGGRESSION IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

(9) "...a capable and resourceful enemy is continuing to engage in overt warfare in South Vietnam. He is being supported by major infiltration through Laos and there is strong evidence that enemy logistical support is also coming through Cambodia. Subversion and insurgency in Thailand, though still limited in scope, are being actively pursued. At the same time the enemy maintains the capability to deploy substantial additional regular forces to South Vietnam."

Admiral U.S.G. Sharp

(U) This chapter deals with CINCPAC's decisions and actions associated with his mission of countering communist aggression in Southeast Asia. Similar subjects, less intimately related to Southeast Asia, are discussed in Volume I. Additional details are in Annexes A and B, published by COMUSMACV and COMUSMACTHAI respectively.

1. From a CINCPAC message quoted in CPRS 001524-67
SECTION A - SOUTHEAST ASIA PLANS, POLICY, AND PROGRAMS

This portion of the History discusses "Contingency Planning" and "PACOM Force Requirements and Capabilities." Actions in implementation of these plans and programs are described elsewhere in this chapter.¹ The changing situation and requirements in Southeast Asia imposed a continuing task of programming PACOM force requirements and capabilities. Recommendations were submitted to the JCS with respect to the problems at hand and existing policies, and concepts and strategy were revised to reflect circumstances associated with the war. Deployment programs were analyzed in detail and adjusted to conform to current developments in the political or military situations. Inflation in the South Vietnamese economy was, near the end of the year, a major consideration regarding the size and composition of military forces engaged in the war.

CONTINGENCY PLANNING, SOUTHEAST ASIA

KANZUS

(TS) During 1966 there was evidence of increased North Vietnamese infiltration activity in the vicinity of the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ), which centered on 17° North. In conjunction with this, substantial North Vietnamese Army (NVA) forces (e.g. the 324B Division) appeared in northern Quang Tri Province. In early August COMUSMACV proposed to organize from in-country resources an international force (termed KANZUS because of its Korean-Australian-New Zealand-United States composition) for deployment to northern Quang Tri Province as an additional measure to cut this infiltration through the DMZ.

(TS) US Ambassador to Vietnam Henry Cabot Lodge and General William C. Westmoreland (COMUSMACV) believed that the international character of this force would benefit the United States in several ways, including:²

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¹ See also Chapter II for Military Assistance Program associated actions prompted by events in Southeast Asia.
² SAIGON to STATE 2934/080804Z Aug 66
1. It would symbolize the Free World shield protecting South Vietnam against further aggression from the north.

2. It would accent the defensive role of the Free World Military Assistance Forces (FWMAF) and refute predictable North Vietnamese charges that US Forces in northern South Vietnam were intended for an invasion of North Vietnam.

(26) In response to a request from the Secretary of State, COMUSMACV's detailed concept for the KANZUS Force was forwarded to Washington. It provided that the force would be tasked to watch probable avenues of approach through the DMZ and to react to attempted infiltration along these approaches. Under a US Marine Corps brigadier general, the force would operate in the III Marine Amphibious Force chain of command. The KANZUS Force headquarters would be manned by personnel from the participating countries.

(26) The force would contain three Marine maneuver battalions (2 US, 1 Korean), a strong reconnaissance element, organic artillery, aircraft sufficient for an air assault capability, and other support elements. The New Zealand battery would be attached and Australia would be invited to contribute a Special Air Service Squadron.1

(26) On 28 August CINCPAC endorsed the concept as operationally and logistically feasible.2 He stated that it was politically and militarily wise to assure that the force was of sufficient strength to assure its own security in the face of extensive enemy forces. He additionally noted the possible proprietary interest of the International Control Commission and the rules of engagement for the southern portion of the DMZ. He visualized the KANZUS Force as the possible post-hostilities peace keeping force.

(26) Detailed force requirements were discussed3 but as of the first week in October, it appeared impossible to have the force deployed prior to the mid-October onset of the northeast monsoon, as had been desired by COMUSMACV. State Department views appeared to favor the concept of a larger international force deployed in the DMZ. As of 31 December, however, the concept for employment of the KANZUS Force had not yet been addressed by the JCS.

1. CINCPAC 150250Z Aug 66
2. CINCPAC 282344Z Aug 66
3. CINCPAC 242348Z Sep 66
Corps Contingency Force

CINCPAC's June statement of the Concept for Vietnam noted that should the enemy buildup rapidly increase, or should there be an opportunity to launch large-scale military offensive operations that would shorten the war, then additional major forces would have to be introduced into the PACOM area to be used as the situation indicated.\(^1\) CINCPAC recommended to the JCS that forces beyond those programmed and requested for 1967 be readied for deployment to Vietnam in the latter half of 1967 or early 1968.\(^2\) CINCPAC noted that he was making the recommendation well in advance of events in recognition of the lead times involved in readying a Corps Contingency Force (CCF).

The CCF could be employed to offset a marked increase in enemy strength or for operations in Laos or Cambodia. More specifically, it could: aid in the defense of the northern I Corps Tactical Zone (CTZ), the central highlands, or other areas threatened by the enemy; conduct large-scale operations from South Vietnam into Laos or Cambodia against enemy bases, facilities, and infiltration routes; conduct increased and sustained operations against Viet Cong-NVA base areas in South Vietnam; and intensify the Revolutionary Development Program.

Accompanying CINCPAC's CCF recommendation was an analysis of the supporting forces and facilities that would be required if the force was employed in northern I CTZ. Selection of this area for the analysis was based on the difficult logistic problems involved, its proximity to the infiltration routes in eastern Laos, and the enemy threat. Additionally, the combat service support troops needed in the I CTZ would be greater than the support requirement in any of the other three CTZs.

From his analysis, CINCPAC concluded that support of the force was feasible and that the support could best be provided by a combination of deep and shallow draft vessels, and overland movement.

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1. CINCPAC ltr ser 000255, 18 Jun 66
2. CINCPAC ltr ser 000277, 7 Jul 77
of supplies and equipment; that upgrading selected LOC and port facilities would be required; and that it was highly desirable to provide a safety level of supplies afloat to enhance the flexibility of employment of the force.

(TS) The illustrative example accompanying CINCPAC's recommendation provided three and one-third divisions supported by eight tactical fighter squadrons for operations along Route 9 in I CTZ and Laos. Admiral Sharp noted that with the forces requested, and an early decision and funding for improvement of ports, airfields, and LOC, the CCF could be accepted and supported in the latter half of 1967.

(TS) On 3 September the JCS informed CINCPAC that they would consider the CCF separately from the 1967 PACOM force requirements and that after the October Honolulu conference they would determine the Services' capabilities to provide the CCF. Also on this date, the JCS requested the Services to provide comments on the composition of the force.

(TS) On 3 December 1966 the Chairman of the JCS directed the Joint Staff to prepare a movement plan for the reinforcement of COMUSMACV by a corps force in accordance with possible requirements earlier expressed by General Westmoreland. This plan was to be provided to the Secretary of Defense.

Proposed US Army Corps Operations in Laos

Operation RAIN FALL

(TS) In December 1965 CINCPAC disseminated a concept for reinforced US Army Corps operations in southern Laos with the objective of blocking enemy infiltration into South Vietnam. Concurrently, the force was to destroy all enemy forces and installations in its assigned zone.

1. JCS 1807/031525Z Sep 66
2. CINCPAC 092032Z Dec 65
Major General Richard G. Stilwell, COMUSMACTHAI, on 2 January 1966 submitted a concept of operations, and emphasized that for reasons political and military it was more realistic to plan the operation as a combined US-Thai effort with command arrangements envisaged in Project 22.\(^1\) He subsequently submitted a concept for bilateral operations (Operation RAIN FALL) and recommended it for acceptance as the definitive basis for development of that portion of CINCPAC plans that would involve operations projected from Thailand to Laos.\(^2\)

Operation RAIN FALL provided for operations in the Laos Panhandle with eight US brigades and four Thai regimental combat teams. Mobile operations would be conducted astride three axes of advance leading into the Laos Panhandle. Brigade bases would be established along the axes.

**Operation SEAFREE**

While RAIN FALL was being formulated, CINCUSARPAC was undertaking to prepare a plan for corps operations in Laos with introduction and support primarily through South Vietnam. The resulting OPLAN SEAFREE was submitted to CINCPAC on 25 March 1966. The US corps would be introduced and supplied in Laos along Route 9 from the Dong Ha-Quang Tri-Hue area in northern South Vietnam. Mobile operations would be conducted from division bases established in the vicinity of Muong Phine and Tchepone. Operations would be conducted in coordination with forces supported from Thailand. A minimum of one and one-third US divisions would be required to secure LOC, and two and two-thirds divisions would operate in Laos.

Both RAIN FALL and SEAFREE would require extensive development of logistic support capabilities before operations could be launched from Thai or South Vietnamese bases. If major projects were

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1. COMUSMACTHAI ltr, Subj: MACTHAI Concept of Operations - Thailand, 2 Jan 66; see "US-Thai Bilateral Planning" elsewhere in this Chapter.
2. COMUSMACTHAI ltr, Subj: MACTHAI Concept of Operations - RAIN FALL, GPRS 0001119, 12 Mar 66

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pursued simultaneously and civilian contractors were utilized to the maximum, it would still take about two years to achieve the desired logistic posture.

**Operation FULL CRY**

On 7 November COMUSMACV notified CINCPAC of an Outline Plan (FULL CRY) to project corps-size operations into the Laos Panhandle by 1 January 1968. The major ground combat forces were an airmobile and two infantry divisions. The concept included phased deployment of forces through 1967, consistent with improvement and development of airfields, LOC, ports, and other logistic facilities.

FULL CRY also involved a brigade-size force deployed south of the DMZ in the Dong Ha-Thon Son Lam area to serve in a surveillance or reaction capacity. Under the concept, there would be a two-division abreast sweep northward from the vicinity of the Plateau des Bolovens to Route 9, and a one division push along Route 9 westward from the Vietnam-Laos border to Tchefone. 1

CINCPAC accepted COMUSMACV's offer for a briefing on FULL CRY. In so doing, he requested more detailed information and asked that FULL CRY be briefed to him in the context of several related contingency proposals for corps-size operations. 2

By the end of the year COMUSMACV's representatives had briefed this plan to CINCPAC's staff and component commanders. It was expected that CINCPAC's views would be formulated after staff review was completed about 15 March 1967.

**Counter-Infiltration Barrier**

In response to a late March JCS request, 3 CINCPAC examined the advantages and disadvantages of a counter-infiltration barrier across northern South Vietnam and Laos from the South China Sea to Thailand. Additionally, he addressed the subject of any alternative measures.

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1. COMUSMACV 48649/070855Z Nov 66
2. CINCPAC 150207Z Nov 66
3. JCS 252305Z Mar 66; JCS 2339/222, 24 Mar 66

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The CINCPAC reply was based on comments of the CINCPAC subordinate commanders and a Department of the Army study regarding construction requirements for the barrier.\footnote{CINCPACFLT 050059Z Apr 66; CINCPAC 042346Z Apr 66; CINCPACAF 050356Z Apr 66; COMUSMACV 041203Z Apr 66; COMUSMACV 040659Z Apr 66; COMUSMACTHAI 041940Z Apr 66}

With careful planning it was estimated that development of the logistic infrastructure would require about two years. Subsequent to this it would require approximately one more year to introduce the required two-corps force (six to seven US divisions or equivalents) and conduct major ground combat operations in the Laos Panhandle to secure the area and establish full control prior to completion of the barrier.

One corps-size force would be introduced and supported through South Vietnam, another through Thailand. The minimum requirement for the South Vietnam-based force was four divisions, and it was estimated that the Thai-based force would include two and two-thirds US divisions and about four Thai regimental combat teams. Tactical air and fixed and rotary wing airlift operations in support of these ground forces would be proportionately the same as the spring 1966 US air-ground force ratio in South Vietnam. There would also be a heavy requirement for construction battalions, and the estimated requirements for construction of the barrier itself varied from 73 to 224 engineer battalion months and from 91,370 to 139,000 tons of materials.

The combat operations associated with the barrier would be conducted in an underdeveloped, militarily difficult area and supported over long and vulnerable LOC. The committed forces would be involved in a strategically static defense that might deny the enemy use of major land infiltration routes, but not the initiative. Force requirements were excessive, especially when considered in terms of what might be gained if the same level of military power and resources were applied in South Vietnam and elsewhere.

Logistics actions necessary to support these operations would constitute a major continuing effort, involving extensive...
commitments of combat service support units, contractor capabilities, and material resources.

The approximately three and one half to four years required to make the barrier fully operational was considered excessive, particularly when it still would not assure the achievement of US objectives in South Vietnam. With these considerations in mind, CINCPAC considered the concept of a counter-infiltration barrier as impracticable.

Infiltration Interdiction System

Despite strongly supported questions of the value of a counter-infiltration barrier, the idea did not die but surfaced in various forms during the summer and fall of 1966. In mid-September the Secretary of Defense established Joint Task Force 728, to report directly to him, and charged it with the mission of developing and installing an infiltration interdiction system to stop (or at least to substantially reduce) the flow of men and supplies from North Vietnam to South Vietnam.

There were four plans under consideration at the time. These were as follows:

1. The Prescribed Plan, based on the Jason Study. Barrier installed and operating by 15 September 1967.

2. The COMUSMACV Plan, a 30 km portion ready by 15 September 1967 and the rest by 1 November 1967.

3. The Phased Installation Plan, a composite of the above plans. It would have the 30 km South Vietnamese portion and the Laos antivehicular portion installed by 1 November 1967, the defile barriers and strong points by 1 April 1968.

4. The Phased Installation Plan (Modified) essentially the same as 3 above but to be completely installed by 1 November 1967.

The JCS concluded that certain requirements implied by Joint Task Force 728 plans might divert critical resources from major programs then underway in Southeast Asia. These programs might thus be jeopardized without the prerequisite determination that the barrier was practical. The JCS accordingly proposed determination of the feasibility of the barrier prior to major commitment of resources and submission of the Joint Task Force 728-developed project definition through the JCS.

1. Secretary of Defense Memorandum, 15 Sep 66, for Lieutenant General Alfred D. Starbird.
Especially in view of the reduced and imbalanced 1967 force authorized by the Secretary of Defense's Program 4, the source of the barrier operating forces had become a major issue. Additional and extremely important issues concerned maintaining the commander's freedom of action to meet military contingencies and to avoid jeopardizing other essential undertakings which were part of a comprehensive strategy that was obtaining results. The already critical piaster problem was another of the many significant issues.

On 23 November CINCPAC submitted a 15-page message explaining in detail the expected impact if the bulk of the barrier forces were drawn from forces then in-country or programmed. CINCPAC's views had the concurrence of his component commanders, COMUSMACV, and the Commanding General FMFPAC.¹

Subsequent JCS comments to the Secretary of Defense gave full support to CINCPAC's views. It was recommended that the Phased Installation Plan (Modified) not be approved for execution, and that efforts to reduce infiltration be as recommended by CINCPAC in accordance with the overall strategy for Southeast Asia.²

On 19 December the Secretary of Defense instructed the Director of the Defense Communications Planning Group to submit a plan that would:

1. Provide for procurement of material for the linear section of the barrier and have it ready in-theater by July 1967 but without commitment as to when it might be used; and

2. Develop and prepare the aircraft elements and other resources unique to the air-supported capability to permit operational availability in-theater by 1 November 1967.

Near the end of 1966 copies of the resulting Defense Communications Planning Group 22 December plan were furnished to the JCS, CINCPAC, and COMUSMACV.³ It was expected that definitive

1. CINCPAC 230410Z Nov 66. This message is of value for future study of the impact of force economy in war.
3. (C) The cover name for Joint Task Force 728.
4. DCPG Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, Subj: Plan for Increased Anti-Infiltration Capability for Southeast Asia, 22 Dec 66, CPRS 0001567-66

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PACOM planning would be required, and on 28 December the JCS alerted CINCPAC that he probably would be called upon for plans as scheduled in the 22 December plan.  

(75) Major considerations in this planning would be to avoid depriving the operational commander of his planning flexibility and prerogative to initiate actions that he considered most responsive to the enemy threat.  

Withdrawal of Forces from South Vietnam

(U) On 25 October 1966, the Heads of State of Australia, Korea, New Zealand, the Philippines, Thailand, the US, and the RVN jointly signed a communiqué that addressed the "goals of freedom" in Vietnam and in the Asian and Pacific areas. Paragraph 29 of this communiqué stated:

"In particular, they declared that allied forces are in the Republic of Viet Nam because that country is the object of aggression and its government requested support in the resistance of its people to aggression. They shall be withdrawn, after close consultation, as the other side withdraws its forces to the north, ceases infiltration, and the level of violence thus subsides. Those forces will be withdrawn as soon as possible and not later than six months after the above conditions have been fulfilled."

(76) In November CINCPAC directed his staff to commence preliminary planning for the possible withdrawal of forces from South Vietnam in accordance with the above quoted paragraph of the joint communiqué signed at Manila. In December CINCPAC directed a study to determine the feasibility of withdrawal in a six-month period. This study was completed 31 December, with the conclusion that a withdrawal of all US and FWMAF Forces from Vietnam in a six-month period was feasible. This determination was based on forces programmed to be in South Vietnam as of 31 December 1967. Upon completion of the study the staff began preparation of a withdrawal plan.

1. JCS 2328/282117Z Dec 66
2. CINCPAC 060820Z Feb 67
3. ADMINO CINCPAC 070345Z Dec 66; CINCPAC J5 Memo 000347-66, 8 Dec 66; CINCPAC Memorandum 1187, 15 Dec 66 for J01, J02, J03; CINCPAC J5 Memorandum 000367, 31 Dec 66
Defense of Mainland Southeast Asia

(PS) In response to a JCS request, CINCPAC submitted on 10 November 1965 an outline plan for the defense of Mainland Southeast Asia. After this plan was considered by the JCS, CINCPAC was requested to revise an existing plan or develop a new plan for Mainland Southeast Asia for two contingency situations:

1. An increase in NVA-Viet Cong forces with limited Chinese intervention; or

2. Chinese intervention in force in South Vietnam and other Southeast Asian countries.

(PS) As a result of this JCS request, an unnumbered plan was developed along the lines of CINCPAC's OPLAN 32. It incorporated the latest concept of operations for South Vietnam and the JCS-specified contingencies. Also included were a force requirements annex, a concept of operations, and a statement of prior logistic actions necessary for force deployment and disposition.

(PS) This plan was submitted on 28 July. After review, the JCS stated that it was generally responsive to the guidelines on which it was prepared and noted that they contemplated no further action on the plan.

(PS) The JCS also noted that OPLAN 32-64, on which the Defense of Mainland Southeast Asia plan was patterned, was largely overtaken by events because of the intensity of activity in South Vietnam and Laos, insurgency in parts of Thailand, and the level of force deployments to Southeast Asia. Accordingly, it was requested that CINCPAC prepare a numbered plan to supersede portions of OPLAN 32. Two cases of aggression were to be dealt with: Case I involved the introduction of four to six Chinese communist divisions into Southeast Asia; and Case II in which the Chinese intervened with maximum capability. In both cases it was assumed that Chinese air and naval forces attacked friendly forces.

1. JCS 5172/272327Z Oct 65
2. JCS 2083/200010Z Jan 66; CINCPAC 260913Z Oct 65
3. CINCPAC 1tr ser 000308, 28 Jul 66
4. SM-1000-66, 23 Dec 66, CPRS 000888-66
PACOM FORCE REQUIREMENTS AND CAPABILITIES

Programming of 1966 and 1967 force requirements and capabilities for PACOM was a continuous process from January to December of 1966. This portion of the History follows the sequence of the major deployment programming conferences, which occurred in January-February, June, and September-October. It discusses the concept changes required by the dynamics of the conflict in Southeast Asia, recommendations of the military commanders, and the impact of US policy decisions related to the roles, size, and composition of the military forces. 1

Capabilities Programs for 1966

(9) In a 17 January to 6 February conference at Camp H. M. Smith, CINCPAC developed a revised concept for South Vietnam with respect to 1966. He additionally prepared three separate capabilities programs and assessed the impact thereof on concept, strategy, and in-country force capabilities. This portion of the History discusses these actions under the headings "Concept for South Vietnam, 1966" and "Requirements versus Capabilities, CINCPAC's Evaluation."

Concept for South Vietnam, 1966

(TS) In the course of the 17 January - 6 February 1966 conference, CINCPAC stated2 a concept for Vietnam that superseded the one promulgated in October 1965. 3 As with previous concepts, the purpose of this one was to provide strategic guidance for the conduct of the Vietnam War, and it included the objectives to be achieved; the mission to be accomplished; the military tasks to be executed within or with respect to South Vietnam, North Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, and Thailand; and the military strategy to be pursued.

(CINCPAC stated a recognition of the inseparability of the political, economic, sociological, and military aspects of the struggle.

2. CINCPAC ltr ser 00055, 12 Feb 66
3. CINCPAC ltr ser 000347, 7 Oct 65; CINCPAC Command History 1965, p 298

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and he sought to exploit our strength and the enemy's weaknesses. The concept provided for discriminate application of military force at the principal source of support to the enemy--North Vietnam, and in the areas where the war must be won--initially the heavily populated and major food-producing sections of South Vietnam. It further provided for the protection of the people and the defeat of the Viet Cong-NVA Forces in South Vietnam.

(PS) The national objective, stated CINCPAC, was to attain a stable and independent noncommunist government in South Vietnam functioning in a secure environment. The four associated military objectives he listed were:

1. To make it as difficult and costly as possible for North Vietnam to continue effective support of the Viet Cong and to cause the Government of North Vietnam to cease its direction of the Viet Cong insurgency.

2. To extend GVN domination, direction, and control over South Vietnam.

3. To defeat the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese Forces in the RVN and force their withdrawal.

4. To deter the Chinese communists from direct intervention in Southeast Asia and elsewhere in the Western Pacific and to defeat such intervention if it occurred.

(TO) The PACOM mission stated in CINCPAC's concept was: to conduct operations to assist the GVN and its Armed Forces to defeat externally directed and supported communist subversion and aggression, and to attain an independent noncommunist government in South Vietnam functioning in a secure environment. The military strategy to achieve these US objectives was to be based on the following:

1. Selective destruction of the North Vietnamese war-supporting and war-making capability, and widespread destruction, disruption, harassment, and attrition of military and military-support facilities, operations, and movement.

2. Protection of the South Vietnamese people from communist subversion and oppression.

3. Liberation of selected areas dominated by the Viet Cong.
4. Destruction of major enemy base areas in the RVN.
5. Defeat of the Viet Cong and NVA Forces in the RVN.
6. Withdrawal of NVA Forces from the RVN.

CINCPAC noted that common to the accomplishment of all objectives was the task of building, maintaining, securing, and defending the bases, ports, airfields, communication centers, and supporting LOC at key localities along the coast, in the Mekong Delta, and elsewhere as necessary in South Vietnam. He then listed the military objectives and the specific tasks that would contribute to their achievement.

**Ground Operations**: (TS) The military operations cited in CINCPAC's 1966 concept reflected the improved US military posture resulting from 1965 deployments and operations. Prominent also were operational techniques validated during actions against the enemy. Operational flexibility and ubiquitous pressure against the Viet Cong and against North Vietnam's Army and Government were apparent from the military operations visualized in the new concept. Another significant aspect was the assistance to be provided the Royal Thai Government in countering externally supported and directed subversion or incipient insurgency.

US-RVNAF-FWMAF Forces would conduct operations in active defense of the major political, economic, food-producing, and population centers of South Vietnam. Forces of the United States would reinforce RVN Forces, operate with other friendly forces, and as necessary conduct unilateral operations. The enemy would be eliminated from vital areas to insure protection of the people and control of resources and LOC. American military operations would be aimed at creating the operational environment and opportunity for the GVN to gain control and establish security in the main food-producing areas. The purpose of this would be to bolster the economy, assure a food supply for the people, deny food to the enemy, and cause him to import or fight for food.

**The capability of the RVNAF to conduct clearing and securing operations would be enhanced by increased advisory and assistance efforts, the provision of combat and close air support, and the training and psychological benefits accruing from participation in coordinated operations.**
US Forces would coordinate their operations with other US mission agencies; GVN officials, especially Province and District Chiefs; and ARVN CTZ commanders.

CINCPAC's concept called for a centrally-controlled intelligence effort to facilitate the application of coordinated and relentless offensive pressure against enemy forces and bases. Mobility, surprise, firepower superiority, and counter-ambush techniques would be exploited to destroy the enemy. The foundation of the Viet Cong organizational and logistic structure would be destroyed by attacks on war zones and base areas. These areas would be subjected to virtually continuous air attack; follow-up ground operations would have the objective of destroying the enemy, his food, and war materiel. Extensive operations would disrupt enemy supply points and bases along the coasts and in border areas.

The foundation of US operations in the RVN would be operational bases along the coast, in the Mekong Delta, and elsewhere. Primary logistic support of these bases would be by sea LOC. US-RVNAF-FWMAF Forces would conduct clearing and securing operations designed to expand the areas of friendly control.

Control of population centers, food-producing areas, and LOC would be expanded to protect the RVN populace and liberate areas dominated by the Viet Cong. After clearing and securing operations destroyed the Viet Cong and their infrastructure, an adequate level of paramilitary and police strength would replace the military forces to preclude a resurgence of enemy activity. The initiative in expanding the secure areas would be maintained by the US-RVNAF-FWMAF Forces.

Refugees would be the responsibility of GVN officials, but United States Operations Mission and US military forces would advise and provide operational and material assistance. When not otherwise committed, tailored US Army refugee relief teams would assist local GVN officials.

Cross-border operations by US and other forces would threaten enemy forces, LOCs, and bases in Laos and Cambodia. In Laos these would include border surveillance, road watch patrols, and
certain limited reconnaissance, harassment, and destruction raids. With the objective of reducing the enemy's use of infiltration routes, the emphasis of cross-border operations would be on developing targets for air strikes. Activities in Cambodia would, however, continue to be limited. Preparatory action would be taken to develop and control friendly guerrilla and tribal resistance potentials in North Vietnam and Cambodia.

(TS) In Thailand the logistic posture would be improved to support air and special operations against the enemy in Laos and North Vietnam, and to accept and support major US combat forces, if introduced.

(TS) The Royal Thai Government would be assisted in countering externally supported and directed subversion or incipient insurgency. This would be accomplished through the following: an improvement in Thai counterinsurgency posture and operational readiness; military assistance to insure adequate training, equipage, and facilities; and an advisory effort to strengthen the Thai Armed Forces.

Air Operations: (TS) Land and sea based US air forces would assist and support RVNAF and paramilitary forces in the conduct of operations against the enemy in South Vietnam, North Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. Air attacks would be directed against enemy military targets and bases of supply to destroy the capability of these targets. CINCPAC's concept of air operations also addressed the air sortie requirements of the expanding US ground force and of extended reconnaissance, targeting, and intelligence operations.

(TS) Air strikes would be directed against enemy ports, power plants, communication facilities, POL, and military installations in the northern part of North Vietnam; and follow-on strikes would keep these targets unusable. Within North Vietnam and its coastal waters, and within Laos, armed reconnaissance would interdict LOC; harass, destroy, and disrupt dispersed military operations; and harass, disrupt and impede the movement of men and materials through southern North Vietnam into Laos and South Vietnam.

(TS) Air reconnaissance operations in South and North Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia would be conducted to provide the necessary
intelligence for operations by all forces. Special air operations would be conducted in support of the overall effort.

(26) Air forces would also mine ports, inland waterways, and coastal waters to restrict or close ports, harbors, and water LOC. Additionally, air forces would support the conduct of psychological operations in South Vietnam, North Vietnam, and Laos.

Navy Surface Operations: (26) Naval forces would destroy or otherwise immobilize confirmed and designated enemy military seaborne traffic and provide antiaircraft and ASW protection. Enemy seaborne infiltration would be detected and severely restricted. This would be accomplished in close coordination with the Vietnamese Navy.

(26) Amphibious forces would conduct operations whenever favorable coastal targets and situations were evident. These forces would destroy or capture personnel and materiel, and seize and hold or raid vital hostile areas.

(26) River patrol units would conduct operations on South Vietnam's inland waterways to interdict the distribution and infiltration of men and materiel intended for the support of the Viet Cong-NVA.

(26) Shore bombardment and gunfire support would be provided to forces operating ashore, and naval forces would participate in air-sea rescue operations with special attention to the Gulf of Tonkin. Offensive mining and mine countermeasure operations were another Navy task.

Operations of the RVNAF: (26) The foregoing concept of operations for US-FWMAF Forces was integrated with and supported the GVN concept for Rural Construction (Pacification)¹ and the COMUSMACV-RVNAF Joint General Staff combined campaign plan for 1966 (AB-141).²

(26) CINCPAC's overall concept visualized the employment of US-RVNAF-FWMAF Forces for the basic missions of search and destroy, participation in clearing and securing operations, and civic action in areas of primary (national) and secondary (CTZ) priority.

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1. These terms meant different things at different times. See "Revolutionary Development" later in this chapter.
plus the defense of governmental centers and critical installations. US and FWMAF Forces would not ordinarily be employed in securing operations in support of Rural Construction other than in areas contiguous to their bases.

(26) Most of the RVNAF would therefore be committed to the defense of GVN installations, and clearing and securing operations. Meanwhile, the majority of the operations against Viet Cong forces and bases outside the secure areas would be undertaken by US and FWMAF Forces, and RVNAF forces of the corps and general reserve.

(25) Because of the known and expected enemy force increase, CINCPAC considered that the focus of the heavy combat-capable units of the US-RVNAF-FWMAF Forces must be directed to the search and destroy effort. These operations against Viet Cong and NVA Forces and base areas would attrit the enemy's main forces and destroy Viet Cong base areas and supplies in South Vietnam.

(25) Concomitant clearing operations of RVNAF and US Forces would be followed by a period when these same forces would provide security. Thereafter, there would be a phased progression wherein RVN Regional and Popular Forces, GVN cadres, and local GVN officials would be introduced into the area. National Police would be introduced to maintain civil law and order, population and resources control, and to eliminate Viet Cong agents, terrorists, and political and security elements. The Regional and Popular Forces would constitute a manpower pool from which civil agencies, to include the National Police, would at a later date acquire the necessary manpower to expand these programs. This would permit the Regional and Popular Forces to function in their proper role, and it would allow the RVNAF to be employed in the roles for which they were originally conceived and equipped.

(25) Civilian Irregular Defense Group forces would, under the concept, continue to conduct border surveillance, interdiction of internal infiltration routes, operations against Viet Cong war zones, and support of selected districts in which US Special Forces were advisors. As the opportunity arose it was planned to convert Civilian
Irregular Defense Group companies to Regional Force status on a one-for-one basis, but no more than 40 companies would be so converted.

(D) The US advisory and support effort for the National Police was conducted by the United States Operations Mission. The programmed strength for these forces was 52,000 at the end of 1965, and a 17,000-man increase was programmed for the end of 1966. Within this programmed 72,000-man force were 15,000 National Police Field Forces, which would provide police support and population and resources control outside the larger urban areas as security considerations permitted.¹

Requirements Versus Capabilities, CINCPAC's Evaluation

(ES) On 16 December 1965 CINCPAC stated that the 1966 PACOM-wide force requirements totaled 122 maneuver battalions.² Of these, 102 battalions were for deployment in South Vietnam and 20 were for reconstitution of the depleted PACOM reserve.³ This was a projection of requirements developed and validated earlier in 1965, which were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Phase</th>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Force Requirement (in thousands)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>1965</td>
<td>200 (initial)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II</td>
<td>1966</td>
<td>112.4 (additional)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IIA</td>
<td>1966</td>
<td>57.7 (additional)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(ES) Even before the 16 December 1965 statement of requirements, Joint Staff and CINCPAC staff representatives were discussing the purpose and agenda for a programming conference to be held in Hawaii during January 1966. These conversations resulted in a JCS request for a conference on the following dates and subjects:⁴

6-9 January Sortie rate (to include B-52), munition, aircraft carrier, airfield, and tactical fighter squadron requirements.

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1. Annex A to Appendix A, CINCPAC ltr ser 00055, 12 Feb 66
2. For this discussion, "maneuver battalion" applies only to infantry (including airborne and airborne infantry) battalions, tank and mechanized battalions, and armored cavalry squadrons.
3. CINCPAC Command History, 1965, pp 308-311
4. JCS 1523522 Z Dec 65
10-13 January  Unit and individual requirements and availability for 1966 (Phases I, II, and IIIA).
14-18 January  Logistic requirements to meet deployment schedules developed in the 10-13 January discussions.
20-21 January  Meeting of principals (participants to be announced).

(75) Thereafter the conference agenda was expanded as a result of additional JCS information; procedures were discussed and the starting date was adjusted to allow the Services to complete their analyses of CINCPAC's 16 December statement of force requirements.¹

(75) In the interest of having a common nomenclature, it was specified that the COMUSMACV proposals of November 1965 would be termed Phase II A, and that the totals under development at the conference would be identified as Phase II A (Revised).²

(75) On 17 January the JCS approved the schedule for the first 15 days of the conference and established 17 to 31 January as the conference period. It was further indicated that the purpose of the conference was to prepare a program of CINCPAC requirements, which would then be matched against the Services' capabilities under three "CASES," each of which assumed that forces would be drawn from a different combination of sources. The impact of the problems thus identified would be assessed in regard to concept, strategy, and in-country force capabilities.³

1. JCS 202324Z Dec 65; CINCPAC 220223Z Dec 65; CINCPAC 222247Z Dec 65; JCS 222347Z Dec 65; JCS 020019Z Dec 65; JCS 272146Z Dec 65; CINCPAC 052339Z Jan 66; SAC 061930 Jan 66; JCS 062117Z Jan 66; CINCPAC 082229Z Jan 66; CINCPAC 121357Z Jan 66; CINCPAC 170100Z Jan 66
2. NMCC Telecon 192352Z Jan 66
3. (U) On the opening date of the conference, JCS representatives conveyed the information that the conference would involve concept development, evaluation, and revalidation procedures. Coupled with other factors, such as delays in troop listings for the Air Force due to problems associated with aircraft beddowns and sortie requirements, this unexpected change was responsible for several delays. These were necessary since each CASE was developed in a building-block sequence with troop lists and deployment priorities firm before tonnages, throughput, and movement requirements were determined. To close the constantly expanding time gap, every feasible step was taken to proceed simultaneously on programs for all three CASES.
The assumed sources of forces under the three CASES were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>CASES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Existing CONUS force structure</td>
<td>1 2 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increases to active service force structure</td>
<td>X X X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feasible drawdowns from overseas areas</td>
<td>X X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Call-up of selected reserve units and individuals</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extending terms of service</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

At the conclusion of the conference CINCPAC submitted programs for the three CASES--each with a different force level, force mix, and time frame within 1966. Each CASE contained a detailed listing of forces and phasings, deployment priorities, logistics and personnel requirements, base development, and transportation. Additionally, the forces of each CASE were evaluated in terms of their capabilities to accomplish the four objectives of the new concept stated in connection with the programs. 1

In evaluating the CASES, CINCPAC assigned particular significance to reconstitution of the theater reserve of Army and Marine forces so there would be a capability for emergency requirements. In CASE 1 virtually all of the required Army and Marine theater reserve forces would be available. Although the Marine division/wing team for the PACOM reserve would be available in CASES 2 and 3, there would be no reserve Army forces available under CASE 2. CASE 3, wherein forces would be drawn from the most limited range of sources, would provide a three-battalion force of the 4th Infantry Division, which would be a partial replacement for the capability lost when the 25th Infantry Division was deployed to South Vietnam early in the year. The required nondivisional support forces would not be available under CASE 3, however.

All CASES provided for a phase-in of a South Korean division and regimental combat team. The aggregate 1966 requirement for additional Korean and Australian forces totaled 23,900 personnel.

TOP SECRET

(25) Under no CASE was the force capability considered adequate to establish in Thailand a logistic base capable of accepting expeditiously a major US ground force early in 1967. CINCPAC therefore stressed that:

"any decision to deploy ground combat forces to Thailand must recognize that additional logistic support units will need to be positioned prior to such deployments."

(25) It would take an estimated 700,000 tons of air munitions to support the desired level of tactical aircraft and ARC LIGHT (B-52) operations in all CASES and areas. It appeared, however, that only 648,000 tons of all types of these munitions would be available. On the assumption that these assets would in fact materialize, CINCPAC presumed identical munitions were available in all CASES. This being true, it would therefore become necessary under CASES 1 and 2 to down load by about three percent the average ordnance delivered per in-country sortie. CINCPAC stated that this would be marginally acceptable under the conditions in Southeast Asia as they appeared in January 1966.

(25) The port throughput capability in South Vietnam was limited in all CASES during the early months of the year. The date when the overall capability would begin to match the overall requirements is shown in the accompanying illustrations entitled "RVN Total Throughput-All Ports." The primary deficits were at Saigon and Cam Ranh Bay. The limiting factors at Saigon would be overcome in the second half of the year when berth and discharge area construction was completed. The limitation at Cam Ranh Bay was caused largely by a shortfall in terminal service companies and truck companies.

(26) A shortage of supply and maintenance units was another problem, resulting in a maintenance deficiency. CINCPAC cited several measures, to include off-shore rehabilitation and in-country civilian contractor maintenance, which were being explored in an effort to find a means to alleviate the problem. He also stated that actions were under way to expand existing and new logistic support contracts.
CASE 1

RVN TOTAL THROUGHPUT - ALL PORTS
(Short tons)

NOTE: Requirements line includes estimated intra-country shipping requirements.
(TS) CINCPAC concluded that the forces available in all cases would achieve the objectives of the air campaigns in Laos and North Vietnam if they were used in accordance with the concept. It was quite another matter with respect to the campaign in South Vietnam. The following table presents a comparison of cases in terms of maneuver battalions, battalion equivalents, and battalion months during 1966.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>CASE III</th>
<th>CASE II</th>
<th>CASE I</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Actual Maneuver Battalions</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>102*</td>
<td>102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Battalion Equivalents (reduction factors applied)</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Actual Battalion Months</td>
<td>831</td>
<td>872</td>
<td>898</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Battalion Months Offensive Operations</td>
<td>591</td>
<td>631</td>
<td>648</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Airmobile</td>
<td>(451)</td>
<td>(484)</td>
<td>(493)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>(140)</td>
<td>(147)</td>
<td>(155)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Battalion Months Base Defense</td>
<td>240</td>
<td>241</td>
<td>250</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* 9 Battalions not available until Jan 67

(DS) CASE 3: While this force could secure the US-FWMAF command at the projected rate of Viet Cong-NVA buildup, it might not be adequate for the safety of the command if the enemy buildup was increased or accelerated, or both. The principal deficiencies of this CASE were:

1. Inadequate mobility and artillery support.
2. No ground forces for stationing in the Mekong Delta.

CINCPAC noted that the composite average air mobility of this force was about 54.7 percent, the impact of which would be felt particularly in the lowered attrition of enemy forces. He pointed out that with this force the available helicopter assets would have to be concentrated to support selected offensive operations, while other operations would have to be conducted with a reduced level or complete absence of helicopter support. This would in turn reduce the force ability to find, fix, and force.

1. They were not. See CINCPAC's "Evaluation of Air Operations in North Vietnam" elsewhere in this Chapter.
2. Annex C (Evaluation of the Campaign in SVN) to Appendix B, CINCPAC ltr 3010 ser 00055, 12 Feb 66
engagement with enemy units. It would limit the capability to fight at several separated locations simultaneously.

(TS) **CASE 2:** This force would provide the required number of maneuver battalions and provide for the safety of the US-FWMAF command. Shortfalls in combat and service support, however, would restrict force capabilities and result in the following deficiencies:

1. Inadequate mobility.

2. Limited offensive capability, thus a force unable to produce enemy casualties faster than the enemy could produce replacements. This would therefore prolong the war at a high level of casualties for both sides.

3. High rate of equipment loss and deadline resulting from maintenance deficiencies.

4. High risk in the event of escalation because the force could not sustain the inherent operations.

5. A shortage of maneuver units, the adverse effects of which were cumulative and would project into 1967.

6. Insufficient logistic support forces to provide the desired level of support for US Forces in South Vietnam. Again, the adverse effects of this were cumulative and would project into 1967.

(TS) **CASE 1:** Generally adequate force when measured against CINCPAC's objectives and capabilities, except there would be a continuing deficiency in helicopter mobility.

(TS) The assembly and packaging of the report of the conference was completed about 0400 hours 14 February, and it was delivered in Washington on the morning of 15 February. The Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the JCS had been briefed in CINCPAC's headquarters on 7 and 8 February. The briefing covered force requirements and Service capabilities, air programs, logistics, and the COMUSMACV evaluation of the three CASES.

**Joint Chiefs of Staff Action**

(TS) On 1 March the JCS submitted to the Secretary of Defense a "Concept for Southeast Asia with Respect to Vietnam." Its essential features were similar to CINCPAC's "Concept for Vietnam," and it specified conducting air operations against the Hanoi-Haiphong complex. The JCS concept for the RVNAF was the same as that proposed by CINCPAC.
The JCS recognized that the most effective means of meeting CINCPAC's 1966 requirements would be to call up reserves and extend terms of service. This was precluded, however, by assumptions contained in the Secretary of Defense's guidelines. Alternative courses of action were therefore examined. These included the following:

1. CASE 1 modified to exclude reserve call-up or extension of terms of service.
2. CASE 1 deployments extended into 1967.

Subsequently, the JCS concluded that CINCPAC's total force requirements, as stated in December, should be approved. However, it was proposed that the related force deployments should be spread over a 16-month period rather than the 10 months remaining in 1966. In support of this stretched-out deployment schedule, the JCS noted that earlier deployments would at best fail to achieve a balance between combat elements and support capabilities. This extended deployment period would provide for all 37 US Army maneuver battalions to be readied for deployment by 31 December 1966. Only 24 of these battalions, reasonably balanced with support forces, would be deployed in 1966; 7 battalions would be deployed in the first quarter of 1967 and the last 6 battalions would follow in the second quarter.

Noting that the deferred deployments would cause some loss of momentum in the war effort, the JCS considered this a more acceptable risk than the greater degradation of US worldwide military posture (EUCOM and LANTCOM in particular) that would result if CASE 1 requirements were met from active forces in 1966.

Regarding PACOM reserves, the JCS considered that two of the three Marine Corps Okinawa-based battalion landing teams should deploy to South Vietnam in April and May, and that CINCPAC could deploy the sole remaining battalion landing team to South Vietnam in June or retain it as a Special Landing Force until July when a CONUS-based battalion landing team was deployed to Okinawa. CINCPAC's Army reserve would be equally tenuous, consisting temporarily of a CONUS-based Strike Command airborne division. The JCS also stated
that an Army airborne brigade would not be reconstituted on Okinawa until the end of hostilities in Southeast Asia.¹

(¶9) By SM-303-66 of 4 April the JCS promulgated the projected deployment program which, in accordance with Secretary of Defense guidance and the Services' estimates of their capabilities, would provide forces in response to the CINCPAC 1966 capabilities program. The projected deployments were based on the drawdown of forces worldwide, and the application of resources applied in the order of CINCPAC's CASE I desired closure dates.

Concept for Vietnam, Revised

(¶10) A revised concept for Vietnam was submitted by CINCPAC in connection with a June requirements conference report. It retained the objectives cited in the previous (January) concept; therefore, the following discussion concerns only the significant changes reflected by the new concept.²

Military Strategy

(¶11) CINCPAC added, as a strategic factor, "restricting NVA/VC forces' access to the coastal and land borders of RVN through effective land, sea, and air interdiction operations." A similar addition was the destruction of enemy base areas "in Laos and along the SVN/Cambodian border."

Objectives and Tasks

(¶12) Tasks associated with the previously specified military objectives were modified or supplemented. To add to the Government of North Vietnam's costs and difficulty, shore bombardment would be extended to North Vietnam and directed against LOC, port facilities, and other coastal military facilities. With the same objective, enemy activities along the South Vietnamese-Cambodian border would be subjected to air and special operations, and the scale of guerrilla operations in Laos would be expanded. Another addition was a task to conduct special air, ground, maritime, and psychological operations against North Vietnam.

1. JCSM-130-66, 1 Mar 66
2. See "Concept for South Vietnam, 1966" earlier in this section.
(TS) To support the defeat (and withdrawal) of Viet Cong and North Vietnamese Forces in South Vietnam, CINCPAC added the following tasks: sustained large-scale operations against major enemy war zones; riverine operations in the Mekong Delta in lieu of the more restrictive amphibious operations of the previous concept; and spoiling attacks and raids into Laos, or into Cambodia as authorized.

(1S) With the objective of deterring or defeating direct Chinese communist intervention, CINCPAC specified increased air, surface, and subsurface reconnaissance to detect their significant military and naval movements. 1

Conduct of Operations

(1S) CINCPAC noted that continued improvements of Western Pacific bases would serve as a deterrent to Chinese communist intervention. He also recognized certain developments that might require the introduction into PACOM of major forces in addition to those in the requirements program submitted with the concept. Preparations in Thailand would emphasize support of Royal Thai Forces in an effort to enhance their capability to meet the guerrilla threat without direct US participation.

1966 Adjusted Requirements and 1967 Requirements

(1S) In submitting his 1966 adjusted requirements and 1967 requirements, CINCPAC stressed the continuing and increasing North Vietnam support of the war in South Vietnam, despite the air campaign against North Vietnam. Admiral Sharp noted that in the past year the enemy had dispersed and concealed many of his high value war support resources, making them difficult to find and harder to destroy. Further, the enemy had refined his support organization and he increased his stockpiles in North and South Vietnam, his air defense, and his ability to direct, control, and coordinate division and higher level tactics in South Vietnam.

1. CINCPAC 000255, 18 Jun 66
CINCPAC noted that ground forces in addition to those in his submission would be necessary unless there was a reduction in the enemy's capability to field and support units in South Vietnam. He proposed that to accomplish this reduction the air campaign should be intensified at once and directed toward objectives similar to those he had proposed in January.¹ He had then stated that military operations against North Vietnam should:²

1. Deny the Government of North Vietnam external assistance through closure of major ports and heavy interdiction of LOC leading from China.

2. Destroy in depth those resources that support aggression, particularly POL.


The first two of these elements were the most important, and CINCPAC pointed out that he had received no authority to implement them. As a matter of fact, 99 percent of operations had been on armed reconnaissance missions concentrated primarily on dispersed enemy facilities and LOC involved in moving supplies and people to South Vietnam. This concentration on a single element at the expense of the others had reduced the overall effectiveness of air operations.³ CINCPAC emphasized, therefore, the necessity for a careful balance in the weight of effort on all three elements he had specified.

CINCPAC also cited the importance of allocating forces and implementing his concept—otherwise, additional forces would be required at a later date. In assessing the impact of the stretched-out deployment program, he stated that the level of operations for 102 maneuver battalions would be less than optimum because of slippage in combat support elements. Similarly, the flexibility to respond to unforeseen and emerging requirements would be limited because of the shortfall in construction units.

1. CINCPAC ser 000255, 18 June 66
2. CINCPAC 120205Z Jan 66
3. On 12 January 1967 CINCPAC again noted to the JCS that 99 percent of air sorties in 1966 had been devoted to armed reconnaissance.
JCS Action on the June Requirements

Most of CINCPAC's force requirements, as reflected in the 18 June report, were supported by the JCS in a 5 August Memorandum to the Secretary of Defense. CINCPAC was at the same time requested to justify or clarify certain force requirements, and, in terms of capability to achieve the overall objective of the concept, to compare forces then approved by the Secretary of Defense with the increased forces in the 18 June submission. This prompted a massive study at the COMUSMACV, COMUSMACHTAI, and CINCPAC levels. During a further review by the JCS, most of the requirements were validated. The exceptions for the RVN, Thailand, and other areas were as shown on the accompanying tables entitled "JCS Validation Withheld."

Military Strategy Revised, September

On the occasion of a JCS request for additional justification and clarification for approximately 205 line items for the CINCPAC stated 1966 Adjusted Requirements and 1967 Force Requirements, Admiral Sharp directed a review and revision of military strategy to accomplish US objectives for Vietnam. A draft strategy was subsequently developed and forwarded to COMUSMACV on 23 August for comment.

The main features of the new strategy were as follows:

1. Air operations in North Vietnam were emphasized and tied to the overall strategy for South Vietnam.

2. In South Vietnam, emphasis was given to the changeover to offensive operations that would wrest area control from the enemy and break his groups into small bands. This would be done by expansion of secure areas.

3. COMUSMACV would become more deeply involved in the Revolutionary Development Program.

4. The strategy covered the time period wherein the enemy would conclude that he could not achieve victory in South Vietnam, and it specified that the capability to deter and defeat a renewed communist aggression would be preserved during negotiations.

1. JCSM-644-66
2. CINCPAC 220755Z Oct 66
3. CINCPAC 232333Z Aug 66
4. Point Paper, J551, 26 Aug 66
**JCS VALIDATION WITHHELD: RVN**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ARMY</th>
<th>FORCE</th>
<th>STRENGTH</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5 AIR BASE DEFENSE PACKAGES</td>
<td>2,370</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 INFANTRY COMPANIES (ADDN COS FOR MECH BNS)</td>
<td>2,145</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SUPPORT AUGMENTATION FOR COMBAT UNITS</td>
<td>2,617</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT UNITS</td>
<td>1,641</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AUGMENTATION FOR 7 COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT UNITS</td>
<td>422</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SUB TOTAL-ARMY:</strong></td>
<td><strong>9,195</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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</table>

**NAVY**

NONE

**AIR FORCE**

11 RF-4C AIRCRAFT AND SUPPORT | 484

**MARINE CORPS**

1 TOPOGRAPHIC COMPANY | 99

**TOTAL-RVN** | **9,778**

**NOTE:** See "JCS Action on the June Requirements," p 433
JCS VALIDATION WITHHELD, THAILAND

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FORCE</th>
<th>STRENGTH</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ARMY</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 ENGINEER BATTALION ( CONST)</td>
<td>911</td>
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<tr>
<td>1 ENGINEER DUMP TRUCK COMPANY</td>
<td>108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 ORDNANCE COMPANY</td>
<td>110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SUPPORT AMMO</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US ARMY SUPPORT HEADQUARTERS</td>
<td>30</td>
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<tr>
<td>AUGMENTATION FINANCE</td>
<td>135</td>
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<td>SUB TOTAL-ARMY</td>
<td>1,294</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAVY</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAVAL AIR FACILITY, U-TAPAO</td>
<td>457</td>
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<tr>
<td>NAVAL COMMUNICATION STATION, SATTAHIP</td>
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<tr>
<td>COMMUNICATIONS SECURITY DETACHMENT, SATTAHIP</td>
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<td>SUB TOTAL-NAVY</td>
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<tr>
<td>AIR FORCE</td>
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<tr>
<td>8 CV 2/CV 7 AIRCRAFT</td>
<td>158</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MARINE CORPS</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NONE</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL-THAILAND</td>
<td>2,094</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NOTE: See “JCS Action on the June Requirements,” p 433
**JCS VALIDATION WITHHELD, OTHER AREAS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ARMY FORCE</th>
<th>STRENGTH</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AUGMENTATION FOR SPECIAL FORCES GROUP OKINAWA</td>
<td>322</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AUGMENTATION FOR PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS GROUP-OKINAWA</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MEDICAL AUGMENTATION-OKINAWA</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AUGMENTATION FOR TRIPLER HOSPITAL-HAWAII</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SUB TOTAL-ARMY:</strong></td>
<td><strong>562</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| NAVY | |
| 1 CRUISER | 1,390 |
| 8 DESTROYERS | 2,464 |
| 1 AMMUNITION SHIP | 316 |
| **SUB TOTAL-NAVY:** | **4,170** |

**TOTAL-OTHER AREAS:** 4,732

**NOTE:** See "JCS Action on the June Requirements," p 433
(CS) The strategy further pointed out that if the enemy chose to scale down operations and go underground, this should not sway us from the basic purpose: to assist South Vietnam to build a free, independent, and secure society.

(25) On 5 September Admiral Sharp released a message to his component commanders, COMUSMACV, and COMUSMACTHAL. He stated that the revision had been coordinated with COMUSMACV and that it superseded the Concept for Vietnam as stated in CINCPAC letter serial 000255 of 18 June 1966.

(25) CINCPAC noted that the revised strategy involved three interdependent undertakings which together constituted an integrated concept for the conduct of military operations against North Vietnam and in Laos and South Vietnam. In summary, these were:

1. **In the North:** Take the war to the enemy by unremitting but selective application of US air and naval power.

2. **In the South:** Seek out and destroy communist forces and infrastructure by expanded, offensive military operations.

3. **Nation Building:** Extend the secure areas of South Vietnam by military operations and assist the Government in building an independent, viable, non-communist society by civic action coordinated with military operations.

(25) In complementary actions elsewhere, the capabilities of friendly Laotian forces would be strengthened and the Thai Government would be supported to suppress communist insurgency. There would be continued expansion of the logistic and communications-electronics infrastructure in Thailand. Within the constraints of national policy, there would be continuing efforts to inhibit Viet Cong and NVA use of Laotian and Cambodian territory. Additionally, there would be a continuation of improving the US posture in Southeast Asia and the Western Pacific to deter or defeat Chinese communist aggression.

(25) In closing, CINCPAC noted that the success of this military strategy depended upon a coordinated and persistent effort embracing the three military undertakings: to destroy the war supporting capability of North Vietnam; to seek out and destroy communist forces and
infrastructure; and to get ahead with building the South Vietnamese nation. He also observed that these military undertakings formed part of an integrated military, political, economic, social, and psychological effort.  

(25) The revised strategy was incorporated in an October report to the JCS. Changes in the tasks supporting the military objectives suggested more pressure on the sanctuaries in Laos, Cambodia, and the theoretically demilitarized zone along the 17th Parallel.

(25) Perhaps the most significant aspect of the revised concept was the increased emphasis on US participation in the Revolutionary Development and civic action programs.

Revolutionary Development

The problem of restoring security and establishing Government control in the RVN was of long standing and efforts initiated during the days of the French and Diem regimes had achieved little progress. First came the French agrovilles of the early 1950’s followed by the strategic hamlet ideas of Diem. These plans had failed for many reasons, not the least of which were failure to base goals on capabilities, a failure to plan realistically, and a failure to take into account the interests and aspirations of the people.

(25) In 1964 the Chien Thang National Pacification Plan established the "oil spot" concept with its three phases: clearing, securing, and developing. It also included a military plan in support of rural construction.

(25) The 1966 concept for restoration of security and establishment of Government control in the RVN became known as Revolutionary Development and was essentially a considerably refined version of the 1964 plan. The Revolutionary Development program was one element in the three-pronged concept that was designed to defeat the Viet Cong while simultaneously building a nation. The elements in the concept were: a military offensive to destroy the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese main forces; Revolutionary Development to continue the restoration of security and to establish Government control; and nation building to develop a nation that could survive in a modern society of nations.

1. CINCPAC 052050Z Sep 66
2. The following discussion is based on a J5151 Point Paper (undated)
Subj: Revolutionary Development, Past, Present, Future.

438
The above three phases were taking place simultaneously in South Vietnam depending on the degree of security available. Where security was submarginal or nonexistent, offensive military operations were conducted; where there was sustained high-level security, civil elements developed the long-range evolution of economic and political institutions. Revolutionary Development, combining elements of both military and civil operations, was conducted in areas that had been cleared of main force Viet Cong-NVA units but where security problems might still exist from enemy units below company size. During the military offensive stage, the emphasis was on military security, and military matters predominated. With progress in Revolutionary Development, civil and economic activities assumed increasing importance and the function of security became more a matter for the police than for the military. Then, in the final nation-building phase, civil and economic programs were of major significance.

Revolutionary Development encompassed those military, political, economic, social, and psychological programs that were designed to liberate the people from Viet Cong control, restore local government, maintain public security, and win the support of the people for the Government. Success in these programs required coordination and integration of both military and civil programs.

The four main tasks to be accomplished during the Revolutionary Development phase were as follows:

1. Destroy the local Viet Cong guerrilla forces and provide local security.

2. Discover and destroy the influence of the communist political and military infrastructure.

3. Replace communist authority with effective local government responsive to the wishes of the people and to national authority.

4. Motivate, inspire, and organize the people to defend their hamlet, resist the return of Viet Cong influence, and develop ties of loyalty and respect with the central government.

Civilian authority was introduced into relatively secure villages and hamlets in the form of Revolutionary Development cadre and National Police. Cadre tasks were to establish the initial governmental administration,
organize the population for self-defense and other Revolutionary Development tasks, assist in destroying the Viet Cong covert political and military organization, and initiate simple economic and social development projects to help win the support of the people.

Upon completion of Revolutionary Development tasks, the nation building phase began. In this phase, social, economic, and political actions took place to strengthen Government control and improve conditions for the people. National Police assumed responsibility for security, law, and order, and military forces were phased out. More lasting social and economic development programs were undertaken (hospitals, schools, etc.) and normalcy returned.

The 1966 revised concept stressed techniques and procedures to win deliberately the active support of the people and involve them in programs for their economic and social betterment. The Revolutionary Development Program began slowly and gained some momentum, with emphasis on quality rather than quantity. Expansion of Government control was necessarily slow and deliberate in order to gain and maintain lasting effects. Additional security accrued from the increased presence of US and other Free World Forces and trained cadre began to become available.

The military's prime contribution was security, but it concurrently contributed heavily to the nonmilitary facets of the endeavor. These contributions included support of the US Agency for International Development from military resources, and capabilities in such fields as logistics, sanitation, medical care, construction, and control of resources and population.

Military civic action was a significant supporting factor in the Revolutionary Development Program, much greater than under any previous approaches to the same problem. Coordination of the civilian and military effort was a problem of some magnitude, which did not readily lend itself to an easy solution. Plans were formulated and discarded or simply held in abeyance, but by the end of the year some progress

1. The following is based on a J555 Point Paper, Subj: Revolutionary Development-Recent Developments, 4 Jan 67.
2. JCSM-626-66
could be detected. Late in the year Deputy Ambassador William J. Porter was given direct responsibility for all nonmilitary US support of Revolutionary Development. In this role he commanded and directed almost all lines of authority relative to US civilian participation in Revolutionary Development, although the Agency for International Development, the Joint US Public Affairs Office (JUSPAO), and CAS would continue to exercise some direct technical liaison with their field representatives.

Under Ambassador Porter was a civilian Director of the Office of Civil Operations (Mr. Ward Lathram) who directed and commanded all field personnel in the implementation of civil programs whether or not in direct support of Revolutionary Development. The Director of Civil Operations was represented in each of the four CTZs by regional directors who in turn had provincial representatives under their direct jurisdiction. Thus, for the first time, all US Government civilian activities in the field supporting Revolutionary Development were under a straight-line, single command and control channel.

Ambassador Porter also assumed operational control of military personnel to the extent of the civilian functions assigned to them. Details of how this would work out were not firm at the end of the year. A staff was created late in 1966 to support Ambassador Porter in the new effort. Possibly this would involve a general officer; at least a job description for this position had been prepared by the Ambassador and reviewed by General Westmoreland.

On the military side, late in the year COMUSMACV had appointed a general officer as Director of his newly created Revolutionary Development Support Directorate. Among other duties, the Director coordinated civil-military plans for COMUSMACV in the area of Revolutionary Development. Additionally, the head of the MACV Training Directorate was directed to insure accomplishment of the training necessary to reorient the ARVN to its newly assigned primary mission of Revolutionary Development.

By the end of the year Ambassador Lodge had detailed his former Mission Coordinator, Colonel Sam Wilson, USA, to act as team leader in Long An Province on a pilot basis. Colonel Wilson would report to
Deputy Ambassador Porter on Revolutionary Development matters, to
General Westmoreland on military matters, and to Ambassador Lodge
on the general situation. The US battalion commander operating in the
province would look to Colonel Wilson for operational advice. Colonel
Wilson would have direct authority over all US civilian elements and
MACV sector and sub-sector advisory elements. By this innovation, it
was hoped to insure unified civil-military effort in a key delta province
where such coordination had been lacking. If this worked out, Ambassador
Lodge would consider similar measures in other key provinces.

(5) The experience of the III Marine Amphibious Force (MAF) in
I CTZ had demonstrated the fragile nature of achievements in
Revolutionary Development type operations. Significant III MAF forces
had been withdrawn from Revolutionary Development support to oppose
enemy operations contiguous to the DMZ, and this had produced a marked
degradation of the limited popular support achieved through long and
arduous work. Accordingly, CINCPAC recognized with concern the
demoralizing effect of withdrawal of forces for other duties, or of partial
curtailment of the Revolutionary Development Program, or loss of the
prerequisite for its existence. 1

(6) On 8 October the Ministry of Revolutionary Development pub-
lished Revolutionary Development guidelines for 1967. These contained
basic guidance for preparation and implementation of provincial
Revolutionary Development programs and provided for the following:

1. Consolidation and development of hamlets already under
nominal Government control.

2. Continued development of National Priority Areas.

3. Basing plans on resources available at the end of 1966
rather than resources requested for 1967.

4. Increasing the number of programs managed by the
Ministry.

5. Emphasizing quality over quantity in the Revolutionary
Development cadre program.

6. Coordinating civil-military efforts in support of
Revolutionary Development.

1. Force capabilities in comparison to possible directed dispositions
are discussed elsewhere in this section. See pp 409-411
Major General Thang, the Commissioner General of Revolutionary Development, had proved to be a pillar of strength in the program, and his continued direction of this effort was considered vital.

The following statistics compare the status of Revolutionary Development in January and December of 1966:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area Control:</th>
<th>1 January 1966</th>
<th>1 December 1966</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Government</td>
<td>8.6%</td>
<td>10.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Viet Cong</td>
<td>56.5%</td>
<td>48.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Population Control:</th>
<th>1 January 1966</th>
<th>1 December 1966</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Government</td>
<td>52.1%</td>
<td>57.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Viet Cong</td>
<td>22.7%</td>
<td>17.6%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Hamlets Secured-Government: | 3,903 | 4,318 |

Inflation and the Plaster Expenditure Reduction Program

(U) At the beginning of the year the people of South Vietnam faced a strong possibility that the cost of food and other essentials would soon be inflated beyond their capability to pay.1 This would, of course, foster unrest and further undermine the stability of the Government. Inflation could also cause the costs of US activities in South Vietnam to soar to unacceptable levels.

(U) In the spring of 1966 the Department of Defense sent a team to South Vietnam to determine remedial measures for the threatened inflation. The results were published in a report (Dr. Stephen Enke's Report) which indicated that limitations on plaster expenditures could and should be applied to US activities. It also revealed a need for much closer analysis of the entire South Vietnamese economy.

Following a Presidential decision, Secretary of Defense McNamara established limitations on plaster expenditures for the last two quarters of 1966. The JCS assigned CINCPAC the management responsibility for the program. The initial ceiling was established at 9 billion piasters per quarter, and CINCPAC assigned this total to COMUSMACV. It was further prorated in three categories:

1. CINCPAC J72
(1) operations and maintenance (and other); (2) military construction; and (3) personal expenditures.

Ceilings on plaster spending in Vietnam were applicable to all expenditures that the Defense Department funded, determined, or advised. Included were actions by the following:

1. The military departments
2. All Defense Department agencies
3. COMUSMACV
4. Contractors of 1 to 3 above
5. Any component of the Defense Department that determined or advised regarding the release of counterpart plaster funds spent in support of US Forces and that portion of the GVN military budget that was joint funded.
6. Civilian or military personnel whose pay was funded by the Defense Department or its contractors and who purchased plasters with Military Payment Certificates.
7. Other FWMAF Forces who used plasters.

(U) With respect to operations and maintenance (and other) activities, General Westmoreland further delegated plaster ceilings to CGUSARV; Commander, 7th AF; CG, III MAF; and COMNAVFORV. The ceiling on construction expenditures was assigned to the Officer in Charge of Construction. Ceilings for personal spending were retained by COMUSMACV.

(U) A major move toward reducing operations and maintenance expenditures was the development of non-RVN sources for items that were expensive in terms of plasters. Actions in this category included reducing the amount of rented space, procurement from US or third-country sources, and developing a military capability for producing some items normally obtained on the civilian market (e.g., manufacture rather than purchase ice). Plaster expenditures related to construction activities were reduced by shifting to non-RVN procurement, e.g., crushed rock. A general belt-tightening was another factor in the effort to reduce expenditures.

(U) The above measures sometimes increased US dollar costs, but the objective was to reduce plaster expenditures. Accordingly, the Defense Department was willing to accept the expenditure of $1.50 outside of South Vietnam for an item that could be obtained on the South Vietnamese market for $1.00.
(U) Personal expenditures were the least susceptible to control. The Secretary of Defense stated there would be no fiat. In addition to command emphasis, however, the following measures proved of value in producing a voluntary withholding of personal funds from the RVN's economy: a savings plan paying 10 percent interest, expanded exchange (Post, Base, Ship) system, and deployments away from population centers.

