



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J. N. SHAFFER
Deputy Chief of Staff for Military
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COMMANDER IN CHIEF PACIFIC COMMAND HISTORY



VOLUME I

1967

Prepared by the Historical Branch
Office of the Joint Secretary
Headquarters CINCPAC, FPO San Francisco 96610

CAMP H. M. SMITH, HAWAII

1968

FOREWORD

(U) The Pacific Command was established on 1 January 1947 as an outgrowth of the command structure used throughout the Pacific during World War II. Much different in size and scope than the command of today, it was flanked to the northwest by the Far East Command, and to the northeast by the Alaskan Command. In the early days of the Pacific Command, the Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet served in dual capacity as Commander in Chief Pacific. This command arrangement for the Pacific area continued until 1 July 1957 when the Far East Command was disestablished and the duties and responsibilities of CINCFE assumed by CINCPAC.


(U) As a result of this reorganization, PACOM became the largest of the unified commands. Its geographical area included approximately 85 million square miles, extending from the west coast of the Western Hemisphere to the Asian mainland, into the Indian Ocean and from the Aleutians south to the frigid South Pole.

(U) CINCPAC's mission was and still is to defend the United States against attacks through the Pacific Ocean area and to support and advance US national policies and interests throughout the Pacific, Far East and Southeast Asian areas. This mission includes assistance to selected countries of Asia to prevent the advance of Communism throughout the area. Because of the magnitude of the Pacific Command area and the many new responsibilities associated with unified command, the Pacific Fleet became a separate command on 13 January 1958. Prior to this, the CINCPAC Staff element had moved to Camp H. M. Smith from Fleet Headquarters on 26 October 1957.

(U) Today the Pacific Command stands alert and ready as America's guardian across the strategic lines of attack from Asia towards the heartland of the North American continent. Both the defensive and retaliatory capabilities of CINCPAC's forces are poised to react at a moment's notice. American infantrymen both in Korea and in Vietnam are resisting Communist aggression. American fighter-interceptors and bombers are prepositioned at strategic sites throughout PACOM, and units of the Fleet patrol across the reaches of the Pacific Ocean from the Bering Sea to the Indian Ocean.

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(U) The Pacific Command today reflects the coordinated efforts of an efficient unified team of Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps forces. It stands ready to defend the United States and to meet its obligations in support of our national objectives.



U. S. G. ~~SNABP~~
Admiral, USN
Commander in Chief Pacific

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PREFACE

(U) This CINCPAC Command History for 1967 was prepared in accordance with the guidance outlined by the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) in their Memorandums SM-247-59, of 5 March 1959, and SM-408-59, of 17 April 1959. These memorandums required "commanders of unified and specified commands (to) submit annually historical reports covering the operations of their headquarters," which would provide "a comprehensive understanding of the operations of the headquarters, the problems faced by the headquarters, and the status of the command from the standpoint of the commander." This command history, therefore, pertains solely to those events occurring in calendar year 1967 that possessed sufficient historical significance to cut across the far-flung responsibilities of the Commander in Chief Pacific and his joint Pacific Command (PACOM).

(U) Like the previous historical reports since 1959, this report describes CINCPAC's actions in discharging his responsibilities assigned by either the JCS or higher authority, especially those connected with international crises, and those that are peculiar to a joint command. This history is intended as a permanent record of command decisions and achievements, and purposely omits detailed activities of subordinate commands or of Allied Nations in the PACOM area. Most of the decisions and activities included in this report are related directly with CINCPAC's efforts to preserve the freedom in those areas in the Pacific Command where people still have the right to make a free choice.

(U) To provide continuity, this history has been organized in the same fashion as previous histories, primarily in line with assigned objectives of CINCPAC. Chapter I, "The State of Readiness of United States Forces," describes CINCPAC forces and certain actions to plan for their employment to carry out United States policies, as well as the multitudinous activities of Headquarters CINCPAC that do not logically fit in the other chapters. Chapter II, "CINCPAC Actions Influencing the State of Readiness of Allied Nations in the PACOM Area," deals with CINCPAC's role in carrying out the Military Assistance Program. Chapter III, "CINCPAC Actions Concerning Relationships Between the United States and Other Countries," reports the actions of CINCPAC in his position as United States Military Adviser to the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, and with politico-military events pertaining to his command. CINCPAC's mission to counter Communist aggression in

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Southeast Asia is treated in some detail in Chapter IV, "Actions to Counter Communist Aggression in Southeast Asia."

(U) As in last year's history, the first three chapters make up Volume I of the CINCPAC Command History 1967, while Chapter IV is published separately as Volume II. As before, the annual histories published by COMUSMACV and COMUSMACTHAI are Annexes "A" and "B", respectively. The separate elements of this history are classified according to content and are distributed on the basis of a need to know. Both a glossary and index, covering the CINCPAC Command History, is a part of Volume II.

(U) This history was planned and outlined by Colonel Edward A. Jurkens, USAF, Secretary of the Joint Staff, Headquarters CINCPAC, working in conjunction with Lieutenant Colonel Jasper R. Johnson, USA, CINCPAC Command Historian. Besides supervising the preparation of this annual history from start to finish, Lieutenant Colonel Johnson also had the continuing duties of maintaining the CINCPAC Command Historical Program throughout Headquarters CINCPAC and all subordinate unified commands in the Pacific. In addition, he personally researched and wrote Sections I, II, III, IX, and X of Chapter IV.

(U) Assisting Lieutenant Colonel Johnson in his preparation of the narrative were the members of his CINCPAC Historical Branch. His Senior Historian, Mr. Truman R. Strobridge, besides being solely responsible for the researching and writing of Chapters II and III, and Section IV of Chapter IV, provided technical guidance when needed and applied his efforts in whatever manner was necessary throughout the preparation of the history. Chapter I, as well as Sections V, VI and VII of Chapter IV, were prepared by Miss Polly Klayer. Mr. Kenneth Ritchie, who returned to this office in February 1968, after a year's tour with the Historical Division in Headquarters COMUSMACV, assisted in the final preparation by preparing the Logistics Section in Chapter IV.

(U) Both the glossary and index were painstakingly compiled by Senior Chief Yeoman D. E. Bentley, USN, who spent many laborious hours

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in their preparation. The manuscript was typed in final format by Mrs. LuElla Saxton, Yeoman First Class Herbert W. Dominy, USN, Mrs. Marian J. Heigle, and Staff Sergeant William J. Stanish, USAF. In addition, the support rendered by the CINCPAC Staff was immeasurable.

Jasper R. Johnson
JASPER R. JOHNSON
LCOL GS USA
CINCPAC Command Historian

10/10/10

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CINCPAC Staff photos unless otherwise credited.

CHAPTER I

THE STATE OF READINESS OF UNITED STATES FORCES

SECTION I - UNITED STATES FORCES DURING 1967

PACOM - Wide Military Strength

(S) Military personnel strength in PACOM rose from 872,296 on 1 January 1967, to 1,001,853 at the close of the year.¹ All Services showed increases. Comparative strengths by Service were as follows:

| <u>Service</u> | <u>1 Jan 67</u> | <u>31 Dec 67</u> | <u>Change</u> |
|----------------|-----------------|------------------|---------------|
| Army | 335,385 | 408,146 | + 72,761 |
| Navy | 276,843 | 300,828 | + 23,985 |
| Marine Corps | 102,331 | 123,300 | + 20,969 |
| Air Force | 157,737 | 169,579 | + 11,842 |
| Total | 872,296 | 1,001,853 | +129,557 |

The major areas of concentration of military personnel and dependents and the changes during the year are indicated in the following table:

| <u>Area</u> | <u>Military</u> | | <u>Dependents</u> | |
|-------------|------------------|---------------|-------------------|---------------|
| | <u>31 Dec 67</u> | <u>Change</u> | <u>31 Dec 67</u> | <u>Change</u> |
| Hawaii | 48,477 | + 294 | 61,138 | + 4,570 |
| Japan | 37,387 | + 1,975 | 49,500 | - 1,171 |
| Korea | 56,223 | - 106 | 5,320 | + 1,728 |
| Marianas | 10,398 | - 3,222 | 13,792 | + 2,940 |
| Okinawa | 39,447 | - 3,663 | 22,560 | - 5,654 |
| Philippines | 27,413 | + 2,650 | 21,321 | + 3,211 |
| Taiwan | 14,241 | + 6,160 | 5,962 | + 1,025 |
| Thailand | 44,517 | +10,028 | 3,110 | + 2,408 |
| Vietnam | 480,536 | +89,968 | 64 | + 64 |


(U) The following charts and tables show PACOM command arrangements and relationships, key personnel, further details regarding personnel strengths, available forces, and the disposition of forces throughout the PACOM.

1. J1 History, Jan 68.

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
THE PACIFIC COMMAND

AS OF 31 DECEMBER 1967



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

COMMAND ARRANGEMENTS IN PACOM



SOURCE: PACOM Digest, Nov 67, p. 6.

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COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS

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1. COMMANDER IN CHIEF PACIFIC (CINCPAC): CINCPAC is the Commander of a unified command comprising all forces assigned for the accomplishment of his missions. His general area of responsibility for the conduct of normal operations is the Pacific Ocean, including the islands therein (less Aleutians), the Bering Sea, the eastern Indian Ocean area, Japan, the Republic of Korea, and the countries of Southeast Asia.

CINCPAC exercises operational command of assigned forces through his component commanders, the commanders of subordinate unified commands, and the commanders of joint task forces (when established). CINCPAC is accredited as the U.S. Military Advisor/ Representative to the following organizations:

- a. SEATO Council: U.S. Military Adviser.
- b. ANZUS Council: U.S. Military Adviser.
- c. Philippine-U.S. Council of Foreign Ministers: U.S. Military Representative and co-chairman of the Philippine-U.S. Mutual Defense Board.
- d. Japanese-American Security Consultative Committee: Member and Principal Adviser on military defense matters to the Chairman of the U.S. Representation.

2. PACOM SERVICE COMPONENT COMMANDERS:

- a. Commander in Chief U.S. Army Pacific (CINCUSARPAC).
- b. Commander in Chief U.S. Pacific Fleet (CINCPACFLT).
- c. Commander in Chief U.S. Pacific Air Forces (CINCPACAF).

The PACOM Service Component Commanders are responsible for accomplishing such operational missions and tasks as may be assigned by CINCPAC. The PACOM Service Component Commands consist of the respective component commanders and all those individuals, units, detachments, organizations or installations under their command which have been assigned to the operational command of CINCPAC. Other individuals, units, detachments, organizations or installations may operate directly under the appropriate PACOM Service Component Commander in his Service role, and should contribute to the mission of CINCPAC as appropriate.

The PACOM Service Component Commanders' responsibilities for the Military Assistance Program are prescribed in the current CINCPAC Military Assistance Manual (MAM).

3. COMMANDERS OF SUBORDINATE UNIFIED COMMANDS: There are five subordinate unified commands in the PACOM:

- a. United States Forces, Korea (USFK), commanded by Commander United States Forces, Korea (COMUSKorea), Seoul, Korea.
- b. United States Forces, Japan (USFJ), commanded by Commander United States Forces, Japan (COMUS Japan), Fuchu Air Station, Japan.
- c. United States Taiwan Defense Command (USTDC), commanded by Commander United States Taiwan Defense Command (COMUSTDC), Taipei, Taiwan.
- d. United States Military Assistance Command, Thailand (USMACTHAI), commanded by Commander United States Military Assistance Command, Thailand (COMUSMACTHAI). COMUSMACTHAI serves concurrently as Chief Joint United States Military Advisory Group, Thailand (CJUSMAGTHAI).
- e. United States Military Assistance Command Vietnam (USMACV) commanded by Commander United States Military Assistance Command Vietnam (COMUSMACV), Saigon, Republic of Vietnam.

4. REPRESENTATIVES OF THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF PACIFIC (CINCPACREPS):

CINCPACREPs are established in certain areas where no subordinate unified command has been established and where significant forces of two or more Services are stationed. There are four:

- a. Commanding General, U.S. Army Ryukyu Islands/IX Corps is the CINCPAC Representative Ryukyus (CINCPACREP Ryukyus), Fort Buckner, Okinawa.
- b. Commander Naval Forces Marianas is the CINCPAC Representative Mariana-Bonin Islands (CINCPACREP MARBO), Agana, Guam.
- c. Commander Naval Forces Philippines is the CINCPAC Representative Philippines (CINCPACREP Philippines), Sangley Point, Philippines.
- d. USAF Liaison Officer to Australia is the CINCPAC Representative Australia (CINCPACREP Australia), American Embassy, Canberra, Australia.

5. CHIEFS OF MILITARY ASSISTANCE ADVISORY GROUPS (MAAGs): Military Assistance Programs (including Foreign Military Sales) are administered in the PACOM under the following authorities:

- a. Chief Military Assistance Advisory Group, Rep of China - Taipei, Taiwan
- b. Chief Military Assistance Advisory Group, Japan - Tokyo, Japan
- c. Chief Joint U.S. Military Advisory Group, Thailand - Bangkok, Thailand
- d. Chief Joint U.S. Military Advisory Group, Philippines - Manila, Philippines
- e. Chief Military Equipment Delivery Team, Burma - Rangoon, Burma
- f. COMUS Korea performs the MAP functions for Korea - Seoul, Korea
- g. Deputy Chief JUSMAG Thailand performs the MAP functions for Laos of planning, programming, requisitioning, receipt and storage in Thailand, and onward shipment to Laos and maintains liaison with USAID Laos and with Attachee. - Bangkok, Thailand
- h. Chief Defense Liaison Group, Indonesia performs the MAP functions of planning and programming for Indonesia. - Jakarta, Indonesia
- i. USDA Malaysia is responsible for Malaysia MAP functions - Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia
- j. USDA Australia, New Zealand and Singapore are responsible for the Foreign Military Sales function for Australia, New Zealand and Singapore respectively.

6. SINGLE SENIOR MILITARY REPRESENTATIVES (COORDINATING AUTHORITIES):

The Secretary of Defense has directed CINCPAC to designate a Single Senior Military Representative in each country or area within the Pacific Command where U.S. Military personnel are on duty. The Single Senior Military Representatives are:

- a. Korea-Commander U.S. Forces, Korea
- b. Japan-Commander U.S. Forces, Japan
- c. Ryukyus Islands-Commander in Chief Pacific Representative, Ryukyus
- d. Taiwan and Penghus-Commander U.S. Taiwan Defense Command
- e. Mariana-Bonin Islands-Commander in Chief Pacific Representative, Mariana-Bonin Islands
- f. Philippines-Commander in Chief Pacific Representative, Philippines
- g. Republic of Vietnam-Commander U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
- h. Thailand-Commander, U.S. Military Assistance Command, Thailand
- i. Indonesia-Chief, Defense Liaison Group, Indonesia
- j. Burma-Chief, Military Equipment Delivery Team, Burma
- k. Australia-Commander in Chief Pacific Representative, Australia

SOURCE: PACOM Digest, Nov 67, p. 7.

SUBORDINATE UNIFIED COMMANDS AND CINCPAC REPRESENTATIVES FAR EAST REGION - KEY PERSONNEL

AS OF 1 NOVEMBER 1967

| UNITED NATIONS COMMAND/UNITED STATES FORCES KOREA | | | U.S. MILITARY ASSISTANCE COMMAND, VIETNAM | | |
|---|-----------|--------------------------------|---|-----------|--------------------------------|
| CINCPACUSFKR | GEN | Charles H. BONESTEEL, III, USA | Commander | GL-1 | William C. WESTMORELAND, USA |
| ColS | Lt Gen | Robert E. FRIEDMAN, USAF | Deputy Commander | GL-1 | Crichton W. ABRAMS, USA |
| Spec Asst for MIL AFF & CHROVMAAG Korea | MG | Raymond B. MARLEN, USA | Deputy Commander for Air | Lt Gen | William W. MOMYER, USAF |
| Spec Asst Armistice Aff & Sec Mgr UNCMAC | Major Gen | Maxwell C. DEMLER, USAF | ColS | MG | Walter L. FERWIN, Jr., USA |
| DCoIS | COL | Edward SCHMIDLER, USA | Joint Secretary | COL | Samuel L. REID, USA |
| ACoIS J-1 | COL | Louise C. BELEWER, USA | ACoIS J-1 | PG | Franklin M. DAVIS, USA |
| ACoIS J-2 | CAPT | Robert H. HARTZ, USA | ACoIS J-2 | PG | Philip B. DAVIDSON, Jr., USA |
| ACoIS J-3 | Col | John A. CAREY, USAF | ACoIS J-3 | MG | Willard PEARSON, USA |
| ACoIS J-4 | COL | Edward B. VALEZ, USA | ACoIS J-4 | MG | Carroll H. DUNN, USA |
| ACoIS J-5 | CAPT | Nicholas R. MASSIE, USA | ACoIS J-5 | Major Gen | Don O. DARROW, USAF |
| Chief Armistice Aff Div | COL | John P. FUGAS, Jr., USA | ACoIS J-6 | Brig Gen | Sam L. HOEY, USAF |
| Sec Mgr UNCMAC | | | Cdr, 7th Air Force | Lt Gen | William W. MOMYER, USAF |
| | | | CHAF Adv Gp | Brig Gen | Donovan F. SMITH, USAF |
| | | | Dep CGUSARV | LtG | Bruce PALMER, Jr., USA |
| | | | COMNAVFOR Vietnam | RADM | Kenneth L. VEH, USN |
| | | | CG III MAJ | LtGen | Robert E. CUSHMAN, Jr., USMC |
| U.S. FORCES JAPAN | | | USMACTHAI/JUSMAG, THAILAND | | |
| Commander | Lt Gen | Scott E. McFEE, USAF | Commander | MG | Harold McCOWN, USA |
| ColS | RADM | Francine P. WILFONG, USN | See Personnel Staff Listing under Military Assistance Advisory Groups | | |
| ACoIS J-1 | COL | Charles S. TOW, SHI, USA | CINCPAC REPRESENTATIVE, RYUKYUS | | |
| ACoIS J-2 | COL | Robert W. BOITCO, USA | CINCPACREP Ryukyus/ CG USARYIS/IX Corps | LtG | Ferdinand I. UNGER, USA |
| ACoIS J-3 | Col | Marion E. POPPER, USAF | CINCPAC REPRESENTATIVE, PHILIPPINES | | |
| ACoIS J-4 | CAPT | William H. AYER, USN | CINCPACREP Philippines/ COMNAVPHIL | RADM | Herman J. KOSSLER, USN |
| ACoIS J-5 | COL | Robert S. DEGLE, Jr., USA | CINCPAC REPRESENTATIVE, MARIANA-BONIN ISLANDS | | |
| ACoIS J-6 | Col | Andrew H. WELCH, USAF | CINCPACREP MARBO COMNAVMARIANAS | PADM | Carlton G. Jones, USN |
| Seccom CSAVFORJAPAN | CAPT | Arthur R. FERRO, USN | CINCPAC REPRESENTATIVE, AUSTRALIA | | |
| Legal Advisor (5th AF) | Col | Joseph BUCHTA, USAF | CINCPACREP Australia | Col | Alexander P. CUTLERFIELD, USAF |
| U.S. TAIWAN DEFENSE COMMAND | | | SOUTHEAST ASIA TREATY ORGANIZATION | | |
| Commander | VADM | John L. CREW, USN | US MILADREP, SMPG Bangkok | COL | Walter J. ADAMS, USA |
| ColS | Brig Gen | Charles M. TALLEY, USAF | | | |
| ACoIS J-1 | CAPT | Lauren K. SIMON, Jr., USN | | | |
| ACoIS J-2 | Col | Harold C. HENSCHEL, USAF | | | |
| ACoIS J-3 | CAPT | Leonard E. FIELD, USN | | | |
| ACoIS J-4 | COL | Wing F. JUNG, USA | | | |
| ACoIS J-6 | CAPT | Malcolm G. FRIEDMAN, USN | | | |

(A) Acting (R) Ordered to Report (D) Ordered Detached

SOURCE: PACOM Digest, Nov 67, p. 18.

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PACIFIC COMMAND PERSONNEL

SERVICE - CATEGORY - COUNTRY

AS OF 31 DECEMBER 1967

| | GRAND TOTAL | MILITARY | | | | | U.S. CIVILIANS | | | | | LOCAL HIRE CIVILIANS | | | | | DEPENDENTS | | | | |
|------------------|-------------|----------|--------|--------|--------|--------|----------------|-------|-------|------|------|----------------------|-------|-------|-------|-------|------------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| | | TOT | USA | USN | USMC | USAF | TOT | USA | USN | USMC | USAF | TOT | USA | USN | USMC | USAF | TOT | USA | USN | USMC | USAF |
| ALASKA | 5057 | 3227 | | 3227 | | | | | | | | | | | | 1830 | | | 1830 | | |
| AUSTRALIA | 659 | 362 | 1 | 357 | | 4 | 1 | 1 | | | | | | | 296 | | | 296 | | | |
| BONIN ISLAND | 91 | 63 | | 33 | | 30 | | | | | | | | | 28 | | | 27 | | 1 | |
| BURMA | 147 | 48 | 36 | 3 | | 9 | | | | | 49 | | 49 | | 50 | 33 | | 8 | | 9 | |
| CHINA | 22437 | 14241 | 423 | 7204 | 23 | 6591 | 314 | 18 | 67 | | 229 | | | 1784 | 5962 | 936 | 1593 | 59 | 3374 | | |
| HAWAII | 132414 | 48477 | 7136 | 23920 | 6070 | 11351 | 22799 | 5942 | 12639 | 568 | 3650 | | | | 61138 | 10845 | 22924 | 7205 | 20164 | | |
| HONG KONG | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| INDONESIA | 80 | 60 | 4 | 47 | 3 | 6 | | | | | 1 | | 1 | | 19 | | | 16 | 3 | | |
| JAPAN | 122074 | 37387 | 7914 | 8618 | 1491 | 19364 | 3551 | 1152 | 343 | 11 | 2045 | 31636 | 13660 | 145 | 3236 | 14595 | 49500 | 9043 | 11837 | 1214 | 27408 |
| JOHNSTON ISLAND | 600 | 420 | | 32 | | 388 | | | | | 12 | | | | 188 | | | 188 | | | |
| KOREA | 86116 | 56223 | 51865 | 171 | 61 | 4126 | 1508 | 1264 | 42 | | 202 | 23065 | 21586 | 46 | 42 | 1391 | 5320 | 4963 | 181 | 65 | 111 |
| LAOS | 6 | 6 | | | | 6 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| MALAYSIA | 15 | 5 | 5 | | | | | | | | | | | | 10 | 10 | | | | | |
| MARIANAS | 28746 | 10398 | 72 | 5182 | 417 | 4727 | 941 | | 806 | | 135 | 3615 | | 3019 | 13792 | | | 7329 | 87 | 6376 | |
| MARSHALL ISLANDS | 35 | 35 | 27 | | | 8 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| MIDWAY | 1844 | 1117 | | 1039 | | 78 | | | | | | | | | 727 | | | 727 | | | |
| NEW ZEALAND | 8 | 8 | | | | 8 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| PHILIPPINES | 65632 | 27413 | 75 | 7624 | 795 | 18919 | 1191 | 4 | 295 | | 892 | 15707 | 62 | 11230 | 4415 | 21321 | 121 | 7770 | 171 | 13259 | |
| RYUKYUS | 83781 | 39447 | 15788 | 1490 | 7568 | 14601 | 3140 | 2019 | 5 | 88 | 1028 | 18634 | 11738 | 2 | 2869 | 4025 | 22560 | 2932 | 1015 | 645 | 17968 |
| THAILAND | 62469 | 44517 | 10330 | 750 | 42 | 33395 | 218 | 95 | 44 | | 79 | 14624 | 6232 | 780 | 7612 | 3110 | 1289 | 325 | 65 | 1431 | |
| VIETNAM * | 529045 | 480536 | 314470 | 32145 | 78013 | 55908 | 693 | 512 | 16 | 68 | 97 | 47752 | 34219 | 4 | 1645 | 11884 | 64 | 52 | 10 | 2 | |
| WAKE ISLAND | 61 | 53 | | | | 53 | | | | | | | | | 8 | | | | | | |
| 7th FLEET | 17701 | 17701 | | 17701 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| SUB TOTAL | 1159018 | 781744 | 408146 | 109543 | 94483 | 169572 | 34356 | 11007 | 14257 | 735 | 8357 | 157015 | 87539 | 15382 | 7792 | 46302 | 185903 | 30224 | 56056 | 9516 | 90107 |
| CONUS | 220109 | 220109 | | 191285 | 28817 | 7 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| GRAND TOTAL | 1379127 | 1001853 | 408146 | 300828 | 123300 | 169579 | 34356 | 11007 | 14257 | 735 | 8357 | 157015 | 87539 | 15382 | 7792 | 46302 | 185903 | 30224 | 56056 | 9516 | 90107 |

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SOURCE: PACOM Digest, Feb 68, p 90.

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MAAG AND SERVICE ADVISORY GROUPS PERSONNEL
PACIFIC COMMAND AUTHORIZED AND ASSIGNED - BY SERVICE - CATEGORY - GROUP
AS OF 31 DECEMBER 1967

| CATEGORY | ARMY | | NAVY | | M C | | AIR FORCE | | TOT MIL | | U S CIV | | TOT US PER | | LOCAL HIRE | |
|-----------------------------|------|------|------|------|------|------|-----------|------|---------|------|---------|------|------------|------|------------|------|
| | AUTH | ASGD | AUTH | ASGD | AUTH | ASGD | AUTH | ASGD | AUTH | ASGD | AUTH | ASGD | AUTH | ASGD | AUTH | ASGD |
| UNITS INCL IN PACOM CEILING | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| MAAG CHINA | 311 | 315 | 83 | 89 | 18 | 18 | 171 | 187 | 583 | 609 | 50 | 52 | 633 | 661 | 94 | 94 |
| MAAG JAPAN | 8 | 15 | 10 | 12 | -0- | -0- | 11 | 15 | 29 | 42 | 16 | 18 | 45 | 60 | 75 | 84 |
| PROVMAAG KOR | 27 | 28 | 8 | 8 | 2 | 2 | 13 | 13 | 50 | 51 | 10 | 10 | 60 | 61 | 10 | 10 |
| JUSMAG PHIL | 43 | 43 | 16 | 16 | -0- | -0- | 29 | 30 | 88 | 89 | 9 | 17 | 97 | 106 | 16 | 16 |
| MACTHAI/JUSMAGTHAI | 435 | 427 | 63 | 63 | 31 | 23 | 230 | 225 | 759 | 738 | 12 | 9 | 771 | 747 | 87 | 86 |
| SEATO | 71 | 59 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 3 | 4 | 77 | 66 | | | 77 | 66 | | |
| MEDT BURMA | 15 | 15 | 3 | 3 | -0- | -0- | 3 | 3 | 21 | 21 | -0- | -0- | 21 | 21 | 51 | 49 |
| DEPCHJUSMAGTHAI | 138 | 107 | -0- | -0- | -0- | -0- | 75 | 75 | 213 | 182 | 9 | 8 | 222 | 190 | 177 | 174 |
| DLG INDONESIA | 6 | 4 | 3 | 4 | 3 | 3 | 2 | 2 | 14 | 13 | | | 14 | 13 | | |
| SUB-TOTAL | 1054 | 1013 | 188 | 197 | 55 | 47 | 537 | 554 | 1834 | 1811 | 106 | 114 | 1940 | 1925 | 510 | 513 |
| ARMY ADV GP KOR | 812 | 805 | | | | | | | 812 | 805 | 84 | 59 | 896 | 864 | 334 | 332 |
| NAVY ADV GP KOR | | | 108 | 109 | 59 | 56 | | | 167 | 165 | 5 | 4 | 172 | 169 | 194 | 192 |
| A F ADV GP KOR | | | | | | | 179 | 166 | 179 | 166 | 8 | 8 | 187 | 174 | 13 | 13 |
| SUB-TOTAL(SV ADV GP) | 812 | 805 | 108 | 109 | 59 | 56 | 179 | 166 | 1158 | 1136 | 97 | 71 | 1255 | 1207 | 541 | 537 |
| GRAND TOTAL | 1866 | 1818 | 296 | 306 | 114 | 103 | 716 | 720 | 2992 | 2947 | 203 | 185 | 3195 | 3132 | 1051 | 1050 |

SOURCE, PACOM Digest, Feb 68, p 92.

AVAILABLE FORCES

| CINCUSARPAC | CINCPACFLT | CINCPACAF |
|---|---|---|
| ASSIGNED TO CINCPAC AS OF 1 NOVEMBER 1967 | | |
| <p>1 Army Hq 2 Corps Hq 2 Field Force Hq 1 Hqs U.S. Army Spt 7 Inf Div (-) 1 Airmobile Div 2 Abn Brigades 3 Inf Brigades 1 Armd Cav Regt 1 Missile Cmd (AT) 3 Logistical Cmd 2 Engr Bde 2 Arty Bde (AD) 1 Corps Arty 2 Field Force Arty 2 Special Forces Gp(-) 3 Engr Gp (Cmbt) 7 Engr Gp (Const)</p> | <p>12 Engr Bn (Cmbt) 20 Engr Bn (Const) 1 Arty Gp (AD) 3 Nike-Hercules Bn (+) 8 Hawk Bn 3 AW Bn (40mm) w/atclhd .50 MG Btry 4 Arty Gp 1 Sergeant Bn 8 8" How Bn 5 175mm Gun Bn 6 155mm How Bn(+) 9 105mm How Bn 1 Honest John Bn 1 Little John Bn 3 Tgt Acq Bn 1 Avn Bde 2 Avn Gp</p> | <p>2 Numbered Fleets 10 Attack Carriers (CVA)\$ 4 ASW Support Carriers (CVS)\$ 8 Cruiser Types\$ 60 Submarine Types 128 Destroyer Types + 99 Amphibious Warfare Types 28 Patrol Ships Types 43 Mine Warfare Ships 8 SOSUS Stations 132 Auxiliary Ships \$</p> <p>1 Fleet Marine Force (including 2 MARDIV/WING Teams, 1 RLT and 1 BLT)</p> <p>+ 10 Atlantic Fleet DD Augmented \$ 1 Atlantic Fleet Unit Augmented % 5 Bns Lant Flt Augmented</p> |
| IN PACOM BUT NOT ASSIGNED TO CINCPAC | | |
| <p>USASA Units in Pacific</p> <p>Army Natl Guard Units Army Reserve Units</p> <p>1 Nike-Hercules Bn (+) 1 Inf Bde (2-Inf Bns 1-105mm How Bn) 1 Arty Gp (AD)</p> <p>1 Inf Bn 1 CA Gp 1 Engr Const Bn 1 Corps Hq (AUG)</p> | <p>25 Naval Reserve Training Ships Naval Security Groups, Pacific</p> | <p>1 Air Refuel Wg (SAC KC-135) PACAF Mission Young Tiger 1 Air Refuel Wg (SAC KC-135) Arc Light & Reflex 4 Bomb Heavy Sqns (SAC B-52) Arc Light & Reflex 1 Ftr Intep Sqn (HANG F-102 Hickam) 3 Military Airlift Sqns (MAC C-124) 3 1/2 Wea Recon Sqns (MAC WB-47, WC-130 & WC-135) 1 Abn EW Flt (ADC EC-121) COLLEGE EYE 1 Test Sqn (AFSC C-130 & CH-3) Air Force Security Service Units (AFSS) Air Force Communications Service Units (AFCS) Air Weather Service Units (HAC) Air Rescue Service Units (HAC)</p> |
| MAJOR AUGMENTATION FORCES WHICH MAY BE AVAILABLE IN EMERGENCY | | |
| <p>See Part I of Annex A (Joint Strategic Capability Plan (JSCP).</p> | <p>See Part I of Annex A (Joint Strategic Capability Plan (JSCP).</p> | <p>See Part I of Annex A (Joint Strategic Capability Plan (JSCP).</p> |

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
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DEPLOYMENT OF MAJOR GROUND UNITS

AS OF 15 MAY 1967

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
10



SOURCE: PACOM Digest, May 67, p 24

DEPLOYMENT OF MAJOR GROUND UNITS

AS OF 1 NOVEMBER 1967



11

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SOURCE: PACOM Digest, Nov 67, p. 23.

SECRET


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DEPLOYMENT OF MAJOR NAVAL AIR & SHIP UNITS

AS OF 15 MAY 1967

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
12



SOURCE: PACOM Digest, May 67, p 25

DEPLOYMENT OF MAJOR NAVAL AIR & SHIP UNITS

AS OF 1 NOVEMBER 1967



13

** 10 DD TYPES AUGMENT FROM LANI11
1 AF AUGMENT FROM LANI11


SOURCE: PACOM Digest, Nov 67, p 24.

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DEPLOYMENT OF MAJOR AIR FORCE FLYING & MISSILE UNITS AS OF 15 MAY 1967

14




SOURCE: PACOM Digest, May 67, p 23

DEPLOYMENT OF MAJOR AIR FORCE

FLYING & MISSILE UNITS

AS OF 15 MAY 1967

15




SOURCE: PACOM Digest, May 67, p 22

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
DEPLOYMENT OF MAJOR AIR FORCE FLYING & MISSILE UNITS AS OF 1 NOVEMBER 1967

16



SOURCE: PACOM Digest, Nov 67, p. 27.

DEPLOYMENT OF MAJOR AIR FORCE FLYING & MISSILE UNITS AS OF 1 NOVEMBER 1967




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SOURCE: PACOM Digest, Nov 67, p 26.

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SECTION II -
ACTIVITIES TO IMPROVE THE CINCPAC STAFF ORGANIZATION

~~(S)~~ CINCPAC's organization continued to increase in size, but not by so great a percentage as in 1966. Changes are shown in the accompanying table, "Growth of CINCPAC Staff Divisions."

Manpower Authorizations

(U) The Joint Manpower Programs (JMP) and Joint Tables of Distribution (JTD) for the CINCPAC staff and closely related support units are discussed in this section.

CINCPAC Staff

(U) On 17 January CINCPAC submitted to the JCS the revised JMP with a recommended increase of 97 billets for immediate approval.¹ The JCS approved the action on 29 March.² This resulted in a revised manpower authorization of 1,225 billets and a 1 July 1967 programmed figure of 1,271 billets.

(U) In May the JCS approved a request for an increase of 15 additional billets, 13 for the Operations Division and two for the Logistics Division, as a result of expanded workload and new mission requirements, with a revised authorization of 1,286 manpower billets for 1 July 1967.³

~~(S)~~ As a result of a special survey of activities related to US air strikes in Southeast Asia, the JCS approved the establishment of an Operations Security Branch in the Operations Division with a staff of 17 additional personnel, for a revised authorization of 1,303 manpower billets as of 1 July 1967.⁴

~~(S)~~ In March⁵ CINCPAC requested an increase in the JMP for the Defense Liaison Group, Indonesia to 22 billets. The JCS authorized

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1. CINCPAC ltr 5320 ser 081, 17 Jan 67.
 2. JCS 1303/292211Z Mar 67.
 3. CINCPAC 132255Z May 67; JCS 6580/292210Z May 67.
 4. CINCPAC 130358Z Jun 67; JCS 9149/291917Z Jun 67.
 5. CINCPAC ltr ser 0358, 27 Mar 67.

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only 14, an increase of 8 spaces.¹ The revised FY 68 CINCPAC JTD authorization of 1,312 billets approved by the JCS on 18 August included the increase for the Defense Liaison Group and the addition of the Scientific Advisor assigned to the CINCPAC staff.² This action also reduced by four the number of Military Assistance Program-funded billets on the staff JTD as a result of the CINCPAC response to a JCS request to re-identify certain billets on the staff associated with military assistance to Vietnam, Thailand, and Laos as non-MAP, as these programs had become Service funded.³

(U) On 17 August CINCPAC requested from the JCS two additional Marine Corps billets for the Operations Division, which had been previously deferred by the JCS. The action was approved on 6 September with a resulting balance of 1,314 billets for the staff.⁴

(U) In November 1966 CINCPAC had recommended establishment of three billets in the Logistics Division with duty station in Australia for administering the Foreign Military Sales Program. A detailed staffing delayed approval of the request by the JCS until 5 October 1967.⁵ The resulting total was 1,317 staff billets for CINCPAC Headquarters. This was the latest change to the staff for 1967.

Command and Control System Group

(U) On 6 December 1966 CINCPAC⁶ forwarded to the JCS the Command and Control System Group JMP with a proposed FY 68 staffing of 146 billets. This was an increase of 26 billets over the FY 67 authorization. The JCS⁷ approved the action on 18 January, and the authorization remained in effect for the rest of the year.

Airborne Command Post

(U) In October 1966⁸ CINCPAC forwarded to the JCS the proposed JMP for the Airborne Command Post with a recommended staffing of 81.

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1. JCS 8095/161715Z Jun 67.
 2. JCS 4296/182150Z Aug 67; OCMM 011217Z Aug 67.
 3. JCS 5033/122026Z May 67; CINCPAC 300408Z May 67.
 4. CINCPAC 171944Z Aug 67; JCS 5565/061925Z Sep 67.
 5. CINCPAC 020710Z Nov 66; JCS 8136/052017Z Oct 67.
 6. CINCPAC ltr 5320 ser 01219, 6 Dec 66.
 7. JCS 3982/182247Z Jan 67.
 8. CINCPAC ltr ser 01068, 28 Oct 66.

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GROWTH OF CINCPAC STAFF DIVISIONS

| DIVISION | 1 JANUARY 1967 | | | | 31 DECEMBER 1967 | | | | Percent Change |
|---|----------------|-----|-----|-------|------------------|-----|-----|-------|----------------|
| | OFF | ENL | CIV | TOTAL | OFF | ENL | CIV | TOTAL | |
| CINCPAC | 4 | 10 | | 14 | 4 | 10 | | 14 | - |
| Chief of Staff | 3 | 5 | | 8 | 3 | 2 | 1 | 6 | - 25 |
| Deputy CofS, Plans and Operations | 3 | 4 | | 7 | 3 | 2 | | 5 | - 28 |
| Administrative Office * | | | | | | 8 | | 8 | + 100 |
| Deputy CofS, Military Assistance, Logistics, Administration | 3 | 4 | | 7 | 3 | 5 | | 8 | + 14 |
| Joint Secretariat | 13 | 53 | 13 | 79 | 14 | 63 | 16 | 93 | + 18 |
| Personnel Division | 11 | 9 | 4 | 24 | 12 | 12 | 8 | 32 | + 33 |
| Intelligence Division | 84 | 96 | 8 | 188 | 100 | 124 | 20 | 244 | + 30 |
| Operations Division | 137 | 107 | 18 | 263 | 164 | 116 | 20 | 301 | + 15 |
| Logistics Division | 102 | 67 | 31 | 200 | 101 | 69 | 35 | 205 | + 2 |
| Plans Division | 57 | 35 | 6 | 98 | 67 | 32 | 10 | 109 | + 11 |
| Communications and Electronics Division | 38 | 110 | 7 | 155 | 41 | 147 | 7 | 195 | + 26 |
| Performance Evaluation Group | 3 | 2 | | 5 | 3 | 2 | | 5 | - |
| Comptroller | 12 | 7 | 8 | 27 | 12 | 7 | 8 | 27 | - |
| Legal Affairs | 3 | 2 | | 5 | 3 | 2 | | 5 | - |
| Public Affairs | 9 | 11 | 3 | 23 | 9 | 11 | 4 | 24 | + 4 |
| Protocol Office | 2 | 3 | | 5 | 3 | 3 | | 6 | + 20 |
| Medical Office | 1 | 3 | | 4 | 3 | 5 | | 8 | + 100 |
| Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff | 7 | 3 | | 10 | 6 | 2 | | 8 | - 20 |
| Defense Liaison Group, Indonesia | 3 | 3 | | 6 | 8 | 6 | | 14 | + 133 |
| TOTAL | 495 | 534 | 98 | 1128 | 559 | 628 | 129 | 1317 | + 17 |
| Command and Control System Group | 45 | 46 | 29 | 120 | 56 | 56 | 34 | 146 | + 22 |
| Airborne Command Post | 57 | 23 | 1 | 81 | 57 | 23 | | 81 | - |
| PACOM MAP Data Center | 4 | 12 | 20 | 36 | 4 | 11 | 20 | 35 | - 3 |
| PACOM ELINT Center | 26 | 119 | 4 | 149 | 26 | 119 | 6 | 151 | + 1 |
| GRAND TOTAL | 627 | 734 | 152 | 1514 | 702 | 837 | 190 | 1730 | + 14 |

* Joint Administrative Office serving the Chief of Staff and Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and Operations.

** Includes 1 CAS.

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The JCS approved the authorization for 1 July 1967 (FY 68).¹ In November CINCPAC proposed to the JCS some minor changes of the wording in Part III mission and functions statements for FY 69,² which the JCS approved.³

PACOM Military Assistance Program (MAP) Data Center

(U) On 28 October 1966 a proposed JMP was submitted to the JCS for the MAP Data Center.⁴ The JCS approved the action in February 1967 for a proposed 1 July 1967 (FY 68) authorization of 36 billets.⁵ This reflected the conversion of one enlisted space to a civilian space as part of the civilianization program.

(U) In April one civilian billet was transferred from the MAP Data Center to the CINCPAC staff.⁶ The JCS approved this action in May.⁷ The authorization for the MAP Data Center as of 31 December was 35 billets.

PACOM Electronic Intelligence (ELINT) Center

(U) The proposed FY 68 JMP for the PACOM ELINT Center was forwarded to the JCS in November 1966.⁸ They approved the request on 30 January 1967⁹ for a staffing of 151 billets. Although some minor changes in grades and occupational specialties were made during the year the authorization remained at 151 billets.

Civilian Personnel Growth

(U) The civilian strength in the CINCPAC Headquarters had increased from 2 civilians in March 1960 to approximately 200 in 1967. Included in the 1967 growth were two senior level civilians. A Public Law 313 (GS-18 equivalent) space was authorized for the Research and Engineer-

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1. JCS 9392/021659Z Dec 66.
 2. CINCPAC 062100Z Nov 67.
 3. JCS 4177/020144Z Dec 67.
 4. CINCPAC ltr 5320 ser 01069, 28 Oct 66.
 5. JCS 6315/142039Z Feb 67.
 6. CINCPAC 052150Z Apr 67.
 7. JCS 6580/292210Z May 67.
 8. CINCPAC ltr ser 01167, 28 Nov 66.
 9. JCS 4966/301926Z Jan 67.

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ing Consultant to CINCPAC,¹ and a GS-15 space was authorized for the Civilian Personnel Specialist for Joint Civilian Employee Advisory Group activities in the Personnel Division.²

Staff Reorganizations and Augmentations

Joint Civilian Employee Advisory Group Personnel Specialist

(U) A personnel specialist was assigned to CINCPAC's staff to assure that appropriate action was taken by the Joint Civilian Employee Advisory Group (JCEAG) relating to non-US citizen personnel policy to be followed by employing activities of CINCPAC's component command commanders, to participate in the deliberations and decisions of the JCEAG, and to complete the necessary staff actions resulting from JCEAG decisions. He was to represent CINCPAC on civilian employee policy matters and take appropriate staff action on matters that were referred to CINCPAC relating to the utilization of civilian employees throughout the PACOM.

Research and Engineering Consultant for CINCPAC

(U) Dr. Thomas P. Cheatham, Jr., the first special advisor to CINCPAC accredited by the Director of Defense Research and Engineering, arrived in January 1967.³ Dr. Cheatham departed the command in June and was replaced in September by Dr. Joel S. Lawson, Jr.

(U) The consultant was a qualified scientist and technological expert who provided CINCPAC and his staff with advice and counsel on scientific and technical matters related to CINCPAC's missions and responsibilities, acting at all times in an advisory and consultative capacity.⁴ He was authorized direct access to CINCPAC, but was to keep the Chief of Staff informed, when appropriate, on matters of possible staff-wide implications. He maintained close liaison with Defense Research and Engineering personnel and monitored research and development activities within the PACOM and elsewhere in the Department of Defense.

(U) Collaterally he served as Director of the CINCPAC staff Re-

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1. JCS 4296/182105Z Aug 67.
 2. JCS 112028Z May 67.
 3. CINCPAC Command History, 1966, p 103.
 4. CINCPACSTAFFINSTR 3920.2, 17 Apr 67.

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search, Development, Test, and Evaluation Group. This group had evolved in 1967 from the Operations Division's Research and Development Section.¹ When a Research and Engineering consultant was assigned, the chief of the group was to be his deputy; when no consultant was assigned, the chief of the group served under staff supervision of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations.

Operations Division Reorganization

(U) A new organization for the Operations Division became effective 1 April.² Under the Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations and his Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff, the office of a third additional deputy was established for the Command Center and Nuclear Operations. The various numbered branches were realigned under three of the deputies, as follows:

Deputy for Special Operations and Analysis³

Scientific Advisory Group
Military Assistance Program Training Branch
Special Operations Branch
Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation Group
Operational Analysis and Reports Branch

Deputy for Current Operations

Operations Plans Branch
Air Operations Branch
Naval Operations Branch
Ground Operations Branch
Joint Reconnaissance Branch (Center)
Battle Staff
Staff Meteorologist

-
1. CINCPAC Command History, 1966, p 49.
 2. J02/Memo/10-67, 28 Mar 67.
 3. Who also exercised control over the Special Operations Center, Pacific Command, located in Okinawa.

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Deputy for Command Center and Nuclear Operations¹

- Airborne Command Post Branch
- Command Center Branch
- Nuclear Operations/Safety Branch
- Operations Security Branch

New Operations Security Branch

(S) After a special study of activities related to US air strikes in Southeast Asia, the JCS approved establishment of a permanent operations security group on the CINCPAC staff.² CINCPAC established an Operations Security Branch within the Operations Division to be the focal point for the coordination of operational security aspects of operations, communications, communications security, intelligence, and counterintelligence.³ It was manned with personnel of those various specialties; the communications and intelligence personnel were assigned to their respective staff divisions but worked in the Operations Security Branch.

Military Airlift Command Liaison Officer

(U) CINCPAC had asked the Commanding General, Military Airlift Command late in 1966 to furnish a liaison officer to his staff.⁴ Colonel Curtis S. Seebaldt was assigned therefore to the 61st Military Airlift Wing at Hickam Air Force Base with duty as the Military Airlift Command Liaison Officer on the CINCPAC staff. He began serving in that capacity on 15 March 1967.⁵

Marine Corps Personnel Office Established

(U) A new Marine Corps Personnel Section was established on 14 August in the Headquarters Personnel Branch of the Joint Secretariat.⁶ Personnel assigned to the Plans and Personal Services Branch of the Personnel Division performed this function as an additional assigned duty.

-
1. CINCPAC point of contact for coordination with the Pacific Operations Liaison Office at Fuchu Air Station, Japan.
 2. CINCPAC 230537Z Jun 67.
 3. CINCPAC 130358Z Jun 67.
 4. CINCPAC Command History, 1966, p 137; CINCPAC 092122Z Jan 67.
 5. Point Paper, J482, 24 Mar 67.
 6. CINCPACSTAFFNOTE 5400, 14 Aug 67.

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Medical Officer Moves to Camp Smith

(U) The CINCPAC Medical Officer and his staff moved from CINCPACFLT Headquarters at Makalapa, Oahu to CINCPAC's Camp Smith Headquarters on 13 November. ¹

Fleet Operations Control Center, Pacific

(U) CINCPAC's computers and certain communications equipment at Kunia and their operations had long been the responsibility of the Navy's Fleet Operations Control Center, an activity of the shore establishment under CINCPACFLT. ² On 24 August 1966, the Commanding Officer of the center was ordered to additional duty on the CINCPAC staff. He retained his title but also became JO2D on the CINCPAC staff. Wearing his second hat, he assisted the Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and Operations and served as the central point of contact for all policy matters under the purview of CINCPAC pertaining to the joint utilization of the Kunia facility (and for direct support to CINCPAC, as required). ³

Defense Communications Planning Group Liaison Office Established

(U) A liaison office was activated on 12 December 1966 to represent the Director of the Defense Communications Planning Group (DCPG), who was in Washington, and to serve as a point of contact for matters pertaining to that group's relations with CINCPAC. It was manned by two officers and two clerical personnel, who were attached to, but not a part of, the CINCPAC staff.

(U) They advised CINCPAC on the DCPG's mission, plans, and requirements, as directed by the Director of the DCPG, and conferred with CINCPAC and his staff on matters of intelligence and administrative liaison pertaining to the MUSCLE SHOALS/DYEMARKER programs.

-
1. J76 Chronology, 1 Jul 64 - 31 Dec 67.
 2. CINCPAC Command History, 1966, p 60.
 3. CINCPAC Organization and Function Manual, CINCPACINST P5400.6A, 17 Jun 67.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SECTION III - KEY PERSONNEL CHANGES

Chief of Staff

(U) Lieutenant General Claire E. Hutchin, Jr., USA, became Chief of Staff on 1 July replacing Lieutenant General Paul S. Emrick, USAF, who retired. General Hutchin, CINCPAC's former Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and Operations, was Acting Chief of Staff from 5 June and was promoted to Lieutenant General on 30 June.

Deputy Chiefs of Staff

(U) Major General Royal B. Allison, USAF, became Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and Operations on 15 June. Rear Admiral J. N. Shaffer, USN, became Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Assistance, Logistics, and Administration on 17 April, replacing Rear Admiral Nels C. Johnson, USN.

Assistant Chiefs of Staff

(U) Major General Chesley G. Peterson, USAF, became Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence on 31 March, replacing Major General G. C. Brown, USAF. Brigadier General John D. McLaughlin, USA, replaced Brigadier General F. G. White, USA, as Assistant Chief of Staff for Logistics on 25 April. Rear Admiral Walter L. Curtis, Jr., USN, became Assistant Chief of Staff for Plans on 22 September, replacing Rear Admiral Ralph W. Cousins, USN.

Research and Engineering Consultant to CINCPAC

(U) Dr. Joel S. Lawson, Jr., who arrived 1 September, replaced Dr. Thomas P. Cheatham, Jr., who had arrived on 27 January and departed on 28 June.

Performance Evaluation Group

(U) Colonel Edgar R. Poole, USA, replaced Colonel Thomas L. Mann, USA, as Chief of the Performance Evaluation Group on 13 November.



C E HUTCHIN, JR
LT GEN USA
CHIEF OF STAFF



R A FEAREY
MINISTER
POLITICAL ADVISER



DR J S LAWSON, JR
RESEARCH & ENGINEERING
CONSULTANT



R B ALLISON
MAJ GEN USAF
DEPUTY C/S
PLANS & OPERATIONS



J N SHAFFER
RADM USN
DEPUTY C/S
MIL ASST/LOG/ADMIN



E A JURKENS
COL USAF
JOINT SECRETARY



J C BARNEY, JR
CO USA
AC/S PERSONNEL



C G PETERSON
MAJ GEN USAF
AC/S INTELLIGENCE



H G HUTCHINSON, JR
BGEN USMC
AC/S OPERATIONS



J D McLAUGHLIN
BGEN USA
AC/S LOGISTICS



W L CURTIS, JR
RADM USN
AC/S PLANS




H A FRENCH
BGEN USAF
AC/S COMM & ELEC



E R POOLE
COL USA
P E G



K BENNETT
CAPT SC USN
COMPTROLLER



J B McDEVITT
CAPT USN
LEGAL



T P COLEMAN
COL USAF
PUBLIC AFFAIRS



G D BRADLEY
COL USMC
PROTOCOL



J S COWAN
RADM MC USN
MEDICAL

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Public Affairs Officer

(U) Colonel Thomas P. Coleman, USAF, became Public Affairs Officer on 15 July, replacing Colonel W. L. Helmantoler, USAF.

Protocol Officer

(U) Colonel Gilbert D. Bradley, USMC, replaced Colonel P. H. Hahn, USMC, as Protocol Officer on 15 July.

Command and Control System Group

(U) Colonel William H. Barnidge, USAF, replaced Colonel E. L. Hehn, Jr., USAF, as Director of the Command and Control System Group on 14 July.

PACOM MAP Data Center

(U) Colonel E. W. Santala, USAF, became Chief of the PACOM MAP Data Center on 22 August, replacing Colonel L. W. Evans, USAF.

Taiwan

(U) Vice Admiral John L. Chew, USN, became the Commander, US Taiwan Defense Command on 17 July.¹ Major General Richard G. Ciccolella, USA, became Chief of the Military Assistance Advisory Group, China on 20 June.²

Philippines

(U) Major General Lloyd H. Gomes, USA, assumed duties as the Chief Joint US Military Advisory Group, Philippines on 2 April.

Marianas - Bonin Islands

(U) Rear Admiral Carlton B. Jones, USN, assumed the duties as Commander of Naval Forces, Marianas and as CINCPAC Representative, Mariana-Bonin Islands on 18 May.³

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1. COMUSTDC 170810Z Jul 67.
 2. CHMAAG CHINA MGPA-P 61373/210817Z Jun 67
 3. CINCPACREPMARBO/COMNAVMIANAS 180029Z May 67.

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Australia

(U) Colonel Alexander P. Butterfield, USAF, assumed the duties of USAF Liaison Officer and CINCPAC Representative, Australia on 28 August. ¹

Indonesia

(U) Colonel Herbert F. Roye, USA, became Chief of the Defense Liaison Group, Indonesia on 25 September. ²


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1. CINCPAC 262220Z Jul 67.
 2. CHDLG INDONESIA 250930Z Sep 67.

SECTION IV - COMMAND FACILITIES AND RELATIONSHIPS AND COMMAND AND CONTROL PROCEDURES

New Command Center Building

(U) CINCPAC's new Command Center building, adjacent to and connected with his Headquarters building at Camp Smith, was completed in July 1967, on schedule. Staff elements of the Operations Division occupied the third floor of the new building on 25 July, followed shortly thereafter by elements of the Intelligence Division, who occupied the first and second floors. Elements of the Joint Command and Control System Group occupied the basement area in September. By the end of the year the building housed the Assistant Chiefs of Staff for Intelligence and Operations and their deputies, the CINCPAC Battle Staff, six Operations Division branches, three Intelligence Division branches, and one branch of the Command and Control System Group.

(U) On 14 September, a telephoned bomb threat against the center was received by the Battle Staff. The Joint Secretary directed a search of the center by CINCPAC staff members and Marine Corps guards. The search group was later supplemented by members of the ordnance disposal elements of CINCPAC's component command commanders. No bomb was found. (Two days later the FMFPAC Command Center was the victim of a similar threat, but again no bomb was found.)




US Marine Corps Photo


HEADQUARTERS, COMMANDER IN CHIEF PACIFIC

CAMP H. M. SMITH

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NEW COMMAND CENTER BUILDING AS CONSTRUCTION BEGAN




COMMAND CENTER NEARING COMPLETION

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


INTERIOR VIEWS OF THE NEW COMMAND CENTER BUILDING. ABOVE, THE WAR ROOM; BELOW, THE EMERGENCY ACTION CENTER




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TWO VIEWS OF THE IBM 360/50 COMPUTER IN THE COMMAND CENTER



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DINS Inspection of the Pacific Command

(U) The Directorate for Inspection Services (DINS), in the organization of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Administration, conducted an inspection of the Pacific Command (PACOM) in 1967. Preliminary and preparatory visits were made at CINCPAC Headquarters and the headquarters of selected joint subordinate commands during the period 19 to 28 June 1967. The formal inspection was conducted at CINCPAC Headquarters from 24 July to 14 August 1967. The 43-man team was headed by Lieutenant General Hugh M. Exton, USA, who was the Director for Inspection Services. CINCPAC's Performance Evaluation Group was the project office for the DINS inspection.

(U) CINCPAC was asked by the JCS¹ to comment on the DINS report and its findings.² CINCPAC's comments³ were later reflected in memorandums from the JCS to both the Secretary of Defense⁴ and to CINCPAC.⁵ The basic DINS report and these three commentaries are the basis for the following discussion.

(U) The JCS commented to the Secretary of Defense that the DINS inspection indicated that the PACOM was organized and managed "effectively and is discharging directed functions, missions, and tasks in an efficient manner." Specific DINS findings follow.

Personnel and Special Staff⁶

(U) The DINS noted that CINCPAC manpower management would be improved by the expeditious conduct of on-site surveys of the 28 joint activities within the PACOM. CINCPAC was responsible for the management of 14,174 personnel spaces, but the statistical data on which manpower decisions were being made was largely outdated or inadequate.

(U) Organization of medical support and hospitalization policies were considered problem areas by the DINS despite an excellent PACOM

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1. JCS 2454/15-3, CPRS 280-67.
 2. DINS PACOM Inspection Report, CPRS 000663-67.
 3. CINCPAC ltr ser 002289, 24 Nov 67.
 4. JCSM-6-68, CPRS 00013-68.
 5. SM-3-68, CPRS 00014-68.
 6. Personnel Division, Office of the Comptroller, the Legal Affairs Office, the Medical Office, and the Joint Secretariat.

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record for care of the sick and wounded. They stated that further study of both matters was needed. As a result, CINCPAC was reviewing the organization of medical support, including possible application of automatic data processing techniques for regulating the transporting of patients and possible relocation of certain regulating agencies. CINCPAC rebutted criticisms of hospitalization and evacuation policies, explaining the reasons governing them. The JCS agreed with CINCPAC that the history of acceptable hospital occupancy and the effectiveness of the current medical system, which were under continuous review, did not require further specific study.

(U) The DINS stated that there were two means for reducing the adverse balance of payments in the Military Assistance Program (MAP). One was to consider shipping Army MAP items and material from the Continental United States (CONUS) directly to recipient countries, eliminating costs of extra transportation and storage in the US Army Depot Center, Japan.¹ CINCPAC challenged the transportation and handling costs computed by the DINS, claiming they were too high. The JCS commented that the additional amount spent for stocking support items in Japan (they used the DINS cost estimates) appeared justified in view of increased efficiency in terms of time and services provided. They agreed with CINCPAC that there was insufficient justification for a re-evaluation of procedures in relation to the international balance of payments consideration.

(U) The DINS also stated that administrative and operational costs be included in total MAP materiel costs when determining whether to procure materiel from foreign or domestic sources. Offshore procurement was decided on a case-by-case basis by the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, who applied provisions of a Defense Department directive. Operational costs paid to the US Army Procurement Agency, Japan to support offshore procurement of MAP materiel had been \$900,000 in both FY 65 and FY 66. CINCPAC and the JCS both passed this DINS finding to the Assistant Secretary for International Security Affairs who could evaluate it and change the Defense Department directive appropriately.

Intelligence

~~(S)~~ The DINS noted that there had been a significant increase in responsibilities assigned to the Intelligence Division during the previous

1. Since 1 July 1966 all Army MAP repair parts had been stored there until they were distributed.

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two years, with a corresponding acquisition of additional resources contributing to better support of the mission of CINCPAC. Specific improvements could be made, they noted, upon receipt of specific guidance from the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) regarding the Defense Department's Human Resources Intelligence Program and the processing by the CINCPAC staff of counterintelligence reports received from subordinate commands and endorsed to the DIA. The JCS replied that the DIA was expected to distribute a draft of the Human Resources Intelligence Program Management Manual by 1 March 1968. Full implementation of the program by CINCPAC would still be delayed, however, by the non-availability of qualified specialists to fill authorized military and civilian spaces. The JCS also said that the DIA would provide CINCPAC with more guidance on the processing of counterintelligence reports.

(S) In response to JCS instructions, CINCPAC had established under CINCPACAF a facility which ultimately would be capable of analyzing enemy air defense, but before the problem of countering increased enemy air defense could be fully solved, the DINS stated, additional personnel would be needed in this facility.

(S) The DINS stated that using the IBM 1410 computer at Camp Smith solely for Intelligence Data Handling System processing would give the Intelligence Division the capability to exercise supervision and control over component command Intelligence Data Handling System programs and also to participate in the many programs being developed by the DIA for worldwide applications. The matter of computer resource allocation had long been under study by CINCPAC.

Operations

(S) A General Accounting Office study of the computer capability at the [REDACTED] (CINCPAC's Fleet Operations Control Center) in 1965 had recommended development of a master control program for the AN/FYK-1 computer system to make it more effective. CINCPAC had forwarded to the Chief of Naval Operations the request for development of the \$700,000 program, but the matter was still under study. Meanwhile, the Secretary of Defense had decided to upgrade equipment and acquire new compatible computers for all fixed command centers of the World-Wide Military Command and Control System by FY 72. This decision made the master program for the AN/FYK-1 of only temporary value and therefore uneconomical. The DINS stated that the need for the program should be reexamined. CINCPAC therefore determined that the program should not be developed, a decision the JCS concurred in.

(S) Other problems were related to the incompatibility of the computer systems [at Kunia] and Camp Smith, including the problem of duplicative data bases. In July CINCPAC had recommended replacing the IBM 1604/160A computers at Kunia with equipment compatible with the IBM 360/50 computer installed at Camp Smith. The DINS found that planning for and maintenance of a general war base by CINCPAC was hampered by the incompatible systems. The inspectors also found that better staff planning and guidance to PACOM component command commanders for compilation of a general war data base was required. On 13 October CINCPAC issued planning guidance to his component command commanders.

(S) The DINS agreed that the JCS should not delay in approving CINCPAC's request for acquisition of a second IBM 360/50 computer (to replace the 1410) for Camp Smith as it was vitally needed for CINCPAC's command and control automatic data processing support capability. The JCS approved acquisition of the second IBM 360/50.

(S) CINCPAC's procedures for application of PACOM forces committed to the Single Integrated Operational Plan were considered effective and fulfilled his responsibilities to the JCS.

(S) The DINS noted that the JCS were providing CINCPAC with clear, adequate, and specific guidance regarding air attacks in North Vietnam (ROLLING THUNDER operations).

(S) CINCPAC staff unconventional warfare planning by the Special Operations Center, Pacific, located in Okinawa, was proving satisfactory, the DINS noted, and they found no justification for relocating the function to Camp Smith. In Okinawa the center was in daily contact with the First Special Forces Group, which it would command if contingency or general war plans were executed.

(TS) Special Forces resources could accept additional tasks arising from the execution of contingency plans, but the PACOM Psychological Operations Forces were completely committed in Southeast Asia and Korea, the DINS reported.

(TS) United States Information Agency psychological operations guidance to CINCPAC was found by the DINS to be adequate, but they did

note that, although it was not critical, a representative of that agency had not been provided to CINCPAC in accordance with a command relationship agreement between that agency and the Defense Department.

~~(S)~~ Reports of lessons learned from operations in Southeast Asia were being handled so that they provided timely and useful information to the operating forces, the DINS reported.

Logistics and Military Assistance

(U) The DINS commented on the two-deputy system used by the Assistant Chief of Staff for Logistics, one to manage current logistic operations and the other to manage logistics plans, programs, and systems. They noted that this arrangement enabled response to high priority logistic problems on a timely basis. They said, "Effective control of sealift and airlift resources is exercised throughout PACOM and has made a significant contribution toward eliminating port congestion in SEASIA." The JCS noted this finding and added that they "commend CINCPAC's efforts in this important area."

~~(S)~~ The DINS noted that CINCPAC was not allowed to reallocate air munitions in Southeast Asia or divert munitions enroute to Southeast Asia to support other PACOM requirements without prior approval on a case-by-case basis by the JCS (who had to get it in turn from the Secretary of Defense). The DINS stated that this curtailed independent CINCPAC action to eliminate excesses in Southeast Asia munitions storage sites or preclude development of such excesses, and also to build war reserves in other PACOM areas. The JCS commented to the Secretary of Defense that they were currently reviewing the worldwide status of air munitions to determine necessary action. Meanwhile, in accordance with existing directives, requests for diversions would continue to be reviewed on a case-by-case basis.

~~(S)~~ CINCPAC had repeatedly asked for authority to divert air munitions to his war reserves in areas outside of Southeast Asia. His air munitions reserves were only about 4 percent of the authorized amount and his ground munitions reserves about 60 percent because stocks had been needed in Southeast Asia. A limited buildup had been authorized by the JCS in June 1967, but the DINS found that CINCPAC's capability to respond to contingencies outside Southeast Asia was still limited by the shortages. The JCS noted the finding, but commented that at any one time there were approximately 150,000 tons of air munitions, as well as large quantities of ground munitions, enroute to Southeast Asia. If a

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contingency occurred elsewhere in PACOM, following Secretary of Defense approval these munitions could be diverted concurrently with the redeployment of the forces who would use them.

~~(S)~~ Munitions stocks for Vietnamese and Laotian Armed Forces were higher than required and excesses had been accumulating. The DINS noted that CINCPAC was waiting for approval from the JCS for revision of those levels, which when approved in September resulted in appreciable savings (over \$22 million). Further review was scheduled by CINCPAC for late 1967, when further savings were anticipated.

~~(S)~~ MAP ammunition war reserves for Korean forces in Korea were below authorized levels and were being further degraded by the use of ammunition for which there was no established allowance in incidents along the Korean Demilitarized Zone. The DINS found that the low levels of MAP war reserve ammunition levels in Korea for 17 Army divisions and 1 Marine division degraded their combat readiness posture and that an ammunition allowance for Korean forces committed to action along the Demilitarized Zone was required. The JCS concurred in the finding and on 16 November they furnished the Secretary of Defense with revised data and asked for the 30-day reserve. The JCS also remarked that CINCPAC's earlier proposal to increase stocks to provide for a 45-day reserve for the 18 divisions plus a 15-day reserve for certain reserve units had been previously disapproved by the Secretary of Defense.

~~(S)~~ The DINS noted that the current system for control of US military construction in Southeast Asia was not fully responsive to rapid change. They stated that modification of program procedures would permit a more timely response to operational requirements. The JCS responded that they had authorized a study by a special military construction group. An evaluation of that study would be forwarded to the Secretary of Defense when it was finished.

~~(S)~~ Some MAP-Agency for International Development (AID) strategic mobility projects submitted to the JCS by CINCPAC did not meet acceptability criteria, but these criteria were general and subject to interpretation. The DINS noted that acceptability criteria in greater detail should be furnished to CINCPAC. In response to a 20 September request for more guidance, the JCS replied that funding criteria varied from country to country depending on the relative economic benefits of the project and that detailed guidance would not be developed. They recommended that projects to be considered for AID funding be coordinated with the USAID mission in the country involved.

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(U) CINCPAC had developed an automatic data processing program for base development planning, the DINS noted, which enabled him to keep abreast of the rapidly changing status of construction in the PACOM. Although supporting base development plans for some bases had not been completed, "progress toward this goal is evident and is commendable."

(U) The DINS noted that CINCPAC's contingency and general war plans contained adequate instructions and information pertaining to petroleum requirements. They also noted that the petroleum situation was continually monitored to insure flexibility of supply in the Western Pacific.

(U) Management of MAP planning and programming functions presented problems to CINCPAC because he was not furnished complete and timely guidance by the office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs. His military advisory elements therefore did not have time to prepare and organize their programs as effectively as they could, the DINS stated. The JCS noted the finding.

(U) The DINS noted that CINCPAC's Performance Evaluation Group was used effectively throughout the PACOM to inspect and improve the Military Assistance Program.



Plans

~~(S)~~ The DINS remarked that CINCPAC developed and maintained

~~(S)~~ The DINS stated that a worldwide post-hostilities US military posture should be developed by the JCS to provide CINCPAC with guidance for planning the orderly withdrawal of all US and Free World Forces from South Vietnam. CINCPAC had already prepared a plan for withdrawal under the broad terms of the Seven-Nation Manila Communique as required in the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan FY 68. US strategy, security interests, and relations with area nations (primarily Australia and New Zealand) in the PACOM would also be affected by the announced reduction or withdrawal of United Kingdom forces "east of Suez," and especially in the Singapore-Malaysia area.

~~(S)~~ The JCS said that they had been developing and evaluating alternative military strategies with associated basing concepts and force requirements to preserve principal US interests in the Western Pacific-Asian area subsequent to the conclusion of hostilities. The Secretary of Defense was also preparing statements of general policy and specific actions required for post-hostilities planning. When these were approved they were to be furnished to CINCPAC. The studies under way would also be useful in determining the desired US-Allied military strategy, policy, and posture in areas east of Suez in the 1970s.

~~(S)~~ CINCPAC had discontinued the war gaming of plans because of other work. He relied on the subjective assessment of plans by his more experienced staff planners. The DINS found that the use of war gaming in the development of plans would enhance CINCPAC's capability to assess critical shortfalls, compatibility of missions with forces provided, and risks involved. The JCS agreed with the finding but added that the condition was partly offset by the concentration of the analytical efforts of the Organization of the JCS on PACOM plans and situations.

(U) The DINS stated that command arrangements in Southeast Asia, while complex, were found to be effective.

Communications - Electronics

(U) The DINS summary stated, "The PACOM communications system has grown in the past two years from a marginally effective high frequency system to a highly complex, expensive, and extensive system responsive to the National Command Authorities and to wartime requirements in SEASIA. Liaison and staff relationships with other military, civil, national and international agencies are considered to be commendable. Close and effective relationships between Defense Communications Agency Pacific and CINCPAC are especially noteworthy."

~~(S)~~ The formidable amount of operational reporting and general information message traffic, often relayed in Southeast Asia by command posts and combat operations centers not designed for such a function, had grossly overloaded facilities and the DINS stated that measures were required to reduce serious backlogs in certain communications facilities in the Western Pacific. In November the Deputy Secretary of Defense asked the JCS and the Defense Communications Agency to develop a plan to permit a more responsive traffic flow management and analysis capability. It would use crises indexes such as backlogs and slow service on high precedence messages to provide specific criteria for the implementation of MINIMIZE procedures or other corrective measures.

(U) The DINS found that the current system of processing PACOM telecommunications requirements and programs was not responsive to CINCPAC's command, control, and communications requirements because of the long delays involved¹ in gaining approval and for implementation. The JCS said that they had recently made recommendations on a proposed revision to a Defense Department directive that should result in increased responsiveness to the command and control communication requirements of the commanders of unified and specified commands.

~~(S)~~ CINCPAC's secure voice requirements had been recognized and validated by the JCS, the DINS noted. Requirements had increased, however, because of changing operational needs caused by the war and had not been satisfied, principally because of problems in establishing system configuration criteria but to a lesser degree by problems of siting, funding, and priorities. The JCS replied that the priority of installations for the Automatic Secure Voice Communications (AUTOSEVOCOM) system had been established, with Southeast Asia given the first priority (worldwide) and other PACOM areas the second priority. The Defense Communications Agency expected that all PACOM requirements would be completed by November 1968, the JCS noted.

(U) CINCPAC had recognized and taken action to lessen abuses of the telephone call precedence system and use of the phone for non-essential matters. He had also asked the JCS for assistance in controlling CONUS-originated telephone calls into the PACOM area, the DINS noted.


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1. From statement of requirements to achievement of an operating communications facility took usually not less than two years and in some cases more than three years.

~~(S)~~ CINCPAC had found that the most effective means of improving transmission security in an operational situation was by use of the comprehensive communications security (COMSEC) survey, not by circuit monitoring and analysis alone. As very few personnel were trained in COMSEC survey techniques, however, support by CINCPAC's component command commanders in this regard was limited. The JCS said they would consider the concept of the COMSEC survey for inclusion in their next COMSEC policy memorandum.

~~(S)~~ Management of high frequency allocations was difficult. The acute shortage of available frequencies required multiple sharing of them. The only known system capable of real-time frequency management was the Common User Radio Transmission Sounding (CURTS) System. This had not yet been approved for use by the Secretary of Defense, who had, however, disapproved the continued interim use of the CURTS network that had been installed in the Pacific for testing. CINCPAC was therefore reduced to using manual methods for frequency management of high frequency systems; these methods were not fully responsive to operational requirements, the DINS stated. CINCPAC commented that he strongly endorsed the CURTS system, which was the only available system that offered any promise of real-time frequency management. The JCS added that the Secretary of Defense had tasked the Defense Communications Agency to prepare an operation plan outlining the capability of the CURTS System to support tactical as well as Defense Communication System requirements. The plan was to propose implementation of the CURTS System beginning in early 1969.

~~(S)~~ The DINS noted that radio frequencies for the support of manned space flight operations in the PACOM area must be provided from PACOM resources. CINCPAC, however, lacked an adequately staffed unit such as a Special Frequency Control Center to provide real-time coordination of frequencies to insure positive control during the National Aeronautics and Space Administration's (NASA) APOLLO mission. CINCPAC also required guidance regarding relative priorities between Project APOLLO and PACOM radio frequency requirements from the JCS and the US Military Communications-Electronics Board. The JCS noted that Defense Department radio frequency support of NASA was becoming more demanding. The Military Communications-Electronics Board had assigned NASA 64 high frequencies with a tight time-sharing arrangement and was studying the need for more for the APOLLO program.

~~(S)~~ The DINS and CINCPAC recognized the vulnerability of [REDACTED] facilities to attack by both [REDACTED]




Command and Control System Group Computer Support

(S) CINCPCAC's automatic data processing equipment² and personnel remained subject to the competitive demands of the staff divisions in 1967. CINCPCAC had installed an IBM 1410 computer at Camp Smith in 1966 and at the beginning of the year was awaiting delivery of a 360/50H computer for the new Command Center.

(S) New programs developed by the Secretary of Defense for statistical analysis of operations in Southeast Asia had been written for the IBM 360/50H computer that was installed in the National Military Command Center Support Center. These programs could not be used on the 1410. Also, the capacities of both the 1410 and the 360/50 were expected to be overloaded by January 1968. CINCPCAC therefore in May 1967 requested a second 360/50. The additional capacity of a second 360/50 was expected to be able to alleviate the overload in 1968.³

(S) The JCS validated CINCPCAC's requirement for the second 360/50 in November and asked the Secretary of Defense to approve the acquisition, waive competitive selection requirements to permit sole source lease of the specific unit desired, and grant priority to insure installation during January 1968.⁴



2. CINCPCAC Command History, 1966, p 60.

3. The longer-range study of standardization of automatic data processing equipment being made by the JCS was not expected to result in selection in time to provide equipment before FY 70 and therefore could not satisfy CINCPCAC's near-term needs. See the next item.

4. JCS 3793/281744Z Nov 67.





(S) Of particular concern to the Operations Division was the processing of reports on combat activities (COACT), which were reports on current combat air operations. The Command and Control System Group had suggested a division of the COACT data processing functions with preprocessing and file maintenance to be done at Kunia, and with querying of the file to be done at Camp Smith.² This suggestion was based on the requirement for daily utilization of the Interim Data Transmission Network circuit at Kunia as well as the projected overload of the Camp Smith computers.

(S) CINCPAC investigated also certain data bases prepared using the National Military Command System Information Processing System (NIPS). The Operations Division recommended that the COACT reports be programmed entirely for the 360/50 computer at Camp Smith, using NIPS file maintenance, retrieval, and output programs. They further recommended that certain files³ being maintained in the National Military Command Center be provided to CINCPAC, so that CINCPAC could query them when a requirement arose.

(S) By the end of the year, in response to these various requirements, the Command and Control System Group had developed a 360/50 COACT system for the Camp Smith computer. In addition, queries against those files that had been requested and received from the National Military Command Center were being programmed by the Command and Control System Group and outputs were being provided on a periodic basis.

Computers for the World-Wide Military Command and Control System

(S) In September 1966 the Secretary of Defense stated that for



2. J3 History, Mar 67.
3. Such as Naval Surveillance Activities, Ground Unit Activities, and Naval Gunfire Support.

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the continued development of all of the fixed headquarters of the World-Wide Military Command and Control System it would be desirable if the selection and acquisition of compatible automatic data processing equipment be made from commercial off-the-shelf items, with single-Service logistics support for that selection, acquisition, and maintenance. ¹

The Secretary's purpose was to insure standardization, compatibility, and economy. CINCPAC had leased the IBM 1410 and IBM 360/50 computers that were installed at Camp Smith as an interim measure until the standard system for command and control was selected and available. ²

~~(S)~~ A JCS study indicated the feasibility of standardized equipment procurement ³ and the JCS formed a Joint Technical Specifications Group to develop detailed specifications before the data processing industry was approached. Members of the group included representatives of the unified and specified commands, the Services, the Defense Intelligence Agency, and the National Security Agency. ⁴

~~(S)~~ The group received some guidance regarding system design and phasing concepts from the Deputy Secretary of Defense, who noted, among other things, that each commander would have adequate influence in the development, acquisition, and operation of his command and control system. The CINCPAC staff developed its system design and phasing plans for presentation to a meeting of the Joint Technical Specifications Group in Washington on 13 June 1967. ⁵

(U) At that meeting the commanders of the unified and specified commands were asked to submit a system design and phasing concept for each

1. J02C Brief 10-66, 28 Sep 66.
2. CINCPAC Command History, 1966, p 62.
3. J02C Brief 7-67, 18 Apr 67.
4. (S) The Director of the Defense Communications Agency was later asked by the JCS to develop a data communications study to test the adequacy of the automatic data processing specifications, to measure existing and projected data flow requirements, and to determine the need for direct computer-to-computer communications. Results of the study could indicate a need for an upgrading of existing communications systems or for planning for a new worldwide wideband communications system. (J02C Brief 12-67, 9 Mar 67.)
5. J02C Brief 14-67, 24 May 67.

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element of their command and control systems, to include their subordinate unified commands.¹ CINCPAC staff members visited CINCPAC's subordinate unified commands in July to study their needs in support of command and control systems.²

(U) The JCS then requested augmentation of the Joint Technical Specifications Group by CINCPAC representatives from 9 to 20 October to insure that equipment specifications thoroughly reflected PACOM automatic data processing requirements. Based on their review of the systems design and phasing concepts that had been submitted by CINCPAC, the group required additional information related to the number and location of display devices remote from the central computer, remote display interrogation concepts, automatic data processing workloads during normal versus emergency operations, and the use of satellite computers for certain peripheral tasks.³ This information was furnished by the CINCPAC staff during the October meetings in Washington.

(U) Meanwhile, the Deputy Secretary of Defense approved the establishment of an automatic data processing Standards Policy Group to expedite joint actions pertaining to the automatic data processing management role of the JCS in the World-Wide Military Command and Control System.⁴ Unified commands were invited to participate in the group as they desired. The Director of the PACOM Command and Control System Group was designated as CINCPAC representative to this group.

(U) As part of the standardization program for the World-Wide Military Command and Control System, the JCS also determined that standards should be established for abstracts describing computer systems and programs in use to facilitate the sharing of analysis and design experience and the exchange of operational computer programs

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1. CINCPAC 050140Z Jul 67.
 2. On 8 March 1967 CINCPAC had requested approval for a command and control computer for Headquarters MACV. (J02C Brief 18-67, 5 Jun 67) The JCS approved the plan and designated the Navy as executive agent for the project. The MACV computer became operational in November.
 3. J02C Brief 34-67, 29 Sep 67.
 4. J02C Brief 31-67, 14 Sep 67.

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to minimize duplication of effort. ¹ Abstracts of existing programs were forwarded to the JCS. Abstracts were to be forwarded for subsequent programs as those programs were developed.

(U) The JCS planned to distribute the total package of system abstracts periodically to all Defense Department organizations responsible for automatic data processing applications in the World-Wide Military Command and Control System. ² In October the JCS published refined standards outlining the minimum content of abstracts to be forwarded for inclusion in this package. ³ CINCPAC's Command and Control System Group began a review of computer program documentation in use to insure that all abstracts met the stated requirements.

(S) The inspection by the Directorate for Inspection Services in the summer of 1967 called attention to CINCPAC's requirement for a master control program for the AN/FYK-1 computer system. The program requirement was under review by the Chief of Naval Operations. The inspectors noted that the Secretary of Defense's plans to upgrade and modernize computers used by fixed command centers would probably limit the useful life of the AN/FYK-1 for such purposes and it therefore was not economical. CINCPAC agreed that the program should not be developed, the JCS approved the recommendation, and the program was cancelled. ⁴

(U) The JCS also worked toward publishing a Defense Department Data Standards Manual, the purpose of which was to establish common names, definitions, and codes for data elements used within all Defense Department data systems. ⁵ The Joint Command and Control Standards Committee of the JCS was responsible for recommending standards for the data elements used in reporting systems of the World-Wide Military Command and Control System. ⁶ Various Defense Department agencies (such as the JCS and the Defense Intelligence, Communications, and Supply Agencies) were assigned responsibility for developing recommended standard data elements, which were to be coordinated with the other department agencies before being submitted to the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) for consideration as de-

1. J02C Brief 47-67, 27 Feb 67.

2. J02C Brief 21-67, 15 Jan 67.

3. J02C Brief 36-67, 25 Oct 67.

5. J02C Brief 19-67, 9 Jun 67.

6. J02C Brief 29-67, 25 Aug 67.

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partment standards.

Force Status (FORSTAT) Reporting

(U) In 1966 the JCS began action to establish a Force Status Report (FORSTAT), which was designed to replace and consolidate the Operational Status Report (REDOPS), the Nuclear Capability Report (NUCAP), and portions of the Commanders Situation Report (SITREP).¹ In December 1966 CINCPAC representatives attended the first of a series of conferences convened by the JCS and attended by representatives of the unified and specified command commanders, the Services, and other Defense Department agencies. The new report was designed to be an "open-end" report — that is, the basic report required by the JCS, and consisting of about 115 items, could be expanded as needed to satisfy contributing or using agencies. Implementation of the new report was planned for 1 February 1968.

(U) As requested, the CINCPAC staff reviewed and commented on preliminary FORSTAT reporting instructions and proposed data elements. Most of the changes recommended by CINCPAC regarding the data elements were adopted,² but there remained a question about the full impact the new reporting system would have on the workload of the CINCPAC staff and its equipment. The problem was mainly the number of units for which data was to be reported, that is, the level or echelon of combat or combat support units in all Services to be included in the report.

(U) A conference convened by the JCS in Washington on 29 August was attended by members of the CINCPAC staff.³ The definition of a reportable unit was clarified at the conference.⁴ The number of units to be reported on by CINCPAC was greater than the number that had been reported on in the REDOPS, but did not include every unit assigned a Unit Identification Code, as had been stated in earlier JCS FORSTAT instructions. The requirement to report on a greater number of units could be imposed on CINCPAC at some future time, however, as a result of an expansion of the FORSTAT data base, both in the number and type of reported units and the data associated with them.

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1. J3 Brief 275-67, 16 Oct 67; J3/Memo/884-67, 17 Aug 67.
 2. J3/Memo/884-67, 17 Aug 67.
 3. J3A5 Memo, Trip Report on Status of Forces Report Conference, 7 Sep 67.
 4. And in JCS 6304/141924Z Sep 67.

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(U) Final detailed reporting instructions were received from the JCS in October. ¹ The FORSTAT was to be processed by the Command and Control System Group on CINCPAC's IBM 360/50 computer at Camp Smith.

Nicknames

(U) The JCS published a new nickname policy late in 1966. ² The unified and specified commands, the Services, and Defense Department agencies were assigned blocks of alphabetical letters from which nicknames were to be assigned after 1 April 1967. Nicknames that had been assigned prior to that time could be used only until 31 December 1967, by which time all nicknames were to be in accordance with the revised system.

(U) CINCPAC redefined code words and nicknames in CINCPAC Instruction 5510.1B of 7 February 1967 in accordance with the JCS policy, and also furnished a list of valid nicknames proposed for use by the CINCPAC staff. ³ CINCPAC's component and subordinate unified command commanders, his representatives, and the chiefs of PACOM military advisory elements were asked to furnish lists of nicknames in use and unclassified descriptions of their meanings. It was planned to incorporate all of them in an automatic data processing program designed to monitor the system accurately with minimum personnel requirements. ⁴

(U) Various elements subordinate to CINCPAC did not like the new approach to nicknames. COMUSMACV, particularly, thought nicknames

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1. J3 Brief 275-67, 16 Oct 67.
 2. A nickname was defined as a combination of two separate unclassified words assigned an unclassified meaning and employed for administrative convenience or for morale or public information purposes. Nicknames could be assigned to events, projects, maneuvers, tests, exercises, operations, or other activities involving elements of information of any classification category, but the nickname, the description or meaning it represented, and the relationship of the nickname to the meaning had to be unclassified. It was not designed nor allowed to be used to achieve a security objective. Code words were designed for security reasons.
 3. J3/Memo/76-67, 3 Feb 67.
 4. J3 History, Jan 67.

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used in his command should have "dignity and cogent meaning" and he so informed CINCPAC, who endorsed the opinions and recommended to the JCS that the program be modified.

(U) The JCS, therefore, in July requested a list of nicknames that were associated with continuing operations and were such that a change of nicknames would adversely affect combat operations or cause confusion throughout the command structure. In reply, CINCPAC furnished a list of 45 nicknames considered desirable for retention.¹ The JCS approved retention of 31 of them.²

(U) In early November the matter opened again regarding the selection of nicknames for operations in Southeast Asia, particularly in Vietnam. General Westmoreland and Admiral Sharp appealed to General Wheeler, as a result of which the JCS provided relief from the alphabetical block system for selection of nicknames for combat operations in Southeast Asia.³ CINCPAC therefore directed that his component command commanders and COMUSMACV submit proposed nicknames at least 15 days prior to their activation to permit checking them against the master worldwide nickname list. Proposed names not in use elsewhere were to be authorized. All other CINCPAC directed activities except combat operations in Southeast Asia were still to be governed by the alphabetical block system assigned by the JCS.

Logistic and Administrative Support for Camp Smith

(U) The primary responsibility for the support of CINCPAC's Headquarters at Camp Smith was assigned to CINCPACFLT.⁴ Additional support was furnished by CINCPAC's other component command commanders. Personnel support matters, for example, were handled for staff members by their respective Services in such areas as pay and allowances, housing, medical care, reassignment travel, etc. CINCPAC's occupancy of space and the provision of maintenance type services at Camp Smith were the result of an agreement with the Commanding General, FMFPAC, whose headquarters at Camp Smith had been a Marine installation exclusively before CINCPAC and his staff began joint occupancy. The Army (CINCUSARPAC) provided certain communications services, but most other support was provided by

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1. CINCPAC 290316Z Sep 67.
 2. CINCPAC 190425Z Dec 67.
 3. JCS 112158Z Dec 67.
 4. CINCPACINST 5400.3B, 23 Oct 67.

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Navy agencies.

(U) The Naval Supply Center, Pearl Harbor provided fiscal accounting support. The Commandant of the 14th Naval District was charged to provide telephone service and wire facilities for teletype requirements, duty travel arrangements (other than for permanent change of station) for all CINCPAC staff members, publications and printing services, and training aids for use by the staff in briefings. Several other Navy agencies provided appropriate services as requested by CINCPAC; these included the Public Works Center, US Naval Base, the Officer in Charge of Construction, Naval Facilities Engineering Command Contracts, Mid-Pacific; the Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard; and the Naval Shore Electronics Engineering Activity, Pacific. Some services were provided on a reimbursable basis, others not.

Support for Headquarters of CINCPAC's Subordinate Unified Commands

(U) The JCS asked for CINCPAC's comments on a Secretary of Defense proposal to designate military department responsibility for administrative and logistic support of the headquarters of subordinate unified commands in a revised Defense Department directive.¹ CINCPAC commented on the proposed changes in February.² He recommended that the JCS support revision of the Defense Department directive to designate the military departments responsible for such support functions and that administrative and logistic support be continued as presently programmed. Support was provided by the Services as follows:

COMUSMACV - Army
COMUSMACTHAI - Army (Navy prior to 1 July 1967)
COMUS Japan - Air Force
COMUS Korea - Army
COMUSTDC - Navy

(U) The JCS recommended to the Secretary of Defense that the military department responsible for administrative and logistic support for a subordinate unified command should be the same as that responsible for supporting the headquarters of the parent commander.³ They considered it desirable that the same department should also be responsible for funding and budgeting support. They recommended to the

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1. JCS 4796/271755Z Jan 67.
 2. CINCPAC 110401Z Feb 67.
 3. J4 Brief 64-67, 18 Mar 67.

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Secretary that such support for the PACOM be provided by the Department of the Navy. Inter-Service support arrangements could still be made, but would have to be approved by the Department of the Navy. The Department of Defense issued Defense Department Directive 5100.3 on 16 March 1967 assigning to the Navy Department responsibility for providing or arranging for the administrative and logistic support of the headquarters of CINCPAC and the PACOM subordinate unified commands.

CINCPAC/USCINCSO Command Relationship Agreement

(C) In November 1967 the Commander in Chief, Southern Command (USCINCSO) concurred in a CINCPAC proposal made earlier that month regarding the role in PACOM maritime operations of the Commander US Naval Forces, South (COMUSNAVSO).¹ The agreement was signed and became effective 16 December.

(C) CINCPAC's responsibilities in the Pacific adjacent to the Southern Command area included submarine, antisubmarine, mining, and control and protection of shipping operations. The USCINCSO was responsible for the inshore defense to the Pacific entrance of the Panama Canal including the harbor defense of Balboa. CINCPAC exercised his responsibilities through CINCPACFLT, who, as necessary, discharged the authority through the Commander Panama Sector Western Sea Frontier/CTG 31.7, who was also the COMUSNAVSO, the Navy component commander of USCINCSO. Assignment as Commander Task Group 31.7 would not alter his functions as component commander. He would remain responsive to the operational command of USCINCSO in matters that normally pertained to a unified command, required intra-theater coordination or direction, or affected the accomplishment of the US-SOUTHCOM mission.

DOD-FAA Planning for Emergency or Wartime Relationships

(U) On 8 July 1964 the President issued Executive Order 11161 regarding certain relationships between the Defense Department and the Federal Aviation Agency (FAA).² The order directed planning in anticipation of the probable transfer of the FAA to the Defense Department in the event of war. The Defense Department would be empowered to direct the FAA Administrator to place his operational elements under

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1. J5 History, Dec 67; CINCPAC 020001Z Nov 67.
 2. J5 Brief 40, 30 Jan 67.

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the direct operational control of appropriate military commanders. In June 1966 the JCS, preparing their recommendation on the matter for the Secretary of Defense, asked for CINCPAC's comments. The JCS planned to recommend to the Secretary that the Commanders in Chief, North American Air Defense, European, and Pacific Commands develop basic plans upon which other commanders of unified and specified commands or subordinate commanders, in consultation with appropriate FAA elements, could base supporting plans or agreements to establish the relationships and procedures that would pertain in their areas. CINCPAC concurred in general with the recommendation.

(U) Subsequently CINCPAC was tasked by the JCS to develop a plan in coordination with the FAA's Pacific Region.¹ The plan identified FAA operational elements for which the Defense Department would assume operational control in emergency conditions, it permitted other commanders to plan to assure that FAA functions were performed so as to satisfy national defense requirements in national emergencies short of war, and it directed action to reaffirm Defense Department-FAA agreements as necessary, routinely updating them to reflect additional authorities. The JCS then developed appropriate emergency action alerting procedures. At the end of the year the PACOM plan had been prepared and was waiting for CINCPAC's approval before being forwarded to the JCS.

1. J5 Brief 73, 2 Mar 67.

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SECTION V - CHANGES IN THE COMMUNIST THREAT DURING 1967¹

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

(S) Soviet armed forces strength in the Far East remained fairly stable during 1967. Ground strength increased by one division while air strength remained at about the same level. The Pacific Ocean Fleet's submarine force decreased slightly. The principal change in the threat from the Soviet Union was the sharp increase in ICBM launchers and newer, more sophisticated missiles. These missiles could be deployed against targets in Asia and the Pacific as well as those in the United States.

Communist China

(S) The principal change in the threat from Communist China was in its growing nuclear weapon and guided missile capabilities. Two nuclear weapons were detonated and several missile test firings took place during the year bringing Communist China very near to, if not achievement of, initial operational capability in both weapons.

(S) In the war industry sector, a plutonium production facility may have begun production, which would greatly enhance Communist China's nuclear weapons production capability. MIG-19 production continued. These aircraft, replacing the MIG-15/17 series, enhanced China's air defense posture.

(S) Although internal dissension siphoned off some military strength for internal security and administrative control, China continued to support guerrilla activities in Southeast Asia and increased the number of support troops in North Vietnam.

North Vietnam

(S) During the year there was little change in the military capabilities of North Vietnam with the exception of the Air Force and air defense forces. Even though the number of MIG aircraft did not change appreciably, individual pilot and ground controller proficiency improved to a significant degree. MIG pilots were more willing to engage US aircraft under less favorable conditions and employ coordinated tactics between

1. J2 History, Jan 68.

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Provision of Information Act
by the National Institute
Nuclear Policy Project

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flights of different types of aircraft to enhance the best performance characteristics of each type. Additionally, there were indications of close coordination between all elements of the air defense system so that interference between antiaircraft artillery (AAA), surface-to-air missiles (SAM), and MIG fighters was usually avoided. SAM and AAA order of battle figures did not change to any great degree during the year.

The North Vietnamese Navy maintained its passive posture during the year with no significant changes in personnel or equipment strengths and locations. Infrequent limited training operations were confined to the Haiphong/Cac Ba area. Some units were noted in the vicinity of Hanoi where they augmented AAA defenses in that area.

There was little change in strength of in-country forces of the North Vietnamese Army during the year. Infiltration to the south continued and largely absorbed increases in military manpower generated in the north. The Army was assessed as a well organized, well equipped, combat effective force.

North Korea

North Korean Army and Air Force strengths remained rather stable. Navy strength increased with the acquisition of two additional submarines and seven guided missile patrol boats.

Air defense capabilities were improved by increased numbers of surface-to-air guided missile launchers.

There was a marked increase in infiltration of agents and saboteurs into South Korea and of provocative acts in the Demilitarized Zone area. North Korea's increased belligerence constituted the second most serious threat to peace in the Far East in 1967.