After studying the anticipated 1967 demands on the economy, Ambassador Lodge encouraged action to control the total demands in South Vietnam, and through his efforts other US agencies and the GVN planned to participate in the program to limit 1967 piaster expenditures. The Ambassador's recommendation for the 1967 ceiling on Defense Department expenditures in South Vietnam was 42 billion piasters.

CINCPAC Recommended Deployment Program, 1967

CINCPAC's force requirements and capabilities program for 1967 was being developed concurrently with the increasing emphasis on control of piaster expenditures. During a preliminary October conference in Saigon, Secretary McNamara was briefed on COMUSMACV's force requirements and informed that the estimated cost of the program was about 46 billion piasters. Subsequently Secretary McNamara established a requirement for COMUSMACV to plan for an end-of-1967 strength of 463,000 and a target for piaster expenditures of 42 billion.

CINCPAC's recommended comprehensive deployment program for 1967 nevertheless incorporated COMUSMACV's 46 billion piaster package. The deployment program added approximately 20 percent in US manpower to the existing program for Southeast Asia and other PACOM areas. If all valid requirements were met, the total US force would approximate 555,000 in the RVN, 52,000 in Thailand and 200,000

1. JCS 2246/092111Z Sep 66; CINCPAC 230415Z Sep 66
2. CINCPAC ltr 000438, 20 Oct 66
3. JCS 2343/760-17
elsewhere in the PACOM. The Services' capabilities to deploy forces would result in an average delay of six to eight months, with a few units delayed as much as 18 to 24 months beyond the CINCPAC required dates. Some requirements could not be met at all.  

(26) In submitting his 1966 and 1967 requirements and capabilities programs, CINCPAC recognized that even delayed deployment of all of his stated requirements would impair the US military position worldwide. He also recognized that a worldwide drawdown of forces would detract from the overall readiness of US Forces. *

(26) Admiral Sharp nevertheless recommended that PACOM forces be brought to required combat strength. At the same time, he recommended that action be taken to minimize the adverse effects of required deployments on US readiness in other areas of the world.  

(26) Submitted with this plan, however, were three additional separate balanced force-level plans--based on ceilings of 46, 44, and 42 billion piasters--for 1967.  

(26) At the end of October four separate 1967 force-level plans were thus under consideration in Washington. These are compared in the following table.  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Deployment Plan</th>
<th>Maneuver Units Requirements</th>
<th>Maneuver Units Capability</th>
<th>Estimated Piaster Expenditures 1967 (in billions)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Comprehensive Program</td>
<td>124</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>46.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Program A</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>45.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Program B</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>44.54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Program C</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>42.03</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

1. Force requirements for the Corps Contingency Force and Task Force 728 were excluded because these could not be met under the restrictive Service availability criteria.
2. CINCPAC ltr 000438, 20 Oct 66
3. CINCPAC 121505Z Dec 66
4. See Point Paper J5542, 23 Nov 66 for a more detailed comparison.
5. The Comprehensive Program was submitted in CINCPAC ltr 000438, 20 Oct 66; Programs A, B, and C were submitted in CINCPAC ltr 000445, 23 Oct 66.
6. The requirement for balanced military forces precluded precise matching of the ceilings of 46, 44, and 42 billion piasters.
After receiving CINCPAC's recommendations, the JCS developed a refined program that was forwarded to the Secretary of Defense. The JCS program did not in all cases meet CINCPAC's desired closure dates, and the following force requirements were not met at all:

- FWMAF infantry battalions for I CTZ: 6
- Helicopter squadrons: 3
- Artillery battalion equivalents: 2
- Destroyers: 12
- Tactical fighter squadrons: 3
- Attack aircraft carriers
  (in addition to 5 on hand): 1
- Combat service support units (various): -

The above requirements were not met because of constraints inherent in the Service criteria for determining capabilities. These criteria were:

1. Resources were derived from the active force structure and additions thereto. Subject to existing political restrictions, it was considered permissible to exercise the widest militarily feasible latitude in worldwide drawdowns of units and resources.

2. No reserve call-up, and no further extension of terms of service.

3. Maintenance of an adequate CONUS training base to sustain deployed forces.

4. No change in rotation policies.

The JCS also noted that peacetime expenditure limitations should be considered as an objective or target to strive for rather than as a limiting factor on force deployments. Despite the reduced force recommendation, the JCS considered that its program would provide for the delayed but effective execution of CINCPAC's concept of operations.

Following a review of the JCS recommendations by his staff, the Secretary of Defense approved specific forces for Southeast Asia.

1. JCSM-702-66, 4 Nov 66
Deployments "Program Four," which would result in a 30 June 1968 force level of 469,300 in contrast to the 522,000 level recommended by the JCS. At the same time, Secretary McNamara invited the JCS to suggest changes in the composition of forces within the approved force level.  

On 18 November, the same date Program Four was promulgated, Secretary McNamara established a piaster spending limit for US Forces in South Vietnam at 10.3 billion and 10.7 billion piasters respectively for the first and second quarters of 1967. In commenting to the State Department, Secretary McNamara stated that a 42 billion piaster ceiling for Defense Department spending could be used in budgetary negotiations with the GVN. He also noted that it should be clearly understood that this figure was subject to review and change during 1967.

After several force adjustments to Program Four, the Secretary of Defense established a piaster ceiling of 21.5 billion piasters for the first half of 1967—allocating 10.5 billion for the first quarter and 11 billion for the second quarter.

The force level of Program Four approved by the Secretary of Defense was short seven US maneuver battalions and reflected sharp reductions in the combat service support elements of all Services. This, in turn, necessitated elimination of some units previously approved by the Secretary in order to achieve the balanced force needed for sustained operations. This lesser capability imposed by Program Four forces implied slower progress and a longer war.

In response to a JCS request, CINCPAC recommended modifications for better balance in the Program Four force. With the piaster expenditure problem now an integral part of Program Four, it became a matter of importance to ascertain the piaster-spending

1. JCS 7864/142144Z Nov 66
2. For background on the impact of piaster expenditures, see SAIGON 9892/021102Z Nov 66
3. JCS 2343/864-17 CPRS 000845-66
4. SECDEF 1969/212339Z Dec 66
5. COMUSMACV 191327Z Nov 66; CINCUSARPAC 200150Z Nov 66; CINCPACAF 200510Z Nov 66; CINCPACFLT 220351Z Nov 66
individuals within the programmed force. With respect to this point, CINCPAC proposed excluding forces that were embarked, quartered, and supported in ships and waterborne craft. He further suggested that personnel hospitalized in South Vietnam or on rest and recuperation outside South Vietnam would not be spending piasters and should therefore be excluded from these computations. These last proposals were keyed to Army personnel only, because the immediate task was to attempt to lower the Army's piaster-expending base figure so that certain Army units could be restored or added to Program Four. CINCPAC also recommended a revised force mix, and proposed that military construction personnel replace civilians in the interests of reduced piaster spending.¹

(1) With certain exceptions, the JCS accepted CINCPAC's recommendations and incorporated them into a 2 December Memorandum to the Secretary of Defense. Some of the conclusions stated by the JCS on this occasion were as follows:²

1. Force ceilings established by Program Four would restrict US combat capabilities in South Vietnam.
2. Out-of-country force requirements should be exempt from space-for-space substitution.
3. Out-of-country rest and recuperation personnel should not be included in strength ceilings based on piaster spending.
4. Program Four forces would reduce the military capability to achieve US national objectives and execute US military tasks in South Vietnam.

(2) The JCS reaffirmed their recommendations as submitted in JCSM-702-66 and noted that those recommendations were supported by General Westmoreland and Admiral Sharp. At the time of the JCS 2 December recommendation to the Secretary of Defense, CINCPAC was asked to determine the effect for all Services, not just the Army, if the rest and recuperation and hospitalized personnel were excluded as piaster-costing factors. He was also asked to review the 2 December

1. CINCPAC 230953Z Nov 66; CINCPAC 290455Z Nov 66
2. JCSM-739-66, 2 Dec 66
JCS recommendations concerning Program Four and recommend such additional changes as he desired--but on a space-for-space substitution basis. Additionally, CINCPAC was asked to comment on how these proposals could be included in the determination of force levels despite the piaster ceilings.

(3) On 9 December Secretary McNamara approved the JCS recommended deletions and additions to Program Four, but he deferred approval of new Army units (2,803 spaces) pending receipt of detailed justification for each by Deployment Adjustment Request. The Secretary's memorandum stated "...Any additional requests for deployments to out-of-country areas should be fully justified as to their relation to the conflict in SEA." This implied exemption of out-of-country deployments from the space-for-space substitution and raised doubt as to how Program Four could be modified.

(3) CINCPAC requested that the JCS clarify the guidelines on procedures for additions to Program Four for South Vietnam, Thailand, and other PACOM areas, and procedures for temporary duty personnel for South Vietnam and other PACOM areas.

Planning Status, End of 1966

(3) Late in December several other problems had developed with respect to the approved force ceilings. There was uncertainty as to the precise force structure included within Program Four. The effects of some recent unilateral Service changes in the organization of in-country forces would have to be analyzed for their impact on COMUSMACV's recommendations for additional forces. Another problem concerned procedures for inactivating or redeploying a unit no longer required, and then replacing it with a needed unit to meet new requirements. Accordingly, CINCPAC was preparing to call a conference related to the formation of adequate review procedures. It was anticipated that the conference would be held about mid-January 1967 in Honolulu, and

1. SM 937-66, 2 Dec 66
2. CINCPAC 160003Z Dec 66
SECRET

involve representatives of the Joint Staff, the Services, COMUSMACV, CGUSARV, COMNAVFORV, COM7thAF, COMUSMACTHAI, and CINCPAC component commands. ¹

(U) In the interim, CINCPAC and subordinate commanders were undertaking review, analysis, and anticipatory planning with respect to deployments to Southeast Asia and other PACOM areas. ²

**Combined Campaign, 1967**

(5) The RVNAF's Joint General Staff and COMUSMACV promul-gated the Combined Campaign Plan, 1967 on 7 November 1966. The stated mission was: "RVNAF and US/FWMAF...to defeat the VC/NVA forces and extend GVN control throughout the Republic of Vietnam." The plan further stated that there would be no clear division of Revolutionary Development responsibility, although the RVNAF were assigned the primary responsibility for supporting the program.

(5) As a significant change, the plan tasked the commanders of both US and FWMAF Forces. The details of the tasks were in consonance with CINCPAC's October concept.

(5) National Priority Areas ³ in III and IV Corps were expanded over those of 1966. Unlike the 1966 plan the new plan specified no corps priority areas per se. But areas of priority for military offensive operations were selected, to focus military capabilities of the US-RVNAF-FWMAF Forces in operations to destroy the enemy or drive him away to sparsely populated and food-short areas; insure the protection of the population; insure control of resources; and provide unrestricted use of major LOC. All of the foregoing would permit follow-on Revolutionary Development. Spoiling attacks to frustrate Viet Cong strategy would continue in other areas.

(5) The plan for 1967 placed special emphasis on Revolutionary Development--far beyond that in the 1966 plan. It also followed the

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1. CINCPAC 040326Z Jan 67
2. CINCPAC ser 000526, 10 Dec 66; CINCPAC 280510Z Dec 66
3. Areas of major significance at national level where civil and military resources were focused on a priority basis for Revolutionary Development. See accompanying chart.
general philosophy of nation-building as outlined in CINCPAC's October concept. In comparison to the plan for 1966, the new plan placed less emphasis on US-FWMAF support of non-military activities such as bolstering sub-sector advisory efforts, support of Revolutionary Development cadres and personnel, and military support of Revolutionary Development programs with personnel and material.

(6) The priority of ARVN operations would be focused on providing security for Revolutionary Development activity. Priority of US-FWMAF operations was to be concentrated on operations against Viet Cong-NVA units in areas of military offensive operations to facilitate follow-on Revolutionary Development.

1. Point Paper, J551, 26 Nov 66
TOP SECRET

US/ALLIED MANEUVER FORCES RVN
(BATTALION SIZE OR LARGER)

AS OF: 30 AUG

SUMMARY

MANEUVER BATTALIONS:

I CORPS 23
II CORPS 28
III CORPS 23
IV CORPS 0

TOTAL 74

INCLUDES INFANTRY, AIRBORNE, MARINE AND TANK BNS ONLY.

US MAR
III MARINE AMPHIB FORCE
3rd MAR DIV
1st MAR DIV
18 INF BNS
2 TANK BNS

KOREA
2nd ROK MAR BDE
3 BNS

US ARMY
BDE. 25th INF DIV
BDE. 4TH INF DIV
6 INF BN/1 TANK BN

US ARMY
1st CAV DIV
9 BNS

KOREA
CAPITAL DIV 9 BNS

US ARMY
HQ I FIELD FORCE VIETNAM

US ARMY
BDE. 101ST ABN DIV
3 BNS

US ARMY
1st INF DIV
9 BNS

US ARMY
HQ II FIELD FORCE VIETNAM

US ARMY
173rd ABN BDE
3 BNS

AUS NZ
ROYAL AUS REG
2 BNS

TOP SECRET
TOP SECRET

US/ALLIED MANEUVER FORCES RVN
(BATTALION SIZE OR LARGER)

AS OF: 12 SEP

SUMMARY
MANEUVER BATTALIONS*

I CORPS  23
II CORPS  31
III CORPS 27
IV CORPS  0

TOTAL  81

*INCLUDES INFANTRY, AIRBORNE, MARINE AND TANK BNS ONLY.

US MAR
III MARINE AMPHIB
FORCE
3rd MAR DIV
1st MAR DIV
18 INF BNS
2 TANK BNS

KOREA
2nd ROK MAR BDE
3 BNS

US ARMY
BDE, 25th INF DIV
BDE, 4th INF DIV
6 INF BN/1 TANK BN

US ARMY
1st CAV DIV
9 BNS

KOREA
CAPITAL DIV 9 BNS
26th REGT 3 BNS

US ARMY
HQ 1 FIELD FORCE
VIETNAM

US ARMY
BDE, 101st ABN DIV
3 BNS

US ARMY
1st INF DIV
9 BNS

US ARMY
11th ARM CAV REGT
3 ARM CAV SOD

US ARMY
173rd ABN BDE
3 BNS

AUS/NZ
ROYAL AUS REG
2 BNS

459
US/ALLIED MANEUVER FORCES RVN
(BATTALION SIZE OR LARGER)

AS OF: 27 SEP

SUMMARY

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<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
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*Includes infantry, airborne, marine and tank bns only.

US MAR
III MARINE AMPHIB FORCE
3rd MAR DIV
1st MAR DIV
18 INF BN
2 TANK BNS

KOREA
2nd ROK MAR BDE
3 BNS

US ARMY
BDE: 25th INF DIV
BDE: 41st INF DIV
6 INF BN/1 TANK BN

KOREA
CAPITAL DIV 9 BNS
8TH INF DIV: 16 BNS

US ARMY
HQ I FIELD FORCE
VIETNAM

US ARMY
BDE: 101st ABN DIV
3 BNS

US ARMY
1ST INF DIV
9 BNS

US ARMY
11TH ARM CAV RGT
3 ARM CAV SQUAD

US ARMY
173RD ABN BDE
3 BNS

AUS/NZ
ROYAL AUS REG
2 BNS

US ARMY
196TH INF BDE
3 INF BN

US ARMY
25TH INF DIV [-]
6 INF BNS
# Free World Military Assistance Recap

**JULY 1966**

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<td>COMBAT SUPPORT &amp; LOGISTICAL UNITS</td>
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**Total** 30,007
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## Free World Military Assistance Recap

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SECTION B - COMMAND AND CONTROL, SOUTHEAST ASIA

(U) The following material describes major command and control changes in Southeast Asia. Supplemental information is contained in Chapter I. Additionally, the index will aid in locating related information which may be in Annexes A and B of this History.

II FIELD FORCE VIETNAM ESTABLISHED

II Field Force, Vietnam (IIFFORCEV) became operational 15 March and was assigned to the command less operational control of the Commanding General, US Army Vietnam (USARV). Operational control was assigned to COMUSMACV. Forces assigned were US and FWMAF units designated by COMUSMACV. A primary function of the IIFFORCEV was to conduct, in coordination with CG, III Corps, unilateral US, coordinated US and FWMAF, or coordinated US-RVNAF-FWMAF Force combat operations in the III CTZ.1

COMMANDER US - THAI ARMED FORCES (COMUSTAF) OPLAN 1/65

In March the JCS approved a CINCPAC request that the COMUSTAF (under COMUSTAF OPLAN 1/65) would have a separate ground component commander as well as air and naval component commanders.2 Therefore, COMUSTAF would not be his own ground force component commander.

NAVAL COMPONENT COMMAND FOR COMUSMACV

At the end of 1965, CG, III Marine Amphibious Force (MAF), Major General L. W. Walt, USMC, was the naval component commander for COMUSMACV. CG, III MAF was both a tactical commander and senior US Advisor to the CG, I Corps. As naval component commander he was charged with performing many tasks and functions of

1. COMUSMACV MONEVAL, Mar 66, CPRS 002176-66; COMUSMACV ltr ser 00309, 14 Mar 66, CPRS 001673-66
2. CINCPAC 112235Z Mar 66; SM 280-66, 29 Mar 66; CINCPAC 050422Z Apr 66

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area coordination, logistic support, and base development in the I CTZ. COMUSMACV considered it most desirable that the CG, III MAF be relieved of his naval component commander functions so that he might be able to devote full attention to the planning and conduct of ground and air operations in the I CTZ. Accordingly, COMUSMACV recommended to CINCPAC that:

1. A Navy command with assigned units be established in South Vietnam as the naval component command for COMUSMACV.


3. NAVFORV be assigned to the command less operational control of CINCPACFLT.

4. NAVFORV be assigned to the operational control of COMUSMACV.

5. NAVFORV be commanded by a Flag Officer.

6. III MAF with assigned units be designated as a separate uni-Service command under the operational control of COMUSMACV and command less operational control of CG, FMFPAC.²

CINCPAC concurred in the COMUSMACV recommendations with certain amplifications. These recommendations were subsequently approved by the JCS.²

On 14 March CINCPACFLT recommended specific COM- NAVFORV tasks in both the subordinate unified command and Service channels. He also proposed 1 April as the transfer date of naval component command functions from CG, III MAF to COMNAVFORV.³

To facilitate the transfer, CINCPAC requested that COMUSMACV propose terms of reference for COMNAVFORV and CG, III MAF.⁴

COMUSMACV's recommended terms of reference were submitted on 1 April, and with some alterations these were approved by CINCPAC on 30 April.⁵ Also on 1 April, Rear Admiral N. G. Ward

1. COMUSMACV 01175/130159Z Jan 66. See also CINCPAC Command History, 1965, Annex A, pp 99-100
2. CINCPAC 251120Z Jan 66, 262215Z Mar 66; JCS 3964/142250 Feb 66
3. CINCPACFLT 142351Z Mar 66; CINCPAC 070022Z Mar 66
4. CINCPAC 250358Z Mar 66
5. COMUSMACV 10325/01120Z Apr 66; CINCPAC 300429Z Apr 66
assumed command of NAVFORV as the naval component commander for COMUSMACV. Under General Walt, III MAF with assigned forces became a uni-Service command assigned to the command of CG, FMFPAC and under the operational control of COMUSMACV.¹

7TH AIR FORCE ESTABLISHED

(U) The bulk of US Air Force support in Southeast Asia had been provided by the 2d Air Division with headquarters in Saigon. With the continual expansion of 2d Air Division forces and activities, the Air Force Chief of Staff, General McConnell, determined that it would be appropriate to change the unit title to 7th Air Force.

(U) The change was made effective 1 April, with 2d Air Division commander Lieutenant General Joseph H. Moore, USAF, assuming command of the 7th Air Force, with no alteration in existing command relationships.²

USMACHTAI-JUSMAGTHAI MERGER

(✓) COMUSMACHTAI had proposed in September 1965 to consolidate the headquarters of USMACHTAI and JUSMAGTHAI.³ CINCPAC studies indicated that a key issue in the proposed merger was provision for the Military Assistance Program (MAP) functions.

(✓) On 8 January CINCPAC recommended the merger to the JCS. He proposed that the resulting command be identified as USMACHTAI/JUSMAGTHAI, and that the commander be dual-hatted as COMUSMACHTAI/CHJUSMAGTHAI. It was expected that preserving the JUSMAG identity and establishing a MAP Directorate at the J-staff level would aid in providing for the MAP functions.⁴ The JCS obtained Secretary of Defense approval for the change and informed CINCPAC that authority to re-organize would be forwarded concurrently with approval of terms of reference (TOR) and the joint table of distribution (JTD) for Headquarters USMACHTAI/JUSMAGTHAI.⁵

1. COMUSMACV 10548/031127Z Apr 66; JCS 042225Z Apr 66
2. CSAF AFCCS 76859/171547Z Mar 66
4. CINCPAC 082038Z Jan 66; CINCPAC ltr ser 022, 10 Jan 66
5. JCSM-105-66, 14 Feb 66; JCS 4997/011535Z Mar 66

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At CINCPAC's request, COMUSMACTHAI submitted comments regarding a CINCPAC draft of the TOR for the new command. COMUSMACTHAI indicated that Ambassador Martin had no substantive objection to the draft TOR with changes as proposed in COMUSMACTHAI's letter.

The Secretary of Defense-JCS approved TOR were forwarded to COMUSMACTHAI/CHJUSMAGTHAI on 26 August. In his capacity as COMUSMACTHAI, General Stilwell was also designated as Commander Designate of US-Thai Field Forces. MAP responsibilities were spelled out in detail, to include developing, implementing, reviewing, administering, advisory, and coordination activities.

CINCPAC's proposed manpower requirements for COMUSMACTHAI/CHJUSMAGTHAI were forwarded to the JCS on 12 March. The Secretary of Defense required further justification, stating to the JCS in August, "... I seriously question whether we should approve a 40 percent increase. ... Please reexamine the plan to hold to present strength levels."

By the end of 1966 CINCPAC had not received approval of the proposed JTD, although he had assured the JCS and the Secretary of Defense that the JTD carried only hard-core, minimum essential manpower requirements to perform the mission. Meanwhile, 152 support spaces had been identified for transfer to Army units upon their deployment to Thailand. By late 1966 the Department of the Army had accepted functions associated with 102 of these spaces; 33 other deletions were contingent upon the Department of the Army assuming responsibility in other support functions, and 17 deletions would result from arrival in Thailand of new Army units. Temporary duty (150 days) personnel had been in Thailand since July to support critical requirements, and replacements had been requested from the PACOM component commanders.

1. CINCPAC ltr ser 00391, 8 Mar 66
2. MACTC AG Log 882/66, 5 Apr 66
3. CINCPAC ltr ser 001419, 26 Aug 66
4. CINCPAC ltr ser 00417, 12 Mar 66
5. JCS 3065/192113Z Sep 66
6. CINCPAC 2903402Z Apr 66; CINCPAC 082028Z Oct 66
7. Point Paper, J12, 22 Nov 66; J1 History supplement, Mar 67

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HEADQUARTERS, US ARMY SUPPORT THAILAND

Early in the year it was recognized that COMUSMACThAI would need a headquarters to enhance the operational readiness posture and facilitate management of Army resources in Thailand.

The headquarters was formed from the IX Corps, which had been stationed in Okinawa since February 1965. With the reorganization of IX Corps, a Headquarters and Headquarters Company, forerunner of US Army Support, Thailand (USARSUPTHAI) Headquarters, was formed on 25 April 1966. Colonel Francis B. O'Brien, then Chief of Staff of IX Corps, assumed command.

On 28 September CINCPAC directed deployment of USARSUPTHAI (133 personnel) to Khorat. In October the first echelon of 11 officers and 28 enlisted men arrived there. Subsequent air and sea movements followed and the headquarters closed at Khorat on 15 November 1966. Brigadier General Edwin F. Black assumed command of the headquarters on 11 December 1966. By the end of the year, the CG, USARSUPTHAI formally assumed command and/or operational control of all US Army units in Thailand.

1. CINCPAC 282321Z Sep 66
SECTION C - OPERATIONS, SOUTHEAST ASIA

GROUND OPERATIONS HIGHLIGHTS, SOUTH VIETNAM

(2) The continued allied military offensive during 1966 succeeded in denying the enemy forces a major victory during the year. Whereas the year began with a military stalemate, it appeared that by the end of the year the initiative had passed to the Armed Forces of the United States and the Republic of Vietnam, and the Free World Military Assistance Forces (US-RVNAF-FWMAF). Notwithstanding definite gains by friendly forces, the enemy continued at the end of the year to try and subvert the Government and people of South Vietnam by every means available. There was, however, no reason to believe that he was considering any cessation of his military efforts. The NVA continued to penetrate the South Vietnamese border through the rugged region of the once Demilitarized Zone (DMZ), across the border from bases in Laos, and from de facto sanctuaries in Cambodia.

(3) All nations contributing military forces on the allied side--the United States, Australia, New Zealand, and South Korea--increased their commitments to the military struggle during the year, and only New Zealand failed to achieve an actual force increase. Additionally, Thailand began to contribute military forces to the side of the allies, and the Philippines contributed a Civic Action Group that performed valuable services in the program of Revolutionary Development in South Vietnam.¹

(4) This portion of the History presents an account of the buildup of friendly forces and the significant military developments in South Vietnam during 1966. It also provides a general background that will facilitate consideration of separately treated subjects in the context of the general military situation in South Vietnam.

Monthly Summaries
January - March

(5) US forces increased by more than 52,000 during the first

quarter of the year, to include most of the US 25th Infantry Division.  
On a regular basis friendly air and ground operations penetrated long-
held Viet Cong strongholds. Our peace overtures failed, and the air
strikes against North Vietnam were resumed on 31 January. Neverthe-
less, through a combination of infiltration and local recruitment the
enemy reconstituted his personnel losses of over 10,000 and COMUS-
MACV estimated that the number of enemy combat battalions within
South Vietnam increased by 3 to a total of 129 (confirmed, probable,
and possible). Additionally, there was increasing evidence of better
enemy weaponry (120mm mortars, 37mm and 57mm antiaircraft guns,
heavy machineguns).

Despite many successful friendly search and destroy opera-
tions, the enemy avoided contact unless forced to fight. Gains in area
and populace under the control of the Government of Vietnam (GVN)
were relatively small, in part because of the fitful progress of systematic
clearing and security operations.

The Viet Cong-NVA eliminated the A Shau Special Forces
Camp on 10 March. This and the enemy buildup and positioning of
troops in the vicinity of Khe Sanh and Tra Bong was most significant
since the neutralization of Khe Sanh would provide an unobstructed Viet
Cong infiltration corridor approximately 200 km long. With Tra Bong
also under Viet Cong control, a rice-rich area would be available for
resupply of newly infiltrated units.

But the process of sapping the enemy’s strength and eroding his
will had begun.

April

The US-FWMAF Force increased by 12 operational maneuver
battalions during April, including the balance of the US 25th Infantry
Division. The favorable aspects of these additions were tempered by
a revised estimate of enemy forces, which increased the number of
Viet Cong-NVA confirmed, probable, and possible battalions to 139—an
ingcrease of 13 since January 1966. In terms of battalion days of opera-
tion, the friendly force military operations increased slightly (eight

1. COMUSMACV MONEVAL, Jan-Mar 66, CPRS 001650-66, 001907-66,
002176-66
2. COMUSMACV MONEVAL, Apr 66, CPRS 002495-66

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percent) but there was not a corresponding increase in results. Viet Cong losses dropped 30 percent, RVNAF killed in action decreased by 42 percent, and there were one-third fewer US Forces killed in action.

\(\text{(6)}\) This paradox is explained in part by the disorganization resulting from a surge of political turmoil, most serious in Saigon and the northern I CTZ (See Appendix 1 for details.) As usual, the Viet Cong attempted to intensify the general discord by turning their attention to activities that would exploit GVN political weaknesses. Another contributing factor was an increasingly apparent Viet Cong determination to avoid significant contact with large US-RVNAF-FWMAF elements. For example, there were only three battalion-size or larger Viet Cong initiated attacks during April, compared to eight in March.

\(\text{(6)}\) The air interdiction campaign in North Vietnam and Laos was meanwhile achieving a record number of destroyed enemy vehicles and secondary explosions, but at the end of April it seemed that the enemy's capability to mount large-scale combat actions in South Vietnam was not seriously reduced.

\(\text{(6)}\) Typical of enemy actions were a 13 April attack on Tan Son Nhut Air Base, which achieved extensive damage to POL storage facilities, and the killing of 50 Vietnamese Regional Force-Popular Force personnel during an attack on their training center in Kien Hoa Province.

\(\text{(6)}\) In other developments, US-RVNAF Forces (Operation BIRMINGHAM) operating against the enemy near the Cambodian border received automatic weapons and mortar fire from the Cambodian side of the border. The fire was silenced by a heavy volume of artillery fire placed on the Viet Cong positions inside Cambodia. NVA forces were reported surrounding the Khe Sanh Special Forces Camp, and British-made 25 pounder artillery shells and 105mm shells were fired at the Cai Cai Special Forces Camp. Crater analysis suggested that the fire came from the direction of Cambodia, only a short distance away. Elimination of the Special Forces camps in the area would enable the Viet Cong to consolidate the Dong Thap Muoi War Zone (Plain of Reeds) and allow uninterrupted movement across the Cambodian border.
By the end of the month it was increasingly apparent that the enemy forces were using Cambodian areas as sanctuary for staging operations into South Vietnam. Specific areas were along the Pleiku-Kontum Province borders in II CTZ, the Phuoc Long-Bin Long-Tay Ninh Province borders in III CTZ, and the Kien Tuong-Kien Phong-Chau Doc Province borders in IV CTZ.

Most in-country developments were overshadowed by political unrest, which had the greatest impact on I CTZ. RVN Forces generally chose sides—Government, "Struggle Forces," or unaligned—until-the-victor-was-determined—and turned their efforts to this task rather than to the Viet Cong-NVA. To avoid becoming heavily involved in what threatened to become civil war, American advisors were withdrawn from tactical units that were being positioned for political reasons.

Programs heavily dependent upon continuity of effort suffered a substantial setback. For example, in early April members of the Army of (the Republic of) Vietnam (ARVN) 3d Psychological Warfare Battalion left their posts to actively support the "Struggle Forces." The ARVN PSYWAR effort simply ceased to exist. Although most personnel had returned to their posts by the end of the month, they gave little evidence of resuming the PSYWAR effort. Other RVN military personnel became involved in the disturbances, and military control virtually ceased among the Government forces.

Port operations and other transportation activities dependent upon civilian labor were seriously curtailed during the widespread demonstrations, strikes, and disorders.

May

The expected enemy monsoon offensive did not materialize in May.¹ They initiated five battalion-size or larger attacks, as compared to eight in March and three in April, but Viet Cong-NVA Forces on the whole continued to avoid combat.

The major activities of the US-RVNAF-FWMAF Forces were designed to deprive the enemy of base areas and materiel, disrupt his operations, and destroy his forces. Two operations in II CTZ were of

¹. COMUSMACV MONEVAL, May 66, CPRS 002738-66

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major significance when measured in terms of enemy killed. Operation CRAZY HORSE accounted for 356 enemy killed, and another 374 were killed in Operation DAVY CROCKETT. Extensive penetrations into the enemy's War Zone C during Operation BIRMINGHAM succeeded in destroying many base camps and training areas and large amounts of food, supplies, and equipment.

(9) The enemy harassed Government posts and units in northern I CTZ in an apparent effort to expand Viet Cong control over the population and to isolate the Hue-Phu Bai area. Captured documents resulted in the acceptance in order of battle of the 31st NVA Regiment and four additional battalions in southern I Corps. These units were subordinate to the 620th Division located in the Quang Tin area. Significant Viet Cong buildup and activity in II Corps appeared closely related to the increase in Viet Cong forces in southern I Corps. Intelligence indicated a plan for an attack on An Khe, and there were over 11,000 enemy troops in combat units in Binh Dinh Province.

(9) In Operation PAUL REVERE, the US 25th Infantry Division made contact on 28 May with what appeared to be elements of three regiments. The area of contact was approximately bounded by the Duc Co and Plei Djereng Camps and the Cambodian border. In contrast to previous practice, the enemy continued to reinforce. This was interpreted as an indication of a forthcoming enemy offensive in the Kontum-Pleiku Province area.

(9) There was considerable evidence that the enemy would attack the Loc Ninh sub-sector and the Special Forces Camp in III Corps. Late in May, Viet Cong sabotage was especially intense on LOCs in Binh Duong and Bien Hoa Provinces where the enemy was attempting to curtail the mobility of friendly forces during the rainy season.

(9) On 10 May, MARKET TIME units thwarted a major sea infiltration attempt by running a steel-hulled trawler aground south of the Rach Gia inlet off An Xuyen Province.

(9) FWMAF in-country strength increased by 15,700 in May to a total of 152,575. This increase included elements of the 1st Australian Task Force, which continued to arrive by air in Operation HARDIHOOD.
June

(1) During June there was an increase in allied search and destroy operations in enemy dominated territory.¹ Most of the significant engagements occurred in II CTZ. Several of these -- FILLMORE (360 Viet Cong killed), SU BOK (250 Viet Cong Killed), PAUL REVERE (441 Viet Cong killed), and CRAZY HORSE (478 Viet Cong killed) -- were continued from previous months. Two search and destroy operations initiated in II CTZ during June were highly successful, achieving a total of 975 Viet Cong killed. Operation EL PASO II took place in Binh Long Province (III CTZ). About 553 enemy were killed during this operation, and the tonnages of captured rice and salt (1,500 and 25 tons respectively) were the largest yet captured at one time.

(2) One additional US maneuver battalion was added during the month, and the enemy added four.

(3) Political unrest subsided in I CTZ, depriving the enemy of some opportunities for political subversion and agitation. The enemy capability for more direct action increased, however, with reports of the movement of the 324th NVA Division into northern I CTZ.

(4) On 20 June friendly waterborne units forced a steel-hull ship aground off Vinh Binh Province (IV CTZ). Between 80 and 100 tons of weapons and ammunition of Chinese and Soviet origin were taken off the ship.

(5) Since friendly forces held the military initiative throughout June, the enemy was generally forced to defensive measures designed to preserve his strength. But the grim determination displayed by the enemy continued to indicate a war of attrition.

(6) The last increments of the 1st Australian Task Force reached South Vietnam. The deployment (Operation HARDIHOOD) had extended from 27 April to 19 June and involved 3,633 personnel. A South Korean Logistical Support Package (765 personnel) was also deployed to South Vietnam during Operation ROUNDCUT II, 8 to 11 June.

¹. COMUSMACV MONEVAL, Jun 66, CPRS 003097-66
July

Large-scale enemy infiltration through the DMZ developed rapidly in July. In operation LAM SON, the ARVN 2d Airborne Battalion made heavy contact with what was probably the NVA 812th Regiment of the 324B Division. Operation HASTINGS, the largest III Marine Amphibious Force (MAF) operation to date in South Vietnam, resulted in a series of violent actions involving forces up to battalion size. On 18 July an estimated 1,000 NVA troops in full battle dress assaulted the 3/4 Marines command post near Cam Lo. Enemy activity declined thereafter and capability was further reduced by continued friendly force offensive actions.

Indications were that the NVA 324B Division had the mission of helping the forces already in the area to liberate Quang Tri Province and cover the infiltration route along Route 9. An unidentified division was to attack from Laos, move along Route 9, and cover the corridor to transport supplies. The NVA 304B Division was sent to replace the 324th Division at Ha Tinh, North Vietnam and would reinforce as required in South Vietnam.

Although enemy units in the II Corps highland area were relatively inactive during July, the DI · Local Force Battalion attacked an ARVN battalion in northern Darlac Province. In the action, which was considered significant because the enemy fought without numerical superiority, 105 Viet Cong were killed. This may have indicated a defense of the Chu Pong-Chu Dle Ya infiltration route. Operation NATHAN HALE interrupted plans for an NVA regiment to attack the Dong Tre Camp.

In III CTZ the enemy generally avoided contact, although the Viet Cong 272d Regiment ambushed US 1st Infantry Division elements on 9 July. This engagement cost the enemy 238 killed, and the survivors were observed withdrawing to the northwest, either to War Zone C or to Cambodia.

In IV CTZ, 7 identified Viet Cong battalions had suffered losses of about 25 percent or more in single engagements during the

1. COMUSMACV MONEVAL, Jul 66, CPRS 003404-66
previous 6 months; elements of other unidentified battalions suffered heavy losses on occasion. Recognizing that these losses could be replaced over the period, there were other indications that the general level of training of fulltime Viet Cong battalions was declining. During two operations it was reported that Viet Cong recruits abandoned their positions under heavy fire and left the cadre to take the brunt of the ARVN attack. Also, the Viet Cong had failed to meet their stated political and economic goals. Their combat units had been able to support, but not to expand, the Viet Cong political, economic, and guerrilla warfare position.

(6) Major enemy forces threatened I CTZ from the north. Elsewhere, division-size forces were intact in southern I CTZ, in northern II CTZ, the highlands, and southeastern III CTZ. In northern III CTZ the Viet Cong 9th Division was still active, despite a reduced effectiveness due to casualties.

(6) Enemy fighting effectiveness was somewhat reduced because of heavy losses in men, supplies, and materiel from combat actions. Malaria, low morale, and constant movement had also adversely affected his capabilities. He nevertheless retained a tenacious will to fight and win and had reinforced his operations in South Vietnam with additional men and more modern weapons.

(7) Deployment of the US 4th Infantry Division (Operation ROBIN) commenced in July with the arrival of the 4th Engineer Battalion at Qui Nhon on the 29th. The personnel debarked on the 30th and moved by air to Pleiku.

August

(5) The August pattern of allied offensive operations was to seek out and destroy the enemy, his base camps, and his materiel.1 Special effort was directed toward spoiling the enemy's offensive capability in I CTZ. The most successful action, when measured in terms of enemy casualties (703 killed and 98 captured), was the US-RVN Operation PAUL REVERE II in Pleiku Province against the NVA 32d, 33d, and 66th Regiments. Enemy losses were also increased by several other friendly-

1. COMUSMACV MONEVAL, Aug 66, CPRS 003647-66

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initiated ground operations: Operation LIEN KET 52 (RVN) in I Corps killed 504 enemy personnel, and Operation HASTINGS (US, 7 July - 3 August) accounted for 883 enemy killed.

Several previously unfavorable trends changed for the better, particularly the force ratio, Chieu Hoi returnees, and Viet Cong-NVA captured. Continued favorable trends were reflected in friendly and enemy casualties, increases in secured population and area, a decline in Viet Cong-initiated incidents, and improved road security. Statistics associated with the Revolutionary Development Program showed an overall improvement, and there were indications of improving credibility of the Chieu Hoi program and the National Safe Conduct Pass.

The US 196th Infantry Brigade closed at the Tay Ninh base camp (Operation BLUE JAY) on 16 August. On the same date, advance elements of the 28th Korean Regimental Combat Team closed at Qui Nhon.

Navy air operations from aircraft carriers on DIXIE STATION terminated this month; assets thus released were to be used on YANKEE STATION henceforth.

The end of August marked the fifth successive month in which the enemy was denied a major victory. He nevertheless continued to demonstrate a determination to win.

September

Much military effort was devoted to providing the RVN population freedom of movement to the polls during the National Election on 11 September. Overall, the US-RVNAF-FWMAF Forces continued a pattern of operations designed to find the enemy and destroy his camps and materiel, and simultaneously protect the population. Revolutionary Development made only moderate progress in September, as GVN officials turned their efforts toward the elections.

Operation PRAIRIE (initiated 3 August) was of particular significance. It immediately followed Operation HASTINGS, which had successfully disrupted the NVA 324B Division's attempted invasion through the DMZ in July. PRAIRIE inflicted heavy casualties on enemy 

1. COMUSMACV MONEVAL, Sep 66, CPRS 003933-66

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forces and continued to frustrate attempts to move the hostile force in large units. Other major operations were also effective in reducing the enemy's capability. Among these were: MACON, GOLDEN FLEECE 7-1, BYRD, THAYER, BINH PHU 27, MAENG HO 6, and DAN CHI 261.

At the end of the month, 3,826 personnel of the US 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment were at Long Binh; 14,994 personnel of the Korean 9th Infantry Division were in country; 981 personnel of the Philippine Civic Action Group had arrived; and the US 4th Infantry Division had 7,295 personnel in the RVN, mostly at Pleiku.

October

Friendly operations continued to emphasize offensive actions to find and destroy the enemy.\(^1\) Especially significant in this respect were Combined Operations IRVING (US), MAENG HO 6 (ROK), and DAI BANG 800 (ARVN) in II CTZ (Binh Dinh Province). These actions severely mauled the enemy along the east-central coast and accounted for about 2,119 killed. Perhaps more important were the very large amounts of captured or destroyed arms, ammunition, and foodstuffs. These operations also opened a large area that had been enemy dominated and controlled for several years.

Operation PRAIRIE (USMC) continued to prevent enemy attempts to mass and infiltrate in large numbers through the DMZ. Also in I CTZ, Operation MACON (USMC) and TRUY KICH TRD 51 (ARVN) pressed the enemy and forced him to fight.

Activity in III CTZ increased with Operation ATTLEBORO (US) continuing from September and SHENANDOAH (US) initiated on 17 October. These and two IV CTZ ARVN operations were reducing enemy strength and capturing large stores of supplies.

During October, 28 battalion or larger size allied units arrived in the RVN and were deployed. This included 3,520 personnel of the Korean 30th Regimental Combat Team on 8 October and thereby completed deployment of the Korean 9th Infantry Division. Also closing in South Vietnam was the balance of the Philippine Civic Action Group, airlifted from their homeland to Tay Ninh.

\(^1\) COMUSMACV MONEVAL, Oct 66, CPRS 004215-66
The US 4th Infantry Division also completed its deployment in October; the 1st Brigade reached Nha Trang on 6 October and was airlifted to Tuy Hoa. The 3d Brigade reached Vung Tau on 12 October. At the end of the month there were more than 900 men of the US 9th Infantry Division in the RVN.

November

Allied military operations continued to emphasize search and destroy efforts, while simultaneously protecting the population and establishing an environment conducive to Revolutionary Development. Operation PRAIRIE continued in the area south of the DMZ and served to prevent the enemy from massing in that area or infiltrating in large numbers through the DMZ. The enemy in Quang Ngai Province was kept off balance by combined operations DRAGON EYE (ROK), LIEN KET 70 (ARVN), and RIO BLANCO (US). In Binh Dinh Province, Operation THAYER II continued, exacting 328 enemy killed and capturing significant amounts of foodstuffs and war materials. Operation PAUL REVERE IV gained momentum in Pleiku Province and realized some 756 enemy killed and the capture of over 200 weapons during the month.

The most significant operation during November was Operation ATTLEBORO, initiated on 14 September in Tay Ninh Province. Contacts were light until the end of October when increasingly large enemy supply caches were discovered. In early November the enemy engaged the US 196th Brigade in a pitched battle from well prepared positions. In the presence of these indications of an imminent Viet Cong offensive, allied forces built up rapidly and soon totaled 19 battalions under II Field Force Vietnam. This became the first corps-sized operation of the war.

ATTLEBORO was terminated on 25 November with the following results: friendly, 107 killed, 494 wounded; enemy, 984 killed, 44 prisoners of war, 60 detained; 128 individual weapons, 19 crew-served weapons, 316 tons of rice, and 17 tons of salt captured; 1,255.5 tons of rice and 3.6 tons of salt destroyed. This extensive

1. COMUSMACV MONEVAL, Nov 66, CPRS 004464-66
penetration into War Zone C resulted in limited denial of areas that had been a communist stronghold for about 20 years. Additionally, large base camps were overrun and vast amounts of Viet Cong war materials were captured or destroyed.

Northeast monsoon weather inhibited air operations and caused a decrease in strikes below the average of the previous six months. Weather and heavy seas also resulted in a relatively quiet month for MARKET TIME operations. There was nevertheless a significant increase in GAME WARDEN activity.

The overall pressure resulted in significant military, psychological, and political victories. Simultaneously, the enemy's strongholds were battered and he lost increasing amounts of men, foodstuffs, and war materiel. The almost continuous pursuit denied the enemy opportunity for an effective large-scale attack, and major enemy forces in southern I CTZ and II CTZ continued maneuvering to avoid decisive combat. The Viet Cong 9th Division's offensive capability was reduced to two regiments. The enemy continued to strengthen his forces in I CTZ, perhaps in preparation for an attempt to seize Quang Tri and Thua Thien Provinces. In the remainder of the RVN the enemy employed sabotage and harassing attacks to inhibit expansion of Government influence.

Overall results for November indicated progress, but there was no evidence of a collapse of enemy forces or a cessation of his efforts to dominate the country.

Lieutenant General Quang, IV CTZ Commander, was quietly lifted from the rice-rich delta region and placed in a newly created Cabinet post as "Minister of Planning and Development." General Quang was replaced in the IV CTZ by Brigadier General Nguyen Van Manh.

December

Allied offensive operations continued to accent search and destroy efforts against enemy forces and base areas while shielding

1. SAIGON 1910452 Nov 66; CINCPAC Command Center Briefing Notes 21 Nov 66
the population and supporting Revolutionary Development. Operation PRAIRIE continued to prevent the enemy from massing in the area south of the DMZ.

The most significant operation of the month, measured by the number of enemy killed, was Operation THAYER II, continuing in Binh Dinh Province. This operation began in October as a search and destroy operation.

In the I CTZ, Operation CHINOOK was initiated on 20 December in northeastern Thua Thien Province to provide additional security along the coast and near the main highway and railroad. During this operation US Marines were attacked by elements of the Viet Cong 802d Battalion and possibly elements of the NVA 6th Regiment. A particularly favorable kill ratio, 40 to 1, was achieved.

Enemy units in II CTZ avoided major contact during the first part of the month, but there was an increase in enemy initiated activity during the last two weeks. In the western highlands, NVA units abandoned positions north and west of the Plei Djereng Special Forces Camp and returned west to their sanctuary. The NVA NT 10 Division was accepted in order of battle as probable, and located in the western highlands area with the 88th, 95B, and the possible 101C Regiments as subordinates.

Operation ATTLEBORO (November) spoiled temporarily the winter-spring campaign plans of the Viet Cong CT 9th Division in northern III CTZ. The division's three regiments plus the NVA 101st Regiment spent December regrouping, resupplying, planning, and training. At the end of the month indications were that the CT 9th Division had replaced at least a portion of its losses and was preparing for offensive operations. In the southern portion of the III CTZ, elements of the Viet Cong CT 5th Division posed an offensive threat, ambushing the US 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment south of Gia Ray in southern Long Khanh Province. The CT 5th Division's primary objectives, however, were lightly defended installations, ARVN outposts, and convoys in Phuoc Tuy and southern Long Khanh Provinces.

1. COMUSMACV MONEVAL, Dec 66, CPRS 001343-67
Enemy initiated actions in the Capitol Military District were highlighted by an attack on Tan Son Nhut Air Base during the early morning hours of 4 December. Damage to the airfield was light, while the Viet Cong suffered 31 killed and 4 captured. This operation was consistent with the winter-spring campaign plans, of which the known objectives, besides Tan Son Nhut, were shipping on the Long Tau River, Nha Be, and interdiction of LOCs.

In I CTZ the enemy continued the autumn-winter campaign with the objective of expanding his control over the populace and strengthening his military position. Viet Cong activity consisted primarily of harassment of ARVN outposts and interdiction of LOCs.

MARKET TIME forces detected two trawlers similar to the one that attempted infiltration in May and June. One of the vessels altered its course and departed the area after being held under constant surveillance; the other was sighted off the Ca Mau Peninsula on 31 December and was subsequently sunk. During this same period the number of naval gunfire missions declined to 126 from 186. This drop was attributed to the transfer of naval gunfire ships from YANKEE STATION.

The French merchant ship SINDH received 10 rounds of 75mm fire on 2 December while transiting the Long Tau River, 23 km southeast of Saigon. The ship proceeded to Saigon under its own power with heavy damage to the after superstructure; two seamen were wounded.

Viet Cong agents assassinated Mr. Tran Van Van, a member of the Constitutional Assembly and a political rival of Premier Ky, on 070900H December in Saigon.

At 080150H December, US Military Police apprehended what appeared to be an intoxicated Vietnamese civilian who was or had been firing a submachine gun in the vicinity of the My Canh floating restaurant. The prisoner was violent and refused to show identification. When a Vietnamese patrol took custody of the prisoner, he was identified as Colonel Cua, Mayor of Saigon.

1. CINCPAC Command Center Briefing Notes, 3 Dec 66
2. CINCPAC Command Center Briefing Notes, 7 Dec 66
3. CINCPAC Command Center Briefing Notes, 8 Dec 66
On 20 December, Australia's Prime Minister Holt announced additional forces for Vietnam, although he did not give any details of their number or composition at that time. This announcement was received calmly enough by the news media, but the Labor Party leaders, as was expected, warned that the "size of Australia's increase in Vietnam would be decided in Washington and Saigon and not in Canberra."\(^1\) In a later amplification, Prime Minister Holt announced that the overall number of personnel in South Vietnam would be increased by 1,700 from the existing level of 4,600 to about 6,300.\(^2\) This addition would require no increase in the call-up.

Some personnel of the US 9th Infantry Division main command post and the 3d Brigade closed Bear Cat base camp on 11 December.\(^3\) The total 9th Infantry Division strength in-country on 31 December, including elements at Vung Tau, was approximately 9,260.

The USNS POPE debarked 1,160 troops of the US 199th Infantry Brigade at Vung Tau on 11 December. Shortly after noon on 12 December the troops closed at Long Binh without incident.\(^4\) Units were the 4/12 Infantry, the 17 Cavalry, and the 2/40 Artillery. The last major unit of the brigade arrived by air at Bien Hoa Air Base between 21 and 25 December and closed at Long Binh on 25 December.\(^3\) Total strength of the brigade was 3,948.

At the close of the year, the US-RVNAF-FWMAF Forces continued to defeat the enemy in major military encounters. His base areas were being penetrated with a resultant enemy loss of men, materiel, and foodstuffs. Increasing numbers of his military forces were rallying to the GVN, and hundreds of additional Vietnamese civilians were being brought into secure areas daily. These and other indications were that the struggle was being won. Notwithstanding, the enemy continued to try to subvert the Government and the people by every means available. There was no reason to believe that the enemy was considering a halt.

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1. CANBERRA 3175/21042Z Dec 66
2. CANBERRA 3198/220459Z Dec 66; Briefing Notes, 22 Dec 66
3. COMUSMACV MONEVAL, Dec 66, CPRS 001343-67
4. CINCPAC Command Center Briefing Notes, 12 Dec 66
Cease-Fires

(1) In anticipation of probable proposals for Christmas, New Year, and Tet (the Vietnamese New Year) cease-fires, CINCPAC presented his views well in advance so they might be known before any decisions were made concerning a stand-down. In so doing he cited the conclusive disadvantages and risks that had accrued to friendly forces as a result of the extended 1965-1966 Christmas and Tet stand-downs.

(2) At that time the enemy had achieved an increase of 400 weapons in his AAA inventory in North Vietnam, the addition of at least 18 early warning and fire control radars, and construction of 29 additional SAM sites. Also, the flow of men and materiel through Laos toward South Vietnam had continued unabated and at an accelerated rate during the first quarter of 1966. Large-scale reconstruction of LOCs had been launched, key rail lines were repaired and traffic was resumed, and other measures taken to overcome the shortcomings and deficiencies caused by air attacks had increased the southward flow of men and materiel.

(3) In South Vietnam the Viet Cong had initiated heavy country-wide activity to position forces for the subsequent January-February campaign. The Viet Cong had also initiated a total of 84 significant incidents during the 30-hour cease-fire.

(4) CINCPAC further noted that another Christmas-Tet stand-down would almost certainly result in a repeat performance by the enemy. While a stand-down of not more than 36 to 48 hours was militarily acceptable to him, he felt there must be an unqualified understanding that it would not be unilaterally prolonged. Commanders must also be instructed and permitted to take all measures necessary for their forces to include increasing air reconnaissance (other than armed reconnaissance) and continuing patrol activity, to include GAME WARDEN and MARKET TIME, away from their bases so that threatening enemy movements and

1. CINCPAC 262330Z Nov 66
2. CINCPAC Command History, 1965, p 384
concentrations could be detected. Friendly commanders must also be allowed to retain contact until the NVA or Viet Cong forces withdrew, and to resume offensive operations if necessary to provide for safety of US Forces.

(3) In closing his remarks, CINCPAC stated that the risk of a stand-down of more than one or two days would serve only to the enemy's advantage and generate risks that we should not accept for our forces.

(2) When the cease-fire for Christmas was directed it provided for a stand-down in Vietnam from 240700 to 260700 December (Saigon time). The salient features of the policy were generally in line with CINCPAC's November remarks and were as follows:

1. Initiate no military offensive operations in South Vietnam except in response to enemy initiatives endangering the safety of US-RVNAF-FWMAF Forces.

2. Intensify aerial reconnaissance in both South and North Vietnam.

3. Suspend armed reconnaissance, air strikes, and naval gunfire operations during the period.

4. COMUSMACV, CINCPACFLT, and CINCPACAF were authorized to recommend to CINCPAC strikes against the movement of SAM missiles that would extend the SAM-defended areas southward.

(3) During the cease-fire period there were 101 violations reported: 49 in I CTZ, 16 in II CTZ, 24 in III CTZ, and 12 in IV CTZ. Total casualties were: for the United States 3 killed in action, 27 wounded in action; for the RVNAF 27 killed and another 27 wounded; 3 civilians were killed and 5 wounded; and the Viet Cong-NVA lost 26 killed.

(2) In the SEA DRAGON area, waterborne traffic increased substantially during the cease-fire period. Approximately 500 watercraft were sighted along the North Vietnamese coast moving between the mouths of the Song Giang and the Kien Giang (rivers). Of these, more than 15 were large steel-hulled cargo carriers, trawlers, or gunboats up to 140 feet long. The total sightings during this 48-hour period were 101.

1. JCS 91750/040157Z Dec 66
2. CINCPAC 080942Z Dec 66
3. CINCPAC Command Center Briefing Notes, 27 Dec 66

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period almost equaled the total for the first two months of SEA DRAGON operations. The larger cargo craft and trawlers were the first reported after initiation of SEA DRAGON on 25 October.

(79) The enemy, as expected, made maximum use of the cease-fire to resupply his forces. Accordingly, CINCPAC recommended and the JCS approved a modification of the New Year stand-down (310700H December 1966 to 020700H January 1967) policy to permit COMUSMACV to react to overt resupply activities that fulfilled the following criteria.

1. Taking place in a known, well-established enemy base area.

2. Material being unloaded in sufficient quantities to indicate major resupply operations.

3. Resupply taking place in base areas in close proximity to friendly units or installations and hence constituting a direct threat to friendly forces.

(79) While favoring continued operations against military targets in North Vietnam during the cease-fire, CINCPAC recommended that no major enemy resupply activity be permitted south of 19° North during any future stand-down. He also recommended that the SEA DRAGON operations be extended to 19° North, thus forcing the enemy to mass his logistic vessels farther north and extending the length of the supply run to the south.

Combat Reporting

(7) By the end of 1966 the JCS-required combat reporting system was resulting in an average monthly total of 5,928 messages and 117,500 punched cards. The reporting system contributed to heavy communications traffic, duplication of reported information, complex reports with suspect validity, and a large data collection and administrative burden for units and headquarters engaged in combat. The problem originated in the ever-growing desire of numerous Washington agencies

1. Briefing Notes, 25, 26, 27 Dec 66; COMUSMACV 261240Z Dec 66
2. CINCPAC 290647Z Dec 66; CINCPAC 300224Z Dec 66; CINCPAC 302204Z Dec 66
3. CINCPAC 290647Z Dec 66
for detailed data, and in a general lack of appreciation for the related costs in men, effort, and equipment.

(6) The JCS Commanders Operational Report (OPREP) had been required for about 19 months as of the end of 1966. This system was generally satisfactory except for the large volume of FLASH and IMMEDIATE precedence traffic, and some redundancy. Less so was the Combat Activities Report (COACT) which had been required for a similar period. The production and error check inherent in the COACT system required resources of automatic data processing equipment and trained personnel that were not available in the field. Accordingly, the validity of the resulting complex and cumbersome report was suspect.

(6) Near the end of the year Admiral Sharp managed to obtain at least temporary deferral of a proposed helicopter COACT report, and in so doing he presented to the Chairman of the JCS his position on all combat reporting. Based on the experience of the war, specific points of CINCPAC's position were as follows:

1. Keep report requirements to a minimum. The criterion should be, "Does this report assist in making decisions?"

2. Eliminate duplicate reporting where possible.

3. Establish realistic time requirements for the submission and transmission of reports.

4. Match the precedence of a report with the need-to-know time frame of the addressee.

5. Prior to implementation of a report, allow enough time for the necessary preparatory actions. For ADP systems, this included the lead time necessary to position equipment and trained personnel.

6. Give the CINC and his subordinates an opportunity to review and comment on proposed reports.

7. Have a preliminary shake-down period for new reports before declaring them official.

8. Analyze what had been created in the field of combat reporting.

(6) At the end of the year the Chairman of the JCS had directed a review of combat reporting requirements and there was hope for early action to improve the situation.¹

¹ Point Paper, J3529, 3 Jan 67
AIR OPERATIONS, SOUTHEAST ASIA

Limited combat air operations were initiated by the United States in Laos during 1964, and by the end of 1965 these operations were being conducted in almost all of eastern Laos and throughout South Vietnam. Additionally, all except the northeastern section of North Vietnam was regularly subjected to armed reconnaissance, and on occasion fixed targets were struck in the northeast. Strategic Air Command (SAC) B-52s also supported CINCPAC by conducting strikes in North and South Vietnam.

Combat operation areas continued to expand during 1966; very limited fighter-bomber strikes were conducted at Hanoi and Haiphong, and the DMZ was struck repeatedly. B-52 operations in 1966 were intensified in Laos, extended into the DMZ, and also extended to very limited portions of North Vietnam.

The air campaign was conducted under several US programs and under command structures appropriate to the military and political situation extant in the areas of operation. Air components of the Thai, Laotian, and Vietnamese Forces conducted concurrent campaigns that were outside any US command structure but which contributed to the common objective of defeating communist aggression.

This portion of the History discusses the air campaigns from the viewpoint of CINCPAC; further details will be found in Annexes A and B, and in the histories prepared by the Services.

ROLLING THUNDER

Policy and Operations, January - May

As 1966 opened, North Vietnam's airspace was free of US combat air operations. This suspension began about Christmas of 1965 in connection with US peace overtures. It lasted until 31 January 1966 when, the peace efforts having failed, limited ROLLING THUNDER strikes and armed reconnaissance operations were resumed.

During the pause, both friendly and enemy forces were deeply involved in actions preparing for the resumption of combat operations. On the US side this consisted of photographic reconnaissance
and analysis of the information obtained. The enemy preparatory activity involved reconstructing and improving LOCs, improving and increasing air defense of important areas, dispersing the military support base, and pushing a large number of trucks and supplies toward the infiltration corridors leading into Laos. Some 40 additional air defense positions were added in the vicinity of the northwest rail line. Similarly, an increase of 26 guns protecting the LOC south of Vinh was noted.¹

The photography accomplished during the pause was of great value in determining enemy activity, and was of material aid in planning future strikes. Additionally, analysis of the enemy effort expended to rehabilitate certain LOCs indicated the value the enemy assigned to the various routes. It was therefore possible to delete certain routes from the category of primary LOC.

The 31 January resumption of ROLLING THUNDER operations apparently came as no surprise to the North Vietnamese, because the LOC associated activity resumed "normal" night time and dispersal procedures several days prior to this date.² News media were quite speculative near the end of the pause and there were many political and other developments which forewarned that the period of relative quiet was about to end.

On 12 January, during the stand-down of offensive air operations against North Vietnam, Admiral Sharp submitted to the JCS a detailed discussion of the relationship of military operations in North Vietnam to the overall strategy of the war in South Vietnam.³ In this he noted that plans should be made to resume effective operations against North Vietnam if negotiations did not bring an early cease-fire.

CINCPAC stated that it was therefore essential to recognize the vital relationship of military operations against the NVA, and he noted that this overall strategy was based on three undertakings: (1) to deny to the communists in South Vietnam the effective NVA direction and assistance so vital to their war-making capability; (2) to assist the GVN in providing the protection of the South Vietnamese people from

1. CINCPACAF It r DOPL, 17 Feb 66, CPRS 0001077-66
2. CINCPACFLTF ser 32/001702, 15 Feb 66, CPRS 001384-66
3. CINCPAC 120205Z Jan 66; see also JCSM-16-66, 8 Jan 66
communist subversion and oppression, to liberate areas dominated by the Viet Cong, and to assist in the establishment of a stable economy and the continuation of an independent non-communist government; and (3) to defeat the Viet Cong and NVA Forces and destroy their base areas in the RVN.

(7) Admiral Sharp also noted that it was necessary to achieve success in each of these three elements of strategy and necessary that each of the three undertakings be subject to a simultaneous application of appropriate military force.

(TS) The first undertaking--to deny the communists in South Vietnam effective North Vietnamese direction and assistance--was what CINCPAC advocated as the guideline for the renewed air campaign. The air campaign should be conducted so as to accomplish this undertaking most effectively.

(3) External assistance that maintained North Vietnam's capability to sustain effective internal military operations and external aggression must be denied; the resources already in North Vietnam and most needed to support aggression should be destroyed in depth; and all known military material and facilities should be destroyed, and military activities and movements should be continuously harassed and disrupted. The foregoing, CINCPAC noted, would require operations quite different from those before the cease-fire.

(S) After reviewing the situation at the beginning of ROLLING THUNDER, CINCPAC reminded the JCS that in February 1965 he had pointed out that the "threat" of destruction of the capital resources of North Vietnam would probably not bring Hanoi to the conference table, and that Ho Chi Minh would view the prospect of eventual defeat in South Vietnam as the one unacceptable threat to his long-term objectives. CINCPAC had noted at that time that the immediate ROLLING THUNDER objective should be "to make it as difficult and as costly as possible for NVN to continue effective support of the VC and Pathet Lao, thereby contributing directly to our ultimate objective of winning in SVN."

(TS) ROLLING THUNDER had nevertheless been conducted in a manner to cause Hanoi to "decide" to cease support of the Viet Cong and Pathet Lao.
(TS) While recognizing limited achievements in the air campaign, CINCPAC stated that the important fact was that the nature of the war had changed since the air campaign began. ROLLING THUNDER had not forced Hanoi to the decision sought, and indications were that Ho Chi Minh intended to continue to support the Viet Cong until he was denied the capability to do so.

(CS) CINCPAC then stated his belief that air operations against North Vietnam should be resumed as one of the three main elements of the strategy in Vietnam. With due regard to the President's intention not to destroy the North Vietnamese people and nation, CINCPAC further stated that we should use all available force to eliminate Hanoi's capability to support the Viet Cong. A complementary course in South Vietnam would be to employ the combined military force to better protect the South Vietnamese people, liberate areas dominated by the Viet Cong, institute and maintain a pacification-rural construction program, destroy enemy base areas, and defeat the enemy's regular military forces. The most rapid progress toward achieving US objectives would come from success in all three elements of this strategy.

(CE) In closing, CINCPAC observed that these three tasks, well done, would either bring the enemy to the conference table or cause the insurgency to wither from lack of support. The alternative appeared to be a long and costly counterinsurgency—costly in lives and material resources.

(5) ROLLING THUNDER 48 extended from 31 January to the end of February. Weather was an effective limiting factor throughout the period; during the first 10 days almost half of the scheduled photographic reconnaissance sorties were cancelled because of the weather, and more than 25 percent of those flown were unsuccessful because of it. Weather also caused a high percentage of cancellations or diversions, and greatly limited the information for bomb damage assessment.

(5) Most ROLLING THUNDER operations during this period were

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1. CINCPACAF ltr DOPL, 17 Feb 66, CPRS 0001077-66

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limited to the four southern Route Packages, and by the end of the month there was little to report in the way of results. A fixed-target strike was conducted against JCS Target 2 (Dien Bien Phu Airfield) on 5 February, and this same target was struck several times thereafter.

Results of armed reconnaissance operations against fleeting targets are depicted in the illustration entitled "Moving Targets Destroyed - Damaged by ROLLING THUNDER Armed Recce." Note, however, that the results for February 1966 were substantially below the 1965 monthly average in terms of trucks, railroad rolling stock, and watercraft.

By the end of February, the results obtained through ROLLING THUNDER offered very little evidence of progress toward the objective of the program. Diversions from ROLLING THUNDER helped increase the sorties flown in Laos during January and February, and with comparatively good weather and the use of forward air controllers there was a significant increase in the number of trucks destroyed or damaged.

March weather was slightly better than February, with an occasional day of good visibility throughout the ROLLING THUNDER area. More often, however, pilots found 100 percent cloud cover or haze to 12,000 or 14,000 feet. This caused a high rate of cancellations and more diversions to targets in Laos where, on occasion, there were so many that the forward air controllers were unable to use all of them profitably. Even so, the rate of damage to fleeting targets in the ROLLING THUNDER area improved significantly.

In March, General Westmoreland urgently requested authority to bring military power to bear on the enemy approaches to the battlefield for which he was responsible. CINCPAC's 1 April Basic Operation Order for ROLLING THUNDER and IRON HAND thus assigned COMUSMACV primary responsibility for armed photo reconnaissance and intelligence analysis in Route Package 1 in North Vietnam. 2

1. See illustration entitled "ROLLING THUNDER Route Packages."
2. CINCPAC 010200Z Apr 66; CINCPAC 190452Z Mar 66; CINCPAC 190326Z Apr 66; CINCPAC 262337Z Mar 66
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<td>205</td>
<td>803</td>
<td>951</td>
<td>632</td>
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</table>

| TOTAL | 14553 | 135 | 2818 | 4462 | 5360 | 4464 | 7630 | 9806 | 11683 | 12206 | 8810 | 7118 | 6479 |

**Note:** RT 47 never executed.

### Diagram:

**Rolling Thunder Armed Reece**

**by**

**Destroyed-Damaged Moving Targets**
remove any doubt about where the emphasis might lay, Secretary McNamara stated on 16 April that operations north of Route Package 1 would be conducted only when they could be performed without penalty to required operations in the "extended battlefield," i.e., South Vietnam, Laos, and Route Package 1.  

ROLLING THUNDER 50, effective 1 April, directed planning and preparation for attacks against significant targets including the Viet Tri Railroad-Highway Bridge, the Haiphong Thermal Power Plant, the Haiphong Cement Plant, and POL storage at Haiphong, Hanoi, Nguyen Ke, Bac Giang, Do Son, and Duong Nham. 2 Another important target was the early warning-ground control intercept radar at Kep, a facility that supported the area's air defense. Authority to strike these targets was to be rendered separately, however. There was some hope that this authority might survive the hazards of the Washington scene and reach the operational commanders, but it didn't. In late April, ROLLING THUNDER 50 was indefinitely extended, and at that time the strikes on the 10 significant targets listed above had not been authorized. 3  

Indeed, the virtual disintegration of Government authority in the northern portion of South Vietnam served to discourage any innovation, even one that would enhance the military effectiveness of the air campaign.  

In late May a CINCUSARPAC study (Project ALPHA) suggested a targeting concept that fairly well validated the armed reconnaissance operating procedures followed since January. 4 This concept included the following:  

1. Attack trucks wherever found, but look for them primarily in the highlands.  
2. Concentrate on motorized watercraft in the lowlands.  
3. Concentrate installation attacks at points where modes of transport change.  
4. Concentrate attacks on LOC targets in the highlands area.

1. SEC DEF 8689/162292Z Apr 66  
2. JCS 7480/010112Z Apr 66  
3. JCS 9326/261842Z Apr 66; CINC PAC 040447Z May 66  
4. CINC PAC 2204332Z Jan 66
One of Admiral Sharp's messages to the JCS discussed the CINCUSARPAC study and underscored the point that the main question remaining was the degree of effort that should be applied against the various target elements; for example, against trucks in the highlands as compared with watercraft in the lowlands. He noted that past operations had been well balanced between trucking support activity in Laos (where forward air controllers could operate) and watercraft and transhipment points in North Vietnam (where the return per sortie was high).

CINCAPAC further noted that the coming rains in Laos might upset this balance, and he proposed that some of our effort should move out of Laos to the dry side of the highlands in North Vietnam to maintain pressure on the trucks, these being a key link.

After commenting on the trend of North Vietnam to disperse materiel into less remunerative targets, he stated his hope that June would see a modification of rules to permit strikes on key POL targets, and on selected targets in the Hon Gai and Cam Pha complexes, and relaxation of restrictions on coastal armed reconnaissance in the northeast.

Admiral Sharp also suggested that ROLLING THUNDER effectiveness would be enhanced by a reduction of the US-created sanctuaries around Hanoi and Haiphong. He further noted that 8 of the targets in ROLLING THUNDER 50 were within the sanctuaries, and that authorization to attack these would effectively shrink the circles.  

Specific advantages CINCAPAC foresaw from early strikes against the North Vietnamese POL targets were that they would:

1. Underscore our resolve to continue our support of the GVN.
2. Increase North Vietnam's difficulty in dispersing POL assets.
3. Limit use of trucks and motorized watercraft.
4. Have a critical impact on Hanoi's thinking at a time when they were perhaps hopeful of some seasonal success by their forces mounting from bases in Laos and Cambodia.

1. CINCAPAC 080757Z Jun 66
2. CINCAPAC 060805Z Jun 66

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(76) On 7 June CINCPAC restated, for clarity, his policy on the priority of effort and allocation of resources for air operations in Southeast Asia. This included reiteration that support within South Vietnam continued as the first priority task. One reason for restating the policy was to confirm the carrier-based aircraft support that COMUSMACV could count on. In this respect, CINCPAC specified that one CINCPACFLT attack aircraft carrier from DIXIE STATION would support the in-country air effort until further notice.¹,² Should this prove insufficient, it would be appropriate for COMUSMACV to request additional carrier aircraft support from CINCPAC.

(76) The 10 fixed targets specified by ROLLING THUNDER 50 proved sacrosanct through early June, when an 11th target—Phuc Yen POL Storage—was added.³ Soon thereafter, Washington agencies began an intensive search for techniques that would minimize civilian casualties during strikes on POL storage at Haiphong and Hanoi and at the Haiphong Thermal Power and Cement Plants.

(76) Then on 23 June CINCPAC received the authority to conduct air strikes, after first light on 24 June Saigon time, on seven POL storage facilities and the Kep radar.⁴ It was specifically directed that same-day strikes against the POL facilities at Hanoi and Haiphong would initiate ROLLING THUNDER 50 ALPHA. Special care was to be taken to avoid damaging merchant shipping when attacking the Haiphong target. The following exceptional steps were taken to minimize casualties among enemy civilians and the friendly operating force:⁵

1. Maximum use of individuals most experienced in operations in the target area.

2. Detailed briefing of pilots, stressing the need to avoid civilian casualties.

3. Selecting weather that would promote visual target identification and strike accuracy.

1. CINCPAC 070309Z Jun 66
2. Other policy provisions were related to carrier aircraft and Vietnamese Air Force participation in out-of-country tasks, and to the priority for ARC LIGHT effort.
3. CINCPAC 092240Z Jun 66
4. CINCPAC 222352Z Jun 66
5. CINCPAC 230943Z Jun 66
4. Selecting the best axis of attack to avoid populated areas to the maximum extent feasible.
5. Maximum effort to reduce pilot distraction so as to improve delivery accuracy.
6. Weapons selected on the basis of highest precision of delivery consistent with mission objectives.
7. Air defense suppression strikes limited to sparsely populated areas so as to minimize civilian casualties.
8. Special precautions to insure security of the information pertaining to these operations.
9. Personal attention by commanders to accomplishment of ROLLING THUNDER 50 ALPHA.

Special measures were also devised to assure a rapid flow of unusually detailed information to Washington. ¹

(U) Despite special precautions to insure the security of information pertaining to these operations, news media carried essential strike details at almost the same time the POL strikes were authorized. This prompted a postponement of the strikes, deferring damage to North Vietnam's most basic resource for maintaining the military effort. ²

(FO) Shortly after noon on 30 June, the program against POL facilities was finally launched with strikes on stores at Hanoi and Haiphong. About 95 percent damage was achieved by the Hanoi strike, and an almost equal level was obtained after a second strike at Haiphong.³

(FO) In retrospect, it seems apparent that the June-initiated effort against POL stores and facilities was at least five months late—with a corresponding delay in the date when the action might achieve a militarily significant result.⁴

(FO) The POL system of North Vietnam was the primary target of ROLLING THUNDER 51. CINCPAC therefore promulgated a plan of action in late July to accomplish the maximum feasible POL system destruction while yet assuring a balanced effort against other North

1. CINCPAC 240315Z Jun 66
2. CINCPAC 252117Z Jun 66
3. CINCPAC 290148Z Jul 66; CINCPAC 310403Z Jul 66; CINCPAC 060845Z Jul 66
4. CINCPAC 150101Z Nov 65 had recommended essentially the same anti-POL program for ROLLING THUNDER 42/43.
Vietnamese elements and their military capability to support the Viet Cong. In it he stated four basic and interrelated requirements for POL destruction.

First of these was the destruction, to the extent feasible, of North Vietnam's means of POL importation. Second was the destruction of permanent fixed POL installations, which held the bulk of the POL remaining in North Vietnam. Third was the destruction of POL targets of a transitory nature; those moving on the roads and waterways, and the dispersed stocks that could be moved easily. These transitory stores were extremely expensive in terms of sorties, but the fleeting nature of the target required that it receive priority time-wise. In this regard, CINCPAC noted the importance of destroying vehicles, rolling stock, and watercraft whether related to POL or not.

The fourth element in the POL destruction plan was a reconnaissance program designed to develop intelligence concerning the overall POL system in North Vietnam. This was not to be a separate program, since most POL reconnaissance requirements would be met through regularly scheduled reconnaissance with POL as a required first read-out objective.

Other specific CINCPAC recommendations were also submitted with the objective of aiding the overall POL program. These involved the destruction of dredges in the Haiphong area; air strikes to cause foreign tankers to consider it inadvisable to bring their cargoes to North Vietnamese ports; strikes against major POL storage facilities at Phuc Yen and Kep; and consideration of strikes against the Xom Trung Hoa lock and dam, installations that were important to water control associated with inland waterway traffic but not directly related to any agrarian function.

CINCPAC observed that the success of his recommended program could not be assured within a short time, but he noted that it would be effective as our intelligence efforts discovered the pattern of POL movement.

On 8 August CINCPAC reiterated his proposal, noting that

1. CINCPAC 242059Z Jul 66

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the overall POL plan effectiveness would be enhanced by the addition of Phuc Yen and Kep POL storage facilities (nearly one-third of the remaining North Vietnamese capacity), the Thanh Hoa lock and Xom Trung Hoa lock and dam, Haiphong dredges located away from populated areas, and especially selected targets that would encourage foreign reluctance to have their ships exposed to the carefully regulated hazards of air strikes. Critical elements of the Thai Nguyen Iron and Steel Combine were recommended on the same day as an appropriate target. This plant was the confirmed source of POL tanks and bridge trusses. Nevertheless, the only fixed targets for ROLLING TUNDER 51 were bridges and a bypass. 2

**Operations Highlights, June - December**

**POL:** (S) While the campaign against North Vietnamese POL stores was underway, Soviet tankers made regular deliveries of POL stocks to North Vietnam. These ships were exempt from attack, and the burden was thus placed on US operating forces to intercept the POL after it was unloaded and before it was dispersed. As an example, on 10 August the 478-foot tanker KOMOSOL was observed near the port of Hon Gai with two POL barges alongside, and with three POL barges alongside on 12 August.

(6) Later on 12 August four barges under tow were seen heading away from the KOMOSOL. Air strikes that evening set fire to three of these but the fourth suffered only light damage.

(6) Other tankers were unloaded into barges and dispersed without being intercepted, however. A total of more than 20,000 tons of gasoline or diesel fuel from the BUGURUSLAN and MOSKOVSKIY FESTIVAL escaped in this manner.

**Ninh Binh:** (6) From 14 to 19 September, 90 strikes were executed against the Ninh Binh complex with results that included rendering both railroad bridges north of town unserviceable. This cut off the escape of cargo-laden rolling stock, and North Vietnam

1. CINCPAC 081937Z Aug 66
2. CINCPAC 080730Z Jul 66
3. ROLLING THUNDER Digest 1-66, CPRS 001465-67 and 2-66 CPRS
   The Digest is a quarterly publication of CINCPAC's Operations Division.
massed about 60 trucks to attempt to save the material. On 18 September strike aircraft reported destroying 30 of these trucks, and numerous secondary explosions and fires were reported throughout the period, with approximately 100 rail units destroyed or damaged.

**Thanh Hoa:** (3) The Navy employed similar tactics at the Thanh Hoa logistics center during the period 21 to 25 September, with the result that about 150 rail cars were trapped. In the 4-day period there were at least 107 strikes with a concurrent assessment of damage to determine areas for restrike. Eighty rail units were destroyed or damaged in the rail yard many as a result of secondary explosions and fires caused by the strikes against the trapped rolling stock.

**USS ORISKANY:** (5) Because of a serious fire on USS ORISKANY in October, there were only two aircraft carriers on YANKEE STATION for a short period late in the month. With the arrival of USS CORAL SEA on 31 October, however, the normal three carriers were on station.

**Northwest Railroad Interdiction:** (5) During the last few days of September and the earliest portion of October, interdiction of the northwest railroad (Rail Line 1) was extremely successful. In an 11-day period, the Khe Se railroad bridge was blown off its abutments and into the river bed; on its northern approach, 200 feet of track were destroyed. The Lang Quack Ngoai railroad bridge was destroyed, and the Lang Khay railroad bridge was severely damaged. Structural damage was inflicted on the Pho Hop and Lang Bun railroad bridges. Successful interdiction was achieved on the Ky Dong railroad spur, the eastern choke point of the Ga Ngoai Hop railroad yard, both choke points at the Dong Cuong railroad yard, and an approach to the Trai Hut railroad bridge.

(5) The above interdiction effort, consisting of 50 strike sorties, precluded through traffic during October, and 62 rail cars were either destroyed or damaged.

**Viet Tri Complex:** (5) The Viet Tri railroad yard and the Viet Tri ferry complex were struck during November. This effort was designed to further impede traffic flow adjacent to the previously destroyed Viet Tri railroad and highway bridge. Bomb damage assessment photography indicated that 325 feet of pontoon highway bridge were either destroyed
or severely damaged at the ferry complex, 14 pieces of rolling stock
trapped, 2 of the 4 through tracks interdicted within the rail yard, and
a large warehouse and 3 support buildings destroyed.

Ha Gia POL Storage Site: (J) This was a major target in Route
Package 6A and was first struck 22 November. A large secondary
explosion and fireball were reported in one area of the target, and
black smoke from another area of the target could be seen from a
distance of more than 100 nautical miles within 25 minutes after the
strike.

Truck Convoys: (J) Air Force armed reconnaissance aircraft
located a truck convoy in Route Package 2 near Ky Anh on 3 November.
While this force was destroying 24 vehicles, word was passed to Task
Force 77 and within approximately one hour Navy strike aircraft were
over the area. They destroyed eight more trucks and damaged two
during the ensuing attack. An hour later, additional Navy aircraft
arrived and destroyed two vehicles and damaged four. A fourth group
of aircraft destroyed one truck to bring the total destroyed or damaged
vehicles to 41. During the night, other aircraft struck nine trucks in
the area, obtained one large secondary explosion, and left four trucks
burning.

(J) On 6 November USAF pilots located a second convoy in the
vicinity of Ha Tinh. Under marginal weather conditions, Navy and Air
Force aircraft attacked 36 vehicles with a known total of 20 destroyed
or damaged trucks.

(J) Through direct coordination on 7 November, Navy and Air
Force aircraft struck a 50 to 75-truck convoy along Route 1A in the
Song Gia Hoi area. Results were 10 vehicles destroyed and 5 damaged.
Weather precluded further significant damage.

Route 15: (S) The Nuy Caay interdiction point near Mu Gia Pass
was a primary target in December, receiving 28 strikes by tactical
aircraft and 1 strike by B-52s. The Nuy Caay highway segment
received daily strikes from 15 November to 18 December, with an
associated drop in the number of vehicles sighted.

Yen Vien Rail Classification Yard: (J) This target was first
struck on 4 December with results that included secondary explosions and fires. After additional strikes on 13 and 14 December, bomb damage assessment of the area revealed 1 locomotive destroyed, 6 buildings destroyed and 12 damaged, interdiction of a single rail at the turning wye, 46 secondary buildings destroyed and 60 damaged, and 11 cars with POL-type drums destroyed.

**Van Dien Vehicle Depot:** This target was struck 6 times between 2 and 14 December with the result that 72 buildings were destroyed and 54 were damaged out of the 184 buildings in the complex. At the end of the year it was considered that this facility was no longer capable of performing its function.

**Hanoi Success:** The Hanoi reaction to strikes on the Van Dien motor vehicle depot (2 and 14 December) and the Yen Vien railroad classification yard (4 December), both near the city of Hanoi, was prompt, vociferous, and effective. Claims of civilian casualties and damage to civilian structures resulted in a suspension of further US strikes against JCS fixed targets through the end of the year.

**Unauthorized Targets Struck Inadvertently**

(FS) Certain key targets in North Vietnam were exempt from strikes, by JCS direction. Extremely close control was exercised to preserve these, but during early July two of these special targets, the Thai Nguyen Thermal Power Plant and the Viet Tri Thermal Power Plant, were struck inadvertently. In both instances F-105 pilots were maneuvering to evade enemy ground fire in their primary target areas, which were in the proximity of the exempt targets.

**Rules of Engagement**

(FS) Because of increased MIG activity in North Vietnam, the rules of engagement for ROLLING THUNDER were changed in early April to simplify the process of identifying aircraft as friend or foe. CINCPAC specified that visual identification of aircraft over North Vietnam was unnecessary unless there was a possibility that the aircraft was friendly or a civilian or International Control Commission aircraft.

1. CINCPAC 300335Z Jul 66
2. CINCPAC 060200Z Apr 66
Naval gunfire against shore targets in North Vietnam was not authorized. Within the potential range of this fire, the enemy exacted a toll of aircraft, pilots, and crewmen throughout the year. An exception to the no-fire rule was made for search and rescue operations or for defense of SEA DRAGON units.

Attrition Rates and Target Base

The aircraft loss rates in northeastern North Vietnam (Route Packages 6A and 6B) were eight or more times the rate for other Route Packages. Most of these losses occurred during interdiction operations against targets that were readily repairable, e.g., the northeast/northwest railroads.

The inescapable conclusion was that the risk factor in the northeast was sufficiently high that air operations should be directed toward lucrative targets only, such as the steel plant at Thai Nguyen; the chemical plant at Viet Tri; power sources at Haiphong, Hanoi, and Hon Gay; and port facilities at Haiphong. But by national policy these were exempt from strikes.

This balancing of the comparison of results and costs was one of the major considerations that prompted CINCPAC to seek to establish a broader target base in the northeast.

Armed Reconnaissance

Over an extended period of time CINCPAC had urged CINCPACFLT and CINCPACAF to direct armed reconnaissance against lucrative dispersed and isolated targets and selected LOC elements. Performance was nevertheless below his expectations until about October when this new concept of armed reconnaissance was implemented by CINCPACFLT and enthusiastically endorsed by Navy operational commanders.

1. Point Paper, J381, 3 Jan 67; See "SEA DRAGON" elsewhere in this Chapter
2. See table entitled "US Aircraft Attrition Rates, January-September 1966"
US AIRCRAFT ATTRITION RATES
January - September 1966

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Route Package</th>
<th>Attack Sorties (thousands)</th>
<th>Losses</th>
<th>Loss (Attack) Rate (percent)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Attack</td>
<td>Other</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>23.9</td>
<td>43</td>
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<td>9.4</td>
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<td>14</td>
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<td>1 through 5</td>
<td>49.4</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>25</td>
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<tr>
<td>6A and 6B</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
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</table>

Non Attack Sortie Loss Rate

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Losses</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 1 through 5         | 49.4   | 25               | .05
| 6A and 6B           | 3.7    | 17               | .46
### SUMMARY OF US AIRCRAFT LOSSES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

**(Army - Navy - Air Force)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<td>1965</td>
<td>168</td>
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<td>355</td>
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<tr>
<td>1965 (1 Jul - 31 Dec)</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
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<td>1966</td>
<td>284</td>
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<td>95</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>201</td>
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<td>315*</td>
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<tr>
<td>1965-66 Total</td>
<td>452</td>
<td>59*</td>
<td>169</td>
<td>66*</td>
<td>292</td>
<td>180*</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>992</td>
<td>315*</td>
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<td>Totals</td>
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<td>1,307</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Incomplete total.

Data from CINCPAC Weekly Summary of Aircraft Attrition, Tables 15, 16, 25, 26, 35, 36, 45, and 46. Revised to 2 Mar 67.
A systematic and increasingly effective armed reconnaissance effort was thereafter directed against the following type targets in North Vietnam:

Logistic Center: A major distribution and support center, e.g., Vinh. Of vital importance for the receipt and distribution of supplies moved by road, rail, inland waterway, and coastal shipping. Ferries, junk, trucks, and rail cars concentrated activities in such areas at night. Docks, storage areas, and truck parks were necessarily located in such areas if the enemy was to maintain logistic flow.

LOC Hub: A major LOC junction through which rail, road, and waterway traffic flowed. To maintain traffic flow with any reasonable efficiency, storage areas, truck parks, ferries, and construction equipment must be located nearby.

Dispersed and Isolated Targets: Military facilities dispersed and hidden away some distance from LOCs. Enemy military activity and logistic support could be expected to remain in such configuration.

Segment Objective: Vulnerable and heavily traveled segments of key infiltration routes. These were motorable roads leading into Laos, and the rail lines and coastal highway, where through traffic could be blocked by day or night operations. Recognizing that this could not be completely successful with available area-denial weapons, it was expected that means would be developed to accomplish this when the enemy's need and our capability were increased.

Selected Interdiction Point: Carefully selected and vulnerable LOC support facilities outside of logistic centers and LOC hubs. These were strategically located and hard to bypass points on major inland routes. One of the best indicators of these points was the effort expended by the enemy to keep them open.

North Vietnamese Accommodation to the Limited Air Campaign

(T3) During the 24 December 1965 to 31 January 1966 stand-down, CINCPAC analyzed the evidence pertaining to the results of air operations in North Vietnam. It was concluded that during the first half of 1965, in its early period, ROLLING THUNDER had a tremendous

1. First defined in CINCPAC 130033Z Jan 66
psychological and physical impact on North Vietnam. There had been confusion, disorganization, and a marked lack of capability to cope with interdiction. During this period, however, the enemy was busy dispersing all activities and digging in. In consultation with its allies, the North Vietnamese Government assessed the situation and set about the tasks of reconstruction and other means of adjusting to the scope and tempo of the US air strike effort. This process of accommodation was aided by the failure of the US effort to exert increasing pressure.

(5) During the second half of 1965 reconstruction of LOCs was made a national strategic task, and the resulting actions were so effective after July that even increased sortie authorizations did not succeed in extending the effectiveness of the armed reconnaissance program. September weather adversely affected armed reconnaissance, and at the same time attacks on the most significant targets declined. North Vietnamese military forces had meantime dispersed and reorganized; the enemy's population control was tight; construction camps with equipment, material, and workers were prepositioned at key points; and the directing organization was functioning smoothly.

(7) During the January 1966 stand-down the enemy significantly improved his LOCs. At the Nam Muan highway bridge on Route 82 near Vinh, for example, a third bypass was constructed around the destroyed bridge. Repair gangs and prefabricated repair parts were positioned nearby for a quick-reaction repair capability. Similar preparatory measures were taken at hundreds of other vulnerable bridge sites, and the enemy also moved a large number of trucks and supplies over key infiltration routes leading into Laos. 1

Evaluation of Air Operations in North Vietnam

(U) Admiral Sharp's evaluation of 1966 US air operations in North Vietnam was clearly stated on 12 January 1967 in connection with Chairman of the JCS, General Earle Wheeler's visit to Camp Smith. This portion of the History is based on the briefings and discussions that took place at that time.

1. ROLLING THUNDER portion of presentation (draft) by CINCPAC J2 to Air Command and Staff College, Apr 66, dated 8 Mar 66 and reviewed by CINCPAC. Copy in CINCPAC History Branch files. See also JCS 2343/737, CPRS 001-66 and CINCPAC J3 Brief 5, 7 Jan 66; CINCPAC 262330Z Nov 66

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The objective of air operations in 1966 was to bring increasing pressure on North Vietnam so as to cause it to cease supporting, controlling, and directing insurgencies in Southeast Asia. Tasks to accomplish this objective were three: (1) reduce or deny external assistance; (2) increase pressures by destroying in depth those resources that contributed most to support the aggression; and (3) harass, disrupt, and impede movement of men and materials to South Vietnam.

Broadly, these three tasks were interdependent and required an integrated targeting concept that would contribute to their collective accomplishment. This concept had been presented to Secretary McNamara on 8 February 1966. It was reviewed with him in June in a progress report, and it was then pointed out that much of what CINCPAC had proposed had not been authorized.\textsuperscript{1} Nor was it authorized by the end of the year. The efforts directed toward accomplishing the individual tasks, and the successes achieved, were as follows:

Reduce or deny external assistance: Very little was accomplished on this task. Haiphong was out of bounds except for strikes against POL stores and facilities. This meant that the port was almost undisturbed while it handled 85 percent of North Vietnam's 1966 imports, to include a broad range of war-making materiel. This free flow of external assistance through Haiphong reduced the value of the northeast rail line, which, if Haiphong were closed, would be a significant alternate means of importing aid through China. Since this rail facility was heavily defended, the risk of attacking it was not commensurate with the results that could be achieved.

Increase Pressure by Destroying in Depth Those Resources that Contributed Most to Support the Aggression: The results achieved were minor in comparison to what could have been accomplished. Of 104 JCS-numbered targets (i.e., those that required JCS approval for strike) in the northeast, 19 were struck in 1965 and 20 in 1966. Eight of the latter were bridges, and on the basis of experience it was known that this type

\textsuperscript{1} See also Tab A to Annex A to Appendix A CINCPAC ltr ser 000255, 18 Jun 66
of target was easily bypassed or repaired, so these could hardly be termed vital to North Vietnam's war effort.

Harass, Disrupt, and Impede Movement of Men and Materials to South Vietnam: This task absorbed the greatest proportion of effort and was effective, although men and material nevertheless continued to flow into South Vietnam in quantities that were perhaps greater than in 1965. But this movement required an ever mounting and prodigious effort and involved severe losses of rolling stock, vehicles, watercraft, and manpower. More important, armed reconnaissance in conjunction with ground and sea anti-infiltration measures aided the Ground Forces in their success against an enemy who had been unable to win one victory or make one effective defensive stand in South Vietnam during 1966. The enemy had been forced to make increasing use of sanctuaries in Laos, Cambodia, and the DMZ.

Sortie Utilization: Less than one percent of some 81,000 attack sorties were against JCS-numbered targets in 1966. Yet this pitifully small number struck a nerve. For example, the July POL strikes and the December strikes against the Van Vien Motor Depot brought cries of anguish from Hanoi. Armed reconnaissance absorbed the remaining 99 percent of the attack sorties, with the bulk of these devoted to LOC harassment and disruption.

Application of Pressure Against the North Vietnamese: The 1966 application of pressure was erratic and certainly there was no steady increase. First, there was the January stand-down, then only armed reconnaissance during February and March, and the April through June JCS-authorized targets were bridges. The year's pressure climax occurred in July when strikes were conducted against the major POL targets. No new lucrative targets were authorized until 12 November, and six of these were immediately deferred. Two others were deferred after the job was only partially accomplished.

The Tasks: The tasks undertaken in 1966 were sound, but self-generated US constraints precluded the effective use of available air power in their execution. CINCPAC termed the 1966 tasks as valid and

1. See illustration entitled "NVN Strike Sorties Flown"
NVN
STRIKE SORTIES FLOWN
1966

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>JAN</th>
<th>FEB</th>
<th>MAR</th>
<th>APR</th>
<th>MAY</th>
<th>JUN</th>
<th>JUL</th>
<th>AUG</th>
<th>SEP</th>
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<th>NOV</th>
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<td>9806</td>
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<td>12206</td>
<td>8810</td>
<td>7188</td>
<td>6479</td>
<td>81,041</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

[Graph showing bar chart with monthly totals for Armed, Recce, and TGTs]

SOURCE: CINC PAC J3 BRIEFING NOTES
applicable to 1967, but he emphasized that increased pressure must be applied to assure their accomplishment. He further noted that the lack of a definite goal would not achieve the objective. Hanoi must be convinced that there was an end in sight and that this end was clearly that of an unacceptable level of destruction in North Vietnam.

Concept of 1967 Air Operations

Near the end of the year CINCPAC was formulating a long-term concept of air operations that would achieve the US objectives. This concept emphasized target systems, but more importantly it stressed a steady weight of effort on a continuing basis. The peaks and valleys typical of 1966 operations were to be avoided, precluding the sporadic approach so typical of 1966 strikes against lucrative targets, which was utilized so effectively in North Vietnam's propaganda campaigns. Each peak in 1966 operations had prompted an outburst of enemy propaganda, which occasionally produced a partial stand-down by US Forces. Each subsequent renewal was called escalation by North Vietnam and provided additional fuel for the propaganda machinery.

Although armed reconnaissance would continue to absorb most of the effort, the main objective would be to apply steady pressure to destroy the enemy's war-making potential and to deny or reduce his external support. Analysis of the target structure indicated six basic target systems: electric power, war-supporting industry, transportation support facilities, military complexes, petroleum facilities, and Haiphong and other ports.

Program effectiveness would depend on target approval by higher authority than CINCPAC as most of the targets associated with these systems were either located within the restricted Hanoi-Haiphong areas or were JCS-numbered targets that had not previously been authorized for strike. A dynamic targeting process, not previously achieved, would also be necessary to provide for restrikes or for new targets that would gain significance from the results achieved in operations. Perhaps the key element in the success of the evolving concept was the reduction of North Vietnam's import capability, which, in light of the upheaval in China, rested in the operations of the port of Haiphong.
SECRET

Tactical Air Program, Southeast Asia

In June CINCPAC forwarded his concept for the air campaign in Southeast Asia and requirements for tactical aircraft to successfully prosecute the planned campaign. After the Services stated their capabilities to provide forces, the tactical air program was revised and submitted to the JCS in October. The JCS supported CINCPAC's air program and on 4 November recommended approval of the comprehensive deployment program required to support the CINCPAC concept.1

The Secretary of Defense, however, disapproved the following tactical air deployments affecting the CINCPAC Southeast Asia air program:2

USAFO Thailand
Tactical Fighter Squadrons
RB-66s
A-26s

USAFO South Vietnam
Tactical Fighter Squadrons (to include the replacement for the F-5 squadron to be transferred to the RVN's Air Force in March 1967)
RF-4Cs

USA South Vietnam
Maneuver battalions

In fact, the Secretary of Defense's deployment program for 1967 (termed Program Four) did not approve any additional tactical fighter squadrons for deployment. The Program Four Southeast Asia total for the end of 1967 was as follows:

Tactical Fighter Squadrons (jet)
A-1 Squadrons
A-26 Aircraft
Attack Aircraft Carriers on line

Under Program Four the combat sortie capability in Southeast Asia would average 32,500 per month during 1967. Of this, support

1. JCSM-702-66, 4 Nov 66
2. JCS 2343/855-27, 15 Nov 66

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requirements for the COMUSMACV-recommended maneuver battalion phase-in (108 FWMAF battalions) would average 21,450 per month.

In view of the established priority to insure fulfillment of South Vietnamese sortie requirements, the residual combat sortie capability of 11,050 would be all that was available for the balance of Southeast Asia. The stated CINCPAC requirement for the out-of-country portion of the air campaign was 16,200 combat sorties per month, leaving a deficit of 5,150. A reallocation of sorties could partially offset the deficit, and on-hand resources would permit continuation of approximately the 1966 level of effort in Southeast Asia.

More significant, however, the projected 1967 air assets would not support the intensified out-of-country effort that was basic to the CINCPAC concept for the Southeast Asia air campaign. 1

Surface-to-Air Missiles

CINCPAC called a conference for late October to review all aspects of the SA-2 threat. His purpose was to determine how the threat could be countered with available resources, what additional equipment was needed to cope with the threat, and what the requirements would be if the threat became more sophisticated or increased in scope. The ultimate objective was to eliminate or neutralize the threat so that aircraft could operate using optimum tactics. 2

The history of missile threat development was discussed in one of CINCPACFLT's preconference comments. 3 He noted that US military restraint had allowed the enemy the time, incentive, and access to weapons to convert an initially weak and limited capability into one that contained a dense array of weapons with an integrated central control. CINCPACFLT further pointed out that the SA-2 was usually employed in conjunction with other elements of the air defense system, such as antiaircraft artillery or automatic weapons sites and early warning or ground control intercept radar.

CINCPACFLT recommended more recognition of the fact that the air defense threat was and would continue to be increasing under

1. Point Paper, J311, 23 Nov 66
2. CINCPAC 180054Z Sep 66; CINCPAC 272352Z Sep 66
3. ADMIN CINCPACFLT 140331Z Oct 66
existing restraints and within existing tactical concepts. He further suggested that the time was at hand to reevaluate the relative emphasis on primary objectives.

(76) Commenting on short-term posture, he recommended: (1) continued aggressive employment of available assets and the tactics proved effective in past operations, and (2) continued refinement of anti-SAM tactics and dissemination of the lessons learned.

(75) Reference the long-term posture, CINCPACFLT recommended a concept that placed greater emphasis on the necessity for methodical destruction or neutralization of North Vietnamese air defenses to permit continuation of an aggressive and selective target destruction program. CINCPACFLT proposed an example of such a concept, with the following main features:

1. Concentration on the destruction or neutralization of early warning and ground control intercept radar and associated radar-controlled antiaircraft elements. This would require longer periods of radar (FAN SONG) radiation in the acquisition mode, thereby facilitating faster and more accurate ELINT SAM location. Further, photographic reconnaissance would have increased immunity from antiaircraft artillery and automatic weapons, thus improving the accuracy of SAM location photography. Lastly, MIG ground control intercept radar would be impeded.

2. Concentration on the systematic destruction of SAM sites to enhance US ability to conduct an aggressive air strike program with a reduced loss factor.

3. Permit attacks on missile assembly and checkout facilities and storage areas regardless of their location in North Vietnam.

4. Study the possibility of utilizing other missiles, such as TALOS, which could be adapted to provide a significant anti-radar capability.

5. Continue investigation of SHRIKE modifications, perhaps to include marker heads and a memory feature with an expanded frequency coverage for use against acquisition radars.

6. Assign highest priority to certain command and control systems (under development) that would permit nearly instantaneous read-out of emission sources and pinpoint site locations.

(74) CINCPACAF's preconference comments noted that nullification actions against the SA-2 threat fell into three interdependent

1. CINCPACAF 30442/152045Z Oct 66

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areas as follows: (1) acquisition and destruction; (2) tactics to circumvent or evade; and (3) passive means, such as Radar Homing and Warning (RHAW) and electronic countermeasures, and perhaps an increase of the fear of detection when firing.

(TS) Much of the existing threat he attributed to past restrictions, sanctuaries, and concepts that had allowed the enemy to build his defense without effective interference. CINCPACAF said that the enemy's extremely effective camouflage and dispersal of missile sites served to frustrate nullifications by destruction. At times IRON HAND flights found SA-2 sites located in populated areas or political sanctuaries.

(TS) Other enemy countermeasures included controlled emissions and multiple firings. CINCPACAF considered it obvious that we had remained one step behind the enemy, and that effective target acquisition and destruction require a marked improvement in equipment, such as an improved SHRIKE missile that could find a short-emission target and then lead pilots to it. Another requirement was ample quantities of area weapons such as the CBU-24 which could complete the destruction. Success in this method would be denied if villages or restricted areas were allowed to continue serving as sanctuaries for sites or control centers.

(TS) Nullification by tactics was classed as a fairly effective interim measure. Radar Homing and Warning was termed the greatest improvement in this area. CINCPACAF felt that every effort must be made to free our forces for the primary job of getting to the target, however.

(TS) Passive means to nullify the threat had been only partially effective until the recent introduction of the QRC 160-1 electronic countermeasures pod. Indications were that this equipment was highly effective, and nullification of the SA-2 threat and radar-controlled antiaircraft artillery might be achieved if the air fleet was completely equipped with it.

(TS) The existing plan for CINCPACAF's forces was to fully exploit the QRC 160-1 pod capability and to counter the probable increase in MIG defense by electronic countermeasures designed to negate the
enemy's ground control intercept capability. Seeking to destroy the SA-2 threat before effective countermeasures could be undertaken, complementary IRON HAND-WILDE WEASEL operations would continue. The improved SHRIKE would be a requirement for this, however.

(75) Next, tactics and Radar Homing and Warning would be further developed to help counter the next step-up in the SA-2 threat. The final element of the plan was to establish a program to destroy SA-2 support facilities, control centers (GCI) and early warning sites. Requirements for this were a SHRIKE that could find and mark early warning radar, and ample stocks of CBU-24s.

(75) Following the SA-2 threat conference CINCPAC forwarded his comments to the JCS. In general the JCS concurred in CINCPAC's proposals, and stated that the Air Force Chief of Staff had been tasked to procure and deploy adequate numbers of QRC 160-1A, SEE SAM, and WIDE BUSH. The Defense Intelligence Agency was directed to provide photo interpretation guides to aid in locating camouflaged transmitter locations.

(75) North Vietnam's SAM defense system operated under some serious disadvantages, which partially explained its poor kill ratio, 26.9 to 1. on manned aircraft as of the end of September. One problem involved the sensitivity of the missiles and associated equipment to the poor roads encountered while the equipment was moved. Another was the long supply line, extending to the USSR, for replacement parts. These items were subject to the normal hazards of our aerial harassment of North Vietnamese LOC; additionally, Soviet materiel moving through China had to survive deliberate delays, pilferage, and the substitution of Chinese material.

SAM Effectiveness

(75) On 8 May, 44 armed reconnaissance sorties were flown in Route Package 6. This was significantly more than usual for the area, and it drew a spectacular but uneconomical response from North Vietnam's SAM defense system.

1. JCS 292044Z Nov 66
2. ROLLING THUNDER Digest 1-66, CPRS 001465-67

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TOP SECRET
US pilots observed 12 SA-2 missiles in flight on this occasion. Some described the SA-2s as looking like telephone poles, slightly tapered at the front and trailed by an orange flame. Evasive action, most often a fast breaking turn to lower altitude, was successful and no aircraft were lost. One missile passed within approximately 40 feet of an aircraft and detonated a safe distance away. In another case a missile passed between A-4C wingmen.1

Because of this and other events involving the SA-2, the Russians subsequently became very sensitive to references to the effectiveness of their missiles.2

SHRIKE Missile Effectiveness

In mid-1966 there was a major effort to acquire and use the SHRIKE missile (AGM-45) during ROLLING THUNDER operations. As of the end of the year there were reports of 415 launchings, 206 by the Navy and 209 by the Air Force. Data to support a conclusive assessment of this weapon was not available, but a study by the CINCPAC Scientific Advisory Group of the results of all launchings indicated the following: 28 percent possible kills, 15 percent probable suppressions, 35 percent probable misses, and 22 percent with unknown results.3

The difficulties of analyzing SHRIKE effectiveness were expressed, in part, by CINCPACFLT as follows:4

"Introduction of the SHRIKE missile has been associated with new attack tactics, and it is impossible to separate the changes in ground defense system behavior due to SHRIKE from those due to changes in tactics, or those due to other devices, such as DECM.5 Nearly identical attack missions with and without SHRIKE support are not available for rigorous analysis of SHRIKE suppression effect."

MIG Threat

September and December 1966 were the months when MIG

1. CINCPACAF 090058Z May 66, CINCPAC Command Center Briefing Notes, 8 May 66
2. JCS 1735/706-36, CPRS 00509-66
4. CINCPACFLT 180031Z Jan 67
5. Deceptive electronic countermeasures.
incidents were highest, also the months when targets near Phuc Yen and Hanoi were attacked. During the 1966 MIG encounters, the loss rates were 1 US aircraft for every 2.8 enemy aircraft destroyed. This favorable ratio had to be considered in connection with other factors to properly assess the threat, however.

(1) Five times during December air-to-air missiles were fired by MIGs at US aircraft—the first known enemy use of these weapons during the war. Additional MIG-21s were introduced into the enemy aircraft inventory during 1966, and North Vietnam was effectively utilizing its ground control intercept radar capability to vector MIGs into firing position. Another consideration was that the MIG caused the diversion of US Forces that might otherwise have been available for strike sorties. For example, Navy practice was to have 28 sorties for protection against MIGs for each 100 strike sorties. Additionally, strike pilots often found it necessary to jettison their bombs when they encountered MIGs.

(2) MIG threat statistics, as of 31 December 1966, were:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Number</th>
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<td>Encounters</td>
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<tr>
<td>Engagements</td>
<td>93</td>
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<td>Enemy losses</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US losses</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. One US aircraft was destroyed.
2. ROLLING THUNDER Digest 2-66

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Air Operations in Laos

(TS) At the beginning of the year US aircraft were conducting armed reconnaissance, interdiction, and photo reconnaissance against selected targets and LOCs in specified areas in Laos. The photo reconnaissance program (nicknamed YANKEE TEAM) under CINCPAC was originally initiated to provide reconnaissance for assessment of the situation and for occasional action by Royal Laoian Forces. The program included visual and weather reconnaissance, low and medium altitude daytime photography, and infra-red and nighttime photographic missions.

(TS) Throughout most of 1966, YANKEE TEAM principally supported air strikes conducted under BARREL ROLL and STEEL TIGER operations. Both of these were strike programs designed to disrupt Pathet Lao, Viet Minh, and North Vietnamese logistic support and enemy logistic flow into South Vietnam, and to cause North Vietnam to cease supporting insurgencies in Southeast Asia. To achieve these objectives in Laos, military air operations were to: (1) destroy the resources already in Laos that contributed to the support of insurgencies in Laos and South Vietnam; (2) destroy or deny use of enemy facilities and LOCs in Laos; (3) harass and disrupt dispersed military operations; and (4) harass, disrupt, and impede movement of men and materials through Laos and into South Vietnam.

(TS) COMUSMACV was charged with the execution of the combat air operations in Laos. The area of operations was as shown on the accompanying illustration entitled "BARREL ROLL/STEEL TIGER Operations Areas, 1 January 1966."

Constraints

(TS) Combat air operations in Laos were conducted under less stringent constraints during 1966 than in the previous year. A desirable degree of flexibility was nevertheless denied by a multitude of regulatory measures originating at various levels of command. Some constraints were of long standing while others were imposed for short periods because of some special consideration. For example, during the late January Vietnamese New Year holidays (Tet), air operations policy forbade South Vietnam-based aircraft striking targets in Laos.
This constraint applied for a short period only, but during this time the only authorized strikes were by aircraft based in Thailand or on carriers. These strikes could, however, be supported by South Vietnam-based forward air controller (FAC) aircraft.¹

(78) Nevertheless, sorties later released by the January standdown of air operations in North Vietnam and diverted to Laos brought the total to a record high of almost 8,000. The results achieved were not commensurate with this new level of effort, however, and the main reason was a lack of targets.

(79) One consideration in this matter was the difficulty of locating targets in the rugged, thickly jungled border region where the bulk of the enemy forces were located. Another, and equally important issue, was the number of civilians in the vicinity of the enemy forces and the extreme difficulty of discriminating friend (or at least non-enemy) from foe. Weather in Laos also imposed a significant operational limitation on the effective application of airpower, particularly during the southwest monsoon.

(79) One view of operational constraints was provided by LTJG Dieter Dengler, a Navy pilot shot down in Laos, captured, and later rescued after escaping from the prison camp where he and other Americans were held. Lieutenant Dengler's debriefing, conducted while he was still hospitalized, weak from his ordeal, and receiving medication contained the following statement:²

"...in Laos there wasn't much of a war, just restriction. You go over there and you are near some guy or you shoot at some guy and you come back, next thing you know you get court martialed for it. The pilots talked to each other and said the hell with it .... I got shot at by the people down there and then you got to call back and say, hey some guy is shooting at me can I roll in. They say heck no you can't roll in. What's the matter with you? Right away you stop shooting there and... a truck down there goes two hundred yards up the road. He is safe he can stick his tongue out at you. I mean that was it. He is safe and you were not allowed in and they had rules, and rules, and rules. We obeyed these rules and the pilots got sick of these rules...."

(TS) Napalm had not been authorized for Laos regardless of the nature of the target. There was no supporting military consideration.

¹ CINCPAC 060736Z Jan 66; CINCPAC 092122Z Jan 66
² Debrief of LTJG Dieter Dengler, Navy Department, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Office of Naval Intelligence, p 602, CPRS 003978-66
either US or Laotian, for this constraint, and on occasion napalm could have been much more effective than general purpose bombs against targets such as truck parks, troop concentrations, and supply bases. CINCPAC and COMUSMACV had repeatedly asked that napalm be approved for use in Laos, and the JCS rationale on the subject coincided with CINCPAC's, the JCS adding that using napalm in Laos did not appear to be greatly different from using it just across the border in South Vietnam. This seemingly interminable discussion continued, however, and in the latter half of February CINCPAC recommended a critical review of the existing prohibition and that the 1966 production of napalm be increased by 25,000 tons for use in Laos.

On 30 March Ambassador William H. Sullivan in Laos authorized employment of napalm on Royal Laotian Air Force (RLAF) targets in the STEEL TIGER area, but only when these strikes were under FAC control. From 29 to 31 March, therefore, napalm was used on 18 sorties, which destroyed 20 buildings and 100 barrels of POL and damaged 6 buildings, 2 bridges, 1 truck, and 1 radio antenna.

In response to COMUSMACV requests, flexibility in the use of napalm was further expanded on 6 April when the US Ambassador in Laos granted permission to employ napalm against vehicular traffic and against automatic weapons sites from which fire was being placed on US aircraft. About the same time Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma authorized use of napalm on a trellis over Route 912 between Route 911 and the South Vietnamese border.

In early June the US Ambassador approved FAC-controlled use of napalm against RLAF targets in the BARREL ROLL area. Also in this area, napalm was approved for use against motorized vehicles and against antiaircraft-automatic weapons positions from which our

1. COMUSMACV 45315/280045Z Dec 65; CINCPAC 120020Z Jan 66
2. JCS Telecon Item 191413Z Jan 66; VIENTIANE to STATE 719/060600Z Jan 66
3. COMUSMACV 190130Z Feb 66
4. CINCPAC 192015Z Feb 66
5. VIENTIANE 301100Z Mar 66
6. COMUSMACV 150650Z Mar 66; COMUSMACV 311203Z Mar 66
7. VIENTIANE 060958Z Apr 66
8. VIENTIANE 060959Z Apr 66
a aircraft received fire. Designated RLAF targets were to be used as napalm alternates when FACs were not available. 1

Following an early 1966 general review of air operations in Laos, CINCPAC promulgated a new basic operation order concerning such operations. 2 While this order imposed fewer restraints on operating forces, it still contained a formidable list of restrictions that included the following:

1. Classified ordnance was not authorized.

2. Unless a truck park was a numbered (and thus validated) RLAF target, it would not be struck with napalm. As for targets of opportunity, only vehicles could be struck with napalm.

3. Under no circumstances would ordnance be expended on Sam Neua, Khang Khay, or Xieng Khouang Provinces—not even in response to hostile fire.

4. Camp fires and civilian habitations would not be attacked.

5. Bombing through an overcast, including radar bombing, was prohibited.

6. Within the approved armed reconnaissance area, there would be no attack against targets of opportunity located more than 200 yards from an identifiable motorable route or trail except targets marked by the RLAF. Other exceptions were antiaircraft guns observed firing against friendly aircraft, and trucks located outside the area of a fixed installation.

7. Fixed installations, unless on the RLAF target list, would not be struck except in connection with attacks on clearly identified military convoys and military personnel, or when identified as a special target by the US Ambassador. Bridges in uninhabited areas were exempt from this restriction. Strikes on airstrips (short take-off and landing (STOL) sites) were prohibited unless under FAC control or designated as an RLAF target.

8. Non-emergency jettisoning of ordnance in Laos was authorized on any approved armed reconnaissance motorable route or trail, including bridges, unless these were in villages. Under emergency conditions, ordnance would be dropped safe in an uninhabited area and the location reported.

9. STEEL TIGER missions in southern Laos, unable to establish radio or radar contact with an appropriate ground control intercept site or to establish a positive TACAN fix prior to entering an approved armed reconnaissance area, would abort unless FAC directed.

Bombeing under radar control through an overcast was prohibited.

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1. USAIR.A VIEN TIANE 030421Z Jun 66; VIEN TIANE 080440 Jun 66
2. CINCPAC 120243Z Apr 66

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during 1965.\(^1\) This was changed in 1966 and during the first half of the year a bombing technique termed "radar buddy bombing," utilizing B-66 and fighter aircraft teams, was used in the Mu Gia Pass area. Indications were that traffic through the pass was only slightly inhibited, and when faced with limited iron-bomb stocks near mid-April CINCPAC directed suspension of this type of operation against the pass. This suspension was short lived, however, and at COMUSMACV's urgent request CINCPAC, on 17 April, authorized resumption of this practice.\(^2\)

\(\) This interim system of radar bombing was not proved effective, however, and a new technique utilizing MSQ-77 ground director radar became operational near mid-1966. This system was nicknamed SKY SPOT, and effective 30 June authority was obtained for day or night strikes against RLAF fixed targets and FAC identified targets within the STEEL TIGER armed reconnaissance areas.\(^3\) SKY SPOT bombing in Laos actually began on 6 July, compensating somewhat for the constraints presented by the southwest monsoon weather and permitting maintenance of some pressure on a large segment of the target system.\(^4\)

\(\) The reliability and degree of accuracy obtained through this system was found acceptable,\(^5\) and in September about 45 percent of the strikes on RLAF fixed targets were controlled by SKY SPOT. The October percentage was only 25, however.\(^6\)

\(\) Another constraint was relaxed in June when armed reconnaissance was authorized against boats 30 feet or more in length. River traffic played a significant role in the enemy transportation system in Laos. Restrictive rules of engagement had normally protected this privileged war-supporting LOC from US air power, but this situation changed during 1966.

\(\) In June, armed reconnaissance was authorized against boats 30 feet long or more on the Song Ma River in the BARREL ROLL area.\(^7\)

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1. CINCPAC Command History 1965, p 408
2. ADMINO CINCPAC 171350Z Apr 66
3. VIENTIANE 080440Z Jun 66
4. VIENTIANE 300530Z Jun 66
5. COMUSMACV 170750Z Sep 66
6. The nickname SKY SPOT was changed to COMBAT PROOF in early December.
7. USAIRA VIENTIANE 030421Z Jun 66
Further flexibility was obtained in August when, in response to a COMUSMACV request, FAC controlled strikes were authorized against all traffic on the Se Bang Fai River between Mahaxay and Ban Nabok, and against all boats and barges beached on the shore between villages along the same route (UTM coordinates WE 2226 to WE 8522).  

Air delivered land mines were approved for use against infiltration traffic and LOC associated targets (both numbered RLAF targets and suspect targets) in June. Employment of this ordnance was authorized at the same time for North Vietnam and South Vietnam.

Operation CRICKET

A new type of operation, called CRICKET, sometimes termed Operation TRUCK BUSTER, grew out of a 1 and 2 February conference in Vientiane attended by representatives of the US Ambassador and the US Air Attache to Laos, and the commanders of Task Force 77 and the 2d Air Division. Under Operation CRICKET, US Forces in Thailand coordinated strikes against targets discovered through intelligence obtained from road watch teams in Laos.

This was a relatively small-scale operation, using about 20 US piloted O-1Es and a few A-1s operating from Nakhon Phanom in Thailand. The operation was limited to areas of Laos within 200 miles of Nakhon Phanom, and Lao observers were aboard the O-1s. The O-1 pilots received information directly from the road watch teams and requested strip alert aircraft in Thailand to attack the targets, which consisted of trucks, troops, military supply areas, etc.

A mid-July enemy buildup in the Mahaxay area required special air action and this area, designated CRICKET WEST, was enlarged to include a sector designated "CRICKET WEST Fringe Area" and approved for joint US-RLAF air operations. The special rules of engagement for this situation required validation of each target prior to strike. Antiaircraft and automatic weapons positions were authorized to be struck under FAC control, and SKY SPOT bombing was also

1. USAIRA VIENTIANE 110415Z Aug 66; CINCPAC 170222Z Aug 66
2. JCS 201321Z Jun 66; CINCPAC 230940Z Jun 66
3. 2AD 090248Z Feb 66
4. See illustration entitled "CRICKET Operational Area."
5. VIENTIANE 160350Z Jul 66; VIENTIANE 210200Z Jul 66
authorized. Four RLAF targets in the area were changed from priority "C" to priority "A" to permit air strikes against them.

Target Validation

(1) Targets in Laos recommended for strike, and areas or routes recommended for armed reconnaissance were nominated from various sources to the US Ambassador in Laos for validation. He in turn passed the approved targets and armed reconnaissance areas or routes to COMUSMACV, who maintained and promulgated current target lists and authorized areas or routes for armed reconnaissance. This procedure was not varied during 1966, but there were improvements in intelligence acquisition and in the Ambassador's target validation capabilities.

(2) For optimum sortie utilization, CINCPAC had stated a minimum monthly desired validation rate of 30 additional targets. 1 New validations for January totalled 34, an improvement resulting from experience, additional resources, and improved procedures and operational flexibility. Of these new targets, 73 percent were in the southern (STEEL TIGER) region of Laos, and an improved intelligence collection system permitted a significant increase in damage to enemy materiel.

(2) Further targeting and intelligence collection improvements were considered during a Coordinating Committee for US Missions, Southeast Asia (SEACOORD) meeting held 24 and 25 January. At that time the target reconnaissance activities of SHINING BRASS were discussed, as was the need for additional targets in Laos. 2 Additional discussions concerned the immediate deployment of 30 0-1 aircraft to Thailand. 3 At this same meeting, COMUSMACTHAI reported that the GOLDEN EAGLE intelligence collection plan was ready. Similar in purpose to SHINING BRASS, the GOLDEN EAGLE operation would emanate from Thailand and add a second dimension to military pressure on enemy LOC through Laos. This capability was neither developed

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1. CINCPAC 300930Z Dec 65
2. See "Unconventional Warfare, SHINING BRASS" elsewhere in this Chapter.
3. BANGKOK 250855Z Jan 66

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### TARGET VALIDATIONS - LAOS, 1966

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Target Validations*</th>
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<tr>
<td>February</td>
<td>90</td>
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<td>October</td>
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<td>November</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total validated targets 1 January 1966: 191
Total validated targets 31 December 1966: 488
New targets under development as of 31 December: 56

*Excludes ARC LIGHT targets

### US AIR STRIKES LAOS

(Ordnance-expending Sorties, 1 January to 31 December 1966)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>BARREL ROLLI.</th>
<th>STEEL TIGER/TIGER HOUND</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
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<td>July</td>
<td>394</td>
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<td>November</td>
<td>526</td>
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<td>3,075</td>
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<tr>
<td>December</td>
<td>449</td>
<td>4,361</td>
<td>4,810</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total 6,734 39,357 46,091
nor exercised during 1966.

($) During February, 90 new targets were validated, a record that stood throughout the year. Partial credit for this improvement was due to the increased target detection role of the 0-1 and to SHINING BRASS operations.

(T$) The March record of damage to the enemy in Laos gave dramatic evidence of the effectiveness of target acquisitions by SHINING BRASS reconnaissance teams, and by the 0-1s in visual reconnaissance and FAC operations. For example, 278 enemy trucks were damaged and 210 destroyed in March. This was an increase of 100 percent over the February record.

($) The 1966 spring monsoon came to Laos in May and provided a mixed blessing for air operations. The rains turned many of the roads into impassable barriers and were more effective than air power in stopping vehicular traffic. At the same time the southwest monsoon weather cut down on the amount of possible photography that could have aided in the development of additional targets. Even so, at least one-third of the 920 trucks sighted during May were destroyed.

(T$) SHINING BRASS teams continued to acquire targets and control the strikes thereon. Only two such operations were conducted in May, but with 43 sorties a number of structures were destroyed and 13 secondary explosions occurred. Some of these sorties also brought three troop concentrations under attack by napalm, rockets, and bombs. An undetermined number of enemy soldiers were reported killed or wounded by these air strikes. One of the SHINING BRASS teams captured two members of the NVA 32d Regiment and brought them out when the team exfiltrated on 28 May.

(T$) During June, ground reconnaissance by SHINING BRASS teams penetrated seven of eight authorized target areas. With 80 air sorties flown, 60 structures were damaged or destroyed; the team members set fire to an additional 44 structures. During July SHINING BRASS teams again controlled strikes by 55 sorties, destroying 77 structures; the reconnaissance team members destroyed 15 structures by fire.

(T$) The number of fleeting targets fell off sharply in
August. SHINING BRASS ground teams controlled air strikes on 8
targets, utilizing 101 strike sorties, which resulted in 118 buildings
destroyed or damaged and 4 secondary explosions. Four prisoners of war were captured and exfiltrated on 9 August with a reconnaissance team.

(TS) SHINING BRASS ground teams controlled air strikes against more targets during September; 55 sorties flown against these targets struck 17 troop concentrations, caused 7 secondary explosions, and damaged or destroyed 64 buildings.

(TS) In October SHINING BRASS team-directed air strikes were executed against 10 targets. Forty-four sorties were flown in support of the teams, resulting in strikes against 15 troop concentrations and destruction or damage to 16 buildings. Teams also directed air strikes against another 10 targets infiltrated by them in November, resulting in strikes on 20 troop concentrations. Seven bunkers were destroyed and seven enemy were confirmed to have been killed by air. SHINING BRASS teams succeeded in infiltrating 9 targets in December and, with 65 supporting sorties, struck 22 troop concentrations, destroyed 32 buildings, and caused 4 secondary explosions.

US Air Support at Muong Soui

(TS) At the request of the US Air Attache in Vientiane, 101 strike sorties were flown near the end of March in support of friendly forces in the vicinity of Muong Soui (STOL Site 108). This request came to CINCPAC who directed COMUSMACV to provide these strikes, diverting ROLLING THUNDER sorties if necessary. Incomplete reports of results indicated seven buildings damaged or destroyed, several tanks hit, an automatic weapon destroyed, and two flak positions damaged.

Miscellaneous Control Measures

Night armed reconnaissance had been conducted as a routine measure on some routes in Laos, but after 20 February it was suspended north of Route 12 (the STEEL TIGER area) because friendly

1. VIENITIANCE 200400Z May 66; CINCPAC 201001Z Mar 66

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guerrilla psychological warfare units were operating in the Nakay Plateau area and because no enemy truck activity had been reported in the area. Night armed reconnaissance continued, however, on Route 12 and the road network south of it.¹

(S) All STEEL TIGER armed reconnaissance not under FAC control was suspended on 24 February and for an extended time thereafter at RLAF General Ma's request, because of an alleged US jet attack on a friendly command post.² Strikes on RLAF Targets 14 and 24 were also prohibited, and all jets, except those on fixed target strikes, were required to remain at 18,000 feet or above within a radius of 35 nautical miles from Muong Phalane.³ The 35 mile constraint was lifted 27 February.⁴

(S) By late March there was increased infiltration traffic on the Sihanouk Trail (Route 110) and COMUSMACV proposed that the rules of engagement be changed to permit US jet strikes and night visual air reconnaissance on the trail. This request was not approved in Vientiane, however; the Ambassador stated that he preferred to leave the program in General Ma's hands as the RLAF was already actively engaged along the "trail," the Cambodian border area was a politically sensitive area, and many innocent civilians were intermixed with enemy personnel in the area.⁵

(S) A May request by COMUSMACV was also related to obtaining authority to cope with enemy activity on the Sihanouk Trail plus enemy traffic on Route 965. This time he requested Ambassador Sullivan to approve an extension of the STEEL TIGER boundary to 107° East to incorporate a suitable portion of both routes in the approved operational area.⁶ The Ambassador approved a modified extension only, enough to include Route 965, but he approved night armed reconnaissance on Route 110 by AC-47 aircraft.⁷ CINCPAC concurred in the extended

1. USAIRAZ VIENTIANE 201018Z Feb 66; 2AD 210804Z Feb 66
2. USAIRAZ VIENTIANE 240024Z Feb 66
3. COMUSMACV 251455Z Feb 66
4. USAIRAZ VIENTIANE 280151Z Feb 66
5. VIENTIANE 061035Z Apr 66
6. COMUSMACV 110700Z May 66
7. VIENTIANE 161010Z May 66

536 SECRET
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<th>Structures Destroyed</th>
<th>Structures Damaged</th>
<th>Vehicles Destroyed</th>
<th>Vehicles Damaged</th>
<th>Secondary Explosions</th>
<th>Interdict Points</th>
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<td>1,611</td>
<td>2,639</td>
<td>5,963</td>
<td>127</td>
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1. BARREL ROLL/STEEL TIGER
RESULTS, BARREL ROLL/STEEL TIGER
1966
area, and the boundary satisfied in part COMUSMACV's previous request for US jet armed reconnaissance along the routes. ¹

**Laos-South Vietnam Requirements Conflict**

(1) In February Ambassador Sullivan requested suitable aircraft for Operation CRICKET, and subsequent planning was directed toward deployment of eight AC-47s (formerly called FC-47s). Meanwhile, the Air Force assigned eight A-26s of the 606th Air Commando Squadron to Nakhon Phanom on 17 July for trial operations with a plan to add four more if the test proved successful.

(3) Also in June, the JCS ordered eight AC-47s to Nakhon Phanom, but these were stopped enroute and held at Clark Air Base in October by direction of CINCPACAF, who then recommended to CINCPAC that these aircraft be diverted to South Vietnam against an unfilled requirement for 15 AC-47s for base security. CINCPACAF's supporting rationale was that the AC-47s were too vulnerable for operations in Laos (four had been lost there); also, the aircraft had poor characteristics for observation activity, were too slow, and were too lightly armed for the Laos mission whereas they were suitable for South Vietnam.

(3) Ambassador Sullivan concurred, but in so doing he requested eight additional A-26s. He compromised on four additional A-26s, however, after learning that the Air Force could not provide eight. CINCPAC then recommended to the JCS that four additional A-26s be sent to Nakhon Phanom and requested immediate authority to direct the eight AC-47s to South Vietnam.

(3) Both of these actions were subsequently disapproved by the Secretary of Defense. At the end of the year CINCPAC was planning to muster additional justification and submit another request for the diversion and for the additional A-26s.²

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1. CINCPAC 120036Z May 66
2. Point Paper, J312, 21 Nov 66

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Detection Devices

As a result of an analysis of STEEL TIGER and BARREL ROLL operations, CINCPAC stated a requirement for an automatic device which, when placed in the vicinity of a road, would sense and report the movement of trucks directly to aircraft by radio.

Investigation revealed two types of sensor devices that showed promise: (1) the Hardhead device (seismic or magnetic) developed by the Department of the Army Limited War Laboratory; and (2) the Sandia device (a seismic device developed by the Sandia Corporation under a Defense Department Advance Research Projects Agency contract. The Hardhead device was designed to perform as an automatic roadwatch station. It had a capability to detect the direction of travel and count the number of trucks by sensing seismic disturbances.

1. Point Paper, J393, 12 Jan 67
produced by the vehicles, or by sensing magnetic disturbances. The seismic and magnetic sensor heads were interchangeable. Information stored in the device could be read by remote radio interrogation, either from the ground or from the air, and could be remotely reset to zero.

The Sandia device was originally designed as a personnel detection device but it also was effective as a truck detection system and could either report movements as they occurred or store truck count up to 32. Like the Hardhead device, it could be remotely interrogated and reset to zero.

Hardhead tests were conducted in Panama and at a later date eight units were delivered to COMUSMACV for tests and evaluation by the Army Concept Team in Vietnam. Sandia devices were evaluated initially in Thailand in April. When installed in an operational environment they emitted real-time very high frequency signals as a result of detecting moving vehicles; they were clearly monitored by an O-1F aircraft and an H-34 helicopter at distances of 25 to 40 miles.

In July six Sandia devices were emplaced in Laos, two each at three locations. The results obtained from this operational employment were inconclusive; trucks were moving during the rainy season, and systematic monitoring of the devices from the air was prevented by weather and operational priorities. An improved version of the Sandia device was later tested in a personnel detection role, and its performance was somewhat less than satisfactory for this application. This device seemed to have the greatest potential for reporting truck movements to aircraft on a real-time basis.