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COMMUNIST FAR EAST GROUND STRENGTH

AS OF 1 NOVEMBER 1967

| USSR* | CHINA | NORTH VIETNAM |
|---|--|---|
| MAJOR FIELD UNITS OF SOVIET ARMY** 1 Combined Arms Army Hqs 1 Corps Hqs 7 Motorized Rifle Divisions** (TO 10,535) 7 Tank Divisions (TO 8,506) 1 Airborne Division (TO 7,300) 1 Artillery (Gun) Division 1 Rifle Brigade 2 Artillery Brigades 1 SS-1 (SCUD) Brigade PERSONNEL: 155,000*** * Includes Transbaikal & FE Military Districts. ** One possible additional division may be on Sakhalin. *** Does not include: (a) ground units assigned to territorial air defense (PVO); (b) coastal defense forces of Soviet Navy; (c) ground crews & support elements of the air forces; (d) Internal Security Forces 7,900 to 15,600 and Border Guard Troops 20,300 to 40,000. | 34 ARMIES: 106 Infantry Divisions (TOE 13,910) 24 ARTILLERY DIVISIONS: 15 Field Artillery (T/O HOW-6,344) 3 AT (T/O GUN-5,378) *6 AAA (T/O 4,220) (T/O 3,143) 5 ARMORED DIVISIONS (T/O 8,004) 3 CAVALRY DIVISIONS (Security) (T/O 5,710) 3 AIRBORNE DIVISIONS (T/O 10,263) 20 BORDER DEFENSE/MIS DIVISIONS (T/O 8,538) 11 RAILWAY ENGINEER DIVISIONS (T/O 11,012) 127 INDEPENDENT REGIMENTS** PERSONNEL (Army) 2,335,000 (Security Forces) 500,000 * 20 additional AAA divisions subordinate to Air Defense Command of the CCAF. ** Includes 6 Infantry, 8 Tank and 5 Cavalry. | REGULAR FORCES 10 Inf Div (T/O 10,400 (est)) 1 Arty Div (Note 1) (T/O 4,500 (est)) 1 AAA Command (103 AAA Regts) (T/O 133,900 (est)) 3 Inf Brigades (T/O 5,500 (est)) 1 Arty Brigade (T/O 1,200 (est)) 6 Independent Inf Regiments (T/O 2,500 (est)) 2 Independent Armored Regiment (T/O 1,300 (est)) 7 Independent Arty Regiments (T/O 1,200 (est)) 8 Independent Engr Regiments (T/O 1,750 (est)) 30-35 Independent SAM Bns (T/O 150 (est)) 7 Independent Trans Regiments (T/O 450 (est)) MILITIA: Local part-time, lightly armed troops SECURITY FORCES OF MINISTRY OF PUBLIC SECURITY: Armed Public Security Forces (5 Regts and 5 Bns) PERSONNEL: Regular Army 458,300 (Note 2) Militia (Note 3) APSF 22,500 (Note 4) |
| NORTH KOREA 5 Army Group Hqs 19 Infantry Divisions (TO 9,200) 1 Tank Division (TO 4,727) 3 Antiaircraft Artillery Divisions (TO 3,500) 5 Infantry Brigades (TO 8,700) 2 Artillery Brigades (Howitzer - 152mm) (TO 1,400) 2 Mortar Brigades (Heavy - 160mm) (TO 1,200) 1 Rocket Launcher Brigade (TO 1,200) 1 Reconnaissance Brigade 4 Medium Tank Regiments 1 Heavy Tank Regiment 2 Independent Infantry Regiments 7 Corps Artillery Regiments 2 Army Group AAA Regiments 7 Corps AAA Regiments PERSONNEL: Army 344,300 Security Forces 8,000 | NOTES: 1. Possible Artillery Command vice Division. 2. Strength includes NVA deployed outside NVN. 3. Estimated potential 3,000,000 including females, not included in above personnel strength totals. 4. Strength may be as high as 30,000. | |

SOURCE: PACOM Digest, Nov 67, p. 28.

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COMMUNIST NAVAL STRENGTH

FAR EAST & PACIFIC

AS OF 1 OCTOBER 1967

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| CATEGORY | | USSR | COMMUNIST CHINA # | NORTH KOREA | NORTH VIETNAM | TOTAL |
|--|--------------------------|---------------------|----------------------|---------------------|---------------|-------|
| SUBMARINES | <u>NUCLEAR</u> | | | | | |
| | BALLISTIC MISSILE | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 |
| | CRUISE MISSILE | 15 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 15 |
| | TORPEDO ATTACK | 3 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 |
| | <u>DIESEL</u> | | | | | |
| | BALLISTIC MISSILE | 9 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 10 |
| | CRUISE MISSILE | 5 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 5 |
| | LONG RANGE ATTACK | 21 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 21 |
| | MED RANGE ATTACK | 46 | 29 | 2 | 0 | 77 |
| | SHORT RANGE ATTACK (OLD) | 0 | 4 | 0 | 0 | 4 |
| PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS | OLD HEAVY CRUISER | 1 ^a | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| | LIGHT CRUISERS (MISSILE) | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 |
| | LIGHT CRUISERS (GUN) | 4 ^b | 0 | 0 | 0 | 4 |
| | DESTROYERS (MISSILE) | 4 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 4 |
| | DESTROYERS (GUN) | 26 ^c | 4 | 0 | 0 | 30 |
| | ESCORTS (DE,PCE) | 24 ^d | 8 | 0 | 0 | 32 |
| MINOR SURFACE COMBATANTS AND SUPPORT SHIPS | MINOR SURFACE COMBATANTS | 238 | 468 | 72 | 31 | 809 |
| | MINE WARFARE TYPES | 74 | 80 | 26 | 0 | 180 |
| | AMPHIBIOUS WARFARE TYPES | 136 | 279 | 8 | 0 | 423 |
| | NAVAL AUXILIARY TYPES | 191 | 72 | 0 | 0 | 263 |
| | SERVICE CRAFT TYPES | 33 | 349 | 90 | 35 | 507 |
| PERSONNEL STRENGTH | | 91,000 ^e | 125,000 ^f | 10,200 ^g | 2,500 | |

SOURCE: PACOM Digest, Nov 67, p. 31.

- a. In reserve
- b. Two in reserve
- c. Four in reserve
- d. Two in reserve

- e. Does not include personnel in Naval Aviation, Coastal defense or training
- f. Does not include 17,300 personnel of Naval Air Force
- g. Possibly includes Naval Infantry and Coast Defense personnel

SUMMARY OF COMMUNIST FAR EAST AIR FORCES

AS OF 1 OCTOBER 1967

| | USSR ¹ | | CHINA | | NORTH KOREA | NORTH VIETNAM | TOTAL |
|--|-------------------|---------------|----------------------------|---------------|---------------------------|-------------------------|-------------|
| | AIR FORCE | NAVAL AIR | AIR FORCE | NAVAL AIR | AIR FORCE | AIR FORCE | |
| COMBAT AIRCRAFT² | | | | | | | |
| Jet Fighter (Day) | 413 | | 1520 | 215 | 327 | 77 | 2552 |
| Jet Fighter (A/W) | 463 | | 460 | 110 | 117 | | 1150 |
| Piston Attack | | | | | | | |
| Jet Light Bomber | | | 151 | 108 | 80 | 8 | 347 |
| Jet Medium Bomber | 148 | 129 | 2 | | | | 279 |
| Piston Light Bomber | | | 125 | 10 | | | 135 |
| Piston Medium Bomber | | | 13 | | | | 13 |
| Jet Heavy Bomber | 45 | | | | | | 45 |
| Turboprop Heavy Bomber | 46 | | | | | | 46 |
| Piston Heavy Bomber | | | | | | | |
| TOTAL | 1115 | 129 | 2271 | 443 | 524 | 85 | 4567 |
| SUPPORT AIRCRAFT³ | | | | | | | |
| Piston Transport, Light | 160 | 11 | 175 | 19 | 23 | 62 | 450 |
| Piston Transport, Medium | | | | | | | |
| Jet & Turboprop Transport, Light | 1 | | 4 | | | 3 | 8 |
| Jet Transport, Medium | | 2 | | | | | 2 |
| Turboprop Transport, Medium | 87 | 6 | 13 | | | 1 | 107 |
| Jet Trainer | * | * | * | * | * | 3 | 3 |
| Piston Trainer | * | * | * | * | * | 29 | 29 |
| Helicopter | 87 | 50 | 146 | 15 | 20 | 26 | 344 |
| Recce, Jet | 30 | 34 | 16 | 20 | | | 100 |
| Recce, Turboprop | | 12 | | | | | 12 |
| Recce, Prop | | 22 | | 9 | | | 31 |
| * Not Estimated | | | | | | | |
| TOTAL | 365 | 137 | 354 | 63 | 43 | 124 | 1086 |
| TOTAL COMBAT AIRCRAFT | 1244 | | 2714 | | 524 | 85 | 4567 |
| TOTAL COMBAT SUPPORT | 502 | | 417 | | 43 | 124 | 1086 |
| GRAND TOTAL | 1746 | | 3131 | | 567 | 209 | 5653 |
| PERSONNEL STRENGTHS⁴ | 77,500 | 13,500 | 197,000⁴ | 17,000 | 23,000⁵ | 3700⁶ | |

¹ Includes aircraft within Transbaikal & Far East Military Districts & all bomber aircraft attached to the 3rd Long Range Air Army (Transbaikal, Far East & Turkestan Mil Districts).

² COMBAT AIRCRAFT: Fighter & Bomber aircraft only, which are used in fighter, ground attack or bomber/tanker roles.

³ COMBAT SUPPORT AIRCRAFT: All other aircraft assigned to operational units in support of the combat mission, including light and medium transports, helicopters, all types of

reconnaissance aircraft, all types of utility/liaison aircraft, & jet fighter trainers.

⁴ Includes 120,500 personnel assigned to AA&W, SAM & AAA units.

⁵ Does not include 10,000 personnel in 3 AAA Divs. subordinate to Artillery Command of North Korean Army but under operational control of NKAf for Air Defense.

⁶ Probably is higher but insufficient data available to make an estimate

** Includes 43 jet fighters and two light jet bombers at Peltun/Yunnani, Communist China.

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SOURCE: PACOM Digest, Nov 67, p. 33.

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SUMMARY OF COMMUNIST FAR EAST MISSILE FORCES

AS OF 1 OCTOBER 1967

| USSR * | | CHINESE COMMUNIST | | NORTH KOREA | | NORTH VIETNAM | |
|---------------------------|----------------------|---------------------------|-------------------------------------|---------------------------|-----------------|---------------------------|-----------------|
| TYPE | SITES LAUNCHERS | TYPE | SITES LAUNCHERS | TYPE | SITES LAUNCHERS | TYPE | SITES LAUNCHERS |
| SURFACE TO SURFACE | | SURFACE TO SURFACE | | SURFACE TO SURFACE | | SURFACE TO SURFACE | |
| ICBM | 152 174 | ICBM | | ICBM | | ICBM | 0 |
| IRBM | 3 11 | IRBM | | IRBM | | IRBM | 0 |
| MRBM | 8 32 | MRBM | | MRBM | | MRBM | 0 |
| | | COASTAL DEFENSE | 3 3 | COASTAL DEFENSE | 1 1 | COASTAL DEFENSE | 0 |
| TOTAL | 163 217 | TOTAL | 3 3 | TOTAL | 1 1 | TOTAL | 0 |
| SURFACE TO AIR | | SURFACE TO AIR | | SURFACE TO AIR | | SURFACE TO AIR | |
| SA-2 | 138 ^a 828 | SA-2 | 24 ^c 72-120 ^d | SA-2 | 13 78 | SA-2 ^e | 222 EST 150-200 |
| SA-3 | 15 ^b 60 | SA-3 | | SA-3 | | SA-3 | |
| DM-2 ^f | 2 36-60 | | | | | | |

a. Eighteen sites occupied intermittently or no history of occupancy.
b. Two sites occupied intermittently or no history of occupancy.
c. Only a few are occupied; battalions frequently move between prepared sites. Estimated 30-35 battalions (six launchers per battalion).
d. Chi Com SA-2 sites may consist of 3-5 launchers.
e. Defense Missile Complex.
f. *in area east of 100° E.

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SOURCE: PACOM Digest, Nov 67, p. 35.

SECTION VI - US BASE REQUIREMENTS OVERSEAS

(U) Certain overseas base requirements and usage rights became matters of special study and concern by CINCPAC and his staff in 1967 and are discussed in the following section. CINCPAC continued to urge retention of existing US base rights, but the philosophies of friendly governments in the PACOM continued to evolve, and foreign political pressures for the return of US bases or attempts to place restrictions on the use of some of those bases also continued.

(U) Annually the JCS published a document entitled "U. S. Base Requirements Overseas." The 1967 edition was approved by the JCS on 20 July and forwarded to CINCPAC.¹ As usual, this document was reviewed and revisions were recommended by CINCPAC's component command commanders. These changes were coordinated with CINCPAC's Representatives and subordinate unified command commanders. CINCPAC's recommended revisions were then formulated and forwarded to the JCS in December.² No major changes were included in the PACOM submission.

US Bases in Japan

~~SECRET~~ The defense of Japan and fulfillment of that country's role in regional security dictated continued United States use of bases there. CINCPAC, commenting in March on the possible future of US air posture in Japan, noted that although progress had been made in building and modernizing the Self-Defense Force, Japan would continue to place principal reliance for its defense on US military power³ and the continuation

1. J4 Brief 141-67, 5 Oct 67.
2. CINCPAC ltr ser 000664, 23 Dec 67.
3. The Coordinated Joint Outline Emergency Plan for the Defense of Japan from Attack (S) served as a basis for mutual defense planning should the Japanese Government enter into formal joint planning agreements. The plan, revised annually, was prepared by representatives of COMUS Japan and the Japan Joint Staff Council. Agreements for the 1967 plan (BIG HORN) and the 1968 plan (FOREST BLAZE) were achieved with the Japanese military only, and the planning had no formal sanction other than that of the Joint Staff Council. Operations of CINCPAC's forces were to be under the direct command of PACOM component commanders. Coordination of joint operations was to be effected by the commanders concerned or the commander delegated such responsibility by CINCPAC. (Point Paper, J5111A, 14 Sep 67.)

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of the US-Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security. ¹ Japan would not possess adequate capabilities to defend against Communist aggression for the next five to ten years, he continued, and consequently US capabilities would be required to augment those of the Japanese.

(S) In preparation for President Johnson's talks in November with Japan's Prime Minister Sato Eisaku, the JCS asked CINCPAC for his comments on the role, function, and mission of US Forces in Japan. CINCPAC's reply ² considered the comments he had solicited from his component command commanders and the Commander of US Forces, Japan.

(S) CINCPAC replied that the US military mission in Japan was to assist that country in maintaining its security; to maintain or establish control of essential sea areas, air spaces, bases, and communications and electronics facilities as required; and to be prepared to deploy forces to assist in Japan's defense. He outlined the benefits to Japan from the US presence there, possible changes in the role of Japan's forces, ³ the US contribution to regional security in terms of US strategy and forward defense posture, logistic and base support provided, and the possible use of Japan for the defense of Korea.

(S) Specific CINCPAC comments follow. The paramount military benefit derived by Japan from the presence of US Forces was the assurance of its national defense. Attendant to this was

*PAC NWC
P. 1038*

[REDACTED]

Deliberations with the US military had made the Japanese military increasingly aware of the need to modernize and strengthen their forces. Japan had developed forces that could maintain internal security and combat an invasion by a force of equal size for a limited time. The Constitution severely limited military activities and Japan, accordingly, relied primarily on the security treaty and US Forces in Japan for external defense. Japan was one of the largest foreign base establishments of the United States, and the joint use of bases was mutually beneficial in that close coordination of defense activities was realized.

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1. J5 History, Mar 67.
 2. CINCPAC 111240Z Sep 67.
 3. CINCPAC found roles and missions proper and anticipated no change.

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(S) CINCPAC also commented on economic benefits to Japan. Because the Japanese had not had to build large defensive forces, they had been able to channel the bulk of their assets toward the economic buildup of the nation. Large US dollar expenditures by US Forces in Japan and a manpower reservoir of Japanese trained in US methods were among other economic benefits.

(S) CINCPAC then evaluated the contribution of US Forces in Japan to the overall security of the Asian-Pacific area. He said,

[REDACTED]

Stationing US Forces in Japan enables the US to complete as a defensive perimeter the natural island chain extending from Alaska through Taiwan and the Philippines to Australia and New Zealand. This is vitally important to our forward defense posture. . . . US bases in Japan render significant support to US and other Free World forces in Southeast Asia to include: POL and ammunition storage; rest and recuperation; hospitalization; aero-medical evacuation; transportation of cargo and personnel; aircraft and ship repair; and procurement activities. . . . The Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between Japan and the United States provides that in the event of an armed attack against either party in the territories under the administration of Japan both parties would act to meet the common danger. Further, the treaty grants the US Forces (rent free) use of facilities and areas in Japan. "

(S) CINCPAC discussed also the agreed use of Japanese bases in the event of attack [REDACTED] As a result of a secret agreement between the United States and Japan at the first meeting of the Security Consultative Committee, [REDACTED]


[REDACTED] In this connection, CINCPAC concluded, "should the US vacate its military bases and facilities in Japan, and subsequently desire to use them under the terms of this treaty, it must be assumed that the operational condition of these bases and facilities would prohibit their timely use. "

(U) A specific example of the possible impact of withdrawal of US Forces from one Japan base follows.


Marine Aircraft Units at Iwakuni

(S) Possible relocation of the US Marine attack and fighter squadrons and base support from Iwakuni Marine Corps Air Station, Japan to bases in Hawaii or the West Coast was considered by the Secretary of Defense in April 1967. He stated that the move would still provide a responsive force under CINCPAC's command that could be deployed on short notice, ease Marine pilot rotation problems from South Vietnam, and expand opportunities for the personnel to be with their families. The JCS in turn asked CINCPAC for his views, enumerating several specific areas for comment, and asked for a plan to accomplish the move.¹

(TS) CINCPAC's reply on 5 May² noted that PACOM force requirements in a post-hostilities situation were being studied. He stated that it appeared imprudent to take individual actions that could create new pressures for reversion of bases in the Pacific before these studies were completed. The United States was obliged under the Status of Forces Agreement to return facilities to the Government of Japan when they were no longer needed, he noted.



(TS) Movement of the Marines from Iwakuni could also have an adverse impact, CINCPAC stated, because of the reduction of base support on which Japan Air Self-Defense Forces relied, loss of revenue to the area, reduction in the Japanese work force there, and removal of a potential air defense capability. The Japan Air Self-Defense Force fighter squadron that was stationed at Iwakuni on a joint-use basis would require

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1. JCS 3755/270524Z Apr 67 and 4129/012150Z May 67.
 2. CINCPAC 
 3. Planning continued to include a forward deployed Marine division/air wing.

augmentation; complete withdrawal of base support would probably require the squadron's relocation, decreasing air defense capabilities in that sector.


(S) The patrol squadron (VP) stationed at Iwakuni was also dependent on base support provided by the Marine Base Squadron and could require augmentation of remaining Marine units.

(S) CINCPAC outlined the effects of the proposed move on the First Marine Air Wing in South Vietnam. He said the move could substantially reduce Marine Corps abilities to reinforce COMUSMACV with Marine fighter/attack aircraft. It could reduce the ready reserve emergency capability to replace in-country aircraft losses and would eliminate a base that had been a major factor in insuring optimum combat effectiveness of Marine units in South Vietnam. It would liquidate the useful out-of-South Vietnam support and maintenance capability for fixed-wing aircraft and eliminate an intra-theatre rotation program. Elimination of the rotation program could reduce individual pilot effectiveness, the further effects of which could affect pilot retention adversely. He concluded that the disadvantages of the move outweighed the advantages and recommended against it.

(S) On 9 May CINCPAC provided the requested plan for the move, but again recommended against it.¹

(S) The JCS furnished the Secretary of Defense with a plan and comments on the proposed move, which included substantially the data furnished by CINCPAC.²

(S) On 15 June the Secretary concurred in the recommendation that the Marine Air Group not be relocated from Iwakuni and the matter was closed.³



Reversion
of Ryukyu
Islands
(p. 1078)

1. CINCPAC 090008Z May 67.
2. J5 Brief 163-67, 8 Jun 67.
3. J5 Brief 197-67, 8 Jul 67.



(U) When Japan's Prime Minister Sato visited the United States in November he came with the purpose of discussing the return of the Ryukyus and the Bonins. After two days of talks in Washington, President Johnson and Prime Minister Sato announced on 16 November that negotiations were to begin immediately for the return of the Bonins.² The official communique stated that the United States was to retain military facilities in the Bonins "as required in the mutual security of both countries." The Japanese Prime Minister expressed the intention of the Government of Japan to gradually assume much of the responsibility for the defense of the area.

~~(S)~~ The official communique issued after their talks also addressed the Ryukyus.³ Prime Minister Sato emphasized the strong desire of the Government and people of Japan for the return of administrative rights of the Ryukyu Islands to Japan and emphasized that an adequate solution should be promptly sought on the basis of mutual understanding and trust. The President stated that he understood the desire of the Japanese people, but at the same time they both recognized that the US military bases on those islands continued to play a vital role in assuring the security of Japan and other free nations in the Far East. They agreed to keep the matter under joint and continuous review, with the aim of returning administrative rights over the islands to Japan.

~~(S)~~ Therefore, to minimize stresses that would arise when administrative rights were restored, joint measures should be taken to identify further the Ryukyuan people and their institutions with Japan proper and to promote the economic and social welfare of the Ryukyu residents.

2. STATE 69484/1/151906Z Nov 67.
3. Ibid.

Obtained under the
Freedom of Information Act
by the Nautilus Institute
Nuclear Policy Project

98-113 (4)

This was
secret?

1/15/1906Z?

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To this end they agreed to establish an advisory committee to the High Commissioner in Naha, with both governments and also that of the Ryukyus represented, to develop recommendations toward removing the remaining economic and social barriers between the Ryukyus and Japan. The functions of the Japanese Government Liaison Office would be expanded as necessary to permit consultations with the High Commissioner and the US Civil Administration on matters of mutual interest.

~~(S)~~ On 20 November, US Ambassador to Japan Alexis Johnson was debriefed at CINCPAC's headquarters regarding the Heads of State communique and in connection with negotiations for the reversion of the Bonins.¹ His comments to CINCPAC were as follows. He estimated that the United States could hold its existing position on Okinawa through 1968 and stated his opinion that it would be a few years (1973 to 1975) before the United States would be willing to set a future date with the Japanese for reversion. An important factor to the Japanese, he said, was the determination of a reversion date, rather than a statement of a condition precedent to reversion, such as the easing of tension in the Far East.

~~(S)~~ Regarding the Bonins, Ambassador Johnson cited several problem areas. These included converting from a dollar to a yen economy,² the rights of resident Bonin Islanders on Chichi Jima and returnees, and payments by Japan for facilities transferred to them. He said it should be made clear to the Japanese that reversion imposed obligations on them to assume effective responsibility for government of the islands, utilities, and the maintenance and operation of navigation aids including the Loran A station,³ the weather station, and the fuel farm.

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1. CINCPAC 250348Z Nov 67.
 2. He noted the importance of denying Japan any balance of payments windfall and commented that although the amounts would be small in the Bonins, the principles would apply in future negotiations for the Ryukyus.
 3. The United States was to retain responsibility for operating the Loran C stations.

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(S) CINCPAC was also concerned with protecting the rights of the approximately 200 residents of Chichi Jima who lived on land owned from pre-World War II days by Japanese nationals, resident in Japan, who could be expected to claim their property rights when the islands reverted. ¹ CINCPAC wanted the present residents to be permitted to continue to use the property on which their dwellings were situated. ²

(S) Another question that faced CINCPAC was the post-reversion command relationship with respect to the US military presence in the area. Whether the military there would be under the cognizance of COMUS Japan, CINCPACFLT, or a divided command arrangement had not yet been determined. ³

(S) CINCPAC furnished his recommendations to the JCS in late November regarding matters he believed should be included in the reversion agreement, as follows. ⁴ The Government of Japan should assume responsibility for government of the islands, utilities, and the maintenance and improvement of airfield, harbor, navigation and weather station facilities and fuel farm operations. The United States should have free and unrestricted use of the airfield on Iwo Jima and the harbor at Chichi Jima, and other airfields and harbors that may be constructed later in addition to free and unrestricted overflight rights.



The United States should be permitted to retain free and unfettered operation of the LORAN C stations on Iwo Jima and Marcus Island, as well as rights for use of other kinds of possible future installations. US use of airfield and port facilities should be sub-

1. In 1961 the United States made an ex gratia payment of \$6.1 million to those landowners in Japan as satisfaction for all claims arising from the loss of their property so long as the US administration continued.
2. The Chichi Jima inhabitants had been loyal to the United States. Several had testified against Japanese war criminals and in November 1967 at least two served in the US Marines. The residents were of Caucasian ancestry (this was the criterion for permitting them to return and establish residence) and had been afforded US protection and support by all Military Governors of the Bonins.
3. Point Paper, J5125, 18 Nov 67.



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

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SSBN

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

Sangley Point Navy Base, Philippines

~~(S)~~ Barely six months after agreement was reached on 25-year leases granting US tenure at bases in the Philippines, that Government presented a surprise request for the return of Sangley Point Navy Base³ located in Cavite.⁴ The request said Sangley was needed by the Philippine Navy, which was too crowded in its Manila headquarters. Plans were already under way to construct a new headquarters at Cavite, how-



3. Sangley Point was a 341-acre area with an all-weather, 8,000' airfield. It was used as a base of some Southeast Asia operations and served as an excellent alternate airfield in the triangular Clark-Cubi Point-Sangley complex. (Point Paper, J5151, 3 Apr 67).
4. AMEMB MANILA 9886/230906Z Mar 67.

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ever, with Military Assistance Program financing.¹

When CINCPAC heard of the Philippines' request, he commented to the JCS in strongest terms.² He said, "A firm US position against the release of Sangley is appropriate" [REDACTED]


In an interview with Washington Post correspondent Selig Harrison on 25 March, President Marcos, when asked about his grievances against the United States, replied that there were a number of issues concerning US bases that hadn't been settled.³ One, he said, was Sangley, which had been discussed, but on which the United States was not moving very fast so the Philippines had formally asked for relinquishment. When Harrison asked him what the Philippines' next step would be, he replied that as far as he was concerned "it is pending." Asked for clarification, President Marcos said that he was not going to make an urgent matter out of it. Harrison then asked about the 25-year military bases agreement, and Marcos agreed that Sangley had been included. When asked what the Philippines would do if the United States refused to give it up, Marcos replied, "Well, nothing," and added that he hoped that the United States would see the Philippines' side of the matter. President Marcos said that the Philippine Navy needed Sangley for its own development and that it might also provide a supplementary runway for Manila International Airport. He said he didn't see why the United States couldn't transfer Sangley functions to some of its other facilities in the Philippines. (Off the record to Harrison he identified the "other facilities" as Subic.)

CINCPAC reviewed additional background and assumptions regarding possible Marcos rationale provided by the American Embassy in Manila, and again commented strongly to the JCS.⁴

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1. The Navy was reportedly still miffed that some land next to the existing headquarters and earmarked for Navy use had been taken over by Mme. Marcos for her new cultural center. (AMEMB Manila 9895/250505Z Mar 67).
 2. CINCPAC 240405Z Mar 67.
 3. AMEMB Manila 9896/261124Z Mar 67.
 4. CINCPAC 290404Z Mar 67.

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~~(S)~~ Admiral Sharp said, "... The US Naval Station, Sangley Point should not be relinquished to the Government of the Philippines.



Accordingly, CINCPAC recommends that the US take a strong stand against the Philippine request for Sangley Point."

~~(S)~~ The US Embassy prepared a note detailing Sangley's importance to area defenses and rejecting the Philippines' request. The matter was discussed with President Marcos by Ambassador Blair⁵ before the note was officially forwarded to the Government on 3 April,⁶ and the President was reported to be calm, understanding, and not surprised.



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1. Government of the Philippines.
 2. Southeast Asia.
 3. Antisubmarine warfare.
 4. Republic of the Philippines.
 5. AMEMB Manila 10136/310836Z Mar 67.
 6. AMEMB Manila 10175/030732 Apr 67.

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Guam

Plans for construction of an Army ammunition storage facility at Oura Wan, Okinawa¹ were dropped when CINCPAC was advised that political considerations made such construction inadvisable.² CINCPAC then directed that Guam be surveyed as an alternate site. CINCUSARPAC reported that three areas on Guam were suitable.³ The Department of the Army withheld any action on the facility, however, pending completion of an overall ammunition storage facility study that was in progress in Washington.⁴ The JCS ammunition storage analysis subsequently revealed that sufficient vacant storage space was available in Air Force and Navy controlled assets to accommodate Army offshore Southeast Asia requirements. The analysis further indicated, however, that Army use of the vacant storage to alleviate the existing storage deficit would still not provide the required long-term Army storage facilities.⁵ CINCPACAF and CINCPACFLT commented that existing vacant storage space resulted from a drawdown of war reserve stocks in support of operations in Southeast Asia and would be required when stocks were replenished.

CINCPAC also commented on the use of North West Airfield on Guam as one of the possible ammunition storage sites. He determined that it was not appropriate for development as the primary ammunition storage site and that ammunition storage there should be the minimum required for essential operations, and should be located so as to minimize problems in future development of the North West Airfield as an air facility. CINCPAC also recommended that other islands in the Trust Territory be considered, and that the advantages of using military lands in those islands be compared to the requirement to procure or lease additional privately owned land on Guam.

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1. CINCPAC Command History, 1966, p 33.
 2. Point Paper, J4213, 6 Apr 67.
 3. CINCUSARPAC 6386/112144Z Mar 67.
 4. CINCPAC 230036Z May 67.
 5. CINCPAC 290131Z Jun 67.
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(S) Another proposed new facility for Guam was a 25,000 barrel-a-day oil refinery and associated POL storage.² The Mobil Oil Company wanted to construct this installation in the Outer Apra Harbor area on 20 acres of land to be leased from the Navy. No decision had been made because a master plan for Guam was being prepared by the Naval Facilities Engineering Command and was expected to be completed by 1 May 1968. If the general proposition of locating the refinery in the outer harbor was approved by the Chief of Naval Operations, the feasibility of making the site available to a commercial company would be included in the master plan.

(S) CINCPAC believed that in this case, in consideration of the benefits to the military, the economic benefits of Gold Flow aspects, and the boost to the Guam economy, the commercial refinery would be advantageous to all concerned.

(S) This did not contradict CINCPAC's previously stated position regarding the disposition of any US Government-controlled real estate on Guam.³ CINCPAC's comments to the JCS in January reflected his opinion that it was probable that Guam would eventually become a major base supporting US military operations in PACOM. He said, "US strategy calls for a forward posture for US Forces in the Western Pacific through the coming decade and beyond. The US should continue to maintain its presence near the Asian Mainland along the offshore island chain so long as such presence is required by the Communist threat and is compatible with US interests. At the same time, we should recognize that future developments could lead to a reduction of US foreign soil bases in the PACOM. It is prudent that we strengthen our long term basing posture in the Western Pacific by acquisition or improvement of other appropriately located bases in areas where US control and tenure are assured. This is particularly true in the siting of facilities entailing extensive permanent construction, such as airfields, supply and ammunition depots, and naval bases. . . . In the event of restrictions in the use of certain foreign bases in the Western Pacific, relocation of

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1. Point Paper, J4731, 29 Aug 67.
 2. Point Paper, J44A, 26 Aug 67.
 3. CINCPAC 242052Z Jan 67.

US forces and materiel could be achieved by rearward displacement. . . . Of areas in PACOM available for basing of certain forces and materiel, Guam offers the following advantages: . . . It is strategically located as a forward support base for operations in the Western Pacific. . . . The existing military bases, lands and facilities on Guam represent a considerable basis for expansion. . . . The assured, extended tenure favors the siting there of facilities involving extensive permanent construction. "

(S) CINCPAC continued that it was difficult to predict military real estate requirements, but that it was probable that such requirements could exceed that held by the military. He therefore recommended that no military controlled property on Guam be released, unless it was clearly of no future military value, until total long-term military requirements were determined. He further recommended that any real estate declared excess by other governmental agencies be examined for future military utility.

Indian Ocean Islands

(S) On 30 December 1966, the United States and the United Kingdom (UK) concluded an agreement for the use of certain islands in the western portion of the Indian Ocean for defense purposes of both nations. The islands were Diego Garcia and the remainder of the Chagos Archipelago, Aldabra, Farquahar, and Desroches Islands. They constituted the British Indian Ocean Territory.¹ Significant terms of the agreement included: (a) the territory was to remain under UK sovereignty, (b) the islands were to be available to meet the needs of both governments for defense, (c) the required sites were to be made available to US authorities without charge, (d) each government should normally bear the cost of facilities developed to meet its own requirements; the two governments would consult together when joint financing was to be considered, (e) commercial aircraft should not be authorized to use military airfields in the territory, and (f) the agreement should continue in effect for an initial period of 50 years, conditionally extendable for another 20 years.²

(S) The United States had proceeded with plans for the combined US-UK development of base facilities on Aldabra and Diego Garcia. The development was proceeding on Aldabra, but the United Kingdom indicated in the spring of 1967 that its financial participation in the development of Diego Garcia was not possible. In June the JCS requested the views of

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1. J5 Brief 239-67, 4 Aug 67.
 2. J5 Brief 74, 3 Mar 67.

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appropriate unified command commanders relative to the value of a naval facility on Diego Garcia and the desirability of proceeding with the project without UK participation.¹

(S) CINCPAC's reply noted that there were no immediate PACOM contingency requirements for a naval facility on the island and that it was more directly associated with Atlantic or Strike-Middle East, Africa, South Asia Command responsibilities.² He did reaffirm, however, his earlier stated view³ that an expanded US military presence in the Indian Ocean was in the best interest of the United States and that the development of Diego Garcia, on a unilateral basis if required, would help fulfill an essential requirement. He noted the tenuous nature of many accepted international relationships, particularly the response of nominally friendly nations to US endeavors to relieve the 1967 crisis in the Middle East. The likelihood that friendly governments could act to the detriment of US interests should be recognized when evaluating future requirements, he said. CINCPAC continued, "This consideration is particularly applicable to the emerging nations bordering the Indian Ocean. To some extent, all are internally unstable and potentially antagonistic. All, in a given situation, could oppose or seek to limit the freedom and flexibility of US response to situations in the area."

(S) CINCPAC also commented on the increasing tendency of many nations to expropriate or limit the use of US bases in their territory, citing specifically the recent [REDACTED]

(S) CINCPAC noted that British participation would be desirable, but that the UK financial contribution should not be an overriding consideration in view of the inherent advantages afforded to the United States and the relatively modest sums involved. Continued British presence could tend to reduce inflammatory reactions by newly emerging or non-aligned countries on the periphery of the Indian Ocean and would assure some form of British presence in the area "east of Suez."

(S) CINCPAC cited the potential long-range use of Diego Garcia in PACOM operations, concurrent with the UK reduction of forces and withdrawal from Southeast Asia, to permit an increased naval presence that


1. J5 Brief 239-67, 4 Aug 67.
2. CINCPAC 160311Z Jun 67.
3. CINCPAC 042029Z Jun 67.

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could possibly prove necessary to insure the free use of the Strait of Malacca.

[REDACTED] He also noted economic benefits to be derived and concluded that an expanded US military presence in the Indian Ocean was in the best interest of the United States.

(S) The JCS considered that construction of a naval facility on Diego Garcia was in the best US interest and should proceed with or without UK participation. In July they recommended to the Secretary of Defense that the United Kingdom be approached to determine its interest in proposals that the United States build the naval facility (at a cost of \$26 million), that the United States and United Kingdom share operating and maintenance costs, that the United Kingdom man the facility and provide for manning costs, and that each country have equal user rights.



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SECTION VII - PLANNING

Joint Program for Planning

(U) The JCS in the Joint Program for Planning provided five basic planning documents, which were revised annually.¹ These studies were used as a basic reference by the CINCPAC staff in the development of plans and in recommendations for the JCS regarding National level plans. Four of these documents are highlighted in this section, with particular emphasis on items of special interest to CINCPAC.

Joint Long-Range Strategic Study

~~(TS)~~ The Joint Long-Range Strategic Study prepared in 1967 was projected for the period FY 78 through FY 87.² The world power structure would consist of two super powers, the United States and the USSR, with three lesser but significant power bases, Western Europe, Communist China, and Japan. (This promoted Japan from its rating in the previous year's study as one of three countries³ with the potential to develop to that status.)

~~(TS)~~ Various possible alternative world power alignments were outlined. The dominant feature of the most likely would be the persisting confrontation of the United States and the USSR, perhaps less militant than in the past, but with no slackening of competition between the two.

~~(TS)~~ Characteristics of the 1980 decade, barring World War III, were (1) changing patterns of current and ideological groupings, with multi-national, regional, and continental systems based more on economic requirements achieving a dominance no longer possible by nation-states or intercontinental military alliances; (2) volatile socio-economic conditions, in which world population would increase 35 percent by 1980 and varying national economic growth rates would widen the gap between "have" and "have not" nations. Military roles would increase significantly in both developed and underdeveloped countries, particularly in nation-building activities and in matters of controlling the violence associated with civil unrest; (3) nuclear weapon proliferation, in which new nuclear powers (possibly including India and Japan) would heighten

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1. CINCPAC Command History, 1966, p 64.
 2. JCS 1920/19, 28 Apr 67; J5 Brief 189-67, 29 Jun 67.
 3. The others were India and Brazil.

pressures for arms control and complicate the risks in crisis but not necessarily lead to nuclear conflict; (4) US global involvement, which since World War II had been based primarily on response to the threat of Communist expansion, would be increasingly more affected by economic considerations, with US public opinion possibly trending toward more selective military involvement, largely contingent on a direct and obvious threat to US security; (5) increased constraints on the development and use of military force by major powers, partly in fear of escalation to thermonuclear war; and (6) advanced military technology and scientific advances in space and oceanography (with their military implications), which would further widen the gap between the super powers and the rest of the world.

~~(TS)~~ Primary potential sources of military conflict were the USSR with its sophisticated military capability, a militant China (an increasing if sometimes exaggerated threat) with increasing nuclear capabilities, and the less developed countries of the world susceptible to pressures and foreign exploitation. A strategy for containing Chinese expansion in East and South Asia required three interrelated parts, deterring or defeating direct or indirect aggression, strengthening the areas threatened by aggression or subversion, and influencing the Chinese and other Asian Communist leaders to seek a more constructive relationship with the outside world.

~~(TS)~~ In underdeveloped world areas the United States and its allies would face complex problems in distinguishing between externally supported Communist subversion and valid nationalist movements.

~~(TS)~~ Any actual military conflict was considered likely to be in the form of insurgency, not strategic nuclear war, but for the non-Communist world to contain Soviet and Chinese ambitions a fundamental need was for the United States to maintain and, if necessary, evince a willingness and determination to commit decisive military strength.

~~(TS)~~ US military power would become increasingly interwoven in US diplomatic efforts and domestic considerations. All elements of national power (diplomatic, economic, psychological, and military) in concerted action were required to effectively conduct US foreign policy. The United States neither could nor should police the world, but it should not be reluctant to use military resources in furtherance of established national policies. A major role for US military power in Asia was foreseen because of the increasing Chinese threat and the lack of cohesiveness of non-Communist Asian states (a factor that would constrain such power, as would their traditional antipathy to foreign influence).

(TS) It would continue to be in the US interest to provide military assistance to selected friendly countries. When preparing country and regional plans and programs it would be essential to examine the role of local forces primarily in the context of US strategy and plans, even though economic and political factors were also considered. The US goal should be to develop local forces adequate to meet internal security and initial defense requirements, which would also reduce the requirement of permanent stationing of large numbers of US forces in foreign territories.

(TS) While research and development efforts must continue to improve all facets of military endeavor, priority should be given to capabilities that would favorably influence the US-USSR strategic balance of power and that would increase US ability to apply military power on a global basis. Detailed objectives were outlined in the Joint Research and Development Objectives Document, but are not discussed in this history.

Joint Intelligence Estimate for Planning

(TS) The Joint Intelligence Estimate for Planning was published in seven volumes, the first six based on geographic divisions and the seventh a longer-range summary. The 1967 edition of Volume VII, the Worldwide Summary and Estimate of Long-Range Trends, was projected through 30 June 1986. Volume III was devoted to the Pacific and Asian areas, with countries or groups of countries in the area the subject of individual studies. The Volume III studies that were updated in 1967 covered a "short range" period through June 1968 and a "mid-range" period through June 1976 for all except the Communist countries (the USSR, China, Outer Mongolia, North Korea, North Vietnam), which covered a short range period through June 1969 and a mid-range period through June 1977.

(TS) Volume VII¹ concerning longer range trends, foresaw an antagonistic USSR the most powerful threat to US security. Communist China, while lacking the strategic capabilities of the USSR, posed a more imminent threat because of aggressive policies and growing military strength. There was a trend seen away from the former monolithic structure of international communism. In the Free World, nationalistic attitudes reflected some erosion in the United States' former position of unchallenged leadership, with a continuing flux in Free World relationships, alignments, and alliances.

1. SM-301, 1 May 67, CPRS 000292-67; J2 Brief 19-67, 13 May 67.

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(S) The future overall situation in Southeast Asia was seen to depend largely on the outcome of the war in Vietnam. In any case, historic Chinese ambitions would remain, but China was expected to calculate achievement of its aims by means short of overt war.

Continued US control of Pacific islands, despite possible pressures in the United Nations, would remain strategically important, and Indian Ocean islands could be of strategic value if militarily developed.

Various current national claims for extended sovereignty over sea areas and air space and restrictions to land passage could continue and become acute.

(S) Trends in military policy and in force and equipment development for the USSR and Communist China were outlined in the long-range estimate.

(U) Individual Volume III studies received for countries in the PACOM were as follows:

Australia¹

(S) The United States could continue to rely on Australian support and maintenance of military and political commitments. Australia's trend toward expanding its relations with Communist countries would be lessened or ruptured if conditions changed to limited or general war.

Burma²

Both militarily and politically Burma would remain vulnerable to Chinese encroachment. The Government would be able to contain but not defeat dissident groups, which offered a potential for Chinese exploitation. Burma would attempt to remain neutral or uninvolved in any kind of war in which the United States was involved. Continuing economic problems were not considered to threaten the regime's stability.

Cambodia³

Prince Sihanouk would probably remain the most important sin-

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1. J2 Brief 1-67, 5 Jan 67.
 2. J2 Brief 8-67, 28 Feb 67.
 3. J2 Brief 10-67, 2 Mar 67.

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gle factor in Cambodia's politics. His objectives would be unchanged: to maintain Cambodia as a nation-state regardless of the future political organization in Indochina and to prevent the war from spreading to Cambodia. A marked rise in border incidents was to be expected as Cambodia supported the Viet Cong and offered them a safe haven and logistics base. If the war continued longer, the risk of border conflict was further heightened. A Free World victory in South Vietnam would probably influence Prince Sihanouk to take a genuine neutralist position.

Republic of China¹

(S) The importance of China's island position in the Free World's Pacific defense perimeter was expected to undergo considerable change due to Communist China's probable development of a nuclear ballistic missile capability and advances in conventional offensive weapons. The Republic would continue limited military actions against Mainland China while sustaining morale with invasion planning and propaganda. Chiang Kai-shek was likely to die and his eldest son, Chiang Ching-kuo, was likely to succeed him. The death of both would create a power vacuum, however. No major changes in the armed forces were foreseen. China's eagerness to continue as an ally would depend on the extent of US willingness to provide support. With termination of US grant aid, funding for economic development was expected from international lending institutions and increasing foreign private investment.

Indonesia²

(S) Despite efforts of the moderate military-civilian leadership, instability was expected to continue because of various kinds of political, ethnic, religious, and military rivalries. Indonesia would adopt a course of action best serving its national interests and would maintain good relations with any nation providing assistance (East or West). It would probably form or join a Southeast Asia organization for regional cooperation. Recovery of the chaotic economy would be slow. Increased technical and military assistance would probably be provided.

Malaysia-Singapore³

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1. J2 Brief 22-67, 10 Jun 67.
 2. J2 Brief 13-67, 23 Mar 67.
 3. J2 Brief 2-67, 9 Jan 67.

(S) Continued racial tensions, the possibility of further dissolution of Malaysia, and the likelihood of UK withdrawal were unfavorable factors, but the present moderate democratic governments were expected to remain in power. US influence in Malaysia was expected to increase as UK presence diminished, and increased US commitments might be necessary. In cold or limited war, both would attempt to remain neutral but would eventually be drawn into the conflict alongside the Commonwealth nations and the United States.

New Zealand¹

(S) New Zealand's principal value to the Free World was its moral, psychological, and political support. It was pro-United States and likely to remain so, but a Labor Party takeover of the Government could result in a weakening or even abrogation of New Zealand's treaty obligations and a possible discontinuation of its involvement in the Vietnam war.

Thailand²

(S) Thailand was expected to remain pro-West, with the military government expected to remain the key to power. It would adopt a course of neutrality only if it thought the United States lacked the determination or capability to cope with Communist pressures. Expanding subversion and insurgency would pose the most serious threats to internal security because Thai forces, while able to contain and confine insurgency at existing levels, might have difficulty in coping with expanded insurgency spread throughout the land with strong external support. The possibility of significant expansion of Communist activity and attacks against bases at which US Forces were located was recognized as a matter of concern.

USSR³

(S) Soviet military objectives would remain unchanged and Soviet military doctrine and force structure would continue to emphasize the requirements of general nuclear war. In contingencies short of general war, Soviet military thinking would continue to reflect the possibility of "war in which conventional weapons are used." The USSR would continue to maintain and improve its offensive and defensive capabilities in the

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1. J2 Brief 18-67, 13 May 67.
 2. J2 Brief 17-67, 28 Apr 67.
 3. J2 Brief 26-67, 30 Aug 67; The USSR estimate was included in the Joint Intelligence Estimate for Planning, Volume I, Warsaw Pact.

Far East. The strength and disposition of ground forces was not expected to change during the period. While the air forces might show an overall quantitative decrease, they were expected to evidence significant qualitative increases. Strategic offensive and defensive missile forces were likely to be significantly improved, and the increased tempo of activity that had recently characterized Soviet naval operations was expected to continue.

Communist China¹

(S) China's developing program for nuclear weapons, deliverable by aircraft, medium-range ballistic missile, and possibly ballistic submarine, considerably enhanced Chinese military stature. It was estimated that through the mid-range period Chinese strategy for the expansion of influence and control in Asia probably would emphasize power diplomacy and the promotion and support of revolutionary causes and insurgency. Although they may conduct limited operations against neighboring areas, the Chinese leaders were unlikely to initiate any action which they estimated could result in major confrontation with the United States. China would defend to the limit of its capabilities against any attack upon the Chinese mainland, however. For the period of the estimate, it was believed that Chinese vulnerabilities to nuclear attack would make it infeasible for the Chinese to initiate a major war with a major power. China's basic antagonism to the United States would not likely change in the short-range period. ✓

Outer Mongolia

(S) With no military capability, Outer Mongolia would be unable to resist either of its neighbors, China or the USSR, but its Government had aligned itself almost completely with the USSR.

North Korea

(S) In cold war conditions, North Korea probably would intensify efforts to subvert Western influence in South Korea and elsewhere in Asia, and would increase infiltration of subversive and intelligence agents into South Korea to create "controlled" incidents. In limited war conditions, North Korea would probably not attempt overt military action in the Korean Peninsula as long as the United States maintained a

1. The Asian Communist countries, China, Outer Mongolia, North Korea, and North Vietnam, were covered in one study (J2 Brief 39-67, 2 Dec 67; SM-764-67, 17 Nov 67, CPRS 00668-67).

sizable force in South Korea. In general war, North Korea would probably attack South Korea to help the Communist effort.

North Vietnam

(S) North Vietnam would probably remain an advanced base for Communist insurgency operations in South Vietnam and Laos and continue to train Thailand insurgents. The basic aim of Communist expansion would remain after the end of the Vietnamese conflict and North Vietnam would probably continue as the leader of Communist subversion in Southeast Asia, directing and supporting the effort in South Vietnam and Laos. If US/Allied forces moved to occupy North Vietnam or if Communist control of the country were threatened, China could be expected to intervene, probably at North Vietnam's invitation. In the case of general war, North Vietnam probably would increase troop deployment in an attempt to overrun and occupy South Vietnam and Laos. If successful, Hanoi would attempt to dominate Cambodia by political and military action and unify all of Indochina under Hanoi's control.

Joint Strategic Objectives Plan

(TS) The Joint Strategic Objectives Plan (JSOP), one of the Joint Program for Planning documents, was the basic military document against which continuing military recommendations on force level actions and related issues concerning strategy could be measured. It provided military advice to the Secretary of Defense for development of the Department's budget and justification for mid-range force objectives.¹ In 1967 CINCPAC was concerned with the JSOP for FY 69-76 and FY 70-77. The JSOP was published in several parts. Volume I, Strategy, was published first and was the basis for the preparation of Volume II, Analysis and Force Tabulations. In 1967 the former Annex J, Free World Forces, became JSOP Volume III.

(TS) JSOP Volume I for FY 69-76 was published in 1966,² Volume II in 1967.³ Force objectives in Volume II were developed in light of requirements to meet worldwide commitments, to provide appropriate phase-in of new forces and systems requiring long lead time, and to continue operations in Southeast Asia. The length of the conflict there was not pre-judged. Arrangements for temporary adjustments to forces were built into the plan for that reason. The plan also noted that mobilization

1. JCS PM-84, 23 Sep 66, CPRS 210-66.

2. CINCPAC Command History, 1966, p 66.

3. SM 260-67, 1 Apr 67, CPRS 000207-67; J5 Brief 121-67, 13 Apr 67.

would not be authorized unless the Chinese Communists intervened in Asia or a direct confrontation with the USSR in Europe required it. Armed Forces were listed worldwide; forces for PACOM were not distinguishable.

(TS) The Free World Forces portion of the JSOP was still carried as Annex J to the FY 69-76 JSOP.¹ It substantially reflected CINCPAC's submission.² The annex for the first time contained a recommended order of priority for the application of US military assistance on a worldwide, regional, and country basis. The JCS therefore asked CINCPAC to submit detailed funding data concerning the development, support, and/or modernization of forces in the PACOM to be used for a military assessment of the risk associated with fiscal constraints and a recommendation for the FY 69 military assistance budget.

(TS) CINCPAC furnished the requested information for China, the Philippines, Korea, and Laos in August³ and the information concerning Thailand in October.⁴ CINCPAC recommended funds in the following amounts in FY 69 to fulfill JSOP requirements in the FY 69-76 period: China - \$405.2 million; Philippines - \$45.7 million; Korea - \$625.5 million; Laos - \$85.0 million; and Thailand - \$179.6 million for a total of over \$1.3 billion.

(TS) Other annexes to the JSOP 69-76 were largely unchanged from the previous year and substantially reflected CINCPAC's recommendations.

(TS) CINCPAC was invited by the JCS to submit recommendations for inclusion in Volume I, Strategy, for the next JSOP, for FY 70-77, with particular regard to regional considerations. CINCPAC's 13 specific recommendations are highlighted below.⁵

(TS) US military strategy and force development tended to reflect a rather precise interpretation of the past and a positive assessment of the current and future world, which could be disadvantageous to the United States by limiting the range of contingencies prepared for. This

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1. J5 Brief 80, 9 Mar 67.
 2. CINCPAC Command History, 1966, p 67.
 3. CINCPAC ltr ser 001552, 17 Aug 67.
 4. CINCPAC ltr ser 001883, 5 Oct 67.
 5. CINCPAC 050550Z Jun 67.

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was particularly true in the Pacific-Asian world of tergiversating friends and enemies and the limits of current intelligence and the projections of future events.

✓ ~~(TS)~~ Notwithstanding the values of a strong, flexible force disassociated with specific threats, the US force, particularly the nuclear force, targeted against deterrence of Communist China, and particularly China's nuclear capability, should be distinguishable from that against the USSR and it should have maximum flexible nuclear and non-nuclear capabilities in response to the overall threat. US strategy regarding China, which had been largely directed toward the peripheral manifestations of the threat, would be required to focus increasingly on China itself, with consideration given to possible Chinese diversionary military adventures generated by internal political pressures.

~~(TS)~~ Continued cognizance of the significant Soviet threat to US interests in Asia was important, as demonstrated by the impact of Soviet assistance in a limited war in Southeast Asia not involving Soviet forces.

MIRROR ~~(TS)~~ A growing awareness of nuclear matters by Asian-Pacific nations could be expected, which should be reflected in US strategy and associated policy, profiting where possible from lessons learned in these matters in Europe.

~~(TS)~~ While creeping escalation could sometimes be necessary or effective, in many serious military situations a positive and rapid reaction with sufficient force to achieve US objectives promptly could be more effective in the short and long term, both in ending the conflict satisfactorily and in maintaining or restoring relations with our allies and the enemy.

~~(TS)~~ CINCPAC suggested that the statements regarding the prevention and defeat of insurgency be revised to indicate more accurately the usefulness of military force. The prevention of Communist insurgency required a coordinated and integrated effort involving political, economic, psychological, sociological, and military measures. The key military requirements were to deter outside military support of an insurgency while providing the internal security and stability necessary to alleviate the adverse conditions that made the country susceptible to the insurgency. These requirements emphasized the need to develop reliable indigenous military and paramilitary forces. A second concept concerned requirements when the decision was made to commit US resources in friendly nations to prevent or defeat insurgency. Depending on the level and intensity of the insurgency and on the ability of the friendly country

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to cope with it, appropriate military measures could include military assistance and advice, development of an intelligence network, assistance in providing security to the population, securing strategic facilities and bases, and conducting conventional and unconventional warfare, psychological operations, and special operations.

~~(TS)~~ The requirement for combat and service support forces and responsive logistic support keyed to both US and allied forces should be given greater emphasis to maintain a balance in strengths, capabilities, and combat readiness.

~~(TS)~~ US strategy would continue to encompass the concept of collective security and therefore strong military allies. Where reduction of total or forward US Forces was contemplated, military assistance must be increased to provide the same basic military capability, and where allied support was reduced, US Forces should be increased as necessary. While the trend was toward military sales rather than grant aid, Asian countries with underdeveloped economies continued to need air in order for them to support US security interests.

~~(TS)~~ The reduction or withdrawal of United Kingdom forces, particularly in the Singapore-Malaysia area, would require strategy and plans, in concert with other allies, to counter threats to the area. An increased US Navy presence may be necessary to insure free use of the Strait of Malacca and to provide desired US posture at sea.

~~(TS)~~ US-Japan security consultations should be expanded and strengthened as Japan evolves a greater military capability. US strategy and policy, while holding firm to the need for the use of the Ryukyus, should be flexible enough to adjust to new arrangements without seriously weakening US capabilities. US strategy should relate negotiations on the Ryukyus to the basic Japanese and Northeast-Central Asia defense problem and seek to extract appropriate Japanese participation in the larger defense sphere.

~~(TS)~~ The Pacific island and ocean areas had growing importance, not only in relation to maintenance of air and sea lines of communication, but from the growing economic value of their resources. US strategy and policy should assure the continued, unfettered use of these territories, particularly the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, and should seek positively to reverse any trends toward their autonomy or non-US administration.

~~(TS)~~ Finally, discussions of command and control facilities should encompass the requisite communications necessary to make them effective. Agreements with host countries should provide for cooperative use of communications-electronics facilities for development of an in-country communications base. Discussions of general purpose forces should include requirements for US forces trained and equipped for the conduct of electronic warfare. There also was a need for continuing effort to improve both offensive and defensive electronic warfare capabilities.

~~(TS)~~ Volume I, Strategy, of the JSOP for FY 70-77 was subsequently published and distributed in August, and was to be used for the development of CINCPAC's recommendations for the Analysis and Force Tabulation and Free World Forces volumes for the later time frame.¹ The main differences between Volume I for FY 70-77 and for the previous year were as follows.

~~(TS)~~ Two new basic military objectives were added. One was "limiting damage to the United States," the capability for which required a combination of offensive forces, ballistic missile defense, air defense, space defense, antisubmarine warfare forces, and civil defense. The other was for employment of military forces to include assistance in maintenance of order under constituted authority within the United States.

~~(TS)~~ The concept that problems in Asia could not be met by the same formula the United States had applied in Europe was recognized. In particular, broad collective security was more difficult to achieve, subversion and indirect aggression were more prevalent, and deployments to and operations in areas along the mainland periphery were more difficult in Asia than in Europe.

~~(TS)~~ The strategic concept for Asia stated that the United States must hold along the line (Japan, Okinawa, Taiwan, the Philippines, the areas of Australia and New Zealand, and the Trust Territories of the Pacific Islands) rather than insure defense of these strategic areas. The concept no longer included the requirement to hold lodgements on the Asia mainland in key areas, although it required a military capability for an active defense of South Korea, South Vietnam, and Thailand, as well as a capability for offensive operations.

(U) Specific conflict situations which CINCPAC was directed to address in development of his submission for JSOP 70-77, Volume II were as follows.

1. J5 Brief 257-67, 7 Sep 67.

General Purpose Land Forces

~~(TS)~~ CINCPAC provided the criteria he used for major land forces requirements planning, and he often evaluated and recommended types and mixes of organizations for specific assignments based on lessons learned in Southeast Asia and earlier in Korea. In his military judgment they were the minimum forces required to execute the JSOP 70-77 strategy.

~~(TS)~~ CINCPAC required a force of 4 2/3 Army division force equivalents and 2 Marine expeditionary forces permanently assigned at full structure and full strength with the support necessary to sustain combat. For planning purposes, a balanced ready force of 1 1/3 division force equivalents would remain in or adjacent to mainland Southeast Asia. Two Army division force equivalents would remain in Korea. One airborne brigade and one Marine expeditionary force would recycle from South Vietnam to forward positions in the Western Pacific (Ryukyus-Marianas).

~~(TS)~~ To provide PACOM reserve forces, one Army division force equivalent would recycle from South Vietnam to Hawaii, and one Marine expeditionary force (minus 1/3) to the Eastern Pacific. In addition, following cessation of hostilities in Vietnam, adequate combat and support forces should be planned for extended duty in South Vietnam as JCS (Temporary Adjustment) forces, to be reduced as the Southeast Asia situation was resolved.

~~(TS)~~ To meet contingencies depicted by the JCS in Volume I, Strategy, required an augmentation to the permanently assigned force ranging from 5 1/3 to 23 1/3 division force equivalents and 1 to 3 Marine expeditionary forces.

~~(TS)~~ CINCPAC recommended that all permanently assigned PACOM forces, including the two Marine expeditionary forces, remain in the PACOM to be available for all likely contingencies, notwithstanding the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan requirement for CINCPAC to redeploy one Marine division/wing team to Europe in certain contingencies.

General Purpose Air Forces

~~(TS)~~ CINCPAC's air forces recommendations for JSOP 70-77 considered the threat and the strategy to meet it, tempered with Southeast Asia experience. The recommended forces could apply offensive and defensive air power rapidly and discriminately at intensities appropriate to the circumstances. Most recommendations were the same as those he made for JSOP 69-76.

~~(TS)~~ For Navy air forces only carrier air wings and complementary deployed forces were covered in this section, the rest were under General Purpose Navy Forces. CINCPAC recommended a carrier air wing force level of 10 in FY 70, 11 in FY 74, and 12 in FY 76. This reduced acquisition rate from CINCPAC's previous year's recommendation was based on a reassessment of the reasonable attainability of attack aircraft carriers, and CINCPAC believed that a minimum of one full wing per carrier was necessary. His requirement for nine squadrons¹ in the complementary deployed fleet air force was unchanged from the year before.

~~(TS)~~ For tactical fighter and attack aircraft, many of CINCPAC's JSOP 69-76 requirements were unchanged, including requirements for 7 wings of 21 squadrons for air offense; 6 squadrons for air defense; 4 squadrons for reconnaissance forces; and 2 air commando wings (composite) for special air warfare forces. These last named included strike/reconnaissance, airlift, and utility aircraft used in support or conduct of counterinsurgency operations, unconventional warfare, and psychological operations.

~~(TS)~~ An increase in the requirement for tactical electronic warfare support forces was necessary, with three squadrons recommended through FY 72, then two thereafter. Only one squadron had been recommended for JSOP 69-76, but experience in Southeast Asia had confirmed the enemy's increased reliance on electronics in the conduct of anti-air warfare.

~~(TS)~~ For tactical air control system forces, two squadrons of airborne forward air controller aircraft were recommended (this also based on Southeast Asia experience) in lieu of the O-1 type aircraft assigned to the seven direct air support flights. Reassessment of the need for air-

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1. One helicopter combat support squadron and eight special mission squadrons.

borne warning and control aircraft resulted in a reduced recommendation from that of the previous year, from seven to four aircraft.

~~(TS)~~ CINCPAC's requirements for his Airborne Command Post and an Airborne Launch Control Center (five EC-135 aircraft each) and for 25 SAC air refueling tankers was unchanged from his JSOP 69-76 recommendation.

~~(TS)~~ CINCPAC had stated his requirement for two Marine air wings in his Marine requirements for general purpose land forces, as the air wing was intrinsic to a Marine expeditionary force.

General Purpose Navy Forces

~~(TS)~~ CINCPAC stated that PACOM general purpose Navy forces were operating at a more intensive pace and were more widely committed than at any time since World War II. This provided considerable insight, he said, into realistic requirements for the mid-range period. His requirements for JSOP 70-77 were little changed from those for JSOP 69-76.

~~(TS)~~ Twelve attack aircraft carriers (conventional and nuclear) were required, and CINCPAC vigorously urged a continued and hopefully accelerated modernization-construction program. Meantime, he considered stated requirements for 10 in FY 70 and 11 by FY 74 to be realistic, with addition of the twelfth carrier in FY 76.

~~(TS)~~ CINCPAC's requirement for antisubmarine warfare (ASW) support aircraft carriers was based on the magnitude of the enemy submarine threat, which could sever US and allied seaborne lines of communication if adequate ASW forces were not in being at the outset of hostilities.¹

~~(TS)~~ Although the result was a seriously deficient ASW posture in the early years of the JSOP time frame, CINCPAC recognized that reasonable attainability expectancy was for only four ASW carriers through FY 69, gradually increasing to nine by FY 77. He proposed one full air group for each carrier (plus one replacement air group throughout the JSOP period).

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1. CINCPAC noted that the Soviet Pacific submarine force alone was larger than the US Pacific force that effectively blockaded Japan in World War II and also larger than the German submarine fleet at the outbreak of World War II that so nearly cut Britain's Atlantic lifeline.

(TS) CINCPAC saw a continuing requirement for heavy naval gunfire support ships (battleships, heavy cruisers and guided missile heavy cruisers, and landing force support (LFS) ships) and recommended activating Reserve Fleet heavy cruisers to meet the PACOM objective of nine ships by FY 71. After entry of the LFS in the fleet, possibly in FY 73, reliance on cruisers could be diminished.


(TS) CINCPAC stated a continuing and urgent need for modern anti-aircraft warfare (AAW) and ASW destroyer type escorts, a significant number of which should be multiple purpose destroyers. His requirement for major fleet escorts¹ was for 43 ships in FY 68, 55 by FY 73, 75 by FY 75, and 93 by FY 77. His requirement for multiple purpose destroyers² increased from 102 in FY 70 (of which 15 were reactivated from the Reserve Fleet) to 138 in FY 72 (52 from the Reserve Fleet), to 145 in FY 77 (with all old Reserve Fleet craft phased out and replaced by newer ships).

(TS) Certain other CINCPAC requirements are tabulated below for three arbitrarily selected dates in the JSOP time frame:

| | <u>FY 70</u> | <u>FY 72</u> | <u>FY 77</u> |
|--|--------------|--------------|--------------|
| Single Purpose Escorts | 34 | 44 | 45 |
| Nuclear Attack Submarines (PERMIT/STURGEON) | 15 | 26 | 59 |
| Older Nuclear and other Attack Submarines | 41 | 41 | 28 |
| Mine Warfare Ships | 100 | 106 | 276 |
| Patrol Forces | 17 | 17 | 17 |
| River Assault Flotilla | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Patrol Squadrons (VPRON) (plus one replacement VPRON throughout the JSOP period) | 18 | 25 | 27 |

(TS) The POLARIS missiles carried on nuclear fleet ballistic missile submarines were to be phased out and replaced by POSEIDON. Such submarine requirements were as follows. From the nine recommended for FY 70, the number equipped with POLARIS was to be re-

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1. All surface combatant ships capable of providing both AAW and ASW defense for other ships in company.
 2. Surface combatant ships capable of both ASW escort of fleet units and naval gunfire support, except those included as major fleet escorts.



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"Force Packages" in Contingency Planning

(C) A conference sponsored by the JCS in August 1967 explored the concept of developing a common force packaging system to be used in contingency planning by the commanders of the unified and specified commands.² A package would be a balanced combination of combat and support units with known movement and logistic requirements. Later the JCS asked CINCPAC for his comments on the system and certain sample force packages for the four Services, particularly regarding the utility of such a system, the suitability of the sample force packages to meet peculiar requirements, and the type of changes required to adapt the sample packages to local requirements.

(C) After considering the comments of his component commanders, CINCPAC concluded that the force packages would be of only limited utility in CINCPAC planning.³ He already used a kind of force packaging, the Army's Tables of Organization and Equipment and the equivalent for

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1. CINCPAC ltr ser 002015, 19 Oct 67.
 2. J5 History, Dec 67.
 3. Ibid.

other Services. While a complete "force package" in terms of a division slice, squadron slice, or other unit force could be pre-planned against specific criteria, a pure multiplication of the packages by the number of divisions, squadrons, or such, on which existing plans were based, would not give a meaningful gross cut of the support required. Breaking of the "packages" and re-forming them would be essentially what was being done by CINCPAC. As CINCPAC Operational Plans were constituted, the designated combat forces and support structure formed a single package that was tailored to the plan.

Operation Plan Package Review

(S) Selected for review by the JCS for the 1967 Operation Plan Package Review¹ were the PACOM Southeast Asia Deployment Program Four and the Southern Command's OPlan 6312 (Guatemala), which, implemented simultaneously, formed Phase I of the review, with mobilization not considered.² Phase II would involve the reinforcement and defense of Europe in a NATO/Warsaw Pact conflict (utilizing the European Command's OPlan EC-102 and the Atlantic Command's OPlan 200-65), concurrent with the implementation of defensive operations in Southeast Asia, with mobilization included. In an excursion separate from either Phase I or II the review was also to include the development of the total envelope of selected support items to meet the wartime requirement of certain Allies, i. e. , Korean Army forces identified in CINCPAC OPlan 27, Chinese Navy forces identified in CINCPAC OPlan 25, and Chinese Marine and Air Forces identified in CINCPAC OPlan 39.

(S) Phase I action for CINCPAC involved only the modification of the logistics analysis to support the Southeast Asia Comprehensive Deployment Program (developed during the October 1966 Planning Conference) to reflect deployments authorized by Program 4 and other changing conditions. CINCPAC, after reviewing the Logistic Support Deficiency Reports submitted by his component command commanders, forwarded them and a summary of overall capability to support the Program 4 forces, highlighting the most significant logistics deficiencies, which were in the areas of construction and engineering support.³ This fulfilled the requirements for Phase I of the review.

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1. CINCPAC Command History, 1966, p 83.
 2. J5 Briefs 117-67, 11 Apr 67 and 85, 15 Mar 67.
 3. J4 History, Apr 67.

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~~(S)~~ CINCPAC's requirements for Phase II were cancelled by a JCS decision to use the study only internally and in abbreviated form.¹

~~(S)~~ The separate excursion regarding wartime support for grant aid to Allies was to be used to justify to the Secretary of Defense the establishment within the PACOM area of prepositioned war reserve munitions for the support of Allied Forces.² Although beginning with the forces listed above, the compilation, reporting, and storage of data would be a continuing process, not terminated with the Operation Plan Package Review, and would be enlarged to cover other areas and forces. Report requirements included requirements and asset information on a selected list of combat consumables and ammunition items, shortfalls in logistic support considered critical, and the basis for any specific support that may be recommended. Automatic data processing methodology was to be used for reporting requirements and assets information.

Cover and Deception in PACOM Plans

~~(TS)~~ CINCPAC in March provided comments on cover and deception in general, and on a JCS Policy Memorandum in particular, in response to a JCS request.³ CINCPAC advised that proper use of cover and deception⁴ can enhance almost any military action. In pre-hostility planning situations, two basic cover and deception schemes could be developed. The first was oriented to the pre-hostilities period with the objective of dissuading the enemy from initiating hostilities. The second was directed toward the initial phase of the conflict with the intent of enhancing US and allied military action, casting cover and deception in its more familiar tactical role.

~~(TS)~~ Cover and deception planning operations, CINCPAC continued, could not be divorced from the combat operations they complement or supplement. Accordingly, the responsibility for planning and conducting military cover and deception should be delegated to all echelons including

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1. J5 Brief 266-67, 13 Sep 67.
 2. J4 Brief 0075, 30 Jun 67.
 3. J5 History, Feb 67; CINCPAC 030300Z Mar 67.
 4. The object of cover was to keep the enemy uninformed. The object of deception was to inform him falsely. Successful cover denied the enemy a stimulus for action; successful deception supplied him with a stimulus for misguided action. The distinction was not one of technique, as both used the same techniques; the distinction was of intent and expected result.

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tactical unit commander level. The approval authority for tactical plans that did not conflict with strategic cover and deception plans could be granted to subordinate unified command commanders of the unified and specified commands. Plans that were either a part of a strategic cover and deception plan or had an impact on one must be referred to the JCS through the commander of the unified or specified command.

(S) Although adequate military cover and deception guidance existed at all levels, CINCPAC believed that the actual quantity and quality of plans generated would be improved by increasing the expertise of the planners by means of training programs, conferences, and seminars, and he recommended that consideration be given to establishing such training.

Strategic Mobility Analysis and Planning

(S) The Secretary of Defense in April 1966 assigned the JCS the task of preparing a study of Movement Capabilities (MOVECAP) for the FY 67 to FY 71 time period, to determine the capability for moving forces and material to meet limited war contingencies.¹ The study was also to develop movement schedules for obtaining maximum strategic effectiveness from Defense Department movement capabilities. Accompanying the completed study to the Secretary was a recommendation by the JCS that the MOVECAP 67-71 be used as one of the source documents for general movement planning. They further informed the Secretary that commanders of unified and specified commands would be tasked to include in all operation plans (new or revised) an LOC throughput analysis in order to identify constraints and to develop movement programs that would permit improved strategic mobility planning. CINCPAC was tasked by the JCS to evaluate MOVECAP 67-71.

(S) CINCPAC's evaluation included the following thoughts.² Constraints due to enemy action should be included in the study, specifically regarding air and sealift vulnerability and interdiction of LOC (particularly the vulnerability of certain major air and sea ports to attack). The need for additional amphibious lift was noted, particularly in the case of redeployment of PACOM Marine forces to the European Command in response to contingency needs there.

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1. J4 Brief 008, 24 Jan 67.
 2. ADMINO CINCPAC 012201Z Mar 67.

~~(TS)~~ CINCPAC concluded, "Notwithstanding the artificiality of assuming that all units are considered to be at their normal home station, the use of gross planning factors in conjunction with detailed analysis, and the lack of logistic degradation attributed to enemy operations, MOVE-CAP is considered a valuable and useful document in terms of evaluation of movement capabilities and examination of alternatives to movement constraints. The study presents useful reference information and when used in appropriate context it should assist operational and logistic planning." He concurred with the recommendation contained in the study that it be conducted annually and that efforts be continued to achieve a fully automated movement planning and analysis capability.

Facilities Restoration Planning

~~(S)~~ The CINCPAC General War Plan (OPlan 1) required that CINCPAC's component command commanders prepare Facilities Restoration Plans for use in event of attack against US bases in the PACOM. In March the Commanding General, US Army Vietnam, reported limitations to the Service approach to this task and recommended that it be assigned to COMUSMACV.¹ CINCUSARPAC agreed with the USARV proposal and further recommended that the responsibility for future updating of certain additional Facilities Restoration Plans be assigned to the PACOM subordinate unified command commanders. With the general concurrence of those commanders, CINCPAC in May realigned planning responsibility as follows:²

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|---------------|---|
| Okinawa | CINCUSARPAC |
| Hawaii, Guam | CINCPACFLT |
| Philippines | CINCPACAF |
| Korea | COMUS Korea |
| Japan | COMUS Japan |
| Taiwan | COMUSTDC |
| South Vietnam | COMUSMACV (COMUSSEASIA, when activated) |
| Thailand | COMUSMACTHAI (COMUSSEASIA when activated) |

Reconnaissance Planning

~~(S)~~ Representatives of CINCPAC attended various general war reconnaissance planning conferences in 1967.

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1. J4 History, Apr 67.
 2. CINCPAC 031945Z May 67.

~~(TS)~~ On 4 April a conference was held at CINCPAC's Alternate Command Center and was attended by representatives of CINCPAC, his Air Force and Navy component commanders, and the Commanding Officer, Fleet Intelligence Center, Pacific. The purpose was to update the PACOM Reconnaissance Plan and revise the CINCPAC input to the JCS Coordinated Reconnaissance Plan (CRP), both of which were accomplished.¹ The group also considered the concept of planned delay of post-strike reconnaissance sorties to monitor additional weapons effects. They agreed that a maximum delay of not more than four hours would allow reconnaissance of such additional effects while still providing timely reconnaissance reporting.

~~(TS)~~ Five representatives of CINCPAC attended a JCS reconnaissance conference for the CRP at the Joint Reconnaissance Center in Washington 15 to 18 August.² One project of the conferees was to finalize preparation of a Coordinated Reconnaissance Planning Manual, for which distribution was planned during October 1967. Command representatives agreed that specific values for planning factors should not be included in the manual, that they should be used only in evaluation of the CRP. At the time of the conference CINCPAC was the only commander that had evaluated the CRP using such specific factors; the other commanders indicated delays of four to eight weeks.

~~(TS)~~ The annual PACOM Reconnaissance Conference was hosted by the Pacific Operations Liaison Office at Fuchu Air Station, Japan, 6 to 8 November.³ At these conferences the PACOM input to the CRP,⁴ based on the PACOM Reconnaissance Priority List, was developed. A report on production of the Coordinated Reconnaissance Planning Manual indicated it was still being staffed by the JCS, but outlined its contents.

~~(TS)~~ Efforts continued to simplify, clarify, and reduce redundancy in reporting. Numerous specific means of achieving these results were studied.

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1. J3 History, Apr 67.
 2. J3/Memo/0001282-67, 26 Sep 67.
 3. CINCPAC Command History, 1966, p 86.
 4. Which was derived from Preplanned Reconnaissance Pacific (PRERECAPAC).

(15) During the period 15 to 17 November the Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff (JSTPS) convened a Coordination Reconnaissance Conference for Revision C to JCS CRP-4, at Offutt Air Force Base, Nebraska, attended by CINCPAC representatives.¹ Following the JSTPS review of recommendations presented at previous conferences, the question arose as to what action was being taken by the JCS. The JCS representative stated that recommendations contained in previous conference reports could not be considered as formal requests for action by the JCS. It was agreed that the conference recommendations would be forwarded from the JSTPS to the unified and specified commands, participating agencies, and the JCS, who would either concur or provide rationale for non-concurrence. The responses would be compiled by the JSTPS and forwarded to the JCS, requesting action.

(15) The Deputy Director of the JSTPS recommended that future conferences, in addition to coordination and administration of the CRP, also address what the National Command Authority can expect from the CRP; what could be done to improve the survivability of reconnaissance forces and processing facilities; how commands are utilizing the technical knowledge obtained from nuclear weapons tests to overcome the limitations of aircraft and reconnaissance equipment; and what the commands are doing to improve the communications reliability of their forces and reporting the required information to the JCS.

COMUS Japan's Planning Coordination

(S) In about October 1967 CINCPAC became aware of a problem in the coordination by COMUS Japan of planning data regarding the Coordinated Joint Outline Emergency Plan for the Defense of Japan from Attack (CJOEP) (S), for use in related supporting plans, and for release to Japanese military authorities.² On 15 November COMUS Japan stated certain coordination requirements that he believed to be vital to his CJOEP planning. These requirements were that planning data concerning the CJOEP be forwarded to the Service component commanders in Japan through COMUS Japan, and that substantive information received by the Service component commanders in Japan through Service channels be coordinated with COMUS Japan prior to use in supporting plans or release to Japanese services.

1. J3C31/Memo/00012-67, 1 Dec 67.

2. J5 History, Nov 67.

SECTION VIII - WAR GAMING

By CINCPAC

(S) The policy of the JCS on war gaming was updated in 1967.¹ The JCS emphasized the importance of war gaming techniques in the evaluation of plans, strategies, tactics, concepts, organizations, and weapons. CINCPAC agreed with the concept of the importance of war gaming, but the press of operational reporting and combat reporting requirements of the war in the PACOM had required that the efforts of his war gamers be redirected to the reporting problems.

(S) CINCPAC considered the discontinuance of war gaming only temporary, however.² In June 1967 the JCS had approved a change to his Joint Table of Distribution authorizing two additional officer billets in the Operations Division to manage war games. One billet was filled by August. CINCPAC planned to use the two experienced war gamers to organize and conduct games using temporary additional people from his staff and the staffs of his component commanders, as the manpower need was not continuous. When the concept was implemented, CINCPAC would have the capability to assess war plans for shortfalls, compatibility of missions with forces provided, and risks involved. Until that time, and for the duration of the Southeast Asia conflict, CINCPAC considered that war gaming personnel could be more effectively utilized in tasks directly related to Southeast Asia operations.

By the JCS

(S) The Joint War Games Agency (JWGA) was the JCS focal point for war gaming matters and was often concerned with gaming plans or postulated critical world situations concerning the PACOM. CINCPAC was occasionally required to send representatives to these games and he was naturally interested in the conclusions of the studies. Among the games conducted in 1967 were the following.


(S) TAU I-67³ was a joint State-Defense Department game conducted in Bangkok 23 to 28 January and attended by CINCPAC staff officers. It was a politico-military game concerning counterinsurgency in

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1. J3 Brief 169-67, 10 Jun 67.
 2. J3/Memo/001001, 21 Aug 67.
 3. J3 Brief 172-67, 13 Jun 67.

Thailand. Nobody "won" in this kind of a game; its value lay in the exchange of information through the wide range of experience among the participants.


(S) Also concerning counterinsurgency, from December 1966 through March 1967 the JWGA, in TIGER-67, war gamed Phase II (Thailand) of the unnumbered CINCPAC Plan for the Defense of Mainland Southeast Asia, dated 29 July 1966. ¹ Results of the game were forwarded to CINCPAC, followed by a 2 June JWGA briefing at Camp Smith for CINCPAC, his staff, and his component commanders and FMFPAC and their staffs. The study found that forces in the plan were adequate but not excessive, that natural physical barriers should be exploited, and that it was extremely difficult to determine when a counterinsurgency effort had been successful.

(S) The JWGA commenced gaming CINCPAC's OPlan 41-68, Defense of Mainland Southeast Asia against CHICOM Intervention in Current Combat Operations (S) in November 1967 and had not finished by the end of the year. The plan had been prepared in response to the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan FY 68 and concerned assistance to non-Communist Mainland Southeast Asia countries in defense against, and defeat of, two levels of Chinese Communist aggression. ²


The requirement placed too heavy a burden on his staff, already deficient in qualified war gamers. CINCPAC therefore nominated one officer from each of his three component commands, to serve sequentially. The JCS requested one planner for the full 90-day period, however, so CINCPAC nominated a representative from CINCPACAF. ⁵

(TS) In February CINCPAC tasked his component command com-

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1. J5 History, May 67.
 2. J5 Brief 173-67, 17 Jun 67.

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 4. J3 Brief 16-67, 18 Jan 67.
 5. ADMINO CINCPAC 200513Z May 67.

manders to update the Pacific Theater Objective Targets List compiled by the JWGA for RISOP-68 and he returned the revised list to the JWGA.¹

(U) Results of the game had not been received by CINCPAC by the end of the year.

(S) SIGMA I and II-67, conducted in the Pentagon 27 November to 7 December 1967, were Senior Interagency explorations of Southeast Asia problems. The primary purpose of this pair of games was to explore the problems associated with the cease-fire and negotiation phases of the Southeast Asia conflict. CINCPAC was represented by four staff officers. As in the case of TAU I-67, there were no acknowledged "winners"; the chief value of the games was the exchange of information and ideas.

1. CINCPAC ltr ser 00084, 17 Feb 67.

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1. The first part of the document is a list of names and addresses of the members of the committee.

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SECTION IX - OPERATIONS OF US FORCES

Nuclear Powered Ships in Foreign Ports

(S) Nuclear powered US merchantmen and warships continued to meet reluctant welcome in certain Asian ports. In other ports, visits by some such ships had become almost routine. Because visits to Japan by nuclear powered submarines had become more acceptable to the Japanese people and Government, and to simplify procedures, CINCPAC requested and was granted authority by the State and Defense Departments in August to approve such visits.¹ CINCPAC, however, was required to obtain concurrence from the US Ambassador in Tokyo before authorizing visits. In addition the JCS, the Secretary of State, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, the Chief of Naval Operations, and the Commander of the Naval Ship Systems Command were to be kept apprised of visits to afford those agencies the opportunity to object. Washington retained the authority to approve visits by nuclear powered surface ships.

(S) Inter-government agreements permitting nuclear powered surface ship visits were slow to develop. The Governments of the United States and Japan were unable to agree on mutually acceptable wording of an aide-memoire² that was to govern visits by nuclear powered surface ships.

 CINCPAC believed that it should be stressed to the Japanese that use of their naval bases by all US Navy ships would enhance security to the mutual benefit of both countries.³

(S) Visits by nuclear-powered submarines to Japan continued with some frequency. Visits to Sasebo had been successful to the extent that the US Ambassador had termed them routine and the Japanese Government had agreed to such visits at Sasebo at any time. Yokosuka was considered more desirable for nuclear submarine visits than Sasebo be-

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1. CINCPAC 272335Z Jul 67 and 030130Z Aug 67; STATE 22516/172018Z Aug 67.
 2. CINCPAC Command History, 1966, p. 96.
 3. Point Paper, J3B4, 27 Apr 67.

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cause of its superior repair and R&R facilities, but such visits were not yet considered routine, even though the number of protesting demonstrators had decreased significantly.¹ For example, when USS BARB (SSN-596) left Yokosuka on 29 June, a 20-minute rally attended by 133 demonstrators was held without incident, bringing the total attendance at rallies to 8,334 for BARB during that visit. This continued the trend downward, observed in previous visits, in which 51,800 had participated in demonstrations against USS SNOOK (SSN-592) in May 1966, 16,884 against USS SEADRAGON (SSN-584) in September 1966, and 9,245 against USS SCULPIN (SSN-590) in March 1967.²

Foreign Vessels in US Waters

~~(S)~~ In August CINCPAC promulgated policy and guidance to PACOM forces regarding the treatment of foreign ships illegally within US jurisdictional waters.³ Although the US Coast Guard was specifically charged with responsibility for enforcing the law in US waters, unique situations might arise in which other Armed Forces could be required to enforce laws regarding fishing, navigation, marine safety, national security, or other matters. CINCPAC noted that there had been an increase in foreign shipping in or near the US territorial sea. Most of this traffic was legitimate and of little concern in peacetime, but PACOM forces were directed to be prepared to respond promptly and appropriately when foreign ships committed, or were about to commit, illegal or hostile acts.

~~(S)~~ The instruction defined categories of ships, jurisdictional waters, and innocent passage. Examples of behavior that could lead to the conclusion that a foreign ship was not in innocent passage were cited, as were actions to be taken by PACOM forces in such event. Reporting instructions to substantiate subsequent diplomatic measures that could be taken were also specified.


Weapons Systems Survivability

~~(S)~~ CINCPAC was frequently required to study and devise operational doctrines and procedures to minimize the vulnerability of his own weapons systems and to exploit those of the enemy.

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1. The Japan Socialist and Communist Parties were able to hire fewer demonstrators due to waning public interest.
 2. Point Paper, J3B42, 22 Sep 67.
 3. CINCPACINST 03128.2, 7 Aug 67.

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SSBN
Survivability doctrine (P. 1048)



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Authentication and Safeguarding of Nuclear Control Orders

~~(S)~~ The JCS sponsored a worldwide conference on authentication policies and procedures from 9 to 13 January 1967 attended by representatives of CINCPAC, his component command commanders, the Commander of Submarine Forces, Pacific, and the Commanding General, [redacted]. The resulting revision of JCS guidance was expected to assist in a better understanding by PACOM emergency action and cryptographic logistic personnel of the policy and procedures to safeguard nuclear control orders.

USMC
UK?
TAIWAN

(U) CINCPAC published an interim instruction in April for use throughout the PACOM. Then, on 1 July, a revised PACOM Sealed Authenticator System for nuclear control orders was implemented. To provide compartmentation (which would improve security) and to give

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1. J3 Briefs 152-67, 23 May 67; 274-67, 16 Oct 67.
 2. CINCPAC 140457Z Oct 67.
 3. J3 Brief 293-67, 31 Oct 67.
 4. CINCPAC 022127Z Dec 67.
 5. J3 Brief [redacted] 67.

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each PACOM component its own authenticators (better tailored to individual needs), 29 new or revised authenticators were implemented.¹ In July, the Commanding General of the [REDACTED]

(S) Amplifying instructions received in August for the JCS Sealed Authentication Systems required changes to Annex U to CINCPAC's OPlan 1-68 to refine emergency action procedures.² Changes were accomplished in August³ and were scheduled to be incorporated in Change 2 to Annex U to CINCPAC OPlan 1-68 to be published in 1968.

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1. J6 History, Apr, Jul 67.
 2. J3 Brief 221-67, 3 Aug 67.
 3. CINCPAC 110334Z Aug 67.

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SECTION X - PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

PACOM PSYOPS Planning and Policy Coordination

(S) Psychological operations (PSYOPS) were being conducted in the PACOM in 1967 by CINCPAC, the United Nations Command in Korea, [REDACTED] The JCS considered the magnitude of their efforts impressive. In October the JCS proposed a concept for broadening PSYOPS programming and policy guidance throughout the PACOM by establishment of a Joint Regional PSYOPS Center in Hawaii empowered to coordinate and direct all PSYOPS in the PACOM,¹ and composed of representatives of the agencies already involved.

(S) The JCS noted specific developments in Southeast Asia that had increased PSYOPS responsibilities and the need for regional coordination. To develop PSYOPS programming for a given country in the PACOM, especially in Southeast Asia, without consideration of the region as a whole, limited the full exploitation of propaganda media, did not properly treat the enemy as a whole, reduced the effectiveness of US actions, and made the use of PSYOPS resources difficult and more expensive.

(S) The JCS believed that the center would offer the opportunity for measurable improvement in the fields of regionally oriented policy guidance, flexibility and rapidity of response to the enemy, initiative, and more efficient use of resources. The center could produce regional objectives, plans, concepts, and courses of action that would permit a more realistic and long-range employment of the PSYOPS effort. In-depth propaganda analysis and studies of enemy vulnerabilities could be accomplished.

(S) The JCS concluded that it might be timely to propose broadening PSYOPS programming and policy guidance for such programs to encompass the entire Asian and Pacific area. A center empowered to coordinate and direct all US PSYOPS would permit the United States to wage PSYOPS on a scale compatible with its security interests in Asia, would counter the increasing scope of Communist propaganda efforts, would assure timely US support of friendly host nation PSYOPS, and would increase the impact of combat and political actions.

1. JCS 1069/261934Z Oct 67; J5 History, Dec 67.

Voice of the United Nations Command, Korea

(S) The Voice of the United Nations Command (VUNC) radio had been broadcasting as part of a psychological operations program in Korea. The broadcasts were in Korean and until July 1967 had included segments in Mandarin and Cantonese. The Chinese language portions were discontinued by direction of the Deputy Secretary of Defense, although the CINCUNC had sought to have them continued.¹ CINCUSAR-PAC, who was tasked by CINCPAC to support the psychological operations mission of the CINCUNC, was to adjust support operations accordingly.

(S) At a meeting of the East Interdepartmental Regional Group² in May the entire VUNC operation was brought into question by objections on the part of the US Information Agency (USIA) and the US Ambassador to the UN.³ The USIA favored suspension of all broadcasts and considered that the VUNC functions fell within the purview of the Voice of America. The Interdepartmental Regional Group in May considered only the question of broadcasts to North and South Korea and agreed that they should be continued, but with more policy guidance being furnished by all agencies concerned. The USIA member disassociated himself from the decision and indicated that the USIA may wish to raise the matter with the Senior Interdepartmental Group.

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1. J5 Brief 140-67, 8 May 67.
 2. See CINCPAC Command History, 1966, p 31.
 3. J5 Brief 176-67, 19 Jun 67.

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
SECTION XI - JOINT EXERCISES

Exercise HIGH HEELS VI


(S) JCS-sponsored Exercise HIGH HEELS VI, 24 October to 1 November 1967, was the first worldwide command post exercise in which CINCPAC had participated since 1964.¹ PACOM commands west of Hawaii and subordinate units below component command headquarters did not participate because of current operations in Southeast Asia and to prevent overloading vital communications circuits between Hawaii and the Western Pacific. Had staff involvement in current operations or communications overloading dictated, CINCPAC would have terminated participation immediately.²

(S) The exercise included pre-general war, Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP) monitoring, and subsequent operational phases of a general war.³ The scenario depicted a world situation in which the United States was confronted by the USSR and China in collaboration in a policy of "violent revolution." The Chinese had deployed extensive forces, some to coastal regions opposite Taiwan and along the Yalu River. North Korean ground and air forces were mobilized and action by North Vietnam continued at the existing level.

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1. CINCPAC 210316Z Nov 67.
 2. J5 Brief 111-67, 13 Apr 67.
 3. Ibid.
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SECTION XII - RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT ACTIVITIES

Interchange of Scientific and Operational Analysis Studies

(U) The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Systems Analysis asked the JCS to provide him with copies of all technical memorandums, indexes of past studies, and other analyses published by CINCPAC's Scientific Advisory Group and similar analysis groups of CINCPAC's component command commanders.¹

(U) The JCS limited the scope of the request to those studies pertaining to combat operations in Southeast Asia or those that CINCPAC determined to be of value to the JCS.²

(U) CINCPAC believed that availability of reports produced in the PACOM could reduce duplication of analysis effort and be of value more rapidly to the JCS. He was concerned, however, about upsetting what had been an informal but very profitable exchange of data, views, and analysis among PACOM analysts with the understanding that the views of their respective commanders were not necessarily represented. Many studies were prepared to assist CINCPAC and his staff. Some of these considered only a small part of a larger problem and could lead to unjustified conclusions if they were considered out of context. Also, the requirement for timeliness often precluded fully documenting data collection methods or analysis methodology.

(U) When CINCPAC replied to the JCS he asked in turn for copies of studies prepared in the Office of the Assistant Secretary for Systems Analysis prior to their publication.³ CINCPAC believed a review of such studies could prevent erroneous interpretation of combat data be -

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1. CINCPACAF had an Assistant for Operations Analysis and a Tactical Evaluation Division. Responsive to CINCPACAF were the 7th Air Force's Office of Operations Analysis and a Tactical Air Analysis Center. CINCPACFLT had an Operations Evaluation Group. Responsive to CINCPACFLT were the Commander, Seventh Fleet and the Commander of Task Force 77, both with Operations Evaluation Group representatives. CINCUSARPAC had a Systems Analysis Branch and the CG, FMFPAC had an Operations Analysis Section. COMUSMACV had a Scientific Advisor and, toward the end of the year, established an Operations Research and Systems Analysis Division.
 2. J3 Brief 24-67, 23 Jan 67.
 3. J3 Brief 125-67, 29 Apr 67.

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fore the analyses became incorporated in Defense Department or JCS policy or objectives. CINCPAC, however, was not furnished the papers prior to their publication. He did receive monthly summaries of studies produced by the Office of the Assistant Secretary for Systems Analysis.

(U) A procedure for forwarding PACOM-produced documents to the Assistant Secretary was devised as follows. CINCPAC reviewed the publications of his component command commanders, forwarding them along with papers produced by the CINCPAC staff that were deemed appropriate for distribution to the JCS. He further noted which of those papers he forwarded were appropriate for further distribution by the JCS to the Assistant Secretary for Systems Analysis.¹

(U) A subsequent memorandum from the JCS expressed the appreciation of the Assistant Secretary for the prompt forwarding of operational analysis reports; he said they had materially assisted in an exchange of analysis information.²

Studies Prepared or Reviewed by the Scientific Advisory Group

(S) The numerous studies of CINCPAC's Scientific Advisory Group in 1967 were sometimes presented as formal analysis reports but frequently they were short, one-time analyses to satisfy a particular staff need. Many reports were parts of continuing studies on matters of long-range interest.³ Some brief highlights of Scientific Advisory Group studies, plus a few highlights of studies produced by agencies subordinate to CINCPAC, follow.

a. ARC LIGHT: A study of FAN SONG electronic intelligence relative to TALLY-HO area ARC LIGHT missions concerned a three-week summer 1967 period in which [REDACTED]

b. Aircraft Attrition: Preliminary attrition estimates were calculated for PRACTICE NINE and MUSCLE SHOALS operations.⁵

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1. J3 Brief 24-67, 23 Jan 67.
 2. J3 Brief 220-67, 1 Aug 67.
 3. CINCPAC Command History, 1966, p 107.
 4. SAG Working Paper [REDACTED]
 5. SAG Working Papers 2-67, 1 Feb 67; 5-67, 1 Apr 67, and 8-67, 1 Jun 67.

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A CINCPACFLT study of downed carrier-based aircrews indicated that 42 percent of A-1 crews were killed if the aircraft was downed versus 24 percent of A-4 crews. ¹

c. COMMANDO LAVA: A predictive analysis based on geological distribution of soil types was made of areas of South Vietnam where COMMANDO LAVA could be expected to produce maximum results. ²

d. Counter-Mortar Radar: Relative effectiveness of operational and new counter-mortar radars for use in Southeast Asia was studied. ³

e. Crop Destruction: In South Vietnam in 1967, 98 percent of crop destruction missions were conducted in areas of Viet Cong control, 2 percent in contested areas, and program objectives were being met. ⁴



1. CINCPACFLT Analysis Staff Study 9-67.
2. J3A1/Memo/000190-67, 6 Oct 67.
3. Working Paper 17-67, 20 Sep 67, still in draft form at the end of the year.
4. SAG Working Paper, 20-67, 23 Dec 67.



h. Infiltration: Based on RAND Corporation interviews of prisoners of war, 60 percent of North Vietnamese Army infiltrators had been briefed on the possible use of acoustical sensors along trails through the DMZ and Laos. ¹

Analysis of CAS messages for 1967 indicated smuggling through Cambodia of quantities of rice, flints, potassium phosphate, potassium nitrate, and medicines and drugs into South Vietnam or adjacent Viet Cong base areas in Cambodia. ²



j. PRAIRIE FIRE: A PRAIRIE FIRE/DANIEL BOONE automatic data processing data base was established. Used in connection with the computer map plot capability, analysis of location, time, and results of missions was possible. ⁷

k. Propeller Driven versus Jet Aircraft Effectiveness in the Laos Panhandle: Analysis of the results of all propeller driven and jet aircraft attacks in December 1967 indicated that the jets destroyed or damaged 2.12 vehicles per night, the propeller aircraft 1.63. Targets attacked during the study period were motor vehicles - 14.5 percent of total targets; road segments - 34.5 percent; truck parks and transshipment points - 18.7 percent; storage areas - 14.5 percent; and AAA sites and weapons - 7.1 percent. ⁸

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1. J3/Memo/001470, 17 Oct 67.
 2. SAG Activity Report, Jun 67 - Jan 68.
 3. SAG Working Paper 13-67, 29 Aug 67.
 4. Ibid.
 5. J3A1/Memo/00199-67, 20 Oct 67.
 6. J3/Memo/00164-68, 20 Jan 68.
 7. SAG Activity Report, Jun 67 - Jan 68.
 8. J3A1/Memo/0029-68, 9 Feb 68.

l. River Patrol Requirements Model: This was designed to determine on a mathematical basis the optimal number of river patrol vessels to assign to GAME WARDEN to give the desired probability of detection of Viet Cong movements on waterways of the Delta area.¹

m. ROLLING THUNDER: A Navy study indicated that as a result of ROLLING THUNDER operations transit time for troops moving south from the Red River area to the DMZ increased from one week in April 1965 to six to nine months in April-May 1966.²

[REDACTED]

For the period September to November 1966, 54 percent of motor vehicle sightings in North Vietnam were by day. For the same period in 1967, the day percentage was 20 percent.⁴

n. SA-2: Analysis of certain SA-2 installations in North Vietnam indicated that about 70 percent of the sites were never occupied while certain others were probably occupied 100 percent of the time.⁵

o. SEA DRAGON: A CINCPACFLT study indicated that North Vietnamese coastal fire had forced SEA DRAGON ships to operate farther from shore.⁶

Development of fin and spin stabilized missiles to deliver ordnance from 16" tubes for distances up to 70 miles was studied; the projectiles may have too great a probable circular error to be of significant value.⁷

The decline in the rate of waterborne logistic craft detections suggested the effectiveness of SEA DRAGON operations.⁸

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1. SAG Working Paper, 6-67, 1 Apr 67.
 2. J3/Memo/001111-67, 1 Sep 67.
 3. J3A1/Memo/003-68, 11 Jan 68.
 4. J3A1/Memo/00243-67, 28 Dec 67.
 5. J3A1/Memo/000219-67, 15 Nov 67.
 6. CINCPACFLT Analysis Staff Study 5-67.
 7. J3A1/Memo/0173-67, 14 Sep 67.
 8. J3A1/Memo/00119-67, 14 Jun 67.

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p. SHRIKE: SHRIKE missile effectiveness under ROLLING THUNDER operations was the subject of continuing study in 1967.¹

q. STEEL TIGER/BARREL ROLL: The optimum period for MSQ-77 bombing of Mu Gia Pass for the purpose of destroying moving vehicles would be between 1700 and 1800 hours when the rate of truck movement averaged 32 trucks per hour. The number of expected truck kills, however, would be low.³

An evaluation of the STEEL TIGER/BARREL ROLL program for the period October 1965 through April 1967 reflected the changing target structure, sortie effect, and patterns of vehicle movement.⁴

r. Viet Cong/North Vietnamese Army Logistics: A mathematical model and the quantitative inputs which estimated Viet Cong/NVA civilian and military consumption rates and requirements in North Vietnam, Laos, and South Vietnam was prepared. Attrition to war supporting material through destruction of motor vehicles, boats, etc., was also provided for.⁶

s. Viet Cong/ North Vietnamese Army Attacks: An analysis of Viet Cong/NVA initiated attacks in 1966 was performed and some characteristics of such attacks were studied.⁷

1. SAG Working Papers 1-67, 17 Jan 67; 7-67, 17 Apr 67.

3. SAG Working Paper 12-67, Sep 67.

4. SAG Working Paper 16-67, 5 Sep 67.

6. J3A1 /Memo/000229-67, 28 Nov 67 and 00225-67, 24 Nov 67.

7. SAG Working Papers 3-67, 13 Mar 67; 10-67, 5 Aug 67.

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


Navy Laboratory Scientists on Temporary Duty at CINCPAC Headquarters

(U) Since 1 May 1967 operations research analysts from various Navy laboratories³ had been spending periods of four-month temporary duty at CINCPAC's Headquarters. The first group consisted of seven analysts on duty from May to September, but the number was expected to level off at about three at a time. The purpose of the temporary assignments was to acquaint laboratory personnel with operational problems and requirements and to keep CINCPAC aware of the latest developments in Navy laboratory programs that could be applied to the war in Southeast Asia.

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1. J3/Memo/00165-68, 20 Jan 68.
 2. SAG Working Paper 2-68, still in draft form at the end of the year.
 3. Including the Naval Missile Laboratory, the Naval Weapons Center, and the Navy Research Laboratory.

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SECTION XIII - LOGISTICS ACTIVITIES

Prepositioned War Reserve Munitions

(S) Munitions were prepositioned in PACOM (outside of Southeast Asia) as a war reserve to permit rapid logistic response and support to initial combat operations if they were needed. CINCPAC's component command commanders stored and maintained their own war reserves. Requirements had been determined to be as follows:¹

| | | <u>TONS</u> |
|-------------------|-------------|-------------|
| Air Munitions: | CINCPACAF | 96,637 |
| | CINCPACFLT | 52,543 |
| | CINCUSARPAC | 6,000 |
| Ground Munitions: | CINCUSARPAC | 170,350 |
| | CINCPACFLT | |
| | and FMFPAC | 105,014 |

(S) Air munitions particularly had been drawn from these stocks for emergency use in Southeast Asia and in mid-1967 assets on hand to fill these requirements were less than five percent of the required amount.

(S) In February 1967 CINCPAC had requested² that the JCS reconstitute war reserve stocks of air munitions using JCS reserves. He submitted quantitative data on the shortages on 24 February³ and amplified it on 12 April.⁴ In June the JCS completed a study of munitions in the European Command and recommended to the Secretary of Defense that air munitions reserves in both Europe and the PACOM be augmented by increasing and accelerating production and shipment to provide for reserves for 60 days in Europe and 30 days in the PACOM.

(S) The Secretary approved the JCS plan for stock buildup or repositioning, and authorized the placing of 30,000 tons in PACOM reserves between July 1967 and March 1968. The JCS then furnished implement-

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1. Point Papers J4712, 4 Aug 67; J4716, 4 Aug 67.
 2. CINCPAC 070235Z Feb 67.
 3. CINCPAC ltr ser 00322-67, 24 Feb 67.
 4. CINCPAC 120050Z Apr 67; J4 Brief 0066-67, 8 Jun 67.

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ing instructions and asked CINCPAC¹ to coordinate the movement of air munitions within the PACOM.² As of the end of the year 25,513 tons had been released for placement in war reserve munitions stocks.

Ground munitions were not in such short supply as air munitions in the prepositioned war reserves. In PACOM 68 percent of Army requirements was on hand and 64 percent for the Navy and Marine Corps.³ Component command commanders had been authorized to requisition available assets as they were required. JCS approval was not required as it was for air munitions procurement. Ground munitions used in Southeast Asia that were common to war reserve requirements could be diverted expeditiously if necessary.

Military Construction Funding

CINCPAC's fund requests submitted in late 1966 and 1967 for military construction in PACOM in support of Southeast Asia were drastically cut by the Secretary of Defense's recommendations and the reduced amounts were approved by Congress. A supplemental military construction program for FY 67 (FY 67S MILCON) in the sum of \$1,250 million was validated by CINCPAC late in 1966.⁴ He had reduced the Service-validated programs by \$200 million and considered the program austere. The Secretary of Defense, in turn, recommended and Congress approved an FY 67S MILCON program of only \$625 million (worldwide) with an additional \$313 million deferred to the FY 68R (Regular) MILCON program. Of the \$625 million, \$540 million was appropriated for use in the PACOM.⁵ As a follow-on requirement the Secretary of Defense recommended an FY 68R MILCON program totaling \$96 million for PACOM area construction with an additional \$200 million⁶ in contingency funds (which would not necessarily be used in the PACOM). The result was that the approved supplemental program for FY 67 and the regular FY 68 program were at least \$400 million short of the amount recommended by CINCPAC for the FY 67S program.

1. In compliance with the Secretary of Defense's policy and JCS instructions, CINCPAC was not normally allowed to reallocate or divert enroute air munitions in PACOM without prior approval from the Secretary of Defense on a case-by-case basis.
2. J4 Brief 0099-67, 1 Aug 67.
3. Point Paper J4716, 4 Aug 67.
4. J4 Brief 045-67, 25 Apr 67.
5. Point Paper J4212, 1 Apr 67.
6. Only \$100 million was later appropriated.

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(S) CINCPAC submitted a reclama and asked for additional funds for some of the construction projects considered most critical.¹ In February 1967 he asked for an additional \$160 million to be added to the FY 68R MILCON program. CINCPAC included only items he had previously validated. Most of the funds granted, deferred, or refused concerned construction programs in Southeast Asia, and are discussed in greater detail in Chapter IV.

(S) In PACOM areas other than Southeast Asia the requested funds which had been disapproved or reduced in scope by the Secretary of Defense, and which were included in the \$160 million reclama, were in the following amounts (by Service and country in which construction was proposed):

| | | |
|--------------------|-------------|------------------|
| Army: | Japan | \$ 600,000 |
| | Okinawa | <u>3,524,000</u> |
| | | 4,124,000 |
| Navy: | Philippines | 7,868,000 |
| | Guam | 2,929,000 |
| | Okinawa | 2,413,000 |
| | Japan | <u>1,770,200</u> |
| | | 14,980,200 |
| Air Force: | Taiwan | 430,000 |
| | Philippines | 4,253,000 |
| | Okinawa | <u>1,200,000</u> |
| | | 5,883,000 |
| All-Service total: | | \$24,987,200 |

(S) The reclama and all other related requests, without exception, were disapproved in Washington in 1967.²

(S) Total funds that were actually appropriated for military construction in support of Southeast Asia, in PACOM areas other than Southeast Asia, from the FY 65R program through the FY 67S program, by Service, were as shown in the following table:³

-
1. CINCPAC ltr ser 00315, 23 Feb 67.
 2. Point Paper, J4215, 20 Feb 68.
 3. Ibid.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

| <u>COUNTRY</u> | <u>ARMY</u> (\$ in millions) | <u>NAVY</u> (\$ in millions) | <u>AIR FORCE</u> (\$ in millions) | <u>TOTAL</u> (\$ in millions) |
|----------------|---------------------------------|---------------------------------|--------------------------------------|----------------------------------|
| Philippines | | 67.1 | 19.9 | 87.0 |
| Okinawa | 33.6 | 9.7 | 31.1 | 74.4 |
| Guam | | 5.3 | 12.3 | 17.6 |
| Japan | 8.8 | 4.7 | 2.5 | 16.0 |
| Hawaii | | 2.4 | 1.0 | 3.4 |
| Midway | | 1.7 | | 1.7 |
| Taiwan | | .2 | 26.6 | 26.8 |
| Wake | | | 2.7 | 2.7 |
| Total | 42.4 | 91.1 | 96.1 | 229.6 |

~~(S)~~ CINCPAC submitted an FY 69R MILCON program request for about \$600 million in August 1967, of which \$68.5 million was for PACOM areas other than Southeast Asia but in support of Southeast Asia.¹ Action was pending in Washington at the end of the year.

(U) On 5 October the Secretary of Defense announced a curtailment of military construction contract awards because of the uncertain state of Federal finances.² Contract awards for which bids were scheduled to be opened by 9 October were unaffected. Those scheduled for opening after that date were postponed for at least a month, with the exception that those in direct support of Southeast Asia or a new weapons system could be called to the attention of the Secretary of Defense for individual review. It was understood that the Secretary would take a "hard line" on approving exceptions, however.

(U) The Navy Facilities Engineering Command immediately prepared a list of projects to be considered exceptions to the freeze. In addition to Southeast Asia construction, these included a small number of military construction projects elsewhere in PACOM that had been included in the FY 67R appropriation, including all AUTODIN facilities.

(U) The Pacific Ocean Division of the Army Engineers had 20 projects totaling \$4.8 million for PACOM areas other than Southeast Asia affected by the freeze.

(U) CINCPAC's component command commanders and their contracting agencies requested exceptions in a timely manner for all proj-

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1. Point Paper J4217, 4 Aug 67.
 2. Point Paper J4215, 10 Oct 67.

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ects in support of Southeast Asia. These exceptions were all granted, which prevented interruption of any necessary construction.

Petroleum, Oil, and Lubricants

(C) Despite the Middle East oil crisis and a 30 percent increase in POL consumption in the PACOM in 1967, and as the result of a tremendous logistic effort, POL was available when and where it was needed for operations. CINCPAC and his staff were concerned with the procurement, planning, shipping, distribution, storage, and quality control of the 147 million barrels of POL consumed in 1967.¹ The cost of the fuel was approximately \$630 million. The accompanying chart and tables portray total consumption by area and by type of fuel.

Tankage

(C) Tankage available for POL products increased throughout the PACOM as shown in the following table.²

TANKAGE (in thousands of barrels)


| | <u>January</u> | <u>December</u> | <u>1967 Gain</u> |
|---------------|----------------|-----------------|------------------|
| Hawaii | 9,557.7 | 9,949.1 | 391.4 |
| Guam | 2,272.6 | 3,021.9 | 749.3 |
| Philippines | 2,589.6 | 3,212.5 | 622.9 |
| Taiwan | 269.9 | 654.9 | 385.0 |
| Japan | 12,070.9 | 12,170.9 | 100.0 |
| Okinawa | 1,926.0 | 2,423.0 | 497.0 |
| Korea | 1,130.0 | 1,130.0 | 0.0 |
| Thailand | 440.0 | 1,620.0 | 1,180.0 |
| South Vietnam | <u>1,200.0</u> | <u>1,929.6</u> | <u>729.6</u> |
| TOTALS | 31,456.7 | 36,111.9 | 4,655.2 |

1. J4 History, Dec 67.

2. Ibid.

PACOM POL CONSUMPTION

(in millions of barrels)



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1967 POL CONSUMPTION

BY AREA

(in thousands of barrels)

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| | Jan | Feb | Mar | Apr | May | Jun | Jul | Aug | Sep | Oct | Nov | Dec | Total |
|--------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|----------------|
| Hawaii | 805 | 1,046 | 1,144 | 976 | 919 | 756 | 978 | 1,020 | 1,007 | 1,141 | 1,002 | 926 | 11,720 |
| Guam | 931 | 916 | 1,030 | 994 | 936 | 821 | 797 | 693 | 723 | 794 | 731 | 761 | 10,127 |
| Philippines | 1,981 | 1,859 | 1,970 | 2,004 | 1,996 | 1,956 | 2,094 | 2,284 | 1,918 | 2,279 | 2,395 | 2,236 | 24,972 |
| Taiwan | 46 | 44 | 44 | 167 | 145 | 242 | 153 | 94 | 88 | 153 | 172 | 201 | 1,549 |
| Japan | 2,541 | 2,654 | 2,346 | 1,962 | 1,958 | 1,760 | 1,994 | 2,113 | 1,810 | 1,742 | 1,739 | 1,726 | 24,345 |
| Korea | 727 | 851 | 622 | 578 | 530 | 468 | 444 | 553 | 429 | 546 | 584 | 701 | 7,033 |
| Okinawa | 1,345 | 1,209 | 1,302 | 1,190 | 1,343 | 1,217 | 1,196 | 1,198 | 1,212 | 1,146 | 1,219 | 1,318 | 14,895 |
| Thailand | 1,027 | 917 | 1,066 | 1,126 | 1,312 | 1,404 | 1,459 | 1,482 | 1,329 | 1,480 | 1,397 | 1,358 | 15,357 |
| Vietnam | 2,584 | 2,548 | 2,744 | 2,765 | 2,958 | 3,239 | 3,244 | 3,279 | 3,187 | 3,347 | 3,461 | 3,343 | 36,699 |
| TOTAL | 11,987 | 12,044 | 12,268 | 11,762 | 12,097 | 11,863 | 12,359 | 12,716 | 11,703 | 12,628 | 12,700 | 12,570 | 146,697 |

1967 POL CONSUMPTION

BY PRODUCT

(in thousands of barrels)

| | Jan | Feb | Mar | Apr | May | Jun | Jul | Aug | Sep | Oct | Nov | Dec | Total |
|--------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|----------------|
| JP-4 | 5,393 | 5,004 | 5,597 | 5,385 | 5,883 | 5,654 | 5,675 | 5,723 | 5,443 | 6,004 | 5,914 | 5,995 | 67,670 |
| JP-5 | 476 | 545 | 508 | 504 | 565 | 473 | 513 | 562 | 393 | 442 | 413 | 399 | 5,793 |
| Avgas | 665 | 704 | 686 | 720 | 756 | 703 | 700 | 627 | 588 | 645 | 658 | 639 | 8,091 |
| Mogas | 737 | 702 | 655 | 799 | 668 | 807 | 785 | 789 | 694 | 719 | 755 | 708 | 8,818 |
| Diesel | 1,928 | 2,147 | 1,645 | 1,470 | 1,336 | 1,356 | 1,361 | 1,382 | 1,411 | 1,515 | 1,567 | 1,605 | 18,723 |
| NSFO | 2,788 | 2,942 | 3,177 | 2,884 | 2,889 | 2,870 | 3,325 | 3,633 | 3,174 | 3,303 | 3,393 | 3,224 | 37,602 |
| TOTAL | 11,987 | 12,044 | 12,268 | 11,762 | 12,097 | 11,863 | 12,359 | 12,716 | 11,703 | 12,628 | 12,700 | 12,570 | 146,697 |

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1967 POL CONSUMPTION

The Middle East Crisis and POL for PACOM

(S) Weeks before the fighting erupted over the Israeli-Arab frontiers, PACOM planners were already considering a potential POL shortage for the Vietnam conflict. At that time, PACOM was consuming more POL (especially JP-4) than was called for in the existing general war plans.¹ The Arab countries controlled over 45 percent of the world's oil supply and their statesmen well knew the value of petroleum as an economic weapon. Approximately 8 million barrels of the 12 million barrel monthly PACOM requirement came from Middle East sources. Any loss because of an Israeli-Arab confrontation would necessitate substantial increases in the amounts of POL being shipped from the Western Hemisphere. "Until full support from the Western Hemisphere could be realized, additional transportation would be required for increased shuttles from Japan and Hawaii to other PACOM areas in order to redistribute inventories to high consuming areas."²

(S) Accordingly, on 27 May 1967, CINCPAC requested JCS "to keep CINCPAC informed of Washington plans related to the current and potential Mid East developments."³ Within two days, JCS came back with a question as to CINCPAC's capability to sustain operations in the event oil shipments from the Middle East were stopped.⁴ Using the existing PACOM inventories and level of inputs from the Western Hemisphere, the following projections were made: JP-4 fuel -- 70 days; automotive gasoline (mogas) -- 100 days; diesel fuel -- 60 days; Navy Special Fuel Oil (NSFO) -- 75 days. Aviation gasoline and JP-5 fuel were already being supplied from the Western Hemisphere sources and no problems were anticipated in sustaining this support.

(S) These projections, however, forecasted a total depletion of PACOM inventories within the time frame indicated, a position which was completely unacceptable. It was considered essential to maintain PACOM inventories at "a 30 day level in order to retain a minimum General War Capability."⁵ As a result, CINCPAC recommended to JCS an immediate

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1. J4 History, May 1967.
 2. Ibid.
 3. J4 Memo 0122-67, Subj: Middle East Emergency and PACOM POL Support, dtd 25 May 67; CINCPAC 270145Z May 67.
 4. JCS 292207Z May 67.
 5. J4 Memo, No Number, from BriGen McLaughlin, J4, to Adm Sharp, CINCPAC, Subj: PACOM POL SUPPORT, dtd 3 Jun 67.

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expansion of the POL input from the Western Hemisphere and stated his requirement to hold a 30-day supply for general war needs. ¹

~~(S)~~ As predicted, when fighting finally broke out in early June, Arab nations threatened to cut off oil shipments to any nation siding with Israel. Then, as the Israeli Blitzkrieg rolled on, such countries as Iraq, Libya, and Saudi Arabia shut down their petroleum production, while Egypt closed the Suez Canal. It became apparent that oil from Persian Gulf sources could not be relied upon and that alternate supply lines would have to be opened. The question now became the extent of the world's vulnerability to Arab blackmail. ²

~~(S)~~ No one knew how long the Arabs would sit on their oil, and one immediate threat for American planners was the POL needs of Vietnam. Since the oil fields of the Middle East were providing 60 percent of the US POL requirements in Vietnam, considerable concern was felt within the US defense community. ³ Moreover, the closing of the Suez Canal had changed the world tanker market overnight from a depressed state to a condition of over-demand. ⁴

~~(S)~~ As early as 6 June, informal contacts between PACOM J4 personnel and JCS sources had indicated "urgent POL meetings between Interior and Industry Advisory Committee, and in JCS and OSD/DFSC regarding PACOM and world-wide POL supply problems." ⁵ Two days later, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara had ordered "the implementation of the plans to place 35 ships with 6.5 million barrels of cargo afloat in PACOM." ⁶ Moreover, news releases were quoting the Secretary of Defense as saying that US industry could meet all Southeast Asia POL requirements if Mid-East sources were lost. ⁷ A prominent news magazine said McNamara was prepared to ship "oil to Vietnam from West Coast and Caribbean refineries--even though the total cost of oil for the war would be more than doubled." ⁸

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1. CINCPAC 042026Z Jun 67.
 2. J4 History, Jun 67; Newsweek, 19 Jun 67, p 68.
 3. JCS 292207Z May 67; JCS 072053Z, 092227Z, and 142123Z Jun 67.
 4. J4 History, Jun 67.
 5. J4 Memo No 00218-67, Subj: JPO POL SITREP 1, 6 Jun 67.
 6. J4 Memo No 0137-67, Subj: JPO POL SITREP 3, 8 Jun 67.
 7. Ibid.
 8. Newsweek, 19 Jun 67, p 68.

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~~(S)~~ By 12 June, however, the situation had stabilized somewhat and would become serious only if the Military Sea Transport Service (MSTS) encountered added delays in contracting for Western Hemisphere shipping.¹ PACOM logistics planners closely monitored this aspect of the crisis and, just five days later, could report:

PACOM POL supply pipelines are beginning to reform in keeping with adjustments made necessary by the Mid-East disruptions. Although there will be some inventory draw-downs, no serious shortages are anticipated. Necessary actions are in process to insure that none of the draw-downs or shortages are felt in SEA or the key island bases supporting combat operations.²

~~(S)~~ By August, the overall impact of the Middle East crisis on the PACOM Southeast Asia POL posture was practically over. Consumption in the war zone for June had hit 4.6 million barrels, but resupply had been met.³ Moreover, by the end of July, the MSTS liftings from the Persian Gulf were back to 90 percent of pre-Mid East Crisis levels. Early in August, all "except 9 of the 34 tankers which were chartered shortly after the start of the Middle East situation to compensate for the reduced availability of product from the Persian Gulf area have now discharged their cargoes."⁴ Eight of the remaining tankers were then en-route.

~~(S)~~ By the middle of September, no major problems of POL supply availability existed. As JCS reported, when military shipments from the Persian Gulf were denied on 7 June, it only "required approximately 30-45 days to completely reorient the supply system to Western Hemisphere sources."⁵ Finally, on 21 September, JCS made "the final report on the POL implication of the Middle East situation."⁶ With the lifting of their embargoes by Iraq, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, and Saudi Arabia,

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1. J4 Memo No. 0142-67, Subj: JPO POL SITREP 5, 12 Jun 67.
 2. J4 Memo No. 0145-67, Subj: JPO POL SITREP 6, 17 Jun 67.
 3. J4 History, Jul 67.
 4. J441 Point Paper, Subj: POL Support in PACOM, 4 Aug 67.
 5. Ltr, LtGen Richard D. Meyer, USA, Director for Logistics, JCS, to BriGen John D. McLaughlin, USA, ACofS J-4, Hq CINCPA C, n. s., 14 Sep 67, with enclosure JCS J4DM-408-67, 14 Sep 67.
 6. Ltr, LtGen Richard D. Meyer, USA, Director for Logistics, JCS, to BriGen John D. McLaughlin, USA, ACofS J-4, Hq CINCPAC, n. s., 21 Sep 67.

oil shipments to the US military returned to normal.¹ Although the continuing closure of the Suez Canal maintained a tight balance between tanker supply and demand, the POL crisis was ended for the time being. PACOM logistic planners, of course, would continue to monitor worldwide tanker availability, as well as petroleum supply, to insure a sufficient stream of the essential POL to the trouble spots of Southeast Asia.

PACOM POL Facilities

~~(S)~~ Specific POL storage and distribution activities in PACOM in 1967 included the following:²

Japan

~~(S)~~ Increasing Military Airlift Command and PACAF traffic through Yokota Air Base had increased POL consumption to over 640,000 barrels a month by October 1967, a 35 percent increase over May 1967 consumption and a 100 percent increase over October 1966. The possibility of building a pipeline from Yokohama to Yokota was therefore explored.³ A military constructed line had been ruled out because of political implications and real estate problems. The possibility of a line to be built commercially or by the Japanese National Railroad (JNR) had been proposed, but did not receive favorable consideration within the Japanese Defense Facilities Administration Agency.

~~(S)~~ Meanwhile, requirements for Yokota were being satisfied by transporting fuel in an average of 45 rail cars and over 200 trucks per day. Truck deliveries were four times more expensive per gallon delivered than rail deliveries and truck deliveries required more manpower to receive. CINCPAC, therefore, wanted to expand rail facilities for cheaper operations.

~~(S)~~ Money to expand rail unloading facilities at Yokota had been approved in the Air Force FY 67S (Supplemental) Military Construction Program. Funds were also made available by the Department of the Army to upgrade the loading facilities at the Tsurumi POL Depot in Yokohama. Until both depot and on-base facilities were actually upgraded, however, the JNR would not provide the maximum number of tank cars possible per day. As a result of subsequent facility improvements, the JNR increased

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1. JCS J4DM-417-67, Subj: Worldwide Supply of POL, 21 Sep 67.
 2. See also Chapter IV.
 3. Point Paper J441, 5 May 67.

tank cars per day from 50 in May to 100 by the end of the year. The result in overall transportation savings through FY 68 was expected to be \$1.3 million.

(U) A new monobuoy was installed at Koshiha to improve fuel handling.

Korea

(S) Plans for a new modern commercial POL terminal at Inchon continued in 1967.¹ The Department of the Army supported the CINCPAC and CINCUSARPAC approved concept of commercial rather than military operation of the terminal.² Sole-source procurement for a service contract with the Korea Oil Corporation (KOCO) was approved. The Department of the Army funded the project and delegated responsibility for consummation of the contract to CINCUSARPAC who in turn redelegated it to the Commanding General, US Army Japan. Negotiations with KOCO began in October 1967. The target date for KOCO service support at Inchon was mid-1968.

(S) The United States had elected to use a commercial contract based on services to be rendered rather than build a new military terminal. This would also foster Korean industrial development.³ The change in operations at Inchon was designed to provide the major portion of the POL supply support requirements of the US Forces in Korea. Additionally it was designed to support Korean military requirements and those minor civil-commercial requirements that were previously supported through US facilities. The support to be provided for Korean users was one of the economic benefits provided in direct recognition of that country's contribution to Free World efforts in the Republic of Vietnam.

(S) In order to perform the services required by terms of the contract, KOCO felt it necessary to construct a new terminal. The KOCO terminal could become the nucleus for expansion to provide the Inchon-Seoul metropolitan complex with a modern POL ocean terminal. This expansion would complement Korean planning for the modernization of the Inchon Port and supplement old and currently inadequate commercial POL storage in Seoul. These POL developments, therefore, would considerably relieve the growing congestion of the rail systems.

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1. CINCPAC Command History, 1966, p 100.
 2. Point Paper J44A, 24 Aug 67.
 3. Point Paper J44, 15 Sep 67.

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Philippines

~~(C)~~ Construction was completed and the 40-mile POL pipeline from the Navy Base at Subic Bay to Clark Air Base became operational in June. ¹ The pipeline eliminated the need for the old Bataan Ocean Petroleum Depot, which was no longer required as an Air Force facility. ²

~~(C)~~ On-base tankage at Clark Air Base had been constructed and was operational (260,000 barrels of JP-4 fuel and 50,000 barrels of aviation gasoline). First increment tankage had been finished at Subic (160,000 barrels of JP-4 fuel and 80,000 of aviation gasoline), but additional JP-4 terminal tankage and an additional JP-4 discharge line were required. The additions were needed to permit quicker tanker discharge and turn-around and to free the fuel pier for the high priority Seventh Fleet oilers. Additional JP-4 tanks were required to permit the fuel to settle properly before it was pumped through the pipeline to Clark Air Base. ³

~~(C)~~ Numerous delays were encountered in reprogramming funds for the additional construction. CINCPAC repeatedly urged the Air Force Chief of Staff (nine messages between January and June 1967) to expedite reprogramming of funds to permit construction. ⁴ CINCPACAF also pushed the project through Air Force channels. Finally Admiral Sharp dispatched a personal request to General McConnell, the Air Force Chief of Staff, ⁵ but the matter was being delayed by the extensive review being given to it in the Department of Defense. On 5 July CINCPAC was asked by the Air Force to restate his need for the additional tankage and discharge line, and he did so the next day. ⁶

~~(C)~~ On 18 July the Air Force Chief of Staff notified CINCPAC that the Deputy Secretary of Defense had approved reprogramming of funds

1. CINCPAC Command History, 1966, p 288.
2. J4 History, Apr 67; Point Paper J4411, 28 Jun 67. Negotiations with commercial firms including the ESSO Corporation were unsuccessfully conducted concerning disposition of the BOPD, but at the end of the year the fate of the old facility had not been decided. The US Ambassador in Manila was in the process of turning over the facility to the Philippine Government.
3. J4 History, Apr 67.
4. J4 History, May, Jun 67.
5. CINCPAC 290108Z Jun 67.
6. J4 History, Jul 67; ADMINO CINCPAC 060005Z Jul 67.


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for the project.¹ At the end of the year construction of two new 80,000 barrel JP-4 tanks and a second discharge line at Subic was under way.

(U) In another POL handling improvement, a new POL monobuoy (trade name "IMODCO") was installed by the Navy at Subic Bay in September.² It improved receiving capability for JP-5 fuel and Navy Special Fuel Oil commercial tankers³ and was one of the first such military installations in the PACOM (others were in Taiwan and Japan).

Taiwan

(U) Construction of a new Air Force-funded POL system was completed at Ching Chuan Kang Air Base in August 1967.⁴ The system included new tankage for 385,000 barrels of POL on base, which was connected by a seven-mile pipeline to a two-mile offshore discharge system. Tankers were to moor and discharge at a new POL monobuoy that was installed offshore in September.⁵ The buoy, however, was damaged extensively in October by Typhoon CARLA and was no longer operational, if in fact it had become completely operational before the typhoon struck.⁶ Repairs were expected to be completed by early 1968.



1. CSAF 182137Z Jul 67.
2. J4 History, Oct 67.
3. ADMINO CINCPAC 060005Z Jul 67.
4. COMUSTDC 142336Z Aug 67.
5. J4 History, Oct 67.
6. J4 History, Nov 67.

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(C) CINCPAC and his component command commanders continued in 1967 to strive to provide maximum physical security for stored weapons, wherever they were located.

Classes of Supply

(U) The standard five classes of supply were not adequate to fulfill all joint logistic planning requirements during the 1966-67 Southeast Asia deployment planning programs. As a result the JCS directed the Services and the Defense Supply Agency to review existing terminology¹ and then asked CINCPAC to comment on proposed changes. The revised classes of supply were as follows:²

- I - Subsistence
- II - Clothing, individual equipment, tentage, organizational tool sets and kits, administrative and housekeeping supplies and equipment
- III - POL
- IV - Construction materials
- V - Ammunition
- VI - Personal demand items
- VII - Major end items
- VIII - Medical supplies
- IX - Repair parts
- X - Material to support non-military programs

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1. The five classes of supply had been Class I, subsistence (rations); Class II, supplies and equipment established by Tables of Organization and Equipment or other allowance lists and including clothing, weapons, and mechanic's tools; Class III, fuels and lubricants for all purposes except for operating aircraft, for medicinal products, or for use in weapons such as flame throwers (examples: gasoline; kerosene; diesel, fuel, and lubricating oil; greases; and solid fuels such as coal and wood); Class IV, supplies and equipment for which allowances were not otherwise prescribed or which were not otherwise classified (examples: construction and fortification materials, resupply of Class II items, and fuel for aircraft); and Class V, ammunition.
 2. J4 Brief 96-67, 29 Jul 67.

(U) CINCPAC logistic planning had already used categories similar to those proposed except for unit equipment and repair parts.¹ CINCPAC concurred in the proposed changes and recommended using the Federal Supply Classification groupings for category definitions.² He also recommended further study toward developing a common language for use by all Defense Department agencies and departments in logistic planning and supply management.

(U) The JCS approved the new classification structure for use by the Services and the unified and specified commands to become effective 1 January 1968 with full implementation expected by 1 January 1969.³

(U) The JCS subsequently asked CINCPAC to advise appropriate military advisory elements and Defense Attaches of the revised terminology and also asked that those agencies brief logistics officials of host countries where appropriate. CINCPAC forwarded the necessary advice, direction, and briefing materials in October.⁴

Automatic Data Processing of Logistics Programs

(U) CINCPAC's computer programs for logistics information continued to expand in scope and depth in 1967.⁵ With the increased need for rapid processing of massive volumes of raw data came a requirement to insure compatibility of the Logistics Division programs with those existing or planned by the JCS, elsewhere on the CINCPAC staff, and by CINCPAC's component and subordinate unified command commanders.⁶ A basic concept of this development was an integrated Logistics Management Information System, in which individual programs could stand alone but in which they contained common codes and contributed (through logical interfaces) to the total system. The development of the broad data base necessary for this integrated system was well under way by the end of 1967 and was strengthened by the expanded use of data processing techniques in areas that had not been previously automated.

(U) The data base for logistics requirements computer programs was updated quarterly during 1967 with copies provided to the JCS and CINCPAC's component and subordinate unified command commanders.

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1. J4 History, Jan 67.
 2. CINCPAC 200408Z Jan 67.
 3. J4 Brief 96-67, 29 Jul 67.
 4. CINCPAC ltr ser 3967, 23 Oct 67.
 5. CINCPAC Command History, 1966, p 127.
 6. Memorandum, J412 to J41, 19 Jan 68.

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(U) At the end of 1967 there were 39 automatic data processing programs either operational, under development, or planned, an increase of 11 programs during 1967. ¹ Included were programs supporting virtually all aspects of the logistics effort.

(U) Planning projects were concerned with capabilities and requirements for deployment and redeployment of forces. In 1967 a concept for reprogramming the system for Logistic Requirements in Support of Planning was developed to expand the system and to reflect the revised classes of supply (see preceding item). ² The Logistics Division had forwarded to the Joint Command and Control System Group a project request for expansion of the existing program ³ to support CINCPAC planners in their logistical analyses of operational and contingency plans, and to reduce hand computations to a minimum.

(U) In February the JCS requested assistance in adapting the computer program in support of planning to run on JCS equipment. ⁴ CINCPAC furnished two representatives for a week in February. The program was modified to run on the JCS computers and the rationale and use of the computer output reports were explained by the CINCPAC team.

(U) Supplies and services computer projects were concerned principally with construction (including material, equipment, and tonnages) and base development as directly related to operational requirements and operational plans support. ⁵ Data elements used included location, activity, Service, construction category, assets, requirements, and deficiencies. Projected expansion in this area included the automated receipt and tabulation of the Logistic Summary report from COMUSMACV.

(U) Petroleum, oil, and lubricants (POL) projects covered the full spectrum of requirements, distribution, control, and management. It was planned to automate virtually all reports that were prepared manually and therefore to employ fully the concept of management by exception. ⁶

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1. Memorandum, J412 to J41, 19 Jan 68.
 2. J4 History, Oct 67; J74 Brief 96-67, 29 Jul 67.
 3. CINCPAC Command History, 1966, p 127.
 4. J4 History, Feb 67.
 5. Memorandum, J412 to J41, 19 Jan 68.
 6. A concept in which the exception--a problem area--was brought to the manager's attention for his remedial action. Routine, non-problem areas did not require continuous monitoring or management.

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Data elements used included the activity, Service, products, consumption factors, inventory objectives, and desired prepositioned war reserve stocks.

(U) Munitions projects were designed to provide CINCPAC and his staff with information required to control, monitor, and effect distribution of munitions in the PACOM. Principal data elements included area, Service, base, Department of Defense identification code for ammunition, stockage objectives, usage factors, and assets on hand and enroute. Status of munitions production was also available. ~~Projected~~ program expansion included preparation of consolidated management reports employing the elements contained in the data bases.

(U) Transportation projects were principally concerned with a system to provide essential information daily on the status of PACOM ports. It was planned to include in the reports ship and cargo data and the relationship of port workload and performance to allocation and throughput capacities. In this area, also, the use of summary reports reflecting the overall status of shipping and port activity would permit the concept of management by exception to be fully exercised. Additional transportation projects concerned PACOM air lift requirements versus supportability and aerial port tonnage requirements versus capabilities.

Base Development Planning

(U) The PACOM Base Development Planning (BDP) program¹ progressed satisfactorily during 1967. CINCPAC's goal was to get the best possible information concerning requirements, assets, and deficiencies for each PACOM installation designated to support the various operational plans.

(U) Initial receipt of all BDP data had been edited, processed, codified, and stored in the data base at the PACOM MAP Data Center. Approximately 90 percent of the automated versions of these BDP had been disseminated to the reporting activities for review and updating and approximately 40 percent of these plans had been returned to CINCPAC for publication and distribution.

(U) CINCPAC hoped to update the entire PACOM data base in 1968.

1. Promulgated by CINCPAC Instruction 11010.1C, 7 Jul 65.

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LOC Capability Study - Burma

~~(S)~~ The JCS had tasked CINCPAC in 1965 to study the capability of Lines of Communication (LOC) in Burma to support US military operations there.¹ The primary purpose of the study was to identify and assess logistic deficiencies, limitations, or constraints that could prejudice the execution of military operations.

~~(S)~~ The study, which was forwarded to the JCS in September,² concluded that the maximum US Armed Forces that could be maintained in Burma, under wet weather conditions and without enemy interference, were approximately six Army division-Air Force wing slices (300,000 men). Logistic support for a force this size would depend primarily on maintaining the Burma LOC to at least the capacity they were considered to have had at the time of the study. The primary limitation to the conduct of logistic support operations was determined to be the absence of suitable alternate facilities.

~~(S)~~ Recommendations made in the study included that Burma's highway and airfield development should receive the highest priority should they qualify as Strategic Mobility Work Projects or Development Loan Projects (both funded by the Agency for International Development), that resources be procured to permit a rapid increase in port discharge capability at established ports and other underdeveloped areas, and that the use of inland waterways for logistic support be considered when developing plans and requirements for operations in Burma.

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1. J4 History, Sep 67.
 2. CINCPAC ltr ser 000452, 6 Sep 67.

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SECTION XIV - COMMUNICATIONS ACTIVITIES

Communications in the New Command Center

(U) Voice and teletype facilities in the new Command Center at Camp Smith were as follows: Emergency Action Center and Consoles, CINCPAC Voice Alert Net, the JCS Alert Network Console, the Emergency Action Center and JCS "Hot Lines," the CINCPAC Mobile Radio System, the Language Translator, and the JCS Emergency Message Automatic Transmission System.

~~(S)~~ CINCPAC had proposed to the JCS that the Emergency Message Automatic Transmission System (EMATS) be permitted to remain where it was, outside of the new Command Center, and be interconnected to the new center by cable for readout purposes. The JCS, however, directed that an EMATS acknowledgement capability be available in the new Command Center, so the system was relocated and reconfigured to meet the JCS requirements.¹

~~(S)~~ Additional circuits for the JCS Alerting Network, requested in September, were installed in October at both Camp Smith and [REDACTED] to permit a split operation of the CINCPAC staff between the two installations.

Commercial Firm to Provide Defense Telephone Service on Oahu

(U) Government operation of telephone systems when equivalent commercial service was available was prohibited by Defense Department and Bureau of the Budget directives.² In April 1966 the Hawaiian Telephone Company proposed to lease and operate the military-owned joint trunking and base telephone exchange facilities on Oahu, Hawaii, and to provide service to military users at tariff rates. The proposal was submitted to the Defense Communications Agency for analysis; there it was recommended for approval. CINCPAC concurred in principle in August 1966.³

(U) CINCPAC's component commands were to fund the telephone and trunk service they required. Credit for Government-owned assets

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1. J6 History, Aug, Sep 67.
 2. J6 Brief 483/66, 16 Dec 66.
 3. J6 Brief 377-67, 21 Jun 67.

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was to be determined by Defense Department analysis and returned to the Government. The Hawaiian Telephone Company was to take immediate action to improve the joint trunking system. It was expected that the 200 or so civilian Government employees who would be displaced could be absorbed by the company. It was estimated that 70 military personnel would no longer be needed for telephone service.

(U) Although the Defense Communications Agency had approved the plan in March the JCS recommended to the Secretary of Defense that approval be held in abeyance until the department carried out a cost comparison study of continued Government ownership versus commercial operation. Many long-needed improvements in the joint trunking system had been delayed in anticipation of the system being taken over by the commercial firm. Further lengthy delays for the cost comparison study could have jeopardized the reliability of critical command and control communications on Oahu.¹ CINCPAC therefore requested that a decision be expedited.²

(U) On 17 June the Deputy Secretary of Defense directed that the joint trunking facilities were to be maintained and operated by the Hawaiian Telephone Company and that a cost comparison analysis be made to determine whether the administrative telephone systems should be managed and operated by the telephone company or by the Government, but that responsibility for residence telephone service would be assumed by the company. The Deputy Secretary assigned overall responsibility for action to the Department of the Army, where it was reassigned to CINCUS-ARPAC, who was to arrange terms and conditions with the telephone company and develop the cost comparison study by 31 August 1967.³

(U) As of the end of the year the required inventory and appraisal of the joint trunking system were virtually complete and contract negotiations were in progress. The cost comparison analysis was under way with completion forecast for mid-1968.

Telephone Service Between CINCPAC and FMFPAC

(U) Plans proceeded in 1967 for a private auxiliary exchange, a 500-station intercom system linking key CINCPAC and FMFPAC personnel, that was to be leased from the Hawaiian Telephone Company. The sys-

1. J6 Brief 142/67, 23 Mar 67.

2. CINCPAC 252221Z Mar 67.

3. J6 History, Jun 67; J6 Brief 377/67, 21 Jun 67.

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tem was expected to be activated in April 1968 to provide improved administrative communications between the two staffs.¹

Communications Center Message Traffic

(U) CINCPAC was concerned with the management of message traffic in a continuing program to reduce it to the extent possible, to speed delivery of urgent messages, and to reduce the number accorded urgent handling, which continued its insidious rise unless constantly monitored.

(U) Total message traffic increased again in 1967 by an average of over 2,000 messages per month over the 1966 rate.² Total messages received and dispatched were 712,104 for the year compared to 689,550 for the previous year.³ Part of the 1967 total, however, included channel checks, which were not included in gross message totals computed after July. Activation of new equipment eliminated an average of about 8,600 channel checks per month.

(U) Message traffic in the CINCPAC Communications Center was reviewed periodically to determine actual speed of service, by priority, to CINCPAC's Headquarters from those agencies most frequently communicated with.⁴ One such survey, for the period 1 April to 30 June, revealed the following times expressed in hours/minutes required from filing to receipt of messages:

| <u>ORIGINATOR</u> | <u>FLASH</u> | <u>IMMEDIATE</u> | <u>PRIORITY</u> | <u>ROUTINE</u> |
|-------------------|--------------|------------------|-----------------|----------------|
| JCS | :45 | 4:10 | 9:51 | 11:34 |
| STATE DEPARTMENT | :46 | 1:58 | 4:50 | 5:28 |
| COMUSMACV | :29 | 2:16 | 6:23 | 6:20 |
| COMUSMACTHAI | * | 8:04 | 7:19 | 9:43 |
| CINCPACAF | * | 2:01 | 3:56 | 5:37 |
| CINCPACFLT | * | 1:32 | 7:35 | 8:34 |
| CINCUSARPAC | * | * | 4:52 | 7:47 |
| CTF 77 | 1:09 | 5:47 | 5:50 | 11:46 |
| I MAW | :48 | 5:04 | 11:14 | 15:17 |

* Insufficient sample to determine realistic handling time.

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1. J6 History, Nov, Dec 67.
 2. J6 History, Dec 67.
 3. Reaching a peak in March when 71,713 messages were processed.
 4. J6 History, Aug 67.

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MESSAGE DELIVERY TIME

1 OCTOBER 1967 — 31 DECEMBER 1967

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
| ORIGINATOR | PRECEDENCE | TIME-HRS:MIN | | | ORIGINATOR | TIME-HRS:MIN | | |
|-------------|------------|--------------|------------|-------------|------------|--------------|------------|-------------|
| | | Text Length | | | | Text Length | | |
| | | 1-5 LINES | 6-20 LINES | 21-90 LINES | | 1-5 LINES | 6-20 LINES | 21-90 LINES |
| CINCUSARPAC | Flash | ① -- | -- | -- | COMUSMACV | :30 | :48 | 1:39 |
| | Immediate | ② -- | -- | 1:05 | | 2:06 | 2:43 | 2:25 |
| | Priority | 3:11 | 3:20 | 3:00 | | 4:20 | 4:31 | 5:53 |
| | Routine | 5:14 | 7:55 | 9:59 | | 7:37 | 5:57 | 6:39 |
| CINCPACAF | Flash | -- | -- | -- | JCS | -- | :54 | -- |
| | Immediate | 1:53 | 1:50 | 2:47 | | 2:31 | 1:51 | 2:33 |
| | Priority | 1:18 | 1:34 | 2:10 | | 5:23 | 5:52 | 7:03 |
| | Routine | 3:44 | 3:14 | 3:17 | | 9:11 | 8:19 | 9:34 |
| CINCPACFLT | Flash | -- | -- | -- | SECSTATE | -- | -- | :50 |
| | Immediate | -- | 2:55 | 5:25 | | 1:20 | 2:36 | 1:36 |
| | Priority | 3:48 | 3:58 | 3:30 | | 5:26 | 5:47 | 3:13 |
| | Routine | 4:16 | 4:26 | 6:13 | | 5:30 | 4:08 | 6:46 |
| TF 77 | Flash | :57 | :57 | 1:26 | 1ST MAW | :34 | :43 | 1:09 |
| | Immediate | 2:28 | 3:37 | 4:56 | | 2:17 | 2:48 | 3:03 |
| | Priority | 3:55 | 4:43 | 5:45 | | -- | 3:32 | -- |
| | Routine | -- | 6:26 | 9:02 | | -- | 5:11 | 8:09 |
| 7TH AF | Flash | :31 | :39 | 1:02 | | | | |
| | Immediate | -- | 3:55 | 3:18 | | | | |
| | Priority | 1:30 | 6:17 | 10:07 | | | | |
| | Routine | -- | -- | -- | | | | |

NOTES:

- ① No entry indicates lack of sampling in the Computer Data Base.
- ② Time-of-File by Originator to Time-of-Receipt by CINCPAC /hrs:mins/.

SOURCE: PACOM Digest, Feb 68, p 85.

CINCPAC STAFF MESSAGE TRAFFIC BY PRECEDENCE



SOURCE: PACOM Digest, Feb 68, p 86.

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
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CINCPAC STAFF MESSAGE TRAFFIC BY SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

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SOURCE: PACOM Digest, Feb 68, p 87.

(C) Abuse of message priority systems was still a matter of continuing concern to CINCPAC in 1967. The greatest number of abuses by far occurred among messages arriving at CINCPAC's Headquarters rather than those being transmitted, as illustrated by the following table which was prepared for the Directorate for Inspection Services (DINS) and reflected CINCPAC Communications Center message precedence summary for the month of June:

| | INCOMING | | OUTGOING | | TOTAL | |
|-----------|----------|---------|----------|---------|--------|---------|
| | Number | Percent | Number | Percent | Number | Percent |
| FLASH | 494 | 1.1 | 19 | 0.1 | 513 | 0.9 |
| IMMEDIATE | 15,090 | 32.3 | 580 | 4.5 | 15,670 | 26.3 |
| PRIORITY | 10,720 | 22.9 | 1,396 | 11.0 | 12,116 | 20.3 |
| ROUTINE | 20,445 | 43.7 | 10,798 | 84.4 | 31,243 | 52.5 |
| TOTAL | 46,749 | 78.1 | 12,793 | 21.9 | 59,542 | 100 |

(C) The DINS finding,¹ which was not formally forwarded to the Pentagon as part of the final report, commented on the large number of FLASH precedence messages processed. The Allied Communications Publication 121, US Supplement - 1 definition stated that "FLASH precedence is reserved for initial enemy contact messages or operational combat messages of extreme urgency. Brevity is mandatory." A DINS review of the June message traffic revealed that many FLASH messages were in connection with air operations in Southeast Asia.²

(C) Also, many messages were duplicates. On the day of the fire on USS FORRESTAL (CVA-59), for example, CINCPAC received 57 FLASH messages, of which 23 were duplicates.

(C) The DINS report noted that the large volume of FLASH precedence traffic did not appear to be warranted in terms of basic definition; that it had become so commonplace that the basic intent of its use had lost its significance; and that brevity was not maintained. The average word count per message was stabilized at 390, as compared to the objective of 150 words including the message heading. The average speed of service for FLASH messages received at CINCPAC's Communications Center was 52 minutes from time of transmission. The speed of service

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1. J6 Brief 0133/67, 9 Oct 67.
 2. CINCSAC had been granted authority by CINCPAC to use FLASH precedence to meet certain speed of service requirements for support of ARC LIGHT missions.

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objective was 10 minutes or as fast as possible. In the event of a true international incident that required the use of this precedence, a message could be delayed in FLASH queues beyond critical national reaction time.

~~(S)~~ If another category of precedence between FLASH and IMMEDIATE was needed to satisfy urgent operational requirements, the DINS team noted, it should be established, but not at the expense of dilution of the basic intent of FLASH, which by definition was of paramount importance.

~~(S)~~ CINCPAC agreed with the finding of the DINS team, but considered the problem a persistent one to be continually monitored and corrected on a localized case-by-case basis.

Communications Traffic under MINIMIZE Conditions

(U) CINCPAC reviewed the effectiveness of MINIMIZE policies and procedures throughout PACOM for the JCS.¹ CINCPAC expressed his belief that policies and procedures were adequate--that in cases where traffic was not minimized the one drafting or approving transmission of the message was at fault, not the instructions. He noted that commanders imposing MINIMIZE restrictions should specify the types of traffic concerned, so that if only teletype channels were affected, for example, such information should be specified to avoid receivers also minimizing voice traffic. CINCPAC had observed that reaction to the imposition of MINIMIZE was almost immediate at his own headquarters, but that it took 6 to 12 hours to filter down and become effective throughout the PACOM. Also, MINIMIZE was more effective when it was first imposed; after prolonged periods some routine matters took on a greater urgency, leading releasing officials to be less stringent in applying the MINIMIZE criteria to the message traffic.

Automation of the Communications Center Studied

~~(S)~~ As part of the continuing effort to speed message handling, CINCPAC asked to have his Communications Center studied by the Naval Command Systems Support Activity (NAVCOSSACT) to determine what, if any, advanced techniques of data processing, reproduction, or distribution could be made available to improve and speed the operations of the center.²

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1. CINCPAC ltr ser 1411, 14 Apr 67.
 2. CINCPAC ltr 5230 ser 3657, 13 Oct 66.

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(S) Analyzing the completed study, CINCPAC concluded that although certain functions could be automated, the cost was so great that the change was not worth while. ¹

(S) The Communications Center used manual operations; that is, all incoming and outgoing messages were logged, checked, etc., by hand. Workload had increased greatly, from a monthly message peak of 45,817 in July 1964 to 71,713 in March 1967. The other four communications centers at Camp Smith were also manual operations. These were the FMFPAC center; the Special Security Communications facility (in the Intelligence Division), which processed about 20,000 messages a month; the Department of Defense Regional Relay facility; and the SAC X-RAY terminal facility, which processed about 1,100 messages a month. The study had considered consolidating all communications centers at Camp Smith, but for varying policy reasons, security, or user efficiency, all except FMFPAC were excluded from any consolidation plans.

(S) The NAVCOSSACT report furnished descriptions of some automation processes in use in other communications centers, such as the partially automated systems of the Chief of Naval Operations, the Commanders in Chief of the Atlantic and Pacific Fleets, and the Army's experimental fully automatic system. These could include teletype inputs on paper tapes for high speed reproduction, and automatic routing, computation of numbers of copies, and maintenance of journals or logs of processed messages. Other refinements could include automatic checking for duplicates, automatic decoding of address indicator groups, some automatic routing based on flag words, and video display to permit visual checking of messages.

(S) The study noted that CINCPAC's Communications Center could be automated in three phases to use most of the automatic operations described, with the FMFPAC communications center added in the third phase. Estimated costs were:

| | <u>Phase I</u> | <u>Phase II</u> | <u>Phase III</u> |
|--------------------|----------------|-----------------|------------------|
| One-time costs | \$170,000 | \$225,000 | \$260,000 |
| Annual lease costs | 216,000 | 432,000 | 540,000 |

No manpower savings were expected.

1. J6/Memo/0125/67, 28 Sep 67.

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~~(S)~~ These processes would result in some time saving, but did not affect all communications center processes, nor would they eliminate several of the more troublesome and time-consuming tasks that contributed to errors and delays.

~~(S)~~ The shared use of other general purpose computers at Camp Smith to perform selected Communications Center functions was considered as an alternate course of action, and the Communications Center function was compatible with the IBM 360/50 computer, but this was not considered practical for several reasons. One was that the Communications Center required on-line computer operations at all times, not possible on shared equipment.

~~(S)~~ Therefore the Assistant Chief of Staff for Communications and Electronics proposed to CINCPAC that the action to automate the Communications Center be held in abeyance until technology achieved a greater degree of automation in relation to cost.

Optical Page Reader

~~(S)~~ The entire communications community was continuously concerned with ways to improve and speed message handling. Among programs that were studied as a means of automating message handling somewhat and improving message transmission quality was a newly developed optical page reader. CINCPAC representatives attended an Optical Scanning Seminar at the University of California early in 1967.¹ In April the Defense Communications Agency submitted a plan to CINCPAC for installation of an Optical Page Reader at Hickam Air Force Base to test its use on messages between Hawaii and the National Military Command Center in Washington. CINCPAC asked that the Hawaii terminal be changed to the CINCPAC Command Center.² Installation of the equipment was expected to provide CINCPAC with better message quality control. The plan, including CINCPAC's recommended change, went from the Defense Communications Agency to the JCS and the Secretary of Defense.

~~(S)~~ In June CINCPAC again expressed an interest in obtaining a more mechanized method of eliminating garbles from messages.³ The Defense Communications Agency advised him that the test sites recommended to the JCS were the CINCPAC Command Center and the National

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1. J6 Brief 0784/67, 19 Dec 67.
 2. J6 History, Apr 67.
 3. J6 History, Jun 67.

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Military Command Center, that JCS guidance had been requested, and that a contract was expected in the near future.

AUTODIN

(U) Establishment of Automatic Digital Network (AUTODIN) tributary facilities continued in 1967. The UNIVAC 1004 Set 5 compound terminal was received on 28 April.¹ The UNIVAC 1004 Set 2 equipment already in use absorbed all of the common user circuit traffic while the Set 5 was being tested. The Chief of Naval Operations had proposed² that the Set 2 be relocated to the Fleet Operations Control Center at Kunia when the Set 5 checked out, but CINCPAC rebutted the proposal and validated the requirement for retention of the Set 2 terminal on the basis of needed adequate back-up capability to the Set 5.³

(U) The UNIVAC 1004 Set 5 AUTODIN terminal was cut over to the Automated Electronic Switching Center at the Naval Communications Station at Wahiawa (Honolulu), Hawaii on 9 June. It was determined to send the Set 2 equipment to the FMFPAC Communications Center. This move was completed on 19 June.⁴

(U) While the CINCPAC Communications Center was being modified to accommodate the AUTODIN terminal, modernization of the center continued with the installation of equipment racks and power panels in the crypto room.⁵

(U) The Hawaii Automatic Electronic Switching Center at Wahiawa became operational on 3 April, one year ahead of schedule, when the Navy Communications Station accepted the switching center as the major Defense Communications System facility on Oahu and the first such facility outside CONUS. During testing and cutover, all actions were conducted on schedule and without mishap.⁶ Virtually all record communications between Hawaii and CONUS were being routed directly to the switch by 31 March. Western Pacific traffic was still routed through the Plan 55 Relay Center at Hickam Air Force Base, however,

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1. CINCPAC Command History, 1966, p 114.
 2. CNO 011859Z Feb 67.
 3. CINCPAC 042238Z Feb 67; J6 History, Jan, Feb 67.
 4. J6 History, Jun 67.
 5. J6 History, Jan, Feb 67.
 6. J6 History, Mar, Apr 67.

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and then to the Wahiawa Automatic Electronic Switching Center.

(U) On 3 May CINCPAC asked the JCS to include contingency equipment requirements for rapid restoral of AUTODIN in the current Defense Communications Agency plans. Although this requirement had been submitted by COMUSMACV and approved by CINCPAC, it was part of contingency requirements that could develop worldwide. The requirement specified to the JCS called for air transportable equipment that could be operable in 48 hours after arrival and accommodate (switch) 30 to 50 lines.

~~(S)~~ Implementation of automatic AUTODIN switches at the seven sites selected in the PACOM began in 1967. A facility at Guam was also programmed. The first facility to become operational was that at Clark Air Base in the Philippines on 7 October.

~~(S)~~ The first PACOM data circuit activated by satellite was the AUTODIN circuit activated between the Wahiawa switching center and the Bang Pla, Thailand non-automatic data relay center in October.² To improve survivability to Southeast Asia and the Western Pacific in the case of submarine cable failure, CINCPAC looked to satellite links as a restoral path.

~~(S)~~ There were questions about the reliability of the AUTODIN for command and control purposes. In April the Air Force Chief of Staff expressed concern that actions to develop the AUTODIN program were proceeding on assumptions that were not yet validated.³ He was of the opinion that the Pacific AUTODIN in its existing approved configuration could not fulfill the total requirements of command and control traffic. He noted that after four years of operation the CONUS AUTODIN had proved its capability to move large volumes of traffic with very satisfactory overall speed of service, but that the failure rate of the sophisticated terminal equipment was too high and generally considered unacceptable for command and control purposes. He thought that the Pacific AUTODIN was several years away from the capability to support command and control and that actions should be oriented to forecast requirements and identify improvements necessary in the existing operational system to meets requirements for 1970.

1. CINCPAC Command History, 1966, p 114.

2. J6 History, Oct 67.

3. CSAF 062117Z Apr 67.

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DATAFAX and the Gold Plate Circuits

(S) The secure data facsimile (DATAFAX) system, a network that linked the National Military Command Center with CINCPAC and COMUSMACV was initiated with the installation of the DATAFAX terminal in the CINCPAC Telecon facility on 27 February. ¹ The circuit was to be used in support of command center operations. Tests were conducted in early March to evaluate transmission by both satellite (INTELSAT II) and normal landline/undersea cable circuit. ² The circuit was part of, and used the same circuits (Washington-Hawaii-Saigon), as the special purpose, dedicated secure voice "Gold Plate" system. ?

(S) In May, because of the increased capability of the Automatic Secure Voice Communication System and other secure interfaces between these locations, the Defense Communications Agency proposed that only one of the two Gold Plate circuits was required, and that one only to provide redundancy. On 22 June the JCS validated retention of one of the two Gold Plate circuits until late September, after which the Automatic Secure Voice Communications System could support the traffic. As a result of the tests of the system the Defense Communications Agency discontinued the secure DATAFAX system in August. ³ The leased terminal equipment was removed by the Dictaphone Corporation in September. Subsequently, the second Gold Plate circuit was discontinued.

AUTOSEVOCOM

(S) The Defense Communications Agency's (DCA) worldwide Automatic Secure Voice Communications (AUTOSEVOCOM) system was to eventually absorb the TALK QUICK secure voice system still in use in the PACOM. ⁴ Slippages in the agency's program, however, prompted CINCPAC to ask for 26 more urgently needed TALK QUICK subscriber terminals in Southeast Asia and the Western Pacific. ⁵)

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1. J6 History, Mar 67.
 2. Generally, voice and DATAFAX quality was better over the satellite circuit. Parts of the test transmission were acceptable, some not. CINCPAC 070319Z Mar 67.
 3. DCA 923/0754/092020Z Aug 67.
 4. CINCPAC Command History, 1966, p 114.
 5. CINCPAC 070306Z Oct 66; J6 Brief 0024-67, 27 Feb 67.

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(S) A new wideband switch, the AN/FTC-31, interfaced with the TALK QUICK system, was installed at Pearl Harbor and its operation by the Naval Communications Station, Honolulu (at Wahiawa) began in September 1967. It provided 10 new KY-3 secure voice terminals for CINCPAC Headquarters and 68 additional terminals elsewhere in Hawaii. The AN/FTC-31 was also interfaced through the TALK QUICK switch at Pearl Harbor with the Voice Communications (VOCOM) (Project 493L) to CONUS.¹ A second AN/FTC-31, interfaced with the TALK QUICK system, was installed at Tan Son Nhut, Vietnam and its operation by the 1st Signal Brigade (Long Binh, Vietnam) began in October. It provided 55 new KY-3 secure voice terminals. The existing 24 KY-3 subscribers operating through the TALK QUICK switch at Tan Son Nhut were also to be rehomed to the new FTC-31 switch.

(S) On 7 July CINCPAC again informed the JCS of the need for expansion of the joint switchboards in PACOM to accommodate the AUTOSEVOCOM in Southeast Asia, urging that such expansion (by one means or another) had to be timely to be effective for the war effort. He also submitted certain circuit rearrangements for the network configuration that would save time and funds in implementation.²

(S) CINCPAC had been trying since 1965 to impress the DCA and the Service technical agencies of the need for expanding the joint switchboard capacity in the PACOM.³ The problem of great demand on available terminals was compounded when the overseas Automatic Voice Network (AUTOVON) switch program slipped 18 months, because the AUTOSEVOCOM was originally designed to use AUTOVON switches and trunking for long-haul secure communications. DCA Pacific was undertaking a near-term plan for reconfiguration of the joint switchboards in PACOM from available assets and with the cooperation of CINCPAC's component command commanders. The DCA recognized a need, however, for longer-term relief, and had concluded that modifications to the joint switchboard system were needed. In a memo to the JCS, the DCA outlined the need for a detailed survey of all PACOM joint switchboards and formulation of a plan to improve the system.⁴

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1. The CINCPAC VOCOM 493L terminal had been shifted from cable to satellite as a permanent transmission path on 24 February 67. J6 History, Mar 67.
 2. J6 History, Jul 67.
 3. J6 Brief 0114/67, 11 Sep 67.
 4. J6 Brief 00163-67, 21 Oct 67.

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(S) The major secure voice problem areas were studied as part of the Directorate for Inspection Services (DINS) August inspection of CINCPAC's Headquarters and the PACOM. ¹ The DINS finding stated that "CINCPAC's requirements for secure voice communications are not being satisfied because actions related to system design, program reviews and funding are not being completed on a timely basis at the DCA/DOD level."

(S) By December 1967 the PACOM had secure voice capabilities for 180 wideband and 32 narrowband subscribers. ²

Narrowband Secure Voice Requirements

(S) To fill the gap between the fixed (administrative) secure voice telephone system and short range tactical secure voice radio nets, the JCS in April 1966 proposed a long-range tactical, micro-miniature, high frequency, narrowband radio security system. ³ (Examples of its use would be from Army battalion to division, Navy ship to ship, Air Force long-range air to ground, etc.) At that time CINCPAC was asked to comment and estimate his requirements. He asked for 2,389 terminals for the PACOM. Later in 1966 the JCS asked CINCPAC to define the minimum number of radio nets (and terminals per net) he required. The minimum was specified as 92 nets with 970 terminals. ⁴

(S) In November 1967 the JCS outlined the status of the program for the Secretary of Defense and recommended the adoption of the system. ⁵ They revised the number of terminals for PACOM to 1,227. The contractor had stated earlier in 1967 that he could deliver the first sets seven months after the contract was awarded. The matter was pending at the end of the year.

AUTOVON Preemption for the Alternate Command Center

 This authorization was academic, however,

1. J6 History, Sep 67.
2. J6 History, Dec 67.
3. J6 Brief 041/67, 21 Mar 67; J6 Brief 00172/67, 14 Nov 67.
4. The JCS added 12 terminals to this total for Marine Transplacement Units rotating in the Western Pacific.
5. J6 Brief 00172-67, 14 Nov 67.
6. J6 Brief 054/67, 18 Apr 67.

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as installation of the AUTOVON switch for Hawaii had been delayed until November 1968. CINCPAC already had a FLASH OVERRIDE capability at his Camp Smith Command Center.

PACOM Voice Management Group

(U) The PACOM Voice Management Group, organized in 1966, was composed of representatives of CINCPAC, his component command commanders, FMFPAC, the US Army Strategic Communications Command, Pacific, and the Defense Communications Agency, Pacific. The group devised a series of recommendations to improve voice communications procedures. Among these were reminders to limit duration of calls, modified preemption procedures in which 30-second warnings were given to callers being preempted (who could often complete their business in that time and avoid call-backs), improved manning level and training of operators, and greater use of high frequency circuits. Other improvements resulted from an improved echelon system of authorization for calls above ROUTINE precedence.

(U) In use, these procedures proved noticeably effective and they were forwarded to the JCS.¹ These recommendations were incorporated in a JCS paper with instructions to other commanders of unified and specified commands to obtain information from CINCPAC's Voice Management Group on its activities.² The Voice Management Group continued monitoring activities in the PACOM, with particular attention to best use of switchboard terminations.

Discrete Routing Indicators in PACOM

(U) CINCPAC staff members developed a completely new system for discrete routing indicators in 1967. In this system, base root four letter and five letter relay routing indicators and tributary derivatives were assigned to the PACOM-wide command and control network to users of dedicated teletype networks. The routing indicators followed vertical command channels within CINCPAC's component commands.³ Informal coordination with JCS representatives indicated that the plan was expected to be implemented early in 1968.⁴

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1. CINCPAC 200750Z Dec 66.
 2. J6 Brief 143/67, 23 Mar 67.
 3. J6 History, May-Jul, Sep 67.
 4. J6 History, Dec 67.

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Frequency Management

(S) CINCPAC was concerned with degradation of or possible conflict with military operations as a result of radio frequencies assigned from PACOM resources to the National Aeronautics and Space Administration for the APOLLO Manned Lunar Exploration Project.

(U) In June a member of the CINCPAC staff attended a Washington conference of frequency managers concerned with APOLLO.¹ At that conference, agreement was reached that all Air Force Western Test Range frequencies would be employed before CINCPAC would be asked for additional assets; that silence would be imposed only as necessary for the success of a mission, and then on a case-by-case basis; that silence on APOLLO range instrumented aircraft would be imposed only during actual manned missions; and that the Air Force would send its frequency use plans to CINCPAC 30 days before they were to be implemented, including any additional frequency requests at that time. CINCPAC agreed to reevaluate previously assigned GEMINI-APOLLO frequencies to determine if any could be authorized broader usage, especially in the Western Pacific.

(S) APOLLO problems were discussed with the Directorate for Inspection Services (DINS) team during their July-August inspection. The DINS indicated that CINCPAC should have more support from the JCS in the form of a statement of circuit priorities in the event of cable failure during an APOLLO mission and also by their authorizing CINCPAC to establish a frequency control center in Hawaii manned by personnel on temporary duty to PACOM during APOLLO missions only.²

(U) In October CINCPAC authorized and furnished frequencies for use in connection with the APOLLO program, including those for the spacecraft, range instrumented ships and aircraft, and CTF-130 recovery forces.³

(S) The DINS team was also concerned with the effect on CINCPAC's high frequency radio communications caused by the delay in establishment of the operational capability of the Common User Radio

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1. J6 History, Jun 67.
 2. J6 History, Aug 67.
 3. ADMINO CINCPAC 170258Z Oct 67; J6 History, Oct 67.

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Transmission Sounding (CURTS) system.¹ As a result of the delay, the team found that frequency coordination and control remained the primary limiting factor in CINCPAC's achieving a truly effective high frequency radio communications system, as well as precluding real time sharing of Defense Communications System frequencies with the Air Force Western Test Range in support of the APOLLO program.

Communications Security

(C) The JCS stressed circuit monitoring and analysis as the best techniques to improve transmission security.² By means of surveys conducted in Southeast Asia, CINCPAC had found that the most effective means of improving transmission security was through a detailed examination of all methods and paths of electrical communications involved, which was best accomplished by a team of operations, intelligence, and communications security experts. Communications security personnel trained and experienced in these comprehensive surveys were in short supply, however, on the staffs of CINCPAC and his component command commanders. The Directorate for Inspection Services team noted this during their August inspection of PACOM and also asked the JCS for more detailed policy and instructions on the conduct of comprehensive communications security surveys.

Command Arrangements for the Defense Communications System

(U) The Defense Communications Agency (DCA) was formed in 1960 to provide centralized management of the Defense Communications System (DCS), to assist in achieving operational compatibility among the communications systems of the Services, and to integrate those systems if it would make them more efficient or economical. The DCA provided technical direction and advice to the Services, who in turn provided, operated, and maintained the bulk of the DCS facilities. The DCA also allocated communications circuitry and directed the restoration of facilities in the event of a failure.

(S) In August 1965 the Deputy Secretary of Defense asked the Department's Assistant Secretary for Administration to study a proposal to establish the communications segments, switching centers, and relays of the

1. J6 History, Aug 67.
2. Ibid.

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DCS as field activities under the command jurisdiction and operational control of the Director of the DCA. ¹ The JCS asked the commanders of the unified and specified commands to comment on the proposal.

(S) The JCS, commenting on the study, considered that previous management arrangements had worked well, by and large. ² Some inter-Service network integration had been accomplished and some capabilities improved. Some procedures for the processing of new requirements were haphazard, however, assignment of responsibilities to the DCA could be vague, and there was uncertainty about which facilities were included in the system for DCA management and which were to be excluded from the DCS as purely tactical facilities.

(S) The initial JCS evaluation concluded that establishment of the DCS as a field command of the DCA would not be wise because of jurisdictional interface problems at collocated DCS-tactical facilities and because it would not solve basic management problems. Rather, the JCS recommended the tightening of requirements processing procedures to give the commanders of unified and specified commands more participation in matters within their own commands; the redefining of the composition of that part of the DCS to be managed by the DCA to exclude tactical facilities; the insured participation of the commanders of unified and specified commands in the Consolidated Command and Control Communications Program; and double hatting at several command echelons, including the Director of the DCA to be also J-6 to the JCS, the J-6 of overseas unified commands to be local DCA commanders, and the chief component communicators to be the commanders of the respective Service communications field organizations.

(U) CINCPAC commented on the proposal on 10 April. ³ He agreed with the JCS in that he did not concur in the command arrangements proposed by the Assistant Secretary of Defense. He stated that technical control of the field communications commands should be retained under military department supervision with the concept of "technical control" defined more precisely. CINCPAC concurred in a proposal to tighten procedures for the initiation and processing of requirements and also in the idea that the Director, DCA be responsible for insuring that the agency and its field organizations were responsive to operational requirements of the unified and specified command commanders that they directly

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1. J6 Brief 0032-67, 16 Mar 67.
 2. Ibid.
 3. CINCPAC 102257Z Apr 67.

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supported. He also approved of his own participation in the Command and Control Communications Program review process.

(U) CINCPAC did not concur, however, with the proposal to double hat any joint staff J-6 with any DCA principal at any level. He particularly rejected the idea of double hatting the J-6 of an overseas unified command as the commander of the local DCA organization. He believed that the planning, engineering, operations, and management of the long-haul portions of Pacific area communications were integrated through close staff arrangements between the CINCPAC J-6 and the DCA Pacific on both formal and informal levels, that PACOM communications were responsive to CINCPAC requirements, and that both the DCA PAC and the CINCPAC J-6 staffs were generally responsive to each other's needs. He believed the double hatting would complicate interface problems and other conflicts that occasionally arose between communications users and suppliers as it would reduce the J-6 from the status of an impartial arbitrator to a direct participant. Also, it would divert the time and attention of his J-6 to details of administration and management not essential to his primary role of staff support to CINCPAC in establishing overall PACOM policies on all facets of communications and electronics and with the identification and validation of both DCS and non-DCS requirements. He also opposed directing the double hatting of Service component communicators as commanders of their Services' local communications commands, stating that this should remain an individual option of the Services.

(U) To achieve sounder management of communications, CINCPAC recommended more clear-cut command arrangements for all echelons from Director DCA to tactical organizations in the field. These, he proposed, would provide for technical control of the DCS, enable assignment of responsibilities within the existing command structure, and preserve the organizational integrity of the DCA as an independent Defense Department element while assuring that the DCA organization and DCS facilities were responsive to the operational requirements of the combatant commands. He urged their adoption.

(U) When they commented to the Secretary of Defense on the Assistant Secretary for Administration's proposal for new command arrangements, the JCS supported CINCPAC's position on the major issues.¹ They recommended that the DCS not be established as a command, that the DCA charter and requirements processing procedures be revised, that existing Joint Staff organizational arrangements be reviewed, and that

1. J6 Brief 299/67, 29 May 67.

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"technical control" be exercised by the Director, DCA, but only as it had been redefined by CINCPAC. As had been recommended by CINCPAC and others, the JCS recommended not to double hat the JCS J-6 as Director of the DCA, or the J-6 of an overseas unified command as the chief of the local DCA organization.

(U) The Deputy Secretary of Defense then made his decision on the Assistant Secretary for Administration's study.¹ He agreed that the proposal to establish the DCS as an operating command be rejected. He approved the publication of a revised charter and the circulation for comment of a new telecommunications requirements directive, and asked his staff to evaluate the effectiveness and responsiveness of the DCA and the DCS during an 18-month test of operations under the new charter. He decided not to double hat either the J-6 for the JCS nor CINCPAC's J-6 by assigning them DCA responsibilities. The J-6 for the Commander in Chief, European Command, however, was assigned another hat as DCA Europe commander for an 18-month test, after which the entire issue was to be reviewed. He left to the Services the question of double hatting the Service component communicators as commanders of their respective field communications organizations. He then introduced the question of transferring technical control activities to the DCA, which had not been recommended by the Assistant Secretary's study.

(U) The transferring of technical control activities could have immediate and profound effects on CINCPAC. The technical control facility at a communications installation was the point where all circuits entering or leaving the area, both DCS and non-DCS, were brought together on test boards and patch panels so that technical control personnel could test circuit performance, optimize routing, perform alternate routing during emergencies, and generally supervise the operations and maintenance of the units involved. Key personnel operated these technical control facilities for the Service components. Loss of these facilities and personnel would degrade the ability of PACOM communications units to supervise their operations and maintenance functions.

(U) CINCPAC considered that transfer of technical control to the DCA was a first step toward establishing the DCA as an operating command. The Services could be left without technical control capabilities for non-DCS, as well as DCS, networks or would have to build and man

1. J6 Brief 617/67, 9 Oct 67.

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duplicate facilities. CINCPAC believed, therefore, that PACOM elements should collect data for the JCS that would indicate the operational and management impact that the transfer of those technical control facilities would have on PACOM mission performance.

(U) The DCA subsequently submitted to the JCS a list of DCS Technical Control Facilities that could be transferred to the DCA.¹ Listed for PACOM were 10 switched network stations, 33 transmission nodal points, and 54 subscriber access terminals. The DCA pointed out that the information was submitted in compliance with instructions and that the DCA didn't want to take a position on the subject until a feasibility study had been completed. The matter was pending at the end of the year.

Operations and Maintenance Responsibilities for the DCS

(U) In December 1962 the Deputy Secretary of Defense had determined that responsibilities for operations and maintenance (O&M) of DCS facilities be assigned on a case-by-case basis and that assignment on a geographical basis be for planning purposes only. Because of the difficulties that had been encountered in assigning O&M responsibilities, the JCS in June 1967 developed further guidance, as follows, which was to be used in preparing CINCPAC recommendations on assignment of O&M responsibilities in the PACOM.²

(U) O&M responsibilities for DCS facilities would normally be assigned to the military department operating and maintaining the installation on or near where the facility was located. Possible consideration would be given to the military department responsible for installation of the facility, area planning, or O&M responsibilities for other related facilities. Consideration was to be given to the recommendation of the appropriate commander of a unified command, recommendations of the Services, the need for the Services to maintain a balance of O&M personnel, joint manning of DCS facilities serving a joint activity, and cost effectiveness factors. When a high degree of supervision and coordination on technical O&M matters existed, responsibilities could be assigned to one military department.

DCS Message Quality Control Program

(U) A Defense Communication System (DCS) message quality control program was proposed in May 1967. It was to be concerned with mes-

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1. J6 Brief 683/67, 6 Nov 67.
 2. J6 Brief 395/67, 3 Jul 67.

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sage preparation, correct routing, quality control testing of transmissions, and maintenance and technical control of communications links. ¹ CINCPAC believed that the program as proposed could result in substantial improvements in the quality and handling times of DCS traffic.

(U) The quality control program was implemented by the JCS in July. ² Operating deficiencies highlighted by the program concerned messages that were inaccurately prepared, misrouted, or garbled.

(U) CINCPAC was assigned the responsibility to accomplish and enforce the program within PACOM operating elements of the DCS, to add the program as a subject for inspection of PACOM communications centers and switching centers or relay stations, and to provide for command attention to those stations identified as requiring additional assistance to correct operating deficiencies.

DCA Worldwide High Frequency Utilization and Improvement Plan

✓ (U) The use and requirement for high frequency radio communications had been declining for several years as greater reliance was placed on cable, tropo, and satellite communications systems, by both the DCS and commercial companies. ³ An August 1967 DCS plan called for a careful review of existing high frequency trunks with the idea of improving those that were required and eliminating those that were not. High frequency radio would continue to be used in many areas where a low cost inter-area service and relatively low capacity were needed. The trunks were needed for contingency operations, emergency restoral, and as the primary system for those that had no other.

✓ (U) In the Pacific and Southeast Asia areas 43 DCS high frequency trunks were selected for retention with 34 selected for deactivation, 15 of those in 1967 and 19 in 1970. The trunks to be retained supported the DCS in Hawaii, Guam, Japan, the Philippines, Okinawa, and South-east Asia. The saving on operations and maintenance costs for the discontinued trunks was estimated to be about \$535,000. Cost for improvement of retained trunks in the PACOM area was estimated to be about \$5 million in FY 69, \$2.3 million in FY 70, and \$691,000 in FY 71. ⁴

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1. J6 Brief 296/67, 23 May 67.
 2. J6 Brief 449/67, 3 Aug 67.
 3. J6 Brief 0109/67, 30 Aug 67.
 4. J6 Brief 0112/67, 1 Sep 67.

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Communications Satellites

Synchronous Communication Satellite System (SYNCOM)

(C) Although SYNCOMs II and III remained active¹ the DCA recommended deactivation of the network including the ground terminals and both space elements.² DCAPAC recommended that SYNCOM III satellite and ground terminals in Hawaii and the Philippines be retained to provide vital ship-to-shore service for the Seventh Fleet and to provide a badly needed alternate route. The SYNCOM II satellite would be turned off, according to the DCA recommendations, and ground terminals at Tan Son Nhut, South Vietnam and Bang Ping, Thailand would be phased out at the appropriate time. CINCPAC concurred with the DCAPAC proposal.

Commercial Satellites

(C) In 1967, 45 new voice quality communications trunks that used the Communications Satellite (COMSAT) Corporation's LANI BIRD II were activated in PACOM. Ten channels were activated between Oahu and the Philippines on 1 April. These provided eight new trunks between the Joint Overseas Switchboard on Oahu and the one at Clark Air Base in the Philippines, one trunk between Oahu and Taiwan, and one tone package of 26 teletype channels between Wahiawa, Oahu and Clark. On 16 May, 10 new voice quality trunks were activated between Oahu and Thailand, and on 1 July 1967 another 10 from Oahu to Japan. At the end of the year, a total of 15 voice quality trunks were active between Oahu and CONUS. These satellite facilities provided a vitally needed diverse route and permitted effective command and control in the event of submarine cable failure.³

Initial Defense Communications Satellite System

(C) The Initial Defense Communications Satellite System (IDCSS) added eight new satellites on a random equatorial orbit to the seven already there with a successful launch on 18 January.⁴ All performed satisfactorily. Three more were successfully launched on 1 July, raising the working IDCSS satellite population to 18 birds. Additional ground

1. CINCPAC Command History, 1966, p 117.

2. J6 History, Nov 67.

3. J6 History, Mar, May 67.

4. CINCPAC Command History, 1966, p 118; J6 History, Mar 67.

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terminals were needed in the PACOM and on 11 April CINCPAC validated and forwarded to the JCS a requirement for terminals at U-Tapao, Thailand and Seoul, Korea. ¹ CINCPAC further asked the JCS to task the DCA to develop a plan for early satisfaction of these requirements. Large IDCSS (AN/MSC-46) terminals were already installed in Hawaii, the Philippines, Okinawa, Guam, and at Ba Queo and Nha Trang in South Vietnam. In addition, AN/TSC-54 terminals were in use between North West Cape, Australia and Guam. Three AN/SSC-3 terminals had been installed on ships throughout PACOM, ² and three more were scheduled for future installation.

(C) CINCPAC had formally and repeatedly requested the development of a high speed digital data transmission capability via communications satellite. On 3 April the Director of Defense Research and Engineering asked the DCA to arrange and conduct a demonstration of the feasibility of transmitting such data on IDCSS satellites. ³ The JCS assigned top testing priority to this demonstration.

(C) In June 1967 CINCPAC reviewed the DCA's concept for IDCSS operations and link allocation procedures. The study, forwarded to the JCS, emphasized the advantages and need of various commands to specify the use of satellite link channels. CINCPAC also stated his belief that scheduling for satellite facilities was done generally at too high a level and proposed that it be centered in the DCA geographic areas. ⁴

Photography Transmission by Satellite

(S) On 8 July CINCPAC recommended to the JCS that any arrangement for rapid transmission of photography from Saigon to Washington, DC have a corresponding readout in Hawaii. ⁵ The JCS approved the requirement for a Hawaii readout capability and advised CINCPAC that the DCA was working on a plan. ⁶

(S) The DCA plan was forwarded to the Secretary of Defense in

1. CINCPAC 110339Z Apr 67.
2. Point Paper J621, 19 Jun 67.
3. J6 Brief 062/67, 25 May 67.
4. J6 History, Jun 67.
5. J6 History, Jul 67.
6. JCS 3120/042145Z Aug 67.

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September.¹ It called for a CINCPAC readout capability in March 1968. It provided for the move of the IDCSS relay point from Point Loma, California to Helemano, Hawaii, which was accomplished late in 1967. Photos were transmitted four hours a day from the IDCSS terminal at Tan Son Nhut through a satellite to an IDCSS terminal at Helemano, then onward to Washington through the second Helemano IDCSS terminal and a second satellite. On Oahu, the transmission was to be extended from Helemano to the readout user's location² by the new on-island microwave link by about March 1968. A third IDCSS terminal was to be provided on Oahu when higher powered satellites were available from the Phase II Defense Satellite Communications System program. This third terminal at Helemano would permit emergency IDCSS operations with other areas in PACOM while wideband transmissions were in progress. The JCS had recommended that approval be given at an early date for procurement of the improved higher capacity satellites.

~~(S)~~ Even before CINCPAC was provided with a photo readout capability in Hawaii, he had the authority to reallocate the IDCSS at any time for emergency purposes without referral to the Washington area. Such authority was reiterated in October.³ Transmission of photography had a priority on the IDCSS second only to operational support of PACOM forces. CINCPAC was reminded by the JCS, however, that if photo transmissions were preempted and interrupted, 45 minutes was required to resume transmission. Therefore, emergency conditions were to be considered carefully on a case-by-case basis before the decision to reallocate was made.

? ~~(S)~~ The Commander, 7th Air Force had proposed that his photography transmissions (COMPASS LINK) be scheduled for two non-consecutive four-hour periods daily. CINCPAC considered this time excessive, and in December recommended to the Defense Intelligence Agency that one four-hour period a day be allocated for COMPASS LINK, but that the 7th Air Force commander be granted the option of calling up the COMPASS LINK configuration any time he judged there was photography of sufficient urgency available for transmission.⁴

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1. J6 Brief 00157-67, 9 Oct 67.
 2. 548th Reconnaissance Technical Squadron, Hickam Air Force Base.
 3. J6 Brief 00165, 26 Oct 67.
 4. J6 History, Dec 67.

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Wideband Communications in the PACOM

(C) Delays, revised procedures, refusals, funding reductions, and such from Washington agencies dogged nearly every CINCPAC requirement for additions to or upgrading of communications facilities throughout the PACOM.

(C) From CINCPAC's Headquarters in Hawaii to Southeast Asia the commercial Trans-Pacific (TRANSPAC) and the military Philippines to Vietnam (WETWASH A) cables installed in 1964 had at first provided a high capacity and highly reliable information path.¹ Operating in 1967 at full capacity, and supplemented by commercial and military communications satellites,² and despite strong efforts to reduce communications demand, backlogs continued to exist and demand on facilities increased.

Long Lines Communications - Philippines - Taiwan - Okinawa - Japan

Philippines to Taiwan

(C) The upgrading, expansion, and integration of the troposcatter system from the Philippines to Japan, via Okinawa and Taiwan, had been requested by CINCPAC in November 1965, approved by the Secretary of Defense in August 1966, and pre-contracting actions had been initiated. In May 1967, however, the Secretary of Defense held the entire project in abeyance. Then in August he stopped all actions on the Philippines to Taiwan sector.³ In December he directed that, instead of up-grading the tropo system, a 60-channel submarine cable be installed between Juzon Mountain, Taiwan and San Miguel, Luzon, in the Philippines.⁴ He further directed immediate preparation of detailed plans for deactivation of systems made surplus by the cable.

(C) CINCPAC did not oppose the installation of a submarine cable, but considered it limited and unexpandable and believed that it would concentrate cable facilities at San Miguel⁵ and place an undue burden on other Luzon communications systems.

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1. Point Paper J623, 15 Jun 67.
 2. The military satellites were not capable of providing primary inter-area trunking.
 3. Point Paper, J622, 26 Aug 67.
 4. J2 Brief 012/68, 18 Jan 68.
 5. The cable from Nha Trang, Vietnam also terminated at San Miguel.

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Taiwan

~~(S)~~ The Taiwan Down-Island Communications System (DICS) was the on-island long distance communications service as well as a portion of the Philippines to Japan long-haul system. The DICS plant was obsolescent, the service inadequate and substandard. The JCS therefore in January 1967 approved a December 1966 DCA plan to upgrade the system.¹ They also recommended that the trans-Taiwan portion of the Philippines to Japan system be deleted from the overall plan for that system and funded separately.

~~(S)~~ The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Installations and Logistics suggested to the JCS in March, however, primarily for reasons of economy, that the DICS be considered as part of the Philippines to Japan system, that use of the Taiwan Military Integrated Microwave System or a commercial system be used instead of upgrading the DICS, and also that use of a commercial system between Taiwan and the Philippines be considered.² CINCPAC furnished data to the DCAPAC to be used by that agency in formulating a reply for the Assistant Secretary.

~~(S)~~ The arguments were convincing enough and on 23 August the Secretary of Defense gave the go ahead to upgrade the DICS.³ At the end of the year CINCPAC was evaluating the revised requirements, which had been consolidated by CINCUSARPAC in line with further guidance issued by the Secretary.⁴

Okinawa

~~(S)~~ The original Integrated Joint Broadband System (IJBS) plan for Okinawa had been approved by CINCPAC and forwarded to the JCS in October 1965.⁵ The plan was for consolidation of all communications plans and projects outstanding on the island at the time. A program objective and detailed summary requirements were prepared and the Secretary of Defense had approved some funds. Subsequent changes in specifications by the Defense Department, their requests for additional justifications, reassessments of priorities, changed operating concepts,

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1. J6 Brief 015/67, 14 Feb 67.
 2. J6 History, Mar 67.
 3. Point Paper J622, 26 Aug 67.
 4. J6 History, Sep, Oct 67.
 5. Point Paper J622, 26 Aug 67.

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etc., resulted in the project being held in abeyance and finally, in August 1967, halted. Then on 23 August the Secretary of Defense furnished guidance that impacted on the Okinawa IJBS and also on other segments of the Philippines to Japan system.¹

(U) The Secretary limited initial channel installation to 750 channels (of an estimated total requirement of 2,400), to be provided on an expedited basis if adequately justified. Requirements for 750 additional channels to be provided on a routine basis subject to fund limitations could be submitted. He eliminated alternate, by-pass, and diverse routing that had been requested for air defense systems and called for specific detailed justification for all over 1,500 channels. He would permit continuing action to upgrade the Okinawa to Japan radio system, subject to fund availability. He directed the installation of a submarine cable instead of the radio connection that had been recommended between Taiwan and Okinawa and between Okinawa and Miyako Jima. Among other specifics he called for the deactivation of certain existing radio systems.

(U) CINCPAC reviewed, validated, established relative priorities, and returned the redefined Okinawa requirements to CINCUSARPAC in December for engineering and procurement.²

PASCAT System Deactivated

(U) The Pacific Ionospheric Scatter (PASCAT) radio-system was deactivated in 1967 because newer and better cable and satellite communications capabilities were available.³ It had been in use for about 10 years between Hawaii and the Western Pacific.

Break in Submarine Cable - Guam to Philippines

(U) On 26 August the Trans-Pacific submarine cable connecting Guam with the Philippines broke. It was the first failure of the Pacific cable. CINCPAC imposed MINIMIZE procedures, and message traffic was alternately routed by high frequency radio, tropo, and satellite systems. The alternate means proved effective.⁴ The break was repaired and the cable circuits were restored on 5 September.

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1. Point Paper J622, 26 Aug 67.
 2. CINCPAC ltr ser 01388, 20 Dec 67.
 3. J6 History, Dec 67.
 4. J6 History, Aug 67.

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Korea Long Lines Communications

~~(S)~~ US communications facilities in Korea had long been classified as "tactical" and hence excluded from the Defense Communications System (DCS). CINCPAC believed that in general the management of DCS elements was superior to that possible in tactical systems because of the greater depth of manpower and technical know-how, and that the DCS had more success in obtaining system improvements. ¹ The Commanding General, Eighth Army was opposed, however, unless he could be sure all of his requirements would be satisfied if the DCA took over some of his facilities.

~~(C)~~ In June COMUS Korea asked that CINCPAC not support integration of the Korean Backbone System into the DCS, but CINCPAC replied by outlining the advantages of such a move. ² He pointed out that command would remain with COMUS Korea and that additional funds and personnel advantages would be realized.

~~(C)~~ The DCA and CINCPAC were tasked by the JCS to coordinate with one another their answers regarding plans for establishing the DCS and whether an in-country DCA was necessary.