At the end of the year CINCPAC had directed COMUSMACV to work out with CAS and Ambassador Sullivan the details of a program for testing and plans for operational employment of sensors in Laos. CINCPAC also informed Ambassador Sullivan of the test and operational requirements and requested his full cooperation. 1

1. Point Paper, J3A31, 12 Jan 67
Weather Modification

(26) In August the JCS stated that it might be possible to markedly increase the rainfall and perhaps extend the rainy season in selected portions of Laos, thus causing further deterioration of vehicle infiltration routes. The JCS subsequently approved the concept for the operational evaluation of cloud seeding and designated the Chief of Naval Operations as executive agent for the project. They specified that CINCPAC would designate operational control and implement the project. Further, CINCPAC was to have final approval of the areas selected—most likely the STEEL TIGER area.¹

(28) This project, termed POP EYE, was to be executed as soon as possible in September. CINCPAC held a POP EYE conference on 13 September with representatives of COMUSMACV and other interested commands and agencies. This conference developed support requirements and a concept of operations, and on 18 September CINCPAC stated that upon receipt of the execution order for POP EYE he would delegate operational control to COMUSMACV.² The execution order was received from the JCS and CINCPAC acted to assemble the support requirements and prepare his execution order to COMUSMACV.³ Estimated project completion date was 15 November.

(26) The support requirements from CINCPAC were two WC-130B aircraft, weather support radar from Udorn/Ubon, and normal weather support. Those from COMUSMACV included support for two aircraft at Da Nang, billeting and messing for aircrew personnel and eight Naval Ordnance Test Station personnel, and either three F-4B or six A4E Marine aircraft for seeding.

(29) COMUSMACV was informed that POP EYE support requirements were not intended to result in a serious degradation of his combat mission and that he should determine POP EYE requirements accordingly.²

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1. JCS 011753Z Sep 66
2. CINCPAC 180030Z Sep 66
3. JCS 171633Z Sep 66
4. JCS 2339/233, 27 Aug 66, CPRS 000609; J3 Brief 191-66, 20 Sep 66
Operational testing of the POP EYE project in Southeast Asia was completed on 18 November, and it demonstrated a weather modification control effectiveness of approximately 80 percent. CINCPAC then concurred in the 7th Air Force plan for the next phase of POP EYE and recommended JCS approval. The necessary State and Defense Department approval for initiating this tactical employment of the rainmaking capability was delayed through the end of the year. One consideration was that despite the extensive potential of the POP EYE program it had an adverse propaganda value that could be exploited by the enemy, because of the effects this technique might achieve in certain environments and areas.
Heavy Bomb Allocation Considerations for 1967

During a major portion of 1966 the projected 1967 stock of heavy bombs was of major concern to CINCPAC. These bombs were effective against hard or deep targets, and in late July 1966 CINCPAC stated the following 1967 requirements: MK-83 (1,000-lb) bombs - 66,236; MK-84 (2,000-lb) bombs - 14,574; and M-118 (3,000-lb) bombs - 5,805. None of these critical munitions were reflected in the JCS production schedule of 10 August, however.

1. A broader study (PURPLE DRAGON) was being conducted at the end of the year.
2. COMUSMACV 061036Z Sep 66; COMUSMACV 130420Z Sep 66
3. CINCPAC ltr ser 1214, 25 Jul 66 with changes
4. JCSM-305-66, 10 Aug 66
In September it appeared that with a modest expenditure rate the M-84s would last until April 1967 when it was possible that an undetermined number of them might arrive in the theater. Although the M-66 (2,000-lb) bomb was unsuitable for jet aircraft, and therefore undesirable, 8,000 of them would be on hand for use from April. The next source of possible relief was expected to be a new item, the BLU-34 (a 3,000-lb penetration bomb) in early 1968.

To conserve 3,000-lb bomb stocks for 1967 expenditure, the M-118s were being allocated (by September) at a reduced rate of 300 per month. This and other reduced allocations of heavy bombs degraded the total tonnage allocation to tactical aircraft by about 4,500 tons per month through the end of 1966. This deficit was filled, within the limits of existing assets, with smaller bombs. For example, the September allocation plan provided sufficient MK-82 (500-lb), M-117 (750-lb), and MK-83 (1,000-lb) bombs to bring the tactical tons per sortie up to a reasonable level. It should be noted, however, that these were substitutes for more desirable weapons, and that the reason for this was an overall shortage of optimum weapons to meet current and projected requirements.

Lacking production and delivery information on heavy bombs, expenditure of these items was drastically reduced. It appeared that even with reduced expenditures continuing in 1967, most stocks would be exhausted before 30 June 1967. At least for a time, air munitions were allocated on the basis of the published production schedule rather than requirements to support combat operations. This, in turn, placed additional emphasis on shortfalls in the MK-82 and M-117 bombs.

In November 1966, MK-84 bombs were approved for production starting in January 1967. The lead time would be so long, however, that it would be about one year (November 1967) before even limited numbers of the MK-84 would be delivered to Southeast Asia. This would mean that rationing of the MK-84 must continue until approximately January 1968.

1. CINCPAC 090048Z Aug 66; CINCPAC 172040Z Aug 66
2. J4 History, Sep 66
3. Point Papers: J4712, 13 Sep 66 and 4 Oct 66; J369 17 Sep 66; J471, 20 Sep 66
4. See also "Air and Ground Munitions Stocks" elsewhere in this Chapter.
NAVAL SURFACE OPERATIONS

SEA DRAGON - Naval Gunfire

(U) On 14 May 1965 CINCPAC authorized the use of naval gunfire (NGF) in support of friendly forces in South Vietnam. Results obtained throughout the balance of the year proved the value of such support. Additionally, CINCPAC's stated force requirements for 1966 had included naval elements to perform shore bombardment of North Vietnam, as well as to interdict waterborne traffic off the North Vietnamese coast. CINCPAC's repeated 1966 requests for authority to conduct shore bombardment of North Vietnam, however, were not favorably considered. An indication of the possible cost of withholding this authority is shown in the table "Aircraft Losses Due to Combat Within Range of Naval Gunfire in North Vietnam."

(U) Naval interdiction operations in North Vietnamese waters were authorized in October 1966, and these actions exacted a heavy toll against North Vietnamese waterborne traffic.

(U) The following material discusses CINCPAC's unsuccessful efforts to obtain authority for shore bombardment, and the results of limited naval interdiction operations on the North Vietnamese coast authorized at the eleventh hour.

(U) One of the earliest efforts to obtain NGF authority involved an informal CINCPAC proposal to initiate these operations as an augmentation to the air program. This was followed with a formal recommendation to employ NGF against selected targets in the southern portion of North Vietnam (Route Package 1) in augmentation of the ROLLING THUNDER program, particularly during periods of adverse weather or reduced visibility. See illustration entitled "North Vietnamese Coastal Region" for NGF possibilities.

1. CINCPAC Command History 1965 p 447
2. CINCPAC Command History 1965, p 306
3. NMCC 291551Z Apr 66; NMCC 291936Z Apr 66; J3/Memo 000154-66, 29 Apr 66
4. CINCPAC 012359Z May 66
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<th>Extended Cost ($ in Thousands)</th>
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<td>255,650</td>
<td>199</td>
<td>300,916</td>
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Within 13 nautical miles of the 5 1/2 fathom line (the maximum effective range of 8" guns)

Notes: 1. Personnel losses through 31 December 66 were 27 killed in action and 110 missing in action.
2. The above figures include only combat losses and exclude certain combat losses in special operations.
SECRET

(T3) At the time, there were significant Navy resources with NGF capability in the Gulf of Tonkin; these were engaged in missions of early warning, search and rescue, and in support of the aircraft carrier operations at POINT YANKEE. Except for defensive action, however, this capability had not been exploited against North Vietnam. (It should be noted that on several occasions during search and rescue efforts it was necessary to fire on shore installations, and these incidents raised no significant political reaction.) It was felt that NGF could divert and dilute some of North Vietnam's defensive efforts, which were concentrated on air defense, thereby aiding in reduction of pilot and aircraft exposure and attrition. On 13 May, therefore, the JCS recommended to the Secretary of Defense that NGF be authorized against targets ashore and in the coastal waters of North Vietnam in the area 17° North to 20° North. ¹

(T7) No approval action resulted, and on 29 July CINCPAC reiterated his 1 May recommendation. He noted that NGF would enhance the ROLLING THUNDER program in Route Packages 2, 3, and 4. He proposed specific targets. ² Again, no approval was obtained, so the proposal was resubmitted on 9 August ³ in connection with increased evidence of North Vietnamese reliance on infiltration through the DMZ, and again on 26 August in relation to night coastal traffic supporting the Viet Cong-North Vietnamese effort, particularly near 17° to 20° North. ⁴ The requisite authority was not granted.

(T3) By mid-September the enemy was increasing his forces near the northern I CTZ and apparently preparing to "liberate" the South Vietnamese provinces of Quang Tri and Thua Thien. Accordingly, CINCPAC urgently requested authority to conduct naval surface ship operations in support of COMUSMACV against the maritime and overland operations associated with the enemy buildup; thus helping thwart a major I CTZ enemy offensive. ⁵ Pending approval of this request, he found it necessary to regretfully inform COMUSMACV that this assistance must be withheld.

¹ JCSM-325-66, 13 May 66, CPRS 000321-66; proposed nickname for these operations was BULL WHIP.
² CINCPAC 290333Z Jul 66
³ CINCPAC 092135Z Aug 66
⁴ CINCPAC 262010Z Aug 66
⁵ CINCPAC 150647Z Sep 66
⁶ CINCPAC 012259Z Oct 66

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Another request was submitted 7 October with emphasis on using naval surface operations to supplement air operations and frustrate the enemy effort to launch or sustain his offensive from north of the DMZ.  

Authority was received on 15 October to conduct surface ship operations against waterborne traffic in the coastal waters south of 17°30'N. Shore bombardment was only authorized in self defense, however. Attacks on craft engaged in fishing or other peaceful pursuits were strictly prohibited.  

These operations, conducted under the nickname SEA DRAGON, were initiated on 25 October with the destroyers MANSFIELD (Commander Task Unit embarked) and HANSON as Task Unit (TU) 77.1.1. Both ships proceeded to the assigned interdiction zone, which was limited to a belt of water 12 miles wide off the coast from the DMZ to 17°30'N. At about 251530H October, shore battery fire from the vicinity of Dong Ho was directed against the task unit. Counterbattery fire was commenced and the task unit opened to seaward. Much of the counterbattery fire impacted close to the shore battery. A radio tower and small structure co-located with the shore battery were destroyed by friendly fire, but further damage assessment was impossible due to smoke and dust in the area. The enemy fire unit was evaluated as a 6-gun 120mm antiaircraft artillery position. No damage was incurred by the task unit.

During the short period of employment in October, SEA DRAGON forces fired 1,354 rounds of 5"/38 ammunition against watercraft, destroying 101 and damaging 94 others. Counterbattery fire totaled 426 rounds.  

CINCPAC's implementing directive for SEA DRAGON was interpreted by the operating forces to preclude firing against beached watercraft. As this was not the case, CINCPAC on 29 October gave specific authorization for SEA DRAGON forces to fire upon logistic craft when beached or moored.

1. CINCPAC 070510Z Oct 66
2. JCS 150300Z Oct 66
3. CINCPAC 160133Z Oct 66
4. CTU 77.1.1, 251310Z Oct 66
5. J3 History, Oct 66
6. CINCPAC 290428Z Oct 66
On 19 November shore batteries placed shells within 25 yards of the destroyer HAMNER about 6,500 yards off the North Vietnamese coast. HAMNER and the accompanying destroyer CRAIG conducted counter battery fire against the gun positions (XE 560615 and XE 560610), then moved beyond the estimated 10,000-yard maximum enemy fire range, and continued sweeps parallel to the beach while firing on the guns. At 1510H hours the enemy batteries became silent temporarily. The ships ceased fire and called for an air strike. This was soon cancelled by CTU 77.1.1, however, as an Air Force mission was in progress and the request was deferred due to high traffic density on the coordination net and the low priority of the silent shore batteries. The enemy guns resumed firing at 1537H hours and were quickly silenced by TU 77.1.1. The task unit then turned south and resumed routine interdiction patrol at 1544H hours.  

While engaging a hostile shore battery early in December, USS INGERSOLL received two air bursts that punctured the bridge shield and sprayed shrapnel on the fantail. There were no personnel casualties, however, and no system damage.  

A shore battery fired on USS O'BRIEN at mid-morning 23 December while the ship was on a high-speed photographic reconnaissance mission about 7,800 yards from the beach, some 20 miles north of Dong Hoi. O'BRIEN commenced counterbattery fire and opened at best speed, but five near air bursts and one direct hit near the superstructure killed two men and wounded three. The ship received numerous shrapnel holes and two larger holes along the superstructure. Extensive electrical damage was also sustained. At 1150 hours, one hour and nine minutes after the O'BRIEN was taken under fire, two A-4E and two F-4B aircraft bombed the suspected gun positions with unknown results.

1. CTU 77.1.1 192000H Nov SITREP; CINCPAC Command Center Briefing Notes, 20 Nov 66
2. CINCPAC Command Center Briefing Notes, 5 Dec 66
3. CTG 77.0 231020Z Dec 66; CINCPAC Command Center Briefing Notes, 23 Dec 66
### SUMMARY OF NAVAL GUNFIRE, SOUTH VIETNAM, 1966

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<th></th>
<th>Jan</th>
<th>Feb</th>
<th>Mar</th>
<th>Apr</th>
<th>May</th>
<th>Jun</th>
<th>Jul</th>
<th>Aug</th>
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<th>Nov</th>
<th>Dec</th>
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<td>16,107</td>
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<td>212</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>428</td>
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<td>343</td>
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* Estimated

** Includes estimated figures for January

Source: CINCPAC J3
Demilitarized Zone

The DMZ was a secure sanctuary for the enemy during the first half of 1966, not because of a lack of friendly firepower capability but because of US policy. But on 20 July the JCS authorized limited US actions to counter the serious threat posed by North Vietnamese Army infiltrees through the Demilitarized Zone (demilitarized only for friendly forces). Thereafter, US-FWMAF commanders could legally conduct air strikes and artillery fire (land and naval) against clearly defined military activity in the area south of the Demarcation Line.1

As late as 24 November, however, the rules of engagement prohibited employment of artillery and naval gunfire even against clearly defined military activity in the DMZ north of the Demarcation Line. This, of course, facilitated the establishment of extensive enemy field fortifications with particular emphasis on antiaircraft artillery. CINCPAC therefore informed the JCS that in the absence of specific instructions to the contrary, he would interpret his existing authority to preserve US-FWMAF Forces as including the employment of artillery and naval gunfire in self-defense against weapons that were firing, from positions north of the Demarcation Line, on friendly ground forces or on ships.2 He also proposed that authority be granted to employ artillery and NGF in the area from the Demarcation Line north to the Dia Giang (river), which entered the Gulf of Tonkin near Dong Hoi.

Following a decision by the President, CINCPAC's interpretation of his authority regarding fire returned in self-defense was confirmed by the JCS on 10 December. But the request for authority to employ artillery and naval gunfire against clearly defined military activity in the DMZ-Dia Giang (river) area was not favorably considered.3

1. CINCPAC 212055Z Jul 66
2. CINCPAC 240326Z Nov 66; See also COMUSMACV 131250Z Jul 66
3. JCS 1122/101607Z Dec 66
SEA DRAGON Operations Area Extended

On 11 November, in connection with implementation of ROLLING THUNDER 52, Admiral Sharp authorized extension of the northern boundary of the SEA DRAGON area northward to 18° N vice the old limitation of 17°30' N. This was partially due to a possible compromise of the previous operating area limits by news media statements.

By the end of the year it appeared that the enemy had inferred the northern limits of SEA DRAGON forces and had concentrated his coastal defense batteries in the assigned area. It was thus considered that another northward extension would soon be in order so the defenses would be diluted and thereby provide a concomitant reduction in the threat to friendly forces.

An extension to 19° North would include the coastal water approaches north of Vinh, which was recognized as a logistics hub for redistribution of supplies destined for both the DMZ and the Ho Chi Minh Trail. On the basis of experience as of the end of the year, it was expected that there would be an immediate reduction, or perhaps suspension, of coastal maritime traffic in and out of this key port. A result would be further congestion on the land LOCs.

SEA DRAGON Summary

The modest SEA DRAGON effort, involving only two destroyers on station, virtually stopped the southward flow of enemy coastal maritime traffic between 17° and 18° N. The following losses were inflicted on the enemy by year's end: waterborne logistic craft-382 sunk, 325 damaged; shore batteries-5 destroyed, 2 damaged; radar sites-2 destroyed and 2 damaged.

1. CINCPAC 110600Z Nov 66
Carrier-Based Aircraft Attrition

Combat and combat-associated losses of carrier-based aircraft amounted to about 120 aircraft in the course of nearly 100,000 combat and combat support sorties in North and South Vietnam and Laos for an over-all attrition rate of 0.12 percent - or 1.2 aircraft lost per 1,000 sorties. Attack missions over North Vietnam accounted for most losses, with an attrition rate of 0.25 percent during 1966. This was a little more than half of the 1965 rate of 0.45 percent.

The attrition rate for all carrier-based combat sorties is shown on the table entitled "Combat Attrition of Carrier-Based Aircraft during 1966." By comparison, the rate for Laos was down by more than half of the 1965 rate of 0.18 percent, and the rate for South Vietnam remained essentially unchanged from 1965.

The attack loss rate over North Vietnam dropped sharply, beginning in May. This correlated with the assignment of permanent Route Package areas of responsibility -- and with the subsequent increase in planner and pilot familiarity with such factors as enroute and target area defenses. Other contributing factors were the increasingly stringent restrictions on A-1 operations, and the gradual decrease in F-8 attack sorties.

Attack mission attrition rates in Route Packages 4 and 6B were higher by a factor of about four than the rate in Packages 2 and 3. The loss rate during ROLLING THUNDER 52 Alpha strikes against heavily defended targets in Package 6B was over 2.3 percent -- more than 10 times the overall combat attrition rate over North Vietnam in 1966. This despite a defense suppression effort amounting to 45 percent of the total sorties in the target area. In contrast, multi-carrier strikes against targets in Package 4 during September 1966 were conducted with a loss rate of 0.21 percent, using less than 30 percent of the total sorties in the target area for defense suppression.

1. Initial strikes against a JCS-designated target.
Most of the aircraft losses in 1966 continued to be to antiaircraft artillery, which accounted for over 80 percent of the losses to known weapons systems in North Vietnam. Less than 15 percent were directly attributable to SAMs. Of the losses to antiaircraft artillery, however, 30 percent were enroute losses at altitudes of 5,000 feet or less, and most of these should be considered as indirect results of the SAM threat at higher altitudes.

Over 90 percent of all losses occurred at 5,000 feet or less, and more than half of these occurred at 2,500 feet or less. Most types of aircraft had about the same attrition rate, except for the F-8, which had a significantly higher rate than the other types.

**COMBAT ATTRITION OF CARRIER-BASED AIRCRAFT DURING 1966**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COUNTRY</th>
<th>MISSION</th>
<th>SORTIES</th>
<th>LOSSES</th>
<th>ATTRITION (percent)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NORTH VIETNAM</td>
<td>ATTACK (STK-AR-FS-IH)</td>
<td>33,070</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>0.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>OTHER COMBAT (CAP-RESCAP-ESCORT)</td>
<td>15,250</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>0.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>COMBAT</td>
<td>48,320</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>0.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LAOS</td>
<td>COMBAT</td>
<td>10,030</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOUTH VIETNAM</td>
<td>COMBAT</td>
<td>21,690</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALL COMBAT</td>
<td></td>
<td>80,040</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>0.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALL COMBAT SUPPORT</td>
<td></td>
<td>17,190</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALL COMBAT-RELATED</td>
<td></td>
<td>97,230*</td>
<td>120*</td>
<td>0.12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Following losses and missions not included in loss and sortie totals:
  1. S2D on Sea Surveillance
  2. A3B on Ferry
  3. SH1A on SAR

1. When possible to establish the altitude at which the aircraft was hit.
2. CINCPACFLT ltr ser 3/00231, 1 Mar 67, CPRS 001702-67
GAME WARDEN

During the early part of the year the enemy increased his efforts to block the ocean channel to Saigon by mining the channel and harassing the passing river traffic with mortars and gunfire. Government counter-efforts, despite US support, were insufficient to assure the desired degree of security.

On 8 March USS BELLE GROVE (LSD-2) reported to Task Force (TF) 116 to serve as an interim inshore support ship and to support outfitting of the first increment of 11 river patrol boats. These fiberglass boats were lightly armored in their most vulnerable areas and were armed with twin .50 caliber machineguns mounted fore and aft. They were capable of 37 knots with water-jet propulsion, and were manned by US crews.¹ On 25 March a detachment of UH-1Bs embarked BELLE GROVE in preparation for river patrol operations.

Operating as part of TF 116 (GAME WARDEN), the first two River Patrol Boat (10-boat) sections became operational in April. One section was deployed to Nha Be and the other to the river patrol boat support ship at Vung Tau for patrols in the Rung Sat Special Zone.

April activities included patrols, ambushes, and combined operations in the Rung Sat Special Zone. The UH-1B light-fire teams working from an LST (landing ship, tank) base proved to be a valuable adjunct to the river patrol interdiction of infiltration in the Rung Sat Special Zone. Their utility was especially apparent in regard to the small streams and canals where patrol craft could not operate continuously. In this situation, the light-fire teams significantly compounded enemy movement problems.²

On 1 July, several months after US Forces had been conducting on-scene training in the inland waterways, the GVN formally requested US technical, material, and operational assistance in halting

1. J3 History, July 66
2. COMUSMACV MONEVAL Jan-Apr 66, CPRS 001650-66, 001907-66, 002176-66, and 002495-66
VIET CONG illegal and subversive actions on the inland waterways of South Vietnam. The then "legitimized" GAME WARDEN operation continued.  

By mid-September there were 95 GAME WARDEN river patrol boats (PBR) conducting operations in the major rivers of the Mekong Delta in coordination with 6 armed helicopters. Ten of these PBR were operating from USS COMSTOCK (LSD-19) off the river mouths, and the rest were based at various sites in the delta. Additionally, 12 minesweeping boats (MSB) were conducting operations in the river approaches to Saigon, and a SEAL (Sea, Air, Land) team detachment was conducting surveillance and raiding operations.  

These forces had inflicted about 50 casualties on the enemy and captured 23 VIET CONG. Nine VIET CONG boats had been destroyed and 13 damaged, 14 structures destroyed and 17 damaged. GAME WARDEN forces had also captured or destroyed over 200 tons of rice. As a further benefit, 91 documents (ranging from Top Secret to Confidential classification) captured in one action provided valuable information to assist the IV CTZ Revolutionary Development Program.  

On 18 July CINCPAC submitted to the JCS the GAME WARDEN rules of engagement, which were mutually acceptable to CINCPAC and the US Ambassador to South Vietnam. These were in turn modified and submitted by the JCS to the Secretary of Defense on 17 August. In this submission, the CINCPAC proposal was divided into two portions: GAME WARDEN rules of engagement, and operating instructions. This division was in part designed to permit timely...

1. SAIGON to STATE 64/011300Z Jul 66  
3. Point Paper, J381, 16 Sep 66  
4. SAIGON to STATE 64/011300Z Jul 66; CINCPAC 181850Z Jul 66  
5. JCS Memo 517-66, 17 Aug 66
changes in operating instructions in response to military requirements, as opposed to the prolonged delays normally encountered when inter-
departmental coordination was required.

Even so, approval was delayed, primarily because certain features of the GAME WARDEN rules of engagement were not con-
sidered consistent with other rules for Southeast Asia as prescribed by the JCS in April. In comparison with the April rules, contention centered on the following aspects of the proposed GAME WARDEN rules of engagement:

1. A more accurate definition of Southeast Asia.
2. Immediate pursuit was given the traditional definition and did not need to be continuous.
3. Enemy actions adjacent to as well as within friendly territory were characterized as hostile.
4. Hostile air, ground, and sea forces were more definitively described.
5. Intent to commit a hostile act was included in definitions (this had been ignored in existing Southeast Asia rules of engagement).
6. Visit and search of vessels was authorized on all RVN inland waters, including the Mekong River.

The most significant October GAME WARDEN action occurred at 1830H hours on 31 October when patrol units detected a large number of Viet Cong attempting to cross the Mekong River in approximately 75 junks and sampans. These craft were attacked by nine PBR and armed helicopters. Most of the enemy personnel escaped but two were known to have been killed. Material damage included 45 sampans and 7 junks destroyed, 5 sampans and 3 junks damaged. Two large secondary explosions were also initiated.

A mining incident resulted in damage to the RVN Navy's LSSL 227 at My Tho on 2 October. Another significant action

1. JCS 170122Z Apr 66
2. Point Paper, J382, 16 Sep 66

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was a mortar attack that wounded 15 SEAL personnel being transported in an LCM. ¹

GAME WARDEN Effectiveness Assessed

At the end of the year it was apparent that GAME WARDEN operations had been instrumental in contributing to success of the Revolutionary Development Program in IV CTZ. Supporting this conclusion was an increased freedom of movement on the major delta waterways by local merchants, and a reduction in Viet Cong tax collection and terrorist activities.

End-of-the-year GAME WARDEN forces included 120 PBR, 3 Patrol Air Cushion Vehicles (PACV), 11 MSB (12 authorized), 8 helicopters, and support craft (with 4 LST support ships programmed). Casualties inflicted on the enemy were: 239 killed in action (body count), 231 killed in action (possible), 15 wounded in action (confirmed), 57 captured; 352 craft destroyed, 75 damaged, 37 captured; 202 structures destroyed and 157 damaged. In addition, 90,000 piasters and 205 tons of foodstuffs had been confiscated or destroyed.

Friendly casualties included 8 killed, 80 wounded, and 3 missing in action. One MSB was destroyed by a Viet Cong mine and four helicopters were lost to enemy actions or accidents.

MARKET TIME

MARKET TIME forces had the mission of interdicting the waterborne infiltration of men and material that was aiding enemy forces in South Vietnam. This operation was a COMUSMACV responsibility and was conducted by Task Force (TF) 115 under COMUSMACV's naval component commander.²

MARKET TIME forces gradually increased during 1966, but during the same period there was an almost equal decline in participation by the RVN Navy's Coastal Force and Sea Force. Accordingly, at the end of the year, the 18-month average of MARKET TIME units on patrol was 220 (combined US-RVN Forces).

1. Point Paper, J381, 16 Oct 66
2. CINCPAC Command History, 1965, p 435
Enemy Infiltration Forces and Operations

Prisoners captured when three North Vietnamese Navy PT boats were sunk in the Gulf of Tonkin revealed interesting but inconclusive information related to ships being used for infiltration into South Vietnam. It was stated that these ships were usually provided with false papers and disguised as Chinese communist trawlers. Fish nets were used to camouflage gun mounts on the steel-hulled ships, which were described as resembling those detected by MARKET TIME forces during infiltration attempts on 10 May and 20 June. Reportedly, six or more of these ships stayed well to seaward and approached their destination on a course approximately normal to the coast.¹

Other information related to waterborne infiltration craft came from a captured Viet Cong who knew of junk operations along the Binh Dinh coast. He denied knowledge of sea infiltration, but stated that boats were used by the Viet Cong for patrols and for transportation of personnel. Supposedly, the boats were borrowed for one or two days and then returned to their owners after the assigned mission was completed.²

Another unconfirmed report stated that four junk would approach a landing site simultaneously, and three would lie offshore while the fourth landed to unload. The waiting junks were to evade in different directions if detected by aircraft.

There was some evidence that the enemy used waterborne infiltration to compensate for his reduced infiltration capability through Laos during the southwest monsoon season. One study indicated the possibility of a close relationship between the number of MARKET TIME "incidents" and trucks sighted in the Laos Panhandle.³

Despite a nearly uniform patrol effort there was a sharp increase in incidents during the June to August period, and an

1. USS CAVALIER 071645Z Jul 66
2. J3 History, Jul 66
4. An incident was defined as an exchange of fire with enemy forces, capture of enemy war material, capture of a confirmed Viet Cong, etc.
equally sharp decrease in September. The increase occurred during the period of a marked downturn in truck sightings in the Laos Panhandle. A correlation of such magnitude appeared unlikely to result from chance alone.

**Incidents in the MARKET TIME Area**

(2) First sighted near the Ca Mau Peninsula where it was maneuvering in a suspicious manner, a trawler displaying the Republic of China's colors was maintained under covert surveillance from 1 to 7 January. Boarding or seizure in the RVN contiguous zone was precluded by heavy seas, and the ship later entered communist Chinese waters without incident. Hong Kong authorities later uncovered a significant amount of opium aboard this craft, although firm evidence of infiltration action was lacking.

(4) On 28 April a Cambodian patrol boat refused to answer a challenge by the USCG cutter (WPB) POINT COMFORT in the RVN defensive sea area northeast of Phu Quoc Island. The Cambodian craft fired four rounds of 40mm at the WPB. This fire was not returned, although such action was authorized by the rules of engagement. POINT COMFORT opened range and the PT boat retired in a westerly direction. CINCPAC recommended a protest, which was submitted by the State Department on 12 May. ¹

(4) During the early morning hours of 10 May, the USCG cutter POINT GREY held a suspect ship under surveillance off the southeast tip of the Ca Mau Peninsula. The ship was a steel-hulled trawler type about 120 feet long and with an approximate 100-ton capacity; it showed no national ensign and it had many design features identical to a craft intercepted in the same general area by USS HISSEM (DER 400) in December 1965. ² The ship was driven aground and abandoned by its crew before daylight when POINT GREY personnel attempted to board at 0700H hours. They were repulsed by heavy automatic weapons fire from the beach. POINT GREY cleared the area

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¹ CINCPAC 300004Z Apr 66; SEC STATE 120025Z May 66
² CTF 115/271301Z Jun 66

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and returned fire, and was subsequently joined by other US and Vietnamese Navy surface units. Following an F-100 aircraft fire-suppression strike, and under cover of a UH-1B fire team, another attempt to board was repulsed by heavy fire from ashore, with the result that three POINT GREY personnel were wounded.

The ship was destroyed by NGF prior to darkness, with many secondary explosions and tracer ammunition explosions. A violent secondary explosion at 2030H hours broke the trawler in two and extinguished all fires. Salvage operations conducted on 11 May recovered weapons, ammunition, and electronics material of Soviet and communist Chinese manufacture.

At 191545H June, SP-2H aircraft on barrier patrol at 08°37' N, 107°59' E (approximately 100 nautical miles off the RVN coast) detected a large trawler showing a side number of 2135. The contact was on a southwesterly course and was next detected by the USCG POINT LEAGUE at 200300H, close to the coast in the vicinity of the Song Co (river) mouth. The ship was challenged, but altered course toward the shore without reply. Later it was illuminated and observed to be hove to with a sampan alongside. The trawler then proceeded toward the beach (approximately 2 miles) at about 12 knots.

After POINT LEAGUE fired a warning shot across its bow, the trawler opened fire with .50 caliber automatic weapons. In the ensuing action, POINT LEAGUE sustained two crewmen wounded, and the trawler ran aground at about 0350H hours. POINT LEAGUE requested assistance while making firing runs on the trawler and a helicopter fire team from USS TORTUGA (LSD 26) arrived at the scene at 0500, joined at 0530 by USCG cutters POINT SLOCUM and POINT HUDSON, VP aircraft, and a helicopter fire team from Can Tho.

POINT LEAGUE received automatic weapons fire from the beach at 0600H hours, and two USAF F-100s made strafing and bombing runs to suppress the fire and render salvage of the trawler and cargo more feasible. At 0615 an explosion of undetermined cause occurred on board the trawler and this was followed by fire, most intense in the vicinity of the pilot house and after hold.
POINT SLOCUM then made a fire suppression pass of the beach, during which one of its crewmen was wounded.

By this time numerous additional United States and Vietnamese Navy units had arrived, and the on-scene commander (COMCORTRON FIVE) organized a composite boarding party comprised of personnel from the Coast Guard cutters, USS HAVENFIELD (DER 393), Coastal Group 35, and River Assault Group 23.

The boarding party reached the trawler at 1000H hours and, under cover of suppression fire from aircraft and naval units, began fighting fires and removing the cargo. USS TORTUGA assumed tactical command of salvage operations at 1020 and placed an Explosive Ordnance Disposal team aboard. Troops of the ARVN 21st Division were landed by US Army helicopters at 1115H to provide beach perimeter defense of salvage operations, and by 1400H the fires on the trawler were completely extinguished.

The third attempt (on 21 June) to pull the trawler free was successful and an MSTS-chartered tug boat took it in tow.

Analysis of the navigator's workbook and the ship's log revealed the following track: initial entry 15 June approximately 100 miles southwest of Hong Kong, then skirted east of Macclesfield Bank on 16 June, thence southeasterly on 17 and 18 June to latitude 08°37' N, and thence west toward Con Son Island. A course alteration to the northwest an hour after sighting by patrol aircraft at 191545 would have enabled the trawler to reach the point where it was detected by POINT LEAGUE. It appeared that the trawler probably penetrated the outer surface barrier beyond the radar detection range of ships on patrol at that time, and patrol aircraft missed radar contact when passing within 10 nautical miles of the assumed track at 192215H.

The apparent destination, according to the captured chart, was the Lang Nuoc River mouth, with the Con Chung River as a probable alternate.

At the request of the GVN, a special International Control Commission team boarded the trawler to inspect it on 21 June.
The Polish members refused to accompany the team after first attempting to forestall the inspection.  

The material taken from the trawler included many different types of ammunition, mortars, automatic weapons, recoilless rifles, rocket launchers, machineguns, bayonets, and side arms. Other items recovered included weapons accessories and parts, and TNT blocks.  

On 11 August the US Coast Guard cutter POINT WELCOME was attacked by friendly aircraft while on a night patrol near the barrier at the 17th Parallel. Although the patrol craft received only superficial damage, its commanding officer and one crew member were killed, and the wounded included three crew members, a Vietnamese Navy liaison officer, and a Life Magazine reporter. As a result of this incident, increased emphasis was placed upon proper use of recognition signals and other measures to increase coordination between operational forces and prevent mutual interference.  

At 231145H December MARKET TIME patrol aircraft sighted a suspect trawler of the same type as the two confirmed arms carriers (10 May, 20 June) destroyed earlier in the year. The ship was detected in international waters off Binh Dinh Province and did not enter the MARKET TIME area. It attempted to evade after detection, and it was kept under aerial surveillance until 251214H when USS HISSEM commenced shadowing. The suspect entered Hainan Straits and surveillance was discontinued 261219 December. This was evaluated as an attempted military resupply mission.  

Special Operations, MARKET TIME Forces  
In late March several Swiftcraft and Vietnamese Navy Coastal Group junks supported amphibious Operation JACKSTAY in the Rung Sat Special Zone. Tasks performed included blocking  

1. SAIGON to CINCPAC 2967/210705 Z Jun 66  
2. J3 History, Jun 66  
3. J3 History, Aug 66  
4. CTF 115, 280045Z Dec 66
operations, infiltration and exfiltration of US Marine Corps patrols, and gunfire support. Other special support operations included an exfiltration barrier during amphibious Operation DECKHOUSE IV and several local search and destroy operations by coastal groups. Additionally, in September, MARKET TIME forces evacuated two US Special Forces and 35 RVN Rural Force personnel who were surrounded by a Viet Cong force on Phu Quoc Island.

During Operation IRVING in October, 378 Viet Cong sampans were destroyed by MARKET TIME infiltration or exfiltration barrier forces in support of friendly forces ashore.

Swiftcraft

Eight additional Swiftcraft (Patrol Craft, Fast-PCF) arrived for MARKET TIME operations in February and commenced operating from Cat Lo near Vung Tau. This brought the in-country total to 20. As of 30 April the total had increased to 43 and the enlarged Swiftcraft force was contributing materially to a reduction in the number of craft evading. Viet Cong basket boats could operate in extremely shallow water and thus continued to evade even the Swifts, however. By the end of July, 70 Swifts were in-country, and five more arrived in August. By year's end the full programmed force of 84 Swifts was on station.

Near Rach Gia, a controlled Viet Cong mine attached to bamboo poles destroyed PCF 4 in February. Crew casualties in this incident were four killed and three wounded. In May PCF 41 was grounded and abandoned after being hit by small arms and 57mm recoilless rifle fire in the Rung Sat Special Zone. One crew member was killed and one wounded in this action.

A Swiftcraft with two crews was deployed to the Gulf of Thailand on 19 January to operate under control of the destroyer

1. J3 History, Mar 66
2. CINCPAC 170029Z Feb 66
3. J3 History, Jul 66
4. CTF 115, 150658Z Feb 66

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escort, radar (DER) in that area. This operation was to test the concept of coordinated DER/PCF operations in coastal surveillance. Additionally, it was to investigate the operation of a PCF for an extended period away from established support facilities.

The operation proved highly successful, with the DER and PCF each complementing the capabilities of the other unit. During periods of darkness, the PCF proved particularly useful for work close inshore, to fire illumination rounds and act as a spotter for the DER's heavier guns. 1

Thirteen Swiftcraft were deployed to Cam Ranh Bay during April. There, supported from a barracks ship, these craft were used to provide close and continuous inshore surveillance for MARKET TIME units. 2

A January test of other fast patrol craft capabilities, Operation ANDANG, proved the feasibility of long distance deployment of this craft along the Vietnamese coast. 3

SEATO Contribution Proposed

Some State Department consideration was given to the use of SEATO naval forces in MARKET TIME operations. At the time, Thailand was the only country besides the RVN and the United States actively planning to contribute forces to MARKET TIME. 4 Despite several advantages to the proposed action, it was concluded that SEATO participation, if at all, should include all member nations. Otherwise it would appear to be a number of bilateral actions, unrelated to SEATO. 5

Thai Participation in MARKET TIME

Near the end of 1965, the Secretary of Defense and the US Ambassador to Thailand were agreed that the two-LST (landing ship, tank) commitment to Thailand could be met by providing

1. COMUSMACV MONEVAL, Jan 66, CPRS 001650-66
2. COMUSMACV MONEVAL, Apr 66, CPRS 002495-66
3. COMUSMACV MONEVAL, Jan 66, CPRS 001650-66
4. COMUSMACACTION 200515Z May 66
5. STATE CIRCULAR 2291/211800Z May 66
only one LST (STARK COUNTY) and one "informally loaned" motor gunboat (PGM). Additionally, the diversion of one PGM from the RVN Military Assistance Program (MAP) to satisfy the approved FY 66 Thailand MAP was approved, contingent upon CINC PAC's views.

On 12 December 1965 CINC PAC expressed his agreement. PGM-71 was transferred on 14 January 1966 to Thailand to fulfill the FY 66 MAP. Thailand subsequently agreed to provide crews for an additional PGM, on loan for MARKET TIME operations. Thailand was informed that after the MARKET TIME PGM was completed in May at Boston, it would be delivered to them.

PROGRESS TOWARD 1966 GOALS EVALUATED

During a February conference in Honolulu--attended by President Johnson, high GVN officials, and others--six goals were established as objectives for US operations in South Vietnam during 1966. These goals were as follows:

1. Attrit, by year's end, Viet Cong-NVA forces at a rate as high as their capability to put men into the field.

2. Increase the amount of Viet Cong-NVA base areas denied the Viet Cong to 40 to 50 percent from the existing 10 to 20 percent level.

3. Increase the critical roads and railroads open for use from 30 percent to 50 percent.

4. Increase the population in secure areas to 60 percent from 50 percent.

5. Pacify the four selected high priority areas, increasing the pacified population in those areas by 235,000.

6. Insure the defense of all military bases, political and population centers, and food-producing areas then under Government control.

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1. CINC PAC 120205Z Dec 65
2. CNO 142118Z Jan 66
3. BANGKOK to STATE 1493/271700Z Jan 66
4. SECDEF 282316Z Jan 66
Following detailed study, a system was established to measure the progress toward the above objectives. This was promulgated by CINCPAC in a June Staff Instruction. It was specified that the measurement of progress need not be limited to the six specified goals, and that additional programs of particular CINCPAC interest would be measured and reported. Primary emphasis was on South Vietnam and related external programs.

COMUSMACV's program for monthly review of operational and logistic progress toward specified goals was utilized in the CINCPAC system. CINCPAC prescribed appropriate charts, and a staff seminar group (including the DOD Pacific Research Office and CINCPAC's Political Adviser) prepared a narrative evaluation of progress. Much graphic statistical data and the overall evaluation were published monthly for the CINCPAC staff.

Starting with information reported through June, the principal staff was briefed on the information every third month. These briefings included presentations by COMUSMACV and CINCPAC representatives, and were intended as a first-hand evaluation to CINCPAC of "how the war is going in Southeast Asia."

The report for December incorporated a CINCPAC summary evaluation of 1966 operations in Southeast Asia, which was as follows:

"During 1966, we deployed to South Vietnam a balanced and effective military force for the conduct of the war for Vietnam. Our successful spoiling operations forced the enemy to revert to defensive employment of his main force units. These operations have been instrumental in our successful efforts to prevent a military takeover of South Vietnam by the communists. Nevertheless, a capable and resourceful enemy is continuing to engage in overt warfare in South Vietnam. He is being supported by major infiltration through Laos and there is strong evidence that enemy logistical support is also coming through Cambodia. Subversion and insurgency in Thailand, though still limited in scope,

1. CINCPACSTAFFINST 003100.2, 15 June 66
2. The first evaluation was published in August for the situation as of 30 June (CINCPAC Evaluation of Progress in Southeast Asia CPRS 003188-66)
3. Selected charts from the publication accompany this section.
are being actively pursued. At the same time the enemy maintains the capability to deploy substantial additional regular forces to South Vietnam.

"It would be an over-simplification to suggest that the enemy has reverted to tactical guerrilla action as his primary mode of operation. He realizes that he cannot defeat and eject the US-FWMAF by large unit operations and that he is vulnerable, particularly when concentrated, to our air, artillery, and tactical mobility. He is practical enough to attempt to operate in any mode, Phase II or III or a combination thereof, at times and places where the circumstances indicate to him a good probability of success. It would be erroneous to conclude that VC-NVA main forces are no longer dangerous, that their unit integrity has been destroyed, or that their logistical capability has fallen below that needed to continue the war. It is far more likely that he is avoiding major contact, using his sanctuaries, fighting defensively when forced to do so and attempting to rebuild and reinforce for operations at an opportune time. Tactical guerrilla warfare probably will be intensified without fragmenting main force units or discarding plans for their buildup and use. He probably will attempt to keep up his present rate of infiltration in order to counter our buildup and to replace his losses. He remains a dangerous enemy whose strategy hinges on prolonging the war and outlasting our determination to see the job done.

"Revolutionary Development (RD) is just getting underway and its continued growth will be a slow and painstaking process. We must press on vigorously to strengthen RD and assist the GVN in this important undertaking. Although the RVNAF has the primary mission of supporting RD, U.S. forces will reinforce their efforts by direct support. ARVN units are being redeployed and retrained to support RD programs, but the reorientation of RVNAF will not be easily accomplished.

"Little has been accomplished in preventing external assistance to NVN. With the exception of the POL strikes the key port of Haiphong, through which 85 percent of NVN's imports flow, has been out of bounds. Some progress has been made in destroying those resources that contribute most to the support of the aggression. However, the amount is minor in comparison with what could have been accomplished. As an example, of the 104 numbered targets located in the northeast, only 20 were hit in 1966. The task of harassing, disrupting and impeding movement of men and materials on thousands of miles of roads, trails, inland and coastal waterways, has had primary emphasis. Despite our interdiction, the enemy has accommodated to our LOC attacks by ingeniously hiding and dispersing his logistic activity. His recuperative capability along these routes has been remarkable. However, it has been costly since he has been forced into a prodigious effort to continue to infiltrate men and material into South Vietnam."

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Also included was COMUSMACV's overall evaluation for the year. This was as follows:

"The GVN and Free World Military Forces have defeated the enemy in every recent encounter. He has not had a major military victory over our forces in ten months. His base areas are being penetrated in force with the resultant enemy loss of men and materiel and foodstuffs. Concurrently, increasing numbers of his military are rallying to the Republic of Vietnam and hundreds of additional Vietnamese civilians are being brought into secure areas daily. A solid beginning has been achieved in Revolutionary Development. It is expected that the coming year will see a more marked improvement in Revolutionary Development due to the increased emphasis in combined planning, civil-military cooperation and coordination, as well as the fact that ARVN forces are able now to devote considerably more of their effort in support of RD because of the increase in Free World strength and the military successes of the past year.

"The results attained appear to be positive indicators that the conflict has taken a decided turn for the best, although there is no indication of any lessening of enemy determination."

The year end status of each of the 1966 goals was established as follows:

Goal 1: To achieve a balance between attrition of enemy forces and their ability to put men into the field. This had not been accomplished. Attrition averaged 6,700 per month in comparison to an estimated enemy input of 8,000. Enemy losses had trended upward, however, and his input had shown a downward trend.

Goal 2: Denial of 40 percent of the Viet Cong-NVA base areas. The year end total was 23.9 percent. COMUSMACV had earlier defined 86 new base areas, however, and as a result the measure of the operational effort was shifted from the war zones (the original basis for measure). Of these 86 new areas, 31 had been penetrated in December and 3 of the 31 were reported as neutralized at the end of the month.

Goal 3: Increase to 50 percent the critical roads and railroads open to use. Only 29 percent of the roads were considered secured at the end of the year, an overall decrease of 3 percent for the year. Railroads "opened" improved by 12 percent, thus 43 percent of the railroads were open at year end.

Goal 4: Increase the population in secure areas (countrywide) to 60 percent. This goal was very nearly achieved, with a year end total of 59.6 percent.

Goal 5: Increase secured population in specified areas by 235,000. This was exceeded, with a total of 258,000 in those areas at the end of the year.

Goal 6: Defend all military bases, political and population centers, and food-producing areas under Government control at the time of the Honolulu Conference. This goal was achieved.
RIVERINE OPERATIONS (PROPOSED)

(6) As of the beginning of 1966 most military operations in the Mekong Delta region of the RVN had been left in the hands of the RVNAF. On 1 January, however, COMUSMACV stated a requirement for US operations in the delta under a concept that was subsequently termed by CINCPAC as a "fresh conceptual contribution to other alternatives considered in the past."

(7) COMUSMACV proposed US deployment to the rice-rich and heavily populated delta to assist the GVN in breaking the Viet Cong hold over the people and resources in Kien Hoa, Vinh Binh, Vinh Long, and Go Cong Provinces, and to cut Viet Cong communications and liaison routes extending from the Kien Hoa coast northwest to the Plain of Reeds and the III CTZ. He noted that preparation of a one-brigade base area in the vicinity of My Tho was under way but that this was a long and costly process with the one dredge on hand. Additional base areas would be required, but there was a scarcity of suitable areas because of the heavy population and shortage of dry land. While noting that additional land could be acquired, COMUSMACV emphasized the limited amount to be found in one place and the attendant problems that had led him to seek an alternate solution to land bases, including relocation of families, increased numbers of refugees, and adverse psychological reaction.

(75) The alternative having special merit was to base the US 9th Infantry Division (designated as Zebra Division in deployment programs) in the Ba Ria area, with one brigade at Ba Ria, one at the land base under development in the vicinity of My Tho, and the third brigade as the Army component of a mobile joint task force (JTF) that would have the capability of operating on the major rivers and waterways throughout the delta. The JTF naval component would consist of tactical and logistical ships and craft to support the brigade afloat on riverine operations.

(T) Command of the JTF would be in the hands of the assistant commander of the Army division, who would have a small
joint staff consisting primarily of operations, logistics, and communications personnel. The commander JTF would use a self-propelled barracks ship (APB) as his flagship and would employ helicopters or a command LCM (landing craft, medium) when operating away from the ship. The Army component would be commanded by a normal brigade command organization utilizing an APB as a flagship. The command of the naval component would be vested in a Navy captain, who would have a mixture of approximately 35 ships and boats of various types. He would have an appropriate staff and utilize an APB as a flagship. Deployed along the major rivers and waterways in the delta, the ships would provide the base from which tactical operations could be launched.

(T) This base could be secured more readily than a land base and would reduce land requirements to those necessary for artillery positions, limited vehicle parks, and helicopter landing areas. Local security would consist of a battalion or less, reinforced by shipboard armament to include deck-mounted 4.2" mortars capable of providing supporting fire over the entire perimeter. The remaining two battalions of the brigade would conduct search and destroy operations utilizing LCMs, plastic assault boats, and helicopter lift to enhance mobility. Unlimited artillery mobility could be obtained through the use of helicopters and afloat lift. Existing helicopter bases in the RVN were adequate in number and location to support JTF operations.

(T3) COMUSMACV noted that deployment of the 9th Division to the RVN had been recommended for the last quarter of 1966. He stated, however, that with on-hand ground forces he would expect to commence operating in the delta by 1 October. Therefore, the naval component was desired as soon as possible and its availability should not be made contingent upon the division's deployment. The estimated
naval force requirements were as follows:  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>APB</td>
<td>4-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LST equivalent for logistic resupply</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LCM 6/8 for command and communications</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YTB (large harbor tug) for general support</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Machine shop barge for force support</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>River Assault Groups, consisting of 24 LCM-8s; 4 LCM-6s (Monitor); and 12 Patrol craft, river</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(1) General Westmoreland then requested that CINCPAC determine the availability of the ships and boats required, to include their estimated arrival in the RVN. Also, he requested information concerning the ships' characteristics and plans for each of the classes of APBs.

(1) The force proposed by COMUSMACV became known as the Mekong Delta Mobile Afloat Force (MDMAF), and CINCPAC immediately requested comments from the PACOM component commanders. CINCPACFLT's response noted that the COMUSMACV concept appeared to be an imaginative large-scale adaptation of French river assault operations. The French Division Navale D'Assaut (DINASSAUT) had been described by an informed observer as one of the few worthwhile contributions of the French Indochina War to the store of military knowledge. The backbone of the DINASSAUT was the LCM Monitor with added armor and a 40mm cannon, three 20mm cannon, two .50 caliber machine guns, and an 81mm mortar.

1. Approximately 75 plastic assault boats (one battalion lift) to be furnished by the Army.
2. Only the River Assault Groups were programmed and funded. Perhaps in sympathy with the "bottom of the barrel" status of Service resources, COMUSMACV stated a near-apology for the unfunded and unprogrammed requirements that originated in his command as a result of the unorthodox nature of the war and the terrain on which it was being fought.
3. COMUSMACV 00005/010125Z Jan 66
4. High river banks often precluded effective flat trajectory fire.
TOP SECRET

Monitors were landing craft (for vehicles, personnel, tanks, infantry, and utility) and large landing ships (infantry and support), all with increased armor and armament.

A typical operation toward the end of the French phase of the war consisted of 800 men embarked in 7 or more river craft, which were sometimes supported by an assigned observation aircraft. Viet Minh opposition usually consisted of ambush and the controlled mine, often used in coordination. Of lesser importance were swimmers and the blocking of waterways. French countermeasures for the ambush were based on the tactical formation of the DINASSAUT force, and the relatively unsophisticated nature of the controlled mines permitted landing craft to tow grappling on the channel sides to sever their detonating wires.\(^1\)

Returning now to CINCPACFLT's views on the JTF organization, he favored a command arrangement wherein the naval force would be under the operational control of the Commander, River Patrol Force (CTF 116) and operate in support of the Army force involved. CINCUSARPAC, however, concurred in the command arrangements proposed by COMUSMACV.\(^2\)

CINCPAC concurred in the MDMAF requirement stated by COMUSMACV and so notified the JCS.\(^3\) CINCPAC submitted the necessary programming on 12 February,\(^4\) and on 19 February he observed to COMUSMACV that primary considerations were measures to enhance the effectiveness of operations and to reduce the vulnerability of the force. In this respect, he requested that COMUSMACV's report of the MDMAF conference (then underway in Saigon) include a summary of means to accomplish these goals. For the longer range, he requested that COMUSMACV submit a detailed concept of operations and a logistic concept.\(^5\)

\(^1\) CINCPACFLT 170219Z Jan 66
\(^2\) CINCUSARPAC 526/110320Z Jan 66
\(^3\) CINCPAC 202119Z Jan 66
\(^4\) CINCPAC ltr 3010 Ser 00055, 12 Feb 66
\(^5\) CINCPAC 190533Z Feb 66
face limiting factors in terms of forces and materiel until about the end of 1966; COMUSMACV was separately advised of this.

Alternative ways of projecting US combat power into the vital delta region were studied during the February conference in Saigon. These included: (1) heliborne operations from bases outside IV CTZ; (2) operations from land bases within IV CTZ; (3) operations from a mobile afloat base located on the Mekong and Bassac Rivers; and (4) a combination of (2) and (3) above. The COMUSMACV rationale for adoption of the mobile afloat base concept in conjunction with land-based operations was as follows:

1. Heliborne operations, while the most desirable means, were not considered within existing or reasonably available capabilities.

2. Construction of land bases within IV CTZ (the delta) required dredging operations. Limited resources coupled with competing priorities (harbor and port facilities) imposed unacceptable time and cost factors.

3. Operations conducted from a mobile afloat base were deemed the most readily available and feasible means of initiating early ground operations against the Viet Cong in IV CTZ. Personnel, ships, and equipment had programmed availability dates that would permit operations early in 1967.

The February Saigon conference also addressed security measures, force composition, and other aspects of the MDMAF. The subjects of immediate concern included: (1) the vulnerability of the force in transit and afloat at the mobile base location; (2) the lack of tactical doctrine for the proposed operational concept; and (3) the absence of precise river and canal environmental data.

In December CINCPAC recognized COMUSMACV's urgent requirement for up-to-date data on depths, currents, bottom conditions and for a positioning capability for units operating in the delta. CINCPAC had validated to DIA the requirement for a small boat positioning system and a "quick-fix" data collection effort proposed by the Naval Oceanographic Office. At year's end, special funding for a NAVOCEANO Riverine Survey Team concept, to assist MDMAF in a boot-strap data

1. CINCPACFLT 031749Z Feb 66
3. CINCPAC 170138Z Dec 66
4. CINCPAC 060110Z Nov 66; CINCPAC 110131Z Nov 66
collection effort in the delta, was being processed thru DIA to DDR&E.

(TS) The MDMAF concept was further refined by COMUSMACV and others. On 7 May CINCPAC transmitted to the JCS his views on the concept and his recommendation that the associated force requirements be approved so that the MDMAF concept could be implemented at an early date.

(TS) In addition to early initiation of US operations in the delta, CINCPAC stated a need to encourage, increase, and support RVNAF offensive operations in that area. He termed COMUSMACV's MDMAF concept a positive approach to the solution of problems of military operations in the delta, and to achievement of an early improvement in the situation. Due regard was given to the dependence of the population on the waterways for transportation and commerce, and to the fact that the land area was heavily populated and under a type of cultivation that would require major long-term projects to develop major fixed bases. These factors posed formidable difficulties when viewed in light of the limited US experience in riverine operations.

(TS) Under the proposed concept, operations would share some characteristics with conventional naval, ground, and amphibious operations and the French riverine operations during the Indochina War. The French operation was termed of limited use as an experience factor because of differences in execution and size of forces and the French lack of sufficient transport helicopters to provide a vertical assault capability.

(TS) The unique characteristic of the MDMAF concept was, Admiral Sharp stated, the billeting and sustaining of a brigade-size force afloat and employment of assault elements from the afloat base. By comparison, the French utilized shore installations for the bulk of their forces, embarking them only long enough for combat operations and debarking them on completion. Also, the French employed up to 800 troops and 10 to 20 ships and craft, whereas the COMUSMACV concept would employ approximately 100 personnel and 125 ships and craft in the same restricted environment by the French.

(TS) CINCPAC also recognized the extended time frame required for acquisition of ships and craft, and stated that operations would be supported by the French.

OMUSMACV ltr ser 0003464-66, 13 Mar 66
CINCPACFLT 32128Z Mar 66
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initiated at an early date under specified alternatives utilizing in-country forces already available to COMUSMACV and the PACOM component commanders.¹

More than a month ensued without apparent action on this recommendation and, on the assumption that this was perhaps due to funding difficulties,² COMUSMACV urgently requested that the two River Assault Groups, two APBs, and two tugs of the MDMAF be funded immediately to assure timely availability of the first package of this force. The requirements were reviewed and revalidated in June at the CINCPAC 1967 Requirements Planning Conference, and on 16 June CINCPAC and COMUSMACV jointly reviewed and reconfirmed the requirements.

Requirements and desired closure dates of the MDMAF plus two additional River Assault Groups were specified in a 19 June CINCPAC message.³ Closure date for the first two River Assault Groups was cited as April 1967, with the first additional group closing in July 1967 and the second by December 1967. Concurrent closure dates for other MDMAF craft were also listed, and the final increment was requested to be in-country by March 1968. By this time, of course, the total force composition varied considerably from the initial force proposed by COMUSMACV in January 1966.

On 5 July 1966 the Secretary of Defense approved early activation and deployment of the MDMAF—including only two River Assault Groups. The first increment consisting of the groups, two APBs, and supporting ships and craft would close in the RVN in April 1967; the second increment consisting of three APBs and supporting ships and craft would close in March 1968.⁴ This incremental deployment was in line with CINCPAC’s recommendation, but the two additional River Assault Groups recommended by COMUSMACV and CINCPAC were not approved by the Secretary of Defense.

1. CINCPAC 071957Z May 66
2. The Secretary of Defense on 8 April disapproved a $107.6 million Navy package and directed an alternate concept that would proceed more gradually.
3. CINCPAC 190043Z Jun 66
4. JCS 6183/080023Z Jul 66
TOP SECRET

(TS) At the end of the year the concept for employing the MDMAF forces provided for a brigade of the 9th Infantry Division, most of which had already closed in the RVN, and the two River Assault Groups that would initially be stationed at Dong Tam, eight km west of My Tho. This base would be expanded to accommodate a C-130 capable airstrip, division headquarters, and a portion of the division's support elements. As MDMAF ships arrived, one brigade would phase into the afloat base. The remainder of the 9th Infantry Division would be located in III CTZ near the Rung Sat Special Zone. When additional land bases became available, plans called for the balance of the 9th Division to deploy from the III CTZ to delta areas in the IV CTZ.

(TS) The force conducting operations from Dong Tam or the afloat base could be moved by ships, overland, or by helicopter. Initial operations would usually be limited to a 50 km radius of a base if the River Assault Groups provided the primary means of transportation. The delta waterway system, however, and the mobility of the afloat base would permit operations throughout the delta areas of IV CTZ.

(TS) COMUSMACV's general concept for progressive projection of US military power into the delta was outlined to the Mission Council in September. Several thousand US troops had been stationed in the delta for more than two months, so deployment of additional US Forces would not break any major precedents. Part of the US 25th Infantry Division had been conducting operations in Long An Province in an environment quite similar to that in the balance of the delta, and the experience gained thereby might provide valuable guidance for future delta operations.

(TS) Considerations opposed to US deployments to the delta included intensification of the war in a relatively inactive area; additional support requirements; creation of significant political and inflationary dangers; and initially, an undesirable degree of military control over the populace. Notwithstanding these factors, there were significant considerations that overrode them.
Points in favor of US operations in the delta included: denial of people and resources to the Viet Cong; severance of Viet Cong LOC from the sea and Cambodia; reduction of the Viet Cong capability to recruit, train, and supply its forces; an increased chance for the Revolutionary Development Program to eliminate Viet Cong influence; gain of the military initiative by allied forces; and a possible reduction in MARKET TIME force requirements as a result of sustained friendly military operations.

In the light of military considerations, a satisfactory conclusion of the war would be deferred until GVN domination, direction, and control extended over the food producing and population centers of the delta. The RVNAF had been unable to accomplish this, and either more RVNAF, more US Forces, or a combination of both would be required to do the job. In any event, the sooner the proposed military operations were initiated the earlier the war might be successfully concluded.¹

Command Relations for Riverine Operations in South Vietnam

Revised riverine operations command relationships were published in December by COMUSMACV.² As operations were conducted and lessons learned, it was expected that command relations would be revised as necessary to insure effective and workable arrangements.

The COMUSMACV-prescribed command relations are portrayed graphically in the illustration entitled "Riverine Operations Command Relations" that supplements the following discussion.

Army Units and Higher Headquarters: Army forces conducting riverine operations in III and IV CTZ would be under the operational control of the Commanding General, II Field Force Vietnam, who might exercise this control through designated subordinate US Army headquarters. The Commanding General, USARV would exercise command less operational control of all Army units engaged in riverine operations.

¹. Point Paper, J5512, 5 Oct 66
². MACV Planning Directive 12-66

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The Army will provide the base commander both ashore and afloat. The Navy will provide its appropriate share of personnel for local base defense and primary efforts directed toward provision of gunfire support and protection against waterborne threats.

RIVERINE OPERATIONS COMMAND RELATIONS

MACV

1V Corps

USA IV

11 PFORCEV

Army Riverine
Force

NAYFORV

Navy Riverine
Force

Army Element

Land and Afloat Base

Army Element

Riverine Operations from Land or Afloat Base

Navy Element

Command

X X X
Operational Control

X X X
Command Less Operation

Coordination and/or

Close Support
CONFIDENTIAL

Navy Units and Higher Headquarters: Navy riverine forces would be under COMNAVFORV operational control and under the command less operational control of appropriate CINCPACFLT commanders. COMNAVFORV might exercise operational control through a designated subordinate Navy commander.

Army and Navy Units, Land or Afloat Bases: The senior Army commander assigned would be base commander for all joint Army-Navy bases ashore or afloat. This officer would be responsible for local base defense as described in paragraph 40209, JCS Pub 2. The relation between Army and Navy Units would be one of coordination and mutual support. The Navy would provide an appropriate share of forces for local base defense to include gunfire support and protection against waterborne threats. Operational control of Navy units in these instances would be exercised by the base commander through the Navy chain of command.

Army and Navy Units, Riverine Operations: These operations would commence when troops began embarking to leave the base for an operation, and would end when troops were debarking upon their return to the base. During operations the Army commander would command all participating Army forces and the Navy commander would command all participating Navy forces. The Navy would provide close support to the Army during these operations. The command relation between these units during the operational planning phase would be one of coordination.

Commanding General, II Field Force Vietnam/COMNAVFORV/Senior Advisor I Corps: Command relation would be one of coordination.

Army Riverine Forces/Navy Riverine Forces/Senior Advisor IV Corps: Command relation would be one of coordination and/or mutual support.

Riverine Forces and Other US/RVNAF Forces: Command relations would be mutual support.

US Forces/RVNAF Forces in IV CTZ: Command relation would be one of cooperation and coordination through advisory channels, as in other corps areas.

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(c) Relocation of Mobile Riverine Base: This normally would be accomplished only on COMUSMACV authority, granted on the basis of recommendations of COMNAVFORV and/or the CG, II Field Force Vietnam. Emergency relocations might be made at the discretion of the base commander who would keep all concerned informed. While relocating, the Mobile Riverine Base would be under the tactical control of the senior Navy commander embarked.

(c) Commanders at all levels were responsible to resolve all command relationship problems in the most expeditious and workable manner consistent with the problem. Command relationship problems would be referred to higher headquarters only after the commanders concerned had made every effort to reach agreement.
SECTION D - SPECIAL WARFARE

(U) This portion of the history deals with CINCPAC's actions and decisions regarding Special Warfare activities in Southeast Asia.¹

UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE

SHINING BRASS

(T2) SHINING BRASS special operations involved relatively small ground forces launched from South Vietnam into Laos. They were designed to apply graduated pressures against selected targets. These forces included US and South Vietnamese (RVNAF and other) personnel.

(T2) The SHINING BRASS concept divided operations into phases as follows:

Phase 1: Reconnaissance patrols (Spike Teams, each consisting of three US Special Forces and six Vietnamese personnel) to infiltrate selected target areas in Laos with an intelligence and target acquisition mission. Air strikes would be requested through the USAF TIGER HOUND system.²

Phase 2: A tailored force (restricted at the end of 1966 to one platoon accompanied by three US Special Forces advisors) to infiltrate into Laos to exploit situations developed by Phase 1 operations. The primary Phase 2 mission was interdiction; air strikes could be requested through the TIGER HOUND system.

Phase 3: Deep penetrations for protracted periods, with the objective of developing resistance movements within selected ethnic groups.