~~(C)~~ CINCPAC concurred with the opinions of the DCA Director on those matters as follows. ³ The Director noted that the existing system did not have the quality required for the approved, more sophisticated switched networks such as the Automatic Digital Network (AUTODIN) and Automatic Voice Network (AUTOVON); he recommended improving and expanding the systems in accordance with a joint DCA-COMUS Korea plan to be prepared and submitted to the JCS by the end of the year. The military broadband system from Changsan to Seoul and specific lateral appendages were to be designated as the DCS, with specific facilities, trunks, and channels to be determined by agreement between the DCA and COMUS Korea. The authority of COMUS Korea to validate requirements and establish restoral priorities was to be unchanged; he would also have responsibility for logistic support of the DCA, Korea. The DCA was to establish a DCA, Korea of about 15 people to engineer and allocate DCS circuits; establish control facilities; reallocate, restore, and reroute DCS circuits, if necessary; and operationally direct the DCS stations.

1. Point Paper J621, 4 May 66.

2. J6 History, Jun 67.

3. CINCPAC 216103Z Jul 67.

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(S) Having encountered manpower allocation problems, the JCS in December further questioned the need for a DCA in Korea, noting that neither Taiwan nor Okinawa had an in-country element.

CINCPAC replied¹ that, unlike Taiwan and Okinawa, Korea was an active theater with continuous direct confrontation between hostile Communist combat troops and the forces of Korea, the United States, and their United Nations allies. The increasing enemy infiltration and incident rates heightened the need for both DCS and non-DCS communications that were immediately responsive to local command authority. For DCS elements this would be assured by an in-country DCA. Also unlike Taiwan and Okinawa, Korea relied on a single series system, vulnerable to complete disruption through the loss of any one of several relay stations. Korea had no alternate wideband path for use to a DCA out of the country and COMUS Korea could be effectively isolated from the DCA support activity when he needed it most urgently. Therefore, CINCPAC said, the DCA control activity had to be located within Korea and he urged the JCS to approve the requirement for additional manpower and forward it to the Secretary of Defense for force ceiling adjustment.

Korea Secure Voice Facility

COMUS Korea had stated a need for an interim secure voice capability until the Automatic Secure Voice Communication (AUTOSE-VOCOM) System was installed² because of increased enemy activity.³ As all secure voice assets were controlled at the National level and Southeast Asia requirements had priority, CINCPAC couldn't help right away. He was reviewing all PACOM priorities, however, and the increased tension and enemy activity there would raise Korean priorities in relation to those for Southeast Asia.

In response to a later COMUS Korea statement of urgent need for secure voice communication between his headquarters and the US Embassy during the June general elections, CINCPAC (with JCS approval) borrowed from Hawaii assets and provided four terminals for two circuits on a 60-day loan. COMUS Korea returned them after the 60 days were up, but he still needed equipment and the JCS later approved

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1. ADMINO CINCPAC 062324Z Dec 67; J6 History, Dec 67.
 2. It was scheduled for completion in 1968.
 3. Point Paper J6422, 25 Aug 67.

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the loan of two terminals for one circuit between COMUS Korea's headquarters and the Embassy. The equipment was furnished by CINCPAC.

(U) CINCPAC also offered the use of his "Gold Plate" circuits when they were disestablished in the summer, but these were not particularly suitable to the local area requirement. The "Gold Plate" subscriber terminal equipments were provided to the Commanding General, Eighth US Army in Korea for use in a point-to-point requirement, but due to site preparation and circuit conditioning problems the equipment was not being utilized by the end of the year.

Navy Communications in Korea

(U) In the matter of communications between the US Navy and the Korean Navy, CINCPAC tasked CINCPACFLT on 19 September to reassess capabilities and recommend improvements he found necessary as a result of increased North Korean infiltration and aggressive actions. ¹

(U) The requirements determined by the Commander of US Naval Forces Korea were endorsed to CINCPAC by CINCPACFLT. On 17 November CINCPAC validated the requirements and forwarded them to the Chief of Naval Operations, recommending approval. ²

Armed Forces Radio Voice Network and News Bureau

(U) During May CINCPAC's Headquarters at Camp Smith was tied into both the worldwide Armed Forces Radio and Television Service, a voice network, and the Armed Forces News Bureau, a worldwide teletype service for news being provided to PACOM forces by the Radio and Television Service. ³ CINCPAC was then able to monitor the information transmitted on either service and participate in program conferences as required.

Communications Support for the General War Plan

(U) The DCA forwarded a draft concept for the use of mobile/transportable equipment to restore key DCS facilities in the post-attack phase of a general war. The agency asked for CINCPAC's comment and a

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1. J6 History, Sep 67.
 2. CINCPAC 172237Z Nov 67.
 3. J6 History, May 67.


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listing of circuits required in a general war. ¹

~~(S)~~ In reply CINCPAC pointed out the unique communications problems in the PACOM, where CINCPAC and his component command commanders were thousands of miles away from subordinate unified command commanders and operating forces in the Western Pacific. ² Further complications arose from the insular nature of the PACOM, the lack of US territory, and the questionable retention of base areas on the territory of other nations. The reliance on single axis submarine cables and island-hopping tropospheric scatter systems with their vulnerability and limited routing, the probable loss of high frequency radio communications because of nuclear blackout, and limited communications satellite capabilities created a highly vulnerable situation.

~~(S)~~ CINCPAC recommended that the concept under study be integrated to provide one plan for the extension and restoral of the DCS, considering all available assets, in both contingency and general war situations. An integrated approach using all available systems should identify any gaps and should provide for meeting the shortfalls in such a multiplicity of systems that targeting for a complete blackout of US communications would be virtually impossible. CINCPAC also forwarded his circuit requirements to support the General War Plan. ³

~~(S)~~ In June the DCA asked for comments on a new draft plan entitled "Reconstitution of the Minimum Essential Elements of the World-Wide Military Command and Control System." Among other things, CINCPAC noted the dependence in the PACOM on submarine cables and the requirement for measures to safeguard the cables and cableheads and to plan for their restoral. ⁴ He also noted that because of the heavy reliance to be placed on satellites, plans should be formulated to permit communications by satellite without disrupting other communications means or without using techniques other than satellite.



1. J6 History, Apr 67.
2. CINCPAC 122050Z Apr 67.
3. CINCPAC 242150Z Apr 67.
4. CINCPAC 230105Z Jul 67.

Contingency Force Communications with Diplomatic Posts

~~(S)~~ The JCS and CINCPAC were concerned with communication that might be necessary between a US military commander (afloat or ashore) and a US Diplomatic Post during contingency operations.³ The Department of State had proposed that contingency force commanders communicate directly with a Diplomatic Telecommunications System relay. Clark Air Base, in the Philippines, and Okinawa had such relays in the PACOM. When the requirement for communication might exist for Burma, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, or Singapore, however, establishment of communications through such relays would be marginal. CINCPAC pointed out to the JCS that circumstances and procedures that would create a need for communications at all would also tend to reduce reliability. CINCPAC noted that with the single sideband equipment already available to a Diplomatic Post, only a KW-7 and teleprinter and associated equipment would be required to provide direct communication to the contingency force commander. CINCPAC recommended that this means would be more appropriate than the system proposed by the State Department.

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1. J6 Brief 00151-67, 4 Oct 67; J3 Brief, 000672-67, 13 Nov 67.
 2. The Navy-provided airborne capability for very low frequency transmission.
 3. CINCPAC 040434Z Jul 67.

The present system could remain as an acceptable backup means of communication.

WESTPACNORTH Air Defense System

(S) The Western Pacific North (WESTPACNORTH) air defense program was a plan to net together the air defense systems of that area to provide for the exchange of information quickly and accurately.¹ The various systems to be integrated were as follows:²

| <u>Air Defense System</u> | <u>Current Mode of Operation</u> | <u>Programmed Mode of Operation</u> |
|-------------------------------|----------------------------------|---|
| Korea | Manual | Manual |
| Japan | Manual | Base Air Defense Ground Environment (BADGE) |
| Ryukyus | Manual | Semi-automatic (418L) |
| Navy Tactical Data System | Semi-automatic | Semi-automatic |
| Airborne Tactical Data System | Semi-automatic | Semi-automatic |
| Marine Tactical Data System | Semi-automatic | Semi-automatic |

Integration was to be achieved by full digital exchange of information between automated systems and by voice and teletype between automated and manual systems. When completed, the system would enhance defense capability against the threat from air-breathing craft, but WESTPACNORTH would still be vulnerable to a missile attack.

(S) Operation date for the system had been scheduled for January 1969 and details had been under study by both the Chief of Staff, Air Force and the Chief of Naval Operations. A buffer computer system had been designed to interface the five semi-automatic systems into a common digital language. Three buffer locations were planned for Japan

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1. For Japanese political reasons the program to interface the Japan air defense system in WESTPACNORTH was known as the WESTPACNORTH Information Utilization Program.
 2. Point Paper J5123, 28 Aug 67.

~~SECRET~~

(at Misawa, Yokosuka, and Shingu Wells) with a fourth at White Beach, Okinawa. The management plan and draft copies of the acceptance plan were distributed. In February CINCPAC had commented to the Electronics Systems Division of the Air Force Systems Command on the test plan. Among other things, he recommended land based buffer to buffer testing, rather than buffer to Navy Tactical Data System equipped ships, to reduce the impact on the Commander, Seventh Fleet. ¹

(S) Estimated cost of the program had increased from ~~\$9.8~~ million to \$18.2 million. ² The Navy portion of the cost, consisting of compatibility buffers and associated communications equipment, had increased in cost estimate from \$4.3 million to \$12.7 million. The Navy objected to their portion of the system and charged that their limited operational utility of the system did not justify that great an expenditure. As a result of the objections from the Chief of Naval Operations, on 11 August the JCS requested authority to hold in abeyance further obligation of funds for the program until the threat to the area was reviewed and the cost effectiveness of the program studied.

(S) Submitted with their objection to the increased program cost, the Navy proposed a change in configuration that would greatly reduce their cost. They proposed to substitute a less expensive Link 14 semi-automatic teletype interface system for the programmed automatic digital interface system. ³

(S) The Air Force, commenting on the Navy proposal, noted various operational and technical limitations and questioned long-range financial savings due to the increased costs for equipment and personnel that would be reflected in the BADGE and Ryukyu Air Defense System programs. They expressed concern that implementing a new concept of interfacing at that state of the program could introduce serious political problems when negotiations began between the United States and Japan for a new Mutual Defense Treaty in 1970. ⁴ The Japanese had agreed to the existing program reluctantly and had spent all of the funds obligated for the project. The Navy proposal included sufficient operational limitations to require a major revision to the concept of operations agreed to by all agencies. A new agreement with Japan would be needed and

1. J6 History, Jan, Feb 67.
2. Point Paper J6141, 5 Oct 67.
3. J6 Brief, 00162/67, 12 Oct 67.
4. Ibid.

~~SECRET~~

funds to retrofit the BADGE system would have to be provided by the United States because the Japanese Diet had placed an absolute ceiling on expenditures for WESTPACNORTH additions to the BADGE. This US funding would not be possible without Congressional waiver to the "Church Amendment," which prohibited expenditure of Military Assistance Program funds to a self-sufficient nation.

~~(S)~~ CINCPAC's comments were forwarded on 29 November¹ with additional rationale justifying his position following on 23 December.² CINCPAC agreed with the Chief of Naval Operations that the cost of interfacing Navy Tactical Data System equipped ships with WESTPACNORTH had escalated to a point justifying a change in concept of operations to delete the digital interface requirement between these systems. CINCPAC did not concur with the Navy proposal to substitute Link 14 teletype equipment for the programmed digital interface equipment due to its cost and operational limitations for air defense purposes. He recommended instead that a voice/teletype crosstell capability be utilized. He also recommended that the programmed BADGE-Ryukyu Air Defense System digital interface capability be retained with the responsibility for it transferred from the Navy to the Air Force. A decision on the future of the WESTPACNORTH air defense program was in the hands of the JCS at the end of the year.

Identification, Friend or Foe - General Wartime Procedures

~~(S)~~ Late in 1966 the JCS requested a proposed time schedule for implementation of the specifications and procedures in PACOM of US Supplement 1 to Allied Communication Publication (ACP) 160.³ The supplement concerned identification, friend or foe (IFF) Mark X and Mark XII procedures, worldwide. CINCPAC in January 1967 reiterated his recommendation against implementation of Supplement 1, pointing out that extensive negotiations with countries in the PACOM would first be required, that the supplement was an interim measure pending introduction of the Mark XII system into the US inventory, and that it appeared that so much time would be taken implementing the provisions of the supplement that they would be overtaken by events.⁴ The JCS

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1. CINCPAC 290241Z Nov 67.
 2. CINCPAC 232341Z Dec 67.
 3. J6 History, Jan, Feb 67.
 4. CINCPAC 070240Z Jan 67.

~~SECRET~~

concurring in CINCPAC's recommendation to continue use of existing procedures in the PACOM. ¹

~~(S)~~ In April the JCS forwarded to CINCPAC for review and comments the draft of US Supplement 1. CINCPAC reaffirmed his need for existing Mark X Selective Identification Feature procedures until the Mark XII system was fully implemented by US Forces and friendly countries throughout the PACOM. ²

~~(S)~~ During a working level conference convened by the JCS it was determined that it would be better to cover IFF Mark XII procedures in a separate document, which they drafted as ACP 160, US Supplement 2. Current CINCPAC procedures were to remain in effect, and therefore CINCPAC substantially concurred in the Supplement 2 draft. ³

~~(S)~~ The conclusions of a Standardization Field Panel that had also been formed by the JCS and the comments and recommendations of the commanders of the unified and specified commands were subsequently reviewed by the Joint Command and Control Requirements Group. ⁴ At this meeting it was concluded that the procedures set forth by the panel, for several reasons, did not increase standardization but rather diminished it. ⁵ The procedures contained in Supplement 1 provided the maximum degree of standardization possible pending US worldwide implementation of the Mark XII IFF system. Also, the procedures had been concurred in by the Services and the commanders of the unified and specified commands, except CINCPAC. Unique PACOM IFF procedures were to continue in effect, the group concluded, until CINCPAC determined that his area of responsibility was adequately equipped to implement Mark XII procedures.

~~(S)~~ CINCPAC's reply to the JCS noted that although the exception for PACOM IFF procedures had been specifically noted, ACP 160, Supplement 1, standing alone, with the proposed changes approved, implied that it was directive in nature and that during wartime its procedures would be implemented worldwide with no mention of the PACOM exception. CINC-

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1. JCS 3883/172346Z Jan 67.
 2. ADMINO CINCPAC 160110Z May 67.
 3. CINCPAC 160458Z Jun 67.
 4. Assisted by representatives from the JCS, the Services, and other appropriate National level agencies.
 5. J6 Brief 00183-67, 16 Dec 67.

~~SECRET~~

PAC recommended that Supplement 1 clearly state that it did not apply in the PACOM.¹

Revision of the 1966 Navigation Plan

~~(S)~~ In February CINCPAC forwarded to the JCS his requirements and recommendations for the Navigation Plan 1966, particularly regarding the OMEGA navigation system, which had been deleted from the plan.² CINCPAC said that he had a near-term requirement for expansion of LORAN C/D coverage between the US West Coast and Hawaii, and that increased coverage may be required in Korea, Eastern USSR, and Eastern China. He recommended procurement of transportable LORAN D terminals as the most cost-effective means of meeting the requirements for increased coverage. CINCPAC said that the DECCA navigation system would continue to be required to support Army Aviation in South Vietnam until suitable LORAN D avionics equipment was procured and Army aircraft retrofitted.³

~~(S)~~ CINCPAC also stated that he had additional navigation requirements in PACOM that could not economically be met by further expansion of the LORAN C/D coverage. He recommended that a reclama be made to the Office of the Secretary of Defense. He said that OMEGA was the system best suited to provide general purpose, PACOM-wide navigation coverage and he wanted it retained in the 1966 Navigation Plan.

~~(S)~~ The JCS supported CINCPAC's February recommendations in their April comments to the Secretary of Defense.⁴

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1. CINCPAC ltr ser 002474, 21 Dec 67.
 2. CINCPAC 162309Z Feb 67; CINCPAC Command History, 1966, p 34.
 3. CINCPAC Command History, 1966, p 696.
 4. J6 Brief 0049-67, 11 Apr 67, of JCSM 190-67, 5 Apr 67.

10/10/10

Dear Sir,
I am writing to you regarding the matter of the...

As you are aware, the situation is becoming increasingly...

I have discussed this with the relevant departments and...

It is my hope that you will find this information helpful...

I am sure that you will understand the need for a...

Thank you for your time and attention to this matter.

I am sure that you will find this information helpful...

I am sure that you will find this information helpful...

I am sure that you will find this information helpful...

I am sure that you will find this information helpful...

I am sure that you will find this information helpful...

I am sure that you will find this information helpful...

I am sure that you will find this information helpful...

I am sure that you will find this information helpful...

I am sure that you will find this information helpful...

Yours faithfully,
[Signature]

SECTION XV - INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Intelligence Management

~~(S)~~ In February 1966 the JCS established an ad hoc group¹ to "identify and review the major intelligence production and Intelligence Data Handling System (IDHS) support requirements to PACOM with a view to providing recommendations which will contribute to the maximum effective utilization and development of the intelligence capabilities required to satisfy short and long-term PACOM and DOD intelligence needs."²

~~(S)~~ The group visited CINCPAC's Headquarters in September 1966 with a proposal that CINCPAC develop implementation plans for a Joint Target Center and a Joint Air Defense Analysis Center. CINCPAC and his component command commanders opposed the idea and subsequent discussions resulted in such revision of the group's proposal that PACOM command relationships were not significantly affected. The group concluded that, with comparatively minor exceptions, intelligence production in the PACOM appeared to satisfy user needs. Specific recommendations made by the JCS as a result of the group's study and follow-on actions taken by CINCPAC in response follow.

~~(S)~~ The CINCPAC Intelligence Production Review Board, composed of representatives of CINCPAC and his component command commanders, was the management vehicle for maintaining the PACOM intelligence production program. Greater management capability was required, the study group reported, and they recommended augmentation. The board developed intelligence production objectives and determined requirements for finished intelligence products as well as production tasking.

~~(S)~~ CINCPAC believed that creation of an air defense analysis function would require careful study with consideration given to the role of the PACOM Electronic Intelligence Center and requirements of subordinate PACOM air elements. As a result of such study, in May 1967 CINCPAC tasked CINCPACAF to establish and operate a PACOM Air

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1. Probably the action grew out of a June 1965 refusal by the Director, Defense Research and Engineering to approve a dedicated IDHS computer for CINCPACAF because he thought sufficient computer capability existed on Oahu to support all intelligence processing requirements.
 2. J2 Brief 46-66, 28 Dec 66.

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Defense Analysis Facility at Hickam Air Force Base.¹ The facility was being staffed by the Services with support being provided by the National Security Agency, but recruitment of qualified personnel had been slow.

(S) JCS instructions on target selection emphasis and target re- search duplication among component commands were challenged by CINC- PAC. All PACOM targeting was accomplished by continuous improve- ment of selection criteria and the target data base. Effective contingency planning for other areas continued despite the necessary growth of the Southeast Asia target base since 1964. Target research duplication a- mong the components was believed to be minimal and inevitable.

3121 (S) Regarding computer support, CINCPAC was to determine re- quirements for support of general war functions [REDACTED] [REDACTED] provide additional personnel for IDHS management, and insure that support from other component command commanders was available to satisfy priority requirements of CINCUSARPAC.

(S) Other JCS recommendations were addressed to the Services and the Defense Intelligence Agency, but accomplishment of them would provide needed improvements for component command commanders' IDHS capabilities. They also represented a JCS position that the origi- nal request from CINCPACAF for an IDHS computer was valid.

PACOM Air Defense Analysis Facility

(U) To perform a function assigned by CINCPAC in May, CINCPAC- AF created the PACOM Air Defense Analysis Facility (PADAF) to pro- vide timely information on trends in the enemy's capabilities and actions to counter friendly air operations. These included strategy, tactics, existing disposition of forces and expected deployments, and vulnerabil- ities and strengths of hostile air defense environments in the PACOM.

(S) CINCPACAF's proposed concepts for the operation of the facil- ity were furnished to CINCPAC in September.² First he cited inadequa- cies of the US intelligence community's understanding of the enemy's air defense environment in North Vietnam when the air war started there. Nor was there a feel for the response, counter-response rela- tionship that developed with the application of US airpower seeking

1. J2 History, Dec 67.

2. CINCPACAF ltr 1 Sep 67, Subj: PACOM Air Defense Analysis Facility (PADAF) (CINCPAC 100206Z May 67, Air Defense Analysis).

~~SECRET~~

political goals under significant operational restraints. US airpower losses in Southeast Asia had been high, but it would be the goal of defense analysis to bring more pilots back safely.

~~(S)~~ The new facility could provide a type of support that would be difficult or impossible to furnish under field conditions. It would be oriented more toward longer-term analytical research, such as analyzing enemy tactics for patterns for which operations planners could plan counter tactics. The ability of the enemy to provide himself with warning concerning US offensive air actions would be the subject of special emphasis.

~~(S)~~ Another air defense task not previously accomplished was that of photo locating all elements of the enemy's defense system so that they could be targeted. This task, performed well, could produce two additional results at no extra cost. First, close scrutiny of the defense system could provide clues about general military targets because guns and missiles were usually placed near something of military value, and an analysis of movement, cluster, and strength patterns of the system could identify significant targets. Secondly, the Communists for two decades had provided air defense weapons to make military and political inroads in countries both aligned and non-aligned. Which Communist country was engaging in this activity, determined by weapons sources, system support logistics, strategy and tactics equivalents, training support, and similar observations, could yield significant clues concerning international political relationships.

~~(S)~~ The facility would have direct and timely access to the data bases held by the various PACOM specialized processing centers. It would be the focal point for such data bases but would not duplicate them. It would also furnish data bases needed by transient forces in the PACOM such as aircraft carriers or the Tactical Air Command's fighter wings.

~~(S)~~ The facility's personnel, trained in air defense analysis and thoroughly familiar with the enemy's air defense posture, could supplement as necessary, when hostilities were initiated, the combat units responsible for the operation.

~~(S)~~ After staff review of the CINCPACAF proposal, CINCPAC concurred in general with the PDAF concepts, objectives, and functions while noting that the proposed extent of National Security Agency (NSA)

participation and support to the PDAF was inadequate.¹ In order to achieve a proper level of NSA support, CINCPAC requested that the JCS task the Director, NSA (DIRNSA) to provide a Special Support Group (SSG) to the PDAF.² The JCS validated the support requirement and advised that the DIRNSA was initiating appropriate programming actions.³ On 28 November 1967 a Memorandum of Understanding was signed by representatives of CINCPAC, CINCPACAF, and the DIRNSA regarding the establishment, operation, and command relationships of the SSG in the PDAF.

Intelligence Collection Requirements

~~(S)~~ The Specific Intelligence Collection Requirements (SICR) program improved throughout the PACOM in 1967 as a result of better management at all command levels. The number of SICR was reduced and their quality increased.⁴ The 500 or so SICR levied on PACOM resources at the end of 1967 was less than half of the number outstanding at the end of 1966. Improved automatic data processing support and assignment of additional personnel were contributing factors at CINCPAC's Headquarters.

Human Resources Intelligence Program

~~(S)~~ The Defense Department's Human Resources Intelligence (HUMINT) Plan was approved by the Deputy Secretary of Defense in January 1967. In implementing the program, however, CINCPAC encountered delays in the receipt of guidance he was expecting from the Defense Intelligence Agency and in obtaining qualified personnel to fill the 14 authorized spaces, although by the end of the year 11 spaces were filled.⁵

~~(S)~~ In August 1967 CINCPAC sponsored a PACOM-wide and National level HUMINT Conference at Fuchu Air Station, Japan. Conference recommendations dealt with HUMINT management, coordination, and operations and were subsequently being acted on by the Defense Intelligence Agency and CINCPAC's component command commanders.

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1. CINCPAC 210125Z Oct 67.
 2. CINCPAC 110525Z Nov 67.
 3. SSODIA DIAPL-4/242153Z Nov 67.
 4. J2 History, Dec 67.
 5. Ibid.

Photo Reconnaissance

As a result of the war in Southeast Asia, there had been a continuing trend for CINCPAC to assume increased responsibility for management of the intelligence collection effort that he had delegated to his Service component command commanders in recent years.¹ Greater workloads were somewhat offset by manpower increases, and automatic data processing support for the management of reconnaissance collection increased significantly in 1967.

One data processing improvement resulted in regular monthly production of the PACOM Priority Reconnaissance Objectives List. This document identified the PACOM component command originator of a reconnaissance requirement, its priority, collection, frequency, and photo specifications. By the end of the year, however, it was being replaced by a new machine listing known as the Imagery Reconnaissance Objectives List (IROL). The new program was broadened in scope to include all facets of imagery reconnaissance such as infrared, high resolution radar, and side-looking radar as well as conventional photographic imagery. In addition the IROL was re-formatted to make the program more functional and expressive of users' requirements. Further, the program was to be broadened to include information on the exploitation of imagery collected in addition to the list of requirements for collection.

Another data processing program was concerned with CINCPAC's photo requirements input to the Defense Intelligence Agency and that agency's response. A record of photo coverage of objectives in the PACOM was also begun, initially with coverage of North Vietnam only.

Counterintelligence

In October 1966 the JCS directed the Defense Intelligence Agency to assume a more positive role as the primary agent for the JCS in counterintelligence matters.² The JCS also charged commanders of the unified and specified commands with additional responsibilities for counterintelligence measures and for coordination of counterintelligence programs. One task was to provide the Defense Intelligence Agency with evaluations of the significance of counterintelligence information, where appropriate. Firm guidance had not been received from that agency by the end of the year, however, regarding CINCPAC's analysis responsibilities.

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1. J2 History, Dec 67.
 2. J2 Brief 3-67, 17 Jan 67.

Korea Map Revisions

(C) In September CINCPAC validated and sent to the Defense Intelligence Agency an Eighth Army requirement for revision of 1:25,000 scale maps of the Korea Demilitarized Zone and vicinity. ¹ Coverage was outdated and new mapping was required for operations countering North Korean incursions. CINCUSARPAC was assigned the western half of the area to be covered, the Republic of Korea's Army Map Service the eastern half, with tentative completion scheduled for June 1968.

Indonesia Mapping Project

(C) The Defense Intelligence Agency had outlined a tentative program for an extensive cooperative mapping, charting, and geodesy project for Indonesia. ² A draft of the joint Government agreement was sent to CINCPAC for comment. ³ He concurred, as the result would contribute substantially toward improved US mapping posture in the area. As PACOM mapping elements might be used in the project, CINCPAC asked the Defense Intelligence Agency to keep him informed of developments.

PACOM Map Production Capabilities

(C) In March CINCPAC asked the Defense Intelligence Agency to assist in bringing to the attention of the Department of the Army the need for additional Army cartographic personnel to meet PACOM mapping requirements. ⁴ Specifically, he asked that a CINCUSARPAC request for an additional 73 personnel for the 29th Engineer Topographic Battalion be accelerated at Department level.

Target Materials

(S) CINCPAC's first annual Tactical Target Materials Program status summary was furnished to the Defense Intelligence Agency in January. ⁵ It identified the Tactical Target Illustration coverage of installations associated with PACOM contingency and general war plans (less

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1. J2 History, Sep, Oct 67.
 2. J2 History, Jun 67.
 3. CINCPAC's relationships and responsibilities in such international agreements were outlined in CINCPACINST 5711.3, published 24 July 1967.
 4. J2 History, Mar 67.
 5. J2 History, Jan 67.

the USSR), plus significant installations in Southeast Asia outside contingency plan areas. The illustrations covered 34 percent of installations in general war plans and 74 percent in contingency plans.

(S) In August CINCPAC assigned additional Tactical Target Illustration production responsibilities to certain of his component command commanders. ¹ [REDACTED] B1a

Charting and Targeting Conferences

(U) CINCPAC staff members attended various national mapping, charting, and geodesy and target materials conferences in 1967.

(C) At the Defense Intelligence Agency's Air Target Materials Conference in Washington, 7 to 10 February, the CINCPAC representative briefed on PACOM Air Target and Tactical Target Materials completed and planned for production. ² Two new types of target products, the Tactical Photo Mosaic and the Quick Response Photo, were developed during the conference.

(S) At the Defense Intelligence Agency's Target Intelligence Conference at Orlando Air Force Base, Florida, 15 to 19 May, the agenda contained 49 items, of which 12 were submitted by CINCPAC. ³ The conferees agreed on several CINCPAC recommendations that would result in more definitive target documentation for Southeast Asia.

(U) CINCPAC representatives attended the annual Defense Intelligence Agency's Geodetic-Cartographic-Air Target Materials Conference at Alexandria, Virginia in late October.

PACOM Photo Interpretation Conference

(S) The third annual PACOM Photo Interpretation Conference was held at Yokosuka, Japan, 18 to 22 September. ⁴ Discussions concerned

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1. J2 History, Aug 67.
 2. J2 History, Feb 67.
 3. J2 History, May 67.
 4. J2 History, Dec 67.

SECTION XVI - PERSONNEL ACTIVITIES

Korean Hostile Fire Pay

(U) COMUS Korea recommended in November that under Section 310 of Title 37, US Code, the geographical area north of the Imjin River extending from the intersection of the Demilitarized Zone and the US west flank to the US Second Infantry Division east flank be designated as a hostile fire area.¹ He stated that during the first 10 months of 1967, 419 hostile acts had been committed by North Korean forces resulting in 20 US personnel killed and 70 wounded.

(U) In reply to a query from CINCPAC, CINCUSARPAC requested that in conjunction with this recommendation consideration should also be given to other benefits presently available to certain US personnel in Southeast Asia, including combat awards, income tax deductions, \$50 custom exemptions, free mailing privileges, and R&R.² The matter was under study at the end of the year.

General/Flag Officer Position Analyses

(U) The JCS in October 1967 announced the annual review of position analyses for all General and Flag Officers in PACOM joint activities and initial submission of analyses for any such billets approved since the previous review.³ CINCPAC submitted revised analyses in November and December.⁴

(U) As a related, but separate, action the General Officer billet previously identified as a PACOM joint billet for the Air Force Advisory Group, MAAG China was designated as a primary Air Force billet for the Commander, 327th Air Division and concurrently as Chief of the Air Force Advisory Division, MAAG China.

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1. COMUSKOREA 250400Z Nov 67.
 2. CINCUSARPAC 020408Z Dec 67.
 3. JCS JIDM 655-67, 19 Oct 67.
 4. CINCPAC ltr ser 01275, 21 Nov 67; CINCPAC ltr ser 002294, 25 Nov 67.

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Manpower Requirements and Changes

Headquarters, Commander US Forces Japan

(U) ~~(C)~~ Manpower authorizations for the headquarters US Forces, Japan remained at 73 throughout the year. No significant changes within the total authorization occurred. ¹

Headquarters, Commander US Forces Korea

(U) The JCS approved in January a manpower authorization effective 1 July 1967 of 159 billets, reflecting no increases over the existing authorization. ²

(U) ~~(C)~~ In July COMUS Korea requested 14 additional billets to establish an Intelligence Support and Indications Center. CINCPAC concurred. ³ The JCS approved the seven non-Army billets involved but deferred the seven Army billets pending identification of in-country compensatory Army billets. ⁴ During August and September COMUS Korea submitted and amplified a request for an additional 41 billets to establish a Combat Operations Center and to reinforce his staff's planning capability. ⁵ CINCPAC concurred in 18 of the 41 requested billets and forwarded the request to the JCS. ⁶

Headquarters, Commander US Taiwan Defense Command

(U) During 1967 manpower authorizations for the USTDC increased from 187 to 189. Minor changes included deletion of a protocol officer and one operations staff officer and the addition of a civil engineer, a security control officer, and two clerks for the R&R center. ⁷ In addition, the Chief of Naval Operations approved the transfer of five billets from the Security Group Activity, Taipei to the USTDC, bringing the

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1. JCS 6016/101809Z Feb 67; CINCPAC ltr ser 01327, 5 Dec 67.
 2. JCS 5111/312110Z Jan 67.
 3. ADMINO CINCPAC 110311Z Aug 67.
 4. JCS 9370/192111Z Oct 67.
 5. COMUSKOREA ltr USFK AJ, 27 Sep 67.
 6. CINCPAC ltr ser 00297, 27 Nov 67.
 7. JCS 7332/272003Z Feb 67; JCS 2110/242108Z Jul 67; JCS 7288/261921Z Sep 67.

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total to 194 upon JCS approval of formal change to the Joint Table of Distribution.¹

Civilianization Program

(U) In the fall of 1965 CINCPAC at JCS direction submitted, for Phase I of the civilianization program, a list of military manpower spaces from PACOM joint activities that could be converted to civilian spaces between January 1966 and June 1967.² The first increment was for 123 billets to be converted by December 1966, but this number was later reduced to 112 and the deadline was extended. By 31 December 1966, 36 billets had been converted. On 30 June 1967 Phase I was concluded with a total of 89 conversions reported as filled and a balance of 23 converted but not filled.

(U) Phase II, a follow-on civilian substitution program, concerned 32 military billets to be converted to civilian billets during FY 68.³ In July 1967 the JCS announced a new reporting procedure for the Phase II Civilianization Program in an automatic data processing format.⁴ By 31 December, 9 of the 32 billets had been converted.

Civilian Performance Awards - CINCPAC Staff

(U) In 1967, 16 performance awards were granted to civilian employees with a total cash payment of \$1,945.⁵ These awards consisted of four outstanding performance ratings attendant with quality step increases; two outstanding performance ratings attendant with sustained superior performance awards; two sustained superior performance awards; one outstanding performance rating; and seven superior achievement awards.

(U) Outstanding performance ratings were granted for work performance sustained at a truly exceptional level for a period of 12 months.

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1. CNO ltr ser 13743, 29 Aug 67.
 2. CINCPAC Command History, 1966, p 141.
 3. CINCPAC Command History, 1966, p 142.
 4. JCS SM-332-67, 18 Jul 67, CPRS 178-67.
 5. J03 Approval of CINCPAC Incentive Awards Committee Meetings held on 30 Mar 67, 11 May 67, 23 Jun 67, and 14 Nov 67.

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Quality step increases were granted in recognition of high quality performance above that ordinarily found in the type of position concerned. This award could be granted for a period of three months, but no more than one quality increase may be granted within any 52-week period. Quality step increases were continuing in benefit.

(U) Superior achievement and sustained superior performance awards were granted for employee contributions that were sufficiently above normal job expectancy to warrant special recognition. The amount of cash granted for the superior achievement award was determined in terms of the degree of benefit and the extent of application. The amount of the sustained superior performance award was determined by the employee's grade level.

Civilian Employee Services and Benefits - CINCPAC Staff

Employee Handbook

(U) The first employee handbook for CINCPAC staff civilian employees was published on 29 July.¹ It provided supervisors and employees with a concise, non-technical digest of the regulations and benefits affecting the employment and conduct of Civil Service employees.

Health Services

(U) Civilian employees working at Camp Smith were offered chest X-ray service in July² and influenza immunizations in November.³ These services, provided by the Camp Smith dispensary, eliminated the need for civilian employees to travel to the Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard dispensary.

Authority to Approve Civilian Fringe Benefits, Korea

(U) On 9 December CINCPAC requested that the Navy's Office of Civilian Manpower Management (OCMM) delegate authority to CINCPAC's Joint Civilian Employee Advisory Group (JCEAG) to act on fringe benefit proposals for Korea covering minor changes in severance pay and designation of two additional holidays for a total of nine holidays.⁴

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1. Civilian Employees Handbook, 29 Jul 67.
 2. J14 Memo 87-67, 10 Jul 67.
 3. Employee Services Bulletin, 6 Nov 67.
 4. CINCPAC 090412Z Dec 67.

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The change in benefits was the result of a wage survey conducted by Army-Air Force Wage Board (AAFWB) representatives in Korea during the period 19 October to 17 November. The survey covered wages, compensation-related fringe benefits, and employment practices in Korean industries.

(S) The JCEAG had reviewed the situation during a visit and determined that a potentially volatile situation existed in labor-management relations in Korea as a result of activities in connection with the wage survey. Additionally, the Foreign Organization Employee Union (FOEU) advised COMUS Korea on 22 November that it had filed notice of an official labor disagreement concerning improvement of wages and working conditions in accordance with Article XVII, the Labor Article, of the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), and Article 15d of the Labor Management Agreement.¹ The FOEU's action in filing this disagreement under the SOFA was considered premature and not in accordance with the Labor Management Agreement.

(S) Approval from the OCMM for the JCEAG to act on the fringe benefit proposal was received,² which enabled the JCEAG to staff the fringe benefit proposals concurrently with approval of the wage schedule by the AAFWB. CINCPAC provided COMUS Korea the authority to implement the fringe benefits in December.³

Filipino Employment Policy Instructions

(S) Due to increased labor-management activities in the Philippines, the US Forces in the Philippines recognized the need to eliminate inconsistencies between instructions issued in 1962 by the CINCPAC Representative, Philippines and the Commander Naval Forces, Philippines. On 15 May, the CINCPAC Representative submitted to CINCPAC a revision of the Filipino Employment Policy Instruction (FEPI) and asked that approval be granted to implement its provisions as Military Bases Agreement negotiations on labor were imminent.⁴ The FEPI revision proposed numerous changes that had been in the process of development for approximately three years, including an approval awards scale, a change in the table of offenses and remedial actions on

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1. Eighth US Army ltr, 25 Nov 67.
 2. OCMM 222159Z Dec 67.
 3. CINCPAC 290223Z Dec 67.
 4. CINCPACREPPHIL ltr 07 12000 ser 030, 15 May 67.

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theft, level of appeals, the military leave provision, employee group relations, an administrative requirement, within-grade increases, advanced in-hire rates, reduction-in-force procedures, and involuntary separations.

(U) ~~(S)~~ On 11 August CINCPAC provided comments and guidance on the FEPI revision.¹ On 20 October the CINCPAC Representative, Philippines proposed three additional changes pertaining to within-grade increases, involuntary separation, and administrative requirements (for union recognition, a requirement for certification that all ~~members~~ and officers of the organization were currently employed by the US Forces and that some were employed by the installation from which recognition was sought).² CINCPAC granted approval on 20 November.³ The revision of the FEPI was to be used as a bargaining point in negotiating the Bases Labor Agreement between the US Government and the Philippines scheduled to begin in January 1968.

Bases Labor Agreement, Philippines

(U) ~~(S)~~ Since early 1966 the labor provisions of the United States-Republic of the Philippines Military Bases Agreement had been under informal discussion between the US Ambassador in Manila and the Labor Advisor to the CINCPAC Representative, Philippines. In April 1967 the CINCPAC Representative advised that the Government of the Philippines proposed to negotiate with the United States the labor agreement covering employees of the US Forces in the Philippines. The Philippines had indicated an interest in equal pay for equal work, the strike as a collective bargaining weapon, and the application of the principles of Executive Order 10988 and the application of stateside work standards to the Filipino employee work force at US bases in the Philippines.⁴

~~(S)~~ In May the CINCPAC Representative advised that the US representatives had attempted to reach an understanding with Philippine members as to the purposes of meeting and to discuss parameters of negotiations for the labor agreement.⁵ Also in May the CINCPAC Representative asked for guidance in conducting the Military Bases Agreement

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1. CINCPAC ltr 14 ser 0856, 11 Aug 67.
 2. CINCPACREPPHIL ltr 07 12000 ser 069, 20 Oct 67.
 3. CINCPAC ltr 14 ser 01262, 20 Nov 67.
 4. CINCPACREPPHIL 200533Z Apr 67.
 5. CINCPACREPPHIL 090915Z May 67.

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negotiations. ¹ CINCPAC reconfirmed the guidance he had given in 1966. ² Discussions continued and in July the CINCPAC Representative recommended that the United States start with the optimum bargaining position, which would provide latitude for concessions later if necessary. ³ CINCPAC concurred and so advised the Secretary of the Navy. ⁴ The US Ambassador in June and July ⁵ provided the Department of State with an initial draft of the Bases Labor Agreement, which had resulted from a series of discussions between Embassy personnel and the CINCPAC Representative's Labor Advisor.

(C) A joint State-Defense Department position provided details on the draft Bases Labor Agreement previously submitted by the US Ambassador. ⁶ The Navy's Office of Civilian Manpower Management in October requested a review of the previous position in light of information provided by the joint State-Defense Department message. ⁷ CINCPAC therefore reiterated to the Secretary that the United States should start with an optimum position and later concede certain trade-offs to gain a favorable agreement. ⁸ On 16 November the CINCPAC Representative provided CINCPAC with the Secretary of State's guidance to the US Ambassador regarding the negotiations. ⁹ In November the Ambassador advised that formal negotiations with the Philippine Government were scheduled to begin in January 1968. ¹⁰

Union Dues Civilian Payroll Deduction, Philippines

(U) Representatives of the US Ambassador in Manila and the CINCPAC Representative, Philippines met with the Executive Council of the Filipino Civilian Employee Association at Clark Air Base following a labor strike at Clark. Union officials stated that collection of union dues

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1. CINCPACREPPHIL ltr 07 12000 ser 030, 15 May 67.
 2. CINCPAC 280536Z Jun 67; CINCPAC ltr 12700 ser 098, 2 Feb 66.
 3. CINCPACREPPHIL 260321Z May 67; CINCPACREPPHIL ltr 07 12000 ser 041, 19 Jun 67; CINCPACREPPHIL 070307Z Jul 67.
 4. CINCPAC 230155Z Sep 67.
 5. Manila Airgram A906, 30 Jun 67; AMEMB MANILA 353/130931Z Jul 67.
 6. Joint State/Defense 42932/1/231801Z Sep 67.
 7. OCMM 051939Z Oct 67.
 8. CINCPAC 240309Z Oct 67.
 9. CINCPACREPPHIL 161121Z Nov 67.
 10. AMEMB MANILA 4665/220735Z Nov 67.

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directly from individual employees had proved unsuccessful and they asked that payroll deductions for union dues be authorized on a voluntary basis. The union agreed to reimburse the employing agencies for administrative costs involved.

(U) On 30 October the CINCPAC Representative requested authority for all US Forces activities in the Philippines employing both appropriated and non-appropriated fund employees on a direct hire basis to implement voluntary payroll deduction of union dues; he also asked for the establishment of appropriate administrative costs for these voluntary payroll deductions.¹ CINCPAC approved the request on 11 November for immediate implementation. If the CINCPAC Representative deemed this authority useful as a bargaining point in negotiation of the Bases Labor Agreement, however, implementation could be delayed.² Action was still pending at the end of the year.

Hospitalization Insurance Proposed for Filipino Employees

(U) The Defense Department had directed that employment practices and benefits for local nationals employed by US Forces were to be consistent with local laws, customs, and practices.³ Wage surveys in the Philippines in March 1966 indicated that 89 percent of the firms surveyed provided medical-hospitalization plans for their employees.

(U) CINCPAC's Representative in the Philippines submitted a proposed medical-hospitalization plan to CINCPAC in July 1967.⁴ CINCPAC approved the plan and forwarded it to the Navy's Office of Civilian Manpower Management (OCMM) in September,⁵ who in turn referred it to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower and to the Departments of the Army and Air Force for study and concurrence.⁶

(U) The OCMM then requested additional information regarding 1966 and 1967 fringe benefits surveys, which CINCPAC requested from his Representative in the Philippines.⁷ A reply was awaited at the end of the

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1. CINCPACREPPHIL ltr 07 12000 ser 652, 3 Oct 67.
 2. CINCPAC ltr 14 ser 4342, 17 Nov 67.
 3. DOD Instruction 1400.10, 8 Jun 56.
 4. CINCPACREPPHIL ltr 07 12000 ser 521, 29 Jul 67.
 5. CINCPAC ltr 14 ser 01025, 22 Sep 67.
 6. OCMM Spdltr OCMM 0331.2:gh, 30 Oct 67.
 7. OCMM ltr OCMM 0331.2:cay ser 0615 67, 21 Dec 67; CINCPAC Endorsement 14 ser 034, 2 Jan 68.

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year.

Policy Manual on Third Country National Employees in PACOM

(C) A proposed policy manual for administration of third country nationals in the PACOM was developed by CINCPAC's Joint Civilian Employee Advisory Group (JCEAG). As this manual required review and staffing by interested PACOM activities, a preliminary conference was held at Camp Smith on 2 and 3 August.¹ A draft of the manual was forwarded to CINCPAC's Representatives in the Philippines and Ryukyus and his subordinate unified commanders (except COMUS Japan) for detailed in-country staffing.² At the end of the year the JCEAG was reviewing information received in reply.³

PACOM Postal Service

(U) Prior to July, CINCPAC had been charged with the responsibility for providing postal service for members of the Army and Air Force assigned to the PACOM in accordance with a Joint Army and Air Force regulation.⁴ CINCPAC carried out these responsibilities by instructing CINCPACAF to perform certain functions pertaining to the PACOM postal service, in coordination with CINCUSARPAC and CINC-PACFLT.⁵

(U) On 26 July the Army and Air Force revised the joint regulation and charged the Departments of the Army and Air Force with the responsibilities for providing postal service for their respective departments, which had previously been the responsibilities of the unified command commanders. In addition, this revised regulation established a Military Postal Liaison Office at Department level to perform the postal service functions previously performed by the unified command commanders.⁶

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1. CINCPAC 180351Z Jul 67.
 2. CINCPAC ltr 14 ser 0841, 4 Aug 67.
 3. CINCPACREPRYUKYUS ltr, 6 Oct 67; COMUSMACTHAI ltr MACTJ13, 13 Oct 67; COMUSTDC ltr ser 0163, undated; COMUSKOREA ltr, 25 Oct 67; COMUSMACV ltr MACJ12, 15 Nov 67; CINCPACREPPHIL ltr 07 12000 ser 077, 4 Dec 67.
 4. AFR 182-1/AR 65-5, 20 Jul 56.
 5. CINCPACINST 2740.1B, 16 Nov 64.
 6. AFR 182-1/AR 65-5, 26 Jul 67; TANGO DA 48496/161927Z Oct 67.

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CINCPAC therefore revised his instruction to prevent duplication and/or overlapping of postal services and facilities that supported the Navy, Army, and Air Force elements of the PACOM. ¹

Combined Federal Campaign

(U) CINCPAC conducted the first Combined Federal Campaign in the PACOM from 1 March to 15 April 1967. ² This replaced separate solicitation campaigns by the American Red Cross, American Overseas Agencies, and National Health Agencies. The campaign was not officially conducted in the Republic of Vietnam, although voluntary contributions were accepted. A total of \$513,543.72 was received. ³

PACOM Cooperation With Boy and Girl Scouts

(U) CINCPAC stated in 1967 the continuation of his existing policy of maximum cooperation and support to Boy and Girl Scouts to the extent allowed by regulations and permitted by military operations. ⁴ He encouraged commanders at all levels to give continuing and enthusiastic support to the Scouts.

Credit Unions

(U) The Defense Department had dispatched a task group to survey the activities of credit unions in the PACOM in 1966 for compliance with Department regulations. ⁵ They all appeared to be complying, with the exception of the United Credit Union of Japan. A Defense Department management survey team was therefore dispatched to review that credit union. On receipt of the results, it appeared that activities were being conducted in accordance with Defense Department regulations, with the exception of granting loans for Japanese property and permitting membership of other than Defense Department employees. ⁶

(U) When CINCPAC received notice that corrective action had been taken in most areas, and that Price, Waterhouse and Company had just

1. CINCPACINST 2740.1C, 4 Nov 67.
2. CINCPAC Command History, 1966, p 142.
3. CINCPAC ltr ser 2436, 7 Jul 67.
4. CINCPAC Instructions 5760.1, 13 Mar 67 and 5760.2, 6 Nov 67.
5. DOD Directive 1000.10, 3 Mar 66.
6. ASD(M) ltr, 20 Apr 67.

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conducted an audit, he requested permission to certify the United Credit Union.¹ The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower, however, withheld permission for certification pending a financial audit that was to be conducted early in 1968.²

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1. CINCPAC ltr ser 2611, 24 Jul 67.
 2. ASD(M) ltr, 4 Nov 67.



SECTION XVII - COMPTROLLER ACTIVITIES

Military Banking Facilities

(U) Necessary banking services for Defense Department personnel and installations overseas were provided by the US Treasury Department's Military Banking Facilities at US bases.¹ The facilities were agencies of the Treasury Department, but they were operated by commercial institutions including the American Express Company, the Bank of America, the Chase Manhattan Bank, and the First National City Bank of New York. Normally the services of these facilities were available to members of the Armed Forces and their dependents, US Civil Service personnel, disbursing offices, and non-appropriated funds activities such as exchanges, clubs, and messes.

(U) The Military Banking Facilities were the responsibility of the Treasury Department and the Services, who hosted specific installations throughout PACOM. Most Defense Department activity in connection with the facilities was handled through Service channels, but CINCPAC encouraged the concept and coordinated matters connected with the facilities as necessary.

Checking Account Interest at Military Banking Facilities

(U) Military Banking Facilities in Vietnam and Thailand offered a unique benefit in which individual checking accounts maintaining a balance of at least \$100 during a quarter earned five percent interest per annum compounded quarterly.² This special arrangement, available to all Defense Department personnel on duty in those countries, encouraged thrift while helping to attract the US dollar away from the foreign economy and thus improve the US balance of payments position. The benefit did not compete with the Uniformed Services Savings Program since it fulfilled the customer's need to keep an adequate amount of working capital readily accessible.

(U) The Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) asked the Treasury Department to make this benefit available to all overseas Defense Department personnel. To assist in making a decision regarding this proposal, the Treasury Department scheduled a test of this benefit

1. J72 History, Dec 1967.

2. Ibid.

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to be held in Taiwan (selected because it was a relatively stable area) beginning 1 January 1968.

(U) CINCPAC did not believe that the Treasury Department's proposed test for a period of "not less than three months" would give optimum results because interest payment was to be made only to depositors who had maintained the minimum balance for a complete calendar quarter.¹ CINCPAC therefore recommended to the JCS that the test period be extended to at least two or three calendar quarters, although such an extension would not preclude an interim evaluation that could support a decision to apply the benefit to all Defense Department personnel overseas.

(U) CINCPAC's instructions to COMUSTDC regarding the test included the need for wide advance dissemination of information on the availability and benefits of the special arrangement, while not giving preferential treatment to the Military Banking Facilities to the exclusion of similar institutions such as credit unions or banks in the United States.² He also asked COMUSTDC to gather data that reflected personnel participation in Military Banking Facility services before, during, and after the test, particularly in the areas of levels and rates of change in numbers of individual accounts and total dollar balances held.

Military Payment Certificates

(U) Military Payment Certificates (MPC) were a form of currency used by US Armed Forces in countries where open competition of the US dollar with the local currency would seriously disrupt that country's economy.³ They were in use in 1967 in Vietnam, Japan, and Korea.⁴

(U) In February 1967 the Republic of Korea revised its foreign exchange regulations and agreed to permit the substitution of US coins (of less than \$1.00 denomination) for the fractional MPC in use there. Substitution of the coins was made from 25 September through 8 October, at which time \$363,450 in US coins was put into circulation.

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1. CINCPAC ltr ser 4655, 14 Dec 67.
 2. CINCPAC 222133Z Nov 67.
 3. J72 History, Dec 67.
 4. They had been used in the Philippines until September 1963 when US currency was introduced in their place.

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SECTION XVIII - PUBLIC AFFAIRS ACTIVITIES

(U) Admiral Sharp, as Commander in Chief, Pacific, received rather continuous press coverage by all media. After he testified before the House Foreign Affairs Committee in Washington in April, for example, he held several news conferences and appeared on the NBC-TV program "Today".¹

(U) In August Senator John Stennis, the Chairman of the Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Armed Services, announced that later that month he would conduct hearings on the conduct and effectiveness of the air war against North Vietnam and that Admiral Sharp would be the chief witness.² The Admiral's appearances before the subcommittee received extremely wide press coverage. Immediately upon his return to Hawaii, CINCPAC was featured on the ABC-TV program "Scope" in a half-hour interview concerned principally with the air war in North Vietnam.

(U) CINCPAC hosted Vice President Humphrey in August and many other US and foreign political and military visitors throughout the year.³

PACOM Public Affairs Conference

(U) The first PACOM Public Affairs conference was held at Clark Air Base in the Philippines from 30 January to 1 February 1967.⁴ The conference discussed development of a public affairs plan for crisis situations short of limited war. It also discussed requirements for establishment of country information teams in the PACOM, possibly composed of in-country US Information Service officers and senior military public affairs officers. The teams would work toward anticipating problem areas and recommending policy actions through both US Information Service (State Department) and Defense Department channels. The conference also recommended certain management of the Pacific Stars and Stripes.

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1. J74 History, May 67.
 2. J74 History, Aug 67.
 3. J74 History, Mar, May, Aug-Nov 67.
 4. J74 History, Jan 67; attendees included representatives of CINCPAC, his component and subordinate unified commands, his Representatives, and the commanders of FMFPAC, the Seventh Fleet, the III Marine Amphibious Force, and the 13th Air Force.

Pacific Stars and Stripes Policy Direction

(U) The first PACOM Public Affairs conference recommended establishment of a policy council for the Pacific Stars and Stripes to be composed of public affairs representatives of CINCPAC and his component command commanders. The council was to meet with the officer in charge of that publication to recommend management and editorial policy for consideration by CINCPAC and CINCUSARPAC (who had executive responsibility for Pacific Stars and Stripes management).¹

(U) The first council meeting, concerned primarily with orientation and some policy formulation, was held in Tokyo in November.²

1. J74 History, Feb 67.

2. J74 History, Nov 67.

CHAPTER II

CINCPAC ACTIONS INFLUENCING THE STATE OF READINESS
OF ALLIED NATIONS IN THE PACOM AREA

(S) "[As for military assistance] it is not the policy of the United States to provide sophisticated arms to countries which could better use their resources for more productive purposes, [but that] it is the policy of the United States to help ---

Where we are asked.
Where the threat of invasion or
subversion is real.
Where the proposal is militarily
and economically sound.
Where it is consistent with our
interests and our limited means.¹

Lyndon B. Johnson ¹

1. Quoted on page 3 of The Journal of Military Assistance prepared by the Evaluation Division, Directorate of Military Assistance, Deputy Chief of Staff, S&L Headquarters, USAF, June 1967. Hereafter cited as Journal MA, with appropriate date.

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Introduction

(U) "The Military Assistance Program [MAP], since its inception, has been predominantly in the self-interest of our country--enlightened self-interest, we would hope, but self-interest nonetheless.¹ MAP has been a fundamental part of U.S. postwar policy of assisting world governments to defend themselves against communism. Over the years, the program has expanded until a substantial number of countries receive annual assistance, but most of the funds go to only the few key countries directly threatened by communist aggression. The assistance provided by the U.S. might take "the form of grants and sales of military equipment, services, and training, but never money."²

(S) Basically, the purposes of a worldwide Military Assistance Program (MAP) have been to serve the following U.S. interests: (1) to arm friends against the threat of external attack; (2) to help them protect their societies against internal violence; (3) to obtain U.S. access to bases and facilities in strategic places; and (4) to dispose nations favorably toward the U.S. in their diplomacy, their public sentiment, and their direction of internal development.³

Brief History of PACOM MAP

(U) For many Americans, post-World War II brought bitter disappointment and disillusionment. Instead of peace, as pledged by wartime promises, hostilities reigned between certain of the former allies. The Free World soon found itself confronted with the growing worldwide menace of international communism. In Asia, for example, Mao Tse-tung was busy massing his Peoples' Armies in anticipation of a final decisive struggle against Chiang Kai-shek and the Nationalists for control of the mainland. At the same time, hard-core Communists fanned the sparks of rebellion in the Philippines--so recently made independent by the U.S.--and kept the fires of discontent aflame amidst the former European colonies of Southeast Asia.⁴

1. Harold A Hovey, United States Military Assistance: A Study of Policies and Practices, (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1965), p. v. Hereafter cited as Hovey, USMA.
2. Ibid., p. 15.
3. Point Paper, J5312, 15 Nov 66, Subj: PACOM Regional Capabilities Analysis of MAP-Supported Countries.
4. Information and Guidance on Military Assistance, prepared by the Evaluation Division, Directorate of Military Assistance, Deputy Chief of Staff, S&L, Headquarters, USAF, 1965, pp. 2ff. Hereafter cited as MA Guidance.

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(S) The use of armed force or internal subversion by communist countries eventually forced the Free World to face up to its responsibility of forging a military strength capable of successfully resisting such aggression. Since many of the allies of the U.S., such as the Philippines, lacked the means to produce or buy the weapons and equipment needed for an effective defense from their indigenous resources, the U.S. had to supply them with economic and technical assistance, as well as direct military aid. Finally, MAP was formalized with the passage of the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949, which brought together under one legislative authority a number of ad hoc programs of military aid to U.S. allies. Over the years, MAP has gradually become an institutionalized, continuing program that attempts to deal not only with military problems, but with a range of diplomatic, economic, and political problems as well.¹

(S) Actually, the inception of military assistance in the PACOM area took place in 1946, when the U.S. initiated a program of military aid for the Republic of the Philippines. Over the ensuing years, ten countries have received aid through MAP. In the case of Cambodia, MAP was terminated, while the termination for Indonesia was only temporary.

(S) In the beginning, the military forces of U.S. allies receiving military assistance consisted of ineffective mixtures of disassociated units characterized by poor leadership, hampered by lack of education and technology and equipped with obsolete and non-standard items of weapons and equipment from many countries. Today, primarily because of MAP, these forces have progressed to varying degrees of modernization, standardization, and reorganization.

(S) "Other contributions that military assistance had made toward the fulfillment of U.S. objectives, i. e., peace and stability in Asia, are:

a. MAP-provided assistance in personnel and equipment for Civic Action projects has contributed significantly to the economic and social development of the various countries. Military equipment and

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1. Military Assistance Programs, prepared by the Office of the ACofS G-3, Hq USARPAC, 1 Mar 58; Xerox copy in CINCPAC Historian's Files of Draft Memo for the President, Subj: the Military Assistance Program FY 1968-1972, 4 Nov 66.

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manpower have built and improved roads, bridges, dikes, dams, and buildings; improved sanitation and health of the populace; increased agricultural production and provided for flood control measures. The use of country troops in civil relief in typhoon and flood damage and disasters not only has aided in the rehabilitation particularly in remote areas but also has fostered a better mutual understanding and appreciation of the military.

b. Without MAP, many of the underdeveloped countries would be forced to sacrifice economic improvements in order to support and maintain an armed force capable of discouraging Communist incursions, thus neglecting a vital area of national substance in the fight against Communism.

c. Through agreements with recipient countries, MAP has provided bases and storage facilities vital in the event of war in the Far East, in the Republic of China, Japan, Korea, Philippines, Thailand, and Vietnam. The country forces, by assisting in the protection and maintenance of these facilities, further contribute to the security of the Pacific area.

d. Provision of U. S. materiel through MAP has precluded Communist Bloc military aid to a point of negligible importance with the exception of Cambodia, Indonesia, and pro-Communist factions in Laos.

e. The buildup of ROK and Japanese forces with the assistance of MAP has enabled the U. S. to withdraw a major portion of its own forces from those countries.

f. Close personal and professional relationships between U. S. and MAP-recipient country military personnel, fostered by MAP, have contributed significantly to the pro-U. S. orientation of country forces.

g. One of the most significant indications of the accomplishments of PACOM MAP is the outstanding performance of the ROK forces in Vietnam. Although the ROK units in Vietnam are now supported and funded by the U. S. Military Departments, they were originally organized, equipped, and trained by MAP. The 'Dove' Civic Action Unit, 'Capital/Tiger' Division, the 9th 'White Horse' Division, a Marine Brigade and Support Forces are now deployed in Vietnam. The ROK Forces in Vietnam now total about 46,000. With the exception of the United States this is by far the largest Free World contribution to the War in Vietnam.

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h. When the Government of Indonesia under General Suharto began to show evidence of its sincere intention and capability to pursue more rational domestic and foreign policy objectives, the USG approved resumption of MAP which had been terminated in 1965. Beginning with a FY 67 program, MAP has already given tangible evidence of U.S. support and encouragement to the leaders of the Indonesian Armed Forces for their civic rehabilitation program. Moreover, the favorable political impact of CONUS training on Indonesian military officers is again in evidence.

~~(S)~~ "In summary, MAP in the Pacific area has made possible the development of a major positive source of Free World strength. MAP supported forces are in various states of readiness and total over two million men. The Army forces comprise over 50 active divisions and 400 separate battalions. Approximately 500 ships of these nations are available to perform surveillance and mine warfare, in furtherance of their responsibility for local defense in coastal waters. The Marine amphibious forces are composed of more than two divisions and the Air Force totals more than 200 squadrons of fighter, interceptor, attack, reconnaissance and transport aircraft." ¹

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1. CINCPAC MA Plan for PACOM Region FY 68-73, 10 Aug 67, pp. C-1, C-2.

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SECTION I - PLANNING AND FUNDING MILITARY ASSISTANCE

Draft Memorandum for the President on MAP FY 68-72

(S) On 10 November 1966, the JCS notified CINCPAC that the Draft Memorandum for the President on the MAP FY 68-72 was being forwarded by courier and that CINCPAC's review and comments were requested on a priority basis.¹ The document arrived two days later. It was a recently completed review by the Secretary of Defense of MAP for the next five years, setting forth the Secretary's major conclusions and his recommendations for MAP FY 68-72.²

(S) The significant portions of the Draft Memorandum as they would affect CINCPAC were: (1) the Far East share of the world-wide MAP appropriation for FY 67 was 43%, and Congress would probably not provide more than \$792 million for FY 68 MAP; (2) it recommended the transfer of the Laos and Thailand programs to the regular defense budget and limited the FY 68 Thailand program to \$35 million; (3) it recommended the transfer of the NATO Infrastructure Program and support of International Military Headquarters of NATO, CENTO, and SEATO to the regular defense budget; (4) it limited world-wide grant aid military assistance to 37 countries, with 15 additional countries to receive grant aid CONUS training only; (5) it recommended a request to Congress for \$606 million for FY 68 MAP (\$820 million if transfers to the regular defense budget were not made); (6) it continued downward pressure on force levels for the Republic of China (ROC) and a reduction from \$95 to \$90 million for FY 68 MAP; (7) it discontinued all grant aid MAP for Japan and placed training on a sales basis; (8) it recommended eventual reduction of the Korean ground forces from 18 to 15 divisions following withdrawal of Republic of Korea (ROK) forces from Vietnam; (9) Burma and Malaysia were to receive CONUS training, Burma commencing in FY 69 and Malaysia in FY 68; and (10) it recommended an Indonesian grant aid program of \$6 million in FY 68 and subsequent years.³

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1. JCS 7715/102334Z Nov 66.
 2. J5 History, Hq CINCPAC, Nov 66; Xerox copy of Draft Memorandum for the President, 4 Nov 66, Subj: The Military Assistance Program FY 1968-1972.
 3. Ibid.; Hq CINCPAC J5 Brief No. 385, 22 Nov 66, of JCS 2458/157, 7 Nov 66, Subj: Draft Memorandum for the President on the Military Assistance Program, FY 1968-1972.

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(S) Following appropriate staffing through his J5 Division, CINCPAC forwarded a reply to the JCS on 16 November 1966. His comments were specifically directed to the programs for Japan, China, Korea, Thailand, and Burma, as well as to orientation visits of senior foreign officers. The justification for these visits was that the "program has been in being for some time in the PACOM area and has proven highly successful."¹ In the case of Japan, continuation of orientation/influence visits to the U. S. by leaders and prospective leaders of the Japanese Defense Agency (JDA) would serve to maintain a pro-U. S. attitude. As for Burma, CINCPAC recommended that "a modest Grant Air program ~~be~~ continued to maintain U. S. interest in the independence of Burma, if a credit sales program is not feasible."²

(S) The reduction to \$90 million for the FY 67-68 MAP for the ROC, CINCPAC felt would not provide for the necessary modernization of the reduced ROC forces as specified by Military Assistance Manual (MAM) guidance. Much of the material previously delivered to China was old when provided and has rapidly been becoming operationally unreliable and logistically unsupportable. As a result, CINCPAC urged "that the dollar guidelines for FY 68-69 remain at \$95 million and \$90 million respectively and \$70 million throughout the remainder of the period for the reduced ROC forces specified by MAM guidance."³

(S) Again, in the case of Thailand, CINCPAC considered the proposed \$35 million inadequate to support the FY 68 program and, at the same time, provide sufficient equipment, such as helicopters and counterinsurgency (COIN) aircraft, to support ground forces. Because of the numerous in-country programs, such as countering increased subversion activity, improving operational readiness of all Thai services, etc., CINCPAC recommended a funding level near \$70 million.

(S) As for reducing the ROK ground forces levels from 18 to 15 divisions following the withdrawal of Korean troops from Vietnam, CINCPAC felt that this proposed reduction should be re-evaluated again based upon the threat that existed at the time ROK participation in Vietnam ceased. Moreover, because he believed that it was a continuing military problem and a key political issue, CINCPAC suggested the inclusion of the following sentence: "Efforts also will continue to improve the ROK

1. CINCPAC 162200Z Nov 66.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.

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forces capability to counter effectively the increased aggressiveness of North Korean infiltration across the DMZ and via the sea approaches."¹

Transfer of Laos and Thailand MAP to DOD Budget

(S) In his 6 January 1967 Memorandum to the President on MAP, the Secretary of Defense concluded:

... in view of the sharp escalation in Laotian requirements and the continuing prospect of war in Vietnam and Laos, that support for the Laotian program should be shifted from MAP to the regular Defense budget, as it appears that we will be hard pressed to absorb rising Laotian requirements within the probable limits of overall MAP funding... because Thailand is so closely related to the Vietnam war and because it has become a base area integral to our Vietnam effort, I recommend that materiel support for the Thai forces be shifted to the regular Defense budget. This will permit a more efficient handling of the problem... With the shift of Laos and Thailand into the regular Defense budget, we will be funding the entire Southeast Asian military effort through that channel.²

(S) For Secretary McNamara, this position was exactly a complete turnabout from his stand of just a year ago. Then, in his 3 December 1965 MAP Memorandum to the President, he had "stated that he did not agree with the recommendation by the JCS that Thailand and Laos should also be placed in the 'open hostilities' category and funded in the same separate manner" as Vietnam.³ By July 1966, however, the Secretary was having second thoughts, for he asked the Joint Staff and each of the Military Departments to review the question again and forward their recommendations.⁴ The CINCPAC, for instance, approved the proposed transfer, but desired to retain the MAP procedures in order to facilitate close management control. The Secretary of Defense, once convinced of the desirability of the proposed action, waged a relentless campaign to secure the necessary legislation for transferring support responsibilities for the two forward defense countries to military service budgets.

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1. CINCPAC 162200Z Nov 66.
 2. Quoted in Point Paper, J531, Hq CINCPAC, 5 Apr 67, Subj: Service funding for Military Assistance for Laos and Thailand.
 3. CINCPAC Command History 1966, p. 173.
 4. Point Paper, J531, Hq CINCPAC, 5 Apr 67, Subj: Service Funding for Military Assistance in Laos and Thailand.

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(C) In due course, a request for congressional authorization for the proposed transfer was forwarded to Congress in early 1967. At the same time, on 19 January, Secretary McNamara wrote identical letters to Honorable Thomas E. Morgan, Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, setting forth the reasons for this transfer of responsibilities:

The reasons for the Laos and Thailand transfers are similar to those leading to last year's Vietnam transfer. That transfer has greatly facilitated the effective management of both our logistics resources in Vietnam and the Military Assistance Program world-wide. We believe that the inclusion of the Laos and Thai requirements in the regular Defense budget will produce similar favorable results.

... The recommended transfers reflect our continuing effort to provide military assistance on an increasingly selective basis to attain those specific objectives of United States military strategy and foreign policy for which it is the best available instrument.¹

(C) When Representative Morgan replied on 24 January 1967, that he had his doubts about the wisdom of the proposed actions and expressed his conviction that the recommendation should be reconsidered, Secretary McNamara quickly provided him with more justification.² After carefully considering the Chairman's objections, the Secretary answered:

These transfers are not being made solely to simplify the operations of the Defense Department nor to relieve the Administration of any responsibility to justify fully their requirements to the Congress or to the American people.

More basic, in the case of Laos and Thailand, is the reason that our assistance programs in these countries are directly related to our overall military effort in Southeast Asia, and to U.S. forces deployed there. Laos is in a combat

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1. Ltr, SECDEF to Honorable Morgan, 19 Jan 67, n. s. , copy in CINCPAC MAP FY 1968 Backup Book, Vol. I.
 2. Ltr, Chairman Morgan to SECDEF, 24 Jan 67, n. s. , a Xerox copy in CINCPAC MAP FY 1968 Backup Book, Vol. I.

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situation where requirements fluctuate rapidly, as evidenced by the recent destruction of U.S. supplied aircraft in Laos, worth more than \$4 million, by Communist forces. The operations of Lao forces against Pathet Lao and North Vietnamese troops contribute to the free world effort concentrated in the Republic of Vietnam. Thailand, where over 35,000 U.S. troops are now stationed, has become a base area vital to U.S. efforts to interdict Communist supply lines in Southeast Asia. Further, our assistance to Thailand bears a direct relationship to the Thai posture in the free world and the Southeast Asia situation.

I believe under these conditions, where we must be able to respond to rapidly moving and fluctuating requirements and where it is highly desirable to manage the total of our Southeast Asia effort in one logistic system, the programs properly should be in the regular Defense budget. Another important consideration is that in so doing we avoid the diversion of critical MAP funds from other carefully programmed needs directly related to our national security interests in other areas of the world and at the same time obtain the benefits of more efficient operations within the Defense Department.¹

~~(S)~~ The Senate of the United States passed the FY 1968 Defense Authorization Bill on 21 March 1967, and forwarded the bill on to the House of Representatives for their action. The proposed transfer had not been an issue with either the Senate or the House Armed Services Committees. However, as already seen, Chairman Morgan of the House Foreign Affairs Committee had not favored the action and had so protested to Secretary McNamara.² Therefore, testimony before this committee in support of the proposed MAP had pertinent significance.

(U) On 11 April 1967, the Secretary of Defense urged acceptance of the President-approved transfer before Representative Morgan's Committee:

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1. Ltr, SECDEF to Honorable Thomas E. Morgan, Chairman, Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, 14 Feb 67, n. s. , a Xerox copy in CINCPAC MAP FY 1968 Backup Book, Vol. I.
 2. Point Paper, J531, Hq CINCPAC, 5 Apr 67, Subj: Service Funding for Military Assistance in Laos and Thailand.

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Unanticipated increases in Laos and Thai requirements, stemming from changes in the overall military situation in Southeast Asia, have in the past had to be financed by reducing grant programs to other important countries of the free world. Such shifts in the allocation of finite assets (most notably to meet rising Vietnam requirements in 1965) have greatly complicated management of the total program. They have also caused understandable concern on the part of the other MAP recipients whose programs were adversely affected. The proposed transfers will remedy this situation; at the same time they will simplify the logistics management in Southeast Asia.¹

(S) Two days later, before the same committee, CINCPAC strongly supported Secretary McNamara's stand, when he said that MAP "was neither designed nor intended to fight a war. Its purpose is to provide forces for internal security, deterrence and initial defense."² The logic of the proposed transfer proved effective with congressmen. The needed authority for the transfer of Laos and Thailand programs from MAP to DOD appropriations was enacted on 5 June 1967.³ It became effective at the first of the 1968 Fiscal Year on 1 July 1967.

MA Planning and Programming 1967

(C) "To facilitate CINCPAC planning for FY 68-73 MAP," the office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense/International Security Agency (OASD/ISA) was requested on 31 December 1966 to provide a schedule of events pertaining to Calendar Year (CY) 1967 MA planning and programming.⁴ Early the next year, following a reply from OASD/ISA, CINCPAC transmitted to all concerned a "tentative schedule for review of FY 68-73 country MA Plans," and stated that Country Team representatives "will hand-carry their MA Plan to CINCPAC and will participate in 'CINCPAC Staff Review.'"⁵

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1. SECDEF 11 Apr 67 MAP Statement.
 2. Statement of Admiral U. S. G. Sharp, USN, CINCPAC, before the House Foreign Affairs Committee on 13 April 1967, hereafter cited as CINCPAC 13 Apr 67 MAP Statement. A Xerox copy in J531 Congressional Backup-Misc-File.
 3. CINCPAC MA Plan for PACOM Region FY 68-73, 10 Aug 67, p. C-1-1.
 4. CINCPAC 310451Z Dec 66.
 5. CINCPAC 122107Z Jan 67; SECDEF 3158/092151Z Jan 67.

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~~(S)~~ During January 1967, CINCPAC dispatched instructions to the MAAGs for the submission of FY 68 Continuing Resolution Authority (CRA) requirements that same month.¹ On the 26th, he airmailed copies of the S-8 (OSD Status/MAP Order Summary), which consisted of the FY 68 program with applicable FY 67 CRA coding, to the MAAGs, who were requested to review, change as necessary, and return one corrected copy to Headquarters CINCPAC by 1 April 1967.

Annual MAP Review - Fall 1967

(U) The Assistant Secretary of Defense/International Security Agency (ASD/ISA) dispatched a letter on 12 June 1967 that advised CINCPAC, as well as the other CINCs of Unified Commands, of the annual Washington MAP Review to be conducted during the period, 21 August to 31 October 1967.² It requested the following actions be taken by CINCPAC: (1) assign an experienced MAP planner on temporary duty (TDY) to the Office of the Director of Military Assistance (ODMA) for the period, 11 September through 9 October 1967; (2) send appropriate representatives to participate in the Inter-Agency Review, conducted between 18 and 22 September 1967; (3) have representatives present a briefing on each PACOM Country Plan; (4) forward an outline of the aforementioned presentations to ODMA by 11 September 1967; (5) prepare a Plan Summary and Issue Papers on each PACOM MA Plan and forward them to ODMA by 21 September 1967; (6) send a representative to attend the Senior MAP Review on 4 and 5 October 1967; and (7) forward to ODMA by 4 September 1967 the name, rank, position, and security clearance of the personnel scheduled to participate in the MAP review.

(U) CINCPAC forwarded the names of his participants for the MAP fall review on 31 July; the Plan Summaries and Issue Papers on each

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1. CINCPAC 210244Z Jan 67; CINCPAC 310248Z Jan 67; J5 History, Hq CINCPAC, Feb 67.
 2. Unless otherwise cited, the information contained in this subsection has been derived from the following sources: J4 History, Hq CINCPAC, Sep 67; J5 History, Hq CINCPAC, Sep 67; Memo for Record, Col Roy E. Eidson, USAF, J531, Hq CINCPAC, 5 Oct 67, Subj: Annual MAP Review - Fall 1967, hereafter cited as J531 MAP Memo 5 Oct 67; Memo for Record, Capt Walter C. Klein, USN, J533, Hq CINCPAC, 10 Oct 67, Subj: Annual MAP Review - Fall 1967, hereafter cited as J533 MAP Memo 10 Oct 67.

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PACOM MAP country followed on 15 August 1967. Three days later, CINCPAC was advised that, because of delays in Congressional action on the FY 68 MAP Authorization, the Inter-Agency Review was rescheduled for 25 through 29 September 1967; he was further advised on 12 September that the Senior Review had been delayed to the 11th and 12th of October. ¹ CINCPAC forwarded an adjusted schedule of his participants for the MAP fall review on 16 September 1967. ²

~~(S)~~ On 13 September 1967, following a review of the FY 69-73 MA Plans, the JCS sent a memorandum to the Secretary of Defense, expressing their concern "about the impact of projected military assistance funding levels on certain areas of major strategic importance. ³ Specific comments on PACOM MAP countries contained in this memorandum were:

a. "Reduction in force levels for Korea and China cannot be justified in view of the threat. Force levels no less than those specified in Annex J (Vol III) to JSOP must be maintained to support U.S. strategy.

b. MAP-funded war reserve stocks are inadequate. Korean war reserve stock of ammunition represents less than ONE MONTH'S SUPPLY AT U.S. combat usage rates."⁴

~~(S)~~ The Inter-Agency Review was conducted, as rescheduled, during the period, 25-29 September 1967. It was opened by VAdm Luther C. Heinz, USN, Director of Military Assistance, ASD/ISA, who pointed out the dilemma that would have to be faced in FY 69 planning, since Congressional action was still pending on the FY 68 MAP. He alluded "to a few of the problems that could not be resolved until congressional action has been completed," such as "the F5 Program, disposition of an F-104A/B Squadron, the disposition of an F/TF-104G Squadron and, in general, the effect that reductions in the FY 68 program would have on FY 69 planning."⁵

~~(S)~~ CINCPAC representatives presented the FY 69-73 MAP for PACOM countries on 26 September and participated in the several dis-

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1. SECDEF 4212/181453Z Aug 67; SECDEF 6028/121322Z Sep 67.
 2. CINCPAC 162016Z Sep 67.
 3. J5, Hq CINCPAC, Brief No. 275-67, 22 Sep 67, of JCSM 503-67, 13 Sep 67, Subj: Military Assistance Plan Review.
 4. Ibid.
 5. J531 MAP Memo 5 Oct 67.

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cussions relative to the problems and issues for each of the countries. "The presentation was well received and CINCPAC was commended by ADM Heinz for the presentation. "¹

~~(S)~~ Several of the more important discussions held during the Inter-Agency MAP Review directly concerned problems in the PACOM area. During one of the manning of the Provisional Military Assistance Advisory Group-Korea (PROVMAGG-K), for instance, it became "quite evident that an attempt was being made to reduce the manpower authorization," but the "CINCPAC representative advised that contrary to the desire to reduce manpower, there have been requests from Korea to increase the advisory effort, primarily because of the increased DMZ activities."² Discussion was also engaged in with the International Logistics and Negotiations (ILN) Directorate, which had the action on providing additional 106 M-41 tanks to China. Although ODMA appeared to favor the idea, indications pointed to ILN disapproval. Before the end of the review, however, a CINCPAC representative was informed by an ILN official that "approval of the proposal in approximately six weeks" was anticipated; meanwhile, "the MAAG Taiwan representative accompanying the GRC military in selecting 253 tanks was advised to personally pick out 106 additional in anticipation of approval for the second lot."³

~~(S)~~ "The problem of F5's for MAP countries was discussed several times and centers around the requirement to provide the Air Force with firm commitments for future production. . . . Associated with the F5 problem are two squadrons of F-104 aircraft. . . . that are MAP owned assets. In order for a recipient country to offset the cost of these aircraft, reductions would probably be made in F5 procurement, further complicating the world-wide F5 problem."⁴ Like so many other issues, such as the effect of price increases for Engineer Construction Battalion equipment on the Philippine program, this F-5 problem could not be resolved until after Congress had determined the funding level for FY 68.

~~(S)~~ As VAdm Heintz remarked during a departure conference with some of the CINCPAC representatives, the "FY 69 planning can only be done in a vacuum until the final appropriation for FY 68 is determined."⁵

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1. J531 MAP Memo 5 Oct 67.
 2. Ibid.
 3. J533 MAP Memo 10 Oct 67.
 4. J531 MAP Memo 5 Oct 67.
 5. J533 MAP Memo 10 Oct 67.

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For this reason---the dilemma faced by the planners of this MAP review ---plus the fact that practically every topic that was unresolved at this meeting is covered later in this chapter, either in the following subsection on "MAP Legislation" or in the individual treatment of the PACOM MAP countries, no attempt is made at this point to touch upon all facets of this review. Upon their return to Hq CINCPAC, the participants reported the results of this Inter-Agency Review as they pertained to PACOM area of interest to the Hq Staff by means of J5 Memorandum For Record of 5 and 10 October 1967.¹ In anticipation of the eminent passage of the FY 68 MAP Authorization by Congress, CINCPAC planners then turned themselves to the task of preparing for those inevitable adjustments that would become necessary in PACOM MAP after a funding level had been established.

MAP Legislation

(S) The Secretary of Defense notified CINCPAC on 22 November 1967 that President Johnson had signed the FY 68 MA Authorization Bill for \$510 million six days earlier. Of this amount, \$24.1 million was earmarked for the International Military Headquarters (IMHQ), although the original request for authorization/appropriation of \$596 million had not included this expenditure, since it was planned to service fund it. Moreover, the House of Representatives had passed a bill which recommended an appropriation of \$365 million in contrast to the \$620 million requested of Congress. The Senate Appropriations Committee, however, was just addressing itself to the MAP question, so no figures were available. As the Secretary of Defense noted, the MAP planning during 1967 was somewhat unique:

Normally the FY 69 Budget request is determined from the FY 68 base position. However, due to the lateness of FY 68 Congressional actions and the necessity of preparing budgetary submissions, the FY 69 Budget request must be determined before the FY 68 Appropriation is finalized. It is obvious that the requested \$596 million NOA (not including \$24 million for IMHQ) will not be appropriated for FY 68.²

(S) Between the authorization figure of \$510 million and the House of Representatives' proposal of \$365 million appropriation, the Secretary

1. Ibid.; J531 MAP Memo 5 Oct 67.
2. SECDEF 3385/220549Z Nov 67.

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of Defense estimated that the final appropriation figure would be around \$420 million New Obligational Authority (NOA). Accordingly, he used this estimate to provide CINCPAC with the following tentative allocation by PACOM country for FY 68:

| | Col. I CINCPAC - Supported FY 68 | Col. II Tentative Allocation FY 68 | Col. III Probable Budget Request FY 69 |
|---------------|--|--|--|
| Worldwide MAP | \$596.0 | \$420.0 | \$555.0 |
| PACOM Totals | 282.2 | 241.9 | 280.7 |
| Burma | 3.7 | 3.1 | .4 |
| China | 90.0 | 50.0 | 90.0 |
| Korea | 160.0 | 160.0 | 160.0 |
| Philippines | 22.0 | 22.0 | 23.8 |
| Indonesia | 6.0 | 5.4 | 6.0 |
| Area | .5 | 1.4 (*) | .5 |

(S) In order that the necessary budgetary planning could proceed, the same Secretary of Defense message of 22 November requested CINCPAC to take the following three actions: (1) provide "card input to reduce your FY 68 programs to the level indicated in Column II and adjust FY 69 program to the level indicated in Column III respectively" by 28 November; (2) provide deferral priorities on 20 percent of the reduced and/or adjusted programs by 5 December; and (3) provide "comments and recommendations relative to each country program for both FY 68 and 69 at the new levels shown in Columns II and III."¹ Six days later, CINCPAC was instructed to place "50 percent of adjusted FY 69 China Program in order of Deferral Priority."² By 6 December 1967, CINCPAC was able to report that the required changes to the deferral priorities had been transmitted via AUTODIN the previous day.³ The "card inputs to adjust the FY 68 - 69 programs" of those countries requiring changes had already been transmitted via AUTODIN earlier.⁴

(S) As for his comments and recommendations, which the Secretary had requested, CINCPAC furnished these on 1 December 1967:

 (*) Includes \$.9 million to finance Korean projects to be reimbursed by sales of excess equipment by the Republic of Korea.

1. SECDEF 3385/220549Z Nov 67.
2. SECDEF 3803/282052Z Nov 67.
3. CINCPAC 062347Z Dec 67.
4. CINCPAC 012307Z Dec 67.

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"4. China - The reduction of the China MAP to a \$50 million ceiling has required, in addition to eliminating virtually all investment items except the DE, a reduction of \$17 million in the current operating program. The Continuing Resolution Authority (CRA) funding previously submitted was based on a \$49 million operating program to ensure the uninterrupted flow of essential supplies and spare parts.

a. A substantial reduction of approximately 50 percent of a developed program (less PCH&T) requires a revaluation of those dollar lines previously designated for CRA funding, if critically needed items to support equipment on hand are to be obtained. Unless authority is granted to reprogram those lines that are funded but unobligated, many critical requirements for aircraft parts, engine overhaul, and missile spares and equipment cannot be obtained.

b. Although the F-5 has been a controlled program, reductions of this magnitude have resulted in elimination of all F-5's from the FY 68 China program.

5. Philippines - The retention of a \$22 million ceiling, without an add-on to fund the directed buy of \$4.5 million in engineer construction battalion equipment, has required the deletion of the PCE, delayed the equipping of the Composite Commando Squadron, and has deferred for at least one year the programming of numerous small force improvement items badly needed by the AFP. The tentative FY-69 ceiling of \$23.8 million will not be sufficient to permit programming of all investment items deleted from the FY-68 program.

6. Indonesia - Adjustment of FY 68 and FY-69 Indonesia MAP to \$5.4 and \$6.0 million, respectively, necessitated deletion of certain significant items including three of the four English language labs, medical supplies, and aircraft necessary to support the civic action program. Since CONUS training is considered to yield the highest benefit per dollar, these dollars were not reduced.

7. Recommend that:

a. After final approval of the dollar guidelines for FY-68 China MAP, action be permitted, in accordance with

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Chapter P of DOD MAM, Part II, to change and deviate from unobligated balances of funded lines, in order to obtain more critically needed items.

b. In view of the magnitude of the cut in the GRC MAP, SECDEF and SECSTATE authorize the Embassy to fully appraise the GRC of the fiscal realities of the China MAP program. Only through a frank evaluation of resources available from both countries can effective bilateral planning be accomplished.

c. The illustrative budget request figures for FY-69, contained in Column III, Ref A, can be reduced."¹

"Current Congressional action in connection with FY 68 MAP Appropriation Bill," wired the Secretary of Defense on 16 December, "has set NOA level at \$400 million which includes \$24.1 for International Military Headquarters."² At the same time, he supplied CINCPAC with the following data in millions on PACOM MAP:

| | Final FY 68 Appropriation | FY 69 Dollar Levels |
|-------------|------------------------------|-----------------------------|
| Burma | \$ 3.1 | \$.2 |
| Indonesia | 5.2 | 6.0 |
| Philippines | 21.0 | 22.2 |
| China | 44.0 | 30.4 |
| Korea | 160.0 | 160.0 |
| Area | .5 | .5 |
| Totals | <u>\$233.8</u> | <u>\$219.3</u> ³ |

Based upon these new dollar levels, CINCPAC was requested to notify the Office of the Director of Military Assistance (ODMA) which deferral priorities would have to be applied to effect the necessary reductions to the FY 68 country programs. On 27 December 1967, CINCPAC forwarded the required deferral priorities to reduce China by 6 million, Philippines by 1 million, Indonesia by \$170,884, and deviations of .5 million for Korea.⁴ In addition, J5 planners made whatever ad-

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1. CINCPAC 012307Z Dec 67.
 2. SECDEF 5321/160036Z Dec 67.
 3. Ibid.; SECDEF 5355/161744Z Dec 67.
 4. CINCPAC 270036Z Dec 67.

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justments that had to be made to previously submitted programs, in light of the new guidance on dollar levels, and transmitted this revised data to OASD/ISA via AUTODIN on 31 December 1967.¹

Use of U.S. - Owned Foreign Currencies for MAP

(U) On 19 May 1967, the Department of Defense (DOD), through Section B, Part II, of its MAM, prescribed the procedures for executing MAP requirements with "Common Defense" foreign currencies without charge to MAP dollar program guidelines.² Basic guidance concerning the utilization of U.S. -owned foreign currencies for payment of DOD requirements overseas were issued on 24 July 1967 in the form of DOD Instruction 7360.9. The principal source of "Common Defense" foreign currency, then as now, is from the sale of U.S. agriculture products to foreign countries.

~~(U)~~ CINCPAC asked the following PACOM MAP countries on 29 August 1967 to submit "Common Defense" foreign currency requirements for inclusion in their country Military Assistance (MA) Plans for FY 68-73: Burma, China, Thailand, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, and Laos.³ The responses from the countries, which had been requested no later than 15 September, "indicated that no common currencies are available for executing MAP requirements."⁴

MAP Deferral Priority

(U) On 19 July 1967, the Secretary of Defense pointed out to CINCPAC that Chapter 5, Section C, Part II, of the DOD MAM, required that Deferral Priority Codes be assigned to twenty percent of each country's dollar level for articles and services. He requested CINCPAC to submit "as soon as practicable program changes assigning deferral priorities to FY 68 ODMA data base."⁵

~~(U)~~ A week later, CINCPAC requested CHMAAG China, COMUSMAC-THAI, CHJUSMAGPHIL, DEPCHJUSMAGTHAI, COMUSKOREA, CHDLG Indonesia, CHMEDT American Embassy Rangoon, and U.S. Defense

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1. J5 History, Hq CINCPAC, Dec 67.
 2. J5 History, Hq CINCPAC, Aug 67.
 3. CINCPAC 290244Z Aug 67.
 4. J5 History, Hq CINCPAC, Dec 67.
 5. SECDEF 1678/191530Z Jul 67.

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Attache Office (USDAO) Kuala Lumpur, to identify twenty percent of their articles and services by deferral priority and to submit codes for the requisition number (RCN) in accordance with the MAM. Responses were due at Hq CINCPAC by 5 September 1967.¹ As of this date, every MAP country, except Burma, had submitted Deferral Priority Codes for FY 68-70. Following a review by the country desk officers, these codes were transmitted to PACOM MAP Data Center for inclusion in the data bank and transmittal to OASD/ISA via AUTODIN. By 10 September, the "L-2 (RCN Listing), which is a detailed listing by country of all active material/training lines in the data base, has been revised to include deferral priority codes for all countries.²

Self-Help Programs - Far East

(S) In recent years, more continuing emphasis has been placed upon self-help among PACOM countries.³ In 1967, self-help programs were in operation in every PACOM nation that was participating in MAP. The extent of these programs, of course, varied tremendously from nation to nation, being influenced in each country by such factors as degree of industrialization, degree of economic development, ability to collect revenues to support government programs, and size of military requirement.⁴ The following activities were representative self-help programs within PACOM in calendar year 1967.

Training.

(S) All countries have continued to improve self-training capabilities in both quantity and quality. Korea, China, Philippines, and Thailand, for instance, all train aircraft pilots, equipment repairman for a wide range of equipment, communications equipment operators, combat equipment operations, military police, and supply personnel.

Repair.

(S) The most significant self-help area, from a cost standpoint, has been the steadily growing capability in all countries for repair and main-

1. CINCPAC 260135Z Jul 67; J5 History, Hq CINCPAC, Jul 67.
2. J5 History, Hq CINCPAC, Aug 67.
3. CINCPAC MAP FY 1967 Backup Book, Volume I; CINCPAC Command History 1966, p. 167.
4. The following discussion on PACOM Self-Help Programs has been derived from CINCPAC MAP FY 1968 Backup Book, Volume I.

tenance of military equipment. During 1967, China performed major overhaul of virtually all types of aircraft, vehicles, ships, and engines, as well as a wide range of lesser equipment. In addition, China overhauls and repairs most of the component parts of the aforementioned items. Korea had a partial, but growing capability, in the same areas during the year, while Thailand and the Philippines were beginning to achieve some of these capabilities.

Self-Financing.

~~(S)~~ Improvement occurred in percentages of contributions to defense expenditures. China and the Philippines, for example, contributed 74% and 76% respectively of their FY 67 defense expenditures.

Self-Financed Manufacturing and Procurement.

~~(S)~~ In this area of self-help, China, Korea, Thailand, and Japan showed marked improvement. China financed entirely a \$70 million 10-year program for co-production of military vehicles, \$50 million of which will be spent in the U.S. These same trucks, if assembled in the U.S., would cost over \$100 million. In addition, China was planning on purchasing for cash some \$4 to \$5 million of miscellaneous military supplies and equipment and had made inquiries on \$5 to \$10 million of military credit sales.

Besides China, Korea and Thailand manufacture small caliber ammunition. These countries have also steadily increased their procurement of commercial supplies and equipment for military use. In the case of Korea, its rate of increase has leveled off temporarily because of ROK troops deployed in Vietnam. Other military items such as small weapons, tires, batteries, replacement parts and uniforms have been manufactured in varying degrees by MAP countries and purchased from local defense budgets. Japan, although no longer a MAP recipient, has become an important customer of the U.S. for modern military hardware, such as fighter aircraft, air defense ground environment systems and air defense missiles.

Foreign Military Sales (FMS)

(U) In 1967, as in the previous year, FMS were important in PA-

COM.¹ This program, formerly called Military Assistance Sales (MAS), has been progressively developed since its objectives were established in 1962. They were: "(1) to promote the defensive strength of our allies, consistent with U. S. political and economic objectives; (2) to promote the concept of cooperative logistics and equipment standardization with our allies; (3) to offset a substantial part of the dollar outflow resulting from essential United States Military deployments abroad."²

~~(S)~~ In PACOM, as elsewhere, the vast majority of FMS are to highly industrialized countries and, even in these cases, "United States sales represent only moderate percentages of the total military purchases made by those countries."³ Moreover, as the CINCPAC pointed out in September 1965, "most PACOM countries did not have highly developed economies and that the military sales effort must carefully consider the economy of the prospective buyer."⁴ Nevertheless, economic advances by certain PACOM countries have enabled them to assume an increasingly larger responsibility for their own defense cost. The policy in 1967 was the same as the one stated by President Johnson a year previous, that "we will shift our military aid program from grant aid to sales whenever possible -- and without jeopardizing our security interests or progress of economic development."⁵

~~(S)~~ One primary objective of the U. S. in its FMS is the damping down of regional tensions and the slowing down of the pace of arms expenditures. Fortunately, "arms races" have not been a serious problem in the Far East.⁶ Both military assistance grant and sales have been provided only to meet the minimum of self-defense and internal security in recipient countries. In recent years, no serious military rivalries between free world countries of the Far East have occurred.

~~(S)~~ Some evidence of the success of FMS in PACOM countries was

1. Intv, Maj Wilford E. Overgaard, USMC, MAP Br, J5, Hq CINCPAC, with Mr. Strobbridge, Senior Historian, CINCPAC HistBr, 30 Sep 67.
2. Statement of Robert S. McNamara, Secretary of Defense before the House Foreign Affairs Committee in Support of the FY 1968 Military Assistance Program on 11 April 1967, hereafter cited as SECDEF 11 Apr 67 MAP Statement. A Xerox copy in J531 Congressional Backup-Misc-File.
3. Ibid.
4. CINCPAC Command History 1966, p. 162.
5. Quoted in SECDEF 11 Apr 67 MAP Statement.
6. CINCPAC MAP FY 1968 Backup Book, Volume I.

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evident in 1967. The purchase by the Republic of China of nine S2A aircraft from the U. S. thus benefited the Free World. These planes would establish a barrier patrol in and about the contiguous waters of the Taiwan Straits and would provide better observation of Chinese Communist ship and aircraft movements.¹ Other matters dealing with FMS or sales negotiations will be discussed later in this chapter under appropriate country heading.

Loopholes in FMS Procedures

(C) On 2 March 1967, the U. S. announced that it had approved a license for the export of 20,300 AR-15 rifles to Singapore. Immediately, a great deal of furor followed, for this weapon, known in its military configuration as the M-16, was one that both the U. S. troops and the Free World Forces in Vietnam valued highly and did not have enough for their purposes. This action, wired COMUSKOREA to CINCPAC on 9 March, "has created a questioning atmosphere and growing concern within the ROK government and the Korean public."² He further commented that the Korean soldiers in Vietnam were fighting with "outdated" rifles against North Vietnamese Regular troops equipped with "modern automatic weapons, mortars and flame throwers." His views were seconded by the American Ambassador to Korea, who notified the State Department that the U. S. announcement was "obviously totally inadequate to explain sale of M-16 rifles in such short supply to Singapore when ROK forces fighting in SVN" did not have a sufficient supply.³

(C) Prior to the approval of this sale, CINCPAC's views and recommendations had not been sought. Accordingly, he sent a message to the JCS on 9 March, pointing out that the rifle sale reflected an area wherein improved coordination procedures were indicated. In specific, he recommended the "establishment of a policy wherein views of the Unified Commander are requested in each case involving FMS."⁴ The JCS replied the following day, explaining that a "means of insuring coordination of FMS activities by all interested agencies has been under study by the Joint Staff for some time," and that their recommendations contained in JCSM-117-67, which was submitted to the Secretary of Defense on 3 March, would insure such coordination.⁵

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1. CINCPAC 13 Apr 67 MAP Statement.
 2. COMUSKOREA 57736/091000Z Mar 67.
 3. AMEMB Baguio 46/060745Z Mar 67.
 4. CINCPAC 091045Z Mar 67.
 5. JCS 8508/102219Z Mar 67.

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(S) In reviewing the proposed JCS procedures, CINCPAC discovered that they still left loopholes which should be covered. As he pointed out to the JCS on 16 March, the new procedures were "applicable, however, only to those actions originating at the MAAG (DAO) level," and he illustrated two methods whereby an "export license could be obtained in Washington without consultation with the MAAG or unified commander."¹ Once again, CINCPAC urged that the "procedures be expanded to cover all channels through which requests for FMS can be made."² The JCS acknowledged this situation on 27 March 1967, when they stated that this problem was "included in the over-all efforts by the organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to standardize FMS procedures."³

(S) On 30 June 1967, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, in a memorandum to the Chairman, JCS, agreed that FMS planning should be in consonance with the JSOP, but disagreed that the planning steps proposed by the JCS should constitute the controlling procedure. He reiterated that "military sales must proceed on an essentially case-by-case basis...."⁴

Strategic Mobility Work Projects Recommended for MAP and/or AID Funding

(S) In the past as now, the purpose of Strategic Mobility Projects has been to support and to improve the mobility posture of the U. S. in those areas covered by the "Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan, by the most economical and effective means of funding by either AID or MAP or a combination of both. Projects selected were those that contributed: (1) expediting deployments specified in contingency plans; (2) furthering the developments of airfields, ports, roads, and rail lines; and (3) improving cargo and POL handling facilities for both air and sealift."⁵

(S) In mid-1966, CINCPAC was directed by the Secretary of Defense to review all Strategic Mobility Projects that had not yet been considered and to submit his recommendations through channels. Subsequently, the JCS disallowed all of the ones CINCPAC recommended, except two, which the Secretary of Defense disapproved himself in October. This, then, was the status of the projects when 1967 dawned.⁶

1. CINCPAC 162018Z Mar 67.

2. Ibid.

3. JCS 1050/272131Z Mar 67.

4. Memo, Deputy SECDEF to CJCS, 30 Jun 67. Cited by LtCol William M. Kennedy, USA, J5311, MAP Br, J5, Hq CINCPAC, in a comment on the Draft Manuscript, 29 Feb 68.

5. CINCPAC Command History 1966, pp. 171-172.

6. Ibid., pp. 172-173.

(32) (U) The ROKA microwave system should be reviewed for possible system redesign to increase the system flexibility for circuit restoral and for wartime application.

(33) ~~(C)~~ Additional tactical communication capability is required by ROKA divisions to permit tactical displacement of division headquarters and to increase the range of infantry company command nets. "1

1. Korea MAP PEG, pp. 1-5.



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SECTION III - COUNTRY ACTIVITIES

Republic of Korea

"...officially, the Korean War is not over. We are under an armistice which is frequently broken by North Korean armed forays and the infiltration of agents. Twenty North Korean divisions, five infantry brigades and a formidable air force are deployed in such a manner that an attack into South Korea could be initiated with a minimum of advance warning. Additionally, we estimate that under optimum conditions the Chinese Communists, in eleven days, could reinforce the North Koreans with up to 37 divisions and substantial modern air support. Facing this threat, we must maintain effective Korean and United States forces in Korea....

"I should like to emphasize one key point with reference to the previous MAP programs in Korea. As you know, approximately 46,000 troops and five ships of the Republic of Korea are on duty in Vietnam. The major organizations are two infantry divisions and a Marine brigade, all of which have performed exceptionally well. These troops, which are previously MAP supported, are well equipped, have proven to be well trained, and are doing a most professional job. I would say that the results achieved by these forces in combat testify dramatically to the ultimate value of the Military Assistance Program."

Admiral U. S. G. Sharp¹

1. CINCPAC 13 Apr 67 MAP Statement.


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KOREA

AS OF 1 NOVEMBER 1967

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| BASIC INFORMATION | |  | OVERALL OBJECTIVE | U.S. DIPLOMATIC MISSION |
|---|--|---|--|--|
| AREA | 38,000 SQ. MI. | | <p>(A) To support the ROK armed forces which, together with available U.S. forces, are necessary to defend Korea against assault by North Korea and Communist China.</p> <p>(B) To help create a viable Korean economic and social structure.</p> <p>(C) To hold Korean military forces at the lowest practicable strength consistent with the requirements essential for the defense of Korea and for certain Far East regional requirements.</p> <p>(D) To maintain a climate in which the U.S. will continue to enjoy existing and, if required, additional overflight, staging, and base rights.</p> | <p>PROTECT SOUTH KOREA AGAINST RENEWED COMMUNIST AGGRESSION AND MAINTAIN C IN C UNC OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF ROK FORCES.</p> |
| POPULATION | 29.4 MILLION | MAP OBJECTIVE | | |
| ANNUAL GROWTH | 2.9% | | | |
| ARABLE LAND PER CAP. | 0.2 ACRE | | | |
| LITERACY RATE | 85% | | | |
| LIFE EXPECTANCY | 47 YEARS | | | |
| GROSS NAT. PROD. 1966(E) | \$3.1 BILLION | | | |
| PER CAPITA | \$105. | | | |
| DEFENSE BUDGET SELF-FINANCE) 1966 | \$53.0 MILLION | | | |
| AS % OF GNP | 1.7% | | | |
| AS % OF CENT GOVT. | 10.1% | | | |
| <p>PRESIDENT - GEN Pak Chong Hui, ROKA (Ret) PRIME MINISTER - GEN Chong Il-Kwon, ROKA (Ret) DEFENSE MINISTER - LTGEN Kim, Sung-eun, ROKMC (Ret) MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS - Cho Kyu-ha CHAIRMAN JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF - GEN Im Chung-sik C/S ARMY - GEN Kim Kye-won, CNO - VADM Kim Yong-Kwan, C/S AIR FORCE - LTGEN Chang Chi-Ryang, COMMANDANT, MARCORPS - LTGEN Kang Ki-chun</p> | | | | |
| MAJOR FORCE OBJECTIVES | | TOTAL COUNTRY FORCES | COMBAT CAPABILITY | |
| ARMY - | 18 INF DIV, 3 RES DIV, 7 RES REAR AREA SECURITY DIV, 10 TANK BNS, 1 SP FORCES GP, 2 NIKE BNS, 3 HAWK BNS, 6 8" HOW BNS, 10 MED ARTY BNS, 33 ENCR CBT BN, | 19 INF DIV, 3 RES DIV, 7 RES REAR AREA SECURITY DIV, 10 TANK BNS, 1 SP FORCES GP, 1 NIKE BN, 2 HAWK BN, 6 8" HOW BNS, 10 MED ARTY BNS, 31 ENCR CBT BNS. | MAINTAIN INTERNAL SECURITY AND EFFECTIVELY REPEL AGGRESSION FROM NORTH KOREA, ASSUMING ADEQUATE LOGISTIC & AIR SUPPORT FROM OUTSIDE SOURCES. | |
| NAVY | 9 DD/DE, 19 PC, 9 PGM, 16 PTF, 1 SEAL UNIT, 1 LSMR, 20 MSC, 2 APD, 12 LST, 12 LSM, 1 MAR DIV, 1 ISLAND SEC UNIT. | 7 DD/DE, 19 PC, 2 PGM, 4 PTF, 1 SEAL UNIT, 1 LSMR, 10 MSC, 2 APD, 8 LST, 11 LSM, 1 MAR DIV, 1 MAR BDE, 1 ISLAND SEC UNIT. | WITH THE EXCEPTION OF MINE COUNTERMEASURES THE ABILITY OF THE ROK NAVY TO PERFORM ITS ASSIGNED MISSION IS CONSIDERED SATISFACTORY. THE ROK MARINES ARE CONSIDERED CAPABLE OF PROVIDING REINF BN SIZE LANDING FORCES FOR AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULT OPNS OR LARGER SIZED FORCES, IF LIFT & OTHER SUPPORT IS MADE AVAILABLE. | |
| AIR FORCE | 2 AWX SQN, 8 AC&W UNITS, 8 FS SQN, 1 RECON SQN, 1 TAC CONTROL SQN, 1 HELO SQN. | 2 F-86D SQN, 8 AC&W UNITS, 5 F-86F SQN, 3 F-5 SQN, 1 TAC CONTROL SQN, 1 HELO SQN. | FORCES IN BEING OPERATIONALLY READY TO SUPPORT GROUND OPERATIONS, AND CONDUCT VFR AIR AND LIMITED A/W DEFENSE MISSIONS. | |

② 2 ROK DIVISION, 1 ROKMC BDE PLUS SUPPORTING FORCES IN SVN

SOURCE: PACOM Digest, Nov 67, p. 135.

Construction of a Korean DMZ Barrier Fence

(S) In January 1967, the following status of the project to construct a barrier fence along the 166 miles of DMZ across the Korean peninsula was given:

As of the end of 1967 there have been 445 incidents of all types along the DMZ as compared to 37 incidents reported in 1966. . . . While the recorded increase of incidents for 1967 may be attributed to a more aggressive attitude by the North Koreans, it also may be due in part to increased alertness and improved detection equipment along the new anti-infiltration barrier system now being installed. . . . The barrier system consists of a fence across the width of the Korean peninsula bordering the DMZ and backed up in a number of areas by prepared positions. The basic concept of the system involves: a fence to hamper North Koreans infiltration, manned positions along the fence to detect them, and finally back-up Quick Reaction Forces (QRE). . . . The barrier fence in the ROKA sector will be constructed primarily of chain-link and woven barbed-wire. Posts have been sunk for 50 miles of chain-link material; however, more wire posts and reinforcing pipes are still needed. Construction is expected to be completed prior to the start of the 'agent season' next spring.¹

(S) Earlier, on 13 September 1967, the CG, Eighth U.S. Army, explained to CINCUSARPAC the concept of this "improved physical barrier" of chain-link fencing and woven barbed wire, resulting in fences that are "8-foot high, with steel or concrete posts, barbed wire yoke on top and the fence bottom is firmly anchored in the ground."² At the same time, he also requested "service funds in the amount of one million dollars and the authority to procure offshore the needed materials to permit construction of 50 miles of new fence by 1 Dec 67"³

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1. Cdr A. P. Semeraro, USN, Hq CINCPAC, "North Korean Threat in DMZ Area," PACOM Intelligence Digest, No. 2-68, 19 Jan 68, p. 2.
 2. CGUSAEIGHT 82967/130935Z Sep 67.
 3. Ibid.; Unless otherwise cited, the following discussion of the Korean DMZ Barrier Fence has been derived from: J4 History, Hq CINCPAC, Nov 67; Telcon, LtCol William D. Miner, USAF, MAP Br, J4, Hq CINCPAC, with Mr. Strobridge, Senior Historian, CINCPAC HistBr, 30 Jan 68.

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(A) CINCUSARPAC concurred in the barrier fence concept and requested DA's assistance on 3 October in securing the necessary money. In reply, DA said that this construction of "barrier installations and detection equipment is a military assistance mission" and, therefore, "MAP funding is proper," since DA funds could not be utilized for this purpose.¹ On 16 October, CINCPAC recommended to the JCS that "service funds be made available to reimburse the Eighth US Army in order that procurement of materials may be immediately initiated."²

(S) In order to provide an interim solution to expedite the erection of the DMZ barrier fence pending a final determination of the source of funding, however, the following actions were taken. On 21 October, CINCPAC informed CINCUSARPAC that "172,000 lineal feet of 8 foot chain link fence and related fittings are in hands of USARV and are above current military needs" and requested him to "take action to transfer USARV held resources to fulfill urgent requirements of CG Eighth in Korea."³ On 5 November, CINCPAC submitted to the Secretary of Defense a deviation to the FY 68 Korea MAP in the amount of \$505,242 "to provide funds for construction of 50 mile segment fence along Korea DMZ."⁴ He had already made a recommendation the JCS about a week earlier for the reimbursement of the FY 68 Korea MAP from service funds and for the transfer of the fence materials in South Vietnam to Korea on a non-reimbursable basis.⁵

(S) The Secretary of Defense approved the CINCPAC-suggested FY 68 Korea MAP deviation on 20 November 1967.⁶ The next day, DA notified CINCPAC that CINCUSARPAC had been directed to arrange for the shipment of the excess fence material from Vietnam to Korea on a non-reimbursable basis and that authority had been granted for the continuance of required supply actions.⁷ These fence materials reached Korea on 25 November 1967. At the close of the year, no decision had yet been made regarding the reimbursement of FY 68 Korea MAP.

Offshore Procurement - Korea

(S) On 26 August 1966, the Secretary of Defense approved continued

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1. DA 835187/052155Z Oct 67.
 2. CINCPAC 161817Z Oct 67.
 3. CINCPAC 212339Z Oct 67.
 4. CINCPAC 052240Z Nov 67.
 5. CINCPAC 270303Z Oct 67.
 6. SECDEF 3218/202033Z Nov 67.
 7. DA 840666/210012Z Nov 67.

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planning by COMUSKOREA for suspension of the MAPT Program in FY 68, but he stipulated that no indication be given to the ROK Government that the U.S. was prepared to continue the offshore procurement (OSP) of MAPT suspended items after FY 67.¹ By 1 December 1966, however, COMUSKOREA felt that a decision was necessary regarding offshore procurement to permit finalization of the FY 68 Program. He gave his rationale and outlined specific items concerned in a message to CINCPAC and requested "MAP order ASAP and authority to submit requisitions pending receipt."²

(S) Five days later, in a message to higher headquarters, CINCPAC concurred in COMUSKOREA's request and recommended an early approval in order to permit timely planning for calendar year 1967 by the ROK Government and by the U.S. Country Team, Korea. When no reply had come by 20 January 1967, CINCPAC queried the Secretary of Defense as to when an answer could be expected to the "requested early approval of COMUSK's request to continue offshore procurement for FY 68 of commercial consumables originally scheduled for transfer to ROK Defense Budget."³

(S) The Secretary of Defense still had not made a decision by 10 April 1967. On this date, the U.S. Ambassador to Korea, Winthrop G. Brown, sent a strongly worded message to him, noting that COMUSKOREA's request of 1 December 1966 for FY 68 OSP authority still remained unanswered, although supported by the two CINCPAC messages. Meanwhile, FY 68 was rapidly approaching and a decision was needed to permit COMUSKOREA to plan a firm FY 68 Program. In the ambassador's opinion, "continuation of major ROK contribution in Vietnam makes it essential that we renew our commitment to buy in Korea those commercial consumables originally scheduled for transfer to the ROK Defense Budget in FY 66 and 67.... Political repercussions if OSP halted would be immediate and damaging to our overall interests."⁴ As a result, he strongly urged that "FY 68 OSP authority be granted as quickly as possible."⁵

(S) Again, on 27 April 1967, CINCPAC dispatched a message to the Secretary of Defense, reaffirming:

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1. SECDEF 1124/262014Z Aug 66.
 2. COMUSKOREA UK 56873/010340Z Dec 66; J5 History, Hq CINCPAC, Apr 67.
 3. CINCPAC 200418Z Jan 67; J5 History, Hq CINCPAC, Apr 67.
 4. AMEMB Seoul 5400/100830Z Apr 67.
 5. Ibid.

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...urgent requirement for affirmative determination in this matter. The suspension of the MAP Transfer Program in FY 68 is a continuation of a portion of the Quid Pro Quo agreement for the dispatch of the second division of ROK forces in Vietnam. It is considered essential to continue that part of the same agreement relating to OSP authority.¹

Not until 26 May, however, did the Secretary of Defense approve and authorize the notification of the ROK Government of the continuance in FY 68 of OSP in Korea for the same types and amounts of commercial consumables that were authorized for OSP in FY 67.² Three significant qualifications were imposed however: (1) FY 68 OSP was limited to \$11.5 million, and then only if a like amount of dollars was reduced from other Pacific OSP; (2) this procurement was to be within the FY 68 MAP level and to the extent that these items otherwise qualified for OSP under DOD Directive 2125.1; and (3) no justification existed to add to the OSP list items previously scheduled for transfer in FY 68, since such additions would set a precedent for future escalation of OSD expectations for the ROK Government.

In addition, CINCPAC was requested to furnish recommendations for offsetting the reductions in Pacific OSP to compensate for the \$11.5 million earmarked for Korea OSP during FY 68. In his reply to the Secretary of Defense on 3 June 1967, CINCPAC noted that a "survey indicates that MAP dollars involved in OSP in the PACOM area are minimal other than in Korea."³ Because OSP targets are established through service channels, and since DOD Instruction 7060.2, dated 26 August 1966, establishes procedures to control the overall balance of payments problem in DOD, CINCPAC recommended that the procedures outlined in paragraph XII of the instruction "be utilized to equitably apportion among the Services offsetting OSP reductions of \$11.5 million."⁴

On 11 August 1967, COMUSKOREA requested guidance from CINCPAC concerning OSP during FY 69 of items suspended in FY 66 and FY 67.⁵ CINCPAC, in turn, referred this request to the Secretary of Defense on 29 August. When the reply came on 7 September, the

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1. CINCPAC 272116Z Apr 67.
 2. SECDEF 453/262345Z May 67.
 3. CINCPAC 030511Z Jun 67.
 4. Ibid.
 5. COMUSKOREA UK 59725/111117Z Aug 67.

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Secretary granted authority to plan for continued suspension of MAPT Program in FY 69, but he warned that no "indication or commitment to ROKG will be made at this time that the USG is prepared to continue after FY 68 Off-Shore Procurement in Korea of any suspended MAP Transfer Program items."¹ For their information only, the Secretary told CINCPAC and COMUSKOREA that the U. S. expected to continue OSP of FY 66 and FY 67 items in FY 69; however, he did "not intend to seek formal approval here until April 1968."² Since a decision would not be forthcoming until after the end of the year, J5 planners had no further significant actions to take prior to the end of 1967 on this ~~action~~.³

Effectiveness of ROK Navy Destroyers

~~(S)~~ During the early part of 1967, several comments were made through channels about the need for additional destroyers by the Korean Navy to counter infiltration from North Korea.⁴ Typical of these messages was the one from Winthrop G. Brown, U. S. Ambassador to Korea, who stated that it was a:

...virtually unanimous conclusion among Koreans that ROK Navy ill-fitted to defend ROK against North Korean forces. Lack of ships, inadequate armament, slow speeds, and over-age condition was image of ROK Navy that emerged from recent discussions.⁵

~~(S)~~ Because these numerous comments, the Secretary of Defense asked CINCPAC on 21 March 1967 for "a chronology of the employment and effectiveness of the ROK Navy's DD-91 in countering infiltration."⁶ CINCPAC, in turn, passed this request on to the best qualified source to answer it.⁷ On 31 March 1967, COMUSKOREA replied in detail, furnishing a chronology of those days on patrol from the first of calendar year 1965 through the first quarter of 1967. Besides describing the two specific occasions when the Korean DD made successful contacts with known agent boats, he went on to state that:

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1. SECDEF 5710/072242Z Sep 67.
 2. Ibid.; J5 History, Hq CINCPAC, Aug 67.
 3. Intv, LtCol W.M. Warren, USA, MAP Br, J5, Hq CINCPAC, with Mr. Strobridge, Senior Historion, CINCPAC HistBr, 5 Jan 68.
 4. J5 History, Hq CINCPAC, Apr 67; AMEMB Seoul 4302/170255Z Feb 67; COMUSKOREA UK 57749/101020Z Mar 67; CINCPAC 150146Z Mar 67.
 5. AMEMB Seoul 4302/170255Z Feb 67.
 6. SECDEF 9488/212336Z Mar 67.
 7. CINCPAC 250226Z Mar 67.

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...effectiveness of DD as deterrent may be surmised from fact that no known agent landing has been effected on a particular coast during any period of time when DD-91 was on patrol off such coast. Thus second DD could increase deterrent as well as actual capability in that enemy's knowledge of presence of DD off one coast would not rule out possibility of another DD being on patrol off the other coast.¹

(U) CINCPAC passed this answer on to the Secretary of Defense with informational copies to the JCS, CINCUSARPAC, and ~~CINCPACFLT~~.² Since this 4 April 1967 message of the CINCPAC's, no further requests were received from the Secretary of Defense during the remainder of the year.³

Korean MAP Transfer Program - Financing

(S) "Under the MAP Transfer (MAPT) Program, Korea was to assume fiscal responsibility for a progressively larger share of the cost of commercial consumables for its Armed Forces."⁴ To encourage the dispatch of Korean troops to Vietnam, however, the U.S. agreed to a suspension of this program. As 1966 ended, one of CINCPAC's concerns was that "suspension beyond FY 68 would seriously degrade COMUS Korea's plans for force improvement and modernization."⁵

(S) This apprehension was seconded by the Country-Team on 14 June 1967, when the American Embassy at Seoul advised the State Department of the following:

Since continued suspension MAP Transfer Program in 1968 is having adverse impact on ROK Armed Forces modernization commitment and since suspension directly related to ROKG Military participation in Vietnam, Country Team recommends that financing of items in MAP Transfer program be from US Military Service Funds as a Vietnam Associated cost.⁶

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1. COMUSKOREA 310950Z Mar 67.
 2. CINCPAC 040243Z Apr 67.
 3. Intv, LtCol W.M. Warren, USA, MAP Br, J5, Hq CINCPAC, with Mr. Strobridge, Senior Historian, CINCPAC HistBr, 5 Jan 68.
 4. CINCPAC Command History 1966, p. 209.
 5. Ibid., p. 210.
 6. AMEMB Seoul 6685/140240Z Jun 67.

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(S) Even before the start of FY 68, CINCPAC had felt that MAP objectives were being eroded by cost increases in ammunition and equipment, as well as by the fact that, by absorbing the costs of the MAPT Program, a "point could possibly be reached at which the replacement of worn-out equipment would consume all funds programmed for force improvements."¹ For FY 68, the costs of the suspension would amount to \$18.1 million.² On 18 June 1967, therefore, CINCPAC notified the JCS that he concurred in the Country Team's recommendation for "Service funding of the Korean MAP Transfer Program."³

(S) The Secretary of Defense advised CINCPAC on 13 July 1967 that this recommendation was under consideration.⁴ About a month later, COMUSKOREA asked for guidance concerning the continued suspension of the MAPT Program in FY 69 for planning purposes.⁵ When queried by CINCPAC, the Secretary of Defense replied that COMUSKOREA was to plan on the basis that the MAPT Program would be suspended in FY 69.⁶ Also in August, the JCS recommended "that the Services be provided funds to finance the program and that they finance it beginning in FY 68."⁷ In November 1967, the Secretary of Defense made the decision not to service fund the MAPT Program at that time.⁸

Armed Forces Assistance to Korea (AFAK) Funding

(S) Since its initiation in 1953, AFAK has been a valuable public relations tool for the local U.S. commander. It has been used largely to finance small scale construction projects, such as school rooms, which have helped smooth relations with the indigenous population.⁹ At various times, AFAK has been funded by AID, MAP, and Won devised from Public Law (PL) 480, Title I, Sales. Funding for FY 66 and FY 67 had been

1. CINCPAC 180150Z Jun 67.
2. J5 History, Hq CINCPAC, Jun 67.
3. CINCPAC 180150Z Jun 67.
4. SECDEF 132237Z Jul 67.
5. COMUSKOREA UK 59725/111117Z Aug 67.
6. SECDEF 5710/072242Z Sep 67.
7. J5 History, Hq CINCPAC, Aug 67.
8. Ibid.; Intv, Ltcol W.M. Warren, USA, MAP Br, J5, Hq CINCPAC, with Mr. Strobridge, Senior Historian, CINCPAC HistBr, 5 Jan 68.
9. Incl. 5, Inter-Agency MAP Review, Fall 1967, CINCPAC Area to Memo for Record, Col Roy E. Eidson, USAF, J531, Head, Joint Plans & Policy Section, MAP Br, J5, Hq CINCPAC, 5 Oct 67, Subj: Annual MAP Review - Fall 1967. Hereafter, the basic Memo for Record will be cited as Col Eidson, M/R Fall MAP Review 1967.

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from the latter source. In response to ROKG objections concerning the use of funds from this source, the Secretary of Defense made a decision on 2 December 1966 that funding in FY 68 would be by the Korean MAP.¹

(C) On 9 January 1967, COMUSKOREA asked CINCPAC for guidance as to the procedure to be followed in funding for AFAK FY 68. Four days later, CINCPAC replied that a FY 68 AFAK Program of a maximum "of \$.5 million to be financed by MAP within current Table 36 dollar guidelines" had been approved.² He also advised COMUSKOREA that implementing instructions were being prepared by DOD, and that staffing would be expedited. On 21 January, CINCPAC provided to COMUSKOREA the guidance requested in this matter.³

(C) The Secretary of Defense authorized on 18 January 1967 the informing of the ROK Government that the funding for AFAK in FY 68 would be from other than PL 480, but advised against disclosing the fact that MAP would be the source of the funds.⁴ In the FY 68 MA Plan, COMUSKOREA actually programmed \$.276 million for AFAK.⁵

(C) During the Annual Fall MAP Review of 1967, CINCPAC "reemphasized the desirability of the program as a public relations tool for the U.S. Eight Army and recommended service funding."⁶ He also made the point that even a relatively modest AFAK program should not be financed from the austere Korea MAP, while "AID underscored the undesirability of seeking funding as in the past from currency jointly controlled by the U.S. and the Koreans."⁷ Although the Bureau of Budget (BOB) questioned the necessity of special legislative authority for service funding, the decision was to establish the necessity for such legislation. Following this fall

1. CINCPAC MA Plan for Korea FY 68-73, Vol. I, p. E-7; Intv, LtCol W. M. Warren, USA, MAP Br, J5, Hq CINCPAC, with Mr. Strobridge, Senior Historian, CINCPAC HistBr, 9 Feb 68.
2. CINCPAC 130146Z Jan 67; J5 History, Hq CINCPAC, Jan 67.
3. CINCPAC 210241Z Jan 67.
4. SECDEF 3996/182335Z Jan 67.
5. CINCPAC MA Plan for Korea FY 68-73, Vol. I, p. E-7.
6. Encl. 1, Summary CINCPAC Portion of MAP Annual Review, Fall 1967, to Memo for Record, Capt Walter C. Klein, USN, Head, Central & NEA Plans & Program Section, MAP Br, J5, Hq CINCPAC, 10 Oct 67; Subj: Annual MAP Review - Fall 1967. Hereafter, the basic Memo for Record will be cited as Capt Klein, M/R Fall MAP Review 1967.
7. Ibid.; Incl. 5 to Col Eidson, M/R Fall MAP Review 1967.

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review, nothing of significance developed concerning AFAK for the remainder of the calendar year.¹

MAP Planning Guidance - Korea

~~(S)~~ In April 1967, CINCPAC changed Part I of the CINCPAC Military Assistance Manual (MAM) concerning planning guidance for FY 68 Korea MAP. His message to COMUSKOREA on 20 April, amended six days later, was based on a verbatim quote of Part I of the DOD MAM, dated 10 April 1967, and was an interim directive pending publication of the final FY 68 CINCPAC MAM:


MAP planning over the next five years should aim at maintaining ROK air and naval forces at about their current size and at reducing army ground forces from 18 to 15 divisions (a cut of about 87,000 men). The deployment by the ROK Government of 45,000 troops to South Vietnam makes it unlikely that ROK force deductions can be pressed in the near-term; moreover, we should avoid any U.S. actions which would call into question our commitments to Korea during the period of open conflict in Vietnam. However, a MAP program designed to continue the modernization of 15 Army divisions, the Navy and the Air Force now, and to work toward a reduction from 18 Army divisions as circumstances permit, is consistent with these political considerations. Accordingly, beginning in FY 69, MAP planning should be based upon providing investment items for an ROK Army ground force of 15 divisions (13,000 men per division) and operations and maintenance items for the currently authorized level. MAP planning should assume that ROKFV redeploying to Korea should have full TE, and attrited equipment is being replaced in RVN by the U.S.²

~~(S)~~ Actually, this guidance pertaining to a reduction of three Korean active infantry divisions had been part of the CINCPAC Supplement to the DOD MAM for FY 67, so this concept was not new. The FY 68 wording was somewhat modified, however, and the instructions to begin planning the reduction in FY 69 was new.

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1. Intv, LtCol W.M. Warren, USA, MAP Br, J5, Hq CINCPAC, with Mr. Strobridge, Senior Historian, CINCPAC HistBr, 5 Jan 68.
 2. CINCPAC 200035Z Apr 67; CINCPAC 262240Z Apr 67; J5 History Hq CINCPAC, Apr 67.

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(S) On 25 April, CINCUSARPAC acknowledged that the MAP programming actions would be based on 15 ROKA divisions because of the Secretary of Defense's desire, despite the force level of 18 active and 3 ready reserve divisions specified in Annex J or JSOP 69-76. He recommended, however, "that action be taken through joint channels to seek a modification" to the MAM.¹ What he wanted was the incorporation, at least, of the planning assumption for guidance purposes that a "cut of three active ROKA divisions would call for an increase of three ready reserve divisions to a new total of six."²



(S) Giving a rationale similar to that of [redacted] CINCUNC/COMUSKOREA strongly recommended on 29 April 1967 that CINCPAC not implement his new guidance, since this action "will be unwise and will produce such damage to US/ROK relations, US/ROK cooperation in Vietnam and the potential for increased ROK forces for Vietnam as to outweigh any advantages which would accrue from changing the MAP planning and programming force structure base for ROKA before the settlement of the war in Vietnam."⁵ Six days later, CINCUSARPAC

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1. CINCUSARPAC GPOP-PL 11249/250502Z Apr 67.
 2. Ibid.
 3. [redacted]
 4. Ibid.; J5 History, Hq, CINCPAC, Apr 67.
 5. CINCUNC/COMUSKOREA UK-58507/290647Z Apr 67.

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supported this viewpoint by recommending to CINCPAC that no change be made "until end of the Vietnam war can be more accurately forecast."¹

(S) On 5 May, CINCPAC replied to both [redacted] and CINCUNC/COMUSKOREA, with an information copy going to CINCUSARPAC, stating that he recognized and appreciated their views, but that he was fully cognizant of the political implications involved in this matter.² Earlier on 18 February, he had recommended to the JCS that the MAP plans in the draft DOD MAM should not be "built on the assumption that the war in Vietnam will terminate by FY 69," but this reclama had not been accepted.³ CINCPAC further pointed out in his message of 5 May 1967 that the proposed reduction was similar to last year's guidance and this year's final DOD MAM guidance; he cautioned both the Ambassador and CINCUNC/COMUSKOREA that all echelons should do everything possible to prevent any untimely disclosures of this guidance to the Korean Government.

(S) On the same day, the 5th, CINCPAC broached the subject of Ready Reserve Divisions with the JCS. "In order to alleviate the political and military effects of planning for the possible reduction of three active ROKA infantry divisions," his message read, "CINCPAC proposes to plan to convert them to three Ready Reserve Divisions in the time frame FY 70-72. This action is predicated on the MAM guidance assumption that the conflict in Vietnam will terminate by FY 69."⁴ CINCPAC had first originated this possibility of converting three active ROKA divisions to Ready Reserve ones on 1 October 1966, when he directed COMUSKOREA to do a study on "MAP Transfer on the FY 72 Shortfall;" he repeated it again on 31 October 1966 in a message to the Office of the Secretary of Defense, when he stated that it was "based on projected security and political situations in ROK."⁵ Neither the JCS or the Defense Department had challenged this CINCPAC proposal as of May 1967, although they possessed documents setting it forth.

(S) In his message of 5 May 1967, CINCPAC concluded that his proposed action:

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1. CINCUSARPAC GPOP-PL 12541/030408 May 67.
 2. J5 History, Hq CINCPAC, Apr 67.
 3. Ibid.; CINCPAC 182220Z Feb 67.
 4. CINCPAC 050217Z May 67.
 5. CINCPAC 012013Z Oct 66; CINCPAC 311900Z Oct 66.

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...would result in planning for fifteen ROKA infantry divisions and six Ready Reserve Divisions in FY 72 for a total of twenty-one. JSOP objectives are eighteen ROKA infantry divisions and three Ready Reserve divisions, also a total of twenty-one. Recommend JCS approval.¹

(S) On 24 May 1967, the Secretary of State dispatched a joint State/Defense/AID message in reply to the 27 April one of [REDACTED] which, according to the JCS, "eliminates necessity for action" on CINCPAC's proposal of converting three divisions from active to ready reserve.² This joint message expressed appreciation over [REDACTED] concern over MAP planning guidance and went on to state that:

MAM language differs very little from that of previous year, which also anticipated reduction from 18 to 15 active divisions as soon as Viet-Nam situation permits. Viet-Nam situation and ROKG participation therein remain overriding considerations and MAP planning assumptions will have to be reviewed annually to take into account these and other factors mentioned in [REDACTED]. As practical matter, when Korean troops are no longer required in Viet-Nam, overall ROKA force level must be brought down to 18 divisions. Further reductions would be made gradually. For FY 69, MAM guidance specifies MAP planning should be based on providing operating and maintenance support for currently authorized level (i. e., all authorized forces in Korea) but stipulates that investment planning be based on 15 divisions ROKA force. This investment planning appears prudent in view presently limited investment funds and longer range MAP goal of reduced forces. As indicated by O & M support level specified, no planning date has been established for beginning of actual force reductions but investment guidance does preclude buildup of investment items which may be superfluous when reductions become feasible.³

(S) The JCS notified CINCPAC on 5 June 1967 that the Chief of Staff, Army (CSA), had send them a memorandum concerning MAP planning guidance for ROKA. This memorandum suggested that "JCS

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1. CINCPAC 050217Z May 67.
 2. JCS 261829Z May 67.
 3. State 200314/240035Z May 67.

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bring to the attention of SECDEF the apparent difference in Korea MAP guidance between the Draft Presidential Memo and the MAM.¹ Specifically, CSA proposed that the JCS send a memorandum to the Secretary of Defense recommending that "MAP planning over the next five years should aim at maintaining ROK ground, air and naval forces at about their current size."² CINCPAC's comments and recommendations were solicited on this proposal by the JCS.

(S) CINCPAC responded within four days, stating that his "comments and recommendations...are in consonance with the proposals of the CSA Memo."³ On 6 July, the JCS forwarded a memorandum to the Secretary of Defense, recommending the deletion of that portion of MAM guidance for Korea directing that, beginning in FY 69, investment items should be programmed for only 15 ROKA divisions. Final approval of this JCS recommendation was made on 19 July 1967 by the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA).

Providing Ships for the Korean Navy

(S) Last year, the ROK Navy (ROKN) "demonstrated that it had passed a major milestone when its Naval Shipyard at Chinha successfully activated two MAP-provided high-speed transports (APD's) in two months' time."⁴ Since these ships were equipped with five-inch guns and anti-submarine equipment, they were capable of participating in patrol and ASW operations. To date, MAP has produced a ROKN "capable of controlling waters adjacent to the Republic of Korea (ROK) during a limited war involving North Korean Forces."⁵ This capability has lessened the requirements of the U.S. Seventh Fleet, as well as increased ROKN's compatibility with the U.S. fleet in any combined contingency operations.

(S) Late in November 1966, the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) agreed to the early activation of three APDs in substitution for three destroyer escorts (DEs) programmed for FY 68. Following receipt of FY 68 MAP funding, arrangements would be made for towing these ships across the Pacific to Korea, where they would be activated, overhauled, and modernized. The necessary program changes were submitted by

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1. JCS 7085/052127Z Jun 67.
 2. Ibid.
 3. CINCPAC 090356Z Jun 67; J5 History, Hq CINCPAC, Jul 67.
 4. Journal MA, Dec 66, p. 177.
 5. CINCPAC MA Plan for Korea FY 68-73, Volume I, p. C-2-1.

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CINCPAC to ASD/ISA on 10 January 1967.¹

(S) Nine days later, PCE-56 of the Korean Navy was lost, when it was fired upon by North Korean "shore batteries while attempting to round up South Korean fishing craft which had drifted north of the seaward extension of the cease-fire line."² This incident exacerbated the feelings of both the ROKG and the Korean public in general about the capabilities of the ROKN. In addition, it heightened the Koreans' desire for more destroyers (DDs) in particular.

(S) During February, officials from the American Embassy had several conversations with ROK officials in the Ministry of National Defense (MND). Both military and political concern was expressed by the MND over the ROKN and its need for additional destroyers, ranging from three to 10. American Embassy officials explained the difficulties of procuring additional DDs through MAP, especially the legislative problems in securing ship loan authorization for destroyers. The ROKN has one DD and another one was planned for inclusion in the FY 72 MAP, which would mean delivery sometime in 1974, if the U.S. Congress approved this measure. Although several messages emanated from Seoul during March, probably the most important was the one on the 10th from COMUSKOREA, which discussed the DD requirement at length and recommended that the second DD be delivered in FY 68 and funded over and above the projected FY 68 Korea MAP. The message also set forth the Country Team's position:

... that prompt action by US on second DD is justified and would demonstrate to ROKG our sympathetic understanding of their political and defense problem. Should this be approved, early announcement that US Congressional authority is being sought would not only ease this problem but do much to affect ROK attitudes on retaliation for North Korean attacks.³

(S) About this time, the Korean Prime Minister and Minister of National Defense were planning a visit to Washington, D.C. CINCPAC, after querying CINCPACFLT, who had recommended an additional DD in FY 68 and that immediate funding be provided for the three APDS,

1. J5 History, Hq CINCPAC, Mar 67.

2. Ibid.; Journal MA, Jun 67, p. 142.

3. COMUSKOREA UK 57749/101020Z Mar 67; J5 History, Hq CINCPAC, Mar 67.

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replied to COMUSKOREA on 8 March 1967. "In view fact provisions of DD requires Congressional approval, U. S. commitment on DD would not be possible during forthcoming Prime Minister's visit," read the message, however, a commitment to deliver the three APDs would be possible, as well as an appropriate fall back position, during the visit.¹ Although COMUSKOREA felt that the APDs were no substitute for a DD, he admitted that activation in-country was feasible and that the necessary funding could be accomplished if political reasons necessitated an early delivery of the APDs. On 15 March, CINCPAC concurred in and amplified for the consideration of the JCS the Korea Country Team position that another additional DD was desirable for ROKN.²

~~(S)~~ During their March 1967 visits to Washington, D. C. , both the Korean Prime Minister and the Minister of National Defense indicated their need for at least two more DDs, but said that even one more would help. Neither Secretary McNamara nor Secretary Rusk expressed any hopes for the additional DDs, primarily because of inability to secure Congressional approval. Instead of another DD, suggested the Secretary of Defense, he would send three APDs before the end of the year. These the Korean Minister of National Defense wanted, but he encouraged Secretary McNamara to continue his efforts in securing the DD. On 31 March, CINCPAC directed COMUSKOREA to deviate the FY 68 Korea MAP to accommodate the three APDs, which was accomplished on 7 April 1967.³

~~(S)~~ On 28 March 1967, the Secretary of Defense notified CINCPAC that "on 21 March the House Armed Services Committee, in executive session, reported out favorably the CY 1966 ship loan extension bill with an amendment authorizing the loan of one additional destroyer for Korea."⁴ Moreover, regardless of final Congressional action, Secretary McNamara warned that the FY 67 and FY 68 Korea MAP ceilings would not be raised to accommodate the activation of the DD. He also indicated that the Korean Government should be informed of this fact. In conclusion, CINCPAC was directed "to review your current program priorities to ascertain how and when the activation of an additional destroyer could be accomplished within program ceilings."⁵

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1. CINCPAC 082155Z Mar 67.
 2. CINCPAC 150146Z Mar 67.
 3. Point Paper, J5331, Hq CINCPAC, 8 May 67, Subj: MAP Problems - Korean Navy.
 4. SECDEF 1181/282053Z Mar 67.
 5. Ibid.

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(S) Three days later, CINCPAC requested COMUSKOREA to deviate "FY 67 MAP to provide funds for in-country activation of 3 APD's" and recommended "DD be considered for FY 68 programming during current update of the MA Plan."¹ Meanwhile, in view of recent CINCPAC and Defense Department messages, COMUSKOREA had been conducting trade-off analyses to arrive at an optimum mix of program capabilities. On 1 April 1967, he requested more information concerning three options: delivery of DD in fully operational status; activation in Korea; austere activation in CONUS.² Since CHMAAG China had recently been involved in the activation of a DD for the ROC Navy, it was arranged for this experience data to be furnished to COMUSKOREA. On 7 April, COMUSKOREA forwarded his requirements and accompanying considerations with regard to the introduction of 3 APDs and a possible DD into the ROKN.

(S) Earlier, on 24 March, Secretary McNamara requested CINCPAC's comment on the ceiling adjustments necessary to assure the delivery of the three APDs in the summer of 1967. CINCPAC replied on 12 April stating that "a \$2.9 million program deviation was being submitted by AUTODIN and airmail to cover in-country activation of three APD's of plus counter-infiltration items."³

(S) The CNO gave CINCPAC on 14 April his views on both the advantages and disadvantages of the five possible alternatives for activating the DD and concluded that "full activation/overhaul of destroyer in CONUS most feasible alternative."⁴ Five days later, CINCPAC passed on to COMUSKOREA this data furnished by CNO and requested "advise desired programming of DD and comment on possible FY 68 acquisition of APA and AKA."⁵ CINCPACFLT had already advised against any in-country activation of a DD and had recommended that favorable consideration be given to programming at least one cargo ship, attack (AKA) and one attack transport (APA), using Maritime Administration excesses.

(S) When COMUSKOREA replied to CINCPAC's request on 1 May 1967, he stated that he "does desire to program an additional destroyer as soon as possible (hopefully in FY 68), an APA in FY 69 or FY 70 and an AKA or an LSD later in the plan period, depending on priority of other requirements

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1. CINCPAC 310140Z Mar 67.
 2. J5 History, Hq CINCPAC, Apr 67; COMUSKOREA UK 58027/011030Z Apr 67.
 3. J5 History, Hq CINCPAC, Apr 67.
 4. CNO 141904Z Apr 67.
 5. CINCPAC 190307Z Apr 67; J5 History, Hq CINCPAC, Apr 67.

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and fund limitations. "¹ A strict interpretation of CINCPAC's MAP planning guidance, he continued, would appear to eliminate from Korea MAP objectives the second DD, as well as other ships, such as the AKA and APA. His final decision, therefore, would have to wait upon the results of his "reclama of 29 April, which recommended that CINCPAC's FY 68 MAP Planning Guidance not be implemented at this time so that Planning/Programming can continue to be based on objectives established by Annex J, JSOP," or receipt of more explicit planning guidance.² CINCPAC issued the requested explicit planning guidance to COMUSKOREA on 9 May to assist him in making his final decisions on investment programs for ROKN.³

(S) By September 1967, the three APDs had been withdrawn from the U. S. Navy Atlantic Reserve Fleet and towed to Korea, where they were being reactivated at the ROKN's Chinhae Naval Shipyard. They had been provided to Korea under essentially the same terms as the two of the previous year, i. e., the ships, as well as some supplies and materials, were provided under MAP funding, but the actual reactivation was being done in a ROKN shipyard with Korean-provided labor and some Korea-provided materials. "Under this arrangement, the cost to the MAP is significantly less than what it would have been if the reactivation had been carried out in U.S. shipyards; in addition, it serves to aid the ROKN in its efforts to attain eventual logistic self-sufficiency."⁴

(S) In the last quarter of 1967, the possibility of Korea obtaining a APA on loan arose, only to be decided against later. CNO opened the question for J5 planners on 24 October, when a message of his reported that CINCPACFLT had recommended consideration of the loan of APA-45 to ROKN on an as-is/where-is basis upon deactivation from the U. S. Navy.⁵ Following a meeting of CINCPACFLT and CINCPAC representatives at Camp H. M. Smith, it was estimated that \$1.3 million would be required for immediate repairs in CONUS, which it was not possible to get from FY 68 Korea MAP funds, and it was also estimated that an in-country overhaul would cost MAP approximately \$500,000.⁶

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1. COMUSKOREA UK 58516/010925Z May 67
 2. Ibid.; Point Paper, J5331, Hq CINCPAC, 8 May 67, Subj: MAP Problems - Korean Navy; J5 History, Hq CINCPAC, May 67.
 3. CINCPAC 090151Z May 67.
 4. Journal MA, Sep 67, p. 159.
 5. CNO 241729Z Oct 67.
 6. CINCPACFLT 271747Z Oct 67.

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On 29 October, CINCPAC requested COMUSKOREA's views on obtaining APA-45 for ROKN on an "expedited action" basis.¹

(S) Four days later came COMUSKOREA's reply, with four excellent reasons against the proposal:

A. Korea MAP FY 68 Funds not available to accomplish most urgent work in CONUS....

B. Chichae dry dock unable accomodate ship of this size.

C. Chinhae Shipyard only marginally capable of accepting large additional workload without adverse impact on other programs. Ship cannot be made operational in reasonable time and may therefore be political liability.

D. Large continuing O&M costs not acceptable in view other urgent funding requirements.²

(S) CINCPAC concurred with COMUSKOREA's reasoning. On 2 November 1967, he notified both CNO and CINCPACFLT that he felt that "loan of APA 45 to ROKN should not be considered at this time."³ By year's end, no new developments had arisen on this topic.⁴

Funding for a U.S. Proposal Concerning Equipment for Korea

(S) "Some 46,000 capable Korean troops, including two full combat divisions," reported the Secretary of Defense on 11 April 1967 before a Congressional Committee, "are now in Vietnam fighting side by side with our own forces and the South Vietnamese."⁵ In an attempt to obtain more of these effective troops, as well as to demonstrate to the world the support of American allies for the fight against communism in Vietnam, negotiations were entered into with Korean officials in the fall of 1967.

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1. CINCPAC 290047Z Oct 67.
 2. COMUSKOREA UK 50645/010935Z Nov 67.
 3. CINCPAC 021932Z Nov 67.
 4. Intv, LtCol Wilbur B. Warren, III, USA, MAP Br, J5, Hq CINCPAC, with Mr. Strobridge, Senior Historian, CINCPAC HistBr, 17 Jan 68.
 5. SECDEF 11 Apr 67 MAP Statement.

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The U.S. goal was to secure another Korean infantry division for deployment to Vietnam.¹

~~(S)~~ These negotiations proceeded in a relatively low key until President Johnson and the President of Korea, Chung Hee Park, met for a luncheon while both were in Canberra, Australia. At this meeting on 21 December 1967, President Johnson committed himself to a response by the first of the year concerning the Korean President's equipment requests, as well as the most rapid possible delivery of the equipment finally agreed upon by both parties.

~~(S)~~ On 31 December 1967, the position of the U.S. government on the equipment request was transmitted to the American Embassy at Seoul. On the same day, the State Department gave CINCPAC instructions on how the various items were to be funded. The implication was that action to fund those items offered to Korea would be taken following the ROKG acceptance of the U.S. proposal. As the year 1967 closed, no action had yet been taken by the Koreans.

UH-1D Helicopters for ROKAF

~~(S)~~ In the FY 67 Korea MAP, there were six UH-1Ds scheduled for the ROKAF Search and Rescue (SAR) Squadron---this marked the initial programming of UH-1Ds. Because of other pressing requirements for this type aircraft, this scheduling was only tentative, with four possibly becoming available prior to the end of 1967 and the remaining two in the early part of 1968. This Korean SAR squadron, however, had a secondary mission of supporting isolated AC&W sites; unfortunately, the MAP-provided/redistributed UH-19s possessed by the ROKAF were not only becoming rapidly obsolete, but did not have sufficient range and performance to allow adequate search and rescue missions, let alone support the new AC&W sites located on remote mountain tops. As early as 14 July 1966, the Chief of Staff, Air Force (CSAF), was advising CINCPAC that the Eighth U.S. Army, which normally supported the AC&W sites, was unable to provide adequate support and recommending that early delivery be made of two UH-1Ds to ROKAF.²

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1. The following account of this U.S. proposal was derived from:
J5 History, Hq CINCPAC, Dec 67; Intv, LtCol Wilbur B. Warren, III, USA, MAP Br, J5, Hq CINCPAC, with Mr. Strobridge, Senior Historian, CINCPAC HistBr, 18 Jan 68.
 2. Journal MA, Dec 66, p. 177; J5 History, Hq CINCPAC, Feb 67;
Journal MA, Jun 67, p. 144; CSAF AFSMS 81638/141948Z Jul 66.

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(S) When queried by CINCPAC about this potential danger, COMUSKOREA replied that no need existed for an expedited delivery, since the Eighth U.S. Army could and would provide backup helicopter support to the remote AC&W sites. CINCPAC passed this information on to CSAF on 9 August 1966. Towards the end of November, however, CSAF was expressing his concern to CINCPAC that U.S. helicopter support could be provided to the sites only on an emergency basis and was asking for CINCPAC's solution to adequate support for the AC&W installations during the coming winter.¹

(S) In response to another query by CINCPAC, COMUSKOREA re-evaluated the capability of the Eighth U.S. Army to provide backup helicopter support to remote sites during the winter and concluded that, because of a shortage of aircrews, there would be a shortfall in this area. Therefore, he recommended on 7 November 1966 the expedited delivery of a minimum of two UH-1Ds to ROKAF. On 28 November, CINCPAC concurred in COMUSKOREA's recommendation and requested the support of the JCS to obtain fulfillment of it. The JCS approved this request and "recommended to the Secy of Defense that four UH-1D helicopters be delivered to ROKAF not later than 31 Dec 67."² Earlier delivery was not considered possible, because of the high priority that COMUSMACV helicopter requirements had, but a continuing effort was made throughout early 1967 to insure an advanced delivery date prior to the onset of the severe winter weather conditions, which was successfully accomplished.

(S) "The remaining four helicopters," scheduled to move by surface ship, would not have reached Korea until January 1968.³ Since 31 December 1967 was considered as an "inviolable date for delivery to ROKAF," the CSAF arranged for the helicopters to be airlifted.⁴ Two of these aircraft arrived in Korea on 17 December, and the other two came six days later, making the last delivery well within the time limit established by the Secretary of Defense.⁵

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1. CINCPAC 160446Z Jul 66; COMUSKOREA UK 55799/020155Z Aug 66; CINCPAC 092331Z Aug 66; CSAF AFCCS 81905/251637Z Oct 66.
 2. CINCPAC 290122Z Oct 66; COMUSKOREA UK 5666/070820Z Nov 66; CINCPAC 282241Z Nov 66; JCS 5745/081555Z Feb 67; Intv, LtCol Wilbur B. Warren, III, USA, MAP Br, J5, Hq CINCPAC, with Mr. Strobbridge, Senior Historian, CINCPAC HistBr, 17 Jan 68.
 3. AFLC 301948Z Nov 67; J4 History, Hq CINCPAC, Dec 67.
 4. CSAF 012305Z Dec 67.
 5. 6146 AFADVSYGP 220730Z Dec 67; 6146 AFADVSYGP 280030Z Dec 67.

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UH-1D Helicopters for ROKA

(S) Since August of 1966, COMUSKOREA has repeatedly requested the expedited delivery of UH-1D helicopters to ROKA. The initial programming of these turbine-powered helicopters for ROKA came on the 26th of August, when he submitted a proposed deviation to the FY 67 Service-funded Modernization Package, which would substitute three UH-1Bs for communication equipment and war reserve ammunition. CINCPAC came back on 2 September with a request of additional justification for the proposed deviation, as well as a suggestion that UH-1Ds be used to simplify logistical problems, since ROKAF were scheduled to receive this type of aircraft. On 10 September, COMUSKOREA provided further justification. He stated that the UH-1D type was acceptable, its use would give senior ROKA commanders a much-needed air mobility for command and control purposes, and that the eventual requirement would be 17 UH-1Ds for assignment to ROKA and Corps Headquarters.¹

(S) Since the proposed deviation represented the introduction of a new type major item into the ROKA, CINCPAC sought the approval of the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) on 10 October 1966 for submitting this deviation through proper channels. First off, he stated that the rationale provided by COMUSKOREA was sound, since the "rugged terrain and limited road net in ROK seriously hamper the exercise of command and control, and inhibit timely deployment of small counter-infiltration units."² Then, he concurred in Ambassador Brown's remarks "that ROKG is extremely sensitive concerning the U.S. commitment to provide substantial items of modernization to their armed forces" and that early "delivery of 3 medium helos would constitute visible evidence of U.S. intention to provide" this need.³ In a message to the JCS on 28 November, CINCPAC made the statement that he considered both the request for UH-1Ds for ROKA and one for similar type aircraft for ROKAF "of equal priority, but less than that for requirements of COMUSMACV and COMUSMAC THAI."⁴

(S) At the beginning of the new year, on 6 January 1967, COMUSKOREA

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1. J5 History, Hq CINCPAC, Feb 67; Point Paper, J5331, Hq CINCPAC, 21 Feb 67, Subj: Korea MAP; COMUSKOREA UK 55987/260020Z Aug 66; CINCPAC 020136Z Sep 66; COMUSKOREA UK 56109/100420Z Sep 66.
 2. CINCPAC 100049Z Oct 66.
 3. Ibid.
 4. CINCPAC 282241Z Nov 66.

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submitted a proposed change to Annex J of JSOP 69-76, adding five helicopter companies containing 25 UH-1Ds each.¹ Approximately a month later, the JCS notified CINCPAC that the "requirement for UH-1Ds...for the ROKA in Korea should be submitted to" them for consideration as to its inclusion in Annex J of JSOP 69-76.² During February, COMUSKOREA's request to include five helicopter companies---one per ROKA Corps---in JSOP 69-76 was being staffed through Hq CINCPAC. The J5 planners estimated that the cost of equipping and operating these companies through FY 73 would be about \$40 million. They considered it "highly doubtful if Korea MAP can be adjusted to fund this amount without seriously degrading other essential requirements."³

(S) COMUSKOREA, meanwhile, was becoming apprehensive about his request for "3 urgently needed UH-1D helicopters" and felt that perhaps "establishment of JSOP objective in JSOP 69-73 may be prerequisite to their approval."⁴ As a result, he fired off a message to CINCPAC expressing this view on 13 February. The same month, CINCUSARPAC recommended to DA that three UH-1Ds, scheduled for USARV float stock, be diverted to ROKA, but no action was immediately forthcoming.⁵ CINCPAC, meanwhile, on 3 March, advised the JCS that these three helicopters were required as "organic equipment for ROKA Headquarters," and recommended that they "not be included as separate line entry in JSOP 69-76, Annex J."⁶ He admitted that his staff was considering a "JSOP change to include Helicopter Companies urgently needed to counter North Korean infiltration threat," but insisted that this proposed change was "a separate and distinct requirement" and should not be associated with the request for three UH-1Ds, for which he asked "that authority be obtained to submit deviation...."⁷

(S) On 22 March 1967, COMUSKOREA submitted to CINCPAC a deviation for funding the three UH-1Ds for ROKA, because "this addition to FY 67 Korea MAP is of a recognized urgency and warrants expeditious action."⁸ This deviation was in addition to his earlier request of

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1. COMUSKOREA UK 57146/060640Z Jan 67.
 2. JCS 5745/081555Z Feb 67.
 3. Point Paper, J5331, Hq CINCPAC, 21 Feb 67, Subj: Korea MAP.
 4. COMUSKOREA UK/57483/131135Z Feb 67.
 5. Point Paper, J5331, Hq CINCPAC, 21 Feb 67, Subj: Korea MAP.
 6. CINCPAC 032220Z Mar 67.
 7. Ibid.
 8. COMUSKOREA UK 57883/220600Z Mar 67.

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26 August 1966 for the funding of three UH-1Ds in the Service-funded Modernization Package.¹ CINCPAC forwarded on 29 March 1967 the MAP deviation requested by COMUSKOREA to the Office of Secretary of Defense (OSD) for processing. His justification read that these three UH-1Ds:

...would provide extremely valuable troop lift capability in the First ROK Army area which could be used for quick reaction in event of contact with infiltrators or hunter-killer teams south of DMZ. The number of infiltration incidents along the entire DMZ has been steadily increasing. Intelligence indicates probability of deep agent penetration into ROK for the purpose of creating unrest during the forthcoming presidential elections. Helicopters could also be used to assist in support ROK AC&W, SAM and communication sites; to assist in flood relief and to enhance command and control.²

(S) The following day, the JCS notified CINCPAC that they considered "that ROKA WRA and communications items are of higher priority than UH-1Ds assigned to ROKA Headquarters for command and control purposes," the deviation which had been proposed by COMUSKOREA in August 1966.³ Consequently, CINCPAC request of 3 March 1967 for this MAP deviation was not favorably considered.⁴ On 1 April 1967, CINCPAC passed on this information to COMUSKOREA, stating that the action of the JCS had made it impossible for his August 1966 request to "be approved at this time."⁵

(S) Ten days later, CINCPAC recommended to the JCS the addition of five helicopter companies to ROKA, as a change to Annex J, JSOP 69-76. This addition was justified on the basis of: (1) an increase in the Chinese Communist threat to South Korea, "an anchor point of US forward strategy in Northeast Asia;" (2) geographical considerations, such as the rugged and compartmented nature of Korean terrain, which coupled with a "limited, primitive and vulnerable road network precludes rapid, East-West overland movement and restricts North-South movement;"

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1. COMUSKOREA UK 55987/260020Z Aug 66.
 2. CINCPAC 290230Z Mar 67.
 3. JCS 1327/300013Z Mar 67.
 4. Ibid.; CINCPAC 032220Z Mar 67.
 5. CINCPAC 012118Z Apr 67.

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and (3) increased effectiveness of ROKA through a helicopter capability which would provide "improved ROKA reaction capability and operational effectiveness in limited war or counterinsurgency," as well as an "air capability to supply isolated or critical ROKA installations such as Hawk and Herc sites, and ROKA communications relay stations."¹

(S) Four months later, on 14 August 1967, COMUSKOREA told CINCPAC of his need for 10 UH-1D helicopters to provide the Eighth U.S. Army with "a more effective surveillance capability and for quick reaction troop lift to counter agent activity."² CINCPAC, in turn, passed this request for expedited delivery of helicopters to combat an increasing number of North Korean infiltration incidents on to the JCS. On 29 August, he recommended that "action be taken by the JCS with OSD and the military Services to adjust world-wide equipment and personnel priorities and programs, including Program FOUR as appropriate to provide COMUS Korea with an immediate capability of ten UH-1D helicopters and associated personnel and equipment."³

(S) On the same day, DA notified CINCPAC that three aviation companies "scheduled for deployment to SVN in November 67" were the only immediate source of diversion to meet the COMUSKOREA requirement.⁴ CINCPAC's views on this proposed diversion was requested by the JCS in early September 1967, both as to the utilization of the helicopters in Korea and "the impact of diversion of a helo Co or ten UH-1D slice from SVN Program FOUR."⁵ Upon query by CINCPAC, COMUSKOREA forwarded his comments on the JCS request on 15 September. He felt that an ideal solution to the problem of meeting helicopter requirements in Korea would be to ship one complete company with associated transportation and signal corps units. Moreover, his flexible "concept of employment of a UH-1D helicopter company envisions the support of anti-infiltration operations throughout the Republic of Korea, south of and contiguous to the DMZ as well as in the rear areas of the ROK," thereby permitting "the priority assignment of helicopter support of military operations" and providing "selected subordinate commanders the capability to respond rapidly to local actions."⁶

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1. CINCPAC 112247Z Apr 67.
 2. COMUSKOREA UK 59745/140830Z Aug 67.
 3. CINCPAC 290215Z Aug 67.
 4. DA 830394/312105Z Aug 67.
 5. JCS 5504/052249Z Sep 67.
 6. COMUSKOREA UK 50162/150545Z Sep 67; J5 History, Hq CINCPAC, Sep 67.

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Four days following the receipt of COMUSKOREA's message, CINCPAC asked COMUSMACV's comments on the same JCS proposal.¹ COMUSMACV replied on 24 September, giving his non-concurrence to any diversion of Program FOUR or Program FIVE helicopter assets from RVN, since such action "would be detrimental to combat operation in RVN."² "Although the loss of ten helicopters and supporting personnel would be detrimental to the total effort in RVN," he continued, however, "it would be preferred to the diversion of an entire company, if such a course of action is taken."³ After stressing the following points, CINCPAC recommended to the JCS on the last day of September that COMUSKOREA should be provided with the helicopters, associated personnel, and equipment:

The high priority of SEA requirements is recognized and every effort should be made to adjust World-Wide priorities to satisfy Korea helicopter requirements from resources other than those programmed for SEAsia. At the same time, COMUSKorea requirement for helicopters is immediate and urgent. Unless action is taken now to counter the growing threat posed by the introduction of NK agent/guerrilla infiltrators into the ROK for the purpose of subversive war, the present situation in Korea could deteriorate into one that would have even greater impact on the allocation of US priorities and resources.⁴

By 1 November 1967, the JCS had agreed that an immediate requirement existed for UH-1D helicopters in Korea. Even though the deployment of UH-1Ds to South Vietnam had been less than needed for optimum combat capabilities, they felt that the 10 helicopters should be diverted, as an emergency measure, from the resources programmed for South Vietnam. "Accordingly, the JCS recommended that the Secretary of Defense approve the diversion to Korea of a 10 UH-1D helicopter slice from one of the three aviation companies programmed for deployment to SVN in November 1967."⁵ Before the end of the month, the Secretary of Defense had approved this course of action in order to increase the Eighth

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1. CINCPAC 191959Z Sep 67.
 2. COMUSMACV 31485/240340Z Sep 67.
 3. Ibid.
 4. CINCPAC 302113Z Sep 67.
 5. J5 Brief No. 305-67, Hq CINCPAC, 1 Nov 67, of JCSM 570-67 of 21 October 67, Subj: Helicopter Support for Korea.

~~SECRET~~

U.S. Army's surveillance and quick reaction troop lift capability. In line with his decision, Program FIVE resources for South Vietnam had to be adjusted so that the helicopters "requested by CINCPAC for COMUS Korea will be provided in a timely manner."¹

Increased Authorization for UH-19B/D Flying Hours - ROKAF

(S) On 17 October 1967, CINCPAC granted authority to COMUSKOREA "to increase ROKAF UH-19B/D flying hours up to 32 hours per month per possessed aircraft."² The rationale for this increase was the ever-enlarging number of incidents and signs of enemy activity along the Korean DMZ.³

ROK Rebuild of 1,500 1/4 Ton OSP-J Vehicles

(U) At the end of calendar year 1967, the prospects for the program of having the Koreans replace their obsolete wheeled vehicle fleet by rebuilding OSP-J trucks looked good.⁴ Despite many extended delays, the program was scheduled to be initiated in February 1968.

(U) As this program was planned, the Republic of Vietnam (RVN) would be provided with 1,500 trucks of the M-600 series for a like quantity of OSP-J vehicles in an economically repairable condition, which would then be shipped to Korea for rebuild and retention. The idea, as originally conceived, was to help ease the vehicle maintenance load in RVN, as well as enable a low cost replacement of 1,500 obsolescent and unsupported World War II 1/4 ton trucks still remaining in the ROK vehicle fleet. The vehicles from South Vietnam would be furnished at no cost to MAP; in fact, MAP support of the program would be limited to repair parts and PCH&T (Packing, Crating, Handling and Transportation).

(U) Whether or not the project would begin as schedule would depend

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1. J5 Brief No. 328-67, Hq CINCPAC, 24 Nov 67, of JCS 1776/744 of 19 Oct 1967, Helicopter Support for Korea Decision.
 2. CINCPAC 170435Z Oct 67.
 3. J4 History, Hq CINCPAC, Oct 67. See also the subsection, entitled "Aircraft Assigned to MAAGs," located earlier in this chapter.
 4. For background, see pages 191-193 of CINCPAC Command History 1966. The sources for the information contained in this subsection are: CINCPAC 250415Z Nov 67; DA 222005Z Nov 67; J4 History, Hq CINCPAC, Dec 67.

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upon the supply agency in providing the M-600 series replacement vehicles to South Vietnam on time. At the close of 1967, the USAMC field office at Ft. Shafter, Hawaii, was taking action to determine the status of deliveries.

T-33A Attrition Aircraft for ROKAF

(S) COMUSKOREA requested on 17 June 1967 an addition to the FY 67 Korea MAP to provide 12 additional T-33As. The proposed source of these "no costs" aircraft was redistribution from Japanese Air Self-Defense Force (JASDF) excesses reported for return to U.S. control.¹ On 29 June, CINCPAC concurred in this request by approving the acquisition of seven T-33As to satisfy ROKAF advanced attrition requirements "now in approved Shortfall in FY 68-72."²

(S) Following an inspection of the aircraft in Japan by COMUSKOREA personnel, who declared them acceptable, CINCPAC increased the number of T-33As from seven to nine in order to include attrition requirements for FY 73. On 9 August 1967, he programmed these nine aircraft "for redistribution to ROKAF by JASDF as-is, at no cost to MAP."³ Under US-AF MAP Delivery Project 8T113, these T-33As were delivered to ROKAF in the following increments: four on 29 November, two on 7 December, and the remaining three on 20 December 1967.⁴

Materiel Plan for Redeployment of ROK Forces from Vietnam

(S) On 20 June 1967, COMUSKOREA brought to CINCPAC's attention the fact that the issue of non-MAP equipment to ROK Forces, Vietnam (ROKFV), to replace "MAP equipment that is lost or becomes non-repairable results in a reduction in MAP assets," since title to this non-MAP equipment does not pass to the Korean government.⁵ His solution was that, "in those cases where title is not transferred it is recommended that dollar credits, equal in value to the decrease in MAP assets, be given to Korea MAP."⁶ Six days later, COMUSMACV concurred with this proposal and recommended to CINCPAC that he chair a conference to

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1. COMUSKOREA UK 59091/170305Z Jun 67.
 2. CINCPAC 290221Z Jun 67.
 3. CINCPAC 090512Z Aug 67.
 4. 6146 AFADVSYGP Seoul 220730Z Dec 67; J4 History, Hq CINCPAC, Dec 67.
 5. COMUSKOREA UK 59115/200150Z Jun 67.
 6. Ibid.

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discuss the problem and to establish necessary policies and procedures for implementation.¹

(S) At this time, planning guidance, as contained in Part I, Chapter 4, of DOD MAM, stated: "MAP planning should assume that ROKV re-deploying to Korea should have full TE, and attrited equipment is being replaced by the United States." CINCPAC interpreted this guidance to indicate that replacement of attrited equipment was a service funding responsibility; therefore, he did not consider it appropriate to utilize MAP funds to replace the MAP equipment attrited in South Vietnam by ROKFV.²

(S) Accordingly, on 5 July 1967, CINCPAC asked the JCS to confirm his interpretation of the DOD MAM guidance that: "Military Assistance, Service Funded program actions will be taken to insure TE equipment shortages of ROKFV are supplied upon redeployment to ROK. Items not within the Korea MAP will be withdrawn and replaced with authorized items that are in the Korean MAP."³ On the 24th, the JCS replied that the "CINCPAC interpretation essentially correct," but added the following guidance regarding title to non-MAP equipment: "Disposition will be made on a case-by-case basis at time of redeployment."⁴

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1. COMUSMACV 20977/260959Z Jun 67.
 2. J4 History, Hq CINCPAC, Jul 67.
 3. CINCPAC 050103Z Jul 67.
 4. JCS 2086/241942Z Jul 67.

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Republic of China

(S) "The Republic of China Armed Forces, with a strength of approximately 600,000, present a formidable force in deterring a Chinese Communist invasion of Taiwan and the Penghus, and cause the CHICOMs to station considerable ground forces on the mainland opposite Taiwan. The Republic of China is a major link in our defensive strategy. Its bases, airfields, harbors, and early warning capabilities are valuable in supporting our own requirements. Three United States C-130 transport squadrons that support our efforts in Vietnam operate from Ching Chuan Kang Air Base; Tainan Air Base provides support for a flight of our radar equipped early warning C-121 aircraft; harbor facilities are available for our ships operating in the South China Sea. Additionally, the Republic of China's contribution of highly professional teams in agriculture, psychological warfare, electric power and surgery supports the Government of Vietnam's nation building effort. . . . Our investment in China to maintain an effective Free World military force on the periphery of Southeast Asia continues to pay major dividends."

Admiral U. S. G. Sharp¹

China MAP

(S) In sharp contrast to last year, China MAP appropriations suffered a drastic cut during 1967, dropping from a scheduled \$90 million for FY 68 to eventually \$44 million.² As late as 22 November 1967, the Secretary of State revealed that the tentative country dollar guidelines for China MAP FY 68 and FY 69 were established at \$50 million and \$90 million, respectively. The FY 68 level had been based on the maximum obligation authority that ODMA expected to be approved by Congress, while the FY 69 level had been established for use in preparing budgetary submissions.³ On the same day, CINCPAC requested CHMAAG China to -----

1. CINCPAC 13 Apr 67 MAP Statement.
2. Intv, LtCol Wilford E. Overgaard, USMC, MAP Br, J5, Hq CINCPAC, with Mr. Strobridge, Senior Historian, CINCPAC HistBr, 19 Jan 68.
3. SECDEF 3385/220549Z Nov 67.

~~SECRET~~

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 4. JCS 2086/241942Z Jul 67.

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3. SECDEF 3385/220549Z Nov 67.


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REPUBLIC OF CHINA

AS OF 1 NOVEMBER 1967

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| BASIC INFORMATION | |  | OVERALL OBJECTIVE | U.S. DIPLOMATIC MISSION |
|--|--|---|---|---|
| AREA 14,000 SQ.MI. | GROSS NAT PROD (1966E) . . . \$3,22 BILL | | | TO DEFEND TAIWAN AND THE PENGHUS FROM COMMUNIST ATTACK AND TO RETAIN APPROPRIATE U.S. BASE RIGHTS ON ROC TERRITORY. |
| POPULATION 13.5 MIL | PER CAPITA \$238 | | U.S. AID DIRECTOR MR. GERALD HUFFMAN (ACTING) | |
| ANNUAL GROWTH 3.2% | DEFENSE BUDGET (SELF FINANCED) 1967 (E) \$282 MIL | | | CHIEF, MAAG MG RICHARD G. CICCOLELLA, USA |
| LITERACY RATE 90% | AS % OF GNP 8.77 | | MAP OBJECTIVE General objectives are: (A) To maintain ROC armed forces sufficient, in combination with available U.S. forces, to defend Taiwan, the Penghus, and the offshore islands. (B) To maintain a climate in which the U.S. will continue to enjoy existing and, if required, additional overflight, staging and base rights. | |
| LIFE EXPECTANCY 67 YEARS | AS % OF SELF FINANCED PROVINCIAL/CENTRAL GOVT EXP 52.77 | | | |
| ARABLE LAND PER CAPITA 0.2 ACRE | | | | |
| PRESIDENT - Generalissimo Chiang, Kai-shek VICE PRESIDENT - Yen, Chia-Kan DEFENSE MINISTER - Chiang, Ching-Kuo CHIEF, GEN STAFF - Gen (2nd grade) Kao Kuei Yuan, Ca, ARMY CINC ARMY - Gen (2nd grade) Ch'en Ta-Ching, Ca, CINC NAVY - ADM Feng Chi Chung CINC AIR FORCE - Gen (2nd grade) Lai Ming-Tang, CINC, COMBINED SERVICE FORCE - ADM (2nd grade) Liu Kuang K'ai COMMANDANT, MARCORPS - LGEN Yu, Hao-Chang MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS - Wei Tao-Ming | | | | |
| MAJOR FORCE OBJECTIVES | | TOTAL COUNTRY FORCES | COMBAT CAPABILITY | |
| ARMY | 1NIKE BN, 1HAWK BN, 2ARMD DIV, 14INF DIV, 2ARMD CAV REGT, 1ABN INF REGT, 2 SF GRPS, 1PSY WAR GP, 4 TANK BNS (SEP), 13ENG COMBAT BNS, 22FIELD ARTY BNS, 1 RES INF DIV, 13 AAA AW BTRYS, 10 90MM ADA BNS | 1NIKE BN, 1HAWK BN, 2ARMD DIV, 14INF DIV, 2ARMD CAV REGT, 1ABN INF REGT, 2SF GRPS, 1PSY WAR GRP, 4TANK BNS (SEP), 13ENG COMBAT BNS, 22FIELD ARTY BNS, 1RES INF DIV, 13AAA AW BTRYS, 10 90MM ADA BNS, 9RES LT INF DIVS | MAINTAIN INTERNAL SECURITY & CONDUCT EFFECTIVE GROUND DEFENSE OF TAIWAN, PENGHUS & OFFSHORE ISLANDS AGAINST SMALL SCALE ATTACK IF PROVIDED OUTSIDE AIR, NAVAL & LOGISTIC SUPPORT. COULD CONTRIBUTE APPROX 3DIVS TO COLLECTIVE DEFENSE EFFORT. WELL-ORGANIZED AND COMBAT READY. | |
| NAVY | 12DD/DE, 28 PATROL SHIPS, 14MSC, 1NMC, 1AGC, 2APD, 32LST/LSM, 1LSD, 1SEAL UNIT, 2MAR DIV, 2LVT BN, 1LVTA BN, 2AK/AP, 5 AO/AOC. | 12 DE/DD, 29 PATROL, 7 MSC, 8 MMC, 1 AGC, 2 APD, 34 LST/LSM, 1 LSD, 1 UDU, 2 MAR DIV, 2 LVT BNS, 1 LVTA BN, 2 AK/AP, 4 AO/AOC. | THE OVERALL ABILITY OF THE CHINESE NAVY TO PERFORM ITS ASSIGNED MISSION IS CONSIDERED FAIR. THE CHINESE MARINES ARE CONSIDERED CAPABLE OF CONDUCTING DIV SIZED AMPHIB OPERATIONS, PROVIDED THE REQUIRED AIR & NAVAL SUPPORT, INCLUDING AMPHIB SHIPPING, ARE AVAILABLE. | |
| AIR FORCE | 3FTR INTCP (AWX), 11TAC FTR SQN, 1 TAC RECCE SQN, 1COMP RECON SQN, 1ASW PATROL SQN, 1SAR SQN, 7 TRANSPORT SQN, 5ACGW, 15 AAA AW BNS | 4FIGHTER WING, 1COMPOSITE WING, 1TNSP WING, (14 TAC FTR SQNS, 1A/W FTR SQN, 1FTR INTCP SQDN, 2TAC RCN SQN, 1AIR RESCUE SQN, 7TRANSPORT SQN, 1 HAWK BN, 1 NIKE HERCULES BN), 2 ADA BRIGADE | FORCE COMBAT READY. THE AIR FORCE HAS DEMONSTRATED ITS ABILITY TO PERFORM ITS PRIMARY FUNCTION, AIR DEFENSE OF TAIWAN, UNDER DAY VFR CONDITIONS. THE LIMITED ALL WX DEFENSE CAPABILITY HAS IMPROVED. SINCE THE F-104G SQDN BECAME OPERATIONAL, AIR DEFENSE AGAINST A LOW ALTITUDE THREAT REMAINS A PROBLEM. CAPABLE OF PROVIDING FIGHTER COVER FOR NAVAL OPERATIONS IN THE AREA AND TACTICAL SUPPORT FOR AN ARMY CORPS. | |

SOURCE: PACOM Digest, Nov 67, p. 138.

provide "program data adjusting FY 68 and FY 69 programs to established levels."¹ In effecting these reductions, funded lines were not to be reduced or deleted.

(S) Two days later, CHMAAG China dispatched a message, stating that instructions which prohibited "reducing and/or compiling deferral list from funded lines eliminates any flexibility in a major reprogramming action required to meet the new dollar guidelines."² He also requested assistance in obtaining early action to authorize the MAAG to reprogram all unobligated balances. Informal information received from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, through VAdm Heinz, USN, indicated that deviations could be submitted later.

(S) On 2 December 1967, the Secretary of Defense notified CINCPAC that the reduction "in FY 68 China MAP to \$50 million grant level now seems almost certain," and that determination "of proposed FY 69 MAP level for GRC also now in final stage."³ As for the FY 69 MAP level, alternatives were being considered to hold it to a \$50 million level or even a possible further reduction to \$30 million. The Secretary also mentioned that the various possibilities of persuading GRC to reduce its force levels were being considered.

(S) In view of China's commitment to mainland recovery and the existing situation on the Asian mainland, it was questioned whether "GRC could realistically be expected to make cuts of a magnitude that would enable it to provide greater funds for O&M and investment without significantly increasing its defense budget."⁴ In fact, the Secretary was of the opinion that China MAP could be justified in terms of American strategic defense plans alone. Moreover, the Country Team's judgment was ominous as to probable GRC reaction to the \$40 million cut in FY 68 MAP and the comparative political impact if the FY 69 level was held at \$50 million or worse yet reduced to \$30 million.

(S) Since the Secretary of Defense had ended his message by welcoming any comments that CINCPAC may have, these were forthcoming three days later, on 5 December. CINCPAC's reply stated that a reduction of \$40 million in FY 68 and maintenance of a level of \$50 million for FY 69 would require the deletion of all investment items programmed for the

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1. CINCPAC 222236Z Nov 67.
 2. J5 History, Hq CINCPAC, Dec 67; CHMAAG China MGPPP 11-35/241021Z Nov 67.
 3. State 78711/022319Z Dec 67.
 4. Ibid.

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modernization of the GRC armed forces. The impact of such an eroding action upon the GRC military capability would not be apparent immediately but, instead, would increase progressively until such time as the effectiveness of these forces were reduced to a weak enough extent that the capability of the Chinese to defend Taiwan and the Penghus against a CHICOM attack would be seriously impaired, unless the U.S. promptly intervened.¹

~~(S)~~ Any reduction in GRC force capabilities resulting from reduced MAP dollar ceilings would have two major effects upon American strategy: (1) contingency plans would have to take into account the reduced capabilities of GRC forces by allocating a compensating capability in U.S. forces; and (2) more rapid commitment of U.S. forces would be required. The immediate problem, however, was the ability of the GRC to provide funds to offset reduced MAP O&M funds in order that existing inventories of equipment in GRC armed forces would be maintained fully operational.

~~(S)~~ Following his comments, CINCPAC recommended that the "FY 69 dollar ceiling be retained at \$90 million," and that:

The Country Team be authorized to discuss frankly with the GRC the MAP fiscal constraints and resultant coordinated action required to insure an adequate ROC defensive posture, as soon as FY 68 MAP ceiling is established. Frank discussions now will promote a greater understanding and rapport between GRC and US officials when considering future MAP and FMS programs.²

~~(S)~~ One day after CINCPAC reply came that of the American Embassy in Taipei. It stated that the impact of the reduction for FY 68 and FY 69 would have an adverse material effect on: (1) the combat capability of GRC armed forces; (2) morale of GRC armed forces, particularly leadership element; (3) the burden which the U.S. would have to be prepared to assume militarily; (4) the degree of leverage which the U.S. government would have with the existing GRC leadership; (5) the amount of resources programmed for economic development; (6) the position and effectiveness of those political-economic GRC leaders with a positive orientation toward the U.S. and its methods, which have been responsible for the economic viability of Taiwan.³

1. CINCPAC 051030Z Dec 67.

2. Ibid.

3. AMEMB Taipei 1578/061140Z Dec 67.

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~~(S)~~ The Country Team proposed that they "be authorized to inform GRC that while there has been deep cut (because of congressional action) in FY 68 MAP level which will eliminate all investment items and sizeable quantity of O&M items from the FY 68 MAP program,"¹ the U.S. government was still willing and ready to do certain things. For one thing, it was prepared to extend up to \$20 million of U.S. currency in military credits for the balance of FY 68 and a comparable, or even possibly larger, amount during FY 69 for the purchase of those O&M and force modernization items which MAAG and GRC jointly agreed would be essential for the maintenance of GRC military forces. Then, there was the possibility of U.S. equipment from Vietnam being repaired and rebuilt in Taiwan by the GRC as a means of providing credit for GRC purchase in the U.S. of essential equipment from MAP. Finally, the U.S. government was prepared to accord priority treatment for the acquisition by grant or FMS of disposable surplus equipment and material that was building up in Vietnam.

~~(S)~~ The response of the State Department to the American Embassy message was that they:

Appreciate suggestions offered...for approach to GRC on prospective cut in FY 68 MAP. We agree on necessity of apprising GRC in detail of our views of situation, but we are not yet in position to do so....

Consideration being given to possibility sending special State/Defense mission to Taipei to participate in consultations with GRC. We believe such mission would serve to emphasize high-level concern within USG for continuing to assist in maintaining GRC defense capabilities despite reduction in available resources.²

~~(S)~~ On 16 December, the Secretary of State provided a FY 68 program dollar level of \$44 million for China MAP and a tentative FY 69 level of \$30.4 million.³ From a strategic viewpoint, the American Embassy at Taipei replied six days later:

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1. AMEMB Taipei 1578/061140Z Dec 67.
 2. State 83131/121747Z Dec 67.
 3. SECDEF 5321/160036Z Dec 67; SECDEF 5355/161744Z Dec 67.

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...the proposed drastic reduction in China MAP for FY 69 cannot but widen gap between United States JSOP objectives (which have never been met) and GRC capabilities, as well as gap between GRC and CHICOM military capabilities. As this gap widens, departure from agreed US national objectives in this area become greater, concurrently with risk that immediate and massive US combat involvement would be inescapable in event of CHICOM move against Taiwan. Degradation of existing GRC forces through obsolescence... and assumed diminution of US interest and support might embolden CHICOMs to believe that Taiwan and/or off-shore islands could be seized or neutralized at relatively low cost.¹

(S) Furthermore, continued the U.S. Ambassador, the combat capability of GRC military forces would be degraded and would remain degraded for the extended period needed to replace and assimilate deferred equipment. To prevent such a deterioration of its combat capability, the Chinese Government would increase its defense expenditures enough to offset such a MAP reduction, and any internal GRC debate would be over the questions of how to allocate residual resources to economic programs after providing for military requirements. In addition, because the magnitude in the FY 69 China MAP could affect the basis of U.S. interests as they relate to GRC and to Taiwan, the American Embassy did not believe that GRC would be reassured or that U.S. interests would be served by the visit of a Washington team at that time as proposed the State Department.

(S) The following day, the U.S. Embassy at Taipei provided additional comments on the probable impact of the proposed FY 69 reductions. Its message concluded that only the most careful consideration should be given in the "high policy levels in U.S. government to any budgetary proposal which would materially reduce FY 69 China MAP to figure below \$90 million range which has before been accepted and programmed."² The embassy further urged that extensive consultations should be held with CINCPAC in order to review the future role of Taiwan and GRC military forces in the years beyond FY 69, when Congressional appropriations for MAP may be expected to be increasingly restricted. When 1967 drew to a close, this proposal was under advisement by the J5 planners of Hq CINCPAC.³

1. AMEMB Taipei 1713/220930Z Dec 67.

2. J5 History, Hq CINCPAC, Dec 67.

3. Intv, LtCol Wilford E. Overgaard, USMC, MAP Br, J5, Hq CINCPAC, with Mr. Strobridge, Senior Historian, CINCPAC HistBr, 22 Jan 68.

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M-41 Series Tanks for China

(S) In January 1967, the Secretary of Defense brought forth "a concept for placing the GRC forces on a 'self-help' basis with respect to M41 tank requirements at minimal cost to the US."¹ By offering China 253 excess tanks on an "as-is, where-is" basis, the U.S. would satisfy the MAP-supported force level requirement, including a shortfall against the FY 72 MAP force for 211 tanks, plus an additional 42 tanks (or 20%) for cannibalization and attrition. China would be required to procure initial follow-on spare parts support through FMS and to develop an in-country capability to manufacture future requirements. Initially, it was considered that the dollar ceilings for FY 68 and FY 69 would be reduced proportionally; however, the Secretary of Defense stated that if GRC acceptance of this proposal would be contingent only upon maintaining the MAP dollar ceiling level, dollar guidelines would probably not be reduced.²

(S) When queried by CINCPAC, CHMAAG China replied that the proposal appeared feasible; however, he strongly opposed a reduction in the MAP ceiling as a compensating factor. Additionally, he requested that the initial cost for on-vehicle material (OVM), which GRC would pay, be phased with payment over an extended period at a favorable interest rate.³

(S) CINCPAC concurred in these comments and reiterated to both DOD and DA a request by CHMAAG China for additional information as to condition and location of excess tanks, support required, availability of spare parts, and related matters, so that a proper evaluation could be given the proposal.⁴ On 14 April, DA came back with detailed and specific information and requested "Country Team recommendation to facilitate final consideration," but warned that the "concept should not repeat not be discussed with GRC at this time."⁵ CINCPAC, considering the information provided by DA sufficient for a favorable consideration of the SECDEF M-41 tank proposal, asked CHMAAG China for his comments and recommendations.⁶

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1. SECDEF 3949/181857Z Jan 67.
 2. J5 History, Hq CINCPAC, Jan 67; Point Paper, J5332, Hq CINCPAC, 20 May 67, Subj: M-41 Tanks for China.
 3. CHMAAG China 1311/311121Z Jan 67; Intv, LtCol Wilford E. Overgaard, USMC, MAP Br, J5 Hq CINCPAC, with Mr. Strobridge, Senior Historian, CINCPAC HistBr, 4 Jan 68.
 4. Point Paper, J5332, Hq CINCPAC, 11 Feb 67, Subj: M-41 Series Tanks for China; CINCPAC 080323Z Feb 67.
 5. DA 810389/142212Z Apr 67.
 6. J5 History, Hq CINCPAC, Apr 67.

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(S) "The SECDEF proposal," replied CHMAAG China, "appears to be an expeditious means of fulfilling the GRC's requirement for tanks," thereby permitting the programming of other high priority items.¹ The Country Team approved the proposal, subject to certain provisos, which were also concurred in by CINCPAC. As a result, there was to be no reduction in China MAP ceiling, initial costs to the GRC was to be phased with payment over an extended period at a favorable interest rate, and the tanks located in CONUS were to be inspected jointly by MAAG China and GRC representatives.²

(S) In June 1967, DA, in reply to a previous request, informed both CINCPAC and CHMAAG China that a survey of depot stocks to determine availability of on-vehicle material (OVM) for the M-41 tanks, at no cost to MAP, had revealed that no items were available as excess. Therefore, the OVM cost per tank would be \$4,700 with a procurement lead time of 15 months, and this cost would have to be borne by GRC through a FMS arrangement.³

(S) The same month, CHMAAG China notified CINCPAC that news of the M-41 proposal had reached the GRC through its Washington Army Attache. Since ROC Ministry National Defense (MND) representatives were soliciting information and details from MAAG China, guidance was requested ASAP as to whether or not to disclose the requested information, since news of the proposed action had already been leaked. When queried by CINCPAC, the Secretary of Defense wired back to authorize the initiation of "preliminary discussions on subject proposal with appropriate Chinese officials."⁴ CHMAAG was also told not to raise the point voluntarily, but if asked, to state that the tank proposal would not cause a corresponding reduction MAP dollar level. Following preliminary discussions in late June, GRC officials voiced a tentative acceptance of the offer.⁵

(S) During July, a team of three Chinese and two MAAG officers departed Taiwan for CONUS to inspect the tanks located at various depots, as well as to discuss availability of tank parts, specifications, drawings, lead times on procurement of parts, and other aspects of the M-41 tank

1. CHMAAG China MGPR-A 4315/280701Z Apr 67.

2. Ibid.; Point Paper, J5332, Hq CINCPAC, 20 May 67, Subj: M-41 Tanks for China.

3. J5 History, Hq CINCPAC, Apr 67; Point Paper, J5332, Hq CINCPAC 26 Aug 67, Subj: M-41 Tanks for China; DA 520864/261429Z Jun 67.

4. SECDEF 7339/072240Z Jun 67.

5. J5 History, Hq CINCPAC, Jun 67; CHMAAG China MGPR-A 6248/270731Z Jun 67.

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proposal.¹ A month later, DA reported that the selection of tanks was proceeding satisfactorily, but that GRC desired expeditious action to be taken to release the tanks for shipment ASAP. Accordingly, CINCPAC was requested to "process ASAP necessary program change (E line entry) to OSD for 253 tanks."² Upon receipt of this MAP Order, USAMC would prepare a letter of offer for processing the tanks, but they would "not be released to Chinese until necessary agreements have been signed."³ On 19 August, CINCPAC submitted the required program change procedure on the M-41 tanks to ASD/ISA.⁴

In late August, CHMAAG China reported that the "unexpectedly good condition of these tanks will save GRC considerable in rebuild funds" and that the Chinese "would welcome opportunity to direct savings into procurement of additional tanks."⁵ At the same time, he asked for permission to enter into formal negotiations with GRC for the purchase of 106 additional M-41 tanks. These additional vehicles would be used to equip the tank battalions organic to the two MAP-supported Forward Look Infantry Divisions in Field Army Reserve, thus adding increased mobility and firepower to the Chinese army.

This recommendation was not favorably considered by CINCPAC, since it was contrary to both JSOP and MAM policy and guidance, i. e., that tank battalions are not an approved JSOP subordinate element of the infantry divisions and MAM emphasis was on a reduced force level rather than an increasing one. Moreover, in "view of current Congressional attitude toward world-wide MAP, it appears likely that FY 68 MAP appropriations will result in further reductions to MAP dollars. Activation of two tank battalions within the Infantry divisions, whether supported by MAP or GRC budget through FMS, would divert scarce funds from currently approved forces."⁶

Following a more detailed study, CHMAAG China submitted to CINCPAC on 9 September additional rationale and justification to support his advocacy of procuring 106 more tanks. Fiscal constraints were not a limiting factor in considering this proposal, he stated, since these tanks could be obtained within the cost estimate of the original 253 tanks.

1. Point Paper, J5332, Hq CINCPAC, 26 Aug 67, Subj: M-41 Tanks for China.
2. DA 827874/142129Z Aug 67
3. Ibid.
4. CINCPAC 192008Z Aug 67.
5. CHMAAG China MGARG3 836/230731Z Aug 67.
6. CINCPAC 312311Z Aug 67.

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These vehicles would make the GRC less reluctant to scrap their obsolete M-5, M-24, M-18 tanks, and gun carriages, thus reducing MAP expenditures for maintenance and follow-on support, as well as providing a much needed modernization and a facilitation of an one tank system in the ROC Army. In addition, one of the U.S. objectives for some time has been for a reduction in the ROC ground forces. But, before this could ever be attained, the GRC would have to be presented with a persuasive alternative capability. As CHMAAG China pointed out:

The most effective defense against the aforementioned Chicom threat is mobility and fire power. Reliable tank forces would provide this capability to compensate for proposed reductions of GRC ground forces it would lend powerful support to our argument. The addition of 106 more M-41 tanks along with the projected two hundred and fifty three would provide this capability and additionally, provide much needed modernization.¹

(S) Following discussions with the Country Team of their approval of CHMAAG China's recommendation on a visit to Taipei, CINCPAC became convinced that a favorable consideration was in order.² As a result, he forwarded CHMAAG China's proposal to the JCS on 13 September with his concurrence and comments, among which was the following statement:

If the US cannot provide modernization through MAP because of fiscal constraints, and if we do not assist the Chinese with the opportunity to provide their own force improvement, the GRC might well question the basic US interest in maintaining an adequate GRC defensive capability.³

(S) The day before, CINCPAC had also queried DA about the "availability of 106 additional M-41 tanks and OEM equipment for GRC FMS purchase from US Army sources in CONUS."⁴ DA replied on 24 October that rebuilt M-41 tanks could be made available within 90 days from receipt of firm order for \$32,020 each, while tanks in an "as-is, where-is" condition could be had in approximately the same time for \$16,681 per tank.