(T2) During the second half of 1965, Phase 1 was implemented³ and by the end of the year the results⁴ were sufficiently encouraging to prompt a COMUSMACV proposal to enlarge the SHINING BRASS

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1. Other information related to Unconventional Warfare is maintained separately; see CPRS 0001435-65, 0001248-66, and 0001249-67
2. ZAD 21140/140454Z Oct 65
3. JCS 2067/202109Z Sep 65; Basic Ops Order: CINCPAC 290123Z Sep 65; VIENTIANE 206/130304Z Oct 65
4. COMUSMACV 30713/011220Z Sep 66

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operational area and implement Phase 2. He also requested authority to expand the operational area to coincide with the TIGER HOUND area, and to infiltrate and exfiltrate teams by helicopter rather than on foot.\(^1\)

COMUSMACV further proposed to recruit, organize, and train three Nung\(^2\) battalion-size units to support the harassment-raid-ambush actions of Phase 2. Rationale supporting the larger-unit operations was that the existing South Vietnamese forces were insufficient for cross-border operations.\(^3\)

Ambassador Sullivan in Laos expressed apprehension about expanding ground operations in the Laos Panhandle,\(^4\) but CINCPAC supported COMUSMACV's proposal to the JCS.\(^5\) Favored by continued SHINING BRASS successes in 1966, the proposal to recruit and fund three Nung battalions and additional reconnaissance teams was approved by the JCS. Also approved were CINCPAC's recommendations concerning expansion of the operational area and infiltration and exfiltration by helicopter.

On 28 May 1966, with the concurrence of Ambassador Sullivan and COMUSMACV,\(^6\) CINCPAC recommended to the JCS a number of operating rules and techniques and other measures to regulate Phase 2 SHINING BRASS (exploitation force) operations in Laos.\(^7\) A key issue at that time was the shortage of Vietnamese Air Force (VNAF) CH-34 helicopters—a long-standing shortage so severe the VNAF resources were inadequate to support Phase 2 operations.\(^8\)

At the end of 1966 it appeared that this problem might be resolved by withdrawal of 39 UH-34 helicopters from US Navy sources for the VNAF. The availability of troop-lift and gunship helicopter

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1. CINCPAC 240021Z Dec 66
2. The Nung were one of the minority ethnic groups native to the North Vietnam-China border region, some of whom chose to migrate to South Vietnam when Vietnam became divided into North and South.
3. COMUSMACV 00707/080105Z Jan 66; COMUSMACV 04392/110240Z Feb 66
4. VIEN TIANE to CINCPAC 429/061016Z Jan 66
5. CINCPAC 192135Z Feb 66
6. COMUSMACV 17794/24l135Z May 66; CINCPAC 252205Z May 66
7. CINCPAC 282205Z May 66
8. Point Paper, J3322, 13 Jun 66
support was a major influence on the tempo of SHINING BRASS operations. The 10 UH-34s with the VNAF 83d Tactical Group had been able to support an average of 12 missions during a 30-day period. On the basis of this experience, it was anticipated that increasing to 25 the unit equipment of the 83d might provide 18 operational UH-34s to support monthly reconnaissance of 32 targets in Laos.

(92) On 17 June the JCS approved CINCPAC's recommendation to continue with Phase 1 and to begin employing Nung platoon-size exploitation forces (Phase 2). One of these missions was completed during the month, resulting in destruction of 25 enemy structures and emplacement of numerous antipersonnel devices on enemy LOCs. The Nung platoons, with three US Army Special Forces advisors, were tailored to the mission, which was primarily interdiction. Air strikes were requested through the TIGER HOUND system.

(92) COMUSMACV had meanwhile requested authority to conduct SHINING BRASS operations within the western portion of the DMZ and northward approximately 15 km into North Vietnam. At issue in this instance was US ground participation within the DMZ and in North Vietnam. CINCPAC accordingly consulted COMUSMACV concerning

1. JCS 4718/17231S Z Jun 66
2. Point Paper, J3322, Jun 66
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. BANGKOK 2832/030728Z Sep 66

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utilization of wholly indigenous teams to operate in the northern portion of the DMZ.¹

(TS) Another CINCPAC proposal was to extend the SHINING BRASS operational zone farther into Laos along the full length of the western boundary of Quang Tri Province.² The intent of this was to enhance COMUSMACV's reaction capability,³ but decision was still pending in Washington at the end of the year.⁴

(TS) The operating zone at the end of the year extended from the southwestern corner of the DMZ southwest to the Cambodian border, with depth variances into Laos of from 5 km near the DMZ to 20 km in the area toward the south. Phase 1 and 2 operations were conducted simultaneously from forward operational bases at Kontum-Dak To, Kham Duc, and Khe Sanh. Infiltration, reinforcement, resupply, and exfiltration were accomplished by helicopter.

(TS) As of the end of the year, a total of 121 successful SHINING BRASS missions had been completed. Since policy would not permit employment of US personnel in SHINING BRASS operations north of the so-called DMZ along the 17th Parallel, COMUSMACV was working to develop and train all-indigenous SHINING BRASS teams for employment in these areas.⁵

(TS) The year-end assets of SHINING BRASS were:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Authorized</th>
<th>Operational</th>
<th>Recruiting-Training</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Reconnaissance Teams</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exploitation Forces</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Battalions</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Companies</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aircraft</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Helicopters (VNAF UH-34)</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fixed Wing (VNAF U-17)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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* Funds: FY 67, $3.7 million

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2. SACA 5068/112208Z Oct 66
3. CINCPAC 102134Z Sep 66
4. JCS 241529Z Nov 66; Point Papers, J3324, 6 Oct 66 and 5 Jan 67
5. Point Paper, J3322, 5 Jan 67
DANIEL BOONE

(73) This portion of the history discusses the DANIEL BOONE program (nicknamed FLYING HORSE during its initial phases), which was aimed at developing a ground capability for operations in Cambodia similar to the SHINING BRASS program in Laos. Although no DANIEL BOONE operations were conducted in 1966, the base was prepared for ground operations in Cambodia during 1967 if they were authorized.

(73) Throughout 1966 there were repeated confirmations that Cambodia provided sanctuary, support, and free passage to enemy forces. Prince Sihanouk’s fundamental objective, however, remained as always—to prevent the war from spreading to his country, and to insure Cambodia’s existence as a national state whatever the political organization in Southeast Asia. There was increasing US military concern over the aid and comfort the enemy thus gained from Cambodia, and several projects were undertaken to help resolve the problem. Psychological operations in the form of leaflet drops were implemented, but with only limited success because policy forbade US overflight of Cambodia for this purpose.

(73) On 27 June the Secretary of Defense approved CINCPAC’s proposal to develop a ground cross-border capability for operations in Cambodia. Actions specifically approved for FY 66 included: (1) organization and training of intelligence agents, reconnaissance teams, 4 reaction companies, and 1 security force; (2) deployment of 156 US Special Forces personnel; and (3) initial funding of $3.5 million. 2 To expedite the development of DANIEL BOONE assets pending deployment of permanent personnel, the 5th Special Forces Group committed 16 officers and 35 enlisted men to the program. A Con Son Island training camp with an air strip was started, and 40 ethnic Cambodian personnel were recruited and trained before this type of agent was prohibited by the JCS. COMUSMACV’s reclamation to this prohibition was supported by CINCPAC, and the JCS subsequently recommended to the Secretary of Defense that COMUSMACV be authorized to train ethnic Cambodians for

1. For early proposals on this subject see JCS 4037/132312Z Oct 65; CINCPAC 171200Z Oct 65
2. JCS 5374/271912Z Jun 66; CINCPAC 082014Z May 66

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the program. This was not approved, but the personnel already trained could be retained.

By 31 October, 152 of the permanent US Special Forces personnel were present, and the energetic pursuit of DANIEL BOONE had established a significant capability. To maintain and improve force readiness, pending authority to initiate DANIEL BOONE operations, these personnel were committed to an in-country reconnaissance program nicknamed FLAMING ARROW. These activities permitted development of additional trained men and, as of the end of the year, there were on hand 16 reconnaissance teams, 4 reaction companies, and 1 security company.

Meanwhile, $10.4 million had been budgeted to support the program, but it would be necessary to change US policy before conducting operations in Cambodia, and there was doubt that this would occur. Following a 10 November Coordinating Committee for US Missions, Southeast Asia (SEACOORD) meeting, CINCPAC had made certain recommendations and commented on the uncertainty of what could be accomplished in Cambodia in the absence of a belligerent approach.

The Secretary of State's comments on the same subject, however, had emphasized that the basic consideration in our policy in Southeast Asia was to avoid expansion of the war in Vietnam. He also noted that any action that threatened to expand the conflict to Cambodia would cause a misunderstanding of US intentions and weaken the base of national and international support of our effort. The Secretary cautioned that our remedial action should not "involve us in greater problems and dangers than those which it is intended to correct." In recognizing the nature of Sihanouk's temperament and fears, Secretary Rusk stressed the value of a cool and objective balancing of costs and benefits in considering ways to deal with the Cambodian sanctuary problem.

1. CINCPAC 130401Z Aug 66; JCSM-612-66, 24 Sep 66, CPRS 000651-66
2. SAIGON 10958/150909Z Nov 66
3. CINCPAC 260349Z Nov 66
4. STATE 89498/230100Z Nov 66
5. 634
PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE

Leaflet operations were initiated in North Vietnam in 1965 and continued into 1966. During 1966, these operations were extended to Laos and Cambodia.

On 22 January CINCPAC authorized COMUSMACV to conduct psychological leaflet operations against enemy infiltration routes in specified areas of Laos. By April there were extremely limited indications of the effectiveness of these operations against NVA infiltriees moving through Laos. Three North Vietnamese civilian ralliers at Hue claimed that National Safe Conduct Passes found in Laos near the RVN border had encouraged them to carry out their already formulated intention to rally to the GVN.

Two of the infiltriees had found a leaflet showing a B-52 bomber, and they said that the other infiltriees became particularly excited after they saw bomb craters along the route. One of the ralliers also described a leaflet in the form of a letter written by a North Vietnamese soldier who died in South Vietnam, and he reported that it had considerable impact.

A measure of effectiveness of leaflet operations against the

1. CINCPAC 220801Z Jan 66
2. COMUSMACV MONEVAL, Apr 66, CPRS 002495-66

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Viet Cong was a captured instruction from the People's Revolutionary Party to Interzone and Provincial Propaganda Agitators. The document termed US efforts "dangerous and a wicked scheme" which "surely influence(s) our troops." It further stated that the cadre must take all measures to keep others from reading the leaflets, predicting many difficulties if cadre and soldier thoughts were not closely controlled. 1

(TOP SECRET) On 26 May CINCPAC received authority to dispense leaflets by wind-drift methods into a portion of Cambodia immediately adjacent to South Vietnam's Pleiku and Darlac Provinces. The leaflets would be in the Vietnamese language only and directed against North Vietnamese infiltrers. CINCPAC's original request had been for authority to dispense the leaflets from aircraft overflying Cambodia. 2

(TOP SECRET) The effectiveness of the Cambodian program was not established at the end of the year, nor had there been any reaction from Cambodian authorities. 3 While these operations were conducted, plans were under development for additional psychological operations against Viet Cong-NVA forces utilizing Cambodian territory. 4

2. STATE to SAIGON 3641/260010Z May 66
3. COMUSMACV 28123/131026Z Aug 66
4. CINCPAC 280347Z Oct 66; CINCPAC 292221Z Oct 66; Point Paper J3324, 22 Nov 66; J3 History, Oct 66
SECTION E - CAPABILITIES OF FRIENDLY FORCES
IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM

(U) Selected CINCPAC actions designed to enhance RVNAF military capabilities are discussed below. Other material may be found throughout this Chapter. Annex A provides more comprehensive coverage of this subject.

VNAF H-34 Helicopters

During the latter half of 1965 the Vietnamese Air Force (VNAF) had attritted 14 H-34 helicopters. To reconstitute the authorized inventory of 80 (4 squadrons) and to compensate for attrition occurring through the balance of FY 66, 21 helicopters were programmed.

(U) CINCPAC considered the problem critical and asked the JCS to assist in obtaining the required H-34s. The first JCS response indicated that action would be delayed pending the findings of a Secretary of Defense study of worldwide helicopter requirements. But the facts were that the CH-34 was no longer under procurement, and all US Army CH-34Cs had been issued to high priority US Army units. The Army Chief of Staff therefore proposed deletion of 13 of the programmed 21 VNAF CH-34Cs.

(U) In commenting on the Army proposal, CINCPAC advised the JCS that combat requirements in Vietnam made it essential that the helicopters be delivered as programmed. He also requested an expedited Secretary of Defense decision regarding the delivery.

(U) This was not forthcoming, and on 2 March COMUSMACV requested that CINCPAC submit the problem in a FLAG POLE report to the Secretary of Defense-established Vietnam Support Expediting Task Force (VSETF) in Washington. CINCPAC did this.

1. ADMINO CINCPAC 180228Z Dec 65
2. JCS 9307/232337Z Dec 65
3. DA 749103/31231Z Jan 66
4. AF ADVSY GP RVN AFGP-MDC 15040/051020Z Feb 66
5. CINCPAC 060036Z Feb 66
6. CINCPAC Command History, 1965, p 579 discussed establishment of the VSETF.
He pointed out that attrition had averaged two and a half aircraft per month since September, that four of the helicopters were routinely in depot maintenance, and that eight were crash damaged. This left an operating balance of 59 aircraft, which was termed insufficient for essential mission requirements.¹

(9) One month later the JCS requested Secretary of Defense authority to withdraw enough CH-34s from Europe so that 32 could be transferred to Thailand by 1 July, and 21 could be transferred to Vietnam as soon as possible.² The Secretary of Defense was not persuaded, however, that the helicopters for the VNAF should be withdrawn from Europe. He noted that as of 1 March the VNAF was only 9 below its authorization of 80; after stating that VNAF rates of utilization and loss were probably less favorable than ours, he asked the JCS to check further.

(1) This was done, and the requirement was revalidated.³ For cogent reasons COMUSMACV had meanwhile concluded that it was urgent to activate the 83d Special Operations Group (SOG) early in FY 67.⁴ CINCPAC supported this and added 18 CH-34s for SOG support to the FLAG POLE total needed to restore the VNAF authorized inventory.⁵

(8) In response to a subsequent JCS message CINCPAC stated that the VNAF helicopter squadrons could fulfill neither the mission requirements nor the SOG requirements unless the VNAF was provided its full allowance of H-34s immediately, and unless authorization for activation of the 83d SOG was advanced to the first quarter of FY 67 and the associated 18 H-34s were made available in the same time frame.⁶

(5) The JCS thereon asked the Secretary of Defense to provide the 21 H-34s, preferably from assets in Europe, or, as a less desirable military alternative, by withdrawal from the Naval Reserve.⁷

¹ CINCPAC 040100Z Mar 66
² JCSM-217-66, 4 Apr 66
³ CINCPAC 282230Z May 66
⁴ COMUSMACV 19131/040923Z Jun 66
⁵ ADMNO CINCPAC 132032Z May 66
⁶ J4 History, Feb 66, May 66
⁷ JCSM-402-66; J5321 Brief 228, 25 Jun 66
The VNAF H-34 inventory continued low, but the Secretary of Defense's Assistant for International Security Affairs ultimately approved an FY 67 program that would provide 39 UH-34Gs to the VNAF. The source was to be Navy excess; 18 were for activation of the 83d SOG and the remaining 21 were attrition replacements.

The year end schedule projected delivery to begin with 3 in January 1967 and average an additional 6 a month through July 1967 when the total of 39 would be in VNAF hands.2

VNAF Modernization
Helicopters

The VNAF had four CH/UH-34 helicopter squadrons. It was planned to modernize this fleet because of the limited availability of replacement aircraft. Ultimately, all four squadrons would have UH-1Ds helicopters; the immediate plan was for one squadron of UH-1Ds in FY 67 and another in FY 68.

As the UH-1Ds arrived in the RVN the H-34s in the converting squadron would be used to replace the combat losses of the remaining squadrons. It was anticipated that about nine of the UH-1Ds would be delivered by the end of February 1967, thereby providing some relief for the shortage of replacement H-34s.

Jets

During the last quarter of 1965 the JCS solicited CINCPAC's recommendation concerning conversion of a portion of the VNAF from A-1s to F-5s. CINCPAC's views were also requested on the substitution of the F-84 and F-86 for the F-5. CINCPAC's 10 December response recommended conversion of the first A-1 squadron to F-5s at the end of the third quarter of FY 67, and that most of the conversion cost be inserted into the FY 66 RVN program.3 Several days later he emphasized the inadequacy of the F-84/F-86 for VNAF requirements and reiterated his 10 December recommendation. While he recommended

1. JCS 041540Z Oct 66
2. Point Paper, J4332, 15 Nov 66
3. CINCPAC 100400Z Dec 65

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retention of four of the six A-1 squadrons, he also proposed that the
decision as to converting the second squadron be withheld until the
SKOSHI TIGER evaluation was completed. ¹

(₇) These recommendations were fully accepted by the JCS, ² and
submitted to the Secretary of Defense. No decision had been announced
by June, and CINCPAC inquired about the JCS estimated date of the
decision. In so doing he also proposed that training should commence
in July 1966 in preparation for the conversion by the end of the third
quarter of FY 67. ³ Meanwhile, the growing shortage of A-1s necessitated
substitution of another strike aircraft throughout the VNAF.

(₇) On 13 July the Secretary of Defense approved two F-5 squadrons
and four AT-37 squadrons in lieu of the existing six A-1 squadrons.
He also directed the Air Force Chief of Staff to conduct a combat evalu-
ation of the AT-37 to facilitate its introduction into the VNAF. The first
squadron was scheduled for conversion to F-5s at the end of the third
quarter of FY 67 and the second by the second quarter of FY 68. ⁴

(₇) Subsequently, the F-5 conversion training for the VNAF was
scheduled to commence at Williams Air Force Base, California on 3
October with 33 students to graduate in March 1967 and a second incre-
ment to complete training by December 1967. ⁵

(₇) CINCPAC's recommendation for disposition of the A-1s that
would be released during the F-5 conversion process was to distribute
them proportionately between the USN and USAF. ⁶

(₇) In late November the Secretary of Defense approved a Deputy
Secretary of Defense proposal that would produce an end result of one
(18 UE) F-5 squadron, three (18 UE) A-37 squadrons, and two (18 UE)
A-1 squadrons. ⁷ CINCPAC had previously concurred in the proposed
modification to the VNAF modernization program, but he recommended

1. CINCPAC 140255Z Dec 65; CINCPAC Command History, 1965,
   pp 100, 482
2. JCSM-70-66, 1 Feb 66
3. CINCPAC 042332Z Jun 66
4. JCS 2343/655-82, 15 Jul 66; JCS 2343/852-2, 15 Jul 66; JCS
   7118/201326Z Jul 66
5. CSAF 84521/291450Z Jul 66
6. CINCPAC 152300Z Jun 66; J4 History, Jul 66
7. JCS 102355Z Nov 66
maintaining a UE of 21 in the A-1 squadrons as long as feasible. He also recommended retention of the original plan for two (18 UE) F-5 squadrons, and four (25 UE) A-37 squadrons as a long-range VNAF objective.  

Air Defense, South Vietnam

In May the JCS requested that CINCPAC reassess the antiaircraft requirements for Southeast Asia and Okinawa because of the magnitude of the stated requirements in comparison to the air threat. COMUSMACV's subsequent recommendation was for the 1967 deployment of 2 additional HAWK battalions for air defense at Hue and Qui Nhon plus 11 automatic weapons battalions and 15 quad .50 caliber machinegun batteries. When CINCPAC forwarded his reassessment of the requirements to the JCS he did not propose any additional HAWK deployments to South Vietnam; he recommended deployment of 3 vice COMUSMACV's recommended 11 automatic weapons battalions. These were to be at An Khe, Qui Nhon, and Tuy Hoa. Each of the three automatic weapons battalions in CINCPAC's recommended deployment was to be augmented with machinegun batteries.

COMUSMACV thereon requested reconsideration, citing minimum requirements for an additional HAWK battalion for defense of Qui Nhon. He further stated a requirement for a total of 11 automatic weapons battalions and 15 machinegun batteries, emphasizing the importance of these latter units in a ground support role. CINCPAC reaffirmed his July position; but upon further COMUSMACV justification, he recommended to the JCS the deployment of enough automatic weapons battalions and machinegun batteries to meet COMUSMACV's original request for 11 and 15 respectively.

1. CINCPAC 162024Z Nov 66; Point Paper, J5321, 6 Jan 67
2. JCS 3035/26237Z May 66
3. COMUSMACV 22431/301234Z Jun 66
4. CINCPAC 232210Z Jul 66
5. COMUSMACV 27579/100035Z Aug 66
6. CINCPAC 190140Z Oct 66
ARVN Housing, III CTZ

In the interest of improving ARVN unit effectiveness, COMUSMACV in May proposed a self-help construction program of family housing for ARVN personnel in III CTZ.\(^1\) CINCPAC concurred in principle on 8 June.\(^2\) After obtaining further facts in support of the housing requirement,\(^3\) the JCS recommended that the Secretary of Defense approve a trial program at an estimated cost of $2.8 million (operations and maintenance funded) for 9,130 families. If successful, the program would be expanded to include approximately 28,000 additional families at an estimated cost of slightly more than $8 million.\(^4\) Decision was pending at the end of 1966.

RVNAF PX/Commissary System

RVNAF personnel and their dependents were squeezed between their fixed salaries and the spiraling costs of essentials. The RVNAF PX/Commissary (PX/C) system did not offer even minimum essential items. During 1966 various plans were investigated to improve military morale by providing US aid to the PX/C.

The PX/C outlets provided only about 25 percent of the basic necessities such as rice, sugar, and soap. The chance of GVN corrective action was small, primarily because the Minister of Economy considered that an increase in allocations of the essential items to the PX/C system would result in the loss of tax revenue, since some of these items were sold tax-free. Accordingly, the PX/C allocations of rice met only 60 percent of the requirements in I and II CTZ, leaving none at all for the military personnel throughout the rest of the country. Overall, the rice shortage totaled 14,255 tons a month.

In June COMUSMACV proposed that the United States subsidize the PX/C system by selling it certain items at discounted prices. CINCPAC concurred, but this concept was rejected by the Secretary of Defense on legal grounds. As a counterproposal the Secretary of Defense

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1. COMUSMACV 150720Z May 66
2. CINCPAC 082158Z Jun 66
3. JCS 2691/151517Z Sep 66; CINCPAC 181935Z Oct 66
4. Point Paper, J4211, 3 Jan 67

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proposed that the Defense Department furnish commodities to the RVNAF for free issue through the PX/C system as a supplementary ration to the troops. COMUSMACV considered that this would be too complex and expensive, however.

(4) His counterproposal was not accepted, again on legal grounds, and on 17 December CINCPAC suggested another approach to the problem, COMUSMACV opposed this one because it would result in an excessive disparity between market prices and PX/C prices. For example, the official price of rice would have been 11 piasters, the PX/C price 7.7 piasters, and the price under the CINCPAC proposal only 2.28 piasters.

(4) Having thus failed to develop an acceptable solution to the problem, CINCPAC proposed a January 1967 conference in Honolulu, with representatives of interested PACOM and CONUS commands and agencies, to prepare an acceptable plan for resolution of the problem.

LAOS

(5) The geographic location of Laos has assigned this primitive monarchy a key role in the war in Southeast Asia. The combination of a weak Laotian government and the conflicting interests of several powerful nations generated a studied effort to maintain secrecy and confusion about what took place in Laos and how those events were related to the war. The following material discusses the national background of Laos, US objectives with respect to Laos, the interrelationship of politics and military forces in Laos, considerations in the coordination and management of US assistance, and some related problems and progress. Information related to operations in Laos may be found in the "Air Operations" portion of this chapter. Also, see the index.

History to 1962

(U) The Lao people—the ethnic group that dominated the politics and culture of modern Laos—traced their history back to their flight south from China before the advancing forces of Kubla Khan in the 13th

1. Point Paper, J4221, Jan 67

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century AD and the founding of the Lao kingdom of Lan Xang (Land of a Million Elephants) in 1353. By the 17th century Lan Xang reached a political apex and controlled sections of Yunnan, of the southern Shan States, of the Vietnamese and Cambodian mountain plateaus, and large stretches of present-day northeastern Thailand. (See Historical Reference map).  

(U) Lan Xang endured until about the end of the 17th century when it separated into three kingdoms—Luang Prabang (north), Vientiane (central), and Champassak (south)—each headed by a member of the old royal house. Through the 18th and 19th centuries the Lao states quarreled among themselves and struggled to maintain their independence against outside invaders: Annamese from the east, Chinese and other non-Thai bandits and raiders from the north, Burmese from the west, and Siamese from the south.

(U) Vientiane was for a time (1778) in Siamese hands, and regained its independence only by accepting vassalage to Siam as well as to Annam. A centuries-old custom of war in Southeast Asia was to systematically depopulate conquered territory to make good the losses of other wars, to preclude rebellion after the victors had departed, and to leave a devastated area incapable of supporting the troops of another invader. A thorough application of this custom practically obliterated the principality of Vientiane; its population at the middle of the 19th century was only one quarter of what it had been 50 years earlier.

(U) Luang Prabang fared only a little better, suffering from wars with Vientiane, Burma, and Siam. Meo tribesmen later migrated into north Luang Prabang and Tra Ninh (Xieng Khouang); they generally settled down as semi-nomadic farmers, but were often rebellious. Later the backwash of rebellions to the north hit Laos and upper Tonkin; armies of fleeing rebels and bandits ravaged the area. About the same time France began to expand into Annam and Cambodia. To forestall French encroachments into Laos, Siamese strengthened its control over the area. On one occasion a king of Luang Prabang sought aid from Siam against Chinese bandits, but when the Siamese army arrived it came to terms with the Chinese and withdrew, carrying off numbers of Lao.

1. This portion of the History is based on Frank M. LeBar and Adrienne Suddar (eds.), Laos, Its People, Its Society, Its Culture (New Haven, Human Relations Area Files), 1960
(U) After the French established their protectorate over Annam, the Siamese in 1885 reduced the King of Luang Prabang to the status of a governor who took orders from Siamese commissioners at his court. Other commissioners directed the affairs of the King of Champassak. To further forestall the expansion of French influence, the Siamese in 1885 marched into Xieng Khouang and Houa Phans (Sam Neua) under the pretext of acting to suppress Chinese bandits in regions predominantly Thai in race and language. Their real purpose was revealed, however, when the Viceroy of Luang Prabang was seized and taken to Bangkok as a hostage.

(U) The ensuing negotiations resulted in an agreement that recognized Siamese claims but secured for the French the right to maintain a vice-consul in Luang Prabang. Subsequent to a French blockade of Bangkok, all Siamese claims in Laos were formally relinquished in 1893.

(U) By a treaty of 1896, conflicting British-French claims were settled by establishing the Mekong as the border between Burma and Laos. The earlier (1893) Franco-Siamese treaty had also set the Mekong as the boundary between Laos and Siam, thereby cutting both Luang Prabang and Champassak into two sections. By later treaties, however, Siam ceded the west bank section of Luang Prabang and of the province of Bassac.

(U) France now controlled all of Luang Prabang and Xieng Khouang and about half of the former kingdoms of Champassak and Vientiane. All but one of the sons of the King of Champassak left for Siam; the exception, Nhoy, took an oath of loyalty to France and was made governor of Bassac, without royal status. The King of Luang Prabang retained his royal title and prerogatives under French protection; his realm, however, was in all important respects administered indirectly by French officials in Vientiane, the administrative capital of French Laos. There the Resident exercised indirect rule of Luang Prabang and a much more direct administration, through French commissioners, of the eight provinces outside that kingdom.

(U) The Japanese advance southward during World War II was accompanied by a treaty of friendship with Thailand (formerly Siam). Before obtaining permission of the Vichy regime to move troops into
Indochina, the Japanese permitted Thailand to seize those parts of Luang Prabang and Champassak that were ceded by treaty to France in 1904. After the Japanese occupied all of Indochina in 1941 they chose to act through Vichy authorities in controlling Laos and the rest of the region. In August 1941 a treaty with the Vichy French increased the Luang Prabang domain by incorporating with it the provinces of Vientiane, Xieng Khouang, and Nam Tha.

(U) After France was completely liberated by the Allied armies, the Japanese ousted the Vichy officials and declared the colonial regime at an end. Most of the components of French Indochina declared independence, but the King of Laos angered the Japanese by a delay in assuming an independent status. Even after doing so he left the southern provinces free to decide for themselves. The King's son, Crown Prince Savang Vatthana, was sent to Saigon and the Prime Minister—Prince Petsarath—was allowed a relatively free hand in running the country.

(U) With the Japanese defeat, the French acted to bring Laos to heel in its prewar status, but they met resistance from members of the Laos elite. Prince Petsarath headed a Lao Issara (Free Laos) movement which, after a tussle with the King, succeeded in installing King Sisavang Vong as a constitutional monarch ruling all of Laos. The French nevertheless moved armed forces up the Mekong, putting down Lao Issara resistance as they advanced. Despite Viet Minh support sent by Ho Chi Minh, the Lao Issara were dispersed or overcome.

(U) In 1946 a Laos-French commission provided a document signed in Vientiane on 27 August which confirmed a unified Laos under the sovereignty of Luang Prabang and established it as a constitutional monarchy. Prince Boun Oum of Champassak renounced his sovereign rights to that principality in return for a confirmed title of Prince and a lifetime position as Inspector General for the Kingdom.

(U) The politically sophisticated elite were meanwhile in Thailand, split by internal dissention: they were headed by Prince Petsarath, who was resolutely anti-French and ambitious for the crown; his younger half-brother, Prince Souvanna Phouma, who headed a group desiring independence but inclined to work with the French to get it; and another
half-brother, Prince Souphanouvong, who was drawn toward the ideas and methods of the Viet Minh, and who favored armed resistance in concert with them.

(U) A 1949 convention with France confirmed Laos' autonomy within the French Union and liberalized the country's authority to conduct foreign relations. This left the exile government so few issues that it dissolved itself in October 1949. Except for Prince Petsarath and Prince Souphanouvong, most of the leaders returned to Laos to reenter government affairs.

(U) Spurred by the Viet Minh rebellion, the French removed almost all remaining constraints on Laos sovereignty in 1953. Under the constitutional provisions regarding the French Union, France assumed coordination of the means and direction of policy proper to the preparation and assurance of defense.

(U) The newly independent kingdom was immediately plagued with deep problems—economic, military, and political. American aid, first given through France and later direct, was an essential factor in keeping the country from foundering completely. The few French troops remaining in Laos administered US-provided funds and stocks in building an army.

(U) The supreme complication was the constant threat of communist subversion, instigated by the Viet Minh, who were in turn supported by Communist China. Prince Souphanouvong had rallied to the Viet Minh in March 1951 and headed the Laotian dissidents in North Vietnam. This group, which became known as the Pathet Lao (Lao Country), was announced as the free government of all Laos and as the center of all true resistance against French colonialism and American "imperialism."

(U) By 1953 the Pathet Lao, with Viet Minh support, were fighting in Laos. Under a cease-fire agreement of 1954 the northern provinces of Sam Neua and Phong Saly were ceded to the Pathet Lao and Viet Minh as regroupment zones, which were to be administered by the Royal Government. Nevertheless, the Pathet Lao offered armed resistance to Government attempts to assume control, and in further violation of the agreements they continued to increase the strength and amount of their forces.
(U) The Pathet Lao boycotted the elections held late in 1955. A new government led by Prince Souvanna Phouma was installed on 21 March 1956, however, and under a later agreement the two provinces were formally returned to Royal Government control. The communists were then free to leave Sam Neua and Phong Saly, and in 1958 Prince Souphanouvong and one of his aides were included in a coalition cabinet, and four Pathet Lao members were elected deputies to the National Assembly and entered the civil service.

(U) Souvanna Phouma's government fell in July 1958 and was replaced by one headed by Phoumi Sananikone, who soon ended the coalition by excluding all Pathet Lao members from his cabinet. Prince Souphanouvong objected strongly to this move, and his charges of misuse of power and US interference in Laotian affairs were echoed in Communist China and North Vietnam.

(U) Hostilities then resumed in Phong Saly and Sam Neua, with most progress on the side of the communists. As the fighting grew in intensity during the summer, Phoumi Sananikone turned more and more to neutralism. King Sisavang Vong died in November, bringing Crown Prince Savang Vatthana to the throne. With the new King's support, pressure against Phoumi Sananikone's neutralist policies mounted rapidly, and he was ousted in a bloodless military coup in January 1960.

(U) A military committee consisting of five army generals controlled the Lao government for about a week at the beginning of 1960. King Savang then named Thao Kou Abhaya to form a provisional government to prepare the country for general elections.

(U) By May, Defense Minister General Phoumi Nosavan completed a roundup of all rebels in Southern Laos, and the elections were held in a relatively calm atmosphere. General Phoumi was suspected of providing the behind-the-scenes guidance of the subsequently appointed civil government.

(U) Captain Kong Le seized control of Vientiane on 9 August 1960, and the civil government under recently-appointed Prime Minister Tiao Somsanith was ousted. The King thereon instructed Souvanna Phouma to form a new government. But General Phoumi organized his own
government in Savannakhet and began to rally Army support from units located outside Vientiane. Souvanna fled to Cambodia, and forces under General Phoumi and Colonel Kouprasith Abhay, Commander of the 5th (Vientiane) Military Region, recaptured Vientiane on 15 December. The semblance of a new government was formed, and Kong Le retreated to the Plaine des Jarres and embraced the Pathet Lao. Kong Le was soon strengthened by substantial support airlifted by the USSR. As 1960 ended, US military forces were being prepared for deployment in strength to Southeast Asia.

During 1961 and the first half of 1962 the Royal Lao Government continued to operate in a chaotic and deteriorating environment, and the United States exerted heavy-handed influence in Laos internal affairs. These events are detailed in the CINCPAC Command Histories for the period.

Following a US-USSR accommodation with respect to mutual interests in Southeast Asia, the United States entered into a 1962 agreement that had the stated purpose of assuring the neutrality of Laos. Among the other parties to this protocol were the governments of Communist China, North Vietnam, France, South Vietnam, Thailand, the USSR, and Great Britain. The provisions of this "Geneva Agreement of 1962" included the following:

"All foreign regular and irregular troops, foreign paramilitary formations and foreign military personnel shall be withdrawn from Laos in the shortest time possible. . . . (Article 2)

"The introduction of foreign regular and irregular troops, foreign paramilitary formations and foreign military personnel into Laos is prohibited. (Article 4)

"If the Laotian Government considers it necessary, the French Government may as an exception leave in Laos for a limited period of time a precisely limited number of French military instructors for the purpose of training the armed forces of Laos. (Article 5)

"The introduction into Laos of armaments, munitions and war material generally, except such quantities of conventional armaments as the Royal Government of Laos may consider necessary for the national defense of Laos, is prohibited." (Article 6)

1. Kong Le turned away from the PL in 1963. CINCPAC Command History 1963, pp 164-168
(U) Part of President Kennedy's statement made on 23 July 1962, the same date the agreements were signed in Geneva, read as follows:  

"The agreements represent a solemn commitment not only by the United States but by all the other signatories to ensure a free, independent, and neutral Laos. This can be accomplished only by full and continued observance of the agreements by all signatories."

"The Kingdom of Laos, which has been torn for so long by a fratricidal strife, now stands on the threshold of a new era. It now has the opportunity to become united and independent, free to pursue its chosen course of neutrality. The success of that policy ultimately must depend not only on the efforts of the Laotians themselves but also on the moral and material support it receives from the rest of the world. For its part, the United States assures Laos of such support as that country enters this new phase in its history."

Significance of the 1962 Agreements

(U) It must be understood that from the summer of 1962 the coalition Government of Laos was guaranteed by the two most powerful nations in the history of the world--the USSR and the United States. The Laos Government was to reflect a balanced division of power between the communists, Neutralists, and Rightists. By international fiat the Laos Government was to be neutral--and both the United States and the USSR had a vital interest in maintaining this facade without respect to actual events. Similarly, the realities of power politics demanded that the individuals within the Laos Government accept the arrangement contrived for their country.

The US Military Assistance Advisory Group was withdrawn from Laos on 6 October 1962, and the next day the ex-Chief of the group assumed the title of Deputy Chief, Joint US Military Assistance Group, Thailand (DEPCHJUSMAG Thailand). Thus, except for the military attaches, all overt US military personnel were withdrawn from Laos. 2 To avoid compromising Lao neutrality, the relationship between the DEPCHJUSMAG, Thailand and military aid to Laos was classified as Secret. For the next

2. CINCPAC Command History, 1962, p 219
two years the Laos Military Assistance Program was relatively small and was managed by DEPCHJUSMA, Thailand from his third-country location in Bangkok—just as a much larger program was managed in 1966.

(U) The fighting in Laos did not stop after the tripartite (communist, Neutralist, Rightist) government was formed in 1962, but it was at least subdued for a while.

Military Coups, 1964-1965

A lesson learned from a series of coups during 1964 and 1965 was the futility of indulging in such activities without US support.

April 1964

(♩) Phoumi Nosavan, a Rightist and general in the Laos Armed Forces, had once been the US favorite among the contentious military and political factions in Laos. That phase ended with Phoumi's debacle at Nam Tha in 1962 when he and his forces were driven into Thailand. He returned to Laos and maintained a significant following.

(♩) On 19 April 1964 the commander of the Vientiane Military Region, General Kouprasith Abhay, and the head of the paramilitary Department of National Coordination - Laos National Police, General Siho Lamphouthacoul, attempted a coup by establishing a "National Revolutionary Committee," and holding Souvanna Phouma under house arrest. Their declared purpose was to strengthen the Government by seeking a greater share of representation for the Phoumists. These two officers might have drawn some encouragement by the fact that the United States had recently given immediate support to two coup groups in Saigon in a short space of time. General Phoumi and General Siho were not pleased with the outcome of the coup, since US pressure forced them to agree to the restoration of the government of Souvanna Phouma.

February 1965

(♩) On 31 January General Phoumi led an attempt to overthrow the legal government in Vientiane. He was backed by the National Police, and troops in Savannakhet. After about 12 hours of heavy fighting in Vientiane on 3 February, the rebels were defeated and both Phoumi and General Siho escaped to Thailand. The Royal Lao Army (Forces Armee Royale - FAR) and the National Police were reorganized as a sequel to this coup attempt.
March 1965 (Rebellion)

On 28 March, Phoumi remnants in Thakhek led rebellious troop elements against Government forces for three days. These rebel units, approximately 400 troops, were routed and the Phoumist elements dispersed. The rebel leaders, Lieutenant Colonel Savath and Major Kham Samongdy escaped to Thailand.

April 1965

On 17 April two Phoumi supporters—the Commander of Military Region II, General Khamkong Boudavong, and the military adviser to the Ministry of National Defense, General Sang Rattanasamay—were arrested. As a result, Lieutenant Colonel Kham Sao and Colonel Kab Keo led approximately 400 disaffected troops toward Muong Moc. Lieutenant Colonel Kham Sao stated that he was protesting against the FAR policy toward officers who were suspected of being loyal to Phoumi Nosavan. Some of these officers had been interned and others placed under surveillance after a previous Phoumi revolt. Kab Keo was killed during an attack by loyal troops; Kham Sao surrendered to General Vang Pao and was subsequently tried for leading a rebellion. The FAR took control of the other rebels about 1 May 1965.

Objectives, 1966

The ultimate communist objective for Laos was to "liberate" that country—and Thailand as well. The short-range objectives, however, were to utilize Laos territory to support the fight in South Vietnam while at the same time preserving and strengthening territorial and political assets in Laos.

The US objective in Laos was unchanged from previous years—to limit Communist China's and North Vietnam's expansion in Southeast Asia through Laotian territory. It was hoped that behind the facade of a neutral Laos the US objective could be attained by strengthening the Lao ability to preserve their territory in the face of Pathet Lao and NVA forces.

It was significant that while the communists and the United States were employing armed force in Laos, as of 1966 neither had committed their available resources to the struggle. No side was in a position to
reap an appreciable or immediate advantage in committing large combat forces in this primitive country, which was positioned on a line of communication made significant by events outside Laos.

(5) The US military activity (primarily air) was intended to inhibit communist infiltration through Laos and to support actions sanctioned by the Royal Government. The communist military actions involved ground forces and were designed to secure their lines of communication to the south and west and to maintain secure positions in Laos well beyond the critical passage points leading to North Vietnam. If there was a Lao objective at all, it was probably survival—with emphasis on the individuals, their families, and their worldly goods.

**Politico - Military Affairs in Laos**

**Enemy Forces**

(9) The estimated 1 January 1966 enemy infantry strength in Laos totaled 132 battalions, of which 105 were Pathet Lao, 15 were dissident Lao Neutralists under Colonel Deuane or General Khamouane Boupha, and 12 were NVA. Personnel strength was approximately 47,675, of which 34,000 were Pathet Lao, 3,800 dissident Neutralists, and 9,875 NVA. Disposition of the NVA troops was: 5,050 attached as advisors to the Pathet Lao and 4,825 assigned to NVA battalions.

(5) As of 1 June it was estimated that there were 139 battalions of enemy infantry. Of these, 105 were Pathet Lao, 13 were dissident Neutralists (2 fewer than in January), 19 were probably NVA (7 more than in January), and there were 2 battalion equivalents of Chinese communists in the border area. Additionally, some Chinese communist advisors were with enemy units in Laos. The estimated enemy strength in all these battalions totaled 43,000.

(9) There were also an estimated 6 armored battalions, 15 anti-aircraft artillery battalions, and 14 artillery battalions—mostly Pathet Lao and dissident Neutralists. These units had an estimated strength of about 9,000, which, when combined with the estimated infantry strength, brought the tactical strength to about 52,000.

1. PACOM Weekly Intelligence Digest 7-66, 25 Feb 66

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In addition to this total, there were an estimated 26,500 armed command, support, and service personnel, including about 5,000 armed engineers. Of these 78,000 armed troops, 18,000 were believed to be North Vietnamese, of whom about 5,600 were attached to Pathet Lao battalions and organized into units ranging from platoon to company size; they furnished military advice, fire support, and perhaps "shock" troops in military operations.

Approximately 7,400 of the North Vietnamese were in the NVA infantry battalions in Laos, and there were an estimated 700 NVA advisors attached in small numbers to Pathet Lao units.

As of 1 June there were an additional estimated 22,000 unarmed laborers in an estimated 43 engineer battalions, working with the engineers on extensive enemy road, trail, and waterway systems in Laos.

Altogether, the mid-1966 total enemy strength in Laos was close to 100,000 men.

Major Groupings of Non-Communist Military Forces, 1966

There were also several components in the array of friendly Laotian military forces. These were the forces of the Royal Government's Army (the FAR), Kong Le's Neutralists, General Vang Pao's Meos, and other tribesmen such as the Yao in the north. The only increment with any inclination to close with the enemy was that of Vang Pao--but it was primarily committed to defending its highland enclaves and harassing enemy lines of communication. Kong Le's influence with his troops was on the wane and apparently there was no individual to replace him as a symbol of unity within the Forces Armees Neutralistes (FAN).

Summary of Military Developments, early 1966

On 21 December 1965, FAR positions near Hua Muong and Keo Fa Mut were captured by enemy forces estimated at 2 to 3 battalions. A series of enemy probes and resultant skirmishes ensued throughout the eastern section of Sam Neua Province, culminating in the capture of Na Khang on 19 February 1966 and Muong Hiem on 14 March. On 7 February 1966, an estimated 2 to 4 battalion enemy force overran another key FAR position at Houei Thom. Loss of the friendly air landing sites in these

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1. Most of the engineers were North Vietnamese.
2. PACOM Weekly Intelligence Digest, 27-66, 15 Jul 66
actions virtually eliminated all the airheads in the north except Muong Soul and a field under construction at Luang Prabang.

These reverses were more acceptable after the Neutralist forces took Phou Khout in a 14 March assault supported by air strikes and artillery concentrations. This was only a temporary success, however, for the enemy retook Phou Khout on 22 March. The Neutralist force in the area appeared in danger of ceasing to exist as a military force due to internal bickering, weak command, and battle-weariness. Their position at Muong Soul appeared ripe for plucking if the enemy was so inclined.

Regional Considerations, Non-Communist Military Forces

Regional blocs of politico-military power were fundamental to Laos domestic political machinations. These were based on family relations, economic interests, or ethnic groupings—and the composition of one of these blocs, and inter-bloc cooperation, changed according to the weight assigned to each issue in a given situation. In the experience of modern times, only the King’s influence consistently extended throughout the whole structure of the nation, to include communist and Neutralist military forces. The primary and generalized regional groupings are shown in the illustration entitled "Regional Politico/Military Blocs, Laos." It must be recognized that the boundaries between regions were indistinct and shifted according to the situation.

Meo Guerrillas

The Meo tribal group started migrating from South China in the mid-19th century. They normally lived at elevations of 3,000 feet or above and maintained some degree of political unity. It was significant that the Meo were the only ethnic minority to elect a deputy to the Lao National Assembly. Usually they threw their lot with the legal government and constituted the bulk of the Controlled American Source (CAS) supported and trained guerrillas. The Meo guerrillas were the result of approximately 10 years of US Army and CAS training, and they generally made the jungles and mountains an alien environment for the enemy—forcing him to stick to the villages and highways where he was more vulnerable to air attack.
NOTE:
The enemy-controlled area, approximately the eastern half of Laos, is not depicted on this sketch.

**Men Land**
- Military: Vang Pao
- Civilian: Byung family

**Auxiliary connections**
- Men are located in enclaves throughout Laos as well as in South China and northern SVN. Some of these enclaves are in areas of nominal communist domination and in areas under RLG commanders. These tribal groups are generally responsive to Vang Pao’s directive.

**South (upper half)**
- Military: Phompha Marethoara, Cdr
- Southern Tactical Region
- Civilian: Lounh Insurientia

**Auxiliary connections**
- Phompha is Deputy-Commander in Chief FAR. As Commander of the Southern Tactical Region he is the military superior of Phou Phom. Lounh is nominal leader of the Rightist political faction.

**South (lower half)**
- Military: Phoukham Samly
- Civilian: Na Champassak family
- Abhay family

**Auxiliary connections**
- Prince Boun Oum Na Champassak is the principal rival of Souvanna Phomma. Sitthavong Na Champassak is current finance minister and the most qualified potential successor to Souvanna as Prime Minister.

**Violence**
- Military: Khouprathiv Abhay, Commander
- Civilian: Sathanou family

**Auxiliary connections**
- Khouprathiv is also Deputy-Commander in Chief FAR. His wife is a Sathanou, but he is a Southerner by birth.

**Northwest**
- Military: Ouane Rathamkham, Cdr
- Northern Tactical Region
- Civilian: King Savang

**Auxiliary connections**
- Ouane also CINC FAR. The King is the single influential national rallying point for resistance to external pressure.

**FRIENDLY ENCLAVE OR CONTESTED AREA**
It would certainly be incorrect to infer that the Meo fought simply because Vang Pao held a commission as a major general in the King's army, which was fighting the communists. This was one of several elements, however, and Vang Pao had pointedly remarked that there were Meo in North Vietnam and China, but that he was the only Meo general. It has been said that the Meo fought for the fun of it (90 percent of their troops were under the age of 21), "and since we supply guns and rice plus other supplies, allowing them a standard of living higher than they have previously enjoyed, they fight well for our side." ¹

More important factors related to the Meo fighters were that they were defending their homes from traditional enemies, the North Vietnamese and the Chinese. ²

**Practical Politics, Laos Style**

The 1966 Lao political scene was complex, and unifying symbols were few. One such was King Savang Vatthana, and in an extreme emergency the quarreling politicians of diverse leanings would turn to the King who demonstrated wisdom in his guidance and dealings with elements both within and outside the Government.

Many of the same factors that irritated the Lao body politic in earlier years were evident in 1966, but some improvement was evident. Contention between FAR regional commanders and the Vientiane staff was still present but in a more subdued form. Although the possibility of a military coup appeared remote, few were so optimistic as to ever dismiss the possibility. Political groupings were a bit more distinct in 1966 and could be described as the Independent Nationalists (Southern Right Wing), Young ("Les Jeunes") Nationalists, Sananikones (Northern Right Wing), and Neutralists of left and right leanings. The political coloration of individuals was also better defined than in the previous year.

Anti-US sentiments were present as in previous years, but the communist military pressure was causing the Neutralists to be increasingly aligned with the US on significant problems. Enemy pressure also served

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1. Laos Debriefing Report of Brigadier General John R. Murphy, USAF, ex-Assistant Deputy Commander, 7AF/13AF, Thailand; Report No 66-8-20A, attachment to ltr DAF AF XPDR, 8 Nov 66, CPRS 0001515-66
2. Ibid.
to compress the interests of the normally feuding factions: Rightists' internal and external cooperation was more willing, and the forced departure of Kong Le and progressive integration of the Neutralist armed forces into the FAR prompted increasing cooperation among the politicians of that leaning.

The Improving Position of the FAR

(U) This portion of the History examines the relative position of sources of military power in Laos--the FAR (less the RLAF), the FAN, the Royal Lao Air Force (RLAF), and the National Police.

(S) A characteristic of Laos politics was the prerequisite that each noteworthy political group have its military supporters who could give ideas "substance" by force of arms. ¹ This habit prolonged and reinforced the traditional rivalries within the arms-bearing segments of the population, thereby diluting unity within the nation and the armed forces.

(S) In 1966 it seemed that the FAR, with a more effective control of the RLAF, was increasing its potential as a stabilizing and perhaps decisive factor in the garbled Laos political scene. Regional interests were nevertheless reflected in the relationships of these components of the Lao armed forces.

Neutralists: (S) In early 1966 Chief of Staff Oudone Sananikone made it clear that the long-term objective of the General Staff was creation of a unified government of right wing persuasion, firmly under FAR influence. In this respect, it was significant that one rival, the Neutralist Army, was weakening--a fact well documented by military failures around the western end of the Plaine des Jarres, divisive tendencies among its senior commanders, and loss of influence by its original commander, Kong Le. If the FAN should disintegrate it seemed probable that some of its members would cast their lot with the FAR, others would escape to the civil world, and still others would join the communist-controlled Neutralists. This latter possibility was recognized by the communists, and enemy restraint in dealing with the Neutralists (e.g. at Muong Soul)

¹ See "Regional Considerations, Non-Communist Military Forces" elsewhere in this section.
was interpreted as perhaps due to political considerations rather than respect for FAN military capability. ¹

Supporting this idea of closer cooperation between the non-
communists was the apparent dilution of the Neutralist political vitality as evidenced by party members' criticism of party leader Souvanna Phouma; also in Souvanna's increasing interest in drawing the Neutralists and Rightists together into a single party or front for national unity.

Souvanna had approached Rightist Phou Sananikone with this proposition. This task nevertheless faced major stumbling blocks of self-interest, factionalism, and political principle.

October brought concrete evidence of General Staff progress toward bringing the Neutralist military capability closer to Rightist domination. Shortly after the end of confrontations between the FAN and elements of the FAR, some ranking Neutralist colonels took steps to oust Kong Le from the Neutralist command. Under the apparent leadership of FAN Colonel Somphet, and with the apparent connivance of the FAR General Staff, Kong Le was charged with too-close association with the French, a reluctance to push for FAR-FAN integration, and a loss of effectiveness as a Neutralist leader.

On 17 October while three FAN colonels (Somphet, Soulivanh, and Sing) were meeting with certain FAR General Staff officers, Kong Le left Laos for Bangkok—apparently making a graceful exit from the scene.

With Kong Le at least temporarily out of the way, meetings continued between the FAN colonels, FAR Commander in Chief General Ouane Rathikone, and his deputy, General Kouprasith Abbay. The apparent agreement was that FAN would maintain its own staff, at least temporarily, but be under the FAR for operational control and logistic support. Mobile groups reportedly would be formed once FAR-FAN integration was realized.

Perhaps the most significant agreement was that the FAR would recognize the military rank held by the Neutralists. This point had been unresolved in previous negotiations for amalgamation of the forces. But procedural delays could hold up the action for some time. ²

1. PACOM Weekly Intelligence Digest, 28-66, 22 Jul 66
2. PACOM Weekly Intelligence Digest, 41-66, 28 Oct 66
After eluding Thai surveillance, on 15 November Kong Le sneaked back to Vientiane, against the Prime Minister's wishes, and took refuge in the Indonesian Embassy. That night Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma obtained Kong Le's resignation as Commander in Chief of the Neutralist Forces, and on 23 November Kong Le departed Vientiane for an extended stay in Indonesia on the invitation of General Suharto. 1

River Flotilla:  (S) The River Flotilla was an integral part of the FAR, and as a supporting arm it was charged with patrol of the Mekong River to prevent smuggling and to support operations of the ground forces. Headquarters and main base of the River Flotilla were at Vientiane (Chinainmo).

The flotilla's capability and effectiveness were poor, although late in 1965 some improvement was evident as a result of work by a small French Military Advisory Group that assisted in logistics. At the first of 1966 the force was at only two-thirds of its authorized personnel strength, and only 16 of the 52 river craft in its inventory were operational. 2

Royal Lao Air Force:  (S) The RLAF was small, and unique in that many of the pilots were Thai and few of the aircraft belonged to Laos. It could be said that at the beginning of the year the RLAF consisted of two main elements: (1) the RLAF based at Savannakhet and under Brigadier General Thao Ma, and (2) the Thai mercenary force operating from Udorn, Thailand and staging through Vientiane for combat operations in response to US Air Attache, Laos requirements. The T-28 was the primary combat aircraft for these forces, and all heavy maintenance was done by the USAF 630th Combat Support Group at Udorn. RLAF personnel performed organizational, munitions, and some field maintenance at Savannakhet. USAF personnel, "technical representatives," at Vientiane were responsible for the munitions and field maintenance programs there.

RLAF T-28s had frequently played an important and, at times, decisive role in support of ground operations. General Ma, a 36-year-old, highly competent pilot, was dedicated to Laotian nationalism and eager to advance the RLAF. He was not a member of the hereditary elite, but because he had earned a position of real power and US respect as an

1. JANAF ATTACHES LAOS 0853/2606002 Nov 66
2. PACOM Weekly Intelligence Digest, 50-65, 10 Dec 65
effective leader, he received what amounted to direct US aid, and he was very cooperative with his US advisors. While the Lao elite thought they might need him to keep getting the aid, some of them viewed him as a US agent and someone who needed to be carefully watched.  

Ma was anti-French, and this alienated many of the Francophile members of the elite. His attention to administration and logistic requirements left much to be desired, but this was hardly worth consideration—unless someone chose to make it an issue. More importantly, Ma lacked a talent for appreciating the realities of Laotian military politics. Consequently, he had long been at odds with the FAR General Staff, which was dominated by the powerful Sananikone family. That family was well entrenched in the Rightist military and seldom missed an opportunity to advance its fortunes in the FAR—the most important source of power in non-communist Laos.

Among Ma's more objectionable conduct had been his criticism of General Staff use of RLAF transport aircraft for carrying on gold and opium operations.

After an extended period of in-fighting in Government and military circles, Ma was removed from his command from 9 to 12 May. Although reinstated under much closer supervision of the General Staff, Ma's relationship with his detractors continued to be strained. Principal among those opposed to him were Chief of the General Staff Major General Oudone Sananikone; Major General Kouprasith Abhay, a Sananikone relative and a Deputy Commander in Chief FAR; and Major General Bounpone Makthecharaks, the other Deputy Commander in Chief FAR and Commander of the Panhandle area where many of Ma's air operations took place.

At about the same time Ma's position was realigned there were other moves toward reorganization of the RLAF. One objective was the establishment of a joint ground-air operations center and consolidation of air transport and operational planning into a joint section within the FAR. The reorganization plans for the RLAF envisioned a more diversified

1. Laos Debriefing Report of Brigadier General John R. Murphy, USAF, ex-Assistant Deputy Commander, 7AF/13AF, Thailand; Report No 66-8-20A, attachment to DAF AFXFDR, 8 Nov 66, 0001515-66
2. PACOM Weekly Intelligence Digest, 21-66, 3 Jun 66
operation with permanent operations from additional bases, to include Luang Prabang, Pakse, and Saravane. At mid-year, Luang Prabang and Pakse were being used as staging bases for limited operations, and they would be suitable for permanent duty after bomb storage and maintenance facilities were acquired.\textsuperscript{1}

\textbullet\ The Ma-General Staff quarrel was not without a degrading impact on RLAF operations; combat sorties came to a virtual halt during the period of debate over Ma’s situation and as late as 1 July operations had not yet reached their former tempo.\textsuperscript{2}

\textbullet\ In early June, General Ma refused, then agreed, and again refused to move from Savannakhet to his new station at Vientiane. For a few hours it appeared that he would attempt to resist the General Staff by barricading himself under the protection of Group Mobile 18 at Savannakhet. Hard feelings remained even after the incident was superficially smoothed over.\textsuperscript{3}

\textbullet\ The influential Rightist, General Kouprasith, had been one of the most outspoken critics of Ma, alleging that the United States controlled and used the RLAF for American purposes rather than FAR interests. And the near-rebellion in June served to increase Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma’s bias against Ma.

\textbullet\ The climax of the Ma affair occurred on 21 October, only four days after Kong Le’s departure from Laos. At 0500 hours General Ma seized control of Savannakhet airfield with the assistance of Colonel Bounleut Saycocie; at approximately 0830 hours Ma and eight T-28 pilots strafed and bombed Phou Kheng, headquarters of the FAR General Staff; Chaiamo, Headquarters of the Fifth Military Zone; and the Wattay Artillery Camp.\textsuperscript{4} Apparently Ma had counted on the Commander of Group Mobile 18, east of Savannakhet, to arrest Generals Ouane and Bounpone while he eliminated FAR Chief of Staff Oudone and Kouprasith by the suprise air attack.

\begin{itemize}
\item[1.] DEPCHJUSMAG, Thailand ltr to Lieutenant General Emrick, 1 Jul 66
\item[2.] PACOM Weekly Intelligence Digest, 21-66, 3 Jun 66
\item[3.] PACOM Weekly Intelligence Digest, 27-66, 15 Jul 66
\item[4.] Approximately 23 people were killed by these strikes.
\end{itemize}
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Following hurried meetings with Prince Boun Oum, representing in this instance the Lao Government, Ma was apparently convinced that his cause was lost. He and 10 of his T-28 pilots flew to Thailand, where his aircraft were impounded and the personnel taken into custody. All T-28s were later returned to RLAF use, and it appeared that there were sufficient pilots available to reconstitute the RLAF into an effective fighting force. By the end of the year close air support and interdiction operations were underway at high tempo. 1

Throughout the Kong Le and Ma incidents, General Kouprasith, Deputy Commander in Chief of the FAR, was a key figure. The ousting of Kong Le and Ma suggested the possibility of at least a temporary lessening of dissension within the Lao military elite. Kouprasith's prestige was undoubtedly enhanced and he moved higher in his climb to power. 2

National Police: (3)(3) At the beginning of 1964 the Laos National Police had a plentiful supply of machineguns and mortars. Accordingly, this force exercised a significant military capability and was effectively used by Phoumi Nosavan as a power base for his political activities. US aid to the police had started in 1955, but was terminated in 1961 when the police were placed under the Ministry of Defense. Following the unsuccessful April 1964 coup in which the police played a major role, the National Police were reestablished in the Ministry of Interior.

(3)(3)(3) The head of the police, General Siho Lamphouthacoul, and Phoumi Nosavan fled Laos following another coup attempt in early 1965. The decision was then made to institute a modest US program in support of the Laos National Police. US influence was directed toward de-fanging the National Police by removing their heavier weapons and turning them to the task of providing internal security. As a result of this drop in police military potential, the other military groups (primarily the FAR and the FAN, with many sub-groups within each), loomed proportionately larger in politics.

1. USAIRA VIENTIANE 050815Z Dec 66
2. PACOM Weekly Intelligence Digest, 41-66, 28 Oct 66
The US-supported civil police program (for FY 67) thereafter turned to reducing the number of personnel and improving the quality of material in the reorganized force. At the same time the United States sought to guide the police into certain basic civil functions that were pre-conditions for a stable society. These were maintenance of law and order, control of immigration, suppression of crime and vice, enforcement of economic and commercial regulations, and the control of traffic. The police had limited roles in counterinsurgency action, primarily in counter-subversive activities, and control of population and resources. It was hoped that the uniformed police could enhance the Government's image, particularly in rural areas.

American assistance was predicated on the use of the National Police as a civil organization, independent of the military and without paramilitary functions. The aid concentrated on training in basic civil public safety functions, assistance in obtaining equipment from offshore sources, establishment of a vehicle fleet, installation of a communication system, and cooperation with third countries to provide training opportunities abroad.¹

FAR and the Government

Prime Minister Souvanna recognized that his acceptability to the FAR was a significant factor in his continuation as Premier. Accordingly, over the years he warmed to the Rightists who controlled the FAR—thus leaving himself open to partisan sniping by others who had ambitions to lead the party, and who charged that he was selling out to the Rightist opposition.

Within the National Assembly, most Deputies of the Neutralist and Rightist parties avoided extreme positions that might alienate the FAR, whose support they would need in the fall elections. Following political channels for the nonce, a measure of FAR attention was turned to agitation in the Assembly with the objective of replacing left-leaning Neutralists with right-leaning Neutralists who might be more amenable to FAR influence. There was the additional objective of increasing the Prime Minister's awareness of his need for FAR military power as a foundation for his government's stability.

¹. VIENTIANE A-233, 16 Oct 66

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Another General Staff goal was to qualify sizeable numbers of new rural voters (who would be amenable to FAR influence) to participate in the fall elections. To many of these rural people the Army was their most important contact with the Government. It was hoped that the suitable application of FAR "influence," and sufficient money, would lead to a new Assembly with a composition more in accord with FAR desires.  

Laos Cabinet: In theory only, the 1966 Laos Government was tripartite—communist, Neutralist, and Rightist. As provided by the three-party Plaine des Jarres Agreements of 1962, there were 34 Ministry or Secretary of State functions to be undertaken by 19 individuals. At mid-1966 only 15 individuals, including the 4 absent communists, manned the Cabinet.

During August there was Assembly pressure to enlarge the Cabinet, but Souvanna found this unfeasible because of a lack of "suitable" candidates. Portfolios most sought were the vacant Secretaries of State for Rural Affairs (Neutralist), Education (Rightist), and Finance (Rightist). At the time it appeared that Rightist leader Leuam Insixingmay could exercise sufficient party pressure in the Assembly to either modify the Cabinet or leave it as it stood. The mid-year Cabinet is shown on the accompanying table "Laos Government of National Union Cabinet."

Election Preparation: Because of prolonged bickering among the Assembly members seeking appointive offices in the Government for themselves or their associates, the King's Council dissolved the Assembly in October. This was in accord with the Constitution, and, despite pressure to select new members of the Assembly by appointive means, the Government scheduled elections for January 1967. There were hopes that the new Assembly would feature less individual eccentricity and produce better representation of legitimate regional interests.

After the dissolution of the National Assembly on 7 October, the Lao political power factions—family clans, individuals, the Prime Minister, and the Armed Forces—began touting candidates who would support their assorted causes. A Souvanna Phouma-FAR entente was established early in the campaign to back mutually agreeable candidates.

A Royal Ordinance of 2 November set forth procedures for elections.

1. PACOM Weekly Intelligence Digests 19-66, 20 May 66; 35-66, 2 Sep 66
2. JANAF ATTACHE LAOS 0942/310610Z Dec 66

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LAOS GOVERNMENT OF NATIONAL UNION CABINET

Prime Minister
Vice Premier
Minister of Defense
Minister of National Economy
Minister of National Economy
Minister of Education
Minister of Finance
Minister of Fine Arts
Minister of Foreign Affairs
Minister of Health
Minister of Information
Minister of Information
Minister of Interior
Minister of Justice
Minister of Planning
Minister of Planning
Minister of Posts & Telecommunications
Minister of Propaganda
Minister of Public Works
Minister of Religion
Minister of Rural Affairs
Minister of Social Welfare
Minister of Sports
Minister of Tourism
Minister of Tourism
Minister of Transport
Minister of Veterans Affairs
Minister of Youth
Secretary of State for Economy
Secretary of State for Education
Secretary of State for Finance
Secretary of State for Planning
Secretary of State for Public Works
Secretary of State for Rural Affairs
Secretary of State for Social Welfare
Secretary of State for Transport
Secretary of State for Veterans Affairs

Souvanna Phouma
Soupbanouvong - Absent, Communist
Leuam Insixiengmay
Souvanna Phouma
Soupbanouvong - Absent, Communist
Ngan Sananikone - Acting
Leuam Insixiengmay
Sisouk Na Champasak
Leuam Insixiengmay
Souvanna Phouma
Tay Keoluangkhot
Phoumi Vongvichit - Absent, Communist
Tay Keoluangkhot - Acting
Pheng Phongsavan
Inpeng Suryadhay
Soupbanouvong - Absent, Communist
Inpeng Suryadhay

Sisoumang Sisaleumsak
Phoumi Vongvichit - Absent, Communist
Tay Keoluangkhot - Acting
Ngan Sananikone
Boun Om Na Champassak
Souvanna Phouma
Pheng Phongsavan
Leuam Insixiengmay
Phoumi Vongvichit - Absent, Communist
Tay Keoluangkhot - Acting
Ngan Sananikone
Souvanna Phouma
Leuam Insixiengmay
Khamphuean Tounalom - Absent, Communist
Vacant
Vacant
Khamphuean Tounalom - Absent, Communist

Souk Vongsak - Absent, Communist
Vacant
Keo Viphakone
Souk Vongsak - Absent, Communist
Soukan Vilaysarn

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to be held on 1 January 1967. Even so, as late as mid-November elements of the FAR advocated postponing the elections until perhaps April or later. Their reasoning was that a postponement would provide more time to prepare for the elections, to select candidates, and maybe to achieve a more secure situation in which to hold the elections. The King was unconvinced, however, and the 1 January date became firm.