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1. CHMAAG China MGCH 933/090331Z Sep 67.
 2. Ibid.; Point Paper, J5332, Hq CINCPAC, 6 Oct 67, Subj: Additional M-41 Tanks for China.
 3. CINCPAC 132040Z Sep 67.
 4. CINCPAC 120512Z Sep 67.

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More time would be needed, however, to supply OEM and repair parts, as well as fire control equipment and communications equipment.¹

(S) CHMAAG China came back with the comment that these quoted costs "would place an unacceptable burden on ROC" and that the FMS purchase of these 106 additional tanks "would mean that an offsetting amount for other vitally needed equipment could not be purchased."² He stated that he had not envisioned the acquisition of these additional tanks on any other basis than that of the original 253 ones. In addition, he reported that the Country Team recommended "strongly that OSD make these 106 additional M-41 tanks available to GRC on an as is-where is basis under the same conditions that the 253 M-41 tanks are currently being obtained."³

(S) From October 1967 until the year's end, both CHMAAG China and CINCPAC MAP planners hoped in vain for a favorable decision that would make these additional 106 tanks available to GRC. No further action, however, occurred on this matter, although progress proceeded smoothly on the procuring of the original 253 vehicles for the Chinese.⁴

Purchase of APDs through FMS

(S) The end of 1966 found the Government of the Republic of China (GRC) still endeavoring to purchase additional high speed transports (APDs) through FMS. Nine APDs had been purchased so far for conversion to patrol escort vessels (PFs), and the GRC desired to purchase a total of 11 APD hulls, converting 10 to PFs and retaining one as an APD, a military goal which was within the current JSOP levels.⁵

(S) Three APDs had been purchased in 1966, but one had been lost while under tow to the Tsoying Naval Base in April 1966. In addition, the two that arrived in Taiwan on 6 January 1967 had both suffered extensive hull damage from having been lost for 48 hours in the Bashi Channel during their tow across the Pacific. Nevertheless, the 1st Naval Shipyard at Tsoying converted them to PFs for the Chinese Navy, and the "addition of these converted APD's to the CN's fleet significantly enhanced the

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1. J5 History, Hq CINCPAC, Oct 67.
 2. CHMAAG China MGPR-A 10-241/3100813Z Oct 67.
 3. Ibid.
 4. Intv, LtCol Wilford E. Overgaard, USMC, MAP Br, J5, Hq CINCPAC, with Mr. Strobridge, Senior Historian, CINCPAC HistBr, 30 Dec 67.
 5. CINCPAC MA Plan for China FY 68-73, Vol. 1, pp. H-2-2, H-2-3, and K-6.

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ASW/patrol capabilities in countering the Chicom PT/PGM and submarine threat."¹

~~(S)~~ In April 1967, Admiral Ni, GRC Chief of General Staff, requested the assistance of CHMAAG China in acquiring three additional APD hulls for conversion to patrol gunboats.² Since both the Country Team and CINCPAC had previously supported GRC's desires to acquire a total of 11 of these ships to fill out JSOP force objectives, CHMAAG China contacted CINCPAC for information on the sale in order to answer Admiral Ni's request, as well as to develop the MAAG's planning program. CINCPAC, in turn, recommended to the JCS the sale of three APDs subject to availability.³

~~(S)~~ The JCS replied that FMS of two APDs had been approved and that this disclosure had been made to GRC Vice President, C.K. Yen, on 9 May 1967, during his Washington visit.⁴ CINCPAC was also requested to send concurrence and authorization for direct negotiations between CNO and GRC officials. This concurrence and authorization was forwarded on 13 May 1967.⁵

~~(S)~~ Since the CN was acquiring these APDs in a "where is, as is" condition, they wanted to know the location and condition of these two ships in order to expedite transfer and towing plans to allow arrival in-country prior to typhoon season.⁶ According to the CNO, the APDs were located at Bremerton, Washington, and were considered in good condition. Meanwhile, the Chinese Naval Attache in Washington, D.C., had furnished the required FMS cost for purchase and towing charges of \$45,000 each and \$10,000 each respectively.⁷ The schedule called for CN representatives to take delivery of these two APDs during June 1967 and supervise their being towed across the Pacific to Tsoying Naval Base. The end of the calendar year found these two vessels an active part of the Chinese Navy.⁸

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1. Journal MA, Jun 67, p. 130.
 2. CHMAAG China MGNA 433/070707Z Apr 67.
 3. J5 History, Hq CINCPAC, Apr 67.
 4. JCS 4923/101955Z May 67.
 5. CINCPAC 131903Z May 67.
 6. Journal MA, Jun 67, p. 130; CHNAVSEC MAAG China MGNA 5249/170723Z May 67.
 7. CNO 182143Z May 67.
 8. Telcon, LtCol Wilford E. Overgaard, USMC, MAP Br, J5, Hq CINCPAC, with Mr. Strobridge, Senior Historian, CINCPAC HistBr, 2 Jan 68.

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Request for Purchase of Fleet Minesweeper and Fuel Oil Barge

(S) The last of the seven MAP-programmed coastal minesweepers (MSC) joined the operating fleet of the Chinese Navy (CN) during the first quarter of 1967. Built in a New Jersey shipyard by the Dorchester Shipbuilding Company and activated by the Philadelphia Naval Shipyard, this MSC was transferred to the CN in mid-1966. Subsequently, a Chinese crew sailed it to Tsoying, arriving there late in February 1967. Unfortunately, even with this addition, the CN's limited inventory of ships gave it "a wartime capacity to protect only one harbor. This limited capability could pose a major problem in the event of a Chicom attack, for seaborne resupply would be vital to the defense of Taiwan."¹

(S) Probably in an attempt to rectify these handicaps, China expressed through its embassy in Washington a "request for agreement to cash sale of one fleet mine sweeper and one fuel oil barge to be used for patrol duties in strait."² On 24 May 1967, the State Department relayed this request to the American Embassy in Taipei and asked for Country Team comments. Three days later, CINCPAC wired CHMAAG China for his "comments and/or recommendations" on this subject.³

(S) CHMAAG China replied on 7 June 1967 that the Country Team had concurred in both the sale of the fleet minesweeper and fuel oil barge. The minesweeper was to replace one that had been sunk by enemy action in 1965. Only through purchase could the CN obtain a replacement for this item "is in program shortfall and will never realize sufficient priority to materialize as a programmed item."⁴ The ship already selected for this GRC requirement was located at San Diego and its estimated cost in an "as is - where is" condition was \$65,000. The fuel oil barge, on the other hand, would enhance the currently limited capability of the CN to provide POL support to Chinese Army and Air Forces installations on the offshore islands. Its cost in an "as is - where is" condition "is estimated to have current market value of US \$61,000."⁵

(S) Following this concurrence by CHMAAG China and the Country Team, steps were taken to accomplish this sale of the fleet minesweeper and fuel oil barge to the Chinese. Fortunately, no hinderances or

1. MA Journal, Jun 67, p. 130.
2. STATE 200923/241954Z May 67.
3. J5 History, Hq CINCPAC, Jun 67.
4. CHMAAG China 6215/070809Z Jun 67.
5. Ibid.

procedural blocks developed to either prevent or delay this action.¹

CBR Defenses

~~(S)~~ On 7 March 1967, CHMAAG China notified CINCPAC that the "PACOM Forces on Taiwan are not presently equipped or prepared to defend against CBR attack."² In the event of hostilities, these forces would occupy and share key command and control facilities with ROC personnel. None of these key facilities have CBR protection, nor do U.S. personnel on Taiwan have the capability to operate and maintain CBR equipment. As a result, CHMAAG recommended "that the combat planning guidance be revised to show CBR defensive protection for all Services as a Group I versus a Group III priority of funding for material and training requirements."³

~~(S)~~ A week later, on 14 March 1967, CINCPAC requested CINCUSARPAC to peruse this proposal of CHMAAG China and furnish his comments and recommendations within a week.⁴ In reply, CINCUSARPAC stated his concurrence of the basic proposal and added:

MAP funding for this project is most desirable.
The use of non-MAP dollars in support of this recommendation is not considered to be appropriate.⁵

~~(S)~~ Following a thorough review of the proposal, CINCPAC forwarded his comments by message to CHMAAG China on 10 April 1967.⁶ Although "some increase in CHICOM CBR offensive capability has been reported," stated Adm Sharp, "the CBR threat is not evaluated as requiring the same urgency for defensive measures against the conventional weapons threat."⁷ Therefore, in view of austerity of MAP funds and conventional defensive requirements, the request to revise the CBR priority "is not favorably considered at this time. Should funds in excess of that required to meet immediate requirements for Groups I & II objectives

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1. Intv, LtCol Wilford E. Overgaard, USMC, MAP Br, J5, Hq CINCPAC, with Mr. Strobridge, Senior Historian, CINCPAC HistBr, 2 Jan 68.
 2. Ltr, CHMAAG China to CINCPAC, 7 Mar 67, Subj: CBR Defenses.
 3. J5 History, Hq CINCPAC, Apr 67.
 4. Ltr, CINCPAC to CINCUSARPAC, 14 Mar 67, Serial No. 000136, Subj: CBR Defenses.
 5. 1st Ind, Hq USARPAC to CINCPAC, 21 Mar 67, to ibid.
 6. CINCPAC 102115Z Apr 67.
 7. Ibid.

become available, CBR defense requirements may be programmed under current guidance.¹ No new developments arose prior to the end of the calendar year to alter the status of this proposal.²

Use of MAP-Furnished Equipment and Facilities in Support of non-MAP Units

(S) On 7 February 1967, CHMAAG China forwarded a request to CINCPAC and recommended approval of it. This request from DCGSLOG, MND, ROC, was for authority to use MAP-furnished equipment and facilities in support of non-MAP units, as well as a suspension of the change in end-use of MAP-furnished equipment and facilities procedures upon implementation of OPlan ROCHESTER.³ CINCPAC, in turn, requested COMUSTDC and CINCUSARPAC to make comments and recommendations on this request.⁴

(S) COMUSTDC replied on 24 February 1967 that he recommended disapproval of this request for the following two reasons:

A. Diversion of MAP Equip to non-MAP supported units during a period of accelerated military activity would probably be detrimental to combat effectiveness of the MAP supported units for which equip was intended....

B. Automatic suspension of controls over end-use procedures could lead to rapid dissipation of already critical resources and make later recovery of controls difficult.⁵

Moreover, continued COMUSTDC, if an occasion would arise subsequent to the implementation of OPlan ROCHESTER where diversion of MAP equipment and facilities was considered to be necessary by ROC, then he believed "it best to make decision based on available pertinent information and situation existing at the time."⁶

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1. CINCPAC 102115Z Apr 67; J5 History, Hq CINCPAC, Apr 67.
 2. Telcon, LtCol Wilford E. Overgaard, USMC, MAP Br, J5, Hq CINCPAC, with Mr. Strobbridge, Senior Historian, CINCPAC HistBr, 3 Jan 68.
 3. J5 History, Hq CINCPAC, Feb 67; CHMAAG China MGLOG-L 2215/070303Z Feb 67.
 4. CINCPAC 110319Z Feb 67.
 5. COMUSTDC 240122Z Feb 67.
 6. Ibid.

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(S) As for CINCUSARPAC, he concurred with the aforementioned comments of COMUSTDC. In addition, he stated that "lack of in-country U.S. Army resources, small U.S. Army deployed forces, and at least 60 days arrival time for surface shipments gives USARPAC minimal capability to fill emergency requirement, as required by OPlan ROCHESTER, unless estimates are furnished by COMUSTDC for planning purposes."¹

(S) When CINCPAC replied on 4 March 1967 to CHMAAG China, he stated that he also concurred in the comments and recommendations of COMUSTDC. In addition, he considered "that any pre-hostilities agreement to divert MAP equipment to support non-MAP units upon implementation of OP PLAN ROCHESTER could be counter-productive to influencing a reduction of ground forces in consonance with MAM guidance."² For all practical purposes, this message of CINCPAC terminated all further discussions of this topic for the rest of the calendar year.³

Electronic Countermeasures (ECM) Survey

(S) The Government of the Republic of China (GRC) has had a desire for some time of developing an ECM capability to cope with CHICOM radar and interdiction. To further their design, the Chinese initiated negotiations in 1966 with the Bendix Corporation, hoping to secure the needed technological assistance for China's newly-established Chungshan Institute of Science and Technology, which is under the GRC Ministry of National Defense. Bendix proposed conducting a six-month survey to find out what ECM equipment would be needed to jam the 17 CHICOM radar sites; meanwhile, a company representative informally estimated that the overall cost of China's developing the required ECM capability would run up to \$5 million. At the same time, the Chinese asked a controlled American source (CAS) to act as executive agent for the U.S. Government and to help secure U.S. approval of proposed Bendix-China deal. The GRC also requested the COMUSTDC and CHMAAG for extensive MAP support of land-based, ship, and airborne ECM.⁴

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1. J5 History, Hq CINCPAC, Feb 67; CINCUSARPAC GPLO-MM 5460/020414Z Mar 67.
 2. CINCPAC 040159Z Mar 67.
 3. Intv, LtCol Wilford E. Overgaard, USMC, MAP Br, J5, Hq CINCPAC, with Mr. Strobridge, Senior Historian, CINCPAC HistBr, 2 Jan 68.
 4. Point Paper, J323, Hq CINCPAC, 12 Dec 66, Subj: GRC ECM Capability.

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(S) In August 1966, the Secretary of Defense agreed to the dispatching of a Tri-Service Team to Taiwan to assist the MAAG China in formulating specific recommendations in connection with GRC desires for ECM capability. This course of action had been taken apparently in an attempt to discourage the GRC from its intentions of purchasing an offensive ECM capability from the Bendix Corporation.¹ An advance copy of the survey team's report reached Hq CINCPAC prior to the end of the year, but CINCPAC took no action, preferring to wait until the comments of CH-MAAG China arrived before making his own recommendations to the JCS.

(S) MAAG China forwarded the survey team's MTT 4-67 report on 13 January 1967.² It concluded that: (1) GRC was determined to acquire an electronic warfare capability with or without U.S. assistance; (2) basic electronic skills existed in the GRC to execute an electronic warfare program if training and equipment were provided; (3) unless an effective electronic warfare program was initiated in accordance with U.S. policy and guidance, the GRC might well start one of its own which, because of lack of knowledge in concept, doctrine, and tactics, would not only be ineffective but might also be dangerous to both GRC and U.S. interests. Accordingly, the team recommended that an exception to existing national policy be made in the case of China, that the JCS limitations on disclosure of ECM information to GRC forces to only a CONFIDENTIAL security classification be reviewed and restated in order to permit effective training of GRC personnel in Electronic Warfare (EW) at the SECRET level.

(S) CINCPAC, upon review of the survey team's report, concurred in all of the findings but one, for he felt that providing direction finding equipment to China without offering a means of countering targets discovered would only add frustration to the GRC. On 18 March 1967, therefore, CINCPAC recommended to the JCS that, if intercept and direction finding equipment was furnished, then a minimal active ECM capability should also be provided. The rationale behind this recommendation was that it is extremely difficult to differentiate between offensive and defensive ECM, since countermeasures to deny use of communications and/or radars during defensive operations could have similar application to offensive operations. Moreover, a minimal active ECM capability possessed by the Chinese, but under U.S. influence and conceptual indoctrination,

1. Point Paper, J323, Hq CINCPAC, 12 Dec 66, Subj: GRC ECM Capability. For further background information, see pages 243-5 of CINCPAC Command History 1966.
2. J5 History, Hq CINCPAC, Jun 67.

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would be more favorable to U.S. interest than a unilateral GRC action.¹

~~(S)~~ A month later, CHMAAG China queried about an interim response on the MTT 4-67 Report, which he could release to the Chinese, pending final determination of the report. He was told to say that the report was being reviewed by appropriate authorities at the Washington level, and that a response was anticipated by mid-June 1967. On 25 June 1967, CINCPAC notified CHMAAG China that the JCS recommendations on the MTT 4-67 Report had been forwarded to the Secretary of Defense for his decision on 13 June.²

~~(S)~~ Final approval, when it came on 14 August 1967, was in the form of a JCS Memorandum (JCSM-555-67); it approved limited EW training for GRC forces and set forth specific policy and guidance for the conduct of an ECM Warfare Program by the Chinese.³ CINCPAC immediately passed on this decision to CHMAAG China, COMUSTDC, and his component commanders. In addition, CINCPAC requested MAAG China to submit quarterly progress reports in lieu of annual reports in order to assist in monitoring this program in a timely fashion; component commanders were to receive informational copies of these quarterly reports.⁴

~~(S)~~ At this point, it would appear that the JCS Memorandum and CINCPAC's response had terminated any further action by Hq CINCPAC planners for the rest of the year, but a message from CHMAAG China on 28 December 1967 reopened the subject.⁵ It requested CINCPAC to query each of the services to ask for their support and their capability to provide certain services in order to implement the recommendations of JCSM-555-67.

~~(S)~~ The list of CHMAAG China's suggested queries ranged from a Mobile Training Team, which could provide "an EW training course in depth to qualify GRC AF, Army, and Naval Staff Officers and which could also give orientation instructions to Senior GRC officers," as well as five other services, such as "intensive training in tactical deception

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1. J5 History, Hq CINCPAC, Jun 67; CINCPAC 182010Z Mar 67.
 2. CHMAAG China MGOP-OPS 4312/190933Z Apr 67; JCS 3534/242349Z Apr 67; CINCPAC 250001Z Jun 67.
 3. J5 History, Hq CINCPAC, Aug 67.
 4. CINCPAC 281946Z Aug 67.
 5. Intvs, LtCol Wilford E. Overgaard, USMC, MAP Br, J5, and LtCol C.R. Casey, USMC, MAP Training Br, J3, Hq CINCPAC, with Mr. Strobridge, Senior Historian, CINCPAC HistBr, 4 Jan 68.

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operations" for the Chinese Navy, to what CONUS schools and courses were available for selected senior staff officers orientation in EW and for "depth instruction for the GRC ECM school instructors."¹ "In view of the drastic cut in China MAP for FY 68 and predicted FY 69 MAP funds," the message continued, CINCPAC was requested to "explore service funding of the costs of the MTT and service schools" because this was "particularly urgent since MAAG China was committed to this assistance before the announcement of MAP cut."²

(U) As a result of this message, the office of primary interest within Hq CINCPAC was changed from the J5 Division to the J3 Division. At year's end, a J3 action officer was preparing an appropriate message as a result of the CHMAAG China's one.³

Feasibility of Raising Ceiling on FMS Expenditures by GRC

(S) On 3 October 1967, the Secretary of State requested the views of the China Country Team on the feasibility of raising the \$10-15 million annual ceiling limitation on expenditures for credit and cash sales to GRC military.⁴ Twenty days later, the JCS requested CINCPAC's views on this subject, since they would be helpful in an assesment of the capability of "GRC to increase its foreign military expenditures."⁵

(S) On 2 November 1967, the American Embassy at Taipei replied to the Secretary of State's request by means of a 10 page message, which provided a comprehensive assessment of the impact on GRC's economy by raising the FMS ceiling. Among other things, this assessment stated:

...GRC military budget has increased in the past and is expected to continue to increase at a faster pace than actual or anticipated increases in GNP. Thus, any increases in GRC purchases of military facilities, equipment and supplies (all of which are basically of a non-revenue-producing nature) above historic levels will result in an additional allocation of limited resources which would otherwise be available for social and economic

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1. CMAAG Taiwan MGMND-D 12-314/281055Z Dec 67.
 2. Ibid.
 3. Intv, LtCol C.R. Casey, USMC, MAP Training Br, J3, Hq CINCPAC, with Mr. Strobridge, Senior Historian, CINCPAC HistBr, 4 Jan 68.
 4. STATE 47616/030115Z Oct 67.
 5. JCS 9675/232225Z Oct 67.

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infrastructure projects which are essential if Taiwan is to continue to sustain a favorable rate of economic development, i. e. , additional increases in GRC military budget expenditures, without corresponding decreases in other budgetary expenditures, will be at the expense of capital accumulation or private consumption. . . . In terms of financial analyses, additional purchases of military equipment and supplies with foreign exchange would tend to aggravate GRC budgetary deficit which is already equivalent to 20 percent of total central and provincial government budgets, and, in absence of remedial measures, could act as stimulant to inflation. ¹

~~(S)~~ The China Country Team also concluded that the GRC would not be likely to reduce its force level or structure of its armed forces as a consequence of any MAP reductions. Instead, it more likely would seek to maintain its force by increasing its FMS to whatever amount it considered necessary. In the opinion of the Country Team, however, the "GRC might be convinced to reduce the size of its armed forces if modernization of its services becomes more apparent through the introduction of new aircraft (F-5), additional M-41 tanks, additional naval vessels, etc." ² In addition, the establishment of ROC in-country repair and rebuild facilities for U. S. military equipment from Vietnam would enhance the GRC capability to self-finance corresponding reductions of MAP grant aid.

~~(S)~~ CINCPAC, in a message to the JCS on 4 November 1967, concurred in the development of an in-country rehabilitation and rebuild on Taiwan of U. S. military equipment from Vietnam. It was considered that if payment on these contracts could be tied to purchases in U. S. of required military supplies and equipment, an effective "barter exchange" of goods and services would be effected without detriment to the U. S. balance of payments. ³

~~(S)~~ In conclusion, CINCPAC stated that:

To face realistically the problem of declining China MAP dollars, recommend that the country team be authorized to discuss with the GRC the probable future fiscal constraints. Such discussions, when developed within a sphere of mutual

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1. AMEMB Taipei 1267/020105Z Nov 67.
 2. Ibid.
 3. J5 History, Hq CINCPAC, Nov 67.

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understanding, would promote better integrated and more acceptable FMS and Military Assistance Programs.¹

(U) Two months later, at the year's end, the status of this action remained the same.²

Co-Production of Helicopters and Aircraft

(S) On 6 October 1967, CHMAAG China provided CINCPAC with a concept for the development of an in-country capability to assemble/co-produce helicopters and advanced fighter aircraft. "This concept," pointed out CHMAAG China, "is in consonance with the MAAG objectives of gradually phasing out grant aid by increasing the self-sufficiency program of the GRC armed forces and encourage the GRC to purchase within fund limitations through FMS, equipment that cannot be provided because of MAP fund ceilings."³

(S) In his message, CHMAAG China mentioned how a preliminary MAAG study had indicated that the GRC could develop a capability to co-produce helicopters and advanced fighters with U.S. assistance. In addition, the Chinese desired to attain this assembly/co-production capability as soon as possible. Once the ROC armed forces operational requirements had been met by this development, then the GRC wanted to continue the program and provide export sales to third country nations, thus enhancing its economic stability and increasing its self-sufficiency.

(S) In the event that his proposed concept received favorable consideration in Hq CINCPAC, CHMAAG China recommended that:

...a DOD/industry team of specialists, funded at DOD level, be dispatched to represent the USG in a joint USG/GRC feasibility study to assess in-country capability of the ROC to assemble/co-produce helicopters and advanced fighter aircraft, as well as to study cost factors. This study should give the Country Team sufficient basic data upon which to make a decision whether or not... such a major project be undertaken.⁴

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1. CINCPAC 042148Z Nov 67.
 2. Intv, LtCol Wilford E. Overgaard, USMC, MAP Br, J5, Hq CINCPAC, with Mr. Strobridge, Senior Historian, CINCPAC HistBr, 4 Jan 68.
 3. CHMAAG Taipei MGCSF 10-33/060831Z Oct 67.
 4. Ibid.

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(S) On 23 October 1967, CINCPAC forwarded his comments on CH-MAAG China's concept to the Secretary of Defense. He stated how the Country Team, in conjunction with the GRC, had gone as far as practical in determining the feasibility of in-country capability to co-produce helicopters and aircraft. Furthermore, in view of declining MAP dollars and in order for the U.S. to assist the GRC in attaining military sufficiency, CINCPAC recommended "that a DOD/industry team analyze and evaluate the GRC's ability to develop a co-production capability for helicopters and fighter aircraft or for components and spare parts thereof."¹

(S) The Secretary of Defense responded to this recommendation for a DOD/industry team to conduct an in-country feasibility study on 21 November 1967. "In order to assess this situation," he stated, "additional data must be made available which would reflect the practicality of the plan, either from the technical industrial viewpoint or as related to financial implications...."² He also posed questions concerning the technical and economic data needed in order to "determine whether the helicopter/aircraft proposal is sufficiently practical to warrant initiating the formation of a technical study team."³ Since this response had went directly to CHMAAG China, with only an informational copy to CINCPAC, J5 planners did not have to take any further action, and the status of this project remained unchanged at the end of the calendar year.⁴

ROC Rebuild of HAWK Missiles

(S) On 18 November 1967, CINCPAC advised CHMAAG China about the estimate of "HAWK missile rebuild cost at \$10,000 per missile," as well as the information that indicated "MAP payback to Army for the FY 68 HAWK missile rebuild requirement could be financed from either FY 68, 69 or 70 MAP," and asked for his opinions "concerning funding the HAWK rebuild over that period."⁵ Six days later, CHMAAG replied that the:

... program is recognized as being important and highly desirable. Estimated cost for MAAG China is \$580,000 for rebuild of 68 missiles plus \$76,000 to

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1. CINCPAC 232240Z Oct 67; J5 History, Hq CINCPAC, Oct 67.
 2. SECDEF 3344/212246Z Nov 67.
 3. Ibid.
 4. Intv, LtCol Wilford E. Overgaard, USMC, MAP Br, J5, Hq CINCPAC, with Mr. Strobridge, Senior Historian, CINCPAC HistBr, 2 Jan 68.
 5. CINCPAC 182329Z Nov 67.

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modify the remaining 76 missiles to the same configuration. This gives a program cost of approximately \$756,000.

2. We have informed all concerned since we were first notified of this program in May 67, that MAAG China funds were not available in FY 68, FY 69 or FY 70. In light of anticipated major reduction in the MAAG China program for FY 68, reimbursement from MAAG China is out of the question. In view of this, it is recommended that the program be financed with Army funds without repeat without pay-back from MAP.

3. In the event MAP must bear the cost of this program then MAAG China must decline the offer to participate. This will result in a further degradation and deterioration of the air defense posture.¹

~~(S)~~ On 13 December 1967, CINCPAC, while on a trip, received a message from his Hq, recommending "the rebuild and/or modifications of the TAIWAN HAWK missiles to be accomplished by one of the alternative methods," which follows: (1) "At 'no cost' to MAP;" (2) "With funds to be provided as an 'add-on' to China MAP;" (3) "With costs to be covered by incremental programming/funding over three or more years."² CINCPAC, however, disapproved these funding procedures. In addition, when Hq CINCPAC requested CINCUSARPAC's comments on the possibility of Army funding for HAWK rebuild by the Chinese, a non-concurrence was received. In the end, RAdm J. N. Shaffer, USN, J03, Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Assistance, Logistics, and Administration, Hq CINCPAC, "assigned action on funding to J5."³

AC&W Improvement

~~(S)~~ Following the penetration of the Taiwan Air Defense System by a defecting IL-28 without detection, the Country Team made a case

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1. CHMAAG China MGARAL-O 11-33/240301Z Nov 67.
 2. ADMINO CINCPAC 130338Z Dec 67.
 3. J4 History, Hq CINCPAC, Dec 67.

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for additional radars to improve the low-level coverage of the Republic of China (ROC).¹ By early December 1966, an AN/TPS-1 had been installed at Wu Chu, which would close the 500 yard gap approaching the center of Taiwan. CHMAAG China, however, did not consider this set fully operational. Accordingly, he programmed an AN/FPS-8 at Tung Yin, which would provide approximate low-level coverage, in the FY 67 shortfall at a very low priority.

(S) CINCPAC, moreover, had PACGEEIA perform a survey to determine whether or not better radar coverage could be obtained by relocation of existing radar facilities. The findings indicated that all gaps could be eliminated by just relocating three heavy radars. CINCPAC forwarded a copy of this report to CHMAAG China on 22 November 1966.

(S) In CINCPAC's opinion, the ROC Government had AC&W equipment, including ECCM capability, comparable to other countries in PACOM. Gaps existed in low-level coverage of Taiwan--as there existed in every other PACOM country--but these could be removed by relocating existing radars. At the end, both CINCPAC and CHMAAG China agreed that the Chinese should be assisted in developing ways and means of improving their AC&W System within China's resources.

Delivery of F-5 Aircraft to ROCAF

(S) "Eight F-5A aircraft delivered in Taiwan on 13 July 67, " reported a message from MAAG China.² These aircraft were the first increment for the second ROCAF F-86F squadron to be converted to F-5A/Bs. They were assigned to the 3d Tactical Fighter Squadron at Tainan Air Base.³

(S) The introduction of the F-5 onto Taiwan had occurred two years previous, when 7 F-5As and 2 F-5Bs arrived on 26 November 1965. The first Chinese unit to be converted to the F-5s, the 1st Tactical Fighter

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1. The following information on ROC AC&W Improvement has been derived from: Point Paper, J613, Hq CINCPAC, 5 Dec 66, Subj: Taiwan (GRC) AC&W Improvement; Point Paper, J614, Hq CINCPAC, 21 Feb 67, Subj: Taiwan (GRC) AC&W Improvement.
 2. CHAFSECMAAG China MGAFF-MM 737/180815Z Jul 67.
 3. J4 History, Hq CINCPAC, Jul 67.

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Squadron, had its unit equipment allowance (UE) filled, when "10 F-5A aircraft were delivered on 8 October 1966."

(S) Actually, the F-5A/B is the major USAF modernization weapon system designed to replace the F-86F, and it accounts for the majority of USAF investment costs for China MAP. The existing MAP modernization plan is to convert eight ROCAF Tactical Fighter Squadrons from F-86F to F-5A/B aircraft over the period FY 64-71. One hundred and sixty-one aircraft (141 F-5A and 20 F-5B) would be required for unit equipment and attrition. At 1967 prices, these would cost ~~\$122~~, 249, 339. 00. The normal UE was planned as 16 F-5As and 2 F-5Bs, for a total of 18 aircraft per squadron.

(S) During August and September 1967, 9 new F-5As and 1 F-5B were turned over to the ROCAF. As the second increment, they were also assigned to the 3d Tactical Fighter Squadron at Tainan Air Base, which completed this unit's conversion from F-86Fs. These aircraft had been programmed in the FY 66 China MAP and were delivered on aircraft delivery project MAP 6F-377. By October, the squadron had a Combat Capability Rating of C-3. At year's end, a total of 48 F-5As and 5 F-5Bs had been delivered to the Chinese, but 3 F-5Bs had been attrited, leaving an inventory of 50.

(S) Programmed in the FY 68 China MAP were 28 F-5As and 2 F-5Bs, while the FY 69 China MAP had 28 F-5As and 5 F-5Bs scheduled. First indication of danger to these programs came on 6 October 1967. On this date, the Secretary of Defense notified all concerned that imminent FY 68 MAP cuts would directly affect the purchase of F-5s and could place the MA aircraft modernization program in jeopardy.² Then, on 22 November 1967, he directed a reduction in FY 68 China MAP from \$90 to \$50 million, which was further reduced to \$44 million the next month.³ Moreover, on 16 December, the Secretary

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1. CINCPAC Command History 1966, p. 183. Unless otherwise cited, the following information contained in this subsection on Chinese F-5s has been derived from: J4 History, Hq CINCPAC, Oct 67; Point Paper, J4333, Hq CINCPAC, 9 Jan 68, Subj: Status of MAP F5A/B Aircraft Program; Intv, LtCol Alvin W. Banner, USAF, MAP Br, J4, Hq CINCPAC, with Mr. Strobridge, Senior Historian, CINCPAC Hist Br, 23 Jan 68.
 2. SECDEF 8207/061413Z Oct 67.
 3. SECDEF 3385/220549Z Nov 67; SECDEF 5321/160036Z Dec 67.

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advised that the tentative program level for FY 69 China MAP would be reduced from \$90 to \$30.4 million.¹

(S) In order to meet these MAP reductions, all F-5A/Bs had to be deleted from both the FY 68 and FY 69 programs. The impact of this policy decision to reduce China MAP had far-reaching repercussions. These F-5A/B "deletions will jeopardize the world-wide F5 MA Program and could result in cancellation of entire F5A/B modernization program," unless the Secretary of Defense can find other means to continue the production line.² On this ominous note, calendar 1967 ended and the new one commenced.

F-86F Disposition Instructions, ROCAF

(S) Some F-86F aircraft, reported CHMAAG China on 19 October 1967, would become surplus to ROCAF requirements as tactical fighter squadrons converted to F-5A/B aircraft. As he told CINCPAC, there was a need for timely disposition instructions as the F-86Fs were declared excess by the GRC Minister of National Defense. Within the PACOM area, however, there was "no present MAP requirement for the excess ROCAF F-86F aircraft."³ CINCPAC, therefore, requested the Chief of Staff, Air Force (CSAF), on the 21st to provide tentative disposition instructions in order to plan for an orderly phase down of the F-86Fs after they had been declared excess by the Chinese. Meanwhile, he instructed MAAG China to submit a report of redistributable MAP property, in accordance with Volume IX, AFM 67-1, as soon as the declarations of excess had been received from the GRC.

(S) Six days later, the CSAF replied that, "Currently there are no requirements for F-86F A/C however, the situation may change prior to China officially declaring F-86F excess therefore planned disposition instructions cannot be provided at this time."⁴ In the two remaining months of the calendar year, the status of this project did not change substantially.⁵

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1. SECDEF 5355/161744Z Dec 67.
 2. Point Paper, J4333, Hq CINCPAC, 9 Jan 68, Subj: Status of MAP F5A/B Aircraft Program.
 3. CINCPAC 210212Z Oct 67; J4 History, Hq CINCPAC, Oct 67.
 4. CSAF 272324Z Oct 67.
 5. Intv, LtCol Alvin W. Banner, USAF, MAP Br, J4 Hq, CINCPAC, with Mr. Strobridge, Senior Historian, CINCPAC Hist Br, 6 Jan 68.

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F-104G Aircraft

(S) The Republic of China Air Force (ROCAF) began the year 1967 with an inventory of 50 F-104Gs, 6 TF-104Gs, and 8 RF-104Gs. On 13 December 1966 had been delivered the last four F-104Gs scheduled for ROCAF under Project MAP4F-388 and produced in Canada under a joint U. S. -Canadian cost sharing arrangement. This delivery completed the total quantity programmed for the three Fighter Interceptor Squadrons at Chen Chiang Kung Air Base. The TF-104Gs were assigned to the 3rd Fighter Group, which consisted of the 7th, 8th, and 28th Fighter Interceptor Squadrons, while the RF-104Gs were assigned to the 12th Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron at Taoyuan Air Base.¹

GRC Presidential Firepower Demonstration

(S) CINCPAC granted authority to ROCAF on 24 September 1967 for the "expenditure of 16 ea LAU-3/A rocket launchers during 18 Oct 67 GRC presidential firepower demonstration of F5 acft."² This demonstration was the first public appearance of the F-5A/B weapons system, since it was introduced into the ROCAF on 25 November 1965. The LAU-3 A rocket launchers were taken from the War Reserve assets on hand at that time. This firepower demonstration for President Chiang Kai-shek was an attempt to create a favorable image of the F-5A/B weapons system and to cultivate maximum budgetary assistance from the GRC Ministry of National Defense.

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1. J4 History, Hq CINCPAC, Jan 67.
 2. CINCPAC 240010Z Sep 67. Other sources consulted in writing this subsection were J4 History, Hq CINCPAC, Sep 67, and Telcon, LtCol Alvin W. Banner, USAF, MAP Br, J4, Hq CINCPAC, with Mr. Strobridge, Senior Historian, CINCPAC HistBr, 1 Feb 68.

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Japan

(S) "The Japanese Self Defense Forces, primarily as a result of military assistance given in past years, are now capable of maintaining internal security, providing security for United States and Japanese bases and, in coordination with U.S. forces, assisting in the defense of Japan. However, the Japanese recognize that further improvements in defense capabilities are needed. The recently approved Third Defense Buildup Plan will provide a significant improvement in air defense and anti-submarine forces over the next five years.

The United States has a major interest in the execution of Japanese defense buildup plans. First, as the Japanese defensive posture improves, the demand on U.S. Forces decreases; and second, it is in the interest of the United States and Japan that their forces be logistically compatible and mutually supporting. The United States has another interest in Japanese defense buildup plans--that of potential sales of U.S. equipment. While Japanese defense industry has made great progress, Japan must continue to look elsewhere for much sophisticated equipment.

Our small MAAG in Japan, through long years of close association with the Japanese military, has developed and maintained a close rapport and position of confidence with the Japanese. Through this working relationship the MAAG is able to exert a great influence on the Self Defense Forces' buildup plans and promote sales of our military hardware. "


Admiral U. S. G. Sharp¹

1. CINCPAC 13 Apr 67 MAP Statement.

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JAPAN

AS OF 1 NOVEMBER 1967

| BASIC INFORMATION | |  | OVERALL OBJECTIVE | U.S. DIPLOMATIC MISSION |
|--|--|---|--|--|
| AREA 143,000 SQ. MI. POPULATION 100 MILLION ANNUAL GROWTH9% ARABLE LAND PERCAP 0.2 ACRES LITERACY RATE 97% LIFE EXPECTANCY 67 YEARS GROSS NAT. PROD. 1967 (E) \$95.5 BILLION PER CAPITA \$955 DEFENSE BUDGET 1967 (E) SELF FINANCED. \$1,146 MILLION AS % GNP 1.2% AS % OF TOTAL BUDGET 8.0% | | | | TO RETAIN U.S. BASES AND FACILITIES WITH ATTENDANT RIGHTS (PORT ACCESS AND OVERFLIGHT); AND ASSIST ALL EFFORTS TO PROMOTE AMERICAN INFLUENCE. |
| EMPEROR - Hirohito PRIME MINISTER - Eisaku Sato MINISTER FOREIGN AFFAIRS - Takeo Miki DIR-GEN JAPAN DEFENSE AGENCY (JDA) - Kaneshichi Masuda CHAIRMAN, JOINT STAFF COUNCIL (JDA) - GEN Yoshifusa Amano, ARMY CHIEF, GROUND STAFF GSDF - GEN Seiichi Yoshie, ARMY CHIEF, MARITIME STAFF MSDF - ADM Takachi Itaya, NAVY CHIEF, AIR STAFF, ASDF - GEN Hirokuni Muta, AF DIR-GEN, MARITIME SAFETY AGENCY - Noburo Kameyama | | | MAP OBJECTIVE General objectives are: (A) To draw the Japanese into assumption of larger responsibility for the security of Asia. (B) To assist in the qualitative improvement of Japanese forces. (C) To elicit an increase and an improved allocation of Japanese defense expenditures. (D) To maintain a climate in which the U.S. will continue to enjoy existing, and if required, additional overflight, staging, and base rights. | |
| MAJOR FORCE OBJECTIVES FY 73-76 | | TOTAL COUNTRY FORCES | COMBAT CAPABILITY | |
| ARMY | 12 INF DIVS, 1 MECH DIV, 1 ABN BDE, 1 SCH BDE, 16 ARTY BNS, 3 TANK BNS, 26 SPT BNS, 6 HAWK BNS, 3 AAA BNS. | 12 INF DIVS, 1 MECH DIV, 1 ABN BDE, 1 SCH BDE, 12 ARTY BNS, 3 TANK BNS, 29 SPT BNS, 2 HAWK BNS, 6 AAA BNS. | MAINTAIN INTERNAL SECURITY AND CONDUCT LIMITED DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS. | |
| NAVY | 1 CVHS, 51 DD/DE TYPES, 16 SS, 30 PC/PF/PT, 48 MINE WARFARE SHIPS, 10 ASW PAT SQNS, 4 ASW HELO SQNS, 1 SAR SQN, 7 LST/LSM. | 36 DD/DE TYPES, 11 SS, 32 PC/PF/PT, 46 MINE WARFARE SHIPS, 10 ASW PAT SQNS, 3 ASW HELO SQNS, 1 SAR SQN, 1 SAR SQN, 4 LST/LSM. | LIMITED ABILITY TO ESCORT COASTAL CONVOYS; 1 ASW SQN OPERATIONALLY EFFECTIVE; GOOD MINE SWEEPING CAPABILITY. HIGH DEGREE OF READINESS. | |
| AIR FORCE | 12 AW FTR SQN, 1 AEW SQN, 6 NIKE BNS, 4 TAC FTR SQN, 1 TAC RECON SQN, 1 WX SQN, 11 SAR DGT, 2 TRANS SPT SQN. | 13 AW FTR SQNS, 2 NIKE BNS, 4 TAC FTR SQNS, 1 TAC RECON SQN, 9 SAR DET, 2 TRANS SPT SQNS. | GOOD UNDER VFR CONDITIONS; AMX CAPABILITY GROWING. SMALL SIZE AND AIRCRAFT FIRE CONTROL SYSTEM LIMITS CAPABILITY. CAPABLE OF PROVIDING TACTICAL SUPPORT FOR BOTH GROUND AND NAVAL FORCES. | |


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
SOURCE: PACOM Digest, Nov 67, p. 134.

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
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
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


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Acquisition of NIKE-HERCULES and HAWK Missiles Weapons Systems

(S) Early in 1966, the U. S. offered two NIKE battalions to the Government of Japan (GOJ) either through FMS, barter, Army excess sale, or co-production. Despite the repeated renewal of the option date of this offer at the request of the Japanese Defense Agency (JDA), "the Japanese had not yet made a decision on the NIKE acquisition" by the end of the year.

(O) On 16 March 1967, COMUSJAPAN reported to CINCPAC that the "3rd Defense Buildup Plan as approved by National Defense Council and by Cabinet on 14 March" was included in the Japan FY 67 Defense Budget, which would be presented to the Diet.³ It provided for the activation of two additional NIKE-HERCULES battalions, for a total of four, with preparations for the activation of another one.

(U) At this time, the method which Japan would use to acquire these additional battalions was not known. It was not expected, however, that the Japan Self Defense Force (JSDF) would select the U. S. barter proposal to offset the cost of equipping the new battalions. The opinion of MAAG Japan was the JSDF would procure "the ground equipment through FMS and the missiles through a co-production program."⁴

(O) Negotiations between the U. S. and Japan over this issue continued throughout most of 1967.⁵ Finally, the GOJ decided to acquire the additional NIKE-HERCULES and HAWK battalions through a U. S. -Japan co-production

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1. Ibid.; STATE 062300Z Oct 67; AMEMB Tokyo 200100Z Nov 67; STATE 022149Z Nov 67; STATE 242247Z Nov 67.
 2. CINCPAC Command History 1966, p. 264.
 3. COMUSJAPAN USOAC 03101/161320Z Mar 67.
 4. J4 History, Hq CINCPAC, Mar 67.
 5. For example, see SECDEF 1713/191909Z Jul 67.

program rather than through direct purchase or barter arrangements. A Memorandum of Understanding between the JDA and the U. S. DOD was negotiated for each missile system and signed on 13 October 1967. Under the terms of the agreement, the JDA would acquire on a dependable undertaking basis under FMS from the U.S. the following materiel:

a. NIKE-HERCULES. Two battalions of ground and direct support equipment to be available for delivery during the five-year period of Japanese Fiscal Years (JFY) 1967 through 1971 (1 April 1967 to 31 March 1972); a demonstration unit (training battery); an improved kit for one AJAX battalion; general support and maintenance float equipment; ground modernization equipment for converting two AJAX battalions to Hercules; and battery terminal equipment, AN/GSA-77.

b. HAWK. Battery terminal equipment, AN/GSA-77; and various items required to complete the program.¹

(C) Furthermore, under the terms of the agreement, the following materiel would be produced in Japan:

a. NIKE-HERCULES. 311 missiles for the tactical loads of battalions and annual service practices; two Air Defense Fire Distribution Systems (included in HAWK Memorandum of Understanding); and Battery terminal equipment, AN/GSA-77.

b. HAWK. Three battalions (14 batteries) of ground and support equipment; demonstration unit (training battery); 665 missiles for the tactical loads of battalions and annual service practices; six (AN/TSQ-51J) Air Defense Fire Distribution Systems (4 HAWK and 2 NIKE HERCULES); and battery terminal equipment, AN/GSA-77.²

(C) The U.S. Army Missile Command (USAMICOM) was designated the agency responsible for monitoring and implementing the terms on these co-production agreements. On 8 January 1968, a team from this command briefed CINCPAC's staff members from J43, J53, and J72

1. J4 History, Hq CINCPAC, Dec 67.

2. Ibid.

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offices, on a concept for establishing a field office in Japan to provide on the spot management and technical assistance incidental to the implementation and monitoring of the co-production program. When finalized, the plan for this field office would be distributed to all concerned by DA.¹

Orientation/Influence Training Program

(S) For Japan, there would be no provisions under the FY 68 MAP for an orientation/influence training program. Not only did neither the State nor Defense Departments have any "wish to reinstate such program," but their "review concerning other possible methods of continuing a minimal military orientation/influence training program for Japan outside MAP but still at US expense has not produced any likely possibilities."²

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1. Memo For Record, LtCol Roddey B. Moss, USMC, J4342, Hq CINCPAC, 8 Jan 68, Subj: USAMICOM Team Briefing on Field Office in Japan for NIKE-HAWK Co-production Program.
 2. SECSTATE 152080/092330Z Mar 67.

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Philippines

"Maintenance of a free, Western oriented, Republic of the Philippines is clearly in our national interest. The unrestricted use of our bases there is vital to the prosecution of the war in Vietnam. The Republic of the Philippines is, in fact, a keystone to our posture in Southeast Asia.

The Filipinos are aware that United States forces provide their first line of defense against external aggression. However, they are a nationalistic people who resist openly acknowledging this fact. They naturally resent any implication of foreign domination. The Filipinos view the Military Assistance Program as a partial compensation for use of our bases in the Philippines, thereby tempering their sensitivity to American military bases on their soil....

The Military Assistance Program for the Philippines is oriented toward developing forces for the maintenance of internal security. Considerable effort is being expended on improving the supply and maintenance capability of the Philippine Armed Forces. A significant example is the initiation of in-country overhaul of Philippine Navy ships. This will result in more effective use of military assistance funds.

As you know, the Philippines have a contingent of over 2,000 men in South Vietnam. When viewed in terms of the overall size of the Philippine Armed Forces, this is a significant contribution. Hopefully, President Marcos will be successful this fall in gaining Congressional approval for the retention of this unit in Vietnam for another year."

Admiral U. S. G. Sharp¹

1. CINCPAC 13 Apr 67 MAP Statement.


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PHILIPPINES

AS OF 1 NOVEMBER 1967

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| BASIC INFORMATION | |  | OVERALL OBJECTIVE | U.S. DIPLOMATIC MISSION |
|---|---|--|---|---|
| AREA 116,000 SQ.MI. POPULATION 34.6 MILLION ANNUAL GROWTH 3.2% ARABLE LAND PERCAP 0.8 ACRE LITERACY RATE 75% LIFE EXPECTANCY 55 YEARS GROSS NAT. PROD. 1967 (E) 6.3 BILLION PER CAPITA \$182 DEFENSE BUDGET (SELF-FINANCED) 1967 (E) \$79.0 MILLION AS % OF TOTAL BUDGET 13% | | | | TO INCREASE THE EFFICIENCY OF THE PHILIPPINE ARMED FORCES; TO ENCOURAGE PHILIPPINE MILITARY SUPPORT OF SEATO; AND TO MAINTAIN U.S. OPERATED MILITARY INSTALLATIONS IN THE PHILIPPINES |
| PRESIDENT - Ferdinand E. <u>Marcos</u> VICE PRESIDENT - Fernando <u>Lopez</u> SECTY FOREIGN AFFAIRS - Narciso <u>Ramos</u> SECTY NATL DEFENSE - GEN (Ret.) Ernesto S. <u>Mata</u> CHIEF OF STAFF, AFP - GEN Segundo P. <u>VELASCO</u> , AIR FORCE CG, ARMY - BG Romeo C. <u>Espino</u> , ARMY FOIC, NAVY - COMMODORE Pastor G. <u>VIADO</u> , NAVY CG, AIR FORCE - BG Emmanuel S. <u>CASABAR</u> , AF VICE C/S, AFP & CHIEF CONSTABULARY - MG Manuel T. <u>YAN</u> , ARMY | | | MAP OBJECTIVE General objectives are: (A) To support the overriding U.S. policy objective of retaining U.S. base rights in the Philippines. (B) To develop and maintain military/paramilitary forces that are organized, trained and equipped to assure, as their primary mission, the internal security of the Philippines. (C) To support a capability to deploy limited Philippine forces within the SEATO area for mutual defense tasks. | |
| MAJOR FORCE OBJECTIVES | | TOTAL COUNTRY FORCES | COMBAT CAPABILITY | |
| ARMY | 2 INF DIV, 3 BCT, 3 ENG CONST HNS, 1 ABN SPEC FORCES GP, CONSTABULARY (18,000). | 1 LT & REDUCED INF DIV, 3 BCT, 10 ENG CONST BNS, 1 ABN SPEC FORCES GP (REDUCED), CONSTABULARY (18,000), 1 CIV ACT GP in SVN. | MAINTAIN INTERNAL SECURITY, OFFER LIMITED RESISTANCE TO EXTERNAL ATTACK AND CONTRIBUTE BCT TO COLLECTIVE DEFENSE. | |
| NAVY | 2 DE, 11 PC/PCE, 11 PCM, 4 MSC/MSI 1 ATR, 1 SEAL UNIT, 1 MARINE BLT, 6 LST, 3 LSM, 2 ARL, 2 AKL. | 10 PC/PCE, 9 PCM, 2 MSC, 1 ATR, 1 SEAL UNIT (REDUCED STR), 1 MARINE BLT (REDUCED STR), 3 LST, 3 LSM, 1 ARL, 2 AKL. | CONDUCT LIMITED OFF SHORE PATROL AND MINOR AMPHIBIOUS AND ASW OPERATIONS. | |
| AIR FORCE | 1 TAC FTR SQDN, 1 COIN SQDN, 1 COMP RESCUE SQDN, 1 COMP COMBDO SQDN, 1 LIAISON SQDN, 2 TRAN SPT SQDN. | 1 AW INT SQDN, 2 TAC FTR SQDN, 1 COMP RESCUE SQDN, 1 LIAISON SQDN, 2 TRAN SPT SQDN. | LIMITED CAPABILITY TO FULFILL MISSION OF ASSISTING ARMY TO MAINTAIN INTERNAL SECURITY AND CONTRIBUTE TO DEFENSE AGAINST EXTERNAL ATTACK. | |

SOURCE: PACOM Digest, Nov 67, p. 137.

Providing M-16 Rifles to the Philippine Constabulary for Anti-Huk Campaign

(S) In the fall of 1967, General Ernesto S. Mata, the Secretary of National Defense, Republic of the Philippines, "made an urgent plea to Chief JUSMAG that Philippine constabulary (PC) be provided 200 M-16 rifles and 90,000 rounds of ammo as soon as possible for their use against Huks in Tarlac and Pampanga Provinces."¹ For several pertinent reasons, one of which is that these provinces are in the area around Clark AFB, CHJUSMAGPHIL strongly recommended on 22 September 1967 that this request be speedily fulfilled. A similar request had been made by the President of the Philippines, Ferdinand E. Marcos, to the American Ambassador William McCormick Blair, Jr., who felt the U.S. should furnish the requested items.

(S) Although CINCPAC believed that the types and quantities of individual weapons already in the Philippines were adequate for their needs, he placed a great importance upon the fact that the Government of the Philippines (GOP) felt that these M-16s would have "a most significant morale impact in the campaign against the Huks."² Accordingly, he recommended to the JCS on 3 October that 200 M-16 rifles from the September production be allocated to the Philippines. As he saw it:

A U.S. refusal to honor this request would likely be viewed by the GOP as reflecting lack of concern for its law and order problems. Expenditure of \$35,000 in MAP funds for this purpose would have a favorable impact far out of proportion to the amount involved.³

(S) On the same day, the JCS replied that "OASD/ISA presently staffing a recommendation by Secretary Air Force that 200 M-16 rifles be loaned Philippine Constabulary from USAF stocks at Clark AB."⁴ Then, on 14 October 1967, the State Department notified its embassy in Manila that the request for 200 M-16 rifles, including the proposed loan from stocks at Clark AFB, had been turned down on the basis that first priority for the limited production of this weapon would have to remain the Vietnam-associated forces.⁵

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1. CHJUSMAGPHIL 220850Z Sep 67.
 2. CINCPAC 030137Z Oct 67.
 3. Ibid.
 4. JCS 7942/032204Z Oct 67.
 5. State 54190/140017Z Oct 67; J5 History, Hq CINCPAC, Oct 67.

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~~(S)~~ Ambassador Blair, with the concurrence of CHJUSMAGPHIL and CG, 13th Air Force, submitted a strong reclama to this decision of the State Department, ending with:

To deny the urgent plea of President Marcos and Defense Secretary Mata for 200 M-16 rifles is expected to have a divisive, adverse effect on the good relations that now exist between the U. S. and G. O. P. Such action will be viewed as a definite disinterest in improving greater control over dissident and lawless elements and may further reduce G. O. P. interest in the security of Clark AFB. Security of Clark AFB per se is considered more important to U. S. than to G. O. P. Interest, in view of the above and the small number of weapons involved, this request appears to be a small price to pay in comparison to the issues involved. Pending procurement of the rifles through future procurement under MAP the immediate loan of M-16s by DOD would be most useful.¹

~~(S)~~ CINCPAC agreed with this reclama and recommended that the JCS support it on 22 October 1967. He knew that the USAF had over 900 M-16 rifles on hand in the Philippines and felt that the "loan of 200 of these rifles to the PC would not degrade unacceptably the self-protection of USAF forces under present circumstances."² Moreover, if 200 M-16s were lent from the USAF stocks at Clark AFB, he could direct CHJUSMAGPHIL to deviate the FY 68 Philippines MAP program to provide 200 replacements, which would be funded immediately with the understanding that delivery would not be effected until after the other requirements of Vietnam-associated forces had been met.

~~(S)~~ On 4 November 1967, the State Department advised those concerned that it could not reconsider its decision at that time, although this "policy is under continual review, but implication should be avoided that M-16's could be made available to Philippine Constabulary in near future."³ The American Embassy in Manila reported on 22 November that "Under Secretary of Defense Syquio... who is ordinarily calm and unemotional, made a strong plea" to an embassy official for these rifles.⁴ Syquio admitted that the military equipment possessed by the PC already "could probably do this job but stressed the strong

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1. AMEMB Manila 3652/201052Z Oct 67.
 2. CINCPAC 220040Z Oct 67.
 3. State 64967/040178Z Nov 67.
 4. AMEMB Manila 4692/220930Z Nov 67.

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psychological need of his forces to have these weapons in view of the fact that the Huks are now in possession of them. "¹

(S) In this report to the State Department, the American Embassy ended with the following strong position:

Believe we have reached a critical moment in possibly resolving internal security problem in the Philippines. For some time we have been urging Marcos to take the gloves off with the Huks and compliance with this relatively small request would encourage him to do so. Huk problem is within readily manageable proportions at this juncture, and now is the time to deal with it as decisively as possible. While we do not predict that it will get out of hand in foreseeable future, the seeds of Communist subversive guerrilla activity are there. Should they take root and branch out, as they did in the fifties, the cost of dealing with this kind of communist activity will be infinitely greater than they would today. The civic action approach and the efforts to increase rural productivity and peasant incomes in the central Luzon are well under way, but the armed police action is also essential.²

(S) Then, on 10 December 1967, the embassy reported another conversation in which U.S. Charge d'Affaires Wilson told President Marcos that "it was absolutely impossible to consider any sort of arrangement unless we could be assured of an all out effort which would clean out the Huks from top to bottom."³ Further U.S. conditions, which President Marcos agreed to, were that the M-16s be loaned and that there would be no publicity about this agreement. A State Department message on the next day reads as follows:

Approval has been received for the loan of M-16s to the Philippine Constabulary... in order to assist in the on-going campaign against the Huk insurgents, we are prepared to lend to Phil Constabulary 200 repeat 200 M-16 rifles and 90,000 rounds of ammunition. These weapons will be loaned from Air Force stocks currently at Clark Air Force Base.⁴

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1. AMEMB Manila 4692/220930Z Nov 67.
 2. Ibid.
 3. AMEMB Manila 5190/101200Z Dec 67; J5 History, Hq CINCPAC, Dec 67.
 4. State 82629/112124Z Dec 67.

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(S) The end of this action came on 13 December 1967, when the rifles and ammunition were loaned to the Armed Forces of the Philippines.¹

Philippine Engineer Construction Battalions (ECBs)

(S) As 1966 ended, "no decision had been made in Washington as to whether the additional five engineer battalions would actually be equipped by the MAP."² The Philippines already had three partially equipped ECBs in existence, with the equipment shortages for these three ECBs and full equipment for two more programmed for delivery in FY 67 MAP. The additional five ECBs were part of the "immediate and drastic" military assistance from the U.S. that President Marcos felt he needed "to dissipate adverse political reaction against him and against the United States arising from his efforts to send troops to Vietnam."³

(S) In early April 1967, the American Embassy in Manila strongly recommended the five additional ECBs, 6-10, be included in the FY 68 Philippines MAP.⁴ Three days later, on the 11th, CINCPAC made the following comment to the JCS:

If decision is made that we can provide equipment for five more ECB's in FY68, recommend we do some hard bargaining with President Marcos before committing ourselves. There is no reason why we should be heckled by Philippine leaders regarding the use of our bases in the Philippines while at the same time they are demanding equipment for five more ECB's. We have repaid the Filipinos amply for the civic action group they sent to Vietnam. In return for equipment for the five ECB's we should get a firm agreement from President Marcos

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1. AMEMB Manila 5328/130955Z Dec 67; J5 History, Hq CINCPAC, Dec 67; Intv, LtCol J. W. Gerwig, USAF, MAP Br, J5, Hq CINCPAC, with Mr. Strobridge, Senior Historian, CINCPAC HistBr, 22 Jan 68.
 2. CINCPAC Command History 1966, p. 286.
 3. Ibid., p. 279.
 4. AMEMB 10402/080914Z Apr 67. Unless otherwise cited, the following information on ECBs for the Philippines was derived from: J5 History, Hq CINCPAC, May 67; J5 History, Hq CINCPAC, Jun 67; J5 History, Hq CINCPAC, Dec 67; Intv, LtCol J. W. Gerwig, USAF, MAP Br, J5, Hq CINCPAC, with Mr. Strobridge, Senior Historian, CINCPAC HistBr, 23 Jan 68.

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that he will steadfastly support, both privately and publicly, our continued use of Clark, Subic, Sangley, Camp John Hay and Mactan.¹

(S) The reaction from the American Embassy in Manila to this recommendation of CINCPAC was a negative one. In a message to the State Department on 26 Apr 67, the following position was taken:

Embassy understands CINCPAC's annoyance with Philippine request for relinquishment Sangley Naval Station, but believe that any attempt to link Sangley issue with question of U.S. equipment ten Philippine engineering construction battalions (ECB) would be fruitless and probably damaging to longer range U.S. interests in Philippines.²

(S) On the same day as the CINCPAC message to JCS, 11 April 1967, the Secretary of Defense added \$4.4 million to the FY 67 Philippines MAP for use in funding one-half of the cost of equipping ECBs 6-10 in the eventuality they were approved; the other half would be funded by deviations from the FY 68 program under the \$22 ceiling.³ Approximately a month later, on 9 May, the Secretary indicated to CINCPAC that a decision on ECBs 6-10 was in its final stages and requested CINCPAC's recommendations on those items could be deviated from the FY 68 Philippines MAP, which CINCPAC forwarded on 24 May 1967.⁴

(S) On 6 June, the Secretary of Defense advised DA that the requirement for approximately two and one-half ECBs was funded in FY 67 Philippine MAP at a cost of \$4.4 million, and that he planned to fund the remaining requirements in FY 68 under Continuing Resolution Authority (CRA). DA was instructed to proceed immediately with implementation planning pending receipt of a MAP order amendment for the total ECB package.⁵

(S) On 13 June, the U.S. Ambassador to the Philippines, William McCormick Blair, Jr., expressed his opinion that the \$22 million ceiling for FY 68 Philippines MAP was wholly inadequate to meet

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1. CINCPAC 112017Z Apr 67.
 2. AMEMB Manila 11007/260825Z Apr 67.
 3. SECDEF 2440/112113Z Apr 67.
 4. SECDEF 4806/092011Z May 67; CINCPAC 242310Z May 67.
 5. SECDEF 7137/061632Z Jun 67.

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America's national security needs. He insisted that, as a minimum, the ceiling should be increased sufficiently to cover the remaining requirements for ECBs 6-10. On this point, CINCPAC firmly supported Ambassador Blair, primarily on the basis that deviations of the FY 68 Philippines MAP required to fund for the ECBs would require deletion of the equipment for the PC that was part of the quid pro quo for the dispatch of the Philippine Civic Action Group (CAG) to Vietnam. ¹

(S) On the first day of FY 68, the Secretary of Defense directed DA to "proceed on priority basis with implementing actions" to deliver the necessary equipment for ECBs 6-10. ² This decision presumably was based upon a letter from President Johnson to President Marcos in which the statement was made that the U.S. would provide equipment for ECBs 6-10. Approximately one-half of the equipment---at a cost of \$4.5 million---was funded by ODMA in the FY 68 Philippine MAP. ³

(S) On 27 October 1967, CHJUSMAGPHIL reported that the Government of the Philippines (GOP) had requested deletions of certain items from the requirements for the ECBs 6-10 and their replacement by the necessary equipment to provide the ECBs with a paving capability. He, in turn, requested that CGUSAMC take action to effect the deletions, but to hold off any action on the additional paving equipment. Items valued at \$129,866 were deleted by CGUSAMC, while CHJUSMAGPHIL reported as late as 27 November 1967 that the additional items "are under study which provide limited paving capability." ⁴

(S) On 1 December 1967, the State Department reported that the first "substantial shipment of equipment for second five ECBs expected to be made during January 1968." ⁵ Toward the end of the month, CINCPAC expressed a concern that GOP might consider the requested paving capability as a part of the U.S. commitment to equip ECBs 6-10 and, if some of these items were delayed significantly, the U.S. "might be subjected to criticism for not fulfilling commitments on timely basis." ⁶ He recommended that explorations be made with the American Embassy in Manila as "how best

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1. AMEMB Manila 1225/130015Z Jun 67; CINCPAC 152345Z Jun 67.
 2. SECDEF 9393/011546Z Jul 67.
 3. SECDEF 1410/142105Z Jul 67.
 4. CHJUSMAGPHIL 250958Z Nov 67; CHJUSMAGPHIL 270800Z Oct 67; CGUSAMC 241736Z Nov 67; CHJUSMAGPHIL 271000Z Nov 67.
 5. State 78088/012246Z Dec 67.
 6. CINCPAC 270418Z Dec 67.

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to fulfill commitment without subjecting USG to possible adverse criticism, and without escalation of cost or the use of premium transportation. "1

Equipping of Philippine ECBs

(S) On 4 February 1966, President Marcos expressed a particular interest in increasing from three to ten the number of ECBs in the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) in order to increase his government's efforts in socio-economic construction projects. Two weeks later, CHJUSMAGPHIL recommended "action on seven engineer constr Bns be studied jointly between CHJUSMAG and COS AFP to determine organization, equipment needed, utilization of these units and types of socio-economic projects intended," with "the results of these joint studies to determine eventual programming of equipment."2 CINCPAC's reaction was that the "requirement for seven additional engineer battalions appears excessive and expensive, but is in consonance with internal security and civic action guidance" given to the Philippines.3 He offered, on 1 March, for the consideration of the Defense Department, the "proposition that Phils provide comparable engineer unit in RVN for each unit activated in Phils or alternatively provide equivalent size logistical support units SVN for each battalion constituted in Phil."4

(C) CHJUSMAG recommended six days later the immediate funding of equipment for the three existing engineer battalions, whose equipment shortages had previously been programmed over a five year planning period. He also advised of the plans of the Republic of the Philippines (ROP) to organize two more battalions, for a total of five, by 15 July 1966, and five more by 15 May 1967.5 On 16 March 1966, the American Ambassador to the Philippines recommended MAP support for the first five of these battalions. The Secretary of State approved on 9 April 1966, the funding in FY 66 of the equipment needed to fill out the three existing battalions as a quid pro quo for the dispatch of the PHILCAG to RVN, but he reserved decision on the remainder. Approximately two months later, the Secretary of Defense directed DA to obtain and earmark the equipment for the three battalions but not to deliver the equipment

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1. CINCPAC 270418Z Dec 67.
 2. CHJUSMAGPHIL 181000Z Feb 66.
 3. CINCPAC 011355Z Mar 66.
 4. Ibid.
 5. CHJUSMAGPHIL 070700Z Mar 66.

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until the dispatch of the PHILCAG. At the time, he noted that the majority of the major items involved would have to come from production with 12-18 month leadtime. ¹

(S) CINCPAC forwarded a definitive listing of all the equipment required to bring the first three battalions up to full Table of Organization and Equipment (TO&E) on 28 August 1966. Two days later, the Secretary of Defense announced his decision to use service funds "to fill out remaining shortages for three existing ECBs under revised TO&E," authorized use of commercial substitutes where lead-time could be shortened thereby, and indicated his approval "to fund two additional ECBs in FY 67 MAP by deferring F-5s and other items." ² On 14 September, CINCPAC sent forward a list of the equipment required for fitting out ECB No. 4 and 5. During the same month, advanced elements of the PHILCAG departed for South Vietnam, thus meeting the Philippines' obligation in the quid pro quo arrangements. ³

(S) President Ferdinand Marcos made a state visit to the United States in September 1966. While in Washington, D. C., he addressed a joint session of Congress, as well as met with President Johnson. Both men recognized the need for the continued assistance of the U. S. in supporting the efforts of President Marcos' administration to strengthen his country's capabilities for internal defense:

A major objective under President Marcos' program is to expand the Philippine Army's civic action capability, and U. S. support for this endeavor was assured by President Johnson who stated 'that the U. S. would within this fiscal year provide equipment for five engineer construction battalions to be engaged in civic action projects contributing to internal security, and would consider furnishing equipment for five more such battalions in the next fiscal year'. ⁴

(S) Because of the considerable high level interest and political implications involved in the matter, the U. S. Army Materiel Command (USAMC) initiated a monthly status report on 25 October 1966, giving data on availability for shipment of equipment for the first three battalions. ⁵

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1. J4 History, Hq CINCPAC, Mar 67.
 2. SECDEF 1422/302202Z Aug 66.
 3. J4 History, Hq CINCPAC, Mar 67.
 4. Journal MA, Dec 66, p. 187.
 5. CGUSAMC 251429Z Oct 66.

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For the same reasons, DA assigned a high priority of "05" to this project, whose unclassified code name was Project ZMN, and requested necessary action be taken to "insure that personnel concerned at all echelons of supply are aware of the urgency to expedite delivery of the equipment required for the 5 ECBs" to the Philippines by 30 June 1967.¹ Towards the end of November, however, the Secretary of Defense warned that, although the U.S. was working toward maximum possible deliveries by June 1967, the Filipinos must recognize "that there are bound to be specific items which just will not be available by that date."²

(C) DA's efforts to expedite the shipments were continuing at the end of calendar year 1966. In December, the ROP Under Secretary of National Defense, Alfonso Arellano, Jrs., informed CHJUSMAGPHIL that President Marcos was very unhappy with the 1 June 1967 delivery date. It appeared:

... that during the discussions in Washington, Marcos was thinking of this year as calendar year 1966 and not Fiscal Year 1967. On 15 January 1967, the Philippine Army will have the personnel for ten construction battalions trained. As a result, Arellano said the President would appreciate any speed up in delivery of equipment possible. Further, he requested that we make piecemeal delivery if this would speed up delivery of any items of equipment.³

(S) Up until 9 March 1967, it appeared that DA might not be able to fully equip the first five ECBs by 30 June as promised. On the 9th, however, the Secretary of Defense stated that it was "mandatory that all actions be taken to meet in-country delivery of 5 ECB's by 30 June 1967," and he authorized DA "to divert from other MAP requirements to extent necessary to meet June delivery commitments," as well as the "use of airlift if required to meet in-country delivery date."⁴ In addition, the issue priority was raised from "05" to "03".⁵

(S) On 14 March 1967, DA established a project task force, with the unclassified code name of GREAT CARIBOU, to "insure delivery

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1. DA 788480/282139Z Oct 66.
 2. Point Paper, J4314, Hq CINCPAC, 20 Feb 67, Subj: Equipping of First Five Phil Engineer Construction Battalions.
 3. CHJUSMAGPHIL 080250Z Dec 66.
 4. SECDEF 8386/092910Z Mar 67.
 5. Point Paper, J4314, Hq CINCPAC, 27 Mar 67, Subj: Equipping of First Five Phil Engineer Construction Battalions.

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of all items in-country by 30 June 1967."¹ Just days earlier, DA had established a reporting system, whereby all concerned with the shipment for the ECBs would be kept informed as to items shipped, name of vessel, estimated time of arrival (ETA), and actual receipt in-country. Items not already shipped from CONUS depots were to be assembled at Red River Army Depot and shipped as a package from the outloading port of Beaumont, Texas, by 20 May, with an ETA in the Philippines of 25 June 1967.²

(C) On 6 April, and again on 26 May 1967, CINCPAC pointed out to CHJUSMAGPHIL the "extreme importance of providing CGUSAMC prompt and accurate info on arrival of Great Caribou material in Philippines."³ On the whole, however, the prescribed reporting system worked well. During these two months, CGUSAMC offered, and CHJUSMAGPHIL accepted, the services of a customer relations team to assist in the accounting for and deprocessing of GREAT CARIBOU equipment and for the initial orientation training of the eventual users. The 11-man team were scheduled to visit the Philippines from 9 June to 9 July 1967.⁴

(C) The SS Louise Lykes departed Beaumont on 24 May, with all the equipment on board that had been assembled at the Red River Army Depot. Its ETA in the Philippines was 18 June. Three crushing and screening plants, unfortunately, were not included in this final sea shipment, since the contractor had failed to make them available. As a result, two were later rushed to Seattle, loaded aboard the SS Tourist, and dispatched with an ETA in Manila of 10 June. The third one was outloaded at Seattle on the SS Haluala with an ETA in Manila of 18 June. Arrangements were made to airlift all other items, which had not made the surface lift.⁵

(C) On 28 June 1967, CHJUSMAGPHIL reported that all the items listed as shipped for Project GREAT CARIBOU had been received in the Philippines and that U. S. Ambassador Blair had officially turned this equipment over to President Marcos on 24 June. Through an administrative error, however, three each shop sets had not been included in the equipment requirements of ECBs No. 1-3 of Project ZMN. Once the oversight was spotted, close liaison between DA and USAMC resulted in these shop sets being shipped on 26 June from Travis AFB, California, in three special

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1. DA 805522/142322Z Mar 67.
 2. DA 804893/092325Z Mar 67; CGUSAMC 58875/202141Z Mar 67.
 3. CINCPAC 062314Z Apr 67; CINCPAC 260350Z May 67.
 4. CINCUSARPAC 15523/200456Z May 67.
 5. J4 History, Hq CINCPAC, May 67.

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mission aircraft, which arrived at Clark AFB, P. I., on the 30th of the month, just in time to fulfill President Johnson's promise.¹ "In view of the fact that President Johnson committed the U. S. to provide this equipment during President Marcos' September 1966 visit to the U. S., only nine months were left in the fiscal year to implement this program, so the Department of Army performance in effecting these deliveries prior to the close of the fiscal year constituted a major accomplishment."²

Changes to FY 68 Philippines MAP

(S) On 10 January 1967, the Secretary of Defense notified CINCPAC that the Philippines MAP for FY 68 had been approved for Congressional presentation at a level of \$22 million and that "Program Amendment dated 9 Jan will reflect status of ODMA master program file being used for preparation congressional presentation document."³ Review of the Program Amendment of 9 January 1967 revealed that two PCEs had been reinstated, and the equipment for five ECBs had been placed in the unapproved file. Five days later, CINCPAC requested the Office of the Secretary of Defense to "delete program lines" for the five ECBs from the Office's unapproved file.⁴ On the same day, CINCPAC dispatched a message to CHJUSMAGPHIL, advising him of the action that had been taken.⁵

(S) During April and May of 1967, CHJUSMAGPHIL made final adjustments to the FY 68 program, reducing the number of PCEs from two to one, and submitted the refined FY 68 program and the FY 69-73 MA Plan for the Philippines.⁶ Then, on 1 July, the Secretary of Defense instructed DA to "proceed on priority basis with implementing actions" for the project to deliver engineer construction equipment for ECBs 6-10.⁷ Approximately one-half of this required equipment, costing \$4.5 million, had been funded in the FY 68 Philippines MAP, which thus placed this

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1. Point Paper, J4314-A, Hq CINCPAC, 28 Jun 67, Subj: Equipping of Philippine Engineer Construction Battalions, PROJECT ZMN (Great Caribou); Point Paper, J4314, Hq CINCPAC, 1 Sep 67, Subj: Equipping of Philippine Engineer Construction Battalions 6-10 Project Code MYL.
 2. Journal MA, Sep 67, p. 169.
 3. SECDEF 3188/101518Z Jan 67; J5 History, Hq CINCPAC, Feb 67.
 4. CINCPAC 152101Z Jan 67.
 5. CINCPAC 152103 Jan 67.
 6. J5 History, Hq CINCPAC, Dec 67.
 7. SECDEF 9393/011546Z Jul 67.

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program over its \$22 million ceiling by this amount. On 22 November 1967, the Secretary of Defense provided tentative country ceilings based on an anticipated New Obligation Authority (NOA) for MAP of \$420 million; the FY 68 Philippines MAP, however, was retained at \$22 million, and the country program had to be adjusted to this ceiling by 28 November.¹

~~(S)~~ CHJUSMAGPHIL forwarded through channels on 24 November the necessary deletions, which would reduce the FY 68 program by \$4.88 million to the desired ceiling. High value items deleted were 1 PCE, 2 65' PCFs, 3 C-47s, 4 UH-1Ds, and 4 MRC-108 radio sets.² Then, on 16 December 1967, the Secretary of Defense further reduced the FY 68 Philippines MAP ceiling to \$21 million on the basis of a total NOA for MAP of \$400 million, requiring that the necessary adjustments to accomplish this new ceiling be in his office by 27 December.³ Before this date, CHJUSMAGPHIL had submitted a \$1 million reduction readjusting the program to the required ceiling; the only high value items deleted were two T-33 aircraft and 1 50' Swiftcraft. With this action terminated any further changes in the FY 68 Philippines MAP during calendar year 1967.⁴

Philippine Munitions Plants

~~(S)~~ On 24 April 1967, CHJUSMAGPHIL received a letter from the Office of the Secretary, Department of National Defense, Republic of Philippines (ROP), which offered the proposal "that the United States establish and operate in the Philippines complete munitions plants for the manufacture of weapons, from small arms to heavy artillery, and ammunition for these weapons, as well as certain types of missiles."⁵ The stated purpose of these plants was to provide Philippine requirements, but U.S. forces and third country requirements could also be satisfied. On the same day, another official of the same (ROP) Department wrote to CHJUSMAGPHIL,

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1. SECDEF 3385/220549Z Nov 67.
 2. CHJUSMAGPHIL 240600Z Nov 67.
 3. SECDEF 5321/160036Z Dec 67.
 4. CHJUSMAGPHIL 190830Z Dec 67; CHJUSMAGPHIL 210400Z Dec 67; Intv, LtCol J. W. Gerwig, USAF, MAP Br, J5, Hq CINCPAC, with Mr. Strobridge, Senior Historian, CINCPAC HisBr, 18 Jan 68.
 5. Ltr. Ernesto S. Mata, Acting Secretary, Office of the Secretary, Department of National Defense, Republic of Philippines, to CHJUSMAGPHIL, 24 Apr 67, n. s.

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requesting "detailed specifications and working drawings" for certain specified weapons.¹ CHJUSMAGPHIL forwarded both these letters to CINCPAC on 16 June and requested his "guidance as to how this matter should be pursued."²

On 29 July 1967, CINCPAC forwarded a proposed reply, including rationale, to the JCS for their concurrence. It stated that the requirements of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) were not sufficient to justify this undertaking, that U.S. industry had sufficient capacity to satisfy U.S. requirements, and that such an action would involve gold flow and subsidy of facilities in competition with U.S. industry and labor. Concerning the request for detailed drawings and specifications for weapons systems, the proposed reply explained that each weapon system would have to be covered by a separate request, including sufficient detail regarding requirements and possible Philippine Government production plans to permit proper evaluation of the request. On the other hand, should the request relate to technical publications required in the maintenance, overhaul and rebuild of weapons now in AFP inventory, then these documents could be secured by CHJUSMAGPHIL.³

The JCS concurred with CINCPAC proposed reply on 18 August 1967, and CINCPAC advised CHJUSMAGPHIL three days later to use this CINCPAC-developed reply as a "basis for reply to GOP letters."⁴ About a month later, CHJUSMAGPHIL reported that he had received a letter from the Secretary of the Department of National Defense, ROP, stating that a powder plant and a small arms ammunition plant was being delivered starting in the second quarter of FY 68 from Japanese reparations. JUSMAG assistance was requested in obtaining advisory technicians and training for the key personnel of the munitions plants, and the JUSMAG was also advised that the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GOP) had programmed a small arms plant for procurement under Japanese reparations.⁵

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1. Ltr, Col Augusto F. Gutierrez, GSC (SigC), Asst Sec of Defense for Services, Office of the Secretary, Department of National Defense, ROP, to CHJUSMAGPHIL, 24 Apr 67, n. s.
 2. Ltr, CHJUSMAGPHIL to CINCPAC, 16 Jun 67, Subj: Philippine Munitions Plants. CINCPAC Control No. 002727-67.
 3. J5 History, Hq CINCPAC, Aug 67.
 4. CINCPAC 222345Z Aug 67; JCS 4209/181446Z Aug 67.
 5. J5 History, Hq CINCPAC, Oct 67.

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(S) On 12 October 1967, CINCPAC recommended to the JCS that:

- a. US provide, through MAP, the advice and training required by GOP to develop an ammunition production capability.
- b. US approve, on a case by case basis, requests for release of manufacturing rights for ammunition required for AFP.
- c. Decision on support for weapons plant be deferred until such time as experience gained from ammunition plants indicates that weapons production would be a sound venture.
- d. GOP be advised of proper procedures for submitting requests and, within broad parameters, the limits of US support.¹

(U) No further significant developments occurred concerning this subject for J5 planners prior to the end of the calendar year.²

MAP Support for the Philippine Constabulary (PC)

(S) The U.S. Ambassador to the Philippines, William McCormick Blair, Jr., forwarded his comments concerning the Philippines MA Plan FY 68-73 to the Secretary of State on 13 June 1967. Having concurred in this plan "only from a technical standpoint," he made several pertinent comments, one of which was that the FY 68 MAP would "not buy any new MAP equipment, supplies or advice" for the PC "to improve law and order, as recommended by the Public Safety Survey Team, in spite of the fact that everyone in Washington seems to agree with us that this is a most serious situation."³

(S) CINCPAC became involved in this discussion on 12 July 1967, when the Secretary of Defense requested his comments on Ambassador Blair's remark regarding the PC.⁴ Since 1963, actually, CHJUSMAGPHIL had been attempting to secure an agreement between the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the Joint U.S. Military Advisory Group (JUSMAG) on a TO&E for the PC. As he wired CINCPAC on 21 July 1967, such an

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1. CINCPAC 120155Z Oct 67.
 2. Intv, LtCol J. W. Gerwig, USAF, MAP Br, J5, Hq CINCPAC, with Mr. Strobridge, Senior Historian, CINCPAC HistBr, 5 Jan 68.
 3. AMEMB Manila 12525/130015Z Jun 67.
 4. SECDEF 1184/122127Z Jul 67.

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agreement appeared near and that PC requirements and priorities would be re-evaluated then.¹ In fact, the CHJUSMAGPHIL had already established a PC division within the Army section of JUSMAG, and JCS had also approved a change to the JMP to increase the PC advisory personnel from one to six. This would provide one full time advisor for each PC zone, the Chief of the section to advise PC units in the Manila area, and a WO to advise investigative, laboratory, and intelligence units."²

~~(S)~~ When CINCPAC replied to the Secretary of Defense five days later, on the 26th, he concurred in the Ambassador's comment "that FY 68 MAP makes no provision for desirable expansion or new departures in programming for PC," but supported CHJUSMAGPHIL's position that "agreed TO&E is essential in order to establish firm PC requirements."³ As far as J5 planners were concerned, this reply terminated any further noteworthy action on the PC topic for the rest of the calendar year.⁴

Disapproval of Continued Grant Aid Support of T-34 Aircraft

~~(S)~~ On 4 April 1967, CHJUSMAGPHIL requested an increase to FY 67 Philippines MAP to provide for T-41B aircraft. His justification was that these planes were "required to replace obsolete T-34 acft which is no longer MAP supported" and that "failure to replace T-34s within next 18 months will result in a serious cutback in country's pilot training programs."⁵ Based upon this justification, CINCPAC forwarded to the Secretary of Defense a FY 67 Philippines MAP deviation for 14 T-41Bs and requested that the MAP order be expedited.⁶

~~(S)~~ Then, on 3 October, CHJUSMAGPHIL asked for an extension of support of T-34s under MAP, because of limited Philippine Air Force (PAF) maintenance and operation funds. "The T-34 is ideally suited to PAF needs," he continued, and the U.S. "Navy has extended the

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1. J5 History, Hq CINCPAC, Jul 67; CINCPAC 260348Z Jul 67; CHJUSMAGPHIL 210838Z Jul 67.
 2. CHJUSMAGPHIL 280538Z Jul 67.
 3. CINCPAC 260348Z Jul 67.
 4. Intv, LtCol J. W. Gerwig, USAF, MAP Br, J5 Hq CINCPAC, with Mr. Strobridge, Senior Historian, CINCPAC HistBr, 4 Jan 68.
 5. CHJUSMAGPHIL 040320Z Apr 67.
 6. CINCPAC 080421Z Apr 67; CINCPAC 230202Z May 67.

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operational life of its T-34 aircraft in inventory an additional five years, " thus providing a source of spare parts.¹ Unfortunately, this request ran up against some unrelenting facts.

(S) The USAF had terminated its support of the PAF T-34s as of the end of FY 66. Moreover, following CINCPAC's request for a deviation, the decision was made to approve and fund the proposal to replace the obsolete T-34s with T-41Bs. Expedited procurement had been made, and the first 14 T-41Bs were scheduled for delivery in the Philippines in January 1968. As a result, CINCPAC notified CHJUSMAGPHIL on 11 October 1967 of the following:

In view of the expedited action taken to program and deliver T41B aircraft to replace obsolete T34's, continued support of T34's as well as T41B's at MAP expense is not considered feasible and cannot be approved.²

Delivery of T-28A Aircraft

(U) The last two T-28A aircraft, scheduled for the Philippine Air Force (PAF) under MAP Project 6T-469, arrived at Subic Bay aboard the USNS Breton on 20 June 1967.³ After being off-loaded, deprocessed, and assembled at Subic Naval Air Station (NAS), they were flown to Fernando Air Base on 22 and 23 June. This delivery, which was originally programmed in the FY 66 Philippines MAP, brought the total inventory up to 14 T-28As, all of which were attached to the 100th Training Wing for basic pilot training. Although the normal authorization (UE) is 22, the U.S. "will not be able to program the remaining shortage because T28A's are not available."⁴

(S) This shortage has been a major factor in the inability of the PAF Flying School at Fernando Air Base to "produce sufficient pilot graduates, which is resulting in a shortage of line pilots throughout the PAF."⁵ Because the T-28A inventory stood at 12 for the 18 months prior to the arrival of the last programmed two, the number of pilots in each class had to be reduced to 30 and the training course had to be extended to 18 months in contrast to

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1. CHJUSMAGPHIL JPAF-PL 298/030204Z Oct 67.
 2. CINCPAC 112213Z Oct 67; J4 History, Hq CINCPAC, Oct 67.
 3. CHJUSMAGPHIL JPAF-PLM 3138/270050Z Jun 67.
 4. J4 History, Hq CINCPAC, Jun 67.
 5. Journal MA, Sep 67, p. 170.

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the usual 12 month CONUS training course. Moreover, no relief appears likely in the foreseeable future due to the worldwide shortage of this type of aircraft. In addition, "any further attrition of the PAF's T-28 inventory without replacement will result in a proportionate reduction in the pilot training capability."¹

Delivery of F-5A Aircraft

(S) The last three F-5A aircraft for the PAF on MAP Project 6F-83 arrived in the Philippines aboard the USNS Card on 2 May 1967. This action completed the quantity programmed for the 6th Fighter Squadron at Basa Air Base and brought the in-country inventory up to 19 F-5As and 3 F-5Bs. This number included the full UE, as well as advanced attrition aircraft. Previously, the PAF had been scheduled to receive two F-5A/B squadrons, but the requirement for the second squadron was later deleted.²

Manning of a Philippine Helicopter Squadron

(S) During a discussion with President Marcos on the afternoon of 15 December 1966, General Westmoreland observed that, in the event the Philippines desired to increase its contribution to the Free World Forces in South Vietnam, the government might "like to consider the idea of establishing a Philippine Helicopter squadron of HU-1D helicopters to do essentially civic action work."³ This concept was favorably received both by President Marcos and the U.S. State Department. As a result, CINCPAC's comments were requested.⁴

(S) He responded by pointing out the limited capabilities of the PAF and the need for supplemental funding, as well as training and procurement difficulties. In his opinion, the proposal was neither "practicable or desirable at this time," and he so notified the JCS on 7 January 1967, recommending "that no further consideration be given to organizing a PHIL manned helo squadron."⁵ Six days later, however, COMUSMACV followed up with a new proposal for in-country transition training, as well as use of in-country UH-1s, if required by the Filipinos

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1. Journal MA, Sep 67, p. 170.
 2. J4 History, Hq CINCPAC, May 67.
 3. AMEMB Manila 6487/160858Z Dec 66.
 4. Point Paper, J5532, Hq CINCPAC, 6 Jan 67, Subj: Helicopter Manning.

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for manning a helicopter squadron.¹ Before the end of the month, the JCS was requesting CINCPAC's comments on this new concept for the phased development of a Philippine helicopter squadron in South Vietnam.²

~~(S)~~ When he replied on 10 February, CINCPAC admitted that the "portion of the concept providing in-country transition for PAF Helo pilots has merit," but still maintained that COMUSMACV's concept was beyond the capabilities of the PAF and was not "directly responsive to military requirements in SVN."³ The next day, the JCS notified CINCPAC that the Secretary of Defense had been informed "that a proposal for Philippine manning of a helicopter squadron for duty in SVN in conjunction with the PHILCAGV is currently being evaluated" and requested him to "defer any decision" in the interim.⁴

~~(S)~~ The JCS forwarded their conclusions and recommendations resulting from their study of the proposal to the Secretary of Defense on 8 March 1967; he, in turn, forwarded the results of both the Defense and State Departments' review of the proposal on 5 April.⁵ In brief, they had concluded: (1) that it was "not justified as a valid military requirement and would be an uneconomical use of helicopter assets which are in extremely short supply;" and (2) that the "use of Philippine helicopter pilots in Vietnam to support PHILCAG would be militarily useful."⁶

~~(S)~~ Based upon these conclusions, the best course of action appeared to be the following:

U.S. representatives should not raise the subject of Philippine helicopter squadron to support PHILCAG with GOP officials, formally or informally. Nor should the US take the initiative in obtaining Philippine pilots to serve with US units in support of PHILCAG. However, if the Phils raise the question of a Philippine helicopter squadron, US representatives should explain that careful review of helicopter inventory and competing high priority military requirements make it very doubtful that

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1. COMUSMACV 01478/130615Z Jan 67.
 2. JCS 4280/211732Z Jan 67.
 3. CINCPAC 100335Z Feb 67.
 4. JCS 6119/111417Z Feb 67; Point Paper, J5532, Hq CINCPAC, 20 Feb 67, Subj: Philippine Helicopter Manning.
 5. J5 History, Hq CINCPAC, Mar 67; J5 History, Hq CINCPAC, Apr 67.
 6. SECDEF 1981/052358Z Apr 67.

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separate Phil helo squadron could be formed in near future. You could indicate in low key we prepared to give further consideration to use of Phil pilots in US helicopter units to support PHILCAG requirements. We doubt seriously that latter concept would have political appeal to GOP and should not be pressed upon Phils. 1

1. SECDEF 1981/052358Z Apr 67.

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Burma

(S) "...Burma, a nation plagued by economic and internal security problems. Our Military Assistance Program has effectively demonstrated United States interest in the continuing independence of this country. In recent months there has been a noticeable improvement in official Burmese attitudes toward the United States. The exact cause of this improved relationship is difficult to determine, but it probably stems from a variety of Burmese reasons, one of which is possibly their increased fear of domination by Communist China. The FY68 program continues the pattern of last year by providing follow-on parts for previously provided military equipment. "

Admiral U. S. G. Sharp¹

1. CINCPAC 13 Apr 67 MAP Statement.

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Burma MAP

~~(S)~~ In 1967, as in previous years, Burma MAP has been continued "under the guise of a sales program by authority of Presidential Determination within the provisions of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended."¹ This sales program has been developed through periodic negotiations of military sales agreements, whereby the U.S. has accepted local currency as token payment for materiel and services to be delivered. Over the year, the specific return has varied in proportion to the dollar content of a particular agreement. The "token" sales system has been used in Burma in order to preserve Burmese neutrality. While sales prices have been nominal, the U.S. has considered the materiel provided to Burma as grant aid. It must be kept in mind, however, that the Burmese look upon the system as "sales" and not grant aid. MAP is the only system that lends itself to this type of arrangement.²

~~(S)~~ The 1961 MAP commitment, which President Kennedy made to Burma, provided for military assistance over a period of years in the amount of about \$43 million, of which \$39.4 million has already been funded in the FY 62 through FY 67 programs. The balance was planned at \$3.6 million for FY 68, or later, depending on when the Burmese chose to negotiate for this sixth and last increment in Phase II. Recent MAP cuts resulted in a reduction of the sixth increment to \$3.1 million.³ The current Phase II program is a repetition of an earlier 1958-1961 Phase I agreement.⁴

~~(S)~~ The latest agreement, the Fifth Increment of Phase II (FY 67), was officially signed on 28 April 1967, the following negotiations which had been authorized to begin on 7 November 1966. It provided for a country ceiling of \$3.7 million in defense articles and services in return for payment of non-convertible local currently equivalent to \$500,000.

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1. CINCPAC MA Plan for Burma FY 68-73, Vol. I, p. L-1.
 2. Ibid.; MA Journal, Sep 67, p. 142.
 3. SECDEF 5321/160036Z Dec 67.
 4. Point Paper, J5322, Hq CINCPAC, 3 Nov 67, Subj: Burma MAP. For further background on this subject, see the previous command histories of CINCPAC and the Point Papers prepared by J5, Hq CINCPAC, from 1965 to 1967, which are on file in the CINCPAC HistBr.

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Approximately \$2.7 million was earmarked for follow-on-spares for the Burma Defense Forces, while \$0.3 million was for training, another \$0.3 million for MAAG training support, and \$0.4 million for defense services.¹

~~(S)~~ The Military Equipment Delivery Team (MEDT) has been the agency through which MAP requirements have been developed, programs submitted, deliveries accomplished, and U.S. Military 'presence' maintained.² Since Burma has aligned itself with the 'non-aligned' and has pursued an avowed policy of strict neutrality, the U.S. MEDT has not had any official advisory functions and its personnel have been severely restricted in their official movements. Any contact with their Burmese counterparts has been on an impersonal basis, usually by means of formal meetings, telephone, or official correspondence. Only rarely has a Burmese official ever contacted a member of MEDT on a personal basis.³ Nevertheless, the U.S. MEDT is the only foreign military mission permitted in Burma and it provides an excellent channel in which to exert U.S. influence on the military-oriented leadership of the country. Recent activities indicate a relaxation of the official Burmese position, possibly due to the Burmese-Chinese problems in June and July 1967.⁴

~~(S)~~ The last two ships programmed under prior-year MAP for Burma arrived in country during late summer of 1967. The 180' Patrol Craft Escort (PCE) was turned over to a Burmese Navy crew at San Diego on 31 March 1967 and, following a familiarization training phase, sailed across the Pacific, arriving at Rangoon on 1 August. A newly-constructed Landing Craft Utility (LCU) was transported via a British merchant ship to Singapore, where it was launched and sailed to Rangoon. These U.S.-provided crafts provide limited modernization of the Burma Navy and improve slightly its capability to cope with the internal security mission of the Burma Defense Forces. The arrival of the PCE has increased the country's ocean and coastal patrol capability, as well as further enhancing its Navy's anti-submarine warfare (ASW) capability. The LCU, coupled with eight Landing Craft Medium (LCM) delivered earlier, established an amphibious lift capability within the

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1. CINCPAC MA Plan for Burma FY 68-73, Vol. I, pp. A-1, L-1.
 2. Point Paper, J5322, Hq CINCPAC, 3 May 66, Subj: Operation of Military Equipment Delivery Team (MEDT).
 3. CINCPAC Command History 1966, p. 307.
 4. Col Harrison T. Merritt, USA, Debrief, Hq CINCPAC, 25 Jan 68.