The King's ordinance provided for universal suffrage for men and women over 18 years of age. Further, candidates had to be 30 years of age, and if they were military personnel or civil servants they were required to take administrative leave for one year beginning 1 December, the date the electoral campaign would begin. The number of available seats in the National Assembly remained fixed at 59.

Communist (Neo Lao Hak Xat) participation in the election was a major question, and Souvanna quickly invited their participation. Had they accepted, the elections would have been considered "general" elections. Since they did not participate, the elections were characterized as "elections with universal suffrage." With the usual fervor, the Pathet Lao proceeded to denounce the election as a violation of the 1962 Agreements.

Nor did the Neutralist party register candidates. One reason given by their leaders was the failure of Souvanna to guarantee that Neutralist candidates would not be molested or interfered with by the Rightist military. Another was the failure of Deputy Prime Minister Leuam Insixiengmay, head of the Rightist element, to agree to cooperate with them and work with them in harmony on allocation of seats between the two parties. Though the Neutralist Party as a whole did not take part in the election preparations, some Neutralist splinter groups campaigned actively.

Souvanna's campaign stressed his concept of a "United Front" in which he advocated uniting all the factions for the betterment and strengthening of the country as a whole. He chose the FAR as his chief instrument for the advancement of this idea. Except for the proviso that candidates selected should support Souvanna, FAR Commander in Chief General Ouane Rathikone allowed regional military commanders

1. PACOM Weekly Intelligence Digest 28-66, 22 Jul 66

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virtually a free choice in selecting candidates in their own areas. With
a normal amount of foot-dragging, Souvanna and the military cooperated
in compiling and promulgating their list of preferred candidates in hope
that disruptive elements would not appear in the next Assembly. 1

(6) With these preliminaries out of the way, the principal factions
selected candidates, and by the 26 November closing date for filing
156 candidates were listed, of which 52 were Deputies from the previous
Assembly presenting themselves for re-election.

(6) The campaign period officially began 2 December, and Souvanna
visited Savannakhet and Pakse to address regional military leaders,
provincial governors, and senior Government administrative officials.
While this was termed an inspection trip, it was in actuality part of his
election campaign. During the visit he set forth his political principles
in talks about his policy of international neutrality for Laos, and the necessity
for the formation of a national structure composed of military as well
as civilians in the interests of greater national unity. In support of this,
Souvanna cited the invasion threat. He did not mention the "United
Front" in these talks, but he did make it clear that he considered some
such political entity necessary for the survival of Laos.

(6) Another faction leader, Rightist Deputy Prime Minister Leuam,
had sometimes controlled over 30 members of the previous Assembly.
He now found his election influence confined almost exclusively to
Savannakhet Province. He consistently showed opposition to the "United
Front" concept throughout the campaign, probably seeing in it a
potential threat to his already diminished influence.

(6) The Na Champassak clan solidified its hold on the four southern
provinces of Champassak, Wapikmhamthong, Sedone, and Saravane. The
Sananikones apparently were protecting their interest by supporting
Souvanna.

(6) General Kouprasith Abhay, Deputy Commander in Chief of the
FAR, also selected a slate of preferred candidates. In his campaign

1. PACOM Weekly Intelligence Digest 28-66, 22 Jul 66
maneuvers Kouprasith apparently visualized the election preparations as a three-phased operation. These phases were: (1) to block the election of undesirables; (2) to select candidates who should receive support; and (3) to reach agreement with influential military personnel in each area as to which candidates would receive support from the military. Despite knowledge that Souvanna felt that members of the "Young Nationalists" group should not be supported, Kouprasith elected to support members of this group anyway. He at first drew up a tentative slate of 17 candidates, then he reduced this to 5 to limit expenses and to make it easier to control his politicians. Ultimately, Kouprasith gave financial backing to 9 prospective candidates, having apparently concluded that 17 seats would do him no immediate good since it would be impossible to replace Souvanna through legal parliamentary means.

As the vigorous campaign closed, the Lao military emerged more clearly as the dominant element.

Summary, End of 1966

Late in the year there was a flurry of enemy military initiative and propagandizing activity that was generally attributed to efforts to influence the outcome of the January election of a new Assembly. Additionally, an enemy group used explosives to damage the Houei Champi bridge, a US Agency for International Development project connected with development of the Sedone Valley.

At the end of 1966, however, there were no significant contacts between major opposing forces in Laos.

Coordination and Management Considerations, Laos

The Viet Minh and Pathet Lao controlled eastern Laos during 1966 and seldom reacted to any FAR-FAN ground action unless it was considered a threat to their infiltration activities. The fact was that neither the Government nor the communist forces were anxious

1. PACOM Weekly Intelligence Digest 3-67, 20 Jan 67

2. Additional details of events in Laos are available in a series of weekly Joint Operational Summaries - Laos, disseminated by messages from JANAF Attaches, Laos. Pertinent cite numbers and date-time-groups for these messages are as follows: 0717/080546Z Oct 66; 0731/150620Z Oct; 0755/220542Z Oct; 0778/290435Z Oct; 0798/050530Z Nov; 0835/190515Z Nov; 0853/260600Z Nov; 0874/030550Z Dec 66; 0888/100530Z Dec 66; 0904/170540Z Dec 66; 0925/240550Z Dec 66; and 0942/310610Z Dec 66

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to upset the essentially stable situation. Interestingly, US interests were fairly well served by maintaining a status quo with respect to the disposition of ground forces.

Air operations (US and RLAF) against enemy infiltration facilities and activities were nevertheless pushed energetically. (See "Air Operations in Laos" and "Political Considerations in Laos" elsewhere in this Chapter.) As aids to these operations, there were limited US-RVN ground operations (SHINING BRASS) launched from South Vietnam.

Since the Geneva Accords of 1962, no US military headquarters had been allowed in Laos.

While US interests were well served by the tripartite government in Laos, there were times when the restraint necessary to preserve this facade also inhibited overt US military operations in North and South Vietnam.

When the decision was affirmative, the military operations were conducted as planned. If the decision was negative, and of sufficient importance, the military reclamation passed through the JCS to the Secretary of Defense for further action at the Washington level.
The fact was that throughout the year US air forces operated with controlled freedom over Laos and against targets in Laos. As in 1965, despite stringent control there were incidents in which friendly personnel or property suffered as a result of pilot error. Nevertheless, the Lao Government was generally cooperative when consulted with respect to US operations involving Laos territory.

(1) The material furnished by the United States to aid Lao military forces was managed and coordinated by CINCPAC's direct subordinate, the DEPCHJUSMAG, Thailand, who functioned as a "non-resident element of the Country Team."
When the forces refused to fight or when tactically surprised by the enemy, unit commanders had little if any compunction about abandoning anything that tended to inhibit movement—whether it be weapons, boots, uniforms, or otherwise.

Additionally, the Laotians placed complete reliance on US or US-provided air-LOC. Alternate plans for logistic support in the field were rare; therefore during sustained periods of inclement weather their forces either went without supplies or relied solely on pre-stocked (by RO/USAID) supply points in forward areas.

**LAOS Military Assistance Program**

**(S)** Laos ammunition deliveries and forecast deliveries in FY 66 resulted in a $7.5 million over-obligation in the FY 66 MAP. Of the $17.49 million ammunition total programmed for FY 66, only $11.3 million had been funded. It was CINCPAC's understanding that the (Office of the) Defense Department's Director of Military Assistance (ODMA) would provide the $6.19 million worth of ammunition in-country without cost to the Laos MAP. However, ODMA disclaimed this commitment, and June forecasts indicated that the basic authorization of $11.3 million would be exceeded by $9.5 million.

**(S)** ODMA subsequently funded $2 million of this overdraw, bringing defense articles up to the maximum ceiling of $50 million. CINCPAC then submitted a deviation in the amount of the overdraw ($7.5 million).

1. DEPCHJUSMAG Thailand ltr DCH-O Subj: Historical Summary, Deputy Chief JUSMAG Thailand for the Period June 1964-April 1966, 10 May 66, CPRS 002887-66
and ODMA stated that this would be held in abeyance while it attempted to reduce the over-obligation by:

1. Effecting reimbursement of ammunition costs on month-end certificate of delivery.
2. Recouping of the previous year's unused authority.
3. Directing Army and Air Force to review "back orders" to recoup as much as possible.
4. Possible diversion of ammunition shipments.

As a result, CINCPAC submitted a deviation for $7,118,000 by deleting 22 T-28D aircraft and 8 UH-34D helicopters. These aircraft would nevertheless have to be included in future year programs— a difficult task when the FY 67 Laos program shortfall already amounted to $38.5 million.

CINCPAC were in agreement that these deferments would endanger the accomplishment of US objectives in Laos.  

This additional example of the Secretary of Defense's Laos ceiling lagging the requirement was consistent with previous years. It necessitated many deletions and deviations at the end of the fiscal year, and the items sacrificed to the ammunition over-issue would have to be inserted in the FY 67 MAP at an increased cost.

FY 67 Plan

As approved by CINCPAC on 14 June, the Laos FY 67 MA Plan reflected $108.5 million, which included $90 million worth of defense articles. More than half of the defense articles sum was for ammunition. These requirements were well in excess of the $70 million Secretary of Defense dollar ceiling for FY 67, and the existing Presidential Determination limitation of $50 million for FY 67 defense articles.

Since the Presidential Determination was the maximum permitted by law, it seemed apparent that early Congressional action

1. Point Paper, J4311, 11 Jun 66
2. Point Paper, J5322, 23 Nov 66
3. Other unfunded but programmed FY 66 Laos MAP items totaled approximately $500,000 and included trucks, trailers, radios, machineguns, and mortars. (Point Paper, J5322, 11 Jun 66)
4. OSD/ISA DEF 2590/2623372 Jan 66
5. Point Paper, J5322, Jun 66
was required or that an alternate means had to be found to fund some portion of the defense material falling within the Determination.

The FY 67 requirement of $108 million subsequently rose to $113 million. In part this was because some FY 66 items (small arms) were moved into the FY 67 program to provide the funds to meet FY 66 ammunition requirements. Besides general price increases, other reasons for the growth were:
1. the inclusion of FY 66 combat losses in the FY 67 MAP; 2. funding of three additional T-28s for the RLAF; and 3. funding of a hospital, which had been deferred from FY 66.

One of the key issues in this problem was a possibility that the Laos MAP might become Service funded in FY 67 or later. There had been indications that this might occur, and if it did there would probably be a delay in funding the FY 67 requirements. In turn, this would serve to increase the carryover--resulting in successively larger annual programs without an improvement in effectiveness of the Lao Forces.

By late August there was a pending White House proposal for foreign aid legislation that would exempt Laos from the $50 million Presidential Determination limitation.

By December the Foreign Assistance Act had been modified to the extent that the President signed a new Determination for $108.7 million, to include $85.3 million in defense articles. The status of the FY 67 program as of the end of 1966 was $107.3 million total, including $84.1 million in defense articles. However, there were many FY 67 items unapproved and unfunded due to the recent increase (to $106.6 million vice $70 million) in the Secretary of Defense's ceiling.

The new ceiling of $106.6 million covered FY 67 requirements, to include a substantially reduced ammunition requirement ($38.4 million vice $52.7 million) caused by lower expenditures due to floods, weather, General Ma's coup, and a generally lower level of military activity.

1. Point Paper, J5322, 24 Aug 66
2. AID Memorandum for the President, Subj: Determination and Authorization to Furnish Military Assistance to Laos, 30 Jun 66
3. Point Paper, J5322, 10 Jan 67
4. Point Paper, J5322, Nov 66
At the end of the year actions had been initiated to transfer the Laos MAP to the military departments. 1 CINCPAC had recommended that the existing MAP procedures be retained through the CINCPAC and ODMA level to assure positive centralized program control. 2 Pending a decision by the Secretary of Defense regarding transfer procedures, the transfer had not been implemented as of 31 December.

FAR-FAN Materiel Replacement

Contract Air Service

Extensive use of air LOC in Laos was necessitated by poor roads and lack of security in many areas. Laotian training, talent, inclination, and material resources, however, disqualified them from meeting requirements that often originated in US rather than in Laotian interests.

Despite mounting demands for airlift in 1966, it was not judged politically desirable to overtly introduce US military crews and aircraft into Laos. 3

1. CINCPACAF 53365/222350Z Oct 66; CINCPACFLT 242109Z Oct 66; CINCUSARPAC 24989/262126Z Oct 66
2. CINCPAC 280440Z Oct 66; J5 History, Oct 66
3. 679

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contract air carriers provided airlift support

(4) The primary contractors—Air America and Continental Air Service—were under contract to the US Government to provide air support in furtherance of US foreign aid operations in Laos. Air America provided the bulk of the fixed wing flying hours to the AID; Continental provided similar services on a more limited basis. Air America also had the flying and maintenance contract for the US owned helicopters used to support the Laos MAP and AID programs.

(4) The contract air service had been outstanding in reaction, availability, and utilization. It was estimated that substituting military for contract air ultimately would increase costs in terms of facilities, equipment, and ground support. Overtly doing so would also violate the 1962 Agreements, whereas the carefully developed image of the contract carriers did have the appearance of being in consonance with these Agreements.

(4) An AID supervisory activity, the Air Transport Operations Group, maintained hourly flight records on end use (flying hour) utilization. These were transmitted to the AID and cross-billing procedures at the Washington level prorated costs among the using agencies.

(75) Stepped-up combat operations necessitated contract air support expansion after 1964; costs were approximately $4.8 million in FY 64, $5.5 million in FY 65, $5.9 million programmed for FY 66, and an estimated $7.5 million for FY 67.1

(4) A CV-2 aircraft bailed to Air America was damaged extensively during a 6 March landing at Ban Na in Laos. Another of the CV-2s was damaged in a landing accident 8 April.2 Funding actions resulting from these incidents underscored some of the problems involved in Laos operations. The aircraft were Army owned on bail to the AID and flown by Air America contract pilots.

1. Point Papers, J433, 13 Jun and 21 Nov 66
2. VIENTIANE 559/110155Z Mar 66; VIENTIANE 621/081110Z Apr 66

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CINCPAC directed CINCUSARPAC to proceed with removal and repair of the aircraft to preclude deterioration and insure early return to operational status. CINCUSARPAC attempted to establish funding responsibility as defined by the AID contract and the related CV-2 bailment agreement. The Embassy did not, however, have a copy of the bailment agreement and the Ambassador asked that the State Department make a determination as to funding responsibility.

While this question was studied in Washington, CINCUSARPAC requested Department of the Army authority to commit approximately $300,000 of available funds to the project pending resolution of legal funding responsibility. After numerous messages, the Army approved obligation of the $300,000 to remove and repair the aircraft.

One aircraft was flown out for repair at Taiwan. It was planned to disassemble the other CV-2 in Laos and airlift it to Udorn for further evacuation to Taiwan for repair by Air America. In view of the prolonged delays encountered, CINCPAC urged CINCUSARPAC to get the aircraft removed and repaired at the earliest practicable date before further exposure to the elements made it uneconomical to repair it. By 7 September the second CV-2 had been lifted to Udorn by CH-47 helicopter for further evacuation via C-124 to Taiwan for repair by Air America.

One of these aircraft was returned to service in December, and at the close of the year it was estimated that it would be another six or nine months before the second was ready. Meanwhile, one replacement CV-2 had been loaned from COMUSMACV assets. While the JCS desired that Air America purchase the required CV-2 rather than rely on bailed aircraft, this was not feasible because Air America had no contract tenure guarantee and thus could not insure a return on the necessary capital investment.

1. USARYIS Okinawa RID-SSC 013490/280338 Jun 66
2. Point Paper, J433, 22 Aug 66
3. CINCPAC 142249Z Aug 66; J4 History, Sep 66

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CINCPAC had to rejustify the bailment of this CV-2, plus other bailed aircraft (CV-2, C-123, U-10), every six months. 1

Saravane Airfield

The airfield at Saravane was used for forward staging of RLAF aircraft, and by USAF forward air controller aircraft, which operated extensively in the area. The airfield surface was deteriorating, and in late April Ambassador Sullivan recommended resurfacing the field with pierced steel planking (PSP). To this end, the Ambassador requested that 350,000 square feet of PSP be made available on a non-reimbursable basis. 2

CINCPAC requested that CINCUSARPAC obtain replaceable loan authority to permit utilization of PSP stocks in Korea and Japan (sufficient to meet the requirement), and DEPCHJUSMAG Thailand was requested to include the reimbursement costs in the FY 67 MAP. 3

Some later consideration was also given to making a hard surface for the field, a project that would cost $750,000 ($250,000 more than PSP). 4 CINCPAC concluded that upgrading the airfield was not justified since there was no direct US operating requirement. It was desirable, however, to have an emergency recovery capability at Saravane because of its location with respect to other bases used by the United States.

CINCPAC nevertheless requested the DEPCHJUSMAG Thailand and the US Air Attache, Laos to review the AID-MAP program applicability to Saravane Airfield for Laotian military or civilian requirements. 5

Military Hospital

For some time a military hospital for Laos had been under consideration, and in 1965 most of the major equipment items for the installation were received in Thailand. On 3 May, the DEPCHJUSMAG Thailand requested a MAP deviation of $499,320 to cover the costs of constructing a 200-bed military hospital in Vientiane. 6

1. Point Paper, J4334, 12 Jan 67
2. VIENTIANE 280900Z Apr 66
3. CINCPAC 110512Z Jun 66
4. USAIRA VIENTIANE 180954Z Jul 66
5. Point Paper, J4214, 8 Sep 66
6. CINCPAC 122340Z May 66; DEPCHJUSMAGTHAI 250820Z May 66
An exchange of several messages developed sufficient information pertaining to the construction, use, staffing, and costs—and on 3 June CINCPAC advised the DEPCHJUSMAG Thailand and the Ambassador that further action was being held in abeyance pending Laos action to resolve the FY 66 over-obligation for ammunition. The DEPCHJUSMAG Thailand resolved this problem, leaving the hospital funds intact. Thereafter CINCPAC submitted an FY 66 program addition for the full amount of the construction requirement.

The Secretary of Defense subsequently approved and funded the hospital construction in the FY 67 MAP. The DEPCHJUSMAG Thailand's plan was to program a civilian mobile training team to teach hospital administration to FAR medical officers, and to provide third-country doctors to augment the Laotian staff. US Public Health Service representatives were aiding in the hospital construction plan. 1

THAILAND

Events of 1966 indicated a further increase of insurgency in Thailand. Concurrently, US-Thai bilateral planning efforts showed definite progress toward the objective of defending mutual interests in Southeast Asia, and policy decisions on the US side established a position regarding the form of assistance for counterinsurgency actions. Projects to improve the effectiveness of the Royal Thai Government's Armed Forces assumed greater urgency, and US contingency capabilities were further increased by command structure modifications to provide a more effective base for force expansion and operations. In September, CINCPAC initiated action to establish guidelines for US military assistance in the Thai counterinsurgency.

The following material discusses some of these actions; additional information will be found under "Command and Control, Southeast Asia," elsewhere in this Chapter, and in Annex B. Other Thailand-associated subjects may be located with the assistance of the index.

1. Point Papers, J4312, 27 Aug and 1 Sep 66

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US-Thai Bilateral Planning

On 20 December 1965 Commander, US-Thai Field Forces (COMUSTAFF) OPLAN 1/65 reached CINCPAC for review. CINCPAC obtained comments of his component commanders and on the basis of JCS authority expressed his approval on 9 May.

In the approving letter, CINCPAC recommended 129 changes for the Thai Government to review and comment on. The Thai response was a letter from the Directorate of Joint Operations, Supreme Command Headquarters, Bangkok. In it were 19 pages of recommended changes which, with two minor exceptions, CINCPAC approved on 27 May.

On 21 December Thai Field Marshal Thanom Kittikachorn, Commander in Chief, US-Thai Forces (CINCUSTAF) designee; Major General Richard G. Stilwell, COMUSTAFF designee; and Ambassador Graham A. Martin participated in a ceremony for the promulgation of COMUSTAFF OPLAN 1/66. General distribution of the plan was made on 23 December 1966. This action culminated more than two years of US-Thai bilateral planning to defend Thailand, to secure the general line of the east and north banks of the Mekong River, and to deter communist incursions in Laos and Thailand.

Thai Insurgency Situation Assessed, February

Following a US Mission review of the insurgency situation in Thailand, CINCPAC stated his assessment of the situation and proposed courses of action.

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1. Prime Minister Thanom designated this "Project 22" because President Johnson's letter that proposed bilateral planning was dated 22 May 1964.
2. CINCPAC Command History, 1965, p 497
3. JCS 091730Z Apr 66
4. SCHQ J 31302/09
5. CINCPAC 270317Z Aug 66
6. An updated version of COMUSTAFF OPLAN 1/65
7. COMUSMACTHAI 280225Z Dec 66
8. Other pertinent references: COMUSMACTHAI 280500Z Jul 66; CINCUSARPAC 132350Z Aug 66; CINCPACAF 172292Z Aug 66; and CINCPACFLT 170152Z Aug 66
9. JCS 1637/141648Z Jan 66; BANGKOK to STATE 1278/311025Z Dec 65 and 1429/20158Z Jan 66; COMUSMACTHAI 040305Z Feb 66
10. CINCPAC 152325Z Feb 66
CINC PAC's view was that US interest in Thailand was part of the interest in all of Southeast Asia where we had an investment of billions of dollars in military and economic aid, and where the United States bore the major share of the economic and military burden within the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO). Our interests in Thailand could not be discussed apart from our interests in South Vietnam and Laos, e.g., much of the air support for the war against North Vietnam originated in Thailand.

The course-of-action options open to the United States were, in CINC PAC's estimate, three:

Option 1: Provide the Thai Government with prompt support required for full implementation of its counterinsurgency program.

Option 2: Commit US ground forces in Thailand.

Option 3: Implement Option 1 and concurrently build up a logistics capability to prepare for introduction of US Forces if necessary.

The primary responsibility for conducting counterinsurgency operations must rest with the Thai Government, which appeared both willing and capable of the task although lacking certain resources for effective action. CINC PAC stated that emergency measures should be taken to adequately man, equip, and support the Thai forces in the Northeast, and that this might require that the Government redistribute some in-country stocks or expedite indigenous production. Also, Thai Government funds should be made available for per diem to accelerate training, support temporary deployments, provide required commercial consumables, and support permanent redeployments.

As for US action, CINC PAC proposed that we should provide requisite MAP support for emergency military requirements that were beyond the Thai capability; he also proposed that the construction necessary to facilitate redeployments and other operational requirements should be provided. Additionally, POL support at FY 64-65 levels should be provided through the MAP to alleviate strain on the Thai budget. CINC PAC pointed out that the FY 66 MAP would complete

1. CINC PAC 152325Z Feb 66
equipage of the extant Thai Army's Project 22 combat and combat support-service units, and that the Secretary of Defense had been advised of the FY 66 MAP items that needed expedited funding and supply action.

(5) CINCPAC's recommendation was that Option 3 was the most appropriate course of action open to the United States. It would encourage the Thai to move larger numbers of ground combat units out of the Bangkok area and into northeast Thailand; further, it would permit the necessary US logistic buildup for introduction of US ground forces if this became necessary. CINCPAC also proposed that Ambassador Martin's high priority program be supported consistent with the Thai capability to utilize and maintain equipment.\(^1\)

Helicopters to Support the Thai Counterinsurgency Effort

(5) A February US Mission request for a helicopter company to provide direct support of Thai forces in counterinsurgency operations\(^2\) was in direct conflict with air mobility requirements in South Vietnam. At the time, the requirement in Thailand could not be considered of higher priority than that in South Vietnam, although CINCPAC did not dismiss the possibility of shifting priority at a later date.\(^3\) For a short time CINCPAC also took exception to a request for accelerated delivery of CH-34C helicopters to Thailand,\(^4\) but upon receiving a new COMUSMACTHAI proposal,\(^5\) he changed his position and supported the accelerated delivery.

(5) Before very long the proposed CH-34C helicopters for Thailand (a FY66 add-on) were receiving very critical review at the Washington level. In late March the JCS were considering the following sequence of actions:\(^6\)

\(^1\) J5 History, Feb 66
\(^2\) BANGKOK to STATE 1731/220931Z Feb 66 and 241158Z Feb 66
\(^3\) CINCPAC 271300Z Feb 66; JCS 2353/86
\(^4\) CINCPAC 070537Z Mar 66
\(^5\) COMUSMACTHAI 130925Z Mar 66; BANGKOK to STATE 1882/140438Z Mar 66
\(^6\) JCS 262021Z Mar 66
1. Deliver 32 CH-34Cs to Thailand in May-June 1966.
2. Deliver 10 of the 32 to the RTAF in July 1966.
3. Utilize the remaining 22 (of the 32) to form a provisional helicopter company manned by US Army personnel who had completed tours in South Vietnam.
4. Transfer 12 of the 22 helicopters to the RTAF approximately 1 January 1967, with the balance of 10 also available to the RTAF.

The Country Team and COMUSMACV concurred in the above proposal. CINCPAC also concurred, providing the proposed action did not jeopardize COMUSMACV's CH-34C helicopter requirements.

The State and Defense Departments advised on 28 April that it seemed impossible to provide any CH-34Cs to Thailand during 1966. Additionally, the Secretary of Defense advised on 1 May that a provisional helicopter company for the 606th Air Commando Squadron was not yet approved. CINCPAC supported Ambassador Martin's subsequent reclamation for the MAP helicopters for Thailand.

On 8 May the State and Defense Departments approved 40 CONUS helicopter training spaces and the delivery of 10 CH-34Cs to Thailand for about 1 July. Concurrently, the augmentation of the 606th Air Commando Squadron and formation of the Army provisional helicopter company was disapproved. In view of this limited approval of the helicopter portion of the FY 66 add-ons, Ambassador Martin predicted that Thai cooperation would deteriorate significantly.

As it finally turned out, the Secretary of Defense did not approve any add-on funds, but the State and Defense Departments did reverse their positions in reference to the augmentation of the 606th Air Commando Squadron. Additionally, the delivery of 12 more CH-34Cs for about January 1967 was approved.
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1 The reversed State-Defense Department position tied strings to the helicopter arrangement. It required the withdrawal of all US manned helicopters (606th Air Commando Squadron) by 31 January 1967; RTAF utilization of H-34s at a rate of 30 hours a month; and training of 83 RTAF pilots and 243 maintenance personnel by 31 January 1967. Although the RTAF conceded to these conditions,\(^1\) the Ambassador's forecast was that in the future the Thai might not be so ready to approve US requests or be as cooperative.\(^2\)

2 Helicopters had been only one of the FY 66 add-ons denied; other items included some requested of Vice President Hubert H. Humphrey by Prime Minister Thanom and General Praphat Charusathien, Army Commander in Chief,\(^3\) during the Vice President's visit to Bangkok early in the year.

3 Ultimately, 25 US-manned helicopters were provided on a temporary basis in support of Thai counterinsurgency operations. There was a proviso, however, that this force would be withdrawn not later than 31 January 1967, by which time the Thai were to be prepared to assume the mission. At the end of the year it appeared that the Thai would be capable of meeting this schedule.

4 In November, CINCPACAF had asked CINCPAC's support in obtaining authority to retain after 31 January 1967 four helicopters that were organic to the 606th Air Commando Squadron, and necessary for use in association with US missions. Ambassador Martin and COMUSMACTHAI had favored filing a reclama in this instance but CINCPAC concluded that any reclama should address the whole problem of helicopter support in Thailand rather than just the four helicopters for the 606th Squadron.\(^4\)

S-2A Aircraft for Thailand

5 Six S-2A patrol aircraft were approved to enhance the Thai capability for antisubmarine warfare and reconnaissance.\(^5\) Following

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1. BANGKOK to STATE 2858/211044Z Jun 66
2. BANGKOK to STATE 2399/091107Z May 66
3. STATE to BANGKOK 1500/211649Z Feb 66
4. Point Paper, J31, 9 Nov 66
5. CINCPAC Command History, 1965, p 168

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English language training at Lackland Air Force Base, 1 pilot training was completed in June 1966. The S-2As reached Thailand in July, and a 10-man US Navy mobile training team provided in-country aid in squadron organization and training for pilots, crew members, and maintenance personnel. The mobile training team departed in December 1966. 2

Thai Counterinsurgency Training by US Special Forces

(75) Early in 1966 the Thai Army's counterinsurgency requirements and COMUSMACTHAI's planning with respect to in-country counterinsurgency reached the point where US Army Special Forces personnel were needed to assist in training Thai personnel. As an interim response, in March and April a total of 128 Special Forces personnel from Okinawa were deployed on temporary duty to Lopburi, Thailand to conduct combined counterinsurgency training with Thai Special Forces. 3 In conjunction with the Thai Army Special Forces Group, these personnel established a Special Forces Operating Base, conducted joint training, and started advanced field training exercises.

(75) Meanwhile, a Special Forces reinforced company of 369 men was organized and trained in CONUS and deployed to Thailand during the period September to November. 4 This company replaced the Okinawa temporary duty Special Forces detachment and provided advisory support and training at the Thai Counterinsurgency Training Center, Lopburi; it also aided in field training exercises. A 4-phase training program (10 weeks) was developed, and Phases 2 and 3 were conducted at one of three training sites established by US Special Forces operational detachments. These sites were at Sakon Nakhon in northeast Thailand, Pak Chaung in central Thailand, and Trang, on the southern tip of the peninsula.

(75) US Special Forces personnel accompanied the Thai units through all phases except Phase 4, actual counterinsurgency operations. The 606th Air Commando Squadron provided further assistance in training and during actual operations.

1. CNO 292053Z Nov 65
2. CNO 052053Z Jan 66
3. CINCPAC 100015Z Feb 66; CINCPAC 010442Z Mar 66; J3 History Apr 66
4. JCS 2151/082204Z Sep 66 and 1801/031312Z Sep 66; CINCPAC 270332Z Apr 66
5. BANGKOK 081126Z Sep 66
6. Point Paper, J321, 9 Jan 67

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RTAF Tactical Air Control System

In October the insurgency situation in Thailand prompted COMUSMACTHAI to request the loan of certain equipment that would be used in establishing an austere tactical air control system (TACS) to improve the utilization of Thai air resources.¹ This equipment was to be repaid out of MAP resources.

CINCPAC determined that CINCPACAF could immediately provide five of the requested seven MRC-108 radio vehicles, and COMUSMACTHAI agreed with CINCPACAF's suggestion that the last two vehicles be provided later.² CINCUSARPAC was able to furnish the ARC-44 radios. CINCPAC therefore assigned CINCPACAF the task of providing the equipment and training the personnel as well as coordinating with CINCUSARPAC on provision of the ARC-44 radios.³ At the end of the year, these actions were under way and expected to meet COMUSMACTHAI's requirement.⁴

Psychological Warfare Capability

Military psychological operations in Thailand began in 1956 and gained increased importance with the establishment of the National Security Command in 1962. The National Security Command was the national coordinating-action force to counter subversion, and it had the major psychological operations mission in Thailand.

Thailand's Army had an understrength (authorized 238) psychological operations company, which had the major military responsibility, and it had MAP-supplied broadcast studios and a printing plant. Teams from this company were attached to each Special Operations Center.

In October CINCPAC requested that the JCS approve deployment of a 43-man psychological operations detachment to Thailand so it could aid in improving psychological operations.⁵ Meanwhile, a five-man temporary duty detachment from the 7th Psychological Operations Group provided interim assistance.

1. COMUSMACTHAI 010130Z Oct 66
2. CINCPACAF 140352Z Oct 66; COMUSMACTHAI 200220Z Oct 66
3. CINCPAC 020032Z Nov 66
4. COMUSMACTHAI 050715Z Nov 66; CINCPACAF 060102Z Nov 66
5. CINCPAC 092242Z Oct 66
6. CINCPAC 122333Z Oct 66

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The COMUSMACHAI psychological operations staff was increased (to three men) during 1966, and one mission of the 606th Air Commando Squadron was to support Thai psychological operations programs. Additionally, deployment to Thailand of a 67-man US Psychological Operations Company was planned.

Logistics System Improvements, Thailand

Thai logistics operations had a long history of unsatisfactory progress in developing adequate supply and maintenance procedures to support their forces and current operations. The estimate of the Army and Air Force portions of the Thai Country Logistic Improvement Plan (CLIP) for 1966 indicated that the logistic system was incapable of adequately supporting further deployment of combat forces or of significantly increased counterinsurgency operations. The 1966 CLIP further indicated a lack of direction at the Minister of Defense level for medical service in support of Thai forces. Also noted was a critical shortage of physicians, technicians, and other specialists.

Reluctance to turn in excess MAP property (approximately $16 million in November) for disposal sale was one element in the poor Thai performance. After a prolonged effort by COMUSMACHAI, a Property Disposal Agency had been established in October 1965, and soon thereafter the Ministry of Defense rescinded its directive that prohibited turn-in of the MAP material excesses. The first property disposal sale occurred in December 1965, but there was little improvement in the situation even after this.

CINCPAC made numerous recommendations and suggestions, and he advised COMUSMACHAI that it was imperative that new approaches be explored to obtain Thai support for their logistics system. In October 1966 he requested COMUSMACHAI's views on any new means that might require action and assistance by CINCPAC or higher authority.

1. CINCPACAF 010209Z Feb 66
2. Point Paper, J324, 22 Nov 66
3. CINCPAC ltr ser 00299, 23 Feb 66; COMUSMACHAI 220230Z Oct 66
4. CINCPAC ltr ser 01085, 31 Oct 66
General Surkij, the Thai Army Chief of Staff, had told the US Army Chief of Staff that one of Thailand’s problems was a lack of spare parts. This, he stated, prevented a satisfactory maintenance level and proper maintenance of obsolete or obsolescent equipment. Due investigation of this allegation resulted in the conclusion that the source of the problem was other than that reported by General Surkij. In COMUSMACTHAI’s opinion, the actual cause was internal: mal-distribution, poor management, over-control of stocks, cumbersome accounting and reporting procedures, failure of the Royal Thai Army to adequately fill the gap created by the discontinuance of MAP support of commercial consumables, and inadequate methodology and techniques available to project in a constructive manner the Thai Army officials’ concern for improving supply and maintenance operations.

The above situation was a source of CINCPAC concern, particularly in the face of the increasing counterinsurgency operations and an increased military assistance level. On the basis of past experience, however, there would be no "quick-fix." The solution lay in many related activities designed to educate Thai officials and in persuading them to take more interest in their maintenance problems.

Thailand FY 67 MAP

CINCPAC had proposed an FY 67 MA Plan ceiling of $70 million based on a COMUSMACTHAI estimate of requirements. His justification was based on the planned improvements in the Thai Armed Forces, committed increases in Thai Army Manning, and the need to adequately support the planned Project 22 combat support-service forces plus the US Joint Strategic Objectives Plan FY 68-75 force objectives. Supplemental information forwarded to the JCS at a later date indicated that Manning in the Army was expected to increase from an April level of about 85,000 to approximately 103,000 by the end of 1966, with priority to Project 22 units.

1. COMUSMACTHAI ltr Subj: Developments in Thailand, 26 Aug 66; DA 131417Z Sep 66; COMUSMACTHAI 220230Z Oct 66
2. Point Paper, J4342, 22 Nov 66
3. CINCPAC 120230Z Mar 66
4. J5 History, Mar 66

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THAILAND

AS OF 1 DECEMBER 1966

SECRET

NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS

SPECIAL VANGUARD REQUIRED
(9) The MAP ceiling approved by the State and Defense Departments was $60 million, \(^1\) which consisted of a basic $35 million package plus a $25 million add-on. This add-on package was to be maintained separate and identifiable, and it was not to generate any major follow-on requirements for FY 68. \(^2\)

(9) On 3 December CINCPAC's updated FY 67 program was submitted to the Secretary of Defense. On 5 December, as an exception to previous policy and in response to a CINCPAC request, the Secretary of Defense approved $1.4 million in commercial consumable POL. \(^3\)

Military Assistance Funding in Thailand and Laos

(9) On 10 October the Secretary of Defense approved the initiation of actions to transfer Laos and Thailand Military Assistance from the MAP to the military departments. \(^4\) CINCPAC proposed that the existing MAP procedures be retained through the CINCPAC and Defense Department's Office of the Director of Military Assistance levels to maintain positive centralized control of the MAP Articles and Services List data in these programs within the specified dollar guidelines. \(^5\) Pending a decision by the Secretary of Defense on procedures for transfer of funding responsibility, the transfer had not been implemented as of 31 December.

Security of US Facilities and Personnel in Thailand

(9) At the end of 1965 the United States and Thailand were negotiating for Thai guards to secure USAF and USA activities at certain installations in Thailand. \(^6\) This arrangement had become necessary because Thailand would not allow US guards to bear arms. On 1 February the necessary contract was signed by Lieutenant General Kriangsak Chomanan for the Thai Supreme Command Headquarters and by Major

1. CINCPAC 221741Z Oct 66; SECDEF 1569/011921Z Aug 66; CINCPAC 120230Z Mar, 240311Z Aug, 080451Z Jun 66
2. SECDEF 7913/151558Z Nov 66
3. SECDEF 9574/052236Z Dec 66; J5 History, Dec 66
4. JCS 4985/102220Z Oct 66
5. CINCPAC 280440Z Oct 66; J5 History, Oct 66
6. CINCPAC Command History 1965, p 491

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General Stilwell, COMUSMACThAI. Later negotiations were conducted in the interest of increasing the number of Thai guards, and providing one weapon per guard rather than just one per guard post.

Policy Guidelines For US Military Assistance in Thai Counterinsurgency

On 2 September 1966 CINCPAC directed that a clarifying set of guidelines on the US role in Thai counterinsurgency be developed. The stated purpose was to improve the counterinsurgency capabilities of the Thai so that US Forces would not be required to participate in a combat role. The role of Army Special Forces and Air Commandos was to be covered, emphasizing training assistance. Draft guidelines were forwarded on 2 November 1966 to COMUSMACThAI for comments and coordination with the US Ambassador in Bangkok. Comments of the component commanders, Ambassador Martin and General Stilwell were considered. A difference in views concerning the level of assignment of US advisors prompted follow-up action on 2 December 1966; COMUSMACThAI and the Ambassador responded with further amplification of their views. At the close of the year action was under way to resolve the difference in views and to develop the final formulation of the proposed policy guidelines.

1. COMUSMACThAI 011331Z Feb 66
2. CINCPAC 092013Z Aug 66; CINCPAC 100117Z Oct 66
3. General Emrick Memo 631-66, 2 Sep 66
4. CINCPAC 022108Z Nov 66
5. COMUSMACThAI 131010Z Nov 66; BANGKOK 141050Z Nov 66; CINCPACAF 142030Z Nov 66; CINCUSARPAC 190026Z Nov 66
6. CINCPAC 022207Z Dec 66
7. COMUSMACThAI 210830Z Dec 66
8. BANGKOK 231110Z Dec 66

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SECTION F - COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS, SOUTHEAST ASIA

(U) This portion of the history discusses major communications-electronics (C-E) subjects related primarily to Southeast Asia. Additional information may be found in the more comprehensive coverage of C-E in Chapter I and in association with the country military assistance programs in Chapter II. See the index.

SOUTHEAST ASIA LORAN SYSTEM

1,2 Construction of the Southeast Asia Long Range Air Navigation (LORAN) system was completed as scheduled and became operational in October 1966. The master station was located at Sattahip, Thailand and the slave stations at Lampang, Thailand and on Con Son Island, South Vietnam. They provided coverage over Thailand, Laos, Cambodia, and North and South Vietnam.

3 Initially C-47 cargo aircraft began to use the system, after they were retrofitted with LORAN C receivers. Tactical aircraft required the installation of miniaturized LORAN D receivers, which were not yet available because of procurement delays, but which were scheduled to begin to arrive in Southeast Asia early in 1967.

4 The LORAN system was expected to greatly improve tactical navigation in Southeast Asia. Its use should prevent most border violations. Aircraft would be able to navigate below the operational envelope of enemy SAM installations. The ground system, identified during its construction phase as Project TIGHT REIGN, was operated by the US Coast Guard.

TACTICAL AIR NAVIGATION, LAOS AND NORTH VIETNAM

Tactical air operations were conducted over North Vietnam

1. COMFOURTEEN CGDIST 282003Z Oct 66
2. CINCPAC validated the requirement for the new system on 25 September 1965. The JCS also recommended approval, which was granted by the Secretary of Defense on 18 November. CINCPAC 252031Z Sep 65; JCS 7076/232323Z Nov 65
3. COMUSMACTHAI 190530Z Feb 66
4. Point Papers, J613, 21 Dec 65, 18 Feb 66, and 25 Mar 66

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and Laos during 1965 and a portion of 1966 without adequate electronic navigational support. Resolution of this problem required establishment of Tactical Air Navigation (TACAN) ground stations in Laos; by early 1966 Ambassador Sullivan in Laos had succeeded in obtaining Prime Minister Souvanna's permission for three such installations. The US Department of State had approved deployment of a mobile TACAN to Landing Site (LS) 36 near Na Khang, Laos, but Ambassador Sullivan had not given his clearance for deployment because of increased enemy activity nearby.

CINCPAC therefore requested that the Ambassador select a substitute site and offered technical assistance for the task. Various locations were considered, and the end of year installation consisted of: (1) Hill 5210, southeast of Saravane; (2) Sky Line Ridge, southeast of LS 20 at Sam Thong; and (3) Hill 5860, north of LS 85 at Phu Pha Thi. All three sites were operational at the close of 1966, but the enemy had the capability of overrunning LS 85 at any time. The security situation at this site was being assessed, and actions were under way to select an alternate location should it appear that the loss of LS 85 was imminent.

DECCA SYSTEM, SOUTH VIETNAM

In September 1965 CINCPAC validated the requirement for an additional DECCA Chain (Air Navigational System) to provide coverage for Army aircraft in the northern part of the RVN. In so doing, CINCPAC recommended early approval and tasking of the Department of the Army with expeditious shipping and installation of the additional system.

Site selections were for a master station at Phu Cat and slave stations at Pleiku, Cu Lao Re, and Tuy Hoa. The original target date for an operational system was May 1966, but contractual problems regarding installation and construction caused this to slip to July.

1. CINCPAC 052215Z Jan 66; Point Paper, J614, 13 Jan 66
2. Point Paper, J613, 12 Jan 67
3. CINCPAC 2d Ind 3721 ser 001210, 10 Sep 65
4. COMUSMACV 220140Z Mar 66
With the completion of this system, DECCA coverage was available throughout the RVN.  

TACTICAL AIR CONTROL SYSTEM, SOUTHEAST ASIA

(S) In May 1965 the JCS approved the concept for a Southeast Asia Integrated Tactical Air Control System (SEAITACS). The SEAITACS plan published on 15 February 1966 provided for the development and functioning of the system, which would consist of combined MAP and US facilities in Thailand and South Vietnam. Some of the facilities—e.g., heavy radars at Monkey Mountain, Green Hill, and Udorn—were already operational with joint US-host country manning. Many additional facilities had to be constructed, and all elements had to be linked with voice, secure voice, and record communications to insure proper allocation and application of air power in Southeast Asia.

(S) The total number of control radar scopes programmed for the system as of 1 January 1966 was 78. Of these, 49 were operational by the end of the year. This was five short of the goal for 1966. The short fall was caused by non-receipt of equipment from CONUS, by inaccessibility of sites due to heavy rains, and by slippages in building construction schedules.

ELECTRONIC WARFARE

(C) In March CINCPAC initiated a study of electronic warfare operations to include a review of tactical doctrine and concept of operations. The objective of this study was to identify lessons learned and to assess the electronic warfare program. This study was forwarded to the JCS in May.

(TS) A plan for jamming VHF communications in North Vietnam was prepared in June and, after review, ordered executed by a CINCPAC

1. J6 History, Jan 67
2. Point Paper, J614, 8 Apr 66; CINCPAC Evaluation of Progress in Southeast Asia, Dec 66, CPRS 001524-67
3. CINCPAC 160314Z Mar 66
4. CINCPAC ltr ser 000210, 19 May 66

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TOP SECRET
operations order. MONKEY POD, a plan for jamming tactical communications in South Vietnam, was also developed during 1966. In December, with JCS authorization, CINCPAC approved execution of the plan.

1. CINCPAC 01033Z Oct 66
2. JCS 1062/092305Z Dec 66
3. CINCPAC ser SSO-00350, 24 Dec 66 (by other means)
SECRET

SECTION G - LOGISTICS

JOINT LOGISTICS CONCEPT

(U) The joint logistics concept for South Vietnam was formally stated in CINCPAC's report of the October requirements and capabilities conference. This and the Service component logistics concepts are discussed below. 1

The basic objectives of the joint logistics concept were:
(1) a logistic base for combat operations of US, RVNAF, and FWMAF Forces deployed or programmed for the RVN and Thailand; (2) a logistic posture with appropriate flexibility to support either a rapid buildup or redeployment of forces; and (3) a responsible and modern logistic system within the RVNAF.

( ) For South Vietnam, COMUSMACV would exercise centralized coordination and promulgate policy guidance for joint logistic planning. Logistic operations and execution were decentralized to the component commanders and CG, III MAF in South Vietnam.

( ) Logistic support of US Forces in the RVN was organized on an area basis, although common support responsibility would be exercised by the appropriate COMUSMACV component commander. Service-peculiar support would remain a Service component responsibility, however. The Air Force component commander would provide on-base logistic support at designated Air Force bases. While the US and RVNAF logistic systems would remain separate, logistic support would be coordinated at all levels to avoid conflict in common user facilities and services, and to insure efficient utilization of resources and facilities.

( ) Resources required for attainment of tactical and Revolutionary Development goals would be delivered to four separate "Logistic Islands" in Vietnam, as shown in the accompanying illustration. These would be served by principal air and sea ports and associated logistic bases.

1. CINCPAC ltr ser 000438, 20 Oct 66
(Da Nang, Qui Nhon, Cam Ranh Bay, and Saigon) located to facilitate support from sea LOC. Because of the tonnage, distance, and absence of secure north-south LOC, each "island" would be stocked and provided with facilities. Intracoastal sealift and airlift would support shipment between the islands.

It was recognized that this multiple-base feature would limit the flexibility of the logistic support system and increase combat service support requirements, but this was considered effective and necessary.

Each logistic island would be tailored to support tactical operations. The capability for this would depend upon improvements and expansion of the existing support structure and on improving efficiency to obtain the maximum effectiveness from facilities, roads, airfields, storage and handling facilities, and logistics units. Once this was accomplished, resources could be shifted toward support of the expanded tactical and Revolutionary Development effort. Additional roads, airfields, landing sites, storage facilities, maintenance sites, and cargo handling areas were military necessities; as these were completed during 1967 there would be increased effectiveness, flexibility, and efficiency in combat service support and the capability to meet contingencies.

Since combat service support unit deployments lagged behind tactical unit deployments, contractor service would be used to offset reduced capability. Temporary diversion of combat and combat support personnel to combat service support duties might be required, however. The goal would continue to be the orderly substitution of military forces for contractors in some critical logistic support areas.

Contractor service support would nevertheless continue to be a significant and integral part of the total logistic support system in the RVN. But contractor assistance for combat essential support was viewed as a stop-gap measure. A reduction in contractor service support would depend upon operations, the availability of military support units and mission-essential equipment, and the degree of competition in the local economy for contractors' services.
CINCUSARPAC's logistics concept focused on the support of combat forces in the RVN. It included complete supply support for US Army forces, expanded common-item support to other US Forces, and support to FWMAF. Logistic operations in Thailand would be primarily in support of US Air Force operations.

His concept of logistic support envisioned increased shipments direct from CONUS to Vietnam, continued use of Okinawa and Japan as offshore bases, expansion of overhaul maintenance capabilities on Okinawa, increased hospitalization capabilities in Japan, increased use of container shipments and roll-on/roll-off ships between Okinawa and Vietnam, reduction of financial management functions and constraints forward of USARPAC, and increased CGUSARV responsibility for supply management functions in support of operations in the RVN.

Within Vietnam, logistic support would continue to be provided through the depot-Direct Support Unit (DSU) supply chain. The 1st Logistical Command would exercise supply discipline of the depot assets in-country, and supply management of the assets in support of Vietnam would be exercised by CGUSARV. Rapid response would be provided through interface of the large-scale computer on Okinawa with CONUS systems.

In Thailand, the US Army's 9th Logistical Command would perform the support functions for COMUSMAGTHAI/CHJUSMAGTHAI and would assume Class I supply support of all US Forces in-country. Primary emphasis would be placed on supporting USAF operations and on developing port facilities at Sattahip and the logistic complex at Khorat, and related LOC.

The CINCPACAF logistics concept noted that in addition to the standard USAF materiel organization, a "Logistic Readiness Center" was operational around-the-clock. This center responded to immediate requirements from Southeast Asia as well as controlling priorities through continuous contacts with CONUS logistic activities. Logistic Readiness Centers functioned in Southeast Asia locations and peripheral base areas. An ultimate objective was to standardize all supply
operations and to attain full base self-sufficiency at each operating location.

Timely support in Southeast Asia as well as in other Western Pacific areas was dependent upon the uninterrupted service of the Military Airlift Command (MAC) and the Military Sea Transport Service (MSTS). Additional MAC channels would soon be necessary to support operations in Southeast Asia, and the PACAF intra-theater network would require additional aircraft to meet CINCPAC air transport requirements. To insure improved aircraft utilization and command and control, CINCPACAF would establish a new Airlift Division under the 7th Air Force.

CINCPACFLT's logistics concept provided that each Navy unit would be self-supporting to the greatest extent possible. When external logistic support was necessary for deployed fleet units, it would be provided by mobile logistic support forces supplemented by base support when available or necessary. The concept of logistic support of Navy river and coastal forces was oriented toward two Naval Support Activities: one at Da Nang to support forces in the I CTZ and to operate ports and beaches; one at Saigon supporting COMNAVFORV in II and IV CTZs. Naval Support Activity, Saigon received certain support from the 1st Logistical Command.

Within the CG, FMFPAC logistic concept, CG, FMFPAC was responsible for providing or arranging for logistic support of III MAF forces. Support was rendered through a combination of logistic readiness prior to deployment and subsequent support from organic Marine sources and sources operated by other Services and agencies. The Force Logistic Command was the in-country organization providing logistic support for the III MAF, except for aeronautical support (peculiar to aircraft and ground support equipment), which was received directly from Navy sources.

The Marine Corps logistic structure external to the III MAF provided the essential equipment, hardware, spare parts, and ammunition for support in the RVN. Backup maintenance and supply support were provided from the 3d Force Service Regiment on Okinawa.
The Marine Corps organization was not designed to support extended operations such as those in the RVN; backup and specialized support were therefore required from non-Marine sources.

Briefly, this support consisted of supply support from the following sources:

1. Naval Support Activity, Da Nang--subsistence, POL products, and common housekeeping hardware items.

2. Other Services and transportation agencies--inter- and intra-theater transportation support.

3. Naval activities--medical support.

4. Army, Navy, Air Force--other logistic services and support in accordance with Interservice Support Agreements or mission assignments.

BASE DEVELOPMENT, SOUTHEAST ASIA

Base development procedures were refined throughout 1966, and progress was apparent in the construction effort designed to create a fully adequate range of supporting facilities for the war in Southeast Asia. The following material considers a variety of base development subjects; many additional subjects are covered elsewhere in association with the major functions or operations the projects were intended to support. For example, the development of B-52 aircraft support facilities at U-Tapao Air Base in Thailand is discussed in connection with the forward basing of ARC LIGHT B-52s. Similarly, several port development projects are discussed in the context of the cargo backlogs or shallow-draft shipping problems in Southeast Asia. These separately handled base development actions may be found by consulting the index.

Construction Programming Flexibility, South Vietnam

Higher authority had exercised detailed and inflexible control of construction in the RVN, and this had inhibited timely response to shifting requirements. In August 1965 CINCPAC asked COMUSMACV to comment on a JCS proposal to establish a strong MACV Engineer Staff Agency, which would be headed by a "construction czar" who
would exercise centralized control of the construction effort in South Vietnam. COMUSMACV replied that he had a strong Engineer staff under his Logistics Division, and that this arrangement was effective. On 7 December 1965 CINCPAC advised the JCS that he supported COMUSMACV's position; he further stated that a staff reorganization would not solve the construction problems in Vietnam.

The Secretary of Defense, however, approved a subsequent JCS proposed statement of mission and functions for the new "czar" billet. It was stipulated that the incumbent would have full authority to discharge his responsibilities; further, this authority would rest in the "czar" and not in General Westmoreland's Assistant Chief of Staff for Logistics.

The new position, MACV Director of Construction was manned by a US Army brigadier general in February. Having met the prerequisite, CINCPAC then received revised construction approval procedures wherein the MACV Director of Construction was delegated much of the control formerly exercised by the Secretary of Defense.

Construction Funding, South Vietnam

Much of the first year of the military construction effort could be described as rapid mobilization of forces and materials. Construction requirements were identified, facilities were designed, and materials were purchased and transported to the construction sites. Nevertheless, substantial construction was accomplished concurrent with these actions. As a specific example, construction directives for approximately $151 million had been issued for construction at Cam Ranh Bay, and by the end of 1966 a large portion of this money had been transformed into usable facilities.

1. CINCPAC 132317Z Aug 65
2. COMUSMACV 180646Z Aug 65
3. CINCPAC 070453Z Dec 65
4. JCS 2343/724-1 20 Dec 65; JCS 061448Z Jan 66
5. JCS 122201Z Feb 66
Near the end of 1966 the total authorized program was being executed at the rate of five percent per month, and a slight increase was expected in early 1967 with the arrival of additional troop construction units. The monthly rate of work-in-place (WIP) was slightly over $50 million. The funded-construction program was as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Program</th>
<th>Army ($ in millions)</th>
<th>Navy ($ in millions)</th>
<th>Air Force ($ in millions)</th>
<th>Total ($ in millions)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FY 65 (Regular)</td>
<td>14.7</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>11.8</td>
<td>35.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY 65 (Supplemental)</td>
<td>36.1</td>
<td>17.4</td>
<td>20.9</td>
<td>74.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY 65 (Regular)</td>
<td>29.1</td>
<td>30.3</td>
<td>16.6</td>
<td>76.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY 65 (Amendment)</td>
<td>35.9</td>
<td>32.9</td>
<td>39.2</td>
<td>108.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY 65 (Supplemental)</td>
<td>338.4</td>
<td>175.9</td>
<td>138.1</td>
<td>652.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>454.2</td>
<td>265.9</td>
<td>226.6</td>
<td>946.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A follow-on military construction (MILCON) program would fund facility requirements subsequent to 1 April 1967. The FY 67 supplemental construction program submitted by the Services for South Vietnam was designed to eliminate deficiencies in support facilities for Program Three forces and to accommodate the additional forces in Program Four. This program was under review by the Secretary of Defense at the end of the year.

CINCPAC recommended a follow-on military construction program designed to provide only the most necessary facilities to support the approved forces on an austere basis. In so doing, he generally supported COMUSMACV's recommendations and validated a $769 million FY 67 supplemental MILCON program for the RVN. The Service breakout included $204,920,000 Navy; $315,365,000 Army; and $108,838,000 Air Force; with an additional $140 million included to cover prior program underfunding.

It was informally indicated that only $400 million would be approved by the Secretary of Defense for FY 67 supplemental MILCON and that $75 million would be deferred until the FY 68 MILCON program. Allowing $160 million per year for troop construction and...
$40 million for cost overruns, only $100 million in FY 67 supplemental funds would be left for the OICC contractor.

A reduction of this magnitude would necessitate phasing out the contractor starting in mid-1967 with no chance to use his mobilized capability on the FY 68 MILCON program. In contrast, CINCPAC and COMUSMACV had planned to use the contractor at full capacity throughout 1967 and phase him out in 1968. If the rumored reduction was executed, it seemed that combat operations might be seriously degraded because accommodations would lag behind deployments.

CINCPAC's position was that the construction program should continue at the existing rate. Further, adequate follow-on funding should be authorized to satisfy facility deficiencies and to provide additions for programmed force deployments. 2

Construction Program Review, South Vietnam

At the request of the Secretary of Defense, COMUSMACV reviewed the authorized RVN construction program from an operational requirements standpoint. CINCPAC in turn reviewed the program, which was submitted incrementally to the JCS in late September. South Vietnam was divided into four major complexes to encompass areas serviced by the four major ports: Da Nang, Qui Nhon, Cam Ranh Bay, and Saigon.

Data was assembled to reflect total facility requirements by Functional Facility Category Groups necessary to accommodate forces deployed or programmed for deployment under Program Three. Additionally, a restatement of the South Vietnam construction program was prepared and submitted to the JCS in mid-October.

Problems were encountered by the JCS in reconciling the two complex reviews, and rather than attempt to adjust the initial submissions, CINCPAC and COMUSMACV decided to update both the restatement and the complex reviews of 1 December utilizing facility requirements to accommodate Program Four force deployments through December 1967.

1. Officer in Charge of Construction
2. Point Paper, J4212, 5 Jan 67
These updated complex reviews were delivered to CINCPAC on 22 December and at the end of the year were under study by the PACOM component commanders and CINCPAC. The updated documents addressed the RVN construction program in considerable detail and appeared to be a most authoritative definition of the total program.  

**DeLong Piers, PACOM-Wide**

In May 1965 it was decided to develop Cam Ranh Bay as a major logistics base. As a means of quickly providing additional berthing facilities, it was decided to make use of a DeLong Pier. Only one of these floating piers was in the Army inventory, and it was located at Charleston, South Carolina. Arrangements were subsequently completed for towing this unit--measuring 300' x 90'--to Cam Ranh Bay, where it would double the existing two-ship berthing capability of the port. The DeLong Pier reached Cam Ranh Bay late in 1965 and proved effective.

Based on an initial request in October 1966 from COMUSMACV's Logistics Division through the USARPAC Inventory Control Point, and without CINCPAC's knowledge, the US Army Material Command meanwhile issued a letter contract to DeLong Corporation for construction of 6 "A" and 12 "B" DeLong units. 

While this was taking place, CINCPAC made a projection of cargo inputs to Southeast Asia ports that indicated the development of intolerable backlogs unless new berthing facilities were provided expeditiously. The DeLong Pier concept could provide these needed berths in the time required, and on 13 February 1966 CINCPAC therefore initiated a survey of DeLong Pier requirements throughout PACOM. On 4 March he requested the Department of the

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1. Point Paper, J4212, 5 Jan 67
2. The "A" unit measured 300' x 80'; the "B" unit 150' x 60'.
Army to procure sufficient DeLong units to meet the following theater requirements:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Port</th>
<th>&quot;A&quot; Units</th>
<th>&quot;B&quot; Units</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Da Nang</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qui Nhon</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cam Ranh Bay</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nha Trang</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vung Tau</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sattahip, Thailand</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Okinawa</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>18</strong></td>
<td><strong>10</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

At this time the initial letter contract with DeLong had been modified to provide 10 "A" units and 13 "B" units. These were being manufactured in Japan. On 11 March 1966 the Commanding General, US Army Material Command took action to request funding for the additional eight "A" units that were required to meet PACOM-wide requirements.

Of the required eight additional "A" units, only four were eventually approved for procurement; balance-of-payment considerations provided grounds for the deletion of four units. Realigning assets and utilizing uncommitted "B" units reduced the shortfall to two "A" units, which were needed in Okinawa to facilitate repair of the permanent ammunition pier at White Beach. There was an additional shortfall of 1,000 feet of open trestle for Vung Tau. On 13 June the Department of the Army proposed to eliminate the DeLong installation at Nha Trang and use the material thus released to satisfy the requirement for two "A" units in Okinawa, and all except 200 feet of the trestle for Vung Tau.

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1. CINCPAC 040334Z Jun 66
2. DA 769326/131609Z Jun 66
DELONG PIER DISPOSITIONS
31 December 1966

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Units A</th>
<th>Units B</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Vung Ro Bay</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Da Nang</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qui Nhon</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cam Ranh Bay</td>
<td>6** 6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vung Tau</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sattahip</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Temporary use as pier approved; to be moved to Vung Tau after completion of permanent approach.

** Non-standard 90' X 300' pier installed in addition to these units.
CINCPAC reiterate his requirement for the Nha Trang facility on the grounds of a predicted shortfall of 1966 port capability at Nha Trang. He subsequently learned that the Secretary of Defense was reluctant to approve additional offshore procurement of DeLong Pier units because of balance of payment considerations. After a careful restudy of the situation, CINCPAC concluded that certain adjustments could be made to satisfy the immediate needs within the total of 14 "A" units and 13 "B" units under procurement.

The first step would be to divert temporarily the two Nha Trang "A" units to facilitate pier repairs at Okinawa. To compensate for the inherent loss of discharge capability at Nha Trang, cargo could be discharged at Cam Ranh Bay and moved by road to Nha Trang. Further, shallow draft facilities at Nha Trang would afford a continuing discharge capability; support requirements in the Nha Trang area had declined because of changed deployment plans; and manpower and barges could be shifted to increase the Nha Trang "in-stream" discharge capability if necessary. Another consideration was the increased port capability that would result from containerization. CINCPAC therefore advised the Department of the Army that the above modification would preclude, for the time, the need for additional procurement.

The disposition of DeLong Piers at the end of 1966 is shown on the accompanying illustration entitled "DeLong Pier Dispositions." It will be noted that piers were not installed in Okinawa or Nha Trang. These were deleted because of the higher priority of the other installations.

Construction Program Review, Thailand

In May the Secretary of Defense initiated a review of the Thailand construction program. He asked that the Service Secretaries advise him as to whether all military construction in Thailand should be stopped until it was determined that the work to be undertaken was required to

1. CINCPAC 160316Z Jun 66
2. CINCPAC J4 Memo 0238-66
3. CINCPAC 172251Z Jul 66; interview with CINCPAC J421, Lieutenant Colonel Bruce W. Jamison, USA
support approved military plans and programs. The purpose of the Secretarial reviews was to determine which construction projects supported current operations and which, if any, supported contingency operations.

Upon learning of these reviews, CINCPAC advised the JCS that because of the interdependence of Service construction programs in Thailand, only a review through joint channels would be valid. The Secretary of Defense subsequently agreed to consider a review submitted through the JCS, and he requested that CINCPAC review and comment upon the Service submissions.

The CINCPAC review of funded Thailand military construction considered the submissions of the Service departments and of COMUSMACTHAI. CINCPAC determined that it was advisable to adjust the existing Service programs by programming from lower priority projects to other urgent projects that were short of funds for various reasons. He also determined that any further drawdown of Thailand military construction funds would result in lowered capability to perform current missions. A further CINCPAC determination was that his recommended programs submitted with the review were required to support current missions.

CINCPAC's report of the review recommended adjustments to the funded military construction programs and provided the rationale therefor. It also gave detailed subject and issue presentations on 14 locations and facilities in Thailand; these presentations contained detailed breakouts of funded programs and construction items, with associated justifications.

Air Force Review

A comparison of the Air Force and CINCPAC recommended programs is presented in the table entitled "Air Force Funded Program."

The monetary changes from the Air Force recommendations were primarily due to the updating of cost estimates. Within the range of the overall program, however, there were significant variations between the capabilities that would result from the Air Force and CINCPAC recommended programs.

1. CINCPAC ser 001533, 20 Sep 66
2. Hospital construction received a further and separate review, which confirmed the requirements stated in the original review.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location-Item</th>
<th>13 Jul 66, Department of the Air Force Review</th>
<th>CINCPAC Recommended Program</th>
<th>Changes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bong Song (Integrated Tactical Air Control (ITAC) Site)</td>
<td>.1</td>
<td>.1</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chieng Mai (ITAC Site)</td>
<td>.5</td>
<td>.5</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Green Hill (ITAC Site)</td>
<td>.8</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>+ .3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kamphaeng Saen (Flying School, 11.2 previously designated Nakhon Pathom)</td>
<td>11.3</td>
<td>+ .1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U-Tapao Air Base</td>
<td>34.8</td>
<td>39.6</td>
<td>+ 4.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khorat Air Base</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>+ .3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nakhon Phanom Air Base</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>- 2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Takhli Air Base</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>- 1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ubon Air Base</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>- .5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Udorn Air Base</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>- .4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nam Phong Air Base</td>
<td>14.8</td>
<td>14.2</td>
<td>- .6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>87.7</strong></td>
<td><strong>87.7</strong></td>
<td><strong>0</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
U-Tapao Air Base: The Secretary of the Air Force recommended constructing U-Tapao Air Base to support 25 KC-135s and two squadrons of C-130s. His objectives reference the tanker basing were: (1) to relieve congestion at Kadena, Okinawa, (2) to increase the efficiency of KC-135 operations, and (3) to provide for possible future consolidation of tankers at U-Tapao to relieve congestion at Takhli, Thailand.

In contrast, CINCPAC's reprogramming recommendation was designed for rapid development of U-Tapao as a main operating base with basing facilities for 35 KC-135s. The report noted that approval of additional U-Tapao missions, such as basing C-130 squadrons or a B-52 force, would require subsequent or follow-on facilities construction. The deployment of the two C-130 squadrons programmed for U-Tapao had been previously deferred by the Secretary of Defense, and CINCPAC and the JCS were awaiting the results of a reclama on this.

Nam Phong Air Base: Under the Secretary of the Air Force's recommended reprogramming, construction would continue for a "bare base," which would include pavements for three tactical fighter squadrons, airfield lighting, POL storage, ammunition storage, utilities, and roads. This concept would permit future expansion to a forward operating capability by moving in portable navigational and terminal aids, communications, a control tower, and other temporary facilities. CINCPAC had already stated his position that the base should be continued beyond the Secretary's bare base concept because the sortie requirement for the planned CINCPAC air campaign against North Vietnam exceeded the existing Southeast Asia capability based on the geographic priority for sortie allocation. In CINCPAC's view, Nam Phong-based aircraft would operate more efficiently because of the proximity of the base to the target area. A further CINCPAC consideration was that the ground security requirements in Thailand were much less than would be required for bases in South Vietnam, and that it was

1. CINCPAC 050430Z Aug 66 addressed this in detail.
neither practical nor desirable to expand existing facilities at other Thai bases because these had reached the point of practical operational saturation.

(9) The $14.2 million shown for Nam Phong in CINCPAC's recommendation would provide pavements and access road only. To remain within current funding it would be necessary to defer airfield lighting, POL and ammunition storage, and basic utilities.

CINCPAC noted that each item in the Air Force program would support the war effort in South Vietnam, and that each item, except for Nam Phong, was in support of Secretary of Defense-approved deployments. He reiterated his position that deployment of the three fighter squadrons for Nam Phong, deferred by the Secretary of Defense, was required to support the war in South Vietnam, and that construction should continue on the facilities to support them.

Navy Review

(9) The Navy review of the Thailand construction program was completed in mid-July. It identified as contingency requirements the POL storage, airfield (VP(L) facilities), the communications facility, and the MARKET TIME base. The basis was stated as, "These projects are for the support of Naval Forces for which no deployment has been approved." Identified as current requirements were harbor development and POL discharge and distribution. CINCPAC had meanwhile stated 1 that the Navy forces at the VP(L) facility and the communication facility were a requirement in support of the war in South Vietnam. While recognizing that these deployments had not yet received Secretary of Defense approval, CINCPAC considered them valid requirements and proposed that the construction of the facilities should be continued.

CINCPAC concurred with the Navy proposal to defer the MARKET TIME base and the POL storage facilities at Sattahip. He recommended that the funds thus recovered be applied to cover cost overruns in the port quay wall and POL jetty. He noted that these

1. CINCPAC 112240Z Sep 66
# NAVY FUNDED PROGRAM

($ in millions)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location-Item</th>
<th>14 Jul 67, Navy Department Review</th>
<th>CINCPAC Recommended Program</th>
<th>Change *</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sattahip</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Port</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>+ 1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POL</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jetty</td>
<td>.9</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>+ .7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tankage</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>.5**</td>
<td>- 1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MARKET TIME Base</td>
<td>.6</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>- .6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy Communications Facility</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>+ .3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Airfield (VP(L) Facility)</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>+ .1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Real Estate Site Preparation</td>
<td>.7</td>
<td>.3</td>
<td>- .4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>16.3</td>
<td>16.3</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Changes primarily due to adjustments in view of the latest cost estimates.

** Funds already expended for real estate and not recoverable.
recovered funds, supplemented with an additional $3 million in Army funding, would permit completion of the POL jetty and a four-cargo berth quay wall. These, he stated, were required by the Army and the Air Force, and were urgent requirements in support of the war in South Vietnam. See the table entitled "Navy Funded Program" for a comparison of the Navy and CINCPAC recommended programs.

Army Review

(9) The Acting Secretary of the Army's review of the Thailand construction program was dated 15 July and was qualified by the statement that it was based on the "best data available in the Department of the Army." He identified the whole Sattahip cargo port development as supporting contingency operations. His apparent basis was that all currently required cargo could be moved over the DeLong Pier at Sattahip. He recommended, however, that because of the vulnerability of the Bangkok port and delays in unloading, the construction should continue "since some contingency plan port capacity should be provided." The report also categorized as contingency construction some of the storage facilities needed for prepositioned contingency stocks that were already in-country.

(9) CINCPAC did not agree that the Bangkok port could handle all current and projected cargo other than ammunition, feeling that the differing conclusions resulted from incomplete data in the hands of the Army Department. In support of his position, he cited the limiting factors associated with the port of Bangkok, to include ship draft and length limits, inadequate cargo handling equipment, restricted storage space, and slow clearance of cargo. He also noted that vehicular traffic through urban Bangkok was prohibited during morning and evening rush hours.

(9) To further illustrate the deficiencies of the port of Bangkok, CINCPAC cited the results of a Research Analysis Corporation study, that indicated that over-reliance on Bangkok port would result in an accumulation of ships waiting to enter the port, and an overflow of cargoes in storage areas. He also stated that the port area was then
## ARMY FUNDED PROGRAM
($ in millions)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location-Item</th>
<th>15 Jul 67 Department of Army Review</th>
<th>CINCPAC Recommended Program</th>
<th>Changes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sattahip</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Port Facilities</td>
<td>(17.9)</td>
<td>20.9</td>
<td>+ 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dredging</td>
<td>(8. )</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quay Wall</td>
<td>(3. )</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miscellaneous</td>
<td>(9.9)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cantonments</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>.8</td>
<td>- .5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ammunition Storage</td>
<td>.8</td>
<td>.7</td>
<td>- .1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inland Road</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>10.9</td>
<td>+ 10.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khorat</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cantonments</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>5.</td>
<td>+ .5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POL Storage/Distribution</td>
<td>.5</td>
<td>.5</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ammunition Storage</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>- 1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Warehouse &amp; Open Storage</td>
<td>2.</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>+ 1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maintenance Buildings</td>
<td>1.</td>
<td>1.</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cold Storage</td>
<td>1.</td>
<td>.7</td>
<td>- .3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medical Facilities</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>- .2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administration Facilities</td>
<td>.5</td>
<td>.6</td>
<td>+ .1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Utilities &amp; Miscellaneous</td>
<td>10.</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>- 4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Siracha-Don Muang POL Pipeline</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>.3</td>
<td>- 9.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Temporary Camp Cantonments</td>
<td>.8</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>- .8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kabin-Buri/Khorat Road Construction</td>
<td>9.</td>
<td>9.</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northeast Thailand Road Construction</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1.</td>
<td>+ 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special Forces Training Base</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>.5</td>
<td>+ .5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>63.3</td>
<td>63.3</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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SECRET
approximately 50 percent overloaded with cargoes waiting clearance. He predicted conflict between the increasing commercial and military cargo coming into Thailand, and specifically mentioned the fact that the port of Bangkok was not expandable. Additionally, the US military had no voice in port management despite the fact that it was the port's largest single user.

(5) For these reasons, CINCPAC concluded that the port could not assure satisfactory support of current military requirements, and that the development of the port of Sattahip was a priority project needed to support the war in South Vietnam. CINCPAC also stated that storage facilities for prepositioned stocks in Thailand were a current, not a contingency requirement. A comparison of the Army and CINCPAC views is shown in the table entitled "Army Funded Program."

CINCPAC Recommendations

(U) The following discussion concerns the major changes recommended by CINCPAC.

Sattahip Port Construction: (S) Increase the program by $3 million and combine with $2 million in additional Navy funding to cover cost overruns in quay wall construction, which would create four cargo berths. CINCPAC classified Sattahip port construction as a high priority project and noted that as a result of joint planning coordinated by COMUSMACTHAI and CINCPAC, the program made the most efficient use of available construction funds and provided joint or mutually supporting facilities to meet the combined need. CINCPAC further explained that under the original Sattahip Master Plan specific facilities were assigned to the various Services for funding simply because it would ease programming through Service channels. This being the case, he suggested that it was both proper and in the best interests of the theater to have the Army contribute to the quay wall project, which was for common benefit even though originally Navy funded.

Siracha-Don Muang Pipeline: (5) CINCPAC had recently concluded that the project must be retained as a valid requirement, but that it could
be deferred in view of the need for limiting expenditures for the present to only the most urgent requirements.

**Ammunition Storage at Khorat:** Reduce by $1.7 million because the existing Army ammunition storage capability of 2,000 short tons met the current requirements for the location.

**Warehouse and Open Storage at Khorat:** Increase by $1.4 million to eliminate most of the deficiency in facilities required to support current missions.

**Utilities and Miscellaneous Projects, Khorat:** Decrease by $4.2 million. This recommendation was based on detailed requirements data and revised cost estimates resulting from lower construction standards and lesser use of Contract Plus Award Fee contract construction. It was difficult to relate this change to the Department of the Army item, because they used this nomenclature as a line item to cover all projects that could not be identified by them in the Khorat Complex.

**Northeast Road Construction:** This increase recognized a new project initiated under CINCUSARPAC's reprogramming authority. It was required to assure support to Nakhon Phanom Air Base. As an additional benefit the road was an aid in support of the Thai counter-insurgency effort. All-weather roads were an urgent requirement in support of US bases and should be retained.

**Connecting Road, Sattahip Port to Bangkok Bypass Road:** This increase was necessary to assure that ammunition and other cargo could be moved up-country. The only existing route was the coastal road, which had deteriorated under the heavy hauling connected with Sattahip construction. It was narrow, congested, and generally without shoulders. A further consideration was that when the Sattahip general cargo berths became available in the summer of 1967, there would be an imbalance between port and road capacity. CINCPAC recommended that this construction be initiated as soon as possible.

*(U)* The Secretary of Defense approved CINCPAC's recommendations, and ordered execution with some minor modifications that reflected updated cost estimates of the Air Force program.  

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1. JCS 1497/152145Z Dec 66
Thailand Construction - Review

During 1966 work was initiated on three new jet-capable airfields. U-Tapao's 11,500-foot runway was completed in July and formally dedicated in August. Over 400,000 square yards of aircraft parking apron was completed by the end of the year as well as many other supporting facilities. The earthwork at Nam Phong was essentially completed by the end of the year; scheduled for completion in mid-1967 were a 10,000-foot runway, a parallel taxiway, and a 40,000 square yard concrete parking apron. Late in the year work started on the RTAF school at Kamphaeng Saen with completion scheduled for 1968.

At Sattahip, 67 percent of the dredging for new deep-draft port facilities was completed, and work was initiated on the quay wall, which would provide four deep-draft berths by November 1967. A DeLong Pier installed in August provided two additional deep-draft berths. The ammunition pier was completed, although it was fitted with temporary POL unloading facilities. Another temporary POL unloading system was installed at the southern tip of the port area while work was initiated to complete a permanent system.

Army troops and contractor personnel continued work on the Kabin-Buri to Khorat road throughout the year, and on 25 March the 95-km asphaltic concrete Bangkok bypass road was formally dedicated.

Numerous supporting facilities were completed at all bases during the year. These included cantonments, administrative and maintenance structures, ammunition and other depot storage areas, airfield pavements, utilities, and supporting roads.

Tuy Hoa Air Base

On 27 May, Tuy Hoa was selected as the site for construction of a new jet tactical airbase. An Air Force "Turnkey" contract for base construction was formalized 31 May with Walter Kidde, Inc. The contract specified that the contractor would, from his resources,

2. Based on "CINCPAC Evaluation of Progress in Southeast Asia" Dec 66, CPRS 001524-67
3. JCS 2343/828-1
4. CSAF 76066/152206Z Jun 55

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support himself, and provide all materials, equipment, sealift, etc. One provision of the contract required construction of a shallow-draft port adjacent to the airfield, with the capability to berth two LSTs and a T-1 tanker.

Completion dates established by the contract were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Completion Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Expeditionary airfield (3 squadrons)*</td>
<td>31 December 1966</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interim port facility, including temporary fuel unloading facility</td>
<td>31 December 1966</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Permanent airfield (4 squadrons)</td>
<td>April 1967</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shallow-draft port</td>
<td>31 July 1967</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Bonus of $200,000 if contractor beat this date.

Ground operations in the Tuy Hoa area prompted initiation, in July 1966, of a minimal port capability at Vung Ro Bay. COMUSMACV requested authority to install a POL line from Vung Ro to the airbase to support the tactical fighter squadrons scheduled for deployment in December. CINCPAC, however, initially denied this request since the contractor was responsible for installing POL handling at the Tuy Hoa port. It was later decided to leave this up to COMUSMACV because of the added POL requirements for all forces in the Vung Ro area.

Good progress on the expeditionary airfield resulted in a CINCPACAF request for early deployment of the tactical fighter squadrons, and the first closed at the airbase on 15 November. Facilities available at that time included a 9,000-foot runway, 22,000 square yards of parking apron, and connecting taxiway, all constructed of AM-2 aluminum matting. Meanwhile, Tuy Hoa port had been found unusable due to a shallow entrance channel, inadequate mooring facilities, and high monsoon surf conditions. It was therefore necessary that the fuel and munitions support for the squadron be delivered through the Vung Ro port facility.

Because of apparent logistics support difficulties, CINCPAC suspended the scheduled December deployment of the second and third squadrons. CINCPAC temporarily lifted this suspension in late November with CINCPACAF's assurance, and COMUSMACV's concurrence, that the problems
would be manageable.\(^1\) COMUSMACV then changed his position and recommended deferring deployment of the two squadrons until mid-January or early-February due to the inability of the Tuy Hoa complex to support the force of three squadrons.

\(^1\) CINCPACAF insisted that Tuy Hoa could support the scheduled deployments, but after further checking CINCPAC recommended that the deployment of the additional squadrons be withheld until requested by him.\(^2\) Subsequently COMUSMACV concluded that the second and third tactical fighter squadrons could be deployed on 9 December and 16 December respectively.\(^3\) CINCPAC concurred with these closure dates.\(^4\)

\(^2\) Since the Vung Ro port had advanced considerably by December, CINCPAC asked COMUSMACV to investigate the necessity for a permanent port at Tuy Hoa.\(^5\) COMUSMACV subsequently stated that a permanent port was unnecessary, and he proposed that the interim port at Tuy Hoa be closed down as soon as it was no longer needed by the "Turnkey" contractor.\(^6\)

\(^3\) Accordingly, CINCPAC recommended amendment of the contract to delete the provision for the Tuy Hoa permanent port. Decision on this recommendation was pending at the end of the year.\(^7\)

### Phan Rang Expeditionary Airfield

\(^7\) The 389th Tactical Fighter Squadron (F-4Cs) was deployed from CONUS to Phan Rang, arriving 14 March. The squadron's pilots flew their first sorties on the following day. The 389th was the last of the Phase I squadrons deployed to South Vietnam and the first squadron to be assigned to Phan Rang.

\(^8\) Activation of this air base culminated four months of coordinated Army, Navy, Air Force, and contractor effort. It was expected that the base could support four fighter squadrons by May,\(^8\) and this capability was achieved.

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1. CINCPAC 240050Z Nov 66
2. Point Paper, J4214, 26 Nov 66
3. COMUSMACV 031021Z Dec 66
4. CINCPAC 040520Z Dec 66; CINCPAC 102240Z Dec 66
5. CINCPAC 120621Z Dec 66
6. COMUSMACV 170303Z Dec 66
7. CINCPAC 222325Z Dec 66
8. COMUSMACV MONEVAL, Mar 66, CPRS 002176-66

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TRANSPORTATION

A host of limiting factors influenced CINCPAC's transportation problems during 1966. One was the overaged and undersized US merchant marine that was unequal to the task of supporting even a limited war. Another was the gold-flow consideration that made it inadvisable to use foreign flag shipping to compensate for the long-standing neglect of our merchant fleet. Others involved the accumulative impact of an increased tempo of operations, limited reserve stocks, uncertain production schedules for some war material, and CONUS supply agencies' performance—all of which contributed to a situation wherein already scarce transportation assets were used to shift resources in response to exigencies. Additional and equally significant limiting factors included port and beach throughput capabilities, civil unrest in South Vietnam, and a national economy that continued on a peacetime basis.

The following material discusses transportation under the headings of control measures, sealift, and airlift, and it should be considered in the context of the limiting factors mentioned above. Other transportation information and related material will be found elsewhere in this Chapter in association with operations or logistic functions such as base development and ports and beaches. See index.

Control Measures

PACOM Movements Priorities Agency (PAMPA)

This CINCPAC agency was established during January 1966 at Oakland Army Terminal, California with the primary objective of preventing congestion in RVN seaports. By March, PAMPA personnel had developed an effective means of projecting the workload in RVN ports as much as 45 days in advance. PAMPA also reviewed priorities of air shipments and managed to obtain timely air shipment for urgent cargo by diverting some other cargo to ocean transport.

Joint Transportation Board

The PACOM Joint Transportation Board began functioning in September with the objective of aiding in the resolution of transportation

1. See Appendix I.
2. CINCPAC Command History, 1965, p 556
3. PAMPA Itr 4600 ser 02, 3 Mar 66
problems and improving transportation performance within the theater. 1

Ocean Shipment Control System

At the beginning of 1965 there was no effective control of ocean shipments to RVN ports, and this was one of several factors contributing to the congestion of ports in the RVN. Further, there were severe backlogs of loaded ships waiting to be called forward from ports outside South Vietnam. During the latter part of 1965 and the early months of 1966 CINCPAC developed a concept of control wherein COMUSMACV would serve as the focal point for controlling shipments to RVN ports. 2 A conference was held at CINCPAC on 12 and 13 May to delineate the responsibilities of all concerned.

The receiving capabilities of RVN ports were recognized as the basic consideration in ocean shipment control. These capabilities were constantly changing, influenced by many factors, including: the adequacy of terminal service resources and management, the progress of construction, the degree of civil order in the area, the type and amount of intracoastal shipping available, and the impact of weather on port operations.

COMUSMACV assessed the capabilities of the individual ports and allocated a share of each to the agencies exercising control over shipments originating within South Vietnam (intracoastal), in other PACOM ports, and in CONUS ports. These agencies were:

CINCPAC: Pacific Command Movements Priorities Agency and the Western Pacific Transportation Office at Tachikawa Air Base, Japan.

COMUSMACV: Transportation Management Agency (TMA).

The TMA allocated the receiving capabilities of RVN ports for intracoastal use and for receipt of PACOM and CONUS cargoes. It also determined, four to five weeks in advance, when RVN ports would become saturated. The TMA would then disseminate—on the basis of COMUSMACV determined priorities—the type and amount of cargo that would be withheld from intracoastal, CONUS, or PACOM shipment.

1. See "PACOM Joint Transportation Board" in Chapter I.
2. CINCPAC 042015Z May 66
Ready communications were maintained with the CINCPAC agencies and with in-country shippers and receivers to assure responsiveness to the variations in ship arrivals and port capabilities.

CHWTO's branch office in Yokohama controlled cargo movement from one PACOM port to another (excluding RVN intracoastal movements). He received cargo offerings concurrently with the MSTS Far East so priorities could be assigned if shipping requirements exceeded the receiving capabilities of a particular port. Within the limitation of a TMA monthly allocation of the RVN ports' receiving capabilities, CHWTO adjusted the flow of cargoes from PACOM ports. Before exceeding this allocation, he obtained TMA clearance. Additionally, CHWTO provided the TMA with projected shipments from PACOM ports; the goal of this projection was 45 days.

PAMPA, operating from Oakland in close proximity to the Western Area Military Traffic Management and Terminal Service (MTMTS), provided the TMA with a projection of shipments to each RVN port five weeks in advance. PAMPA adjusted the priorities of PACOM bound cargoes--giving full consideration to COMUSMACV's requirements--to assure that shipments did not exceed port receiving capabilities.¹

To reduce the time ships had to spend in hazardous waters, some military cargo ships were held in ports in Manila and Subic Bay and called forward to RVN ports when discharge berths were available.

Despite these controls and increased receiving capabilities in RVN ports, there were times when shipments exceeded receiving capability. When this happened, less urgent shipments were deferred to decrease port congestion. Ammunition and unit equipment received priority for shipment and utilization of port capabilities. These cargoes were sometimes generated simultaneously, and this caused surges in ship arrivals in RVN ports despite the best efforts of the ocean shipping control agencies. Additional problems were encountered in maintaining schedules when ships called at several ports enroute to the RVN.²

1. CINCPAC ltr 4620 ser 0542, Subj: Report of Conference on Control of Ocean Shipments, 4 Jun 66
2. Point Paper, J481, 5 Jan 67

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CONFIDENTIAL

The table compares performance for two six-month periods of 1966:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DEEP DRAFT VESSELS IN THE RVN, 1966</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Average Days in Each Port of Call</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January-June 11.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July-December 11.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966 Monthly Average 11.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Marine Corps Cargo Control**

During August and September a large backlog of Marine Corps cargo developed in Okinawa for shipment to the RVN. Recognizing FMFPAC's command requirements for timely delivery of high priority cargo items to the RVN, CINCPAC had CHWTO develop a support capability. CHWTO noted that some COMSEVENTHFLT ships were offered direct to FMFPAC(F) for opportune movement of Marine Corps cargo from Okinawa to Da Nang or Chu Lai. In some cases the cargo had not previously been offered to MSTS Far East and the cause of the backlog was the delay or cancellation of fleet ships. Further, some cargo booked by MSTS Far East was loaded on fleet ships without advance notice to the Commander, MSTS Far East or the CHWTO. This created an imbalance in the cargo flow.

To correct this situation, mutually agreeable procedure refinements were devised whereby the CHWTO provided representation to the COMSEVENTHFLT quarterly scheduling conferences; (2) the CHWTO requested SEVENTHFLT concurrence in the use of fleet ships between Okinawa and the RVN; and (3) fleet ships thus made available were cleared by the CHWTO and the Commander MSTS Far East against cargo previously offered by the 2d Logistical Command, which was the responsible shipper for Okinawa. This procedure was implemented late in 1966 and promised improved utilization of the total sealift resources.

1. CHWTO 130726Z Dec 66
Sealift

Shallow Draft

The in-country and intra-theater shipping requirements in support of the RVN continued to exceed ship capability throughout 1966. Multiple efforts failed to alleviate the situation, but at the end of the year there were brighter prospects for 1967.

Late in 1965 the Secretary of Defense had authorized a contract for the Alaska Barge and Transport, Inc. (AB&T) to provide intra-coastal shipping service in the RVN. The first of four AB&T flotillas (barges and tugs) departed CONUS on 16 January, and following enroute calls in Hawaii and Guam, closed at Nha Trang on 30 March. The fourth and final flotilla closed at Vung Tau on 7 May. By the end of April some of the AB&T tugs and barges were moving cargo between RVN ports. AB&T's 18 tugs and 31 barges were an appreciable asset to aid in compensating for the shortage of deep-draft berthing facilities along the RVN coast.

Late in the year, AB&T was authorized to hire two additional tugs and to continue seeking additional ocean tugs to enhance its tow capability. Also, MSTS had been requested to provide additional intra-theater and coastal sealift. Other relief for the shallow-draft ship shortage resulted from improved utilization of LSTs within RVN ports, and the completion of additional LST facilities at Newport helped Saigon operations.

Shipments of construction materials to the shallow-draft ports such as Phan Rang and Chu Lai lagged as much as three to four weeks behind desired schedules, but occasional shallow-draft augmentation from CINCPACFLT assets prevented work stoppages at construction sites.

Deep Draft

Roll-on-roll-off (RO-RO) service between Okinawa and the RVN expanded, and during the second half of the year USNS COMET

1. CINCPAC Command History, 1965, p 563
2. MSTS Saigon 080710Z May 66
3. CINCPAC 182036Z Oct 66
4. Point Paper, J481, 22 Nov 66
5. CINCPAC Command History, 1965, pp 534-535
and SS TRANSGLOBE were used for approximately 28,000 measurement tons of RO-RO cargo monthly to Saigon and Cam-Ranh Bay. Additional RO-RO service was established between Naha, Okinawa and Qui Nhon during September to meet increased requirements. This meant that much-needed LSTs were diverted from such tasks as delivering cement to Chu Lai and were scheduled every 15 days for the Naha-Qui Nhon route.

USNS TAURUS was assigned to Commander MSTS Far East in November and in conjunction with COMET and TRANSGLOBE it was possible thereafter to meet total RO-RO requirements with deep-draft ships designed for this purpose. This permitted returning the LSTs to shallow port operations.

At the end of the year it appeared that Western Pacific sealift movements might be leveling off, with a possible downward trend in 1967. A gradual change to direct CONUS-RVN shipments (vice Okinawa/Japan/Philippines/CONUS to the RVN) was already noticed. Other reductions in sealift movements to the RVN were expected to stem from the changeover to a pull system for items (as opposed to the push system which was based on estimates that were not wholly accurate), and identification by RVN stock points of on-hand supplies.¹

Future Requirements and Capabilities

The deep-draft shipping picture gave some grounds for optimism,² but any expansion of combat or logistics support at other than deep-draft port complexes—particularly in the Mekong Delta and I CTZ—would increase the demand for LSTs.³

Shallow-draft shipping requirements in support of the RVN were expected to continue to exceed ship availability. Also, the last two LSTs available for reactivation were scheduled to join the SEVENTH FLEET in March 1967, a prospect that added urgency to the effort to

¹ In the "push" system, items are supplied without a specific statement of the recipient's requirements. In the "pull" system, items are provided in response to a specific statement of requirements by the recipient.

² COMSTSF 150541Z Nov 66

³ CHWTO Semi-annual Report, 1 Jul 66-31 Dec 66

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ASSIGNED SEALIFT PACIFIC COMMAND

1. TAP at 6,500 Measurement Tons
2. TAK (Heavy Lift) at 17,350 Measurement Tons
3. TAP at 13,500 Measurement Tons
4. TAP at 2,700 Measurement Tons, 1,000 passengers
5. TAP in RRS 12 Status
6. CIC-MV at 4,500 Measurement Tons
7. TADU at 10,000 bale capacity
8. TAKV at 55-60 ACFT (total incl. 2 from MSTSCULF)
9. LSV (RO RO) capacity 500 x 1/2 ton trucks (total incl.
   2 MSTS LANT Ships)
10. LST at 5,000 Measurement Tons, 175 passengers. Total
    LST's consist of 36 LST's from MSTSF's nucleus
    fleet, 11 LANCHEPON 3 LST's, 4 GRC LST's and 1 THAI LST.

SOURCE: 148

SECRET
develop deep-water berths in RVN ports such as Vung Ro, Qui Nhon, and Vung Tau. ¹

**Container-Ship Service to PACOM Ports**

(²) The JCS initiated an investigation of the desirability of CONUS to RVN commercial container-ship service. COMUSMACV stated that he would be unable to exploit service earlier than September or October because of the lack of facilities, inadequate or insecure roads, and low bridge capacities in areas where the service would be useful. He further considered that the lead time required to program and construct facilities would preclude experimental operations at an earlier date.

(²) CINCPAC noted that several problems needed resolution before commencing the operation. Among those were the optimum container size, adaptability of containers for other than 25 to 30 foot trailers, truck transport requirements, and how best to use service from Okinawa to the RVN.

(³) This latter adaptation seemed to offer more immediate results, and a special meeting was held at Camp H. M. Smith on 21 and 22 March to determine the feasibility, desirability, and acceptability of the service. Military requirements were determined during the conference, and when CINCPAC had the applicable commanders review the report of the meeting, their comments favored container-ship service.²

(³) As subsequently directed by the JCS, the Commander MSTS successfully negotiated for service to Okinawa and the Philippines. An offer from Sea-Land Service Inc. was accepted,³ and service was inaugurated to Okinawa in August.⁴ After a delay caused by uncertainty as to the military containerized tonnage requirements for the Philippines, the contract for this service was also awarded to Sea-Land Service Inc. with a planned starting date of about 1 April 1967.⁵

(U) Two concepts of off-load--helicopter⁶ and conventional--were studied for the container-ship service to the RVN.⁷ Under the conventional system, Da Nang could accept no more than 18,000 measurement

1. Point Paper, J4821, 5 Jan 67
2. CINCPAC 062250Z Mar 66
3. COMSTS 252001Z May 66
4. CINCPAC 310032Z Aug 66
5. CINCPAC 110108Z Jul 66; COMSTS 232115Z Dec 66
6. CINCPAC ltr ser 2398, 25 Jun 66
7. CINCPAC 292020Z Aug 66
tons per month from two ships scheduled 15 days apart starting in late January 1967. For Saigon (Newport) and Cam Ranh Bay, a starting date of 15 April 1967 was established.¹

(U) In October, COMUSMACV advised that the port-depot complexes at Saigon, Cam Ranh Bay, Qui Nhon, and Da Nang could accommodate helicopter discharged containerized cargo in April 1967.²

(U) The JCS reported in December, however, that commercially owned helicopters would not be available prior to January 1968. In response to a JCS request, CINCPAC initiated a reassessment of the helicopter discharge requirement.³ While this was incomplete at the end of the year, it appeared that the helicopter concept might be justified on the basis of contingency requirements in Southeast Asia. Known discharge requirements alone would not justify it, however.

(U) The Commander, MSTS had meanwhile solicited bids for both helicopter and conventional off-load container-ship service. The bids for the conventional discharge system had been received and evaluated, and the contract award for this method was scheduled for January 1967.⁴

Ammunition Ships

(9) During 1965 the Air Force began using a few ships for floating munitions storage in RVN ports. These ships were unloaded selectively in response to ammunition requirements ashore, and by August 1966 this USAF fleet had grown to 19 ships. The Navy had also begun operating a four-ship system for its air munitions. These ships, Navy and Air Force, were not under MSTS control, and on 29 August the JCS solicited CINCPAC's views on the "private" fleets.⁵ After consulting his component and subordinate commanders,⁶ CINCPAC noted that the special fleets were of benefit to operations in the RVN. He nevertheless listed the following disadvantages of the existing system:

1. CINCPAC 282340Z Aug 66
2. COMUSMACV 021134Z Oct 66
3. CINCPAC 272232Z Dec 66
4. Point Paper, J4831, 5 Jan 67
5. JCS 1304/292121Z Aug 66
6. CINCPACFLT 182111Z Aug 66; CINCPACAF 49301/290319Z Aug 66; COMUSMACV 30940/031736Z Sep 66

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SECRET
1. Slow ship turnaround.
2. Less than full utilization of ship capacity.
3. Loss of the flexibility to use shipping in accordance with the needs of all users.
4. Disruption of port discharge workload.

CINCPAC recommended that a specific phase-out date for the ammunition fleets should not be established until after improvements were made ashore with respect to storage facilities and stock levels. He stated that he would later report the results of a reevaluation of stockage objectives and storage capacity with a view toward recommending a firm date for phase out.¹

By 19 November this reevaluation was completed and CINCPAC had a plan to remedy the situation.² He therefore recommended that more efficient use of shipping resources could be obtained through the following modifications in ammunition loading and shipping procedures:³

1. Return to MSTS control those ships assigned to the USN and USAF for ammunition shipments.
2. Load ammunition for a single port of discharge (POD), except permit two-POD loading of USAF munitions for RVN ports other than Nha Be and Cam Ranh Bay. The two-POD loadings were to be limited to cases where multi-Service loading would not provide a shipload for one POD.
3. Requisition under a pull vice a push system for all munitions except designated preferred items in short supply due to limited production.
4. Under PAMPA coordination, adjust the flow of ammunition ships to Southeast Asia on the basis of needs and receiving capability in the RVN.

CINCPAC's recommendations were approved and the loading to designated PODs was initiated on 5 December. All air munitions would thereafter be moved by MSTS-designated ships.⁴

The 24 December ammunition backlog (48,000 short tons) in RVN ports was well distributed at Nha Be, Cam Ranh Bay, and Qui Nhon. The backlog had declined in December, and the end of the year estimates indicated a flow of 202,000 measurement tons per month for January to

1. CINCPAC 070348Z Sep 66
2. CINCPAC 192351Z Oct 66
3. Point Paper, 74811, 22 Nov 66; CINCPAC 1921102Z Nov 66
4. CINCPAC 040514Z Jan 67
March 1967 in comparison to the 199,300 measurement tons of December 1966.

Airlift

Capabilities

(5) Theater airlift capability was viewed with increasing concern in April because of high priority moves of critical items (including ammunition); a rising tempo of fighting with an associated increase in tactical airlift support; and increased requirements in the Western Pacific for movement of ammunition and other material. Additionally, COMUSMACV continued to request augmentation of his airlift system.

(6) CINCPAC therefore requested that COMUSMACV and CHWTO work out a procedure wherein each recognized the PACOM-wide airlift situation, and that COMUSMACV identify tactical requirements so both he and CHWTO could clearly understand the urgency involved.\(^1\) Also, the airlift shortage was called to the attention of the JCS as a matter requiring immediate action, and CINCPAC requested that the PACOM be augmented with 3,000 to 5,000 C-130 flying hours for the balance of 1966.\(^2\)

(5) CINCPAC had earlier requested two additional C-130E squadrons for employment in the Western Pacific to meet the airlift requirements, but the Secretary of Defense had twice deferred deployment of these units. As a temporary expedient, however, the JCS augmented the Military Airlift Command (MAC) with 4,000 flying hours per month (2 CINCSTRIKE C-130 squadrons) for the 90-day period, 19 September to 18 December.\(^3\)

(6) CINCPAC meanwhile undertook to provide further justification for the additional airlift he had requested; the MAC augmentation was extended at CINCPAC's request.\(^4\)

(6) The questions of C-130 basing and responsiveness received repeated attention, with COMUSMACV advocating basing them in the RVN

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1. CINCPAC 302246Z Apr 66
2. CINCPAC 280822Z Apr 66; JCS 2692/272305Z Jan 66; CINCPAC 010321Z Feb 66; CINCPAC 290306Z Jan 66
3. JCS 2964/171429Z Sep 66
4. Point Paper, J482, 22 Nov 66; JCS 010001Z Dec 66
to improve their responsiveness to day-to-day requirements. When this question was again raised by COMUSMACV in October, CINCPAC reconsidered the matter to include objections raised by the CHWTO.\(^1\) CINCPAC afterward stated to the JCS that the existing arrangements for offshore basing and command and control should be continued. His main reasons were that this arrangement would result in more economy and effectiveness in the use of theater C-130 assets.\(^2\) At JCS request, CINCPAC also began to prepare a beddown plan for two C-130 squadrons in the RVN.\(^3\) On 5 November, however, the Secretary of Defense approved the concept of continuing to provide C-130 airlift in the RVN from offshore points.\(^4\)

**Passenger and Mail Route Additions**

(1) New MAC passenger (PAX) and mail channels from CONUS to the RVN were scheduled to begin operations early in November.\(^5\) These included CONUS to Cam Ranh Bay and CONUS to Bien Hoa (PAX/mail), and CONUS to Da Nang (mail only, PAX later).\(^6\)

(2) These additional channels were to be flown by commercial contract (charter) carrier service, but implementation was delayed because the GVN would not grant landing rights.\(^7\) CINCPAC's position was that the contract carrier service should be treated exactly the same as military flights, and he desired that the service commence early. On 14 November Ambassador Lodge personally requested Premier Ky's approval for the new service, and it was learned on 19 November that this was granted.\(^8\)

(3) At the end of the year the revised schedule was for inauguration of the CONUS to Bien Hoa, Cam Ranh Bay, and Da Nang passenger channels on 1 January 1967.\(^9\) Meanwhile, MAC had initiated direct mail and cargo channels from CONUS to Da Nang and to Cam Ranh Bay in late November.\(^10\)

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1. CHWTO 140806Z Oct 66; CINCPACAF 160545Z Oct 66
2. J4 History, Oct 66
3. JCS 6251/241910Z Oct 66
4. Point Paper, J4121, 30 Dec 66
5. MAC 53023/230051Z Sep 66; CINCPAC 200021Z Sep 66
6. CINCPAC 130410Z Apr 66
7. 616 MILALFSPTS SQ (RVN) 280146Z Oct 66
8. MAC 302359Z Nov 66
9. CINCPAC 090410Z Dec 66; MAC 021408Z Dec 66
10. CSAF 292141Z Nov 66

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PACIFIC SHIPPING ROUTES
315th AIR DIVISION

AUTHORISED AIRCRAFT
16 - C-47
192 - C-130 7 - C-118
### PACIFIC COMMAND INTRATHEATER AILFRIT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MONTH</th>
<th>FLYING HOURS UTILIZED</th>
<th>AIRLIFT ACCOMPLISHMENT</th>
<th>TOTAL UTILIZATION</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>BY WESTPAC TRANSPORTATION OFFICE</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>C-124</td>
<td>C-130</td>
<td>OTHER</td>
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<tr>
<td>DECEMBER 1965</td>
<td>1,289</td>
<td>12,818</td>
<td>1,127</td>
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<td>JANUARY 1966</td>
<td>1,288</td>
<td>12,872</td>
<td>1,114</td>
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<td>FEBRUARY 1966</td>
<td>1,130</td>
<td>13,646</td>
<td>866</td>
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<td>MARCH 1966</td>
<td>1,265</td>
<td>14,481</td>
<td>844</td>
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<td>APRIL 1966</td>
<td>1,253</td>
<td>14,800</td>
<td>925</td>
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<td>MAY 1966</td>
<td>1,321</td>
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<td>991</td>
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<td>JUNE 1966</td>
<td>1,268</td>
<td>13,586</td>
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<td>JULY 1966</td>
<td>1,316</td>
<td>16,814</td>
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<td>AUGUST 1966</td>
<td>1,340</td>
<td>17,633</td>
<td>1,297</td>
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<td>SEPTEMBER 1966</td>
<td>1,347</td>
<td>17,654</td>
<td>1,259</td>
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<tr>
<td>OCTOBER 1966</td>
<td>1,401</td>
<td>17,016</td>
<td>1,429</td>
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<tr>
<td>NOVEMBER 1966</td>
<td>1,367</td>
<td>17,474</td>
<td>1,481</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*MAR. NOT INCLUDED
#MAIL INCLUDED

SOURCE: J45
SEAPORTS AND BEACHES, SOUTHEAST ASIA

Responsibility for Operations, I CTZ

(1) The responsibility for operation of ports, beaches, and depots from Chu Lai north to the DMZ in the RVN was assigned to CINCPACFLT in early 1965. In January 1966 CINCPACFLT noted that construction of an Air Force airfield in the Hue area was contemplated. He therefore requested that CINCPAC designate the component commander responsible for operation of a secondary water terminal and logistics-over-the-shore (LOTS) capability necessary for support of the airfield.

(2) CINCPAC's February 1966 response amplified his earlier policy guidance, and assigned CINCPACFLT the responsibility for planning, programming, construction, and operation of port and beach facilities, depots, and ancillary facilities (including roads and bridges) in the I CTZ when these were external to the boundaries of an installation funded and operated by another component commander. COMUSMACV would designate the commander responsible for overall base development planning when a base was occupied by more than one Service. Facilities for individual Service use would be programmed and funded by the respective Service, and common support facilities were to be programmed and funded by the host commander or as directed by COMUSMACV.

(3) COMUSMACV and CINCPACFLT recommended that upon activation of COMNAVFORV, on 1 April, this new element be tasked with responsibility for the conduct of military logistics operations at ports and beaches and be responsible for planning and coordination of base development in I CTZ. CINCPAC approved this concept in late April. He modified these assignments in November by directing that in I CTZ the "users" were responsible for the distribution of supplies beyond base depots in the port area, and for other logistic support not assigned to COMNAVFORV.

Port Backlogs

(3) A shortage of terminal service units in the RVN restricted

1. CINCPAC 241945Z Apr 65; CINCPAC Command History, 1965, p 545
2. CINCPAC 220423Z Feb 66; J4 History, Feb 66
several barges at the end of the year. At Da Nang three new piers enabled the working of six deep-draft ships, and several LST ramps had been added. Two DeLong Piers and an ammunition pier had been added at Cam Ranh Bay; two DeLong Piers were installed at Qui Nhon. At Phan Rang and Vung Tau facilities utilized by the Alaska Barge and Transport Company were improved.

A comparison of the 1 July and 31 December daily capability at selected ports is shown below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Port</th>
<th>1 July</th>
<th>31 Dec</th>
<th>Increase in Daily Capability</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cam Ranh Bay</td>
<td>8,400</td>
<td>9,840</td>
<td>1,440</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Can Tho</td>
<td>840</td>
<td>840</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chu Lai</td>
<td>2,450</td>
<td>3,413</td>
<td>963</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Da Nang</td>
<td>6,750</td>
<td>12,450</td>
<td>5,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nha Be</td>
<td>1,875</td>
<td>1,875</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nha Trang</td>
<td>1,750</td>
<td>1,750</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phan Rang</td>
<td>375</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qui Nhon</td>
<td>5,600</td>
<td>6,880</td>
<td>1,280</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saigon</td>
<td>11,000</td>
<td>18,020</td>
<td>7,020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vung Tau</td>
<td>4,225</td>
<td>6,175</td>
<td>1,950</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>43,265</td>
<td>61,743</td>
<td>18,478</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Includes 6,100 AID capability
Percent Increase: 43

AID SUPPORT FROM MILITARY RESOURCES

Cargo Discharge Responsibility

The flow of Agency for International Development (AID) and commercial cargo was, for the most part, beyond the purview of military port operations at the beginning of the year. Nevertheless, the continued influx of this material was a significant consideration in maintaining the economic and political stability that would help military operations.

Late in April the White House and the JCS expressed concern about means of improving the flow of AID and commercial cargo. 3

1. COMUSMACV 111500Z Jul 6
2. COMUSMACV 120907Z Nov 66
3. JCS 9772/301539Z Apr 66, 1022/041916 May 66

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CINCPAC offered assistance and recommended that AID establish representation in the PAMPA. He also advised of a study in progress on the use of Vung Tau as the major transshipment point for AID and military supplies. 1

Further action related to expediting AID shipments included AID representation at a 12 and 13 May conference at Camp H. M. Smith on control of ocean shipments. During this meeting it was noted that the main difficulties regarding AID cargoes were the delays in getting cargo ashore, and the delay in moving it out of the warehouse once it was on shore.

To speed discharge, AID was to provide additional tugs, lighters, handling equipment, and transit sheds. Additionally, more US civilian port supervisors were to be hired, and it was planned to reorganize the local port labor market. To achieve faster cargo clearance, AID was undertaking to lengthen the work day, increase the number of customs inspectors and US civilian warehouse advisors, and obtain economic reforms and Government actions that would make it practical and profitable for importers to expedite the movement of cargo through the port.

Other approaches to the problem included: (1) establishment of an AID installation in CONUS to initially serve as a holding and reconsignment point, and later as a depot; (2) additional strengthening of logistic management within the AID; (3) shipment of more AID cargoes as "military essential"; and (4) where possible, arranging for military common supplies to be issued from military sources in Vietnam.

Initial AID emphasis was to be directed toward increased port throughput rather than control of shipments. This was deemed advisable because the AID supply system was not organized to the extent of the military system. For example, AID shipments were to 800 individual importers, who in turn had as many as 4,000 consignees.

Even so, it was concluded at the May conference that a significant amount of AID cargo was susceptible to control procedures. This was particularly significant since the magnitude of projected AID

1. CINCPAC 070810Z May 66

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shifting to the RVN suggested the development of an overall shortage of sealift despite the improving RVN port throughput capability.¹

(7) CINCPAC advised the interested parties that he was ready to assist in any orderly fashion and as circumstances permitted.² The Secretary of Defense subsequently directed that the military on 1 July assume responsibility for discharge and delivery to its first inland destination of AID Central Purchasing Authority cargo, estimated to comprise about 42 percent of AID tonnage. The military portion of the Saigon port thereafter handled increased tonnages of AID cargo, doing so without a significant increase in facilities.

(7) At the end of July the Secretary of State expressed concern over the backlog of cargoes in Saigon and suggested accelerated military takeover and reassessment of required resources.³ At the same time, COMUSMACV predicted a shortfall in the military-AID cargo discharge capability in the next nine months. CINCPAC concurred and requested that the JCS add $30 million ($20 million of this from AID) for Newport facilities to prevent some of the shortfall.⁴

(7) A Defense Department-AID agreement of 29 August formalized the arrangement whereby the military would integrate specified AID cargoes into the military transportation system, and MTMTS and MSTS would treat these as military shipments.⁵ The specified cargoes would be subject to movement controls similar to those for military shipments.⁶ It was estimated that AID shipments would amount to about 170,000 measurement tons monthly and would include some commodities not previously considered adaptable to receipt by the military.

(7) Tonnage that came within the scope of the agreement was basic to the planning of workload and resources necessary to do the job. Nevertheless, there was a significant lack of uniformity between the estimates in the agreement and those provided subsequently by AID, Washington and AID, Saigon.

1. CINCPAC ltr ser 0542, 4 Jun 66
2. CINCPAC 0708102, May 66
3. COMUSMACV 26300/301151Z Jul 66
4. CINCPAC 120321Z Aug 66
5. Ltr JCS SASM-445-66, 9 Sep 66, CPRS 194-66
6. CINCPAC 272226Z Sep 66; COMUSMACV 41976/181045Z Sep 66

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The shift of responsibility for discharge of AID cargo was not accomplished without some adverse impact on the amount of military cargo flowing through Saigon port facilities. Note the following tabulation for Saigon, which indicates that the increasing discharge of AID cargo was purchased by a corresponding decrease in military cargo discharged.¹

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Military Cargo</th>
<th>AID Cargo</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>128,000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>128,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>135,000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>135,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td>152,000</td>
<td>25,000</td>
<td>177,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August</td>
<td>133,000</td>
<td>38,000</td>
<td>171,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September</td>
<td>128,000</td>
<td>47,000</td>
<td>175,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Material Handling Equipment, Saigon

The Department of Defense's assumption of responsibility for movement of AID cargo² created a requirement for a substantial amount of additional cargo handling equipment by 1 March 1967 to meet a forecast AID workload at Saigon. Included were 185 fork lifts ranging in capacity from 4,000 to 15,000 pounds; about 40 cranes (20 truck-mounted) with 20-ton capacity; 19 tug boats; and 45 barges of 200 short ton capacity.³

When CINCPAC inquired about the requisition and delivery status of this equipment it was determined that CGUSARV had not in fact submitted requisitions because of problems associated with determination of source and funding. On 2 December CINCUSARPAC requested Department of the Army coordination with the AID to resolve these problems. The next day CINCPAC requested JCS assistance in expediting procurement or supply actions.⁴ The JCS response informed CINCPAC that the Department of the Army was responsible for programming, budgeting, and funding Saigon port operations in support of AID cargoes. Also, the Department of the Army was taking action to provide the additional equipment and would inform CINCPAC and CINCUSARPAC of details.⁵

1. Point Paper, J4126, 6 Oct 66
2. DOD/AID Agreement, Subj: DOD/AID Procedures for Military Transportation of AID Cargoes to Vietnam, 29 Aug 66
3. COMUSMACV 44123/040445Z Oct 66
4. CINCPAC 030503Z Dec 66
5. JCS SASM 1191/122238Z Dec 66
As of the end of 1966, neither CINCPAC nor CINCUSARPAC had received more information on this subject. It was expected that further JCS assistance might be necessary to insure priority of action commensurate with the urgency of the requirement.

Saigon Port, Planning for Military Takeover

In late 1966 the Secretary of Defense requested a contingency plan that would apply to a military takeover of the GVN civilian port at Saigon. The resulting COMUSMACV plan set forth a requirement for 4,837 military personnel plus trucks and material handling equipment that were not programmed. COMUSMACV recommended that the plan not be implemented. Such action, General Westmoreland emphasized, would only transfer problems from the port over to the warehouse area. The basic problem, he stated, was country-wide distribution of goods.

The most significant alternative proposed by COMUSMACV was to add to the number (then seven) of specified AID Commercial Import Program (CIP) commodities that could best be adapted to military handling.

CINCPAC supported COMUSMACV's recommendation that the plan not be implemented, and he recommended prompt action on the suggestion for military handling of additional AID-CIP commodities. The US Ambassador to Vietnam nonconcurred, however, and at the end of the year this subject was under close study by Embassy personnel in Saigon and by CINCPAC and COMUSMACV.

Meanwhile, the 24 December backlog of AID commercial cargo was reported at 249,000 short tons. This increased before the end of the year because the civilian stevedores in Saigon went on strike at 0900H 26 December. Work stopped completely in the military sector of the port proper, and partially stopped in the civilian sector. The striking union was demanding that the 288 stevedores employed on a temporary basis at Newport (not struck immediately) be retained despite the fact that they were no longer needed. Newport was a US military installation.

1. Point Paper, J422, 3 Jan 67
2. CINCPAC 312156Z Dec 66
3. SAIGON 14402/281102Z Dec 66
4. Point Paper, J481, 5 Jan 67
and the civilian stevedores had been used pending the arrival of sufficient US military personnel to handle unloading.

After giving the RVN's Secretary of State for Labor time to negotiate with the parties concerned, the US military commenced discharging the cargo at 0830H 27 December. Negotiations continued with the aim of getting the civilians to return to the stevedoring task, and the union was given assurance that the temporary employees would be given work by contractors or by the Army. 1

The strike was settled on the evening of 30 December, and PAMPA initiated restraining action in booking CONUS to Saigon cargoes in anticipation of the additional backlog stemming from the strike. During the strike 700 extra US military personnel were employed in handling cargo. 2

Integration of AID into the Military Logistics System

At White House request, an Inter-Agency Study Group was formed to study problems connected with logistic support of AID programs in Vietnam. The Group was headed by the Bureau of the Budget representative and had representation from AID, the Defense Department, and the General Services Agency. One Group recommendation was that the AID Vietnam and US military logistic systems should be further integrated. 3 Included were sub-recommendations on how to achieve this integration.

The sub-recommendations in which CINC PAC concurred and his supplemental comments, included the following:

1. Authorize AID to draw common construction supplies from military sources.

2. Coordinate AID procurement of common construction supplies with military procurements. Comment: A CINC PAC instruction provided for AID representation on the Vietnam General Purchasing Authority, and it encouraged all US purchasing agencies in a given country to participate in mutual purchasing arrangements.

3. The military should take over other RVN ports as it had in Saigon. Comment: An existing Defense Department-AID agreement for Procedures for Military Transportation of AID Cargoes

1. SAIGON 14408/281150Z Dec 66; COMUSMACV 260726Z, 270704Z, 290215Z Dec 66
2. COMUSMACV 310450Z Dec 66
3. JCS ltr S-3678, 20 Oct 66, CPRS 00587-66

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to Vietnam did not limit itself to Saigon and could be extended to other ports.

5. Military overseeing of port operations should be extended as necessary to avoid congestion of commercial cargoes.

6. AID should secure additional common use commodities from military sources in the RVN.

(S) Because AID lacked specific forecasts of requirements, CINCPAC was unable to address the total resources required to implement the above recommendations. He did not concur with the Group's sub-recommendation that AID-operated coastal vessels should be integrated with those operated by the military forces. He reasoned that this would inhibit the development of Vietnamese civilian coastal shipping capability and could generate national and international problems involving competition and control. Further, the fact that AID did not own the cargoes under discussion might give rise to many other problems involving law, politics, and management. Finally, it would be uneconomical to berth the smaller coastal vessels at the military berths designed for larger ships.

( ) Nor did CINCPAC concur in a Group sub-recommendation that the military should provide maintenance support of AID organic equipment in common with military equipment. The saturated military capability was already somewhat dependent upon maintenance support from contractors, and this was expected to continue. Additionally, this recommendation could not be properly assessed because of insufficient information concerning the number and types of AID equipment involved.

( ) As a final consideration, CINCPAC noted that the AID logistics functions would continue long after hostilities were ended, and overdependence on the military could expose AID programs to a severe logistics gap upon a reduction of the military effort in the RVN. ¹

**AID-Defense Department Program Realignments**

( ) On 30 November the Secretary of Defense issued a decision to the Secretaries of the military departments, the Chairman of the JCS, and the Director of the Defense Supply Agency providing that the Department of

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1. Point Paper, J4115, 4 Jan 67; J4 History, Nov 66
Defense would assume from AID the responsibility, retroactive to 1 July, for certain services that were appropriate functional responsibilities of the Defense Department. Each responsible Defense component was directed to take over specifically assigned functions and submit appropriate budget amendments.¹

Included in the 16 functions identified for Defense Department take-over were the following:

1. Integrate AID cargo into the military transportation system (Army-Defense Supply Agency).
2. Administer Saigon port (Army).
5. Air traffic control at non-military airports (Air Force).
6. Port and waterway rehabilitation and development (Army).
7. Military affairs with respect to Revolutionary Development and in support of civic action programs (Army).
8. Vietnamese television (Army).
9. Assistance to refugees displaced by military operations (Army).

¹ Neither CINCPAC nor the PACOM component commanders were given the opportunity to comment or recommend on the realignment prior to the time of the Secretary of Defense's decision. There had been extended discussions of related subjects, however.² After the decision, CINCPAC was asked by the JCS to comment on the impact these additional assignments would have on Program Four approved force levels, programmed construction, and piaster limitations.

(U) These problems were under study by CINCPAC and his component commanders at the end of the year.³

COMMON SUPPLY SYSTEM, RVN

(U) Under a 1965 concept a common supply system was to be developed for military forces in the RVN. CINCPAC's major consideration in

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1. JCS 2343/968, 30 Mar 66, CPRS 00705-66
2. See the preceding item, "Integration of AID into the Military Logistics System"
3. ADMINO CINCPAC 1623022 Dec 66; Point Paper, J4115, 4 Jan 67

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this matter was that there be no degradation in the effectiveness of logistic support for operations while the new system was being implemented.\(^1\)

One of the first moves leading to a single, integrated, Army-operated logistic system in support of all US-RVNAF-FWMAF Forces in the RVN began on 31 July 1965. At this time the 1st Logistical Command assumed responsibility for providing packaged POL (Class III) products. On 1 March 1966 the 1st Logistical Command relieved Headquarters Support Activity, Saigon (HSAS) of responsibility for supporting forces in the II, III, and IV CTZ of all Class I (subsistence) items and 3,500 common supply items in Classes II and III. Naval Support Activity, Da Nang continued to provide this support to forces in the I CTZ, however. Movement and other common logistic services between US forces in the RVN was on a common Service funding (non-reimbursable) basis.\(^2\)

One of the main issues in this action was, therefore, whether the Army controlled system would be extended to the I CTZ where logistic support was under Navy control.

CINCPAC stated in January 1966 that he agreed in principle with the Army plan for the common supply system, except that the Navy should continue to be responsible for determination of supply requirements and prescribing stock levels at Da Nang. He felt that the Army should be responsible for maintaining the prescribed stock levels necessary to support requirements of all other CTZs. COMUSMACV should resolve Navy-Army disagreement over redistribution of assets. CINCPAC further stated that the Navy responsibility for distributing supplies beyond the Da Nang base level should remain with the user and that the Navy should not be required to deliver supplies to units.\(^3\)

In July CINCPACFLT recommended a reevaluation of the Secretary of Defense's decision to shift to the Department of the Army plan for common supply support in I CTZ. He stated that the contemplated move would degrade the effectiveness of the existing Navy-operated system.\(^4\) CINCPAC recommended that the decision be reconsidered and that the responsibility for common supply in I CTZ remain primarily with

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1. JCSM-401-66, 11 May 66
2. Point Paper, J4223, Jan 66
3. J4 History, Jan 66
4. CINCPACFLT 062122Z Jul 66
the Navy. In response to a subsequent JCS request, CINCPAC stated that CINCPACFLT could support all augmentation forces that might be deployed to and operate in I CTZ within the context of the recommended deployment program.

In September CINCPAC was nevertheless directed to complete Phase 1 of the Army plan for a common supply system in the RVN with an adjustable target date of 1 January 1967. CINCPAC was to extend Army support in Class I (subsistence) items and the 3,500 common supply items in Classes II and IV to the Navy-operated segment of the system in I CTZ. Funding was to be on a cross-Service (reimbursable) basis.

During a CINCPAC-hosted 26 and 27 September conference, it was apparent that a firm date could not be established for extension, primarily because the Army had its hands full in providing adequate support in the other CTZs. On 12 December the Secretary of Defense stated in a memorandum to the Service Secretaries and the Chairman of the JCS that procedures had not been sufficiently developed to greatly expand the Army operated system or to extend it to the I CTZ. He provided the following directions and guidance: (1) development of "compatible" common supply systems for all CTZs by 1 April to facilitate the ultimate extension of the Army system to the I CTZ; (2) immediate addition of medical items in all of the RVN; (3) immediate phasing out of the Marine Corps pipeline of common supply system items, and complete reliance on the Naval Support Activity, Da Nang for those items; (4) addition of Defense Supply Agency, General Services Administration, and ATAC items to the system by 30 September 1967; (5) immediate cross-Service (reimbursable) issues to and from depots in the RVN with subsequent issues on a common-Service (non-reimbursable) basis; and (6) Army development of a revised plan by 31 March 1967 to incorporate the above guidance.

The Secretary of Defense also stated that implementation would be through the Service Secretaries and military departments without JCS involvement. CINCPAC therefore did not anticipate being directly involved.

1. CINCPAC 232132Z Jul 66
2. CINCPAC 050431Z Aug 66
3. JCS 7473/312343Z Mar 66
4. J4 History, Sep 66
in implementation, but he would coordinate procedures when necessary to assure continuity of support.\(^1\)

**MUNITIONS**

**Air and Ground Munitions Stocks**

\(\text{\textbf{(T)}}\) The intensified Southeast Asia air operations of mid-1965 caused significant strain on PACOM resources of air munitions. On several occasions it was necessary to utilize scarce aircraft to redistribute available stocks, and the PACOM Service components loaned items to each other in an effort to obtain temporary relief. The air munitions inventory reached a low point in June 1966 when almost every one of the 44 controlled air items used was in critically short supply. There were problems in ground munitions also, though these were less severe. The following material gives the details of these problems, and the actions that by the end of 1966 had vastly improved the situation.

\(\text{\textbf{(T)}}\) CINCPAC had informed the JCS in June 1965 that inter-Service loans would only temporarily ease the air munitions situation; after indicating that ammunition requirements would increase, he requested expedited action to resolve the shortages.\(^2\)

\(\text{\textbf{(T)}}\) In January 1966 CINCPAC specified by types the Southeast Asia munitions requirements and requested confirmation of bomb availability. These requirements were further refined and forwarded to the JCS in February to facilitate a review of assets and the distribution of individual weapons. Concurrently, airlift was being absorbed by the need to transfer component parts to meet immediate requirements.\(^3\) But as of the end of the first week in April, CINCPAC had not been appraised of the results of Pentagon analysis of this study.

\(\text{\textbf{(T)}}\) General Westmoreland on 8 April 1966 advised CINCPAC and the Chairman of the JCS that the USAF aircraft munitions status in Southeast Asia had reached what he considered to be an emergency situation. He stated that immediate extraordinary action was needed to prevent serious degradation of the air strike capability throughout Southeast Asia. COMUSMACV further stated that all feasible actions had

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1. Point Paper, J4223, Jan 66
2. CINCPAC 132200Z Aug 65
3. CINCPAC 122305Z Feb 66
been taken within Southeast Asia to alleviate the shortages. As an example, he cited 940 sorties of intra-theater airlift during the first quarter of the year to distribute and redistribute available munitions to meet strike-base requirements.

(T) The primary causes for the shortages were cited by General Westmoreland. First, allocated munitions had not arrived as scheduled; second, civil disturbances at Da Nang delayed off-loading of a ship with critically needed components necessary to make complete rounds. The off-loading was completed only after the ship was moved to Qui Nhon, and the components were subsequently airlifted to Da Nang. This combination of causative factors resulted in the cancellation or non-scheduling of 233 strike sorties between 4 and 7 April; and on 8 April, 134 available sorties were not used for lack of proper munitions. The effectiveness of the strike sorties actually executed was reduced by other concessions with respect to selection of weapons for specific targets.

(T) The Secretary of Defense expressed shock at the evidence of maldistribution of air ordnance and requested that Mr. Paul Ignatius, his Assistant Secretary for Installations and Logistics, plus representatives of the Service Secretaries meet with members of the COMUSMACV and CINCPAC staffs in Honolulu to initiate action to assure supplies of munitions. Secretary McNamara specifically wanted Lieutenant General Joseph H. Moore, 7th Air Force commander, to be present at the conference. Additionally, CINCPAC invited the PACOM component commanders to attend the conference to discuss all facets of the theater ammunition stocks.

(T) CINCPAC's comments on the ammunition shortage invited attention to his actions of June 1965 and January 1966 (discussed above), and he emphasized that previous small ammunition allocations had

1. COMUSMACV 12200/080826Z Apr 66
2. SECDEF DEF 8036/081853Z Apr 66
3. SECDEF DEF 8038/082013Z Apr 66; SECDEF DEF 8039/082014Z Apr 66
4. CINCPAC 090109Z Apr 66
precluded buildup of base and depot stocks to either authorized or acceptable levels. He noted that the problem was further aggravated by shipments of bombs without related components in some instances, and by the lack of flexibility inherent in the rigid JCS-Departmental allocation systems.

(7B) Remedial actions recommended by CINCPAC were the establishment of employment limitations as necessary to insure availability until sufficient quantities became available, and positioning in Southeast Asia the maximum amounts of munitions. In connection with the munitions conference, CINCPAC emphasized the need for the conferees from Washington to bring with them to Honolulu firm data pertaining to the total ammunition available for PACOM.¹

(7F) The Chairman of the JCS meanwhile advised that the Southeast Asia air munitions problem was being addressed in two phases. For the immediate phase, CINCPAC was authorized to divert and commit to operations in support of Southeast Asia, for the use of any of his component commanders, any appropriate air munitions resources in PACOM without regard to ownership. This authority was intended as a temporary measure and specifically applied to reserves held in Korea for support of US Forces. CINCPAC elected to retain this authority, although the JCS had authorized him to delegate it to COMUSMACV and COMUSMACVTHAI.²

(7G) By a later amendment, the JCS directed CINCPAC to:
(1) establish base operating stock levels to be maintained by his components and CINCSAC forces in PACOM; (2) establish consumption rates consistent with available munitions; and (3) adjust tasks and missions for his components and CINCSAC ARC LIGHT forces accordingly.³ By direction of the Secretary of Defense, first priority in Southeast Asia was to be given to fulfilling requirements for operations against the targets that General Westmoreland called the "extended battlefield."⁴

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1. CINCPAC 090941Z Apr 66
2. JCS 0837/081946Z Apr 66
3. JCS 8558/142345Z Apr 66
4. SECDEF 8689/162229Z Apr 66

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(T/4) The April Honolulu conference would address the longer-
range aspects of the air munitions problem. At that time various
options would be developed after a detailed matching of requirements
with available assets and production.  

(T/4) To conserve ordnance, CINCPACAF directed that the 7th
Air Force commander adhere to the philosophy of optimum ordnance
loading per sortie as opposed to attainment of programmed sortie rates.  
Even so, munitions-ordnance shortages caused cancellation of 515 USAF
combat sorties for the 11 to 14 April period.  

(T/8) The Air Munitions Conference took place 11 and 12 April as
scheduled. Considerable delay was encountered in assembling valid
production and asset data, a development that inhibited the allocation
of munitions among the users. Anticipating early completion of this
task, however, the Secretary of Defense released significant Navy and
Air Force assets in CONUS and authorized transporting them in premium
ships, if available; otherwise combatant ships or other fleet assets were
to be requested from the JCS.  

(T/S) CINCPAC immediately requested that complete rounds of
all ammunition made available be shipped to the Western Pacific pending
determination of specific destinations following an imminent allocations
conference. The JCS concurred and directed the Chief of Naval Opera-
tions and the Air Force Chief of Staff to comply with CINCPAC's ship-
ing request. The Navy reacted promptly and within two weeks most
of their newly released assets were moving to port, with the first ship
due to berth on 2 May.  