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Burma Navy, which had been virtually nonexistent. These craft have proved extremely helpful in transporting heavy construction equipment to remote areas inaccessible by either road or rail, indirectly contributing to the nation's economic development. Since Burma has a long coast-line, as well as several important navigable rivers, water transportation and its protection and regulation have played an important role in national affairs. Indicative of the Burmese realization of this fact was that Burma placed enough value on the acquisition of another PCE to permit its crew to go to the U.S. for training.¹

(S) The continuation of some type of military assistance has been deemed to be in the best interest of the U.S., for the MAP in Burma is one of the few remaining sources of U.S. influence in that country.² Actually, the Burmese armed forces, now in control of the government, like and want the program. Notwithstanding Burma's policy of strict neutrality, it is the only program of foreign military aid they accept, despite reported offers from Communist China and known Soviet offers of military aid and advice.³ Continuation of this program not only serves U.S. objectives in Burma, but enables the Government of Burma to meet its security requirements without exposing itself to the influences and pressures that acceptance of military aid from the Communists would entail. A concrete example of the value of this Burma MAP to the U.S. is that those Burmese personnel who did receive training in the United States generally exhibit a pronounced pro-western attitude.⁴

(S) On 26 and 27 October 1967, a Burma MAP Review Conference held in Japan was attended by representatives from ODMA, CHMEDT, CINCPAC, and USADCJ. Its purposes were to determine how much of the current U.S. MAP commitment to Burma (Phase II, \$43 million) had been met; to define and recoup, for current use, money remaining in prior year (FY 62-66) dollar lines; and to determine if, as a result of changes since 1962, the U.S. -Burmese commitment needed redefining.⁵ The attendees came up with recommendations, but no decisions were made. These recommendations, if acceptable to the Secretary of Defense, would be forthcoming as proposed actions by ODMA, for CINCPAC and CHMEDT approval. As for the CINCPAC representatives, they recommended upon

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1. MA Journal, Sep 67, p. 142.
 2. CINCPAC MA Plan for Burma FY 68-73, Vol. I, p. D-2.
 3. Point Paper, J5322, Hq CINCPAC, 3 Nov 67, Subj: Burma MAP.
 4. CINCPAC MA Plan for Burma FY 68-73, Vol. I, p. C.
 5. J5 History, Hq CINCPAC, Oct 67.

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their return to Hq CINCPAC that CINCPAC support efforts that would extend Burma MAP and CHMEDT presence in Burma.¹ The calendar year 1967 approached its end with CINCPAC planners still waiting for Presidential Determination and official approval to commence FY 68 (sixth increment) MAP negotiations, for a program of \$3.1 million.²

(S) The prior \$3.6 million FY 68 Burma MAP ceiling was changed on 16 December 1967, when the Secretary of Defense reduced it to \$3.1 million.³ On the same day, he also reduced the FY 69 Burma MAP ceiling from \$.4 to \$.2 million.⁴ Upon query from CINCPAC for clarification, the Secretary of Defense replied on 20 December that the dollar level shown for FY 68 was intended to complete the Phase II Burma MAP commitment.⁵ Following the receipt of this reply, the status of the Burma MAP question did not alter significantly prior to the end of the year.⁶

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1. Memo, Cdr John M. Ferrante, USN, LtCol R. N. Mathieu, USA, and Maj A. J. Overturf, USAF, to RADM Shaffer, USN, J03, Hq CINCPAC, n. d., Subj: Trip Report, Burma MAP Review Conference.
 2. Point Paper, J5322, Hq CINCPAC, 3 Nov 67, Subj: Burma MAP; J5 History, Hq CINCPAC, Dec 67.
 3. Ibid.
 4. SECDEF 5355/161744Z Dec 67.
 5. SECDEF 5581/201452Z Dec 67; CINCPAC 042001Z Dec 67.
 6. Intv, Cdr John M. Ferrante, USN, MAP Br, J5, Hq CINCPAC, Mr. Strobridge, Senior Historian, CINCPAC HistBr, 24 Jan 68.

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Indonesia

(S) "In Indonesia the long, corrosive years of the Sukarno regime finally led to the violent upheaval on 1 October 1965. Now that the People's Provisional Consultative Assembly has officially placed the reigns of government in the hands of General Suharto, it appears that Indonesia is firmly committed to more rational political and economic objectives. However, grave problems remain. Only the Indonesians can solve those problems, but without U.S. support, the chances of their doing so, and of Indonesia remaining a free nation outside the communist camp, would be greatly reduced.

The position of the Indonesian military in their government calls for measures which will enhance their posture--their capability to improve living conditions--in the eyes of the populace. As a major step in this direction a substantial portion of the civic action effort should be kept conspicuously under the direct control of the Indonesian Armed Forces. Therefore, a modest yet meaningful degree of support should be channeled through the Military Assistance Program. The inaugural step is now in progress. A materiel program not to exceed 2 million dollars, is under implementation with deliveries to begin this month. The program will provide spare parts for automotive and engineer equipment that is urgently needed by the Indonesians in their civic action projects. Moreover, a FY 67 training program in the United States, totalling about \$400,000, has been in effect since last fall. The FY 68 proposed Indonesia MAP contains \$6.0 million, with emphasis on civic action assistance."


Admiral U. S. G. Sharp¹

1. CINCPAC 13 Apr 67 MAP Statement.

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INDONESIA

AS OF 1 NOVEMBER 1967

| BASIC INFORMATION | |  | OVERALL OBJECTIVE | U.S. DIPLOMATIC MISSION |
|--|--|--|---|--|
| AREA..... 736,000 SQ MI GROSS NATL PROD 1965 (E) \$9.6 BIL POPULATION..... 112.3 MIL PER CAPITA..... \$85 ANNUAL GROWTH..... 2.7% DEFENSE BUDGET 1965 (E) \$259.7 MIL ARABLE LAND PER CAPITA..... 0.5 ACRE AS% OF CENTRAL GOVT EXP (SELF FINANCED) 32.0 LITERACY RATE..... 57% AS % OF GNP..... 2.7 LIFE EXPECTANCY..... 32 YEARS | | | | CONTINUED AVAILABILITY TO THE U.S. AND ITS ALLIES OF SEA AND AIR ROUTES BETWEEN PACIFIC AND INDIAN OCEAN AREAS. |
| ACTING PRESIDENT - GEN <u>Suharto</u> MINISTER OF DEFENSE/ARMED FORCES COMMANDER/ CHAIRMAN OF THE PRESIDIIUM - GEN <u>Suharto</u> NAVY CDR - ADM <u>Muljadi</u> AF CDR - SUPREME AIR MARSHALL <u>Rusmin</u> COMMANDANT MARCORPS & DEP CDR/NAVY - LGEN <u>Hartono</u> PRESIDIIUM MIN FOR THE POLITICAL SECTOR AND FOREIGN MINISTER - <u>Adam Malik</u> ARMY CDR - GEN <u>Panggabean</u> | | | MAP OBJECTIVE | |
| | | | General objectives are: (A) To encourage the army-led government to maintain friendly relations with Indonesia's neighbors and the U.S., and to pursue responsible economic and fiscal policies. (B) To give tangible support and encouragement to the leaders of the Indonesian Armed Forces for their civic rehabilitation program. | |
| MAJOR FORCE GUIDELINES | | TOTAL COUNTRY FORCES | COMBAT CAPABILITY | |
| ARMY | 14 INF BDE, 1 PARA COMMANDO REGT, 1 CAV BDE, 30 INF BN, 6 CAV BN, 3 FA BN (88MM), 5 ENG BN (Const), 8 ENG BN (Cmbt), 25 PARAMIL BN, 1 PARAMIL RANCER REGT. | 107 INF BN, 6 ARN BN, 8 CAV BN, 14 FA BN, 13 AAA BN, 37 POLICE MOBILE BN, 10 ENGR BN (COMBAT), 5 ENGR BN (CONST). | MAINTAIN INTERNAL SECURITY AND EFFECTIVELY REPEL MINOR INCURSIONS BUT NOT A MAJOR ATTACK. LAUNCH AN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE IN BRIGADE STRENGTH | |
| NAVY | 4 DE, 2 PCE, 20 PC, 22 PCM, 6 PT, 6 MSC, 9 MSI, 2 AO, 1 ASW PATROL SW, 3 MARINE INF BN, 7 LST, 1 LSM, 2 LSIL, 19 AKL, 2 AP/APL. | 1 CL, 11 DE, 2 DD, 2 PCE, 6 MSF, 11 MSI, 9 AKL, 1 APA, 10 AO, 1 ASW SQDN, 1 HELO SQDN. | PARTIALLY SUPPRESS SMUGGLING AND PROVIDE LIMITED SUPPORT FOR AMPHIBIOUS OPERATION. CONDUCT ONLY TOKEN SUBMARINE INTERDICTION AND ASW OPERATIONS. INDONESIAN MARINES ARE CAPABLE OF PROVIDING REGIMENTAL SIZE LANDING FORCES FOR AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULTS. | |
| AIR FORCE | 2 TAC FTR SQ, 1 RECC SQ, 1 SAR SQ, 4 TAC COMP SQ, 3 TRANS SQ, 2 HELO SQ. | 1 FTR/INT SQDN, 4 SAM BN, 2 TAC FTR SQDN, 2 LT BMR SQDN, 2 MED BMR SQDN, 1 RCN SQDN, 4 TRANS SQDN, 1 SAR SQDN, 1 TNC SQDN. | FORCES IN BEING ARE MARGINALLY READY TO CONDUCT OFFENSIVE BOMBING OPERATIONS AND VFR AIR DEFENSE OPERATIONS FOR A LIMITED PERIOD AND TO SUPPORT MINOR GROUND OPERATIONS. | |

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SOURCE: PACOM Digest, Nov 67, p. 133.

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Resumption of Military Assistance

(S) Strategically, Indonesia looms large in the concern of PACOM planners. Its some 7,000 inhabited islands spread out over a vast area of Southeast Asia and lie astride vital sea-lines of communications between the Pacific Islands and the Indian Ocean north of Australia. Besides possessing a favorable geographical location, the Republic of Indonesia also has extensive natural resources, such as rubber and tin, as well as being one of the world's more populous nations. Moreover, its armed forces, even by Western standards, are sizable. Accordingly, since Indonesia won independence from the Dutch after World War II, both the Free World and the Communist Bloc have alternatively viewed the new nation either as a potential ally or enemy of considerable importance. As a current PACOM plan reads, "Communist control over Indonesia would therefore not only constitute an evident psychological blow against the Free World, but would also seriously jeopardize the U.S. strategic position in the Far East."¹

(S) Fortunately for the U.S., any danger of the Indonesian archipelago falling under the sway of an enemy power has faded rapidly since the abortive Communist coup of late 1965. Once the end came for the pro-Communist Sukarno era, which had been characterized by grandiose schemes for international aggrandizement, then the Republic of Indonesia could turn its attention to the previously-neglected and long-overdue problems of modernizing its economic and political structure. The final elimination of Sukarno's influence came on 13 March 1967, when he was removed from office and General Suharto was made the Acting President until elections could be held. Out of these momentous changes that occurred in both the structure and policies of the Indonesian government after President Sukarno had lost his power came a rapprochement with America. Within less than a month, on 4 April 1967, Indonesia officially agreed to a resumption of MAP materiel grant aid after a suspension of several years.² Such a dramatic reversal of a country's domestic and foreign policies was a distinct victory for MAP goals for, "on the American domestic political scene Indonesia has provided a test case of assistance to a communist-leaning neutral nation."³

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1. CINCPAC MA Plan for Indonesia FY 68-73, Vol. 1, dtd 10 Aug 67, p. A-2.
 2. Ibid., pp. D-1 - D-4; Journal MA, Jun 67.
 3. Harold A. Hovey, United States Military Assistance: A Study of Policies and Practices (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1965), p. 37.

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(S) Although Indonesia had not been presented to Congress for any category of assistance during FY 67, its changed political climate induced President Johnson before the end of 1966 to reinstate its eligibility for such aid. Accordingly, he made the necessary determinations under the pertinent sections of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, that it was "in the national interest of the United States to furnish assistance to Indonesia."¹

(S) Originally, the added Indonesia MAP for FY 67 was limited to CONUS training in the amount of \$375,000, but events would later increase both the scope and nature of this program. Moreover, the Secretary of Defense approved in mid-November a FY 68 MAP of \$6 million. The CINCPAC proposed the expansion of the Indonesian program by another \$4 million, but the Secretary replied on 31 November 1966 "that the \$6 million program was considered adequate based on available information regarding Indo situation at that time."²

(S) The assistance probably most urgently needed by Indonesia was spare parts for U.S. machinery and equipment already on hand within the country. The Indonesian Armed Forces were engaged in many civic action projects, such as irrigation improvements, road building, port improvement, and land clearing, but much of their MAP-provided equipment was deadlined or working at less than full capacity for lack of spare parts. By providing the necessary spares, as well as selected end-items, a resumed MAP could have a considerable in-country impact in terms of increased esteem for both the Indonesian Army and the U.S. at a relatively small cost.³

(S) CINCPAC dispatched a two-man survey team, consisting of an Army Engineer Officer and a civilian spare parts specialist, to Indonesia in January 1967. Its mission was the "determination of civic action materiel requirements in order to refine the FY 68 MAP and to determine high priority spare parts requirements for possible expedited delivery."⁴

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1. MA Journal, Dec 66, p. 170.
 2. Point Paper, J5321, Hq CINCPAC, 30 Mar 67, Subj: Indonesia MAP; Memo, LtCol William J. Williams, USA, MAP Br, J5, Hq CINCPAC, to Mr. Strobridge, CINCPAC HistBr, 18 Jan 68, n. s. For further background on 1966 happenings in Indonesia MAP, see pp. 297-303 of CINCPAC Command History 1966.
 3. MA Journal, Jun 67, p. 134.
 4. Point Paper, J5321, Hq CINCPAC, 30 Mar 67, Subj: Indonesia MAP.

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The team arrived in Djakarta on 21 January, probably speeded by the Secretary of Defense's request for a report ASAP. The feeling in Washington, D. C., was that it was "considered politically desirable to be in position to expedite delivery of high priority items in the FY 68 MAP to assist Indonesian military civic action program. "¹

The CINCPAC engineer survey team proceeded on its task, conferring with Indonesian officials, visiting Army units, logistic installations, and sites of both actual and proposed civic action projects. During the month of February, two progress reports were submitted to CINCPAC. ² Then, on 20 February, the Secretary of Defense revealed that a decision had been made "to fund and deliver in FY 67 a MAP materiel program for Indonesia with value not to exceed \$2 million. "³ He, therefore, requested CINCPAC to furnish item requisitions or detailed item descriptions for this program, which was earmarked for Indonesia's civic action projects.

A week later, the engineer survey team handcarried to CINCPAC their comprehensive report, "CINCPAC Two-Man Survey of FY 68 MAP-Indonesia Requirements, 21Jan-25Feb67," which included a list of the required civic action type and items, as well as repair parts and components. ⁴ CINCPAC selected CINCUSARPAC to process the team's item list into the requisition format for the FY 67 MAP, but warned that no materiel was to be shipped unless directed by him. He further advised CHDLG Djakarta that the date of shipment would "depend on desires of Ambassador and availability of sufficient quantities of material for shipment. "⁵

On 2 March 1967, CHDLG Djakarta requested certain personnel on a TDY basis by mid-March in order to assist in the administration and operation of MAP. ⁶ At CINCPAC's request, CINCUSARPAC tasked CGUSARJ with: (1) sending a five-man team to Indonesia for 90 days TDY to assist with MAP; (2) identifying, requisitioning, and assembling for air shipment repair parts for FY 67 Indonesia MAP; and (3) referring items not available in Japan to USAILC for shipment direct to country. ⁷

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1. SECDEF 2738/041712Z Jan 67; J5 History, Hq CINCPAC, Jan 67.
 2. CHDLG Djakarta 060925Z Feb 67; CHDLG Djakarta 170935Z Feb 67.
 3. SECDEF 6785/202146Z Feb 67.
 4. J5 History, Hq CINCPAC, Feb 67.
 5. CINCPAC 032200Z Mar 67; CINCPAC 280320Z Feb 67; J5 History, Hq CINCPAC, Mar 67.
 6. CHDLG Djakarta 020855Z Mar 67.
 7. CINCUSARPAC 040418Z Mar 67.

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CINCPAC also requested, and the Secretary of Defense approved, that DA program the five-man team as a Mobile Training Team (MTT).¹

~~(S)~~ With CHDLG's concurrence, CINCPAC dispatched five representatives to Indonesia to assist in the refinement of the FY 68 MAP; they arrived in Djakarta on 19 April 1967.² There, the CINCPAC representatives held discussions with the Ambassador, Indonesian officials, and CHDLG. Final adjustments were made in the FY 67 program, and the FY 68 program was refined and presented to the Country Team for concurrence. CHDLG announced this concurrence on 2 May 1967.³

~~(S)~~ CINCPAC transmitted the refined FY 68 Indonesia MAP via AUTODIN on 18 May 1967. At the same time, CINCPAC forwarded a breakout by services of the FY 68 Indonesia MAP and recommended DOD approval.⁴

~~(S)~~ The Secretary of Defense approved the FY 68 Indonesia MAP in mid-June with but a few exceptions. These were 22 C-47 engines, 12 inflatable boats, 12 outboard engines for the boats, and a communications dollar line which included an anticipated Philco contract for \$30,000.⁵ When requested for additional information on these items, CINCPAC furnished the following: (1) The Philco contract would rehabilitate an existing tropo scatter communications link between Djakarta and Bandung, a major military center. The effectiveness of the civic action program would be substantially enhanced by proper coordination and control; (2) The 22 engines, in combination with spare parts and 2 IRANs, are expected to return 18 C-47s to operational status; and (3) The inflatable boats and outboard engines are to be used for flood rescue operations. The previously acquired inflatable boats have deteriorated beyond repair, and "all motors except one have vastly exceeded hours of normal life expectancy."⁶

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1. CINCPAC 042308Z Mar 67; SECDEF 8169/081700Z Mar 67.
 2. J5 History, Hq CINCPAC, Apr 67; CINCPAC 210401Z Mar 67; CHDLG Djakarta 230500Z Mar 67.
 3. CHDLG Djakarta 020345Z May 67.
 4. J5 History, Hq CINCPAC, May 67; CINCPAC 181915Z May 67.
 5. SECDEF 8015/151922Z Jun 67.
 6. CINCPAC 290224Z Jun 67; CINCPAC 210500Z Jun 67.

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(S) On 7 July 1967, Marshall Green, U.S. Ambassador to Indonesia, reported that "he told Suharto that he would do all possible to help increase U.S. assistance for the Indonesia civic action program."¹ CINCPAC dispatched a message to CHDLG Indonesia on 23 July, stating that he concurred in the Ambassador's position on the expansion of U.S. assistance, and requested that:

... you reappraise Indo requirements and submit recommendations concerning nature and extent of MAP augmentation desired, with full justification.

2. Such recommendations should be based on a mid/long range civic action plan developed in consonance with Indonesian priorities and capabilities.²

(S) Two months later, on 7 September, the Secretary of State queried the American Embassy at Djakarta as to "further justification" along civic action lines for certain items in the Indonesian MAP in view of the upcoming Interagency Review later that month.³ Those items whose civic action pertinence were questioned were those programmed for the improvement of transportation (aircraft and items, IRANs, and spares), anti-smuggling operations (LCVPs), and communications (rehabilitation of Djakarta-Bandung tropo-scatter link).

(S) In response to a CINCPAC request, CHDLG Indonesia furnished additional information, which CINCPAC representatives used at the Interagency Review to explain in detail the relevancy of the items whose pertinence to the civic action program had been questioned.⁴ The following points were the significant ones made at this review:

1. In consideration of the geography of Indonesia and the gross inadequacy of surface transportation, increased employment of air support in civic action would be essential.

2. More effective anti-smuggling measures were needed to plug a serious drain on the fragile economy. A valuable by-product would be

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1. J5 History, Hq CINCPAC, Aug 67; Intv, LtCol William J. Williams, USA, MAP Br, J5, Hq CINCPAC, with Mr. Strobridge, Senior Historian, CINCPAC HistBr, 15 Jan 68; CINCPAC 232058Z Jul 67.
 2. CINCPAC 232058Z Jul 67.
 3. STATE 33588/072130Z Sep 67.
 4. CHDLG Indonesia 190905Z Sep 67; J5 History, Hq CINCPAC, Sep 67.

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visible evidence to the populace that the government was doing something about widespread corruption.

3. Bandung is the hub of commercial in-country and overseas communications. Rehabilitation of the Djakarta-Bandung tropo-scatter link would be a great benefit to civilian users of the system. Moreover, the military would be able to coordinate functions better between two major military areas involved in supporting the civic action program.

~~(S)~~ As mentioned earlier, CINCPAC had requested CHDLG Indonesia on 23 July to reappraise country requirements and to submit recommendations concerning the nature and extent of any proposed MAP augmentation.¹ On 19 October 1967, CHDLG Indonesia "submitted proposed augmentations to increase the FY 68 and FY 69 programs from the existing \$6 million up to about \$15 million per year."² In view of "the present budgetary climate in Washington" toward reduction in the Foreign Aid Authorization, MAP planners at Hq CINCPAC felt that "a request for an increased Indonesia MAP would not be well received."³ Therefore, no further action was taken at this time on the proposed augmentation.

~~(S)~~ "The enabling authorization for FY 68 Military Assistance was signed by the President on 16 November 1967."⁴ Pending passage of the FY 68 MAP Appropriations Bill, the Office of the Director of Military Assistance (ODMA) established tentative Indonesia MAP ceilings for FY 68 and FY 69 of \$5.4 and \$6.0 million respectively. "This constituted a \$0.6 million reduction in the FY 68 ceiling and no change in the FY 69 ceiling. However, both years were somewhat in excess of ceiling due principally to the fact that some construction equipment procurement was changed to commercial configuration to reduce lead time."⁵ As a result, a number of items were deleted or reduced by planners at HQ CINCPAC to bring the programs within the ceiling.

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1. CINCPAC 232058Z Jul 67.
 2. Memo, from Col Marvin H. Merchant, USA, Chief, MAP Br, J5, to RADM J. N. Shaffer, USN, Dep CofS for Military Assistance, Logistics, and Administration, Hq CINCPAC, 3 Nov 67, Subj: Proposed Increase in Indonesia MAP Ceiling (C).
 3. Ibid.; J5 History, Hq CINCPAC, Oct 67.
 4. SECDEF 3385/220549Z Nov 67.
 5. J5 Memo No. 00291-67, from RADM Walter L. Curtis, Jr., USN, ACofS J6, to LtGen Clair E. Hutchin, Jr., USA, CofS, Hq CINCPAC, 28 Nov 67, Subj: Adjustments to Indonesia MAP.

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~~(S)~~ Then, on 16 December 1967, the Secretary of Defense announced adjusted dollar guidelines which further reduced the FY 68 Indonesia MAP to \$5.2 million. CINCPAC accordingly deleted an additional \$0.2 million from the FY 68 program, the last noteworthy action by this headquarters on this project before the end of the year. ¹

Fatigue Uniforms and Jungle Boots for Indonesia MAP

~~(S)~~ In June 1967, Marshall Green, U.S. Ambassador to Indonesia, notified CINCPAC "that Indonesian Army personnel engaged in civic action projects must work in regular dress uniforms because work uniforms are not provided." ² At Banten, for instance, 60 soldiers ruined perfectly good uniforms digging trenches for cement footings for a breakwater. The Ambassador recommended urgently that "32,000 (number of personnel from all branches of armed forces directly assigned to civic mission) fatigue uniforms plus 32,000 pairs of jungle-type boots" be furnished through MAP, since much material and political benefits would be derived from such a gesture. ³

~~(S)~~ The thinking of Hq CINCPAC planners ran similar to that of Ambassador Green's, for a current PACOM MA Plan reads, "Effective civic action performance by the Indonesian Army will lend public support to the Army-led government whose current policies and objectives are in general consonance with those of the United States." ⁴ By 15 June, the Ambassador's request had been approved by both the State and Defense Department, "subject to CINCPAC concurrence," which was forthcoming the next day. ⁵

Urgent Requirement for Engineer Equipment, East Java

~~(C)~~ On a visit to Surabaya, Indonesia, in the spring of 1967, two American officials uncovered:

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1. CINCPAC 200115Z Dec 67; J5 History, Hq CINCPAC, Dec 67; Intv, LtCol William J. Williams, USA, MAP Br, J5 Hq CINCPAC, with Mr. Strobridge, Senior Historian, CINCPAC Hist Br, 16 Jan 68.
 2. AMEMB Djakarta 6053/121000Z Jun 67.
 3. Ibid.; J5 History, Hq CINCPAC, Jun 67.
 4. CINCPAC MA Plan for Indonesia FY 68-73, Vol. 1, 10 Aug 67, p. C-1-1; Intv, LtCol William J. Williams, USA MAP Br, J5, Hq CINCPAC, with Mr. Strobridge, Senior Historian, CINCPAC HistBr, 13 Jan 68.
 5. State 211544/152339Z Jun 67; CINCPAC 162233Z Jun 67.

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...urgent need for one crane shovel, crawler for flood control project East Java prior beginning rainy season Oct. Situation in Mount Kelud area desperate as result volcanic eruption Apr 66 and consequent inundation rich rice land in Blitar-Kediri area where four to five million people live. Indo Army and local population making valiant effort build new overflow channel for Brantas River but no equipment available in Indonesia handle this job.¹

~~(S)~~ On 31 May 1967, CHDLG Djakarta notified CINCPAC of this need by a priority Indonesian Army Civic Action Project for one crane shovel, crawler, 20-30 ton with 50 ft. boom, revolving fairlead, tagline and 1/4 cubic yard drag bucket, as well as two tractor crawlers, low speed, medium, with angle dozer, to cope with the danger of flood. He added that "similar items programmed FY 68 MAP, but will not arrive in time prevent new flooding of large rice growing area," and requested "urgent action provide above equip under FY 67 MAP."²

~~(S)~~ Upon review of Indonesia's asset data, logistic officers noted equipment that might possibly be used in this flood project. As a result, CINCPAC requested CHDLG Djakarta to "screen in-country assets to determine what items of equipment currently in-country can be moved to this project."³ Meanwhile, the supply of repair parts to Indonesia would continue to be closely monitored "to insure expedited repair of deadlined equipment required for civic action projects."⁴

~~(S)~~ In reply, CHDLG Djakarta furnished on 5 June a detailed explanation why current in-country equipment was not suitable for this East Java flood control project.⁵ As a result, arrangements were made immediately to ship one Lima Model 65 crane and two Euclid C-6 tractors from contractor assets located in Vietnam.⁶

~~(S)~~ When this equipment was off-loaded at Surabaya on 11 July 1967, members of a MTT from USADCJ were present. They made a

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1. CHDLG Djakarta 311010Z May 67.
 2. Ibid.
 3. CINCPAC 030509Z Jun 67.
 4. Ibid.
 5. CHDLG Jakarta 050930Z Jun 67.
 6. OICC RVN 22937/111212Z Jul 67.

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technical inspection of the crane and tractors and found them satisfactory.¹ Since the requested equipment had arrived in ample time prior to the onset of the rainy season in October, the U.S. goal in insuring the success of the civic action project by the Indonesian army was achieved.

1. J4 History, Hq CINCPAC, Aug 67.

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Malaysia

(S) "... The United States has a great interest in maintaining the commitments of the British and other Commonwealth countries to defend Malaysia and Singapore from external aggression. A weakening of these commitments, followed by a withdrawal of all or a large part of the Commonwealth forces from Malaysia and Singapore, would call for a reappraisal of U.S. strategic requirements along the southern flank of Southeast Asia and would have implications for future U.S. military assistance to Malaysia....

United States Military Assistance to Malaysia is not designed to counter directly the Communist Chinese military threat of external aggression. It is designed to encourage Malaysia's development of her military forces to a point where she can provide defense against limited external threat and at the same time control the threat of Communist inspired insurgency in East and West Malaysia."¹

1. CINCPAC MA Plan for Malaysia FY 68-73, Vol. I, pp. A-1, B-1-1.

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Malaysia Grant Aid Training Program and FMS Arrangements

(S) U. S. MA to Malaysia was initiated in FY 65, after Prime Minister Rahman asked President Johnson for assistance during a visit to Washington, D. C. , in July 1964.¹ The first annual ceiling was \$100,000, but the program was increased to \$200,000 in FY 66. To date, training programs have been conducted for the Royal Malaysian Air Force---primarily pilot training---and the Malaysian Army. So far, no training program has been established for the Royal Malaysian Navy. The Army program has been utilized to train selected officers in an assortment of specialties, with intelligence, airborne, ranger, medical, and engineer courses being the principal fields. For FY 68, the Government of Malaysia (GOM) has requested a modest increase in career courses.

(S) Actually, the Malaysians have expressed their dissatisfaction with the limited MAP in the past. The FY 67 \$200,000 ceiling, for instance, is far less than they expected from the U. S. With the British withdrawing their support, the Malaysians are apprehensive of finding another source to "fill the gap. " Moreover, British "seconded" officers might be withdrawn, which would seriously deplete the leadership and capabilities of Malaysian armed forces.

(S) The FY 68 MAP again had an allotment of \$200,000 for training purposes. The U. S. , however, had provided a \$4 million loan at approximately 3% interest for the purchase of U. S. military equipment and services. Moreover, during 1967, the two countries agreed upon a \$11.6 million credit assistance arrangement for the purchase of 10 medium helicopters. Another possibility under consideration by both parties was the additional purchase of 5 to 8 Sikorsky S-61A-4 helicopters. Over the long haul, U. S. prospects for FMS to Malaysia will probably improve, in light of the British plans to withdraw their troops from the Malaysia-Singapore area after 1975.

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1. CINCPAC Command History 1966, p. 304. The following sources have provided the information contained in this subsection: CINCPAC MA Plan for Malaysia FY 68-73, Vol. I and II; Point Paper, J32, Hq CINCPAC, 18 Nov 66, Subj: Summary - Malaysia Military Assistance Training Program; Point Paper J5322, Hq CINCPAC, 18 Feb 67, Subj: Malaysia MAP (C); Point Paper, J530, HQ CINCPAC, 24 Oct 67, Subj: Military Assistance Program for Malaysia.

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(S) During 1967, the Government of Malaysia requested that the credit ceiling under the existing \$4 million arrangement be raised by \$300,000 to cover price increases. It also asked for an increase of \$3.1 million to the existing credit sales arrangement, thus making a total of \$7.4 million, to purchase rockets and bombs for use with their CL-41 aircraft, which was being delivered from Canada. The Country Team recommended approval of the \$300,000 increase, but recommended that the Malaysian Government be informed that the U.S. was not prepared to fulfill the \$3.1 million extension request.

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CHAPTER III

CINCPAC ACTIONS CONCERNING RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN THE
UNITED STATES AND OTHER COUNTRIESSECTION I - CINCPAC ACTIVITIES IN SUPPORT OF SEATO

(S) "During the past year, the value of the SEATO framework has been dramatically underscored. It has provided the indispensable constitutional base on which all five of the Pacific members of the Alliance have provided forces to assist South Vietnam. . . .


"Looking beyond Vietnam it is clear that the entire thrust of South Asian regional cooperation will depend upon a secure and stable area. It is difficult to perceive how, in the short term, this security might be provided solely by indigenous military efforts. Accordingly, SEATO will continue to play an important part in providing Southeast Asia with the essential framework for needed security, drawing, of course, on United States power and influence. It is entirely possible that SEATO may be the framework that eventually leads to an expanded security arrangement."

Admiral U. S. G. Sharp¹

1. CINCPAC 13 Apr 67 MAP Statement.

NETWORK OF REGIONAL DEFENSE ARRANGEMENTS


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SOURCE: PACOM DIGEST NOV 67, p. 128.

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UNITED STATES COLLECTIVE DEFENSE ARRANGEMENTS IN THE PACIFIC COMMAND



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
SOURCE: PACOM DIGEST NOV67, p.2.

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SOURCE: PACOM Digest, Nov 67, p. 3.

Military Advisers Conference 26 (MA 26C)

~~(TS)~~ On 14 and 15 April 1967, the Twenty-sixth Conference of the SEATO Military Advisers was held in Washington, D. C.¹ Admiral Sharp, as the U. S. Military Adviser (USMILAD), hosted MA 26C and chaired the conference. On the whole, as he reported to the JCS, the "conference was a success, with frank discussions;" although neither France or Pakistan were represented, "their absence did not cast any significant pall over the meeting."²

~~(TS)~~ During approximately the same period, 13-22 April, Admiral Sharp attended, in addition to MA 26C, the Twelfth Meeting of the SEATO Council of Ministers and the ANZUS Meeting. At the 12th Council Meeting, France did not have any representation, while Pakistan was represented by its Ambassador to the U. S. Coupled with their absence at MA 26C, it was evident that these "absences and lesser representations reflect the disapproval of the respective Governments regarding" the policy actions of the U. S., Australia, New Zealand, Thailand, and Philippines then being pursued in Vietnam.³

~~(TS)~~ This council meeting was attended by the Foreign Minister of the Republic of Vietnam. When the U. S. allowed this RVN observer to speak at the public opening session, the British and Pakistanis, as well as the absent French, were somewhat disenchanted:

Their disapproval reflects their concern that such an act would reflect complete agreement with the Vietnam situation by the organization - this obviously runs counter to their Governments stated policies toward the Vietnam situation. Furthermore, they believe to some degree that the U. S. was using the Vietnam observer to obtain support from the U. S. people for the Government's action in Vietnam.⁴

~~(TS)~~ At MA 26C, several significant actions took place. For one thing, the Chief of the Military Planning Office (CMPO) stated that his office did not contemplate any further up-dating of MPO Plan 6/66,

1. Unless otherwise cited, the information in this subsection on MA 26C was derived from: J5 History, Hq CINCPAC, Apr 67; CINCPAC 190054Z Apr 67; CINCPAC 211710Z Apr 67.
2. CINCPAC 190054Z Apr 67.
3. J5 History, Hq CINCPAC, Apr 67.
4. Ibid.

because the situation in Vietnam had progressed beyond the concept of the plan, thereby invalidating it as a useful document. Admiral Sharp then "proposed the principle that plans should be written and maintained current for use in future contingencies, any actual military situation notwithstanding."¹ Since all the MILADs concurred with this proposal, the CMPO was directed to maintain all current plans up-to-date in the future.

~~(TS)~~ In the opinion of U.S. SEATO planners, there has been a marked increase in the interest shown at the various levels of the military and the governments of member nations. No doubt this increase resulted in part from the Rusk-Thanat Communique of 1962, "but more directly from the fact that all of the member nations participating in Vietnam have stated that their putting troops into Vietnam stems from their obligations under the SEATO Treaty."²

~~(TS)~~ At MA 26C, this heightened interest was reflected in increased requests for spaces for the SEATO Orientation Courses held in Bangkok. Just last year, at MA 25C, the number of these courses given each year was raised from two to three. So far, reported the CMPO, 100 requests had been received for spaces in the two courses still to be conducted in calendar year 1967. Because of expertise gained in conducting these courses, improved facilities, and assistance from member nations in providing air transport for the attendees in-country, the MPO was expected to be able to handle all of the requests. Along this line, the USMILAD recommended to the JCS that the U.S. should consider providing assistance as operational commitments permitted.³

~~(TS)~~ Another matter brought up by the CMPO pertained to the participation of MPO staff members in the planning for exercises. Not only did the CMPO intend to provide specialists to assist in exercise planning, but he also intended to provide MPO staff officers to assist the exercise directors in the actual conduct of the exercises. "This will provide experience to the MPO staff and make needed expertise available to the Exercise Director."⁴

~~(TS)~~ Agenda Item C was the approval of MPO Plan 9/67, Directive, Basic Plan, and concept of operations. Plan 9 is a plan to defend Thailand

1. CINCPAC 190054Z Apr 67.
2. J5 History, Hq CINCPAC, Apr 67.
3. Ibid.
4. CINCPAC 190054Z Apr 67.

from overt aggression from North Vietnam. As was expected, the United Kingdom objected to the threat assessment as written in the plan, which was based upon the then-current SEATO threat assessment. Despite this objection, MPO Plan 9/67 was accepted with only minor deviations from U.S. approved changes.

~~(TS)~~ Another agreement reached by the principals at MA 26C was that there was a need for improvement in the manner in which the threat to the area was assessed. "They directed that an intelligence working party will meet at intervals between the regularly scheduled annual Intelligence Committee meeting to assess the effects of major occurrences in the area on the threat assessment."¹ The findings of this party were to be reported in summary form to the MILADs and was to be used by the CMPO in making his judgment as to whether or not there was a need to revise or update current plans. This meant that intelligence meetings would be held quarterly in the future.

~~(S)~~ In accordance with MILADs' recommendation, the first Intelligence Working Party Conference convened on 28 July 1967. Terms of reference were to review major events affecting the threat to the Treaty Area with particular attention to Plans 6 and 9. This was accomplished, resulting in an increase in North Vietnam (NVN) ground forces capabilities from 283,000 to 360,000 regular forces. Improvements in lines of communication (LOC) route capabilities were reflected in three routes increasing the NVN threat from 8 to a possible 11 divisions in a Plan 9 situation depending upon other enemy force commitments such as home defense, LOC protection, and other factors. The overall objective of the Intelligence Working Party was considered to have been accomplished, and plans were updated accordingly. The ² report of the conference was approved by all MILADs out of session.

~~(TS)~~ Other matters decided were: (1) the approval of SMPO PX 40, with the agreement that details of the exercise would be based upon MPO Plan 8/66; (2) the approval of the Public Information Annex of MPO Plan 8/66, with but minor modifications; and (3) the resolution of the choice of Chairmanship, date, and location of MA 27C.

~~(TS)~~ One indication of MA 26's success was strengthening of the original version of the final press release at the insistence of most of the MILADS. In the opinion of Admiral Sharp, the "twice yearly

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1. J5 History, Hq CINCPAC, Apr 67.
 2. Encl: (1) to J2/Memo/00028-68 to J04, Hq CINCPAC, 5 Mar 68, Subj: 1967 CINCPAC History; Draft review.

meetings of the principals are important to the organization and foster a closer relationship among respective military forces. "¹

Military Advisers Conference 27 (MA 27C)

~~(TS)~~ As the USMILAD, Admiral Sharp attended the 27th conference of the SEATO Military Advisers in Bangkok on 12-13 September 1967. For the first time, this meeting was held in the new SEATO headquarters building, which had been dedicated by the King of Thailand on 8 September, the 13th Anniversary of SEATO.² As was customary, the Secretary General, LtGen Jesus Vargas, addressed the MILADs at their first meeting. He stressed that he felt the breakup of the Chinese Communists Central Government authority was "undeniable," and that, "while the aims of the Soviet Union and Communist China to establish Communist regimes in the treaty area remained unaltered, their divergent approach to this end are clearer than ever."³ He noted, with approval, the recent flurry of meetings among Southeast and Far East Asian countries, with objectives which were basically economic, cultural, and political in nature. He was also encouraged by:

... the conduct of and the percent of voter turn out in recent Republic of Vietnam elections, and pointed out that Souvanna Phouma's position in Laos is unchallenged internally, that Sihanouk is now attempting to steer an unneutralist course, that Sino-Burmese relations have declined to an unprecedented low level and expressed gratification that subversion attempts and acts of terrorism by local communists in Thailand and the Philippines are being met and blunted by firm government counter-measures.⁴

(U) One of the USMILAD's contributions to the MA 27C was a progress report on the war in Vietnam. Along this line, Thailand's MILAD gave a presentation on communist subversion within his country, as well as a detailed description of a newly-adopted organization for combating this insurgency and its methods of operation.⁵

~~(TS)~~ The United Kingdom MILAD made an official statement at MA 27C about his country's decision to reduce its forces stationed in Singapore

1. CINCPAC 190054Z Apr 67.
2. CINCPAC 140138Z Sep 67; J5 History, Hq CINCPAC, Sep 67.
3. CINCPAC 140138Z Sep 67.
4. Ibid.
5. J5 History, Hq CINCPAC, Sep 67.

and Malaysia. In part, he commented that:

...the basic decision is that the United Kingdom plans to withdraw altogether from bases in Singapore and Malaysia in the mid-1970s, and to have reduced the forces now stationed there by approximately 50 percent by 1971. This reduction to fifty percent would be so phased that by the early 1970s British Forces still stationed in Singapore and Malaysia will consist largely of naval forces, including an amphibious element, and air forces....the United Kingdom...would continue to honour its obligations under SEATO, but that the forces assigned to specific SEATO plans would be progressively altered in nature and size....

Looking further ahead, the British Government will continue to maintain a close interest in the Southeast Asia area with which we have so long been associated, and, as they have stated, will preserve a military capability for use, if required, in the area.¹

~~(TS)~~ An excellent example of the conference's productiveness was the approval of SEATO MPO Plan 9/67, an emergency plan for the defense of Thailand against attack from forces of North Vietnam, and its referral to the SEATO council with the recommendation that Thailand be made the Appointed Nation for the plan and that the U. S. be allowed to designate the Field Forces Commander.² Earlier, in July, USMILAD had provided the JCS with his rationale as to why Thailand should become the Appointed Nation for MPO Plan 9/67.³ In turn, the JCS had given Admiral Sharp the authorization to change his position on the Appointed Nation so as to conform with the majority in the event that the other MILADs would not approve this action.⁴ Fortunately, he did not have to resort to such a measure.

~~(TS)~~ Also approved at MA 27C was the SEATO Exercise Program for 1968-70. "U. S. positions were adopted resulting in a reduction in the number of SEATO exercises to (only) one maritime and one CPX or field maneuver during a single training year."⁵

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1. CINCPAC 140138Z Sep 67.
 2. Ibid.
 3. J5 History, Hq CINCPAC, Jul 67.
 4. Ibid.; JCS 3124/042159Z Aug 67.
 5. CINCPAC 140138Z Sep 67.

~~(S)~~ In a post-meeting assessment of MA 27C, Admiral Sharp commented that the "separate presentations by the Thai, UK and US MILADs were significant in that they reflected independent contributions outside framework of established agenda. Continued discussion of this nature will vitalize future meetings."¹

SEATO Logistics Committee Seventh Meeting (LOG 7M)

~~(S)~~ The purpose of LOG 7M was "to provide logistical planning guidance and to examine and resolve SEATO Member Nation logistics problems."² Chaired by the United Kingdom, it met in Bangkok, Thailand, from 25 to 29 September 1967, and was attended by all member nations, except France and Pakistan.³ The last such committee meeting, LOG 6M, was held at the same place during June 1965.

~~(S)~~ In January 1967, Admiral Sharp, as USMILAD, received the Provisional Agenda for LOG 7M from the Chief, Military Planning Office (CMPO), SEATO Hq, in Bangkok. It contained eight agenda items to be divided among three sub-committees, all of which were of interest to Admiral Sharp's Logistics staff. The CINCPAC position on the agenda items were forwarded to the USMILADREP on 3 March 1967 for release to the Military Planning Office.⁴

~~(S)~~ In August 1967, an amended provisional agenda for LOG 7M was received. COMUSMACV was tasked by CINCPAC to designate the Chief U.S. Delegate for LOG 7M with responsibility for developing recommended U.S. position papers on the agenda items. COMUSMACV prepared these papers and forwarded them to the USMILAD for review and approval. A working group, consisting of representatives from CINCPAC's J4 Division and his component commands, convened at Camp H. M. Smith on 11-12 September 1967. Its purpose was to review and update the COMUSMACV-recommended U.S. position papers for LOG 7M prior to submitting them to Admiral Sharp for approval. Ten out of the twelve position papers submitted by COMUSMACV required updating and rewriting. The rewritten

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1. CINCPAC 140138Z Sep 67.
 2. Point Paper, J4117, Hq CINCPAC, 12 Sep 67, Subj: LOG 7M, which is the source for the information contained in this subsection, unless otherwise cited.
 3. J4 History, Hq CINCPAC, Sep 67.
 4. J4 History, Hq CINCPAC, Apr 67; Comment on Draft Manuscript by J4/Memo/00028-68 to J04, Hq CINCPAC, 6 Mar 68, Subj: 1967 CINCPAC Command History; draft review.

U. S. position papers for LOG 7M were approved on 16 September 1967 and were subsequently handcarried to the Chief U. S. Delegate in Bangkok.¹

~~(S)~~ To ensure that the entire U. S. delegation would enter into the formal SEATO Conference with a clear understanding of the U. S. position on all agenda items, a U. S. Unilateral Meeting on LOG 7M was held in Bangkok on 21 and 22 September 1967. That this prior U. S. consultation proved fruitful was evident from what later transpired at LOG 7M. From the viewpoint of the U. S., the Seventh Meeting of the SEATO Logistics Committee was considered a success in that:

"a. The U. S. positions on the LOG 7M agenda items have become the SEATO positions in nearly all cases.

b. Significant constraints have been eliminated in the logistical planning area with the result that logistical planning in SEATO should move ahead at an increased rate.

c. Identification of logistical problem areas requiring study such as the logistical role of COMUSMACTHAI and centralized base development was made."²

(U) "Admiral Sharp approved the Report of the Logistics Committee Seventh Meeting of September 67 on 15 November 1967 and directed that the Chief Military Plans Office be so advised."³

Thirteenth Meeting of the SEATO Intelligence Committee (INT 13M)

~~(S)~~ Chaired by the U. S., INT 13 M was conducted in a cordial atmosphere in Bangkok, Thailand, between 14 and 21 November 1967.⁴ The only SEATO Member Nations not represented were France and Pakistan. During the meeting, recommendations were submitted on all agenda items for consideration by the various MILADs.

~~(S)~~ The committee updated all the supporting intelligence documents, including those country studies which had been previously the responsibilities of France and Pakistan. Following this action, the overall

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1. Ibid., J4 History, Hq CINCPAC, Sep 67.
 2. J4 History, Hq CINCPAC, Sep 67.
 3. J4 History, Hq CINCPAC, Nov 67.
 4. J2 History, Hq CINCPAC, Nov 67, the source for the information in this subsection on INT 13M.

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threat to the treaty area was revised accordingly. In broad terms, the combined threat of the Chinese Communists and the North Vietnamese to the treaty area was estimated to remain about the same for the next two years.

After considerable study, the members of INT 13M concluded that adoption of a Military Geographic Documentation (MGD) SEATO Standardization Agreement (SEASTAG) program patterned after the NATO MGD Standardization Agreements would merely duplicate existing SEATO intelligence documentation. As a result, the SEATO Military Planning Office (MPO) was requested to confirm that there was no overriding requirement for any change in the present system of the SEATO intelligence documentation; in which case, adoption of the MGD series of SEASTAGs would be rescinded for intelligence purposes. This action was in accordance with the recommended position of the U. S. Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). In addition, the new road data tabulation format adopted by the committee for SEATO Military Publication (SEAP) 26A was generally that used by DIA, with but minor modifications.

In considering the SEATO Field Force Commander's recommendations pertaining to intelligence activities in the AURORA Post Exercise Report, the members of INT 13M concluded that it was outside the role of the SEATO MPO to produce intelligence, and that the provision of intelligence for SEATO exercises, in addition to that available from MPO, should be the responsibility of the Appointed Nation. The USMILAD planned to recommend that the Appointed Nation be changed to the Exercise Director, as the intelligence matter was more properly under the Exercise Director's cognizance. Although the establishment of a permanent Intelligence Working Party appeared impracticable, it was felt that the requirement for more frequent reviews of the threat estimate could be adequately met by temporary Intelligence Working Parties convening between SEATO Intelligence Committee Meetings.

For the future, the program of work for the Americans included the normal annual amendments and the triannual major revisions of U. S. Country Studies and the Order of Battle document responsibilities. In addition, the U. S. was to provide major revisions to the China Country Study, Volume I (Sinkiang), and Volume III (Southern China), actions which would meet the requirements of SEATO planners and would help improve the annual workload distribution.

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Tenth SEATO Communications-Electronics Committee Meeting (C-E 10M)

(C) In October 1967, the SEATO C-E 10M met. Two months later on 19 December, the USMILAD approved its final report in the name of the United States. ¹

CCRSFF Real Estate Conference

(S) "CINCPAC J4 staff representatives participated in a SEATO Real Estate Conference in Bangkok during 24-28 July 1967. The conference was sponsored by COMUSMACV in his role of CCRSFF. The conference dealt with SEATO requirements in a Plan 4 situation for real estate and facilities in Thailand. "²

Mechanization of CRSFF Movement Tables

(S) Just prior to the end of 1966, the USMILAD "recommended that a SEATO Movement Tables Working Group convene in January 1967 to finalize, correct as necessary, and print in final form all Plan 4 movement tables. "³ The Working Group convened at Camp H. M. Smith from 23 through 26 January 1967, with representatives from Thailand, Australia, United Kingdom, and New Zealand, in addition to the U.S. ⁴

(S) "The Working Group accomplished all of its objectives, " meanwhile, acquiring a "greater appreciation of the usefulness of Mechanized Movement Tables as a flexible tool for providing accurate and timely data in movement planning. "⁵ The group's objectives were to prepare sea and air movement data in an acceptable machine format for all nations with forces committed under SEATO Plan 4. Using ADP techniques, both port throughput requirements and port capabilities were analyzed to determine daily national work loads and peak movement periods. Similar techniques were applied in the case of air movements.

1. J6 History, Hq CINCPAC, Dec 67.
2. Comments provided by LtCol Emil L. Konopnicki, USA, J4117, Logistics Plans Section, J4, Hq CINCPAC, on Draft Manuscript in J4/Memo/00028-68 to J04, Hq CINCPAC, 6 Mar 68, Subj: CINCPAC Command History; draft review.
3. CINCPAC Command History 1966, p. 318.
4. CINCPAC 012338Z Feb 67. The other source utilized in writing this subsection on the Mechanization of CRSFF Movement Tables was: J4 History, Hq CINCPAC, Jan 67.
5. CINCPAC 012338Z Feb 67.

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One conclusion reached by the Working Group was that SEATO movement requirements exceeded Thailand's seaport capabilities on certain days, which indicated a need to reschedule movements into Thailand.

(S) In anticipation of this meeting, the Logistics Analysis Section of Logistics Plans Branch, J4, Hq CINCPAC, had completed the development of an Automatic Data Processing (ADP) Program, which would assist in the preparation of the SEATO Surface Movement Tables. This ADP Program was presented to the group, which concluded that it would effectively provide the basic data required to support SEATO Movement Conferences or Exercises. As a result, the Working Group recommended that the basic formats contained in this ADP Program be presented to the SEATO Member Nations for acceptance as the standardized method for submitting contingency requirements for SEATO surface movements through seaports and intra-theater movement to final destination.

Report of Air Component Commander, Central Region SEATO Field Forces (CRSFF) Airlift Resources Working Group

(S) A SEATO Working Group convened at Clark Air Force Base, P. I., under the direction of the Commanding General (CG), 13th Air Force, between 13 and 17 February 1967.¹ It was designed to determine the feasibility of centralized control of CRSFF airlift resources. In order to coordinate a U. S. position, the U.S. held a Unilateral Meeting on 7-10 February, which was attended by representatives from CINCPAC, CINCUSARPAC, CINCPACAF, CGFMFPAC (who represented CINCPACFLT); 13th Air Force, COMUSMACV, 315th Air Division, MAC, and CHWTO.

(S) During its discussions, the SEATO Working Group determined that centralized control of CRSFF airlift resources was feasible. Accordingly, the group developed the necessary organization, responsibilities, procedures, staffing, and forms to expedite implementation. Additionally, the members approved SEATO airlift request formats for introduction into regular SEATO publications as Southeast Asia Standardization Agreements (SEASTAGs) 3093 and 3345. All these actions taken by the group appeared in its minutes, which were subject to final acceptance by CG, 13th Air Force, who would then forward it to Commander, CRSFF, for further action.

(U) By the summer of 1967, the SEATO Working Group's Final Report, dated 17 February 1967, was in the process of being reviewed,

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1. The sources for the information contained in this subsection are: J4 History, Hq CINCPAC, Feb 67; J5 History, Hq CINCPAC, Jul 67.

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commented upon, and approved by way of Commander, Air Component Command, CRSFF; Commander, CRSFF (Designate); Commander, SEATO Force (Designate); and the USMILAD, who represented the Appointed Nation. Following receipt of the final approval by the USMILAD, the Air Component Commander, CRSFF, would initiate appropriate action, and the Member Nations of SEATO would utilize this report's data for national planning.

U. S. Appointee for Chief, SEATO Military Planning Office (CMPO)

(C) The three senior billets in the SEATO MPO, located in Bangkok, Thailand, are CMPO, Deputy CMPO, and Head of Planning. At MA 12C, the MILADs established that the ranks for these positions would be MAJ GEN, BGEN, and CAPT/COL respectively. And, at MA 160 they established that these three billets would be filled by three separate countries with representation from three service arms. Tours of duty are of two years duration. Customarily, the three positions have been filled by one officer from an Asian member country, one from a Commonwealth member country, and one from the United States. Although these three positions are rotational among the SEATO nations, and elective, i. e., nominations are voted on by the MILADs, there has never been a true vote necessary to date. Previously, agreement has always been obtained informally between the MILADs in advance as to country and service, thus precluding any formal voting for candidates for any of the positions. All billets are due for rotation in 1968: the CMPO in July, the Deputy CMPO in February, and the Head of Planning in March. ¹

(C) Since the position of CMPO had been filled by all SEATO member nations, except France, which has not been providing officers to the MPO, "it is clearly our [U. S.] turn in the top billet."² In addition such an action would demonstrate to all concerned that the U. S. is supporting SEATO military affairs. Moreover, if the U. S. did not provide an officer for CMPO, it would still have to provide one for Head of Planning, a position that the U. S. has occupied on every alternate rotation since the billet was established in 1960. For these reasons, Admiral Sharp believed "that the U. S. should opt for the CMPO position when due."³ He forwarded this recommendation to the JCS on 24 March 1967. The JCS concurred with

1. CINCPAC 240342Z Mar 67.

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid.

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the USMILAD's proposal on 6 April, stating "that an Army general officer should fill the CMPO position, because the SEATO plans predominately involve ground forces and because an Air Force general officer filled the Deputy CMPO Role in the two previous assignments." ¹

(C) In the past, the SEATO Member Nations had only assigned truly outstanding and capable officers as CMPO. The U. S. should be as equally selective, the USMILAD felt, in order to maintain the high standards and international stature of the SEATO organization. He pointed out to the JCS that since this would be the first time for a U. S. CMPO, the "member nation representatives at all levels will be expecting an able planner who will provide the necessary leadership to guide the organization through what will probably be two busy and difficult years." ²

Among the many responsibilities of the CMPO is the general conduct of the Military Advisers' Conferences held annually in the fall at Bangkok, which includes advising and assisting the Chairman at these meetings, as well as at the MILAD conferences held in conjunction with the annual SEATO Council meetings in the spring. The U. S. appointee for the position of CMPO will assume office on 1 July 1968, which will make him responsible for organizing MA 29C the following October. Since MA 28C will be held in Wellington, N. Z., at the end of March 1968, the USMILAD recommended that the officer be selected and arrangements made far enough in advance as to allow him to attend MA 28C as an observer. ³ On 9 October 1967, the JCS notified Admiral Sharp that a nomination for the CMPO billet had been received from the Department of the Army and that this nominee "will be closely monitored to meet the request that the selectee be able to attend MA 28C as an observer." ⁴

Central Region SEATO Field Force (CRSFF) OPlan 4/67

(TS) During 1967, USMILAD received a Draft CRSFF OPlan 4/67, dated 3 August 1967, from the Commander, CRSFF. On 28 August, Admiral Sharp asked his component commanders, as well as COMUSMACTHAI, to provide comments and recommendations on this draft plan by 16 October 1967. ⁵

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1. JCS 2068/062302Z Apr 67.
 2. CINCPAC 272236Z Sep 67.
 3. J5 History, Hq CINCPAC, Sep 67; CINCPAC 272236Z Apr 67; Point Paper, J5, Hq CINCPAC 29 Sep 67, Subj: Attendance of the U. S. Appointee for Chief, SEATO Military Planning Office (CMPO) at MA28C.
 4. JCS 8395/091925Z Oct 67.
 5. J5 History, Hq CINCPAC, Aug 67; CINCPAC 282004Z Aug 67.

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(TS) As an updated revision of CRSFF OPlan 4/64, the draft plan provided for the defense of Southeast Asia including Pakistan and the Philippines against attack by Chinese and North Vietnamese Communist forces. Basically, its concept was to:

Defend mainland SEASIA against attack by CHICOM/NVN forces, liberate enemy occupied friendly territories in the Central Region, restore peace to the Treaty Area and destroy the enemy's will and capacity to expand Communist influence in the Treaty Area.¹

(TS) By November 1967, USMILAD was ready to forward the draft plan to CMPO in Bangkok with his comments and recommendations. His message on the 17th was 40 pages long, listing his detailed observations as a result of thorough staffing. Some of the most significant comments concerned: (1) the designation of COMNAVFORV as Naval Component Commander for the plan, with COMNAVPHIL being named as a backup commander in the event COMNAVFORV should ever be disestablished; (2) a recommendation that more combat support and combat service support units be added to support maneuver units and the BAC; (3) concurrence in the CRSFF Commander's proposal to establish a forward command post at Korat, provided that this proposal is acceptable to other member nations of SEATO; and (4) the incorporation into the plan of RVN air and naval forces that may accede to CRSFF.² No new developments altered the status of this project by the end of calendar year 1967.³

Seato Field Forces (SFF) OPlan 8/66

(TS) In June 1966, at MA 24C, the SEATO MILADs approved SEATO Field Forces OPlan 8/66, an updated version of an earlier 1963 contingency plan designed to counter communist insurgency in Thailand.⁴ Later in the year, at MA 25C, the Thailand Military Adviser announced that Field Marshal Thanom was designated Force Commander, and Admiral Sharp announced that COMUSMACTHAI was designated Field Forces Commander.⁵ At the same time, tentative force declarations

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1. The source for this information was the Office of Col Jack D. Elliott, USAF, J514, Hq CINCPAC, Dec 67.
 2. CINCPAC 170305Z Nov 67; J5 History, Hq CINCPAC, Nov 67.
 3. Information provided by the Office of Col Jack D. Elliott, USAF, J514, Hq CINCPAC, Jan 68.
 4. J5 History, Hq CINCPAC, May 67; CINCPAC Command History 1966, p. 309.
 5. Ibid., pp. 311, 314.

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in support of the plan were made, and eventually all member nations except France and Pakistan formally declared forces to this plan. The USMILAD officially confirmed the U.S. force declarations at MA 26C in early 1967.¹ On 28 April 1967, Admiral Sharp informed COMUSMACTHAI of the specific declarations and directed him to develop the requirements for combat support, combat service support units, and various headquarters.²

~~(S)~~ COMUSMACTHAI published SFF OPlan 8/66 on 15 May 1967, and it was circulated to USMILAD staff and PACOM Service Component Commanders for review and recommendations.³ This formal review was completed during June.⁴ On 15 August 1967, Admiral Sharp forwarded the comments and recommendations of his staff, PACOM Service Component Commanders, and sub-unified commanders. He informed COMUSMACTHAI that, "subject to delineated comments and recommendations contained in message, USMILAD approved SFF OPlan 8/66 for transmittal to the Commander SEATO Force."⁵ One major change was the rewording of the plan's mission to read:

SEATO Field Forces (SFF) will conduct military operations to assist the RTG in countering communist insurgency so as to assist in establishing conditions in which the RTG can resolve its problems and maintain the security and independence of the Kingdom of Thailand.⁶

SEATO MPO Plan 9/67

~~(S)~~ On 12 August 1967, Admiral Sharp forwarded to the JCS his recommendations for forces declarations and his concurrence in forces requirements for SEATO MPO Plan 9/67, a contingency plan to defend Thailand from a North Vietnam attack.⁷ Four days later, he asked for additional "approval of USMILAD position that Annexes A and D through L of MPO Plan 9/67, and changes to paragraphs 7 and 8 of basic plan, be approved at MA27C, subject" to the comments and recommendations of his staff, PACOM Service Component Commanders, and sub-unified commanders.⁸

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1. J5 History, Hq CINCPAC, Apr 67.
 2. CINCPAC 282320Z Apr 67.
 3. J5 History, Hq CINCPAC, May 67.
 4. J5 History, Hq CINCPAC, Jun 67.
 5. J5 History, Hq CINCPAC, Aug 67.
 6. CINCPAC 150420Z Aug 67.
 7. J5 History, Hq CINCPAC, Aug 67; CINCPAC 122129Z Aug 67.
 8. CINCPAC 162252Z Aug 67.

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~~(S)~~ Later in the year, at the September meeting of MA 27C, these proposed amendments of USMILAD were "approved with minor changes."¹ At the same time, both the U.S. and Thailand made known their forces declarations to support SEATO MPO Plan 9/67. Neither the United Kingdom, Philippines, Australia, nor New Zealand were prepared to declare their forces at the conference, but the last two stated that their declarations would be forthcoming soon.

SEATO Exercise AURORA (SMPO PX-29)

~~(S)~~ SEATO Exercise AURORA, a Command Post Exercise (CPX) in the form of a free play map maneuver directed at the operational aspects of Central Region SEATO Field Force Plan 4/64, was conducted in Bangkok, Thailand, during the period 15-28 May 1967.² Its overall objective was to test the concepts for initial operations under this plan, as well as the logistic activities in support of it.

~~(S)~~ According to the exercise scenario, Communist China and North Vietnam had assembled forces for an overt aggression against Southeast Asia under the cover of a cease-fire in South Vietnam. Prior to the start of the exercise, North Vietnam launched a massive assault across the DMZ into South Vietnam and, on the first day of the exercise, Communist China initiated an attack upon Thailand. The exercise play was divided into three disconnected play periods, each preceded by a day in which players would have time to be briefed, as well as to plan and organize for the following play period.

~~(S)~~ Exercise AURORA had originally been proposed for the 1965-66 SEATO Training Year, but had been postponed. At MA 24C in June 1966, however, the Military Advisers reinserted it into the SEATO Exercise Schedule for 1966-67 in place of SMPO PX-33. Thailand, being the host country, selected "AURORA" as the exercise nickname.

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1. CINCPAC 140138Z Sep 67. Additional information concerning SEATO MPO Plan 9/67 can be found in the subsection entitled "Military Advisers Conference 27 (MA 27C)" in this chapter.
 2. Unless otherwise cited, the following information on Exercise AURORA was derived from: Point Paper, J316, Hq CINCPAC, 20 Feb 67, Subj: SMPO PX-29 (Exercise AURORA); Point Paper, J316, Hq CINCPAC, 31 Mar 67, Subj: SMPO PX-29 (SEATO Exercise AURORA); Point Paper, J3B16, Hq CINCPAC, 6 May 67, Subj: SEATO Exercise AURORA; J3 Memo No. 00362-67, Hq CINCPAC, 10 Jun 67, Subj: Observations at SEATO Exercise AURORA, hereafter cited as J3 AURORA Memo.

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The United States, as sole sponsor, appointed MajGen Richard G. Stilwell, COMUSMACTHAI, as the Exercise Director.

~~(S)~~ Following his appointment, MajGen Stilwell formed a nucleus planning staff and convened a pre-planning conference with all participating nations represented in August 1966. Composed of representatives from the U. S. , Thailand, Australia, and the United Kingdom, the combined exercise planning staff proceeded with its work according to schedule. Despite several changes, the exercise dates were eventually fixed. The final exercise planning conference was held in Bangkok, 29 January - 2 February 1967. Here, 37 delegates "representing CINCPAC, Component Commanders and Sub- Unified Commands met with representatives of Australia, New Zealand, Thailand and the United Kingdom to finalize the arrangements for play of Exercise AURORA. "1

~~(S)~~ Exercise AURORA was conducted at the Asian Trade Fair site immediately adjacent to metropolitan Bangkok, and all SEATO member nations except France, Pakistan, and the Philippines participated in it. "From an overall standpoint, " according to CINCPAC observers, "Exercise AURORA should be considered an outstanding success. "2

~~(S)~~ One of the major objectives of the exercise was to test the logistic support of Central Region SEATO Field Force Plan 4/64. The following summarizes the results of logistic play:

The logistics play during the exercise was unusually heavy and designed to examine the combined effects of logistic requirements on common-user facilities. From a broad logistics viewpoint, AURORA was a success in that significant problem areas were identified which must be corrected if adequate logistic support is to be provided SEATO plans and operations. The most significant problem affecting logistic play was the lack of understanding of command relationships within the SEATO Field Force Organization and the absence of clearly defined responsibilities for the coordination and maintenance of common-user facilities. 3

~~(S)~~ The primary objective of Exercise AURORA was to test the effectiveness of a major SEATO plan. Although a map maneuver is not the ideal vehicle, Exercise AURORA actually succeeded better in this

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1. J5 History, Hq CINCPAC, Jan 67.
 2. J3 AURORA Memo.
 3. J4 History, Hq CINCPAC, May 67.

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respect than most, because of the depth and thoroughness of exercise planning. The existing SEATO Field Force plan was updated in the planning stages, an unusual amount of logistic play was introduced, and the latest approved SEATO intelligence information was utilized. Deficiencies in each of these areas were identified during the conduct of the exercise. The "major and inherent shortcoming of this map maneuver was failure to test SEATO communications in support of the plan. While communications plans were tested, communications problems were not permitted to effect the play of the exercise."¹

~~(S)~~ In the opinion of the CINCPAC observers, Exercise AURORA was successful as a test of SEATO MPO Plan 4, as a revitalizing influence upon SEATO training in Thailand, and as a SEATO public affairs vehicle. The planning for exercise play was thorough and professional, and the support provided by the U.S. Naval Training Aids Center and the U.S. Army Mobile TV Unit was superior. Moreover, the presence of CINCPAC observers from several staff sections contributed to a successful exercise by providing on-the-spot advice and assistance.

~~(S)~~ A few shortcomings, however, were also noted. Although most administrative and support activities functioned smoothly, certain exceptions caused dissatisfaction or inconvenience for player personnel and often resulted in last minute "crash" actions. While the majority of the exercise players had been well briefed prior to their arrival in Bangkok, the obvious failure on the part of a few to familiarize themselves beforehand with SEATO background material, MPO Plan 4, or the basic exercise documents, caused a slowing down during the initial phases of the exercise play.

~~(S)~~ In light of their findings, the CINCPAC observers recommended that "CINCPAC staff sections evaluate deficiencies reported herein and prepare to initiate corrective action within their areas of staff responsibility, as appropriate," and that "CINCPAC staff sections make efforts to provide representative and knowledgeable player or controller personnel for future SEATO ground exercises in the Central Region."²

SEATO Exercise SIYASAT (SMPO PX-35)

~~(S)~~ A two week SEATO exercise, jointly sponsored by the

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1. J3 AURORA Memo.
 2. Ibid.

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United State and the Philippines, was conducted during the period, 8-21 March 1967.¹ Denoted SIYASAT, a Filipino word meaning to look into, investigate, evaluate, or test, the exercise included combined command post, field, air defense, anti-submarine, and mine warfare phases. It was designed to test the deployment, reinforcement, and logistical support capabilities of the SEATO forces in the Eastern Region. More specifically, SIYASAT tested Eastern Region SEATO Field Force Operation Plan 4/64 under simulated conditions designed to approximate real situations. Mine-sweeping and anti-submarine exercises were conducted in the South China Sea, while air defense and ground force maneuvers were held in the Fort Bonifacio area of Central Luzon.

(S) As co-sponsoring nations, the Philippines and the U. S. provided the Exercise Director, MajGen Segundo P. Velasco, Vice Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and the Deputy Exercise Director, MajGen Michael J. Ingelico, Vice Commander, 13th Air Force, respectively. Other participating SEATO member nations were the United Kingdom and Australia, with minor contingents representing New Zealand and Thailand; France and Pakistan did not take part. It is noteworthy that MajGen Velasco was promoted to full general and designated Commander of Philippine Armed Forces shortly after he conducted this exercise. He also became the Philippine MILAD to SEATO.²

(S) SIYASAT was the first SEATO military exercise of its type ever to be held in the Philippines. Also noteworthy was the organization for the first time of a Host Nation Coordination Board, a civilian advisory body to the Exercise Force Commander, designed to coordinate the military and civilian requirements on communications, manpower, industry, agriculture, finance, utilities, and services whether public or private. This board served its purpose well, besides furnishing much vital data which could be used for future planning.

(S) As in almost every exercise, certain areas of correction were uncovered, but SIYASAT was a success on the whole. Besides achieving its goals, it furthered a better understanding among the participating SEATO

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1. The following information on Exercise SIYASAT was derived from: Intv, LtCol James B. Egger, USA, SEATO and Joint Exercise Officer, J3, Hq CINCPAC, with Mr. Strobridge, Senior Historian, CINCPAC HistBr, 13 Nov 67; Journal MA, Jun 67, p. 121; Point Paper, J316, Hq CINCPAC, 20 Feb 67, Subj: SEATO MPO PX-35 (Exercise SIYASAT).
 2. Comment on Draft Manuscript by J5/Memo/00088-68 to J046, Hq CINCPAC, 1 Mar 68, Subj: 1967 CINCPAC Command History; draft review.

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nations, as well as improving the image of SEATO because of the highly successful civic action program in the exercise.

SEATO Maritime Exercise SEA DOG (SMPO PX-36)

(S) The South China Sea lying between Manila and Bangkok served as a maneuver area for the SEATO Maritime Exercise SEA DOG in mid-1967.¹ The naval and maritime air forces committed to SEATO by member nations of Australia, New Zealand, Philippines, United Kingdom, and the United States assembled in Manila harbor for orientation and pre-exercise training. Upon completion of preliminary training, the forces transited the Lingayen Gulf and the South China Sea in the face of active "enemy" opposition. Post-exercise assembly of opposing forces and exercise critique were completed at Bangkok. The stated objectives of Exercise SEA DOG were:

1. To test ability of SEATO nations to conduct combined maritime operations.
2. To exercise Member Nations' naval and maritime air forces in anti-submarine and convoy operations.
3. To further improve coordination between Member Nations' maritime forces with emphasis on use of combined procedures.
4. To test additional allied procedures which could be adopted for SEATO use.

(S) Thailand was the host nation, and Australia and the U. S. were co-sponsors of the exercise. Exercise Director was the Flag Officer Commanding, HM Australian Fleet, and his Deputy was the Commander, Patrol Force, U.S. Seventh Fleet. SEA DOG was successfully conducted during the period 7-29 July 1967.

Facilities in SEATO Headquarters Building

(S) Early in 1967, certain proposals were made through SEATO channels pertaining to a detailed study of precise requirements for an Interim Command Post in the SEATO Headquarters Building upon implementation of SEATO Military Planning Office (MPO) Plan 4.²

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1. The source for information on Exercise SEA DOG was: Intv, LtCol James B. Egger, USA, SEATO and Joint Exercise Officer, J3, Hq CINCPAC, with Mr. Strobridge, Senior Historian, CINCPAC HistBr, 16 Nov 67.
 2. J5 History, Hq CINCPAC, Jul 67.

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The impact of the proposed changes would be slight, since they dealt mostly with backup generators, the adding of SEATO Military Publication (SEAP) documents, and the eventual expansion of communication facilities. By July of 1967, the USMILAD had notified the Chief, MPO (CMPO), as well as the other MILAD Representatives (MILADREPs), that he approved of these changes.

(S) On 8 November 1967, COMUSMACTHAI requested that planning be initiated for equipping the SEATO Communications Center upon activation of the programmed Integrated Wideband Communications System (IWCS) link at the new SEATO Headquarters Building. In reply, the USMILAD wired:

The original concept for an IWCS station at SEATO HQ was to provide trunking access for the USMILADREP and other U. S. activities in the general area, as well as a minimum communications facility for the interim SEATO Force Hq upon implementation of SEATO Plan 4. Concept anticipated the absence of any other designation of a SEATO Force Command Post....

The U. S. does not contemplate operation of a peacetime communications center in the SEATO building at this time....

All questions regarding utilization of designated U. S. Comm Ctr space at SEATO Hq... should be addressed to CINCUSARPAC.¹

Communications from HQ SEATO to Philippine Military

(C) In the later part of 1967, the Chief of Staff, Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), requested the establishment of message service, via U. S. facilities, between General Headquarters (GHQ), AFP, and the Philippine MILADREP at Hq SEATO in Bangkok, Thailand. Since electrical connectivity between these two points did not exist, Admiral Sharp responded to this request from an Allied Nation by making provisions for handling of Philippine traffic over the counter at the JUSMAGPHIL Communication Center and at COMUSMACTHAI Communication Center.²

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1. CINCPAC 250333Z Nov 67.
 2. J6 History, Hq CINCPAC, Dec 67.

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SEATO Air Operations Manual

(U) During 1967, an Air Operations Manual, designed for SEATO air forces operating in support of SEATO ground forces, was prepared for publication. The Commander, 13th Air Force, who was the SEATO Plan 4 Air Component Commander, (Designate), developed this unclassified manual for adoption by SEATO, in an effort to give wide-spread access to standardized terminology and air operating procedures. The draft manual was submitted to CINCPAC for review during April 1967. Following a detailed perusal by the staffs of CINCPAC and his Component Commanders, which brought forth substantive recommendations for improvement, the USMILAD approved the submission on 23 May 1967 of this draft manual, with pertinent suggestions for improvement, to the SEATO Military Planning Office (MPO) for national approval as an amendment to SEATO Military Publication (SEAP) 25.¹

~~(S)~~ The SEATO MPO incorporated all of the changes into the manual that the USMILAD had recommended by 24 July 1967. Shortly, thereafter, on 15 August 1967, Admiral Sharp dispatched a message to the JCS. As for the Air Operations Manual, he asked for the JCS's "approval and agreement to its inclusion in SEAP 25."² Approval had not been received from the JCS by 31 December 1967.

Air Base Rights in the Philippines Requested by Australia and New Zealand

~~(S)~~ In the event of intervention of the Chinese Communists into Southeast Asia and an implementation of SEATO Plan 4, Australia and New Zealand would deploy and maintain forces to Thailand, which would mean the sending of two convoys a month on shipping routes between Indonesia and the Philippines into the South China Sea and the Gulf of Thailand.³ Consequently, both nations would like to have the capability to provide their own effective air anti-submarine warfare (ASW) protection. From the available Australian and Malaysian air bases, however, their aircraft would have range enough only to cover

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1. J5 History, Hq CINCPAC, May 67.
 2. CINCPAC 150502Z Aug 67; J5 History, Hq CINCPAC, Aug 67.
 3. The following sources have provided the information contained in this subsection on Philippine air base rights: J5 History, Hq CINCPAC, Oct 67; CINCPAC 072110Z Oct 67; CINCPAC 272345Z Nov 67; J5 History, Hq CINCPAC, Dec 67.

the eastern and western segments of the convoy route, thus leaving approximately a 600 nautical mile gap in the middle, at a point just south of the Philippine Islands.

~~(TS)~~ In June 1967, the Australian MILAD informed the Philippine MILAD of the aforementioned strategical considerations. Besides proposing that the two governments enter into an agreement that would grant permission to utilize one or more Philippine air bases, the Australian MILAD requested that the Philippine MILAD agree to a feasibility study on the ~~subject~~ bases "by the staff of the Philippine Commander of the Eastern Region SEATO Field Forces and Australian Planners."¹ The Philippine MILAD agreed to the feasibility study but, since the bases were covered by "certain restrictive provisions contained in the Philippine - United States Military Bases Agreement of 1947," for which "prior consent of the United States Government would be required," he "invited the New Zealand and United States MILADS to participate in the study."² These discussions between the four country MILADS was scheduled for December 1967.

~~(TS)~~ On 7 October, Admiral Sharp told the JCS that the "bilateral exchanges of correspondence through SEATO channels between the Phils and Australia and the Phils and New Zealand has progressed to a point where the United States, through the USMILAD, should now reply to the PHILMILAD regarding whether or not we agree to participate in the proposed feasibility study."³ He felt that the U.S. should be represented in this meeting, since the study would probably result in a Philippine recommendation that the U.S. and the Republic of the Philippines should enter into a Consent Agreement to allow Third Countries specified use of U.S. operated bases. JCS-approval was granted, and the other three countries were so notified.

~~(S)~~ From 12 through 17 December 1967, Col Jack D. Elliott, USAF, J514, Assistant for SEATO & Other International Actions, Hq CINCPAC, represented the USMILAD at the multilateral conference, as well as on several field trips to various air bases in the Philippines. Assisting him were the Director of Plans, Hq, 13th Air Force, and the Assistant Chief of Staff for Plans of the CINCPACREPPHIL. As for the other countries, the Philippine Ministry of Defense was represented by the Director of Plans,

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1. CINCPAC 072110Z Oct 67.
 2. Ibid.
 3. Ibid.

General Headquarters (GHQ), while the governments of Australia and New Zealand were represented by two Australian Squadron Leaders from the Department of Air.

(S) In order to present a united front, as well as to protect U.S. interests, Col Elliott had briefed the other American delegates on the approved position. A strong stand, he said, would have to be taken against any negotiations for Australian or New Zealand base rights for Sangley Point, because the U.S. was already on official record denying similar requests by the Philippines. Therefore, to give the impression to the Philippine delegates that we would even consider granting a Third Part such rights would be extremely damaging to the credibility of past and future U.S. negotiations for return to or use of Philippine air bases.

(S) During the conference, the Australians disclosed that both they and the New Zealanders wanted to base approximately 140 personnel and from 6 to 9 P-2V or P-3 Orions at a base in the Philippines. This base would be the one best suited from a logistics support standpoint, while, at the same time, being one that was close enough to the operating area to provide maximum time on station and minimum enroute time. Right from the outset, it was obvious to the American delegates that the Australians had a preconceived brief to press for rights to use the Sangley Point Naval Air Station (NAS). Their rationale was that, since the U.S. Navy was operating the same type aircraft from the base, the Australians could enter into a cross service agreement with the U.S., which would simplify their maintenance, spare parts, and supply stockage problems.

(S) To refute this contention, the CINCPACREPPHIL explained in great detail about the crowded conditions that existed at Sangley Point. Moreover, he pointed out the operational disadvantages of operating from Sangley Point NAS, with special emphasis upon the extended distance of this base from the proposed ASW operating area.

(S) At this point, the Chief Philippine Delegate suggested that all the delegates visit the air bases in Southern Mindanao and examine their suitability for the ASW operations, since they were the closest ones to the proposed operating areas. Accordingly, the bases at Zambugo and Davao on the island of Mindanao were inspected and found to be marginally acceptable from a base facilities and communications standpoint. Next, the delegates visited the Mactan Air Base at Cebu. Their inspection found it to be fully capable of handling the proposed 6 to 9 aircraft, as well as all of the required support personnel. Moreover, the base's communications capabilities were discovered to be completely adequate.

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(S) At the final meeting of the study group, which was held at Mactan Air Base, the delegates all agreed that the best course of action would be to obtain rights for the Australians and New Zealanders to operate P-3 Orions (Lockheed Electras, which had been configured for ASW) out of Mactan Air Base. Since the U. S. was already operating from 3 to 5 squadrons of C-130s from this base, the compatibility of aircraft and spare parts problems would be solved. Moreover, adequate ramp space was available, since Mactan Air Base was then operating at less than capacity, with only an average of 75 take-offs and landings a day. This solution, according to the Australian delegates, definitely was going to be their recommendation to the Governments of Australia and New Zealand.

(S) As the year ended, the next step in this matter belonged to Australia and New Zealand, which would have to negotiate for a base rights agreement with the Government of the Philippines (GOP). The Australians planned to accomplish this goal through the necessary diplomatic channels. This course of action would then require the U. S. and GOP to enter into a consent agreement, which would amend the Philippine-U. S. Military Bases Agreement of 1947.

SEATO Orientation Courses

(U) As explained in the earlier subsection on MA 26C of this history, three SEATO Orientation Courses were held during 1967 in Bangkok. At the second one, for instance, conducted from 26 June to 3 July, over 50 senior officers from all member nations except France attended, including 12 U. S. students. This course also included field trips to military bases within Thailand. For the first time, a CINCPAC Briefing Team made presentations pertaining to the war situation in Vietnam. "This briefing resulted from numerous requests by past students to receive an update on the Vietnam situation since five of the eight SEATO member nations are actively supporting South Vietnam with combat units in South Vietnam."¹

SEATO Joint Table of Distribution (JTD)

(U) On 28 December 1966, CINCPAC proposed to the JCS that the FY 67 Joint Manpower Program (JMP) for SEATO "be extended for 1 July 1968 with" certain minor adjustments.² The JCS, in reply, answered on 20 January 1967 that CINCPAC's request for an extension of the SEATO Military Planning Office (MPO) "1 July 1967 JMP for 1 July 1968 is approved."³

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1. J5 History, Hq CINCPAC, Jun 67.
 2. CINCPAC 282213Z Dec 66.
 3. JCS 4199/202101Z Jan 67.

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On 30 November 1967, CINCPAC submitted the revised FY 69 JMP to the JCS. It reflected the addition of three international rotating billets, one Flag/General Officer, one Aide, and one enlisted Aide scheduled for filling by the U. S. in FY 69.¹

1. J1 History, Hq CINCPAC, Jan 68.

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SECTION II - CINCPAC POLITICAL-MILITARY ACTIVITIES

AustraliaStatus of Forces Agreement (SOFA)

(C) The U.S. -Australia SOFA first became effective on 9 May 1963.¹ As explained in last year's history, diplomatic overtures were under study by Hq CINCPAC as 1967 dawned to expand the original agreements to include U.S. military personnel in Australia on rest and recuperation (R&R).²

(C) By June 1967, a working level agreement had been reached between the American Embassy at Canberra and the Government of Australia (GOA). When and if a R&R location was set up in the country, this agreement would effectively extend SOFA coverage to the visiting U.S. personnel.³ Under its terms, the R&R program would "be considered an 'agreed activity' falling within the scope of the agreement concerning the status of United States Forces in Australia dated May 9, 1963, provided that only those provisions of the agreement which are applicable and appropriate to the program shall apply."⁴ Participants in the R&R program would not, however, be considered as being in an official duty status for the purposes of Articles 8 (Claims) and 12 (Criminal Jurisdiction) of the original SOFA. On 14 July 1967, the agreement extending SOFA coverage to R&R troops visiting Australia was executed.⁵ By the end of 1967, Australia had been officially established as a R&R site.⁶

US-Australian Memorandum of Understanding

(C) Early in 1967, Australia expressed a desire for a speedy consummation of "a bilateral arrangement in which the US agrees to

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1. Point Paper, J73, Hq CINCPAC, 11 Apr 66, Subj: Australian SOFA.
 2. CINCPAC Command History 1966, p. 323.
 3. J73 History, Hq CINCPAC, Apr-Jun 67.
 4. AMEMB Canberra 6066/202301 Z Jun 67.
 5. J73 History, Hq CINCPAC, Jul-Sep 67.
 6. Telcon, LtCol William H. Packer, USAF, J731, Hq CINCPAC, with Mr. Strobridge, Senior Historian, CINCPAC HistBr, 20 Feb 68; J1 History, Hq CINCPAC, Jan 68.


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provide on a reimbursable basis certain common item support such as POL and ammunition items in the event forces are committed to SEATO or bilateral operations in Thailand. ¹ American and Australian representatives met in Canberra on 6-10 March for working level negotiations to draw up a draft agreement. Four months later, a second working party met in Saigon on 17-18 July to identify problems and to refine the text of the agreement.

(C) Australia wanted to have the agreement signed in an out-of-session meeting during MA 27C in Bangkok during early fall. Admiral Sharp, however, felt he needed more time to study the proposed memorandum and so advised the Australians.

(C) A Draft Memorandum of Understanding was forwarded to the JCS on 9 October 1967 for a Washington-level review. Although such a procedure was not necessary, Admiral Sharp felt that a DOD-level review would be advantageous. ²


(C) At the end of the year, no further information about this proposed memorandum had been heard from the JCS. When the Washington-level review has been completed, the U.S. -Australia Memorandum of Understanding will be finalized and copies will be sent to the Chairman, Chiefs of Staff Committee, Australian Forces, for his information, with the understanding that if found acceptable as written, the U.S. would sign the memorandum out-of-session during MA 28C at Wellington. ³

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1. Point Paper, J4116, Hq CINCPAC, 4 Oct 67, Subj: US/Australian Memorandum of Understanding, with attached Draft Memorandum of Understanding Between the United States and the Commonwealth of Australia Regarding the Supply of Petroleum Products, Ammunition and other Classes of Supplies, in Thailand under SEATO Plans or Bilateral Arrangements.
 2. J4 History, Hq CINCPAC, Oct 67.
 3. Comment on Draft Manuscript by J4/Memo/00028-68 to J04, Hq CINCPAC, 6 Mar 68, Subj: 1967 CINCPAC Command History; draft review.

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China

Ambassador Sullivan's China Policy Proposal

(S) In early spring of 1967, William H. Sullivan, U.S. Ambassador to Laos, attended the Far East Mission Chiefs Conference at Baguio in the Philippines. Here, he attacked the old problem of U.S. medium and long range policies for Taiwan and the Pescadores by means of an "imaginative and ingenious proposal."² Following the conference, on 10 March, Ambassador Sullivan cabled CINCPAC, elaborating upon his oral statements, for he felt his proposal should be "examined in further detail."³

(S) Based upon two premises, one, that Communist China's internal problems will keep the country occupied for a long time, and two, that a successful and satisfactory stabilization of the military problem in Southeast Asia will be achieved, Sullivan's suggestion contained four major points:

(1) "...that we move, with appropriate associates, to define the sovereignty of the GRC as limited to Taiwan and the Pescadores..."

(2) "This, in turn, would lead to a definition of territorial representatives in the United Nations and establish a 'two China' situation there, providing the framework into which an ultimate, reformed, mainland China might one day be fitted."⁴

(3) A clear stipulation by the U.S., following prior approval by GRC, that the so-called "Formosa Resolution" applies only to Taiwan and the Pescadores.

(4) The deployment of a forward ready reserve of U.S. ground forces to Taiwan.

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2. AMCONSUL Hong Kong 6436/150428Z Mar 67.

3. AMEMB Vientiane 5546/1002167 Mar 67.

4. Ibid.

(S) The last point, besides giving positive assurance of U.S. readiness to renew its presence in either Vietnam or Korea, would also have political benefits. For example, the stationing of U.S. troops on Taiwan would "prevent a deal behind our backs and against our interest" by inhibiting any desire on the part of the many "old mainlanders who would rather make a deal with Peking than be subjected to permanent divorce from the mainland."¹ Moreover, these troops could be utilized as excellent bargaining chips in the eventuality that a regenerate mainland regime offered to resume normal diplomatic relations with the U.S., if Taiwan was returned. Finally, the U.S. soldiers would obviate a need for a large, costly standing army by the GRC, which would mean less MAP costs, less effective opposition to the "two Chinas" concept, and more resources, both financial and human, for the economic development of Taiwan.

(S) To the American Consul at Hong Kong, this proposal of Ambassador Sullivan, although "imaginative and ingenious," was "infeasible, against background of estimates of present military balance in offshore islands-Taiwan Straits."² According to Consul General Rice:

Main defect of Sullivan plan is its deviousness, which is open to objection on purely pragmatic grounds that we would not be able convincingly to make our purposes and thereby accomplish them. The Chinese are past masters and we mere children when it comes to dissembling innocence and carrying on devious games. I do not believe we could propose bringing to Taiwan the forces Ambassador Sullivan has in mind, for the ends he contemplates, without the ever-suspicious Chinese seeing through our purposes. If their agreement were forthcoming it would be because of Chinese confidence that our designs could be thwarted, and the presence of our troops used instead to serve GRC interests.³

Moreover, he doubted that any regime was likely to emerge on the Chinese mainland in the near future which would be agreeable to the permanent separation of Taiwan from the mainland. Instead, he felt that both the mainland and Taiwan Chinese would learn to live with such a separation, and that such a situation "would represent the optimum practicable goal of relevant U.S. policy for the foreseeable future."⁴

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1. AMEMB Vientiane 5546/1002167 Mar 67.
 2. AMCONSUL Hong Kong 6436/150428Z Mar 67.
 3. Ibid.
 4. Ibid.

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~~(S)~~ Upon receipt of Ambassador Sullivan's cable, CINCPAC directed the undertaking of a staff study on the proposal. This study was completed on 20 May 1967 and contained the following conclusions:

(1) A "two China" situation would be in the U.S. interest for many years to come and this would be the probable outcome of present U.S. policy.

(2) U.S. should not, however, make any official or unofficial recognition of such being the case.

(3) Deployment of U.S. ground forces to Taiwan would not be in the best interests of the U.S., since such a move would prove costly, involve the U.S. in further commitments to a foreign country, and deprive the U.S. of the flexibility required in a theater reserve force.¹

~~(S)~~ Six days after the finalizing of the staff study CINCPAC approved it. He then directed that the document be retained within his headquarters for reference purposes.

Indonesia

U. S. Naval Transits of Indonesian Archipelago

~~(S)~~ As early as 1960, Indonesia had put forth claims that had restricted access to its territorial waters and had limited the right of innocent passage, an action clearly contrary to recognized international law. Two years later, the additional requirement of advance notice for transit of the Indonesian archipelago by foreign warships was requested. With but few exception, the United States and other nations that had disputed these claims provided Indonesia with informal notification as a courtesy, an action that would not in anyway recognize these maritime claims.²

~~(S)~~ The passage of the USS Bainbridge through the Lombok Strait near Indonesia on 10 March 1967, however, threw open the whole question of "courtesy notification," usually a matter of two or three days advance notice. The American Embassy in Djakarta had made such notification in

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1. Point Paper, J56, Hq CINCPAC, 13 Jun 67, Subj: Ambassador Sullivan's Suggested Medium and Long Range Policies for Taiwan and the Pescadores.
 2. The information contained in this subsection has been derived from: J5 History, Hq CINCPAC, Sep 67; STATE 10174/210324Z Jul 67; AMEMB Djakarta 581/030830Z Aug 67; CINCPAC Command History 1966, p. 338.

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the case of the USS Bainbridge, but some delay had occurred in acquiring confirmation of receipt of the notification from responsible Indonesian officials, because of the inaccessibility of all applicable ones.

(S) On 11 March 1967, Commodore Bagdja of the Indonesian Navy submitted a letter to the U. S. Naval Attache at Djakarta, requesting more advance notice of such transits, as well as "additional information on origin, destination and purpose of journey." ¹ The American Embassy in Djakarta believed that this letter had been submitted merely to allow the official record to show Indonesia's objection to the unfortunately shortened notification time. As a result, the decision was made to take no diplomatic action, thus continuing the policy of sufficient "courtesy notification," a matter of two or three days prior warning. These transit procedures were tested on 14 July 1967, when the USS Forrestal passed through the Indonesian archipelago, without any objection or comment. As the American Embassy at Djakarta remarked, "...no further action required." ²

Visit of U. S. Warship to Djakarta

(S) During 1967, the USS Coontz visited the Indonesian capital of Djakarta from 29 to 31 August. It was the first U. S. Warship to call at an Indonesian port since 1963. The Indonesian Navy "provided excellent hospitality" to the American sailors, while the USS Coontz "played host to 6000 visitors." ³ Comments from both official sources and the local press indicated that the visit was well received by the Indonesians. In retrospect, this visit "was an outstanding success." ⁴

Japan

U. S. -Japanese Security Consultative Committee Meeting.

(S) The American Embassy in Tokyo proposed on 6 April 1967 that the date for the seventh meeting of the Security Consultative Committee (SCC) be 15 May 1967, and CINCPAC accepted the following day. ⁵ The plans were "to follow previous agenda items for SCC meetings,


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1. STATE 10174/210328Z Jul 67.
 2. AMEMB Djakarta 581/030830Z Aug 67.
 3. CINCPAC Command Center 0730 Briefing Notes, 1 Sep 67.
 4. Ibid.
 5. History of Headquarters United States Forces, Japan, 1 January - 31 March 1967, dtd 29 May 67, CINCPAC CS 002538-67, pp. 1, 11.

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expanded somewhat in terms of time and participation in order to renew the Japan-US defense dialogue."¹ On 11 February, CINCPAC informed the JCS of his belief that "the SCC could be more productive" and urged them to support the "use of an invigorated SCC as the basic form for more meaningful US-Japan defense discussions."² In addition, he strongly felt that "specific Washington guidance" should be furnished on those "positions the US representatives should take in the SCC on the substantive issues of defense of the Japan area and Japan's role in regional security."³

(S) On 15 May 1967, the seventh meeting of the SCC took place at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Tokyo. The U.S. was represented by Ambassador U. Alexis Johnson and Admiral Sharp, while Japan was represented by the Honorable Takeo Miki, Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Honorable Kaneshichi Masuda, Director General of the Defense Agency.⁴ Agenda items included a presentation on Vietnam by the U.S., with Ambassador Johnson giving the political and economic aspects and Admiral Sharp, the military aspects. The Japanese Foreign Minister spoke on his nation's attitudes toward the U.S. -Japan Mutual Security Treaty, while the JDA Director General discussed the Third Japanese Defense Buildup Plan. The free, give-and-take discussion on each agenda item was extensive, lasting three hours instead of the scheduled two.