(T/4) After a delay, the Air Force Chief of Staff directed movement
of some CONUS assets to port, but this was soon stopped and the Air

1. JCS 0837/081946Z Apr 66
2. CINCPACAF 30167/090429Z Apr 66
3. CINCPAC 100040Z Apr 66; CINCPAC 151441Z Apr 66
4. CINCPAC 172110Z, 180453Z, 180454Z Apr 66
5. CINCPAC 162102Z, 200720Z Apr 66
6. SECDEF 8584/151629Z, 8616/152115Z Apr 66
7. CINCPAC 160619Z Apr 66
8. JCS 868/162102Z Apr 66
9. SPCC MECH 291117Z Apr 66
10. CSAF AFSSS 84248/211519Z Apr 66
Force Logistics Center (AFLC) was instructed to take no action until separate instructions were forwarded later. The AFLC, meanwhile, was to continue the programmed and scheduled movement of ammunition. Accordingly, by the end of the month the Air Force's CONUS assets released by the Secretary of Defense for PACOM use were no closer to the area of operational need.

(T5) Urgency was nevertheless demonstrated by priority action taken between the Air Force Chief of Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations to transfer 10,000 MK-15 fins from Subic Bay to Cam Ranh Bay and Phan Rang. CINCPAC soon afterward directed the transfer of 1,000 MK-81, 1,000 MK-82, and 400 M-65 bombs from CINCPACFLT to Air Force units at Da Nang.

(T5) On 22 April CINCPAC denied a CINCPACAF request of 16 April to withdraw war reserve munitions from Korea for use in Southeast Asia. CINCPAC estimated that the stock under discussion would meet operational requirements in Southeast Asia for only a few days, but more important considerations were the probable adverse political reaction plus the risk involved.

(T5) Pursuant to the April Air Munitions Conference, significant effort had been directed toward calculating total 1966 assets on the basis of theater stocks, assets made available by the Secretary of Defense, munitions production, and "enroute" stocks. The assembled data contained many variables that could generate inaccuracies in this total, but it was decided to proceed with allocations while recognizing a probable need for adjustment of the asset figures. By 24 April assets had been compared to operational requirements, and CINCPAC advised all concerned of tentative allocations. Redistribution actions were also undertaken in consonance with these allocations.

1. CSAF AFSSS 84883/231734Z Apr 66
2. CINCPACAF DMS 44084/160353Z Apr 66
3. CINCPAC 190945Z Apr 66
4. CINCPAC 222345Z Apr 66
5. CINCPAC 242154Z Apr 66. An 18 April allocations conference was only marginally productive because of incomplete production and asset data from higher authority.
6. CINCPAC 262110Z, 262142Z Apr 66
By 29 April more definitive allocations were prepared. In these, discrete quantities of each type of ammunition were allocated by month to each user for expenditure and for stock.\footnote{The magnitude of the redistribution problem is apparent from the accompanying table entitled "Air Munitions Redistribution."\footnote{Accurate asset information proved extremely elusive despite extensive research and critical analysis. For example, the CONUS assets made available to CINCPAC in April had, by the end of May, fluctuated by some 24,000 tons from a high of 114,000 tons to a low of 90,000 tons. As mid-1966 approached there had been significant progress toward development and assembly of validated asset data, and this promised to aid future planning.}}

CINCPAC concluded, however, that a determination of the realistic capability to support ammunition allocations must recognize the factors affecting munitions availability, e.g., the inaccuracies inherent in the highly dynamic munitions inventories and in production schedules, and the responsiveness of the logistic support system.

By the end of May there were signs of an improved munitions situation, but there remained a persistent shortage of components needed to assemble complete rounds. The accompanying table, "Ammunition Rounds on Hand, Complete and Incomplete," compares the situation of the various users as of the beginning of May and June. Note that the difficulty was associated almost exclusively with USAF-supported items.

Air munitions continued to be a major problem requiring a continual shift of assets to match components and major items, and to find suitable substitutes for the task at hand. By September there were definite signs of improvement, with total munitions receipts up 24 percent while expenditures increased only 2 percent. However, the stock of many items was still reported to higher authority as critical.\footnote{CINCPAC 290220Z, 290221Z, 290223Z, 290255Z Apr 66; J4 History, Apr 66\footnote{CINCPAC 042013Z, 060540Z, 070440Z, 070441Z, 110533Z, 112246Z, 112245Z, 212314Z, 252343Z May 66\footnote{J4 History, May 66\footnote{CINCPAC 270000Z Sep 66}}}
## AIR MUNITIONS REDISTRIBUTION

**May 1966**

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<td>MK-65 1,000 lb General Purpose Bombs</td>
<td>3,835</td>
<td>PACFLT</td>
<td>PACAF</td>
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<tr>
<td>MK-81 250 lb General Purpose Bombs</td>
<td>2,400 (All)</td>
<td>VNAF</td>
<td>PACFLT</td>
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<tr>
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## AMMUNITION ROUNDS ON HAND, COMPLETE AND INCOMPLETE

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<td></td>
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<td>PACFLT</td>
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At the same time, a CINCUSARPAC report cited a total of 29 ground munitions items that would reach a zero or near zero stock balance in Southeast Asia by February 1967. CINCPAC requested that the JCS have the Department of the Army take immediate action to direct worldwide assets to Southeast Asia and to adjust production allocations of the 29 critical items to provide maximum amounts for combat forces in the RVN.

One move to improve the air munitions situation was to take ZUNI rockets from CINCLANT assets ashore to meet CINCPAC requirements. In November the JCS recommended the ZUNI and some other items for removal from the automatic push resupply system to the pull system for PACOM. CINCPAC did not concur with respect to the ZUNI and some other items, but he agreed that there were specific munitions that could be transferred to the pull system.

Another improvement recognized in November was that the overall incomplete round situation had declined from a 1 June level of 39 percent to a 31 October level of 5.9 percent. Laotian munition stocks were moving in the opposite direction, however, reaching a level of 43 percent incomplete rounds by November.

During November there was a reduction of 3,072 in the number of incomplete rounds, leaving a theater balance of 7,433 at the end of the month. This advance was primarily due to the receipt of MAU 93-B fins for the MK-82s in SAC, and fins (F-585 and F-590) and fuzes (F-949 and F-970) for the M-57, M-84/88, M-30, and M-64 bombs in MAP stocks. Additionally, airlift and surface transport had been used to complete the BLU type fire bombs with initiator assemblies, cable assemblies, and fuzes.

Less encouraging was a report that 4,368 incomplete M-117 bombs were being shipped to Guam where all required components,

1. CINCUSARPAC 100726Z Sep 66
2. CINCPAC 160400Z Sep 66
3. CNO 261240Z Sep 66
4. JCS 7703/102321Z Nov 66
5. CINCPAC 190145Z Nov 66
6. Point Paper, J471, 21 Nov 66
except lugs, were on hand. SAC stated that CONUS agencies had been shipping MK-4 lugs as a standard M-117 component, but only the MK-6 lugs were usable for B-52 operations.\(^1\) CINCPAC thereon requested that the OOA MA (Ogden Air Materiel Agency) schedule the production and shipping of MK-6 lugs in consonance with M-117 bomb production for SAC.\(^2\)

\(^1\) Redistribution of munitions components continued through December and reduced the size of the incomplete-bomb stock. The most critical incomplete munition at the end of the year was the MK-82 bomb, but the anticipated get-well date for this was January 1967.

\(^2\) Occasional signs of overloaded storage facilities in Southeast Asia began appearing late in the year. This situation was attributed to under-expenditure with respect to component commanders' stated requirements and to shortened pipeline time plus improving production. CINCPAC initiated action to divert to other theater storage locations the ammunition that was excess to the requirements in Southeast Asia.\(^3\)

\(^3\) Excesses of some items in the Laos and South Vietnam inventories also appeared, primarily due to the push system of supply and to expenditures below forecast levels. To remedy this, shipment of certain items was withheld and fire bombs were taken out of the push system.\(^4\)

\(^4\) In December the munitions situation was such that CINCPAC recommended removal of some previously critical items (MK-24 flares, 20mm M-61, and MK-81 bombs) from the automatic resupply system.\(^5\)

\(^5\) About the middle of December the JCS authorized CINCPAC to also allocate the available stocks of critical ground munitions in PACOM. Only six items were in this category at the time, but CINCPAC was authorized to add and delete items on this list. The Department of the Army was to furnish monthly forecasts of six-month availability of critical items, and on the basis of reports from PACOM commanders

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1. SAC GUAM 9960SW Andersen 070435Z Nov 66
2. CINCPAC 090313Z Nov 66
3. J4 History, Nov 66
4. JCS 151412Z Nov 66
5. CINCPAC 080132Z Dec 66; J4 History, Dec 66

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CINCPAC was to furnish the Department of the Army with the desired allocations each month. This procedure was to be effective with the January 1967 production.  

Additionally, a CINCUSARPAC-hosted ground munitions conference was scheduled for 11 to 14 January 1967 to be attended by representatives from CONUS and PACOM commands and agencies. The agenda included stockage objectives, supply rates, and availability forecasts of ground munitions.

At the end of the year the most critical PACOM munitions items were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AIR</th>
<th>GROUND</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2.75&quot; rockets, unscarfed</td>
<td>Cartridges:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M-117 750-lb bomb</td>
<td>5.56mm ball</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5&quot; ZUNI rocket</td>
<td>60mm HE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBU-2, dispenser and bombs</td>
<td>60mm illuminating</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBU-12, dispenser and bombs</td>
<td>81mm HE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBU-24, dispenser and bombs</td>
<td>81mm illuminating</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AGM-45C SHRIKE</td>
<td>105mm HE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AGM-12C (VT fused, Navy only)</td>
<td>4.2&quot; HE</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Indications were that CINCPAC would have to allocate ground and air munitions well into 1967 since the production base did not appear capable of achieving a significant improvement with respect to several of the above listed items.

Air Munitions for the Military Assistance Program

On 24 January 1966 the Air Force Chief of Staff announced what was termed an equitable allocation of air munitions to the MA Program. The allocations had been established after a MAP munitions conference in which assets were analyzed and compared to requirements. Laos was allocated a total of 5,040 bomb units monthly, computed on the basis of 40 aircraft at 21 sorties per month.

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1. JCS 1625/162332Z Dec 66; CINCPAC 242241Z Dec 66
2. CINCUSARPAC 150012Z Dec 66
3. CINCPAC 040514Z Jan 67
4. See "Heavy Bomb Allocation Considerations for 1967" elsewhere in this Chapter.
5. CSAF AFSSS 85850/241531Z Jan 66
Fire bombs and cluster incendiaries were included in the Laos allotment, but Ambassador Sullivan soon noted that Washington specifically prohibited the employment of fire bombs in Laos, and he stated that the cluster incendiaries were not an effective weapon against deeply entrenched troops. The Ambassador therefore equated the allotment to 3,400 bombs of the preferred types and warned that a rationing program would have to be instituted within the RLAF if the preferred bombs were not made available. The Air Force Chief of Staff soon advised that 5,000 additional 500-pound general purpose bombs would be redistributed from Taiwan to Laos, and an additional 7,485 bombs would be provided from Europe.

Before these items became available, Laos borrowed 2,200 500-pound bombs from Thailand. Despite a Laos desire to repay the Thai as soon as possible, CINCPAC determined that since the RTAF was over its authorized level of bombs, the repay transfer should be deferred until the Laos stock position reached a more favorable level. Meanwhile, action was initiated that transferred fire bombs and cluster incendiaries from Laos stocks to Vietnam.

CONTINGENCY STOCKS DIVERTED TO SOUTH VIETNAM

Soon after the January deployment conference the Department of the Army judged it advisable to increase, on an urgent basis, the stock levels of the depots in the RVN. The most immediate sources were the contingency stocks of the Department of the Army's Forward Depot (DAFD) and Forward Floating Depot (DAFFD). The locations and purposes of these were as follows:

**DAFD Section I (Okinawa):** Equipment and supplies for an infantry brigade base and a brigade task force of two infantry battalions and a tank battalion.

**DAFD Section II (Khorat):** Equipment and supplies for one infantry brigade task force base consisting of two infantry battalions and one mechanized battalion.

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1. VIENTIANE 493/050700Z Feb 66
2. CSAF AFSSSC 88860/082051Z Feb 66
3. CINCPAC 120406Z, 200101Z Feb 66; J4 History, Feb 66

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DAFFD (aboard three ships at Subic Bay): Equipment and supplies for a brigade task force of two infantry battalions.

By early February, the Department of the Army was withdrawing stocks from both sections of the DAFFD and using them to support requirements in Vietnam. The PACOM capability to meet other contingencies was downgraded by these drawdowns. In consideration of the possibility of expanding operations into Thailand, however, the Army authorized only minimum withdrawals from Section II, and these were to be replenished within 180 days or less.¹

DAFFD stocks were to be off-loaded as the ships underwent annual overhaul in Japan (one each in March, April, and May). The equipment and supplies thus released would be fed into the regular supply pipeline, and the ships would be released for MSTS use pending the assembly of replenishment stocks.²

CINCPAC monitored, through CINCUSARPAC, the drawdowns and replacement of DAFFD and DAFFD stocks.³

**CONTRACTOR SUPPORT**

**Terminal Service Support**

At the beginning of 1966 there was a broad range of military terminal support requirements in South Vietnam that could not be met because of shortages of certain types of units or equipment within the active US Forces structure. As a matter of policy, CINCPAC preferred that military logistic units, if available, perform these tasks. He directed, however, that contractual services should be obtained if military units could not be made available on a timely basis.⁴

In the face of an urgent need to increase port throughput and transportation capabilities in South Vietnam, arrangements were completed for US and Korean civilian contractors to provide services as follows:

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1. DA 750280/092354Z Feb 66
2. DA 753104/022303Z Mar 66
3. CINCPAC 240000Z Feb 66
4. CINCPAC 290525Z Mar 66
Qui Nhon

Port handling services: The Han Jin Transportation Company of Seoul, Korea to perform stevedore functions and handle the discharge and transfer of cargo. The initial estimated capability of 1,000 short tons per day was to increase to 2,000 per day by 25 June.

Beach clearance and local haul: The Han Jin Transportation Company to provide the vehicles and the drivers, management, and supervisory and maintenance personnel. The initial capability was to be 50 trucks, increasing to 75 8-ton trucks plus 25 6-ton trucks.

Nha Trang

Port and beach clearance and local haul: The Alaska Barge and Transport Company to establish an estimated capability of 21,000 short tons per month with the capability of doubling this if required.

Vung Tau

Alaska Barge and Transport to provide the same capability as at Nha Trang by 30 March, plus full terminal service operations by 30 April.

Da Nang

The Han Jin Transportation Company to establish stevedoring services to handle 1,600 short tons daily, with the capability to expand operations in August.

Saigon

Equipment Rental, Incorporated, Division of Sea-Land Services, Incorporated, to provide cargo handling into and out of the Saigon port and point-to-point within the RVN. The contractor was to provide and utilize 200 new US-manufactured heavy-duty gasoline-powered trucks, each with a capacity of 10 long tons. The contractor was also responsible for maintenance and repair, procurement and stocking of repair parts and tools, and erection and maintenance of shops and other structures. Performance was to begin with 100 trucks available for call within 4 months, and increase to 200 within 5 months. ¹

¹ J4 History, Jan-Mar 66

CONFIDENTIAL
Petroleum, Oil, and Lubricants

(U) The contractural coverage of Southeast Asia POL requirements was reviewed during a 14 to 17 November conference at Camp H. M. Smith. Attending were representatives of CINCPAC, COMUSMACV, COMUSMACTHAI, the Defense Fuel Supply Center, the MSTS, the Navy Fuel Supply Office, the US Army Petroleum Center, and the ESSO, Shell, and CALTEX Companies. The following paragraphs consider the significant problems discussed at the conference and the actions related thereto.

(U) One problem was the advance notice period the contractors required before the Government could pick up cargoes at the contractor's Singapore terminal. After discussions, it was concluded that the contractors would meet emergency military requirements in small quantities and that arrangements through the local contractor representatives would be the best method of handling this. Additionally, after definite provisions for product quality control responsibilities were included in the contract, the contractors agreed to handle Government products through their terminals.

(U) Commercial terminals sometimes held stock levels that appeared dangerously low in terms of potential military requirements. As a remedial measure, the industry would be encouraged to maintain maximum inventories through their own resources and, as an alternative, would be requested to allow resupply by MSTS when stock levels neared what the Sub-Area Petroleum Officer determined to be the critical point.

(U) MSTS tankers were hard pressed to meet requirements, but procedures to be implemented on 1 January 1967 would result in more effective and economical use of these assets. After that date, commercial sources would be primarily responsible for supplying Nha Be and Da Nang. MSTS would support Cam Ranh Bay and Sattahip, to include shuttle runs from Sasebo, Japan. Sasebo would also provide emergency backup to meet changing requirements, thus reducing the frequency of tanker diversions for this purpose.¹

¹ J4 History, Nov 66
SECRET

VIETNAM SUPPORT EXPEDITING TASK FORCE (FLAG POLE)

(Ο) On 15 August the Secretary of Defense advised that the Vietnam Support Expediting Task Force was being disestablished and that FLAG POLE reports to him were to be discontinued.¹ CINCPAC considered that the FLAG POLE system had been significant in resolving critical problems. Additionally, he believed that the system would continue to provide an effective means of emphasizing those critical matters that required Washington-level action. He therefore decided to retain the system among the JCS, CINCPAC, COMUSMACV, COMUSMACTHAI, DEPCHJUSMAGTHAI, and the component commanders.²

(Ο) On 15 September CINCPAC revised procedures for the continuing FLAG POLE system. The significant modifications included deleting the Secretary of Defense as an addressee on the report, and starting the reporting cycle on the 1st rather than the 20th day of the month.³

KOREAN PROPOSAL FOR LOGISTIC SERVICE CORPS

(Ο) When Korea's Minister of National Defense Kim visited Washington in June, he proposed that a paramilitary Korean service force be established for rear area duty in South Vietnam. Without committing the US Government, Secretary McNamara suggested that Kim work out the details and forward a plan on the subject.

(C) CINCPAC received the preliminary plan for a Korean Logistic Service Corps (KLSC) in October. He later concluded that the proposal was too expensive—due in part to proposed exorbitant pay and allowance scales—but that there were alternatives that should be further considered.

(Ο) The first of these was a KLSC consisting of Republic of Korea Forces, Vietnam (ROKFV) personnel discharged in South Vietnam and to be used in support of ROKFV only. The second alternative was for

1. SECDEF ASD(A) 9127/151924Z Aug 66
2. CINCPAC 070251Z Sep 66
3. CINCPAC 152210Z Sep 66

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what became known as a Korean Civic Action Corps (KCAC), also composed of ex-ROKFV personnel, but organized and equipped to assist in the Revolutionary Development Program. Both concepts were predicated on acceptance of the existing ROKFV pay and allowance scales in lieu of the previous Korean proposal.

Apparently Ambassador Lodge and the State Department favored both the KLSC and KCAC because they would increase Korean participation in the RVN. On 24 December CINCPAC stated to the JCS that he did not recommend the KLSC because it would have minimal potential military and political value. On the other hand, he viewed the KCAC alternative as having significant potential in both of these fields. Even so, Admiral Sharp did not believe that either the KLSC or KCAC would replace any significant number of US logistic units or personnel.

Because of the already substantial Korean participation in the RVN, however, Admiral Sharp thought that the major US emphasis probably should be on broadening the base of Free World participation. Of the alternatives under consideration, he therefore recommended the KCAC. He qualified this, however, by noting that a small-scale field trial should be prerequisite to formal US acceptance of the idea. As of the end of the year there had been no response by the JCS or the Secretary of Defense.

1. CINCPAC 240201Z Dec 66
2. Point Paper, J5331, 3 Jan 67
SECTION H - ADDITIONAL INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

(U) This Section addresses only those intelligence activities directly related to Southeast Asia and not covered elsewhere under the "Operations" portion of the History.

MAPPING, CHARTING, TARGETING ACTIVITIES

Map and Chart Requirements

(U) The Joint Operations Graphic (JOG), a 1:250,000 scale multipurpose graphic that was produced in ground, air, and radar versions, was often the subject of CINCPAC staff interest and effort in 1966. A common base was used for all versions, and the map series lent itself to the application of numerous special purpose overprintings to meet specific requirements, particularly tactical requirements in Southeast Asia.

(U) Early in the year CINCPAC proposed certain revisions to the air and ground versions of the JOG that were adopted and implemented by CONUS map producing agencies. CINCPAC continued testing and evaluating the JOG-R (Radar) for the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) to determine whether it could replace the 1:200,000 Air Target Chart for certain geographic areas. The JOG-R, which depicted radar return images and target information, could be produced more economically and rapidly than the target chart because the base map was already available. In October, DIA announced plans for JOG-R production.

(U) In May, CINCPAC proposed that the JOGs be used as the preferred sources of target coordinates for the Southeast Asia Target

1. Proposed revisions were adopted at the Annual Air Target Materials Conference in Washington on 23-25 February 1966. Status of implementation of the specification changes was discussed at the Mapping, Charting, and Geodesy Key Personnel Conference in Washington on 15-17 March. CINCPAC representatives attended both conferences. (J2 History, Feb-Mar 66)
2. J2 History, Apr 66
3. J2 History, Oct 66
Data Inventory rather than Air Target Charts. The JOGs were accepted as the primary reference for combat operations in Southeast Asia, as they presented detailed definition and were more suitable for joint tactical operations and development of target materials.

(1) CINCPAC tasked CINCUSARPAC in August to produce new Lines of Communication Linear Segment graphics to be overprinted on the JOG base. The graphics were revisions of the previously published Route Reconnaissance Graphics.

(2) On the recommendation of COMUSMACV and CINCPAC, CONUS map producing agencies in September were scheduling the over-printing of the South Vietnam DECCA navigation system lattice on appropriate JOG-A (Air) charts.

(3) As a result of a command survey of TACAN user needs, CINCPAC recommended to DIA in November that all JOG-A charts on areas of Laos and North and South Vietnam that were covered by the new TACAN network be appropriately overprinted. He also recommended overprinting TACAN data on selected Vietnamese 1:50,000 scale topographic maps.

(4) Still another navigation system was installed in Southeast Asia in 1966. Installation of the LORAN network increased the urgency of the need for production of charts with LORAN data portrayed on a suitable scale base. CINCPAC representatives stressed this requirement at a DIA Mapping, Charting, and Geodesy Conference in Washington on 20-27 October. No decision on production of this chart series had been made at the end of the year.

(5) Special operational maps that portrayed inland waterways and coastal data were required in South Vietnam. CINCPAC validated and forwarded the requirement in June to DIA, who subsequently agreed to revise 1:25,000 scale pictomaps, incorporating all available hydrographic

1. The proposal was submitted to the DIA sponsored Unified and Specified Commands 1966 Target Intelligence Conference at Orlando AFB on 16-20 May. The conferees concurred.
2. J2 History, Aug 66
3. J2 History, Sep 66
information on the coastal areas and the Mekong Delta waterways. Production priorities were determined by the CINCPAC staff and furnished to DIA. The first maps were completed in October.

Map Base Data Collection

CINCPAC formulated plans for extensive data acquisition programs in Southeast Asia. Requirements for aerial mapping photography of South Vietnam were satisfied in 1966 by efforts of the Navy Heavy Photographic Squadron 61 (VAP-61), which operated under CINCPAC guidance and CINCPACFLT direction. This squadron was then tasked to cover portions of Laos and Thailand; certain other areas of Southeast Asia were being covered by CINCSAC.

Hydrographic data was urgently needed, particularly on the Mekong Delta and coastal areas of South Vietnam. By August all of the Navy's coastal hydrographic survey ships were in PACOM. In late September, a CINCPAC conference coordinated hydrographic survey ship operations, established a collection priority list, and arranged for in-country support of the ships.

As a result of in-country discussion by CINCPAC's MC&G representative with the commands concerned, CINCPAC validated a collection effort for hydrographic data in the waterways of the Mekong Delta to support proposed Mekong Delta Mobile Afloat Force operations. This supplemented an RDT&E requirement for a small-boat positioning system for survey and navigation in the delta area, initiated by CINCPAC and passed to the DIA in November.

Pictomaps and Photomaps

Publication of pictomaps for South Vietnam was completed by the Army Map Service by June 1966, on schedule. The 1:25,000 scale pictomap coverage had been proposed by CINCPAC and approved at a joint CINCPAC-DIA conference at CINCPAC Headquarters in November 1965. Pictomaps were image enhanced photo mosaics with

1. J2 History, Jun 66
2. J2 History, Apr 66
3. J2 History, Aug 66
4. J2 History, Sep 66
5. J2 History, Nov 65

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contours and grid overprinted, and lines of communications and other cultural features annotated. Ground forces who used the maps in Vietnam had high praise for them. COMUSMACV and CINCPAC wanted pictomap and photomap coverage of parts of Laos and North Vietnam, but investigation in August revealed that recent aerial cartographic photography was not available on certain of those areas and its acquisition would be too dangerous in proportion to its value.

When COMUSMACV was advised of the unfeasibility of producing full coverage by these products, he reiterated his need. DIA was then asked to consider having photomaps produced by the Air Force's Aeronautical Chart and Information Center, using available materials and some new photography being acquired, but DIA responded negatively. This production problem was still being studied by CINCPAC's staff at the end of the year.

Mapping Exchange Agreement With Cambodia

The United States had a formal mapping exchange agreement with Cambodia. The 1957 agreement specified that the United States would furnish 200 copies of every US-published map of Cambodia, plus reproduction materials. When diplomatic relations with the United States were broken by Cambodia in May 1965, CINCPAC suspended map shipments pending guidance from Washington. In July 1965 the Secretary of Defense stated that annulment or suspension of the agreement was not in the best interests of the United States and proposed that shipments be resumed. CINCPAC's reply recommended that limited shipments of maps that contained little militarily significant data be furnished to Cambodia, but that maps depicting sensitive data be delayed. The Secretary concurred and asked CINCPAC to identify the sensitive areas. CINCPAC said they included international boundaries, the Mekong River, Tonle Sap, and important roads, railroads, airfields, and urban areas. He emphasized that supplying military maps to Cambodia could be 'inimical to US interests.' The Secretary again concurred.

1. J2 History, Aug 66
2. CINCPAC 140533Z Aug 65
3. OSD 172143Z Aug 65
4. CINCPAC 242304Z Aug 65
5. OSD 302210Z Aug 65
that time, Cambodia was furnished three to five map sheets of non-sensitive areas per month. Cambodia, however, continued through various channels to try to get all maps that were produced. In September 1966 DIA asked CINCPAC to confirm his previous position on the release matter.\(^1\) CINCPAC reiterated his position and pointed out that at the current release rate all non-sensitive map sheets would be provided to Cambodia by early 1968.\(^2\)

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1. DIA 232152Z Sep 66
2. CINCPAC 052234Z Oct 66
SECTION I - US PERSONNEL, SOUTHEAST ASIA

REST AND RECUPERATION FOR US FORCES IN THE RVN

At the beginning of 1966, four rest and recuperation (R&R) sites were in use with the following numbers of personnel authorized to visit in those cities at one time:  

- Bangkok: 500
- Hong Kong: 300
- Taipei: 300
- Tokyo: 200

Initially, military aircraft were used to support this program, but in January the JCS authorized use of Military Airlift Command commercial contract carriers. Commercial contract airlift was used thereafter to support all sites except Manila, which was one of the newly approved R&R sites added in 1966.

Despite significant problems, there was a continuing expansion in the number and capacity of R&R sites during the year. Although Hong Kong was being used at the beginning of 1966, it was not utilized at maximum capacity because the government was concerned about the reaction of the Chinese to an increased US presence. The average daily quota was increased to 510 in May, but only after plans were made to reduce the number of US military flights and the number of combat-configured aircraft flying into Hong Kong.

Following the resolution of customs and aircraft clearance difficulties, R&R to Manila began in January utilizing military aircraft. Initially, about 136 R&R personnel were in the city at one time, while at the same time it was being used extensively as a pass and leave area for Navy and Air Force personnel. With this combined load, hotel capacity

1. ADMINO CINCPAC 251919Z Jan 66; CINCPAC Command History, 1965, pp 590-594
2. JCS 9808/042141Z Jan 66; MAC 04731/052000Z Feb 66; J1 History, Feb 66
3. AMCONGEN HONG KONG 200756Z Apr 66
4. USDAO HONG KONG 090818Z May 66; CINCPAC 072339Z May 66
5. CINCPAC 042144Z May 66; CINCPAC 240332Z May 66
6. COMUSMACV 030944Z Jan 66

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was strained and expansion of the R&R program was slowed pending the completion of new facilities. The pressure on Manila hotel facilities further increased by the overflow crowds descending on the city for the October conference of the Heads of State from the nations participating in the war in Vietnam.  

In January the Government of Singapore expressed a desire to have Singapore utilized as an R&R site. Following a February visit to Singapore by CINCPAC's Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Assistance, Logistics, and Administration, arrangements were completed so that the first R&R group was well received when it reached the city on 31 March. The initial daily rate was 166 personnel.

After resolving jurisdictional problems with respect to R&R personnel in Taiwan, the full utilization of this site was authorized 17 April.

Plans were made for utilization of Kuala Lumpur and Penang in Malaysia as R&R sites, with a small initial quota (83) that would increase to 166 by mid-July. No further increase was to be accomplished until after this level of operations was evaluated. The first group arrived in June and although there were some demonstrations, there were no incidents involving US personnel or property. The public and press generally expressed disapproval of the demonstrators.

The critical need to effect gold flow savings overrode initial objections to using Hawaii as an R&R site. Accordingly, the first group arrived on 3 August, and the program continued throughout the year with an average daily quota of 165.

1. COMUSMACV 080645Z Oct 66
2. USDAO SINGAPORE 110835Z Jan 66
3. AMCONSUL SINGAPORE 010429Z Apr 66
4. COMUSTDC 140202Z Apr 66; CINCPAC 170134Z Apr 66
5. CINCPAC 092123Z May 66
6. J1 History, May 66; AMEMB KUALA LUMPUR: 060610Z, 150957Z, and 181630Z Apr 66; AMEMB KUALA LUMPUR 050440Z May 66; CINCPAC 092123Z May 66; COMUSMACV 101913Z May 66
7. COMUSMACV 12548/111214Z Apr 66; CINCPAC 240733Z Apr 66; JCS 241507Z May 66; JCS 270352Z May 66; CINCUSARPAC 280028Z May 66; CINCPACAF 290049Z May 66; COMUSMACV 300340Z May 66
To insure that the minimum objective, 250,000 R&R trips, was completed during FY 67, the maximum numbers of personnel authorized to visit at one time were:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>1 Nov 66</th>
<th>1 Jan 67</th>
<th>1 Apr 67</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bangkok</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>747</td>
<td>747</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hong Kong</td>
<td>580</td>
<td>747</td>
<td>830</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Hawaii</td>
<td>628</td>
<td>942</td>
<td>1,570</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Guam was designated a limited R & R site beginning 1 January 1967 for servicemen of Guamanian origin.

To insure that the capability would exist to meet FY 68 requirements, CINCPAC requested JCS approval to implement a tenth operational R&R site in Australia on 1 July 1967.

Jurisdictional status over R&R personnel became an issue of significance as several additional countries were added to the list of authorized sites. This resulted in a diversity of jurisdictional arrangements and agreements as follows:

1. JCS 4625/061934Z Oct 66
3. JCS 212204Z Nov 66; JCS JRS 8487/212204Z Nov 66; CINCPAC 230115Z Dec 66.
4. CINCPAC 300340Z Dec 66
Thailand: It was determined that the immunities extended to all USMACTHAI personnel by an exchange of letters between the US Ambassador to Thailand and the Thai Minister of Defense did not extend to R&R personnel. Consequently, they were mere tourists, subject in all respects to Thai jurisdiction. It was anticipated that Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) negotiations would provide coverage for these personnel in the future.

Hong Kong: No special agreement existed regarding R&R personnel. Therefore they were subject to Hong Kong's civil and criminal laws. The US requested that the Government of Hong Kong confer jurisdiction on British military police to apprehend and detain US military personnel in protective custody until they could be transferred to US control under the authority of the Visiting Forces Act of 1952. This was necessary because the US did not have sufficient military police personnel in Hong Kong for this purpose. As of the end of the year, no reply had been received.

Kuala Lumpur and Singapore: By an exchange of letters with the Governments of Malaysia and Singapore, it was agreed that R&R personnel were tourists and therefore subject to local laws, with local police having full power of arrest and detention for law violators. For minor violations, however, the offender was to be turned over to US authorities who would arrange for his expeditious return to Vietnam. A Department of Defense directive announced a policy "to protect to the maximum extent possible, the rights of United States personnel who may be subject to criminal trial by foreign countries," and to avoid undesirable legal and political consequences that could follow if servicemen were tried by courts of these countries. CINCPAC therefore recommended to the JCS that the following agreement be substituted for the existing arrangement: "The US may exercise exclusive criminal jurisdiction over the men except that favorable consideration will be accorded any request by the Singapore (Malaysian) Government for waiver of such jurisdiction in cases considered by it to be of particular importance." No change resulted from this recommendation.

1. COMUSMACTHAI 291030Z Oct 65
2. STATE 28879/162015Z Aug 66; HONG KONG 2071/200945Z Sep 66
3. 5525.1, Subj: Status of Forces Policies and Information, 20 Jan 66
4. CINCPAC 180010Z Jun 66
Republic of China: By special agreement, R&R personnel visiting China were provided coverage under the SOFA. To accomplish this, the United States delivered a letter to the Chinese Government stating that while these personnel were in China they were subject to the authority of US military commanders in the Taiwan Defense Command in the event it became necessary to invoke the provisions of Article V of the US-Republic of China Mutual Defense Treaty.¹

Japan: R&R personnel in Japan were "members of the United States Armed Forces" as that term was defined in the SOFA, and as such they were to be treated on the same basis as US Forces stationed in Japan.

Philippines: Article XIII of the Military Bases Agreement of 1947, as revised 10 August 1965, embodied the standard SOFA jurisdiction provisions, but it also provided in Agreed Minute 1 that primary jurisdiction would extend only to regularly assigned military personnel or those present in the Philippines in connection with the presence of US bases. An unclassified and unpublished letter from the Philippine Secretary of Foreign Affairs, however, expressed his understanding that all military personnel present in the Philippines in accordance with military orders, including travel orders, leave orders, and leave authorizations, were included in the term "present in the Philippines in connection with the presence there of the United States Bases."²

AWARDS AND DECORATIONS, LAOS AND THAILAND

(U) In July a letter was received from the Joint Army, Navy, Air Force Attaches in Laos requesting authority for personnel serving there to be awarded the Armed Forces Expeditionary Medal.³ In October, CINCPAC requested JCS authority to award the medal to personnel stationed in Laos after 1 January 1966.⁴ By the end of the year no reply had been received.

¹ STATE DEFENSE 3768/051702Z Feb 66
² J73/Memo/0010-67, 20 Mar 67, on file in CINCPAC History Branch
³ Ltr JANAF Attaches, Laos, S/NF-77-66, "Award of the Armed Forces Expeditionary Medal," 13 Jul 66
⁴ CINCPAC 272034Z Oct 66

781
(U) In October, COMUSMACVTHAI requested authority to award the Armed Forces Expeditionary Medal to personnel who had served in Thailand since 15 May 1962.\(^1\) This request was under review by CINCPAC at the end of the year.

**USMACV TOUR EXTENSION PLAN**

(\(3\)) COMUSMACV recommended a minimum tour of two years be established for a limited number of selected officers who were occupying his key command, staff, and advisory positions. This was based upon the requirement for command and staff continuity and increased stability in the USMACV organization, which was considered necessary to pursue more effectively the long-range goals and objectives of the military effort and civil programs in the RVN. For the morale and welfare of those officers concerned, and their families, it was recommended that provisions be made either for a leave in the United States midway through their tours, or locating their families in areas that would afford the opportunity for occasional short visits.\(^2\) CINCPAC strongly supported the proposal, recommending that the extended tour criteria accommodate 200 senior officers and that conceptual approval be granted for the relocation of selected dependents to the Manila area.\(^3\)

(\(5\)) The Secretary of Defense approved the COMUSMACV recommendation in October. In response to a JCS request,\(^4\) CINCPAC asked that COMUSMACV provide a time-phased plan for the tour length extension. A summary of initial planning factors was provided.\(^5\)

(\(7\)) In December, the Secretary of Defense approved construction of 100 units of family quarters at Clark Air Base in the Philippines for the families of the key officers designated by COMUSMACV for extended tours. Completion of the first unit was scheduled for 1 June 1967.\(^6\)

---

1. COMUSMACVTHAI ltr MACTCS, "Award of the Armed Forces Expeditionary Medal to US Forces in Thailand," 17 Oct 66
2. COMUSMACV 22142/281324Z Jun 66
3. CINCPAC 092325Z Jul 66
4. JCS 6157/212133Z Oct 66
5. CINCPAC 020719Z Nov 66
6. SECDEF 1830/201931Z Dec 66
CINCPAC requested that COMUSMACV prepare a family phase-in schedule, in coordination with the Commanding General, 13th Air Force and the CINCPACREP Philippines, based upon the availability of housing and furnishings at Clark Air Base. This had not been received by CINCPAC at the end of the year.

FREE WORLD MILITARY ASSISTANCE FORCES INSIGNIA

In October 1965 a joint State and Defense Department proposal was submitted to CINCPAC and COMUSMACV suggesting that a distinctive shoulder patch insignia be designed for wear by all Free World Military Assistance Force (FWMAF) personnel in the RVN. The purpose of the insignia was to provide an identifying device that would show all military and civilian personnel in the RVN that the FWMAF made up one team, fighting for a common cause.

The proposed design of the insignia was submitted by COMUSMACV for wear as a pocket patch. The insignia was adopted for wear by all FWMAF except Australia. The RVNAF limited wear of the insignia by Vietnamese to those individuals involved in direct support of FWMAF, i.e., interpreters, liaison personnel, and members of the FWMAF Working Council. The Secretary of Defense approved wear of the insignia by US military personnel in June 1966 and initiated action to supply 500,000 pocket patches.

AUTOMOBILE SALES IN ARMY AND AIR FORCE EXCHANGES, VIETNAM

CINCPAC and COMUSMACV recommended that the JCS take action to remove the excise tax from the automobiles being sold through the Army and Air Force Exchange Service, Vietnam. This measure was designed to reduce gold flow and to reduce piaster expenditures by US military personnel, thereby deterring inflation in the RVN. On 29 July the JCS advised that staffing of this recommendation as a bill for submission to Congress was nearly complete. The status of this recommendation had not changed at year's end.

1. CINCPAC 240236Z Dec 66
2. STATE/DEFENSE 1004/121945Z Oct 65
3. COMUSMACV ltr MACJ1 ser 1200, 15 Feb 66
4. JCS 5581/292056Z Jun 66
5. CINCPAC 290532Z Apr 66
6. JCS 7911/292116Z Jul 66
SAVINGS PROGRAM, PL 89-538

(1) When the JCS requested recommendations for means of curbing inflation in the RVN, COMUSMACV and CINCPAC submitted recommendations that included the establishment of an incentive interest rate of 10 percent on the Soldiers Deposits Program. This was approved, and on 1 September the existing Savings Deposits Programs for all Services were replaced by the new savings program (Public Law 89-538) with an interest rate of 10 percent.

PRISONERS OF WAR

(1) The International Red Cross in 1965 had taken the position that North and South Vietnam, the Viet Cong, and the United States were bound by the 1949 Geneva Conventions with respect to prisoners of war, and that it should be permitted to fulfill its role under the Conventions. The GVN, however, was reluctant to consider the Viet Cong anything but "insurgents and criminals" and felt that declaring the Conventions applicable would boost the international status of the Viet Cong.

(1) The GVN was receptive to measures to improve the treatment of captives, and on 13 August 1965 the United States informed the International Red Cross in Geneva that we were applying the provisions of the Conventions and that we expected the other parties to the conflict to do likewise. It was further cited that the United States was developing plans to aid the RVN in improving facilities and treatment of captives. Other parties to the Conventions included Australia and New Zealand. Progress was slow through the end of 1965.

(1) Early in 1966 there were indications that North Vietnam might be taking the position that US prisoners were war criminals. The JCS requested CINCPAC's comments on a concept for improvement of the US posture relative to enemy prisoners in the RVN. Basically this

1. JCS 9463/282306Z Dec 65
2. CINCPAC 202140Z Jan 66
3. STATE to SAIGON 2948/180213Z Jun 65
4. SAIGON to STATE 4356/240445Z Jun 65
5. STATE to SAIGON 407/122319Z Aug 65
6. Point Paper, J73A, 14 Aug 65
7. CINCPAC COMMAND CENTER Briefing Notes, 12 Feb 66
proposal called for a coordinated US-RVNAF-FWMAF prisoner of war program concerned with integrated procedures relative to processing, disposition, utilization, and treatment required for compliance with the Geneva Conventions and encompassing all persons (including insurgents, terrorists, etc.) held captive. The RVNAF would retain physical custody of all captives taken by the United States, but the United States was to be afforded the right to determine the standard of treatment of its captives, to have equal voice in the formulation and implementation of policies, and to have inspection authority over such captives. These points were to be incorporated into a covering agreement to be negotiated by the United States with the GVN through the RVNAF Joint General Staff. ¹

(6) CINCPAC endorsed this general concept, but cited reservations about negotiating such a comprehensive plan, as the action would be governed largely by deepseated GVN emotions. ² Having been asked for his views, COMUSMACV also concurred in the general concept but noted and concurred in Ambassador Lodge's strong feeling that any attempt to conclude a formal agreement with the GVN on this subject would be counterproductive. ³ CINCPAC then expressed to the JCS his view that the COMUSMACV-US Ambassador position soundly appraised the resultant situation if the United States were to insist on a formal agreement with the GVN on this matter. ⁴

(7) In April 1966, the State Department issued guidelines for determining prisoner of war status of various prisoner groups falling into US hands in Vietnam. ⁵ These provided that: (1) as the United States was responsible under the Conventions to insure that prisoners transferred to the GVN received proper treatment, the United States had the concomitant responsibility for requesting return of prisoners if the Conventions were being violated by the GVN; (2) the United States would initially determine whether a prisoner was entitled to prisoner of war status under the Conventions; and (3) if doubt existed as to the status of the individual, an independent US tribunal would determine the matter before the prisoner was transferred to the GVN. ⁶

1. JCS 1489/122318Z Jan 66
2. CINCPAC 140255Z Jan 66
3. COMUSMACV 01783 MACJ-1/190018Z Jan 66
4. CINCPAC 250010Z Jan 66
5. STATE to SAIGON 3152/220110Z Apr 66
6. COMUSMACV 271355Z Apr 66
In early June, North Vietnam began emphasizing that captured US pilots were regarded as war criminals and indicated that they would be brought to trial as such. US prisoners were paraded through the streets of Hanoi and subjected to ridicule and abuse in violation of the Conventions. To forestall any trials, CINCPAC proposed to the JCS that a strenuous and widespread diplomatic effort be initiated to alert Hanoi to the dire consequences of their proposed acts, and suggested the use of reprisals by the United States should our pilots be tried and executed. CINCPAC's views were passed to the Defense and State Departments. Pronouncements by Vice President Hubert Humphrey, many Senators, US Ambassador to the United Nations Arthur Goldberg and UN Secretary General U Thant followed, deploring in advance any trial of US prisoners. North Vietnam quickly modified its position and indications were that there would be no so-called war crimes trials.

On 1 July, 19 North Vietnamese prisoners were captured at sea by US Navy Forces and were retained aboard USS CAVALIER (APA-37) and USS RENVILLE (APA-227). In handling these prisoners, difficulties arose in applying some Geneva Convention provisions, especially Article 22, which required that prisoners of war be interned on land. As that requirement related to the place of permanent internment, however, and as CAVALIER and RENVILLE served merely as temporary transit stations pending completion of a shore prisoner of war facility, no violation of Article 22 was considered to have occurred. Other Articles of the Convention were substantially complied with and no complaints were made regarding the confinement of the prisoners afloat.

1. SAIGON to STATE 5549/150930Z Jun 66; SAIGON to STATE 5391/081700Z Jun 66; SAIGON to STATE 693/111100Z Jul 66
2. CINCPAC 150411Z Jul 66
3. JCS 161645Z Jul 66
4. SAIGON to STATE 1883/251230Z Jul 66; SAIGON to STATE 1929/260930Z Jul 66; State Circular 17513/290255Z Jul 66
5. CTF 77 to NMCC 011244Z Jul 66
6. CAVALIER 311520Z Jul 66
 Allegations of physical violence during interrogation were made by several enlisted prisoners to representatives of the International Red Cross. On 12 August CINCPAC issued guidance on steps to be taken to answer the complaints of physical violence and on the extent of permissible interrogation of the prisoners. Detailed sworn statements were requested (to preserve the record) from the Captain, USS CAVALIER, the head of the Exploitation Team, interpreters, and others as appropriate. On completion of shore facilities, all prisoners were transferred ashore on 7 and 8 September.

Two of the prisoners had been injured before capture and plans were made for repatriating them, in accordance with Articles 109 and 110, but this was not completed during 1966. In association with the Christmas truce period, there were proposals to repatriate sick and wounded prisoners of war. CINCPAC recommended to the JCS, however, that such a release be in response to a clear prior agreement with the enemy rather than on a unilateral basis.

Identification and reporting of prisoners of war was another matter of CINCPAC interest because of an apparently distorted or misleading picture of the total actually captured. Despite multiple efforts, this problem had not been resolved at the end of the year.

SPECIAL PAY FOR DUTY SUBJECT TO HOSTILE FIRE (SPDHF)

Recognizing the inequitable SPDHF treatment accorded Thai-based versus RVN-based air-crews, CINCPAC recommended to the JCS that Laos be redesignated as a hostile fire area. Laos was so redesignated in February by the JCS, with the hostile fire pay to be retroactive to 1 January 1966.

1. CAVALIER 040805Z Aug 66
2. CINCPAC 120012Z Aug 66
3. COMUSMACV 100852Z Sep 66
4. SAIGON to STATE 576/090725Z Jul 66; STATE to SAIGON 8531/152203Z Jul 66; STATE to SAIGON 22143/060225Z Aug 66; STATE to SAIGON 36812/272157Z Aug 66; CINCPAC 230821Z Jul 66
5. CINCPAC 091630Z Dec 66
6. CINCPAC 311952Z Oct 66
8. CINCPAC Command History, 1965, p 586; CINCPAC 230821Z Jan 66
9. SECDEF 2929/021702Z Feb 66; CINCPAC Instruction 7220.5A, 10 Jan 66
CASUALTIES, 1966

(U) The numbers of US military personnel killed, wounded, and missing in action in Southeast Asia are indicated in the accompanying tables.

MISSING OR DETAINED US PERSONNEL
Probable Status as of 31 December 1966

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Service</th>
<th>Possibly Held by</th>
<th>North Vietnam</th>
<th>Communist China</th>
<th>Unknown</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>Viet Cong</td>
<td>58</td>
<td></td>
<td>13</td>
<td>71</td>
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<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>91</td>
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<td>104</td>
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<tr>
<td>USMC</td>
<td></td>
<td>37</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAF</td>
<td></td>
<td>56</td>
<td>171</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>291</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>151</strong></td>
<td><strong>266</strong></td>
<td><strong>1</strong></td>
<td><strong>518</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

JOINT PERSONNEL RECOVERY CENTER

(U) The idea of a joint agency to recover US military personnel from the enemy in Southeast Asia originated in 1965. After lengthy discussions of organization, command relationships, and other details, a Joint Personnel Recovery Center (JPRC) was established in South Vietnam on 16 September 1966. The purpose of the JPRC was to establish and maintain a capability for personnel recovery operations that would be conducted subsequent to the termination of the search and rescue effort.

(U) COMUSMACV was the coordinating authority for operations in North and South Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, and Thailand. He was responsible for conducting these operations with assigned forces, augmented as necessary from CINCPAC resources. The JPRC was operational at an early date, on a limited basis at first but improving gradually as additional personnel and equipment were obtained. Several operations were conducted before the end of the year.

1. CINCPAC Command History 1965, pp 586-587
2. CINCPAC 270016Z Apr 66; CINCPAC 260028Z Apr 66
3. CINCPAC 160232Z Sep 66
### Missing in Action

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Jan</th>
<th>Feb</th>
<th>Mar</th>
<th>Apr</th>
<th>May</th>
<th>Jun</th>
<th>Jul</th>
<th>Aug</th>
<th>Sep</th>
<th>Oct</th>
<th>Nov</th>
<th>Dec</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>330</td>
<td>351</td>
<td>274</td>
<td>308</td>
<td>380</td>
<td>342</td>
<td>260</td>
<td>360</td>
<td>3975</td>
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</table>

**10 Coast Guard via**

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<th>Feb</th>
<th>Mar</th>
<th>Apr</th>
<th>May</th>
<th>Jun</th>
<th>Jul</th>
<th>Aug</th>
<th>Sep</th>
<th>Oct</th>
<th>Nov</th>
<th>Dec</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>2612</td>
<td>2689</td>
<td>2492</td>
<td>2270</td>
<td>2839</td>
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<td>2270</td>
<td>2839</td>
<td>2689</td>
<td>2492</td>
<td>29565</td>
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### Wounded in Action

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<th>Month</th>
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<th>Feb</th>
<th>Mar</th>
<th>Apr</th>
<th>May</th>
<th>Jun</th>
<th>Jul</th>
<th>Aug</th>
<th>Sep</th>
<th>Oct</th>
<th>Nov</th>
<th>Dec</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>319</td>
<td>495</td>
<td>346</td>
<td>324</td>
<td>234</td>
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<td>324</td>
<td>234</td>
<td>495</td>
<td>346</td>
<td>324</td>
<td>1271</td>
</tr>
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</table>

**3 Coast Guard via**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Jan</th>
<th>Feb</th>
<th>Mar</th>
<th>Apr</th>
<th>May</th>
<th>Jun</th>
<th>Jul</th>
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<th>Oct</th>
<th>Nov</th>
<th>Dec</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>312</td>
<td>225</td>
<td>324</td>
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<td>495</td>
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<td>324</td>
<td>234</td>
<td>495</td>
<td>346</td>
<td>324</td>
<td>234</td>
<td>1271</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Killed in Action

**As of Dec 31, 1966**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Jan</th>
<th>Feb</th>
<th>Mar</th>
<th>Apr</th>
<th>May</th>
<th>Jun</th>
<th>Jul</th>
<th>Aug</th>
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<th>Oct</th>
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<th>Dec</th>
<th>Total</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
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<td>225</td>
<td>324</td>
<td>234</td>
<td>495</td>
<td>346</td>
<td>324</td>
<td>234</td>
<td>495</td>
<td>346</td>
<td>324</td>
<td>234</td>
<td>1271</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
TRANSFER OF MORTUARY RESPONSIBILITIES

(U) As agreed upon by CINCPAC's component commanders, CINCPACAF (the commander, 13th Air Force) had the responsibility for mortuary services in all Southeast Asian countries until 1966. As the United States became more involved in South Vietnam, and as the majority of fatalities were Army personnel, CINCPACAF requested that this responsibility be transferred to the Army. The Department of the Army and COMUSMACV concurred, but since this action concerned the transfer of property, it had to receive JCS approval. After this was obtained, CINCUSARPAC assumed mortuary responsibilities in Vietnam effective 1 July 1966.

SENTINEL OFFENSES

(U) In January CINCPAC became convinced that, in light of the war in Vietnam, the Uniform Code of Military Justice did not provide adequate punishment for sentinel offenses (Article 113). The specified punishment for such offenses was limited to dishonorable discharge, total forfeitures, and confinement at hard labor for one year. It was determined that a stronger deterrent to forestall such offenses was needed, notwithstanding the fact that the majority of personnel on duty in the RVN did not require the fear of severe punishment to fulfill their duty.

(U) To clearly demonstrate the seriousness with which this type of offense was viewed, and as a deterrent to irresponsible individuals, CINCPAC recommended to the JCS that action be taken to retain the dishonorable discharge and total forfeiture provisions of Article 113, but to increase the maximum confinement at hard labor to 10 years for violations in an area then designated for the award of hostile fire pay.

(U) On 2 December 1966 the President signed an Executive Order amending the Manual for Courts-Martial, United States 1951 to reflect the changes recommended by CINCPAC.

------------------------------------------------------------------------
1. USARPAC Reg 638-40, PACAF Reg 143-4, CINCPACFLT INST 5361.3A, and FMFPAC Order 53N.2A
2. JCS 1289/102307Z Jan 66
3. CINCPAC 142013Z Jan 66; CINCUSARPAC 230512Z Jun 66
4. CINCPAC 120246Z Feb 66
5. JCS 082207Z Dec 66
December was 425,057.

The total force in both South Vietnam and Thailand was as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Units</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>34,889</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marine Corps</td>
<td>25,621</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>1,010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>22,442</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEATO Research and Development</td>
<td>117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEPHEUSMACTHAI</td>
<td>7,189</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USMACTHAI/JSMACTHAI</td>
<td>730</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Military personnel strength in Thailand was as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>390,568</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>496</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1,992</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MiscellaneouS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AF Units</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COMNAVFORV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III MAR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US NAVY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAVAIRCNP (FielD)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The personnel were assigned as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Coast Guard</th>
<th>Air Force</th>
<th>Marine Corps</th>
<th>Navy</th>
<th>Army</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>434</td>
<td>434</td>
<td>432</td>
<td>421</td>
<td>324</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35,753</td>
<td>32,309</td>
<td>48,695</td>
<td>12,322</td>
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<tr>
<td>69,652</td>
<td>166,655</td>
<td>70,12</td>
<td>6,652</td>
<td>1,712</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

During 1966, the buildup of US military personnel strength in South Vietnam.

MILITARY PERSONNEL STRENGTH IN SOUTHEAST ASIA
SUPPORT OF US MILITARY ATTACHE PERSONNEL, LAOS

In November 1965 the JCS recommended that manpower spaces for the air portion of the attache augmentation in Laos continue to be filled by temporary duty personnel from Air Force units rather than establish Joint Table of Distribution (JTD) spaces.\(^1\) CINCPAC concurred in April 1966.\(^2\)

\(^{(*)}\) In May, revised requirements were sent to the JCS requesting 41 Air Force personnel, 62 Army personnel, 2 US civilians, and 2 local nationals as augmentation to DEPCHJUSMAGTHAI.\(^3\) JCS approval was obtained on the initial package in June\(^4\) and the revised space requirements in July.\(^5\) The Departments of the Army and Air Force took immediate action to provide permanent fill for the JTD space authorizations based on the individual qualification criteria established by DEPCHJUSMAGTHAI. In addition, the Air Force continued to provide 37 personnel on extended temporary duty to the Office of the Air Attache from the 606th Air Commando Squadron.

\(^{(*)}\) Arrival of regularly assigned personnel, and experience gained in the field, resulted in minor adjustments to manpower space authorizations,\(^6\) and end of the year requirements were for 42 Air Force personnel, 66 Army personnel, 2 US civilians, and 2 local nationals for a total of 112 personnel.\(^7\)

---

1. JCS 7386/292035Z Nov 65, CINCPAC Command History, 1965, pp 580-581
2. CINCPAC 100139Z Apr 66
3. CINCPAC ltr 3010 Ser 00827, 18 May 66
4. JCS 3740/062334Z Jun 66
5. JCS 7452/251302Z Jul 66
6. CINCPAC 252338Z Aug 66; CINCPAC 290101Z Oct 66
7. JCS 8234/181338Z Nov 66

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# GLOSSARY OF TERMS

## A

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AAA</td>
<td>Anti-aircraft Artillery</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ABNCP</td>
<td>Airborne Command Post</td>
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<td>AB&amp;T</td>
<td>Alaska Barge and Transport, Inc.</td>
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<tr>
<td>AC&amp;W</td>
<td>Aircraft Control and Warning</td>
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<td>ADGSP</td>
<td>Advanced Defense Communications Satellite Project</td>
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<td>AEW</td>
<td>Airborne Early Warning</td>
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<td>AF</td>
<td>Air Force</td>
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<td>Armed Forces Assistance to Korea</td>
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<tr>
<td>AFLOGC</td>
<td>Air Force Logistics Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APP</td>
<td>Armed Forces of the Philippines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AGM</td>
<td>Air-to-Ground Missile</td>
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<td>AID</td>
<td>Agency for International Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>APB</td>
<td>Self-Propelled Barracks Ship</td>
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<td>APD</td>
<td>High Speed Transport</td>
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<tr>
<td>ARFCOS</td>
<td>Armed Forces Courier System</td>
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<td>Army, Pacific</td>
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<td>Army of the Republic of Vietnam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASD</td>
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<tr>
<td>ASW</td>
<td>Antisubmarine Warfare</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AUTODIN</td>
<td>Automatic Digital Network</td>
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<td>AUTOVON</td>
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## B

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<td>Base Air Defense Ground Environment</td>
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<td>Beneficial Occupancy Date</td>
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<td>BR</td>
<td>BARREL ROLL</td>
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## C

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<td>Chinese Air Force</td>
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<td>CCF</td>
<td>Corps Contingency Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>CD</td>
<td>Coastal Defense</td>
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<td>C-E</td>
<td>Communications-Electronics</td>
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<tr>
<td>CH</td>
<td>Chief (normally used as a prefix)</td>
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<td>CHICOM</td>
<td>Chinese Communists</td>
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<td>CIP</td>
<td>Commercial Import Program</td>
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<td>CJCS</td>
<td>Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff</td>
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<td>CLIP</td>
<td>Country Logistics Improvement Plan</td>
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<td>CMPO</td>
<td>Chief of Military Planning Office</td>
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<tr>
<td>CNO</td>
<td>Chief of Naval Operations</td>
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<tr>
<td>COACT</td>
<td>Combat Operations Reporting System</td>
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<td>COM</td>
<td>Commander (normally used as a prefix)</td>
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<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>COMNAVFOR</td>
<td>Commander Naval Forces</td>
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<tr>
<td>COMSTAFF</td>
<td>Commander US/Thai Field Forces</td>
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<td>CONUS</td>
<td>Continental United States</td>
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<td>CPRS</td>
<td>CINCPAC Route Slip (followed by control number)</td>
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<td>CRP</td>
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<td>Central Region SEATO Field Force</td>
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<td>CTZ</td>
<td>Corps Tactical Zone</td>
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<td>CVA</td>
<td>Attack Aircraft Carrier</td>
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<td>CVS</td>
<td>Antisubmarine Support Aircraft Carrier</td>
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<td>Department of the Army Forward Depot</td>
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<tr>
<td>DAFFD</td>
<td>Department of the Army Forward-Floating Depot</td>
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<td>DC of S</td>
<td>Deputy Chief of Staff</td>
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<td>DD</td>
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<td>Guided Missile Destroyer</td>
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<td>Deceptive Electronic Countermeasures</td>
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<td>DER</td>
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<td>GDF</td>
<td>Ground Diverted Force</td>
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<td>GVN</td>
<td>Government of North Vietnam</td>
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<td>HSAS</td>
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<td>Joint Manpower Program</td>
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<td>Joint Operations Graphic</td>
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<td>Joint Reconnaissance Center</td>
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<td>JUSMAG</td>
<td>Joint US Military Advisory Group</td>
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<td>KANZUS</td>
<td>Korea-Australia-New Zealand-United States</td>
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<td>Korean Civic Action Corps</td>
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<td>KLSC</td>
<td>Korean Logistic Service Corps</td>
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<td>KOCO</td>
<td>Korean Oil Corporation</td>
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<td>LCJ</td>
<td>Logistics Center, Japan</td>
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<td>LCM</td>
<td>Landing Craft Mechanized</td>
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<td>Landing Craft Utility</td>
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<td>Landing Ship Tank</td>
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<td>MA</td>
<td>Military Assistance</td>
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<td>MAAG</td>
<td>Military Assistance Advisory Group</td>
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<td>MAC</td>
<td>Military Airlift Command</td>
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<td>MAM</td>
<td>Military Assistance Manual</td>
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<td>Military Assistance Program (Plan)</td>
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<td>MASL</td>
<td>Military Assistance Program Articles &amp; Services List</td>
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<td>MC&amp;G</td>
<td>Mapping, Charting, and Geodesy</td>
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<td>MDMAF</td>
<td>Mekong Delta Mobile Afloat Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>MEDT</td>
<td>Military Equipment Delivery Team</td>
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<td>MILAD</td>
<td>Military Advisor (to SEATO or ANZUS Council)</td>
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<td>Military Advisor's Representative</td>
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<td>Military Planning Office (SEATO)</td>
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<td>MSB</td>
<td>Minesweeping Boats</td>
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<td>Military Traffic Management and Terminal Service</td>
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<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<td>NAVOCEANO</td>
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<td>North Vietnam</td>
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<td>ODDR&amp;E</td>
<td>Office of Director Defense Research and Engineering</td>
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796       UNCLASSIFIED
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<th>Abbreviation</th>
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<td>Office of the Director of Military Assistance</td>
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<td>Ogden Air Materiel Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>OPLAN</td>
<td>Operation Plan</td>
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<td>OPREP</td>
<td>Operational Report</td>
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<td>OSD</td>
<td>Office of the Secretary of Defense</td>
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<td>Offshore Procurement-Japan</td>
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<td>Pacific Fleet</td>
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<td>Pacific Command</td>
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<td>PAMPA</td>
<td>PACOM Movements Priority Agency</td>
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<td>Passenger and Mail Channel</td>
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<td>PCE</td>
<td>Submarine Chaser Escort</td>
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<td>Patrol Craft, Fast</td>
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<td>PCS</td>
<td>Submarine Chaser</td>
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<td>Motor Gunboat</td>
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<td>Pierced Steel Planking</td>
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<td>Psychological Warfare</td>
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<td>Quick Reaction</td>
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<td>Quick Reaction Force</td>
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<td>Research and Development</td>
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<td>Research and Development Field Unit</td>
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<td>RD&amp;T&amp;E</td>
<td>Research, Development, Test and Evaluation</td>
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<td>REP</td>
<td>Representative, e.g., CINCPACREP</td>
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<td>RHAW</td>
<td>Radar Homing and Warning</td>
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<td>Requirements Office</td>
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<td>Republic of Korea</td>
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<td>ROK Forces, Vietnam</td>
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<td>RO-RO</td>
<td>Roll-On Roll-Off</td>
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<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<td>SAC</td>
<td>Strategic Air Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>SAM</td>
<td>Surface-to-Air Missile</td>
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<td>SEACOORD</td>
<td>Coordinating Committee for US Missions, Southeast Asia</td>
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<tr>
<td>SEATACS</td>
<td>Southeast Asia Integrated Tactical Air Control System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEAL</td>
<td>Sea, Air, Land</td>
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<tr>
<td>SEATO</td>
<td>Southeast Asia Treaty Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>SIF</td>
<td>Selective Identification Feature</td>
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<td>SIOP</td>
<td>Single Integrated Operational Plan</td>
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<td>Signal Intelligence</td>
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<td>Special Operations Group</td>
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<td>Short Takeoff and Landing</td>
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<td>Strike Command</td>
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<td>US Military Advisor's Representative</td>
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<td>WESTPAC</td>
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<td>Coast Guard Cutter</td>
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<tr>
<td>WTO</td>
<td>WESTPAC Transportation Office</td>
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(U) Sources for CINCPAC Command History, 1966 were the files of the Pacific Command Headquarters, historical summaries prepared by the CINCPAC staff divisions and offices, and the individual action officers of the staff. Volumes I and II were compiled by the CINCPAC Historical Branch under Lieutenant Colonel Robert G. Miller, USA, Command Historian, who prepared Chapter IV. Miss Pauline Klayer prepared Chapter I; Mr. Kenneth W. Ritchie prepared Chapters II and III.

(U) The following personnel prepared previous editions of the History.

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1960: Commander John T. Poindexter, USN, Command Historian; with Major Russell A. Gugeler, USA. ¹

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---

1. Information compiled from CINCPAC Historical Branch files.
2. Lieutenant Colonel Robert G. Miller, USA

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INDEX

(U) The purpose of this index is to integrate Volumes I and II published by CINCPAC, and Annexes "A" and "B" published by COMUSMACV and COMUSMACTHAI respectively. With a minimum of cross referencing, first priorities for entries are:

**Military function** -- personnel, intelligence, operations, logistics, plans, communications-electronics, medical, etc.

**Command** -- PACOM, MACV, MACTHAI, etc.

**Country** -- Japan, Indonesia, South Vietnam, etc.

Second priorities for entries are:

**Major program** -- Military Assistance, etc.

**Politico-military** -- agreements, negotiations, etc.

**Regional defense organization** -- SEATO

**Ship** -- by name under "ships"

**Program, plan, or project with name** -- CORMORANT,

**Military service** -- Army, Navy, Marines, Air Force

**System** -- HAWK, etc.

(U) Pagination of Volumes I and II is 1-338 and 401-792 respectively, with 2 Appendices numbered separately; each Annex is numbered consecutively from page 1. Sample entries are as follows:

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  Refers to pages 43 and 417 in Volumes I/II, and
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