(S) Most of the questions during the discussions of the agenda items came from Minister Takeo Miki, and their tenor reflected his close interest in security matters, specifically the war in Vietnam and the Okinawa question. When he asked what Japan could do within its constitutional and other limitations to help the U.S. in Vietnam, this gave Ambassador Johnson the opportunity to relate Japanese statements and actions directly to their effect on the psychology of the Communist leaders in Hanoi, which appears to be based on an estimate that holding out will eventually lead to so much internal and external opposition that the U.S. will cease prosecuting the war.



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1. History of Headquarters United States Forces, Japan, 1 January - 31 March 1967, dtd 29 May 67, CINCPAC CS 002538-67, p. 1.
 2. CINCPAC 112141Z Feb 67
 3. Ibid.
 4. The sources for this account of SCC meeting are: J5 History, Hq CINCPAC, May 67; History of Headquarters United States Forces, Japan, 1 April - 30 June 1967, dtd 28 Aug 67, CINCPAC CS 003510-67, p. 1.

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(S) Both of the Japanese representatives stated that means of continuing the security relationship with the U.S. under the existing treaty were under study, for Japan would have to continue maintaining a security system. In fact, in the words of Minister Takeo Miki, the U.S. -Japanese security relationship is "the keystone of our relations."¹

(S) Following the meeting, Ambassador Johnson characterized "the SCC meeting of 15 May as by far the most profitable and useful of the series to date," while the Japanese Foreign Minister at the inevitable press conference following the meeting made "a very forthright initial statement emphasizing U.S. determination with respect to Vietnam."² In retrospect, therefore, it appears that this meeting was very beneficial for the purposes of the U.S.

Security Consultative Committee Sub-Committee (SCC SC)

(S) As early as September 1965, CINCPAC had "suggested to US Ambassador Edwin O. Reischauer that the establishment of a small subcommittee of the Security Consultative Committee (SCC) would be an excellent means of strengthening the SCC."³ Despite further exchange of ideas on this subject between the Ambassador and Admiral Sharp, no decision was then reached to establish such a subcommittee. In sharp contrast, however, by March of 1967, "it had been agreed to establish a subcommittee within the SCC for regular follow-up 'working level' talks at Vice-Minister-Ambassadorial level. The first meeting will follow the SCC meeting. These talks are aimed at being highly informal, with full opportunity for give and take without formal comment on either side."⁴ CINCPAC had been active in this favorable conclusion, for he had given the JCS his opinion on 11 February 1967, that a SCC subcommittee "could prove a worthwhile means of maintaining momentum and achieving useful exchanges between SCC meetings."⁵

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1. J5 History, Hq CINCPAC, May 67.
 2. History of Headquarters United States Forces, Japan, 1 April - 30 June 1967, dtd 29 May 67, CINCPAC CS 003510-67, p. 1.
 3. CINCPAC Command History 1966, pp. 331-332.
 4. History of Headquarters United States Forces, Japan, 1 January - 31 March 1967, dtd 29 May 67, CINCPAC CS 002538, p. 1.
 5. CINCPAC 112141Z Feb 67.

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(S) The first SCC SC meeting took place in Tokyo on 25 and 26 May 1967. Ambassador Johnson and Assistant Secretary of Defense McNaughton headed up the U. S. delegation, which included PACOM representation by LtGen Seth J. McKee, USAF, COMUS Japan, and MajGen Claire E. Hutchin, Jr., USA, Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and Operations, Hq CINCPAC. The Japanese side was headed by Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs Ushiba. Among others, he was supported by JDA Vice Minister Miwa, as well as General Amano and Rear Admiral Tsukudo, both representing the Japan Self Defense Force (JSDF). The U. S. objective of this meeting was:

...to establish a relationship and recurring discussions with the Government of Japan similar to those we have with NATO, and the meeting was the fruition of long efforts to begin a dialogue of this nature. The agenda was restricted to two items: Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Defense and Military Utility of the Ryukyus in Conventional Operations. The U. S. side had previously distributed papers on these topics emphasizing the over-all aspects of U. S. - Soviet ABM [sic] policies taken up with discussion and presentation of viewpoints. The scope of the questions indicated further discussions of these items in subsequent meeting. ²

(S) In the first day of the meeting, the Japanese expressed a keen interest in the ABM presentation, although they were aware that the U. S. had not yet made a decision to deploy such a system. On the second day, when Okinawa was discussed, the Japanese opted for increased autonomy for Okinawa, meanwhile, pointing out that the question of Okinawa remained a serious one between the U. S. and Japan even 20 years after World War II. The Americans, throughout the meeting, consistently attempted to convey the strategic importance of Okinawa to the security of the Pacific region, emphasized the future role of Japan in the Far East, and stressed the importance of free and unrestricted use of the Ryukyuan bases by the U. S. military forces, not only to America but to the whole Far East.

(S) Both the U. S. and Japan had much the same representation at the second SCC SC meeting that was held in Tokyo on 22 and 23 August 1967.

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1. This account of the first SCC SC meeting was derived from: J5 History, Hq CINCPAC, May 67; History of Headquarters, United States Forces, Japan, 1 April - 30 June 1967, dtd 28 Aug 67, CINCPAC CS 003510-67, pp. 1, 2.
 2. History of Headquarters United States Forces, Japan, 1 April - 30 June 1967, dtd 28 Aug 67, CINCPAC CS 003510-67, pp. 1, 2.

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The one major exception was the new representative for CINCPAC, Rear Admiral Ralph W. Cousins, USN, Assistant Chief of Staff for Plans, Hq CINCPAC. Once again, the agenda contained the two subjects that were explored at the first SCC SC in May, and on which the Japanese led the discussions. The Americans, on the other hand, brought out two new agenda items; the U.S. position and comments on both the Bonin and Korean situations. As was written later on this meeting:

The free exchange of views which followed each presentation was noteworthy and considered to be in furtherance of the objectives of these Subcommittee meetings. The Japanese exhibited a keen interest in Missile Defense in Japan. Both sides were favorably inclined towards convening the third meeting in the United States....¹

Fuji-McNair Maneuver Area

"The Fuji-McNair Maneuver Area was the only facility in the Far East that was adequate for large-scale maneuvers, including tank and artillery firing."² In the past, it has been primarily utilized for training U.S. Marines based in the Western Pacific, but U.S. use of the area has declined over the years, while the Japanese Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) have continuously made more intensive use of it. As early as the first meeting of the Security Consultative Committee (SCC) in 1960, the Japanese have requested the return of the area to the Government of Japan (GOJ) for use by the JSDF. The U.S. position has always been favorable to this idea, providing that control of the area would go to the Japan Defense Agency (JDA) and that the area would be available for use by PACOM forces. Since GOJ could never give these assurances, the area has remained under U.S. control. Nevertheless, pressure for the release of the maneuver area continued to be exerted during 1967, mainly by the owners of privately held land within the confines of the area, and special concessions involving partial release continued to be requested.³

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1. History of Headquarters United States Forces, Japan, 1 July - 30 September 1967, dtd 29 Nov 67, CINCPAC CS 004490-67, p. 1.
 2. CINCPAC Command History 1966, p. 335.
 3. Ibid., pp. 335-336; Point Paper, J4215, Hq CINCPAC, 4 May 66, Subj: Fuji McNair Maneuver Area; Point Paper, J5123, Hq CINCPAC, 12 Sep 67, Subj: Fuji-McNair Maneuver Area.

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(S) In August 1967, COMUSJAPAN assessed the problem of retaining U.S. and JSDF use of the Fuji-McNair area. Briefly, his assessment was "that long-range use cannot be assured and that the local political situation is approaching the point where continued US retention and present type use of the entire Fuji maneuver area may become impracticable regardless of the US stand in negotiations."¹ His recommendation was that an alternative site be located and that the Fuji-McNair area be released under the best attainable conditions.²

(S) Before contacting the JCS on this issue, CINCPAC queried his component commanders. CINCPACFLT, the principal user of the area, warned that piecemeal release should be avoided and recommended that the entire area should be released along the terms of the 1960 agreement, accepting the calculated risk that the GOJ would be able to assure use of the Fuji-McNair Maneuver Area for both the U.S. and JSDF forces. CINCPACAF, who would be minimally affected by whatever decision was made, tended to favor settlement of the issue on the basis of the SCC agreement of 1960. CINCUSARPAC, however, stated that U.S. Army, Japan (USARJ), contingency plans require the use of the maneuver area for staging U.S./UN units throughout Japan, and that the 549th Quartermaster Company conducts two weeks field training exercises there semi-annually. As a result, he opposed the release of the area to the GOJ.³

(S) Following a realistic assessment of the situation in light of his component commanders' comments, CINCPAC recommended on 21 October 1967 that the JCS approve a modified policy guidance for COMUSJAPAN which would "authorize the conduct of negotiations with Japan leading to the reversion of the entire Fuji-McNair maneuver area as soon as practicable on the best obtainable terms."⁴ The JCS reply of 16 November stated:

2. (S) The merits of reversion to Japan of the subject area under the terms and conditions of the 1960 Security Consultative Committee (SCC) agreement are recognized. However, there is little evidence that the JGSDF would be able to retain control of the area under the current political pressures confronting the US government. Additionally, a US initiative to turn back any US controlled installation at a time when the Ryukyu/Bonin Islands

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1. Point Paper, J5123, Hq CINCPAC, 9 Oct 67, Subj: Fuji-McNair Maneuver Area.
 2. COMUSJAPAN USLAC-FP 08069/110115Z Aug 67.
 3. Point Paper, J5123, Hq CINCPAC, 9 Oct 67, Subj: Fuji-McNair Maneuver Area.
 4. J5 History, Hq CINCPAC, Oct 67; CINCPAC 212046Z Oct 67.

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issues are being negotiated could accelerate pressures for release of other US military facilities in Japan, Ryukyus, and Bonins.

3. ~~(S)~~ Maintaining status quo should not preclude moving ahead in the search and evaluation of alternate maneuver sites to ensure meeting current and future service requirements in the WESTPAC area.

4. ~~(S)~~ Should pressures for return of the Fuji-McNair range appear to be rising sufficiently to involve the US Embassy/ State Department, JCS should be informed as early as possible.¹

~~(S)~~ "Considering that practical future utilization of Fuji-McNair may not be possible," CINCPAC requested CINCUSARPAC and CINCPACFLT on 12 December 1967 to "proceed with the identification and evaluation of sites alternate to Fuji-McNair and provide interim recommendations to CINCPAC by 1 Mar 1968."² This action terminated noteworthy occurrences on this issue for the remainder of 1967.³

Korea

Korean Status of Forces Agreement

~~(S)~~ On 9 February 1967, the Republic of Korea (ROK) Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) became effective. Its appearance was greeted by the ROK Government with a "formal but friendly ceremony and champagne toast at Capitol," attended by top U. S. military and embassy officers, ROK Cabinet Members, and SOFA officials.⁴ The SOFA entrance into force was both a prominent news item for the local Seoul newspapers and an editorial subject. The consensus of the editorials was that "ambiguous points remain in SOFA, particularly those concerning criminal jurisdiction, and that manner in which SOFA is enforced will be more meaningful than its terms."⁵

~~(S)~~ Earlier, before the SOFA became effective, a "Preliminary Working Group" was formed. It held meetings on 16 and 19 January,

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1. JCS 2922/160023Z Nov 67.
 2. CINCPAC 120330Z Dec 67.
 3. J5 History, Hq CINCPAC, Dec 67.
 4. AMEMB Seoul 4194/110320Z Feb 67.
 5. Ibid.

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when plans for the operation of the U. S. -Korea Joint Committee and its subcommittee were discussed.¹ The first formal meeting of the Joint Committee was held on the same date the SOFA became effective. At this time, the previous actions of the "Preliminary Working Group" were confirmed.

(C) No sooner had the SOFA gone into effect, then the question of the implementation of the criminal jurisdiction provision arose. On 20 February 1967, a U. S. serviceman became involved in the alleged offenses of arson and assault on a taxi driver.² On 25 February 1967, an American soldier had become involved in the alleged offenses of disturbing the peace and assaulting a Korean policeman while in the performance of his duty.³ In both cases, the ROK authorities formally notified the proper American officials that they wanted to exercise criminal jurisdiction; in fact, they even indicated a desire to obtain custody of one of the soldiers involved.⁴

(S) From the CINCPAC's point of view, these actions by the Korean authorities were a "deliberate ROKG effort to shape initial implementation of SOFA in its favor notwithstanding agreed understandings to contrary," for the offenses "involved in both cases fail to meet criterion 'of particular importance' as that phrase is used in the Agreed Minute to SOFA, Article XXII. 3. (b)."⁵ Therefore, to forestall an attempt by the ROK to establish dangerous precedents in implementing the criminal jurisdiction article, CINCPAC dispatched a message to COMUSK on 24 March, informing him that the ROK Foreign Minister had previously assured the American Embassy at Seoul that his country intended to exercise its right to criminal jurisdiction with the utmost restraint and had also agreed that the Koreans would, at the meeting of the Joint Committee, agree that the list of offenses contained in the agreed understanding would be considered limitative and not permissive, an action which had not been carried out as agreed. The CINCPAC requested the COMUSK to "take firm stand to ensure SOFA implementation in line with U. S. understandings."⁶

(S) On 30 March 1967, the American Ambassador at Seoul expressed his concern to the Korean Prime Minister over the manner in which the

1. J73 History, Hq CINCPAC, Jan-Mar 67.
2. 314ADIV Osan AB Korea 0002/100652 Z Mar 67.
3. COMUSKOREA 57771/110515 Z Mar 67.
4. AMEMB Seoul 4850/140925 Z Mar 67.
5. CINCPAC 240344 Z Mar 67.
6. Ibid.; J73 History, Hq CINCPAC, Jan-Mar 67.

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criminal jurisdiction problem was developing. Then he reminded the Prime Minister of the Korean Foreign Minister's promises that Korea would exercise its right to criminal jurisdiction with "utmost restraint" and that this intention would be reaffirmed "for the record at first meeting of SOFA Joint Committee,"¹ an action which had not been carried out. The Prime Minister, in turn, agreed that difficulties over this issue--primarily because of the seriousness with which the U. S. government, its press, and public viewed the problem of criminal jurisdiction--could be seriously damaging to U. S. -ROK relations. Although he did not make any specific promises, "he left clear impression that he intended take some action."²

(S) The situation was complicated again the next day, when the ROK served notice that it was withdrawing its waiver of jurisdiction in the Rich case which involved a violation of customs law. The American Ambassador immediately contacted the Prime Minister again. He protested that "we could not understand how ROKG could consider violation of customs law as being a matter 'of particular importance' and that we could not accept such determination by ROKG."³

(S) Following further discussions with responsible ROK officials, it was revealed that Korea often withdrew its waiver of jurisdiction on some cases merely to permit them to complete their investigation and to stop the running of the fifteen day period. Therefore, according to Korean thinking, the U. S. should not be concerned with the number of cases on which ROK initially withdrew its waiver, but should await a Korean decision on whether or not an indictment would be issued. On the other hand, the American interpretation of this 15-day provision was that "this period provided to allow government time to make political judgement on whether it wishes to exercise jurisdiction and not for purpose of completing investigation to determine whether alleged offender should be indicted."⁴ Despite their differences, each side apparently desired to work out a solution acceptable by both sides. Within less than a month ROK officials indicated:

... that they intended to exercise restraint in their exercise of jurisdiction and that they would repeat for the record

1. AMEMB Seoul 5231/310910Z Mar 67.
2. Ibid.
3. AMEMB Seoul 5242/010350Z Apr 67.
4. Ibid. ; J73 History, Hq CINCPAC, Apr-Jun 67.

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in a joint committee meeting held after the Presidential elections, the assurance they had given while the SOFA was being negotiated that they would exercise utmost restraint in exercising jurisdiction. ¹

(C) The first case to be tried under the new SOFA involved charges of arson and assault. It took place in the District Criminal Court, Seoul, on 16 May 1967. "Trial safeguards guaranteed by SOFA were observed." ² The airman was found "not guilty of arson, but guilty of assault." ³ The court imposed a fine of about \$185.00, and made a provision for additional penalties if fine was not paid in a reasonable time.

Thai Company in Korea

(C) Throughout 1967, as in previous years, Thailand has maintained a military company in Korea under the United Nations Command (UNC). The retention of this unit there has been, and is, important for the U. S. These Southeast Asia troops serve as tangible evidence that the Asian Pacific nations have effected an interconnected common front as a means of countering the threat of Communism in Asia. The Thai servicemen, by being physically located in the Republic of Korea, also support the maintenance of both the letter and the spirit of the agreements with Korea regarding the presence of UN troops there. For the aforementioned reasons, CINCPAC has consistently supported the retention of the Thai Company in Korea, whenever any question arises concerning the unit's withdrawal, as some have in the past. ⁴

New Zealand

U. S. -New Zealand Memorandum of Understanding

(S) Discussions continued with representatives of Australia and New Zealand regarding U. S. logistic support for these countries in Thailand under the terms of the SEATO 1965 Cooperative Logistic Support Agreement. In March 1967, a representative of CINCPAC visited Australia and in coordination with defense officials drew up a preliminary draft of a memorandum which would provide Australian forces with certain

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1. J73 History, Hq CINCPAC, Apr-Jun 67.
 2. AMEMB Seoul 6235/170810Z May 67.
 3. AMEMB Seoul A-566/200905Z Jun 67.
 4. Point Paper, J5121, Hq CINCPAC, 13 Sep 67, Subj: The Thai Company in UNC Korea (C).

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items of logistics support, particularly ammunition and POL. In the same month, New Zealand also requested a similar U.S. logistic support arrangement and item listings of New Zealand requirements were submitted to CINCPAC. ¹

(S) In July, a meeting was held in Saigon with representatives of the Australian Defense Ministry to refine the U.S. -Australian Memorandum of Understanding. This meeting was also attended by a representative from New Zealand and progress was made in drawing up a draft of a U.S. -New Zealand Memorandum of Understanding. ² These draft memoranda between the U.S. and both Australia and New Zealand were discussed in greater detail on the occasion of the September SEATO LOG 7 Meeting in Bangkok. ³ In October 1967, a draft copy of the U.S. -Australia Memorandum of Understanding was sent to the JCS for review and comments. ⁴ Meanwhile, in November, a draft of the U.S. -New Zealand Memorandum of Understanding was reviewed by the JCS and approved with minor changes. ⁵ At the close of the year, CINCPAC's staff was preparing the New Zealand Memorandum for dispatch to New Zealand for final consideration.

Thailand

Thai SOFA Negotiations

(S) As explained in last year's history, both the U.S. and Thailand reached the decision to begin negotiations on a SOFA as soon as possible. ⁶ By 10 November 1966, the State Department had approved a draft Thai SOFA for tabling by the American Ambassador at a later negotiations meeting with the Thais. This draft did not:

... differ substantially from the Korean SOFA. As in Korea with regard to criminal jurisdiction it contains the NATO-NETHERLANDS waiver formula (in the minutes).

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1. New Zealand Minister of Defense ltr to CINCPAC, 2 Mar 67.
 2. Report of Working Party Second Meeting on Administrative Support of Australian Forces by the US in SEATO Plans, 18 Jul 67.
 3. Monthly Historical Submission, J4112, Apr 67; Monthly Historical Submission, J4116, Sep 67.
 4. CINCPAC ltr ser 01089, 9 Oct 67.
 5. CINCPAC ltr ser 01257, 17 Nov 67.
 6. CINCPAC Command History 1966, pp. 327-328.

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Thus, in cases of concurrent jurisdiction, RTG waives its primary right to exercise jurisdiction with right to recall the waiver within 21 days after due notice in certain specified cases wherein major interests of Thai administration of justice make imperative the exercise of Thai jurisdiction. The expanded list of pre-trial, trial and post-trial safeguards in the Korean SOFA are also present in the Thai draft. Cognizable third party claims are to be processed and settled under U.S. law. This differs from Korea where they are processed and settled by the ROKs under their law and where they are later reimbursed 75% by the U.S. Most details concerning the Facilities and Areas Article are contained in the Agred Minutes. The SOFA includes a provision for the establishment of a Joint Committee, as in the case of Korea, China and Japan.¹

~~(S)~~ The U.S. tabled its proposed draft SOFA with the Thais on 28 November 1966. The meeting adjourned with the understanding that the Thai would review the draft and contact the U.S. representatives once they were ready for a second negotiating session to communicate their reactions.² The Thais took until 12 May 1967 to study the U.S. draft, at which time they convened the second Thai SOFA negotiating session. Up to the end of June, no final agreements on any of the articles had been reached, although meetings had been weekly. The discussions did, however, reflect a deep concern of the Thais for their sovereignty and indicated "that they will oppose those sections of the U.S. draft SOFA which they feel infringes on this sovereignty."³

~~(S)~~ Indicative of the Thais' feelings during this period are certain passages gleaned from reports of the American Embassy in Bangkok on the progress of the SOFA negotiations to the State Department in Washington, D. C. On 2 June, for instance, the Thai delegate, "Dr Sompong delivered a spirited rejoinder in which he characterized US position as new, not with the arrangements US had accepted in NATO and in agreement with Japan. Sompong read into record provisions on custody in US-Japanese agreement. He said Thailand was fully as jealous of its jurisdictional supremacy as was Japan and regarding it as a matter of fundamental and even of constitutional importance."⁴ "Seventh meeting on SOFA, June 22, was marathon session beginning at

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1. Point Paper, J731, Hq CINCPAC, 23 Nov 66, Subj: Thai SOFA (C).
 2. Point Paper, J731, Hq CINCPAC, 21 Feb 67, Subj: Thai SOFA (U).
 3. J73 History, Hq CINCPAC, Apr-Jun 67.
 4. AMEMB Bangkok 15744/021104Z Jun 67.

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10:15 AM and closing at 3:15 PM," during which time, the Thais "accepted little of substance and none of form of US proposals." ¹ On the other hand, the Eighth Negotiating Session of 29 June "was virtually free of histrionics characterizing previous sessions," although the Thais "continued to stand firmly by their original proposals and made few concessions to US positions." ²

~~(S)~~ Up through 15 September 1967, the SOFA negotiations continued, almost on a weekly basis. These sessions, although fruitless in agreement, did reveal Thailand's great concern that no part of the SOFA would result in an encroachment--or appearance thereof--on the nation's sovereignty. ³ This "Thai preoccupation was with the appearance of a written grant of something which may be attacked as extra territoriality," and first became apparent during the seventh meeting on 22 June. ⁴ Actually, this issue had arisen during a discussion on the subject of advance waivers by the "Thai of their right to exercise criminal jurisdiction. They were explicit in pointing out that anything in a SOFA which could be interpreted as giving the U. S. any extraterritorial rights is unacceptable." ⁵

~~(S)~~ At the Fifteenth Session, on 14 September 1967, Thailand withdrew that portion of its draft agreement which provided for customs free importation of privately owned vehicles. "When pressed as to the reason, they stated that they are staffing a new provision which will be considered in another negotiation. Thai indicated they were preparing a new draft with a view toward renegotiation of the 1950 Military Assistance Agreement." ⁶ This surprising development portended an even lengthier period of negotiations than had previously been anticipated.

~~(S)~~ The Thai SOFA negotiations took an even more ominous turn during the 3 November 1967 session, when:

...the Secretary to the Thai Delegation and principal spokesman (M. L. Birabhongse Kasemsri who is Secretary to

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1. AMEMB Bangkok 16505/240630Z Jun 67.
 2. AMEMB Bangkok 69/031106Z Jul 67.
 3. Point Paper, J731, Hq CINCPAC, 25 Aug 67, Subj: Thai SOFA: State 6798/142043Z Jul 67; AMEMB Bangkok 2132/231045Z Aug 67; Point Paper, J731, Hq CINCPAC, 15 Sep 67, Subj: Thai SOFA.
 4. AMEMB Bangkok 16505/240630Z Jun 67.
 5. Point Paper, J731, Hq CINCPAC, 25 Aug 67, Subj: Thai SOFA.
 6. AMEMB Bangkok 3291/151147Z Sep 67; Point Paper, J731, Hq, CINCPAC, 15 Sep 67, Subj: Thai SOFA.

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Foreign Minister Thanat) in effect called the current round of negotiations to an end upon the completion of the reading of the Thai draft. In so doing he made the following points:

a. The Thai do not wish to consider further discussions until they are informed whether the U.S. will agree to withdraw its demands as reflected in the draft agreed minutes. He states they were quite inflexible in their general rejection of the minutes.

b. He stated the situation was urgent and they wished to know the U.S. position as soon as possible. He cited as reasons an impatient press and growing public opinion, as well as the current political situation. With elections on the horizon fear is that SOFA issues will spill over into the public area for close scrutiny and criticism.

c. He indicated, in private conversation, that the RTG would prefer to avoid further negotiations completely unless there was a good prospect for early conclusion of a satisfactory agreement. He stated that in the event negotiations did not proceed and there were to be no agreement, Thai law would be imposed in future in many instances in which it was not being fully applied at present.

d. The main issue separating the Thai and the U.S. negotiators is criminal jurisdiction. The Thai considered many of the demands in the minutes as being unreasonable and in conflict with the basic agreement although he did not undertake to be more specific in his statement.¹

(C) Actually, the "draft agreed minutes have been a real source of irritation to the Thai," who "prefer the agreement to be in a single document with an interpretive summary record also setting out implementing procedures."² On 5 December 1967, the American Ambassador in Bangkok called on Foreign Minister Thanat at his home. Here, he explained that certain ideas had been forwarded to Washington, D. C., "about how SOFA discussions might proceed from this point forward with a better prospect of reaching a mutually acceptable agreement," and that the U.S. "government was ready to accept some of the suggestions made from here but before proceeding on a new basis wished me to clarify several key points with him."³

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1. AMEMB Bangkok 5807/091005 Z Nov 67.
 2. AMEMB Bangkok 6082/160956 Z Nov 67.
 3. AMEMB Bangkok 6985/060837 Z Dec 67.

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(S) During this conversation, the following matters were tentatively agreed upon: (a) the U.S. would revise and make shorter its draft SOFA, taking into consideration, the objections raised by the Thais during the previous negotiating sessions; (b) any new draft would provide for tax and customs exemptions and there would be no added financial burdens to the U.S. resulting from the imposition of Thai taxes on U.S. personnel, or companies engaged solely in defense or military projects; and (c) the U.S. would be authorized to exercise court martial jurisdiction in Thailand over its military personnel. Moreover, the American Ambassador indicated that the U.S. was considering a NATO-Netherlands waiver provision in its criminal jurisdiction article.¹

(S) Based upon this conversation, the U.S. initiated the task of rewriting the U.S. Thai SOFA draft. On 23 December 1967, the Secretary of State notified his ambassador in Bangkok that the revised draft would be ready for tabling in mid-January 1968. The American delegates were further encouraged to engage in general discussions with the Thais, but were instructed to be sure that any further reference to the criminal jurisdiction article would be in terms of the Philippine formula and not the NATO-Netherlands formula.² Earlier, on 5 December 1967, the American Embassy in Taipei, Republic of China (ROC), had warned both the American Ambassador to Thailand and the State Department that the offer "of NATO-Netherlands formula to Thais would have potential of creating problem for us here," since certain GRC officials had previously agreed to a less favorable criminal jurisdiction formula for the ROC SOFA.³ The year ended without any further developments in the Thai SOFA negotiations.

Later, when the

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1. AMEMB Bangkok 6985/060837 Z Dec 67; J73 History, Hq CINCPAC, Dec 67.
 2. Ibid.
 3. AMEMB Taipei 1570/050935 Z Dec 67; J73 History, Hq CINCPAC, Dec 67.
 4. Point Paper, J5123, Hq CINCPAC, 11 Sep 67, Subj: Retention of RTAF Detachment at Tachikawa and continuance of the UN SOFA, which is the source for the following narrative in this subsection on the RTAF Detachment.

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Herter-Kishi Notes were exchanged in 1960, the stipulation was acknowledged by both parties that the Acheson-Kishi Notes would continue to be in force as long as the UN SOFA remained in force. The UN SOFA, in turn, will terminate on that day when all UN forces have been withdrawn from Japan.

(S) Because of the foregoing circumstances, the continuance of the UN SOFA becomes the keystone to the maintenance of legal and binding agreements with Japan under which U. S. /UN operations in and about the Japanese Islands are permitted and facilitated for the defense of Korea. In the past, as now, the GOJ has insisted that there must be ~~visible~~ and credible UN presence in Japan to justify the continuation of the UN SOFA. During 1967, the RTAF detachment at Tachikawa was the only non-U. S. force in Japan that provided such a "visible and credible UN presence," thus furnishing a recognized legal basis for continuing the status quo.

(S) A danger arose in 1967 of the possibility of this military unit being removed from Japan. The Thais told the American Ambassador to Thailand, Graham A. Martin, that they wished to withdraw the RTAF detachment from Tachikawa, but that they might be persuaded to leave it there if the U. S. would provide two C-123s. The U. S., in turn, demurred to effect any such quid pro quo, primarily because of insufficient C-123 assets at the time, but did strongly support the retention of the RTAF detachment as vital to the continuance of the UN SOFA. Later, Ambassador Martin reported that the Thais had decided to remain at Tachikawa. As for the modernization of the detachment, the Ambassador submitted the possibility of providing Thailand with Caribou aircraft instead of C-123.

Airlift of Buddha Statue from Thailand to India

(S) In April 1967, the Prime Minister of Thailand personally requested airlift assistance from the U. S. Defense Attache Officer (USDAO) in Bangkok "in moving a large Buddha statue from Bangkok, Thailand to Gaya, India as a good will gesture."¹ The American Embassy at New Delhi strongly urged approval of this request on 14 April for political reasons, stating:

Association of US and USAF with this project would have substantial, positive advantages to image of both in India, and would, among other things, help recoup effect recant publicity associating U Thant and Indian officials in pilgrimage to Buddhist shrine in India, which also provided occasion for further criticism US bombing North Viet-Nam.²

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1. J4 History, Hq CINCPAC, Apr 67.
 2. AMEMB New Delhi 14980/140830Z Apr 67.

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(U) Following coordination with both the State and Defense Departments, the Chief of Staff, USAF (CSAF), granted authority to the Thailand USDAO on 18 April "to accomplish the requested air lift provided there is not impairment of the primary military mission."¹ The USDAO, in turn, wired the Chief, Western Transportation Office (CHWTO), on 21 April a detailed request for the necessary airlift.² Six days later, CINCPAC was advised that the pick-up was arranged for 3 May 1967 with delivery at Gaya, India, the same date.³

(U) The Buddha statue arrived safely in India on schedule, with considerable publicity covering the arrival of the U. S. Air Force C-124 that effected the delivery. As the CHWTO reported to CINCPAC:

Plane arrival, unloading and Buddhist receiving ceremony covered by press, photos, radio, and mopix, and resultant use by Indian as well as USIS media very heavy. One major English language daily of New Delhi carried large front picture prominently identifying US Air Force plane, other papers carrying pix on inside pages some of packing and loading of statue in Thailand, or of arrival Gaya.

Singapore

Weapons Demonstration Team for Singapore

(S) During 1967, the U. S. Defense Attache Officer (USDAO) in Singapore submitted a request to CINCPAC for a demonstration of the Portable Flame Thrower and Light Anti-Tank Weapon (LAW) to the Government of Singapore (GOS). When queried by CINCPAC, the Secretary of Defense stated that he had no objection to inviting the GOS to send a team to a U. S. installation, either in South Vietnam or Okinawa, for such a demonstration, provided the GOS was willing to bear the cost of travel and subsistence.⁵ He also suggested direct contact between the American Embassy in Singapore and CINCPAC if

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1. CSAF AFSTP 79812/181731Z Apr 67.
 2. USDAO Bangkok 0693/210614Z Apr 67.
 3. 315AirDiv Tachikawa AB Japan PAFOP DOOS 06260 Apr 67.
 4. CHWTO 7209/080651Z May 67.
 5. SECDEF 5566/061932Z Sep 67; CINCPAC Command Center 0730 Briefing Notes, 7 Sep 67; CINCPAC Command Center 0730 Briefing Notes, 8 Sep 67.

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the Secretary's suggested alternative was going to be pursued. This idea evidently did not set too well with the people in Singapore, for the USDAO again requested that a U.S. demonstration team be airlifted from Vietnam to provide the GOS with the desired weapons demonstration. In the end, no such demonstration was given during 1967, for both the Secretary of Defense and the State Department turned the second request down.¹

Vietnam

Vietnam SOFA

(S) Early in April 1967, the J5, Joint General Staff, Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF), gave its U.S. advisor a draft copy of a SOFA and asked for his comments on it.² Other RVNAF staff sections, meanwhile, had provided their U.S. counterparts with draft copies and also requested their comments. After consultation with the U.S. Embassy in Saigon, the MACV J5 orally advised the RVNAF J5 of the following:

a. This is a highly sensitive matter, and MACV is not authorized to discuss it.

b. Any discussions of a status of forces agreement would have to be conducted at governmental level, rather than between military establishments.

c. It would appear premature to raise such an agreement. The U.S. has not signed an agreement of this type during a period of hostilities, and it is desirable to wait until the nature of any a U.S. military establishment in Viet-Nam after hostilities cease can be clearly foreseen.³

(S) The J5, Joint General Staff, RVNAF, replied that he would forward these views to the Vietnam Minister of Defense, "who had instructed him through channels to ask for comments on the draft."⁴ Since it was a highly unusual procedure for the Vietnamese military to raise such a political

1. Telcon, LtCol Raymond A. Poerschke, USAF, J530, MAP Br, J5, Hq CINCPAC, with Mr. Strobridge, Senior Historian, CINCPAC HistBr, 20 Feb 68.

2. Unless otherwise cited, the sources for this subsection on Vietnam SOFA are: AMEMB Saigon 23384/181050Z Apr 67; J73 History, Hq CINCPAC, Apr-Jun 67.

3. AMEMB Saigon 23384/181050Z Apr 67.

4. Ibid.

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
issue with their U.S. counterparts and since the RVN Foreign Minister had not raised this question, the U.S. Embassy did not plan to take any initiative in inquiring into this subject. At the end of the year, no further word had been received by Hq CINCPAC on this matter.



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COMMANDER IN CHIEF PACIFIC COMMAND HISTORY



VOLUME II

1967

Prepared by the Historical Branch
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CAMP H. M. SMITH, HAWAII

1968

iii

FOREWORD

(U) The Pacific Command was established on 1 January 1947 as an outgrowth of the command structure used throughout the Pacific during World War II. Much different in size and scope than the command of today, it was flanked to the northwest by the Far East Command, and to the northeast by the Alaskan Command. In the early days of the Pacific Command, the Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet served in dual capacity as Commander in Chief Pacific. This command arrangement for the Pacific area continued until 1 July 1957 when the Far East Command was disestablished and the duties and responsibilities of CINCFE assumed by CINCPAC.


(U) As a result of this reorganization, PACOM became the largest of the unified commands. Its geographical area included approximately 85 million square miles, extending from the west coast of the Western Hemisphere to the Asian mainland, into the Indian Ocean and from the Aleutians south to the frigid South Pole.

(U) CINCPAC's mission was and still is to defend the United States against attacks through the Pacific Ocean area and to support and advance US national policies and interests throughout the Pacific, Far East and Southeast Asian areas. This mission includes assistance to selected countries of Asia to prevent the advance of Communism throughout the area. Because of the magnitude of the Pacific Command area and the many new responsibilities associated with unified command, the Pacific Fleet became a separate command on 13 January 1958. Prior to this, the CINCPAC Staff element had moved to Camp H. M. Smith from Fleet Headquarters on 26 October 1957.

(U) Today the Pacific Command stands alert and ready as America's guardian across the strategic lines of attack from Asia towards the heartland of the North American continent. Both the defensive and retaliatory capabilities of CINCPAC's forces are poised to react at a moment's notice. American infantrymen both in Korea and in Vietnam are resisting Communist aggression. American fighter-interceptors and bombers are prepositioned at strategic sites throughout PACOM, and units of the Fleet patrol across the reaches of the Pacific Ocean from the Bering Sea to the Indian Ocean.

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(U) The Pacific Command today reflects the coordinated efforts of an efficient unified team of Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps forces. It stands ready to defend the United States and to meet its obligations in support of our national objectives.



U. S. G. ~~SHARP~~
Admiral, USN
Commander in Chief Pacific

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PREFACE

(U) This CINCPAC Command History for 1967 was prepared in accordance with the guidance outlined by the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) in their Memorandums SM-247-59, of 5 March 1959, and SM-408-59, of 17 April 1959. These memorandums required "commanders of unified and specified commands (to) submit annually historical reports covering the operations of their headquarters," which would provide "a comprehensive understanding of the operations of the headquarters, the problems faced by the headquarters, and the status of the command from the standpoint of the commander." This command history, therefore, pertains solely to those events occurring in calendar year 1967 that possessed sufficient historical significance to cut across the far-flung responsibilities of the Commander in Chief Pacific and his joint Pacific Command (PACOM).

(U) Like the previous historical reports since 1959, this report describes CINCPAC's actions in discharging his responsibilities assigned by either the JCS or higher authority, especially those connected with international crises, and those that are peculiar to a joint command. This history is intended as a permanent record of command decisions and achievements, and purposely omits detailed activities of subordinate commands or of Allied Nations in the PACOM area. Most of the decisions and activities included in this report are related directly with CINCPAC's efforts to preserve the freedom in those areas in the Pacific Command where people still have the right to make a free choice.

(U) To provide continuity, this history has been organized in the same fashion as previous histories, primarily in line with assigned objectives of CINCPAC. Chapter I, "The State of Readiness of United States Forces," describes CINCPAC forces and certain actions to plan for their employment to carry out United States policies, as well as the multitudinous activities of Headquarters CINCPAC that do not logically fit in the other chapters. Chapter II, "CINCPAC Actions Influencing the State of Readiness of Allied Nations in the PACOM Area," deals with CINCPAC's role in carrying out the Military Assistance Program. Chapter III, "CINCPAC Actions Concerning Relationships Between the United States and Other Countries," reports the actions of CINCPAC in his position as United States Military Adviser to the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, and with politico-military events pertaining to his command. CINCPAC's mission to counter Communist aggression in

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Southeast Asia is treated in some detail in Chapter IV, "Actions to Counter Communist Aggression in Southeast Asia."

(U) As in last year's history, the first three chapters make up Volume I of the CINCPAC Command History 1967, while Chapter IV is published separately as Volume II. As before, the annual histories published by COMUSMACV and COMUSMACTHAI are Annexes "A" and "B", respectively. The separate elements of this history are classified according to content and are distributed on the basis of a need to know. Both a glossary and index, covering the CINCPAC Command History, is a part of Volume II.

(U) This history was planned and outlined by Colonel Edward A. Jurkens, USAF, Secretary of the Joint Staff, Headquarters CINCPAC, working in conjunction with Lieutenant Colonel Jasper R. Johnson, USA, CINCPAC Command Historian. Besides supervising the preparation of this annual history from start to finish, Lieutenant Colonel Johnson also had the continuing duties of maintaining the CINCPAC Command Historical Program throughout Headquarters CINCPAC and all subordinate unified commands in the Pacific. In addition, he personally researched and wrote Sections I, II, III, IX, and X of Chapter IV.

(U) Assisting Lieutenant Colonel Johnson in his preparation of the narrative were the members of his CINCPAC Historical Branch. His Senior Historian, Mr. Truman R. Strobridge, besides being solely responsible for the researching and writing of Chapters II and III, and Section IV of Chapter IV, provided technical guidance when needed and applied his efforts in whatever manner was necessary throughout the preparation of the history. Chapter I, as well as Sections V, VI and VII of Chapter IV, were prepared by Miss Polly Klayer. Mr. Kenneth Ritchie, who returned to this office in February 1968, after a year's tour with the Historical Division in Headquarters COMUSMACV, assisted in the final preparation by preparing the Logistics Section in Chapter IV.

(U) Both the glossary and index were painstakingly compiled by Senior Chief Yeoman D. E. Bentley, USN, who spent many laborious hours

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in their preparation. The manuscript was typed in final format by Mrs. LuElla Saxton, Yeoman First Class Herbert W. Dominy, USN, Mrs. Marian J. Heigle, and Staff Sergeant William J. Stanish, USAF. In addition, the support rendered by the CINCPAC Staff was immeasurable.

Jasper R. Johnson
JASPER R. JOHNSON
LCOL GS USA
CINCPAC Command Historian

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CHAPTER IV

ACTIONS TO COUNTER COMMUNIST AGGRESSION IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

(U) "I believe the great majority of Americans understand that our vital interests are involved in Vietnam and that we must stay the course. The word of three successive American Presidents and of the American people is involved. Free World security has rested for twenty years on a system of alliances depending for their effectiveness on the reliability of our word. Our Vietnam stand has already made possible major advances and a new spirit in the free countries of Southeast Asia. The fall of South Vietnam would undermine confidence in our commitments, imperil the favorable trend of developments in the free Southeast Asian countries, and encourage the communist powers to press ahead with their program for the domination of all Southeast Asia and beyond."

Admiral U. S. G. Sharp¹

(U) This chapter deals with CINCPAC's plans, policies, programs, decisions and actions associated with his mission of countering communist aggression in Southeast Asia. Additional details are in Annexes A and B published by COMUSMACV and COMUSMACTHAI respectively. Because of the seriousness of the situation in Korea a section of this chapter has been devoted to the plans and operations designed to counter North Korean aggression in Korea.

-
1. Address by Admiral U.S.G. Sharp to the National Defense Transportation and Logistics Forum at Los Angeles, Cal., 4 Oct 1967.

SECTION I - SOUTHEAST ASIA PLANS, POLICY AND PROGRAMS

(S) This part of Chapter IV discusses CINCPAC's contingency planning and force requirements in Southeast Asia.

Contingency Planning, Southeast Asia

KANZUS

(TS) In early August 1966 COMUSMACV proposed the organization of an international force (termed KANZUS due to its proposed composition of Korean-Australian-New Zealand-U.S. forces) to be deployed in northern Quang Tri Province as an additional measure to reduce infiltration through the DMZ.¹ On 28 August 1966 CINCPAC endorsed the concept to JCS as operationally and logistically feasible.

(TS) As of 31 December 1966, the JCS had not addressed the concept of the KANZUS force and had given no indication when they might. Later, on 27 January 1967, the JCS notified CINCPAC that they had studied the KANZUS force proposal and agreed that there was merit in the concept. However, the JCS views as to the timing for the deployment of the force was the same as CINCPAC's. The deployment of a brigade-size reconnaissance reaction force appeared to be inconsistent with the enemy threat to northern ICTZ. There was a strong possibility that the proposed international force would be jeopardized and cause serious embarrassment to the U.S. Accordingly, the JCS contemplated no further action on the proposal at that time and, as contemplated, no further action was taken during the remainder of 1967.²

Amphibious Operations North of the Demilitarized Zone (S)

(TS) During June 1967, CINCPAC received from CINCPACFLT a copy of the FMFPAC plan, "Outline Concept for the Destruction of the Enemy in the DMZ Area." CINCPACFLT recommended to CINCPAC that the plan be considered in any evaluation of strategy for the prosecution of the war in Vietnam.³

-
1. See Chap 4, Vol II, CINCPAC Command History 1966 for details of deployment and military-political implications.
 2. JCS 272352Z Jun 67.
 3. Letter, 3P/ado, Ser. 000508-67, Hq FMFPAC, 29 May 67 with 1st Endorsement, Ser. 62/000139, Hq PACFLT, 26 Jun 67.

(TS) The concept envisioned an amphibious helicopter assault in the vicinity of Xom Lap, NVN, approximately 12 miles north of the DMZ. A Marine amphibious force consisting of four Regimental Landing Teams, would land in the vicinity of Xom Lap, attack south through the DMZ and link up with the III MAF which would conduct limited objective attacks in the vicinity of the DMZ to keep pressure on the enemy.¹ The plan was forwarded by CINCPAC to COMUSMACV, CINCUSARPAC and CINCPACAF for review, comments and recommendations by 20 August 1967.²

(TS) The comments and recommendations requested by CINCPAC were received. CINCPACAF concurred in FMFPAC's outline concept and offered staff assistance, as required, to develop the plan.³ CINCUSARPAC's recommendation was not clear but a phone call to a G-3 staff officer revealed that ARPAC did not support the FMFPAC concept.⁴

(TS) COMUSMACV concurred in the concept of an amphibious operation north of the DMZ and provided his own concept (Outline Plan BUTT STROKE). Major differences in his plan and the FMFPAC plan were:

a. The COMUSMACV plan was based on the assumption that NVN would overtly attack across the DMZ and from the Lao sanctuaries into Quang Tri and Thua Thien Provinces.

b. The BUTT STROKE landing forces would consist of 2 1/3 divisions rather than four RLT's.

c. The landing force objective would be in the vicinity of Dong Hoi, approximately 65 miles north of the DMZ.

d. The operation would take 30 to 60 days instead of the planned 5 to 7 day FMFPAC operation.⁵

(TS) On 1 September, CINCPAC was briefed on the FMFPAC and the MACV concepts and he directed CINCPACFLT to prepare an outline plan

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1. Letter, 3P/ado, Ser. 000508-67, Hq FMFPAC, 29 May 67 with 1st Endorsement, Ser. 62/000139, Hq PACFLT, 26 Jun 67.
 2. Letter 5531, Ser 000378, Hq CINCPAC, 29 July 67.
 3. CINCPACAF 230140Z Aug 67.
 4. CINCUSARPAC 192246Z Aug 67; J5, CINCPAC Monthly Historical Submission for Sep 67, dated 12 Oct 67.
 5. J5 (CINCPAC) Monthly Historical submission for Sep 67, dated 12 Oct 67.

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incorporating the following features of both concepts: ¹

- a. Provide for a 2 1/3 division force of US Army and USMC units.
 - b. Objective area would be in vicinity of Xom Lap.
 - c. Provide for a Task Force Commander to be designated by CINCPAC.
 - d. Operation to be completed in 30 days.
- CINCPAC directed that the plan be named FRISCO CITY. ²

~~(TS)~~ On 10 October CINCPACFLT submitted FRISCO CITY as directed. The forces in the plan consisted of one Airborne Division and four Marine RLT's organized into a Joint Amphibious Task Force. Marine forces would land by amphibious and helicopter assault while an Airborne brigade would land by parachute. The remaining two Airborne brigades would be held in reserve, co-located in SVN with supporting airlift units. The assault forces would drive south through the DMZ and link-up with the III MAF. The operation would take 15-20 days. It could not be conducted before May 1968 and July 1968 was considered the optimum time for execution. ³

~~(TS)~~ CINCUSARPAC and CINCPACAF concurred in the outline plan. COMUSMACV also concurred in FRISCO CITY but made two major recommendations: ⁴ (1) that COMUSMACV be assigned responsibility for planning and executing the operation, and (2) that forces for the operation consist of 1st Air Cav Division (two brigades in assault phase), 1st Mar Division, three Vietnamese airborne battalions, and two Vietnamese Marine battalions. One US airborne brigade would be in reserve along with the third brigade of the 1st Air Cav Division.

~~(TS)~~ CINCPAC, the Component Commanders and CGFMFPAC were

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1. J5 (CINCPAC) Monthly Historical submission for Sep 67, dated 12 Oct 67.
 2. CINCPAC 192245Z Sep 67.
 3. Letter 3010, Ser 62/000203, Hq PACFLT, 28 Sep 67.
 4. Letter, MACJ5, Hq MACV, Subject: "CINCPACFLT Outline Plan FRISCO CITY (U), 13 Oct 67.

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briefed on the plan. CINCUSARPAC and CINCPACAF favored assigning COMUSMACV responsibility for planning and executing all phases of the operation. CINCPACFLT and CGFMFPAC recommended that a Joint Amphibious Task Force directly under CINCPAC be established. ¹

~~(TS)~~ Both CINCPACFLT and CGFMFPAC recommended against using SVN troops unless overriding political considerations dictated otherwise. ² CINCPAC requested COMUSMACV's rationale for including SVN troops and was provided the following: ³

- a. A unilateral US invasion of NVN could leave US open to severe worldwide criticism.
- b. Omission of RVN troops would be a blow to the new government and national pride.
- c. RVNAF had already been dealt blows regarding their effectiveness.
- d. The opinion held by some that RVNAF not carrying its share of the load in battle would be reinforced.
- e. SVN troop participation would enhance stature of RVNAF.
- f. As regards security, cover and deception plan would provide for in-country redeployments, and RVNAF would not be brought into planning until last possible moment.

~~(TS)~~ On 3 November, CINCPAC gave the following guidance on command relationships for FRISCO CITY:

"a. CINCPAC will exercise operational command over forces assigned and operating in support of the operation through COMUSMACV and the PACOM Service Component Commanders, as appropriate.

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- 1. CINCUSARPAC 030304Z Nov 67; Letter, DOP, Hq PACAF, subject: "FRISCO CITY (U)", 31 Oct 67. CINCPACFLT 030227Z Nov 67; CGFMFPAC 030417Z Nov 67.
 - 2. J5 (CINCPAC) Monthly Historical submission for Dec 1967.
 - 3. CINCPAC 292035Z Oct 67; COMUSMACV 030422Z Nov 67.

"b. COMUSMACV will be delegated overall responsibility for the planning and conduct of the operation.

"c. A Joint Amphibious Task Force (JATF) will be established.

"d. COMSEVENTHFLT will be designated as Commander, Joint Amphibious Task Force (JATF), reporting to COMUSMACV with the Joint Amphibious Task Force for operational control.

"e. CJATF will exercise operational control over forces assigned in accordance with approved joint amphibious doctrine.

(1) Tactical air operations in the amphibious objective area will be controlled by CJATF through his tactical air commander.

(2) Attack carrier forces and such strike aircraft from 7th Air Force as may be required will operate in support of CJATF.

"f. COMUSMACV will designate the Commander, Landing Force.

"g. COMUSMACV is responsible for coordination between the 1st Air Cav Div, RVN Airborne Bde and the Landing Force.

"h. The JATF will be disestablished when control is passed ashore."

~~(TS)~~ FRISCO CITY was revised by CINCPAC and promulgated.¹ The cover letter to the outline plan authorized initiation of planning for an amphibious-airmobile-airborne operation north of the DMZ. The outline plan reflected command relationships specified by CINCPAC and forces recommended by COMUSMACV. The concept was as follows:

"a. COMUSMACV will conduct an amphibious-airmobile-airborne assault in the vicinity of XOM LAP and attack south through the DMZ. Initial assault forces will, as a minimum, consist of a US Marine Division/Wing Team, two brigades of a U.S. Airmobile Division, three Vietnamese airborne battalions and two Vietnamese Marine battalions. The attack south will be initiated as early as possible and only minimum essential logistic support will be introduced into the amphibious objective

1. Letter 5531, ser: 000590, HQ CINCPAC, subj: "Outline Plan for Operations North of DMZ (S)," 18 Nov 67.

area. This operation will be conducted to ensure maximum destruction of enemy forces and weapons, supply caches, and other logistic facilities.

"b. One brigade of a U.S. Airmobile Division and one U.S. airborne brigade, as a minimum, will be held in reserve in South Vietnam prepared for employment in the area of operations.

"c. Concurrent with the assault in the vicinity of XOM LAP and the attack to the south, COMUSMACV will conduct ~~limited~~ objective attacks to the north to fix and destroy enemy forces in the DMZ area and to install and defend bridge crossings over the Ben Hai River.

"d. After control is passed ashore and the JATF is disestablished, naval forces, as required, will remain in the area to support the operation.

"e. Upon link up with friendly forces attacking from the south, the assault forces will pass through the DMZ into South Vietnam, and the operation will be terminated."

Corps Contingency Force (CCF)

~~(S)~~ In 1966 CINCPAC recommended to the JCS that forces beyond those programmed for 1967 should be readied for deployment to Vietnam in the latter half of 1967 or early 1968. ¹ In December 1966 the SECDEF requested that the JCS prepare a study for providing and moving a corps-sized force to SVN. ² The JCS study was based on the CINCPAC CCF recommendation and the numerical composition of the force proposed by JCS was compatible with the CINCPAC CCF requirements.

~~(S)~~ However, from the JCS assumed emergency situations calling for the deployment of a corps-sized force, it was obvious that the CINCPAC CCF would not be readied for deployment as requested. The JCS assumed emergency situations were:

"1. ~~(S)~~ The emergency situation which would generate the need for a corps-size force in SVN would have to be of a serious nature

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1. The rationale justifying a CCF and the proposed area of deployment is discussed on pages 404-405, Chapter 4, Volume II, CINCPAC Command History 1966.
 2. J5 Brief #101-67, 30 Mar 67, Subject: "JCSM-148-67, Movement of a Corps-Size Force to South Vietnam (U)."

to warrant the expedient measure necessary to provide the force. It would have to be clearly apparent to the National Command Authorities that the emergency would lead to the destruction or loss of a substantial part of U. S. forces unless remedial action were taken.

"2. ~~(S)~~ Such an emergency might consist of the imminent over-running of friendly forces in the I Corps Tactical Zone; or a heavy enemy thrust from the central highlands toward Qui Nhon to split the country in two; or the encirclement and threatened capture of Saigon by heavy enemy forces.

"3. ~~(S)~~ In such a situation, some forces already in SVN probably would have been shifted to meet the threat. The incoming forces could act as reinforcements, replace those forces in vacated areas, or engage in other offensive roles."

~~(S)~~ CINCPAC had also visualized the use of the CCF to conduct: large scale operations in Laos or Cambodia; increased and sustained operations against VC-NVA base areas in SVN; and to intensify the Revolutionary Development Program. JCS did not address these uses for the corps-sized force.

~~(S)~~ The composition, source and ready date for development of the forces set forth in the JCS study are listed below:

| | <u>Composition</u> | <u>Source</u> | <u>Ready for Deployment</u> |
|-------|--|---|---|
| Alt 1 | 2 1/2 Army Div 1 Mar Div/Group 5 TFS | Active - CONUS Hawaii, Okinawa | 90 days after decisions. |
| Alt 2 | 1 1/3 Army Div 2 Mar Div (-) 1 Mar Wing (-) 3 TFS | Same | 60 days after decision. |
| Alt 3 | 3 1/3 Army Div 8 TFS | Same plus Reserves, unit and individual transfers from Europe and Korea | 150 days after decision. Could be shortened to 90 days. |

(S) Various modes of transportation to move the forces to SEA were planned. In all these alternatives one Army division was to be airlifted. In the first two alternatives the Marine assault echelons would be combat loaded and deployed in organic amphibious shipping and in the third alternative, organic amphibious shipping (other than LST's) would not be used. In all these alternatives, the remaining forces would be moved by MSTS sealift and MAC airlift.

(S) JCS considered the study a useful tool assisting in the decision making process and an aid in planning for emergency situations arising in SEA where the deployment of large additional forces would be required. For CINCPAC, the study contained only useful background data on the availability of major combat and support forces for deployment to SVN. This could be related to COMUSMACV's then current force requirement. It did not support CINCPAC's recommendations.

Proposed US Army Corps Operations in Laos



Operation FULL CRY

(S) Operation FULL CRY was planned by COMUSMACV and was forwarded to the JCS on 4 March 1967. CINCPAC, on 12 April 1967² commented to JCS that: COMUSMACV proposed that the plan be used as a "memo" to justify the Corps Contingency Force and as a basis for "initiative actions for employment planning, training and in-country support for forces to be employed in Laos"; the enemy situation in and around SVN dictated that priority for additional forces be given to SVN; and that CINCPAC supported strongly the requirements for a 2 1/3 division force increase in SVN recently recommended by COMUSMACV. It was not



2. CINCPAC 120149Z Apr 67.

anticipated that the requested 2 1/3 division force increase would be available for Operation FULL CRY. On the other hand, provision of the 2 1/3 division force should not preclude consideration for additional forces at a later date. CINCPAC pointed out that COMUSMACV had indicated a possible long-term requirement for another 2 1/3 divisions and that consideration of such a force should include the possible employment of that force in Laos. CINCPAC concluded that although implementation of Operation FULL CRY could result in attainment of limited objectives in Laos, the requirement for additional forces in SVN was of higher priority.

(S) On 28 April 1967 the JCS acknowledged receipt of CINCPAC's comments on Operation FULL CRY and stated that the plan and CINCPAC's comments on the plan would be used in further consideration of operations in Southeast Asia.¹

Anti-Infiltration Interdiction Systems


(TS) At the close of 1966 (28 December) the JCS alerted CINCPAC that he probably would be called upon to provide plans for a linear barrier system in SVN south of the DMZ and for an air-supported anti-infiltration system in Laos and portions of NVN and SVN adjacent to Laotian border. Formal tasking by the JCS was received 7 January 1967.² (For background information on prior planning, comments, actions taken and establishment of JTF 728 see Chapter 4, Volume II, CINCPAC Command History 1966, pages 407 - 411).

(TS) On 11 January 1967, CINCPAC directed COMUSMACV to prepare the linear barrier plan and requested that it be forwarded to CINCPAC by 27 January 1967. On 22 February 1967, CINCPAC tasked COMUSMACV for the air-supported anti-infiltration plan and requested it be forwarded to CINCPAC by 12 March 1967. The suspense dates for submission of these plans to JCS were 1 February and 3 April 1967, respectively.³

(TS) On 25 January 1967,⁴ CINCPAC forwarded a message to the JCS

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1. JCS 281440Z Apr 67.
 2. JCS 2328/282117Z Dec 66; Point Paper, J3B14, CINCPAC, 10 April 1967, Subj: "Status of PRACTICE NINE Project"; Per interview with LTC D. P. Dalton by LTC Johnson, Command Historian. Note: LTC Dalton, J3B13, was used extensively as a source throughout this subject.
 3. Point Paper, J3B14, CINCPAC, 10 April 1967, Subj: "Status of PRACTICE NINE Project."
 4. CINCPAC 252126Z Jan 67.

addressing modifications to the then current anti-infiltration programs. CINCPAC felt that a balanced program of military operations in South-east Asia as opposed to undue reliance on any one specific measure (such as the "barrier" concept) was necessary. He reasoned that the NVN Government would not cease infiltration until it was forced to conclude that it was no longer a profitable course of action leading to the achievement of its objective in SVN. The basic problem was to select the best possible combination of anti-infiltration measures in consonance with the overall strategy - a strategy stressing offense.



(TS) CINCPAC measures to improve the counter infiltration aspects of his then current programs were aimed at striking at the enemy's vulnerabilities and countering his strengths. Those measures included:¹

- a. Destroying the enemy's military and logistics bases.
- b. Forcing the enemy into sustained combat.
- c. Providing security for SVN population to prevent impressment and to assist economic, social and political development.
- d. Inhibiting the enemy's effective use of Laos and Cambodian sanctuaries.

A detailed discussion of the application of these measures was included in CINCPAC's comments.

(TS) On 26 January 1967, COMUSMACV submitted his linear barrier plan to CINCPAC. The plan was known as the MACV PRACTICE NINE Requirements Plan. The plan provided a concept and stated the requirements to support an anti-infiltration system composed of strong

1. CINCPAC 252126Z Jan 67.

points and a fixed obstacle system in the eastern portion of northern Quang Tri Province, from the South China Sea west to the vicinity of the Dong Ha Mountain. 1 November 1967 was the scheduled operational capability date. The plan envisioned a 30 kilometer linear barrier designed to impede infiltration and detect invasion. (The plan was modified later to a 13 kilometer linear obstacle consisting of wire, observation posts, sensors, patrols, etc.) Eventually the system was to be extended westward to the Laotian border by use of strong points, CIDG camps, artillery positions and the like. ¹

(S) COMUSMACV's comments on his plan were: ²

- a. The time frame for implementation should not be inflexible.
- b. Additive forces required to support the plan included one US division and one armored cavalry regiment. A brigade of the division or the cavalry regiment to close by 1 August.
- c. The system would make it more difficult and costly to the enemy but would not stop infiltration.
- d. To meet the 1 November 1967 readiness date, immediate construction, funding action and authorization to negotiate with the Government of SVN was required.
- e. The plan was conceived as one of a number of on-going programs to counter infiltration.

(S) CINCPAC in turn, commented to JCS that; "It is imperative that no one concept or plan have an unacceptable impact upon on-going programs which are essential to the successful execution of the overall strategy for SEASIA." He recommended that the plan not be implemented in the time frame envisioned.

(S) The JCS recommended to the SECDEF that the plan not be

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1. Point Paper, J3B14, CINCPAC, 10 Apr 67, Subject: "Status of PRACTICE NINE Project."
 2. Ibid.

executed and stated that: ¹

- a. The infiltration problem in northeast SVN had been negligible.
- b. To divert resources would reduce emphasis on and impetus of essential approved on-going programs.
- c. Men, money and material could be used better elsewhere.

~~(S)~~ The CJCS by separate memorandum to SECDEF made his independent comments and recommendations. He stated that:

- a. The quickest and most trafficable route from NVN to SVN was through the area involved and that the obstacle system would impede the enemy's option to use the area.
- b. It was not clear that there would be an undesirable diversion of in-country resources.
- c. The decision to take action to provide resources did not rule out a later decision to use the resources in other ways.

~~(S)~~ General Wheeler then recommended:

- a. Immediate authorization and funding of \$13.5 million for improvement of Hue port and Route 1.
- b. Approval in principle of 7,691 additive personnel spaces to Program #4 with a concurrent increase in the piaster ceiling.
- c. Immediate action by the State Department to commence necessary negotiations to obtain GVN authority to proceed with real estate acquisition and relocation of civilians.

1. Point Paper, J3B14, CINCPAC, 10 April 1967, Subject: "Status of PRACTICE NINE Project."

d. Authorization of procurement of necessary materials.

~~(TS)~~ As a result of the recommendations made by the CJCS the SECDEF directed:

a. The JCS to provide him with a recommendation for the additive forces.

b. The Director of JTF-728 to procure materials for the strong points and base camps, sensors, and surveillance devices for a 10 kilometer section of the obstacle subsystem. CINCPAC and COMUSMACV were to develop the bill of materials and submit it to the JCS by 1 April 1967. Delivery of the materials was to be on dates acceptable to COMUSMACV.

c. ASD (I&L) to take steps to ensure necessary improvements to Route 1 and port of Hue without delay.

d. ASD (ISA) to arrange with the State Department to secure GVN approval for land acquisition and civilian relocation, the timing to be determined by COMUSMACV.

The SECDEF also, directed ASD (ISA) to consult with the State Department about the feasibility of integrating the TU DO task force and the PANSEA PIKE concept with the PRACTICE NINE program.¹ The net effect of the SECDEF decision was for all concerned to proceed with those actions that were necessary to assure an operational readiness capability by 1 November 1967, if he should so order. The actual decision to implement the plan was not made by the SECDEF at this time.

~~(TS)~~ On 11 March 1967, COMUSMACV submitted his air-supported

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1. The TU DO task force, a multinational force, was suggested by COMUSMACV in the PRACTICE NINE Plan. Countries contributing troops to FWMAF would have to be asked to contribute additional forces for the task force. The entire matter was shelved when the State Department (SECSTATE 18875/052200Z May 67) indicated that the time was not propitious from either a military or political viewpoint to ask for additional troops from third countries to man the obstacle system. PANSEA PIKE was a proposed plan to extend Route 9 through Laos.

anti-infiltration capability plan to CINCPAC. ¹ The plan was designed to augment existing anti-infiltration and interdiction programs through the selective use of special munitions, sensors, detection devices and related equipment. It was envisioned that the enemy would increase his infiltration effort through Laos when he encountered the ground-supported barrier system in northern SVN. The enemy's maneuver to outflank the barrier was to be countered by using special sensors to detect enemy movement and munitions to protect sensor arrays. Minefields would be air emplaced. Sensors were to be air delivered, with a limited number emplaced by ground teams. There were to be two subsystems, an anti-personnel and an anti-vehicle system. EC-21 aircraft would continually monitor the sensors in both systems and transmit the information generated by the sensors to the Infiltration Surveillance Center (ISC) where the data would be evaluated.

~~(S)~~ COMUSMACV commented that:²

- a. There would be no significant adverse impact on current or planned operations if the additive resources in the plan were provided.
- b. The plan provided no panacea for preventing infiltration but it would make infiltration more difficult and costly to the enemy.
- c. The plan stressed a requirement for flexibility due to intangibles and unknown effectiveness of untested R&D devices.
- d. The 1 November 1967 operational date imposed constraints on the planners.

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1. This plan was also known as the Air-Supported Anti-Infiltration Capability, a part of the overall PRACTICE NINE Plan. The PRACTICE NINE nickname was later changed to ILLINOIS CITY and then to DYE MARKER. Both the ground and the air-supported plans were included in the nicknames. Eventually, the air-supported plan was given the nickname MUSCLE SHOALS and the ground plan retained the name DYE MARKER. The MUSCLE SHOALS plan had two additional nicknames associated with it. The anti-vehicle portion of the plan was called MUD RIVER, the anti-personnel portion was called DUMP TRUCK. The overall air-supported plan remained MUSCLE SHOALS; Point Paper J3B14, CINCPAC, 10 Apr 1967, Subject: "Status of PRACTICE NINE Project."
 2. Point Paper J3B14, CINCPAC, 10 Apr 1967, Subject: "Status of PRACTICE NINE Project."

e. Timely authorization for construction and delivery of special munitions was required if the plan was to be executed as scheduled.

f. Nam Phong Air Base, Thailand should be developed, in lieu of Phu Cat, to accommodate the major additive air units.

g. COMUSMACV must make final determination of the location of required mine and sensor fields.

h. Sensitive and difficult diplomatic problems should be tackled immediately to obtain necessary authorizations from the governments of Thailand, SVN and Laos before committing larger resources to the project.


~~(FC)~~ CINCPAC's comments and recommendations included: ¹

a. Implementation of the concept for an air-supported interdiction system should be considered as complementing and reinforcing on-going anti-infiltration programs and should not degrade on-going effective operations.

b. The new system of mines and sensors was non-discriminating and substantial modifications to rules of engagement in Laos, Thailand, and SVN would be required.

c. A requirement for a substantial quid pro quo to Thailand should be anticipated in return for basing of additional U.S. forces.

d. Immediate approval of the RTG should be obtained for essential base construction, force augmentations and operations from Thailand. The impact on Cambodia should be assessed. Essential authorizations should be obtained promptly from the Laotian Government, including approval of the PRACTICE NINE operation, before committing large sums of money and material to the project.

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1. Point Paper, J3B14, CINCPAC, 10 Apr 1967, Subject: "Status of PRACTICE NINE Project"; CINCPAC 030515Z Apr 67.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

g. Based upon a thorough study of alternative basing and comparative analysis of costs, operational feasibility, etc., CINCPAC fully supported selection of Nam Phong, Thailand vice Phu Cat, SVN, as the location for principal aircraft assets for PRACTICE NINE.

h. Implementation of the plan would be largely dependent upon development and delivery in quantity, of munitions and sensors, which were still in an R&D category. Gravel mine dispensers were unsatisfactory.

i. Construction requirements were such that funds must be made available to the contractors by 15 April for airfield upgrading if the 1 November 67 operational option was to be preserved for the SECDEF.

(S) CINCPAC recommended that the plan not be implemented by an arbitrarily selected date, but be delayed until such time as it could be clearly demonstrated that the resources upon which the plan was dependent for success, possessed the required degree of effectiveness.

(S) A resume of significant developments in the DYE MARKER program was provided Admiral Sharp on 7 August 1967 by J3, CINCPAC:¹

a. Forces approved by the SECDEF as additive to Program 4 by 7 August 1967 totaled 11,567; 7822 for the strong point/obstacle system (SPOS) and 3745 for the air supported plan. (COMUSMACV originally planned to use an infantry brigade to man the SPOS. He later tasked the III MAF to provide a USMC regiment. Three ARVN battalions were also tasked to support the SPOS.)

1. Point Paper, J3B13, CINCPAC, 7 August 1967, Subject: "DYE MARKER."

b. The operational date for execution of both plans remained 1 November 1967. Approval by the SECDEF to execute both plans was not expected until late August. Preparatory planning, tests and procurement of special items proceeding on the basis of protecting the 1 November date.

c. The Thai Government had granted clearance for airbase construction and related facilities in Thailand. The SECDEF had approved [REDACTED] Korat, Nakhon Phanom and Ubon were approved as principal bases [REDACTED]

d. [REDACTED]

e. GVN had endorsed and approved the SPOS south of the DMZ.

f. US Ambassadors Martin (Thailand) and Sullivan (Laos) had "alleged" to the State Department an apparent lack of coordination with their embassies on the DYE MARKER program. (The State Department's response was not available as of 7 August.)

g. Lieutenant General Starbird, Director of JTF-728, informed the SECDEF on 28 July 1967 that:

(1) A minimum number of EC-121, OP-2E and A-1 aircraft would be ready by the initial operational capability date (IOC) of 1 November 1967. Electronic countermeasure (ECM) equipment would cause delay. CH-3 helicopters would be available, UH-1 escort helicopters would not be available in-country until April 1968. (Requirements for the UH-1 could be met by diverting in-country assets or from Program 4, but CINCPAC was opposed to this action.)

(2) Mines for the anti-vehicular sector presented a problem. A self-sterilization design difficulty in the DRAGONTOOTH mine had caused a delay in production. None would be available by 1 November. The Mark 36 (with MK82) would not be available until early 1968 due to a priority restriction imposed by CINCPAC.

(3) Necessary construction was proceeding on schedule.

(4) If all EC-121s were equipped with the most advanced ECM, the cost would be \$15 million. This would require a diversion of the ECM equipment planned for installation in B-52s. If the IOC date were slipped 30 days for the anti-personnel area, ten aircraft scheduled for use in that area could be equipped at a cost of only \$7 million.

(5) Increase funding in all areas of procurement, RDT&E, and munitions for the DYE MARKER program was indicated.

(S) On 8 August 1967, ¹ General Westmoreland notified General Wheeler and Admiral Sharp that he was appointing Brigadier General McBride, USAF, to be operating manager of the air supported anti-infiltration system. General McBride was scheduled to command the 7th Air Force Task Force located at Nakhon Phanom RTAFB, Thailand where ISC was also located. He would be assigned to and directly responsible to Lieutenant General Momyer, CG 7th Air Force.

On 23 August 1967, ² the CJCS outlined for the Director of JTF-728 the responsibilities and command functions of Brigadier General McBride. He was to:

- a. Have full authority for directing all infiltration surveillance activities conducted in his area by the 7th AF and all other MACV forces.
- b. Act as 7th AF coordination authority for surveillance forces employed under his command.
- c. Direct the employment of surveillance, reconnaissance, and FAC aircraft and surveillance teams.
- d. Select targets, based on intelligence information, and recommend the employment of strike forces in his area.
- e. Specify the employment of ground action teams made available in his area from MACV resources.

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1. Memorandum for CINCPAC, J3 Brief No. 239-67, 2 Sep 67, Subject: "DYE MARKER JCS 2471/35 of 23 Aug 67."
 2. JCS 2471/35, 23 Aug 67.

(S) General Wheeler discussed Brigadier General McBride's proposed duties with the SECDEF and informed him of General Westmoreland's plans to appoint a brigadier general from within country to serve as a focal point on the MACV staff for all DYE MARKER activities. The SECDEF was in agreement with both proposals.

(TS) Throughout most of 1967 the SECDEF opted for an IOC date of 1 November 1967. He directed all agencies concerned to take those actions necessary to protect the 1 November 1967 date from jeopardy. Although there were recommendations from time to time ~~to~~ defer the IOC date, it was not until 20 September 1967,¹ at a conference among the SECDEF, Secretary Nitze, Secretary Brown, Dr. Foster, Lieutenant General Starbird, and General McConnell that it was agreed that the anti-vehicle portion of MUSCLE SHOALS would be deferred to not later than 1 December 1967 and the anti-personnel portion to not later than 1 January 1968.² The delay was necessitated by unresolved technical problems affecting sensors and other equipment, modification of aircraft, training of personnel for the ISC, and production of necessary special munitions.

(TS) On 25 November 1967, the JCS directed CINCPAC to implement MUSCLE SHOALS. CINCPAC on 27 November directed COMUSMACV to implement the anti-vehicle portion of the plans by 1 December and the anti-personnel portion by 1 January 1968 in accordance with the JCS schedule. A formal decision to execute DYE MARKER (strong point/obstacle system) was not expected or made since portions of DYE MARKER were actually operational prior to 25 November. Previous to this date the SECDEF's guidance on DYE MARKER had been to the effect that COMUSMACV should implement it as the tactical situation and availability of forces permitted.³

(TS) The scope of approved funding for FY 67 and 68 was as indicated below:⁴

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1. Memorandum for CINCPAC, J3 Brief No. 264-67, Subject: "MUSCLE SHOALS IOC Dates, JCS 2471/41 of 17 September 1967. (C)."
 2. JCS 7151/241629Z Sep 67.
 3. Point Paper, J3B13 (CINCPAC) 28 Nov 67, Subject: "MUSCLE SHOALS/DYE MARKER" (U).
 4. Ibid.

| | <u>FY 67</u> | <u>FY 68</u> |
|--------------------------------------|---------------|---------------|
| a. Aircraft and dispensers | 83.5 | 39.4 |
| b. Air base and related construction | 22.2 | |
| c. Strong point system/obstacle | 14.6 | 12.2 |
| d. ISC and communications | 5.5 | 7.6 |
| e. Sensors and munitions | 235.2 | 310.7 |
| f. RDT&E | * | 59.4 |
| g. JTF-728 and test program | 15.1 | 1.8 |
| | <u>376.1M</u> | <u>431.1M</u> |

* 33.8M distributed throughout all of the above ~~items~~ except b.

~~(S)~~ Because of the sensitivity of the MUSCLE SHOALS and DYE MARKER programs, the SECDEF on 7 September made the following news release:¹

"Recent news stories have speculated on anti-infiltration systems around the DMZ and I would like to discuss this matter with you briefly today.

"As you all know, we have for two years or more been examining into the possibilities of using ground obstacles and other devices to help impede the flow of men and supplies into South Vietnam. Many persons, some inside the Department of Defense and some in research organizations outside the Department, have recommended different proposals.

"Some of these proposals have been examined in detail and discarded. Other appear to have more promise. You are all aware that work has been started on clearing the jungle south of the DMZ for a stretch of roughly 15 miles. We are preparing to initiate late this year or early next year the operation of a system to make infiltration more difficult. The system's objectives will be consistent with those of our air campaign against the lines of communication. We know, of course, the no obstacle system can stop the infiltration of personnel or supplies.

"Equipment to be installed will range from barbed wire to highly sophisticated devices. The more the enemy knows about our plans, the more ready he could be to defeat the system when this is installed. Therefore, I am directing that no additional information be

 1. Message DEF 5695, ASD(PA) 072049Z Sep 67.

made public by anyone in the Department of Defense on this program. I do not intend to give the enemy the advantage of knowing what materials we will use, where they might be used or in what quantities. All such information would be of military assistance to him. Appropriate committees of congress will, of course, be kept informed of our plans."

~~(TS)~~ On 28 October CINCPACAF¹ requested CINCPAC to provide press guidance in the event of an accident or incident which might expose MUSCLE SHOALS munitions to the public. In response Admiral Sharp replied:

"Any statements required for public safety due to public exposure, jettison or loss of MUSCLE SHOALS munitions will identify the munitions as conventional high explosive ordnance and describe only to the extent necessary for safety purposes. Should equipment so exposed, jettisoned or lost include electronic detection devices, these will be described only as non-explosive electronic devices. No repeat no statement will relate the ordnance or other equipment to MUSCLE SHOALS.

"When public safety is endangered precautions used will be the same as those taken with other conventional high explosives in the public domain."

Withdrawal of Forces from South Vietnam and Cease Fire Planning

~~(TS)~~ Planning for the withdrawal of US and FWMA forces began in November 1966 at the direction of CINCPAC. The CINCPAC staff made a preliminary analysis and determined that it was logistically possible to withdraw US and FWMA forces from SVN within a six-month period.² The withdrawal within the six-month period was in consonance with the Manila Communique which was signed on 25 October 1966 by the Heads of State of Australia, Korea, New Zealand, the Philippines, Thailand, the US and the RVN.

~~(TS)~~ CINCPAC sent a message to his component commanders and COMUSMACV on 12 January 1967 to advise them of the assumptions on which the guidelines of the analysis were based.³ Additionally, his message included questions and a discussion of those questions which were

1. CINCPACAF DXICA 94641/291918Z Oct 67.

2. CINCPAC 120111Z Jan 67.

3. Ibid.

included in the analysis. He also informed COMUSMACV, CINCSAR-PAC, CINCPACFLT and CINCPACAF that: (1) the preliminary analysis was only the first step in the plan; (2) additional planning was underway and that within ten days he would forward for their comments and recommendation a draft concept of operations, intelligence concept, logistics concept and a communications-electronics concept for the withdrawal; and (3) an informal three-day conference would be convened at Camp Smith to examine in broad terms the withdrawal problems.

(TS) As indicated in his 12 January 1967 message, CINCPAC notified all interested agencies that the three day conference would be convened on 31 January 1967.¹ Six committees were formed to discuss the areas of intelligence, logistics, MAAG, RVNAF post-hostilities structure, redeployment programming and communications-electronics. Suggestions for additional items were welcomed.

(TS) On 25 January 1967, the JCS requested CINCPAC to submit a post-hostilities plan which included the withdrawal of US and FWMA forces within a period of six months after the conditions outlined in paragraph 29 of the Manila Communique had been met.² The conditions outlined in the communique were to the effect that the allied forces would be withdrawn, after close consultation, as NVN withdrew its forces to the north, ceased infiltration, and the level of violence subsided. Allied forces were to be withdrawn as soon as possible but not later than six months after the conditions had been fulfilled. The plan was due to JCS by 3 April 1967.

(TS) The Post-Hostilities Planning Conference was held during the period of 31 January - 2 February 1967 as scheduled. The proposed committees were formed and chaired by CINCPAC representatives. A representative from the PACOM Component Commanders and COMUSMACV were assigned to each committee. A conference report was prepared and distributed to all participating commands.³

(TS) CINCPAC forwarded his OPLAN 67-68 "Withdrawal of US/ FWMA Forces from South Vietnam Within a Six-Month Period" to JCS as required and furnished copies to his subordinate commanders.⁴ The plan was based on his preliminary analysis and the planning conference

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1. CINCPAC 242050Z Jan 67.
 2. JCS 4587, 252139Z Jan 67.
 3. CINCPAC ltr. Ser 000129-67, 10 Mar 67.
 4. CINCPAC ltr, Ser 000165, 31 Mar 67.

discussed above. The plan required CINCPAC subordinate commanders to prepare implementing plans within 60 days after receipt of the CINCPAC plan. (These plans were received by CINCPAC during June 1967.) On 28 June 1967, the JCS approved the plan and suggested certain modifications for clarity and accuracy. The title of CINCPAC OPLAN 67-68 was changed to "A Post-Hostilities Plan for Vietnam." ¹

(TS) On 6 June 1967, ² COMUSMACV recommended that the JFK Center for Special Warfare be tasked to study the role of US forces in the phasing down of the RVNAF to include the gainful employment of its veterans; to develop programs, organizational structure, programs of instruction and references; and to initiate training of military cadres to cope with this post-hostilities problem. CINCPAC agreed with COMUSMACV that postwar phase down of RVNAF and its attendant release of thousands of men into civilian life would create problems for which the GVN and the US Government must plan. ³ However, in his comments to the JCS on the COMUSMACV proposal, he pointed out that:

a. Responsibility for a veterans program was not in the purview of and should not be assumed by the military. The military could provide support and assistance to civilian agencies of the U. S. Government tasked with this responsibility.

b. Elements of the US Army Special Forces (USASF) should not be bound to long-term responsibilities for assisting in demobilizing the CIDG or elements of the RVNAF. CINCPAC felt that it was logical for the USASF to assume the initial task of preparing CIDG forces for demobilization but that early transfer of this mission to some other agency or element of the US Army must be made.

c. The Department of the Army or the JCS should designate the organization best suited for the required limited military study and training responsibilities.

d. Consideration should be given to requesting ROK assistance in developing a GVN veterans program and advising in its execution. CINCPAC considered that the phasing down of the RVNAF and planning for the gainful employment of GVN veterans were only parts of the whole postwar problem of economic viability and development.

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1. JCS-SM-460-67, 28 Jun 67, Subject: "Review of CINCPAC OPLAN 67-68 (U)."
 2. COMUSMACV 18358/060210Z Jun 67.
 3. CINCPAC 050138 Jul 67.

(S) Another facet of the post-hostilities planning addressed by CINCPAC was the possibility of a reduction in the level of violence by US forces in NVN and SVN. Should the character of the conflict in SVN reduce itself to a scattered insurgency-type action, the JCS wanted to be prepared to implement the best course of action to meet this situation. Accordingly, they requested CINCPAC's views on how to disengage in the north, at what rate air strikes should continue and when and under what conditions should they be phased down.¹

(S) To this request CINCPAC replied² that if the communists stopped their offensive actions in the south and ceased military support to the VC without negotiations, their action could be attributed primarily to a deterioration of their political, military and economic position. However, they would probably maintain a covert communist infrastructure in SVN which could be used to Hanoi's advantage. CINCPAC advised the JCS that full military pressure should be maintained until positive proof had been obtained by the US and its allies that Hanoi had in fact stopped infiltrating personnel and material in SVN and Laos; demonstrated conclusively that all NVA units were being withdrawn from SVN and Laos; and that Hanoi had stopped its support of the VC and Pathet Lao insurgencies. When these conditions were met the bombing of NVN could be stopped provided that it was made clear to the world that the halt in bombing would last only so long as Hanoi continued to withhold support of the insurgencies in SVN and Laos.

Cease Fire Planning

(TS) In early September 1967 the JCS forwarded a draft planning directive³ to CINCPAC for comment. If the draft planning directive was approved by JCS, CINCPAC would be required to prepare a plan to cover the period commencing with a cease fire and overlapping into a withdrawal period such as that envisioned by the CINCPAC OPLAN 67-68. After studying the draft planning directive, CINCPAC replied that should the cease fire situation set forth in the draft plan materialize, Phase I (Preparation of Withdrawal) of CINCPAC OPLAN 67-68 should be implemented. This would preclude a requirement for a separate plan. Even though no requirement for a separate plan was foreseen, a

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1. JCS 8454/100007 Oct 67.
 2. CINCPAC 120154Z Oct 67.
 3. Joint Staff J3M-1693-67, 8 Sep 67, Subject: Vietnam Cease Fire Planning (S).

requirement existed for necessary preparation to participate in negotiations if this possibility became a reality. To this end, CINCPAC recommended that appropriate agencies act immediately to select key personnel for a negotiating team who could prepare themselves in advance for the problems that would be encountered in negotiating with communists.

T-Day Planning

(TS) In March 1967, the SECDEF directed his staff to develop for him information connected with "post-war conversion," or T-Day Planning. The information developed was based on the assumptions:¹

a. "T-Day is defined as the day firing ceases and a truce begins."

b. "Redeployment of personnel from Southeast Asia will begin T+3 months (R-Day), and will be completed by T+9 months. As a part of the planning exercise, every effort will be made to have forces reach post-hostilities strength prior to T+15 months. Forces remaining in Southeast Asia will be part of, not additive to, that strength."

(TS) Six memoranda were prepared by the SECDEF's staff in response to his request. The memoranda were divided in two groups:²

a. To be issued T-Day:

(1) Adjustment of Operations Based on Cessation of Hostilities in Southeast Asia.

(2) Revisions to Procurement Programs Based on Cessation of Hostilities in Southeast Asia.

(3) Military Construction, South Vietnam and Thailand.

b. To be issued R-Day:

(1) Redeployment of Personnel from Southeast Asia and World-Wide Force Reduction.

(2) Revisions to Procurement Programs Based on

1. J5 Brief No. 299-67, 25 Oct 67, CINCPAC Control 00599-67.

2. Ibid.

Cessation of Hostilities in Southeast Asia.

(3) Military Construction, South Vietnam and Thailand.

~~(S)~~ The memoranda together with the assumptions on which the memoranda were based and memorandum from the SECDEF were forwarded to CINCPAC for comments and return to the JCS by 3 November. CINCPAC replied on 10 November and his comments were based on the following general points:¹

a. T-Day planning in the draft memoranda should relate specifically to South Vietnam and not refer generally to Southeast Asia.

b. T-Day should be redefined so that withdrawal planning would be based on an actual cessation of hostilities rather than a temporary cease-fire.

c. A cease fire and truce should apply to both South Vietnam and Laos.

d. Initial force withdrawal planning should be limited to forces in South Vietnam.

e. There should be sufficient time, subsequent to a withdrawal from South Vietnam, to assess the impact on other areas before withdrawal from Thailand.

f. CINCPAC OPLAN 67-68 should form the basis for any further withdrawal planning from South Vietnam.

~~(S)~~ In commenting to SECDEF the JCS redefined T-Day as: "TRUCE DAY--the day that hostilities in South Vietnam are terminated based on a determination made or joined in by the U.S. that the essential conditions for a cessation of hostilities are being met." They defined R-Day as "the day that major force withdrawals will begin from South Vietnam."²

~~(S)~~ The JCS noted for the SECDEF that the policy was too restrictive in that it failed to recognize a wide range of possible situations that might prevail. They also pointed out that:

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1. J5 Brief 344-67, 20 Dec 67, CINCPAC Control 00716-67.
 2. Ibid.

a. Planning should recognize that if conditions envisioned in the Manila communique were not met, a residual force ranging from a MAAG to a balanced combat force might be required.

b. The JCS would develop specific levels for incorporating into T-Day planning assumptions to precede the planning guidance needed to develop comprehensive plans for the post T-Day period.

(S) The JCS recommended that the plans be limited to a cessation of hostilities in SVN only, rather than from all Southeast Asia. In addition they recommended many other changes to the policy and draft memoranda which related more realistically to operational, personnel and logistics problems which would arise during a "phase-down" to an approved hostilities posture. Actually, all of CINCPAC's recommendations were incorporated in the JCS recommendations except the recommendation that a cease fire and truce should apply to both SVN and Laos.¹

Plans for Defense of Mainland Southeast Asia

(S) In late December 1966, CINCPAC was tasked by the JCS to (1) prepare a numbered plan for CHICOM intervention in Southeast Asia which would supersede applicable portions of OPLAN 32 and (2) to update OPLAN 39 to retain the optional air and naval strategy to deal fully with CHICOM intervention in Southeast Asia. These plans were to be responsive to all aspects of JSCP-68 and to provide for the following options:²

a. Assist mainland Southeast Asia countries in defense against and defeat of at least two levels of CHICOM aggression. The first level assumed CHICOM introduction of four to six divisions into Southeast Asia either to relieve NVA forces in NVN thus freeing these NVA forces to move into SVN, or to reinforce NVA forces already in SVN. The second level assumed CHICOM intervention in Southeast Asia with their maximum capability.

b. Extensive air and naval offensive operations against

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1. J5 Brief 344-67, 20 Dec 67, CINCPAC Control 00716-67.
 2. CPRS 000888-66; Point Paper, J5511, CINCPAC, 27 Aug 67, Subject: "OPLANS 41-68 and 42-68 (U)."

mainland China to cause the CHICOM to cease aggression.

~~(TS)~~ The strategic concepts of CINCPAC's OPLAN 32 and OPLAN 39 dealt with contingencies and CINCPAC response thereto based on a normal PACOM deployment situation as a starting point. A requirement for these two plans remained valid. Consequently, the JCS was notified that these two plans were being retained for use in a post-hostilities situation. The two new plans were to deal with CHICOM intervention in current combat operations. The preparation of the new plans was also a valid requirement.¹

~~(TS)~~ CINCPAC OPLAN 41-68, a defensive plan, was forwarded to JCS by CINCPAC on 6 July 1967.² The plan provided for the conduct of operations to assist mainland Southeast Asia countries in defense against and defeat of at least two levels of communist aggression discussed above. It was based on Phases III and IV of the "Plan for Defense of Mainland Southeast Asia," dated 28 July 1966 (an unnumbered plan). The JCS approved OPLAN 41-68 on 24 October 1967 subject to minor changes. They considered the plan to be responsive to the guidance furnished to CINCPAC.

~~(TS)~~ CINCPAC OPLAN 42-68, the second of the two new plans, was forwarded to the JCS by CINCPAC on 24 July 1967. This offensive plan provided for extensive air and naval operations against the CHICOM homeland. It was designed to cause the CHICOM to cease aggression. On 24 October 1967,⁴ the JCS notified CINCPAC that they considered OPLAN 42-68 to be responsive to the requirement to provide a plan to counter CHICOM intervention in current combat operations in Southeast

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1. Point Paper, J5511, CINCPAC, 27 Aug 67, Subject: " OPLANs 41-68 and 42-68 (U). "
 2. CINCPAC letter, serial 000332, 6 Jul 67; J5 Brief 306-67, 1 Nov 67 (J5513), CINCPAC Cntl 000641-67, Subject: "SM-719-67, dated 24 Oct; CINCPAC Operation Plan No. 41-68 (Defense of Mainland Southeast Asia against CHICOM Intervention in Current Combat Operations) (S) "; JCSM 719-67, 24 October 1967.
 3. CINCPAC letter, serial 000365, 24 Jul 67.
 4. JCSM-720-67, 24 October 1967; J5 Brief No. 310-67 (J551), CINCPAC Control 000642-67, 6 November 1967, Subject: "SM-720-67, dated 24 October 1967;" CINCPAC Operation Plan 42-68-"Offensive Operations to Counter CHICOM intervention in Current Combat Operations in Southeast Asia (S). "

Asia and recognized that CHICOM intervention in Southeast Asia was the major threat. However, they pointed out that the possibility of overt CHICOM aggression existed in other areas of the Western Pacific. Accordingly, CINCPAC was requested to broaden OPLAN 42-68 to include the contingency of CHICOM aggression against Taiwan and Korea. The JCS approved the plan with the understanding that the scope would be broadened to include the Taiwan and Korea contingency and subject to lesser modifications contained in JCSM-720-67, 24 October 1967. This action by the JCS required a major rewrite of the basic plan including the concept, force disposition, logistics considerations, intelligence and communications. Time required to complete this action extended into 1968.

PACOM Force Requirements and Capabilities

(S) "If you want to get this thing over with (the war in VN), the way to do it is to increase the bombing and troop strength both. I think the time factor is so important that we should do both."

Admiral U. S. G. Sharp¹

(C) Programming of force requirements for PACOM for 1967 and 1968 was a continuous process throughout 1967. As the new year 1967 began, CINCPAC was faced with several problems that had developed with respect to approved force ceilings. Two of the more immediate problems that needed resolution at the time were: (1) to determine the precise force structure included within Program #4 and (2) to establish better accounting procedures and controls in order to stay within approved ceilings. Solution of these problems facilitated subsequent force requirement actions.

(U) This portion of the history is devoted to resolving problems faced by CINCPAC and his Staff and his subordinate commanders and their staffs. It also treats with the estimation of requirements, the rationale behind the estimates and the import of U.S. policy decisions related to the roles, size and composition of the military force.

(U) Many actions pertaining to PACOM force requirements,

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1. Admiral U.S. Grant Sharp, CINCPAC, in testimony before the Senate Preparedness Subcommittee, 9 Aug 67.

accounting procedures, and the plaster ceiling were carried on concurrently. For the sake of clarity these actions will be treated separately as an entity rather than entries in a purely chronological record.

CINCPAC Concept for Vietnam, 1967

(TS) Late in 1966 CINCPAC published his CY 66/67 Requirements and Capabilities Programs.¹ The concept for Vietnam was essentially the same as the concept promulgated for 1965. As in the past the purpose of the concept was to provide strategic guidance and direction to subordinate commanders of the Pacific Command for planning and conduct of operations.

[REDACTED]

PACOM Mission

(TS) The mission of the Pacific Command remained the same: "To assist the Government of Vietnam and its armed forces to defeat externally directed and supported communist subversion and aggression and attain an independent non-communist society in South Vietnam functioning in a secure environment."

Military Strategy

(TS) The United States military strategy for Vietnam involved three interdependent undertakings which collectively constituted an integrated concept for military operations against North Vietnam and in South Vietnam and Laos. These three undertakings, as outlined in the "CINCPAC CY 66/67 Requirements and Programs" document, were:

- a. To take the war to the enemy in North Vietnam by unremitting but selective application of United States air and naval power.
- b. To seek out and destroy Communist forces and infrastructure in South Vietnam by expanded offensive military operations.

1. CINCPAC CY 66/67 Requirements and Capabilities Programs, Serial 000438, 20 Oct 66.

2. [REDACTED]

c. To extend the secure areas of South Vietnam by military operations and assist the Government of South Vietnam in building an independent viable, non-communist society by civic actions coordinated with military operations.

An overall explanation of how each undertaking was to be accomplished and the expected results was outlined for each of the three undertakings listed in the concept. Complimentary actions required to enhance the prosecution of the war were also listed.

Objectives and Tasks

(TS) The military objectives and tasks necessary to carry out CINCPAC's mission remained relatively the same as announced by CINCPAC for 1966.¹

Conduct of Operations

(TS) Military operations would continue to be conducted in concert with appropriate political, economic and sociological programs of U.S., FWMAF, and host country agencies. CINCPAC would continue, through his subordinate commanders, to direct operations in consonance with the forces made available and with the support and general policy guidance provided to CINCPAC by the JCS.

Ground Operations

(TS) The conduct of ground operations as envisioned by CINCPAC included:²

a. Retention of initiative through tactical offensive operations by U.S. forces, RVNAF and FWMAF. Offensive operations would include searching out and destroying VC main forces and North Vietnamese Army units. Offensive operations launched against enemy bases and war zones would be characterized by exploitation of intelligence generated through conventional and unconventional means and maximum use of air support (tactical aircraft and B-52), mobility, surprise, firepower superiority

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1. CINCPAC's military objectives were the same as those furnished to the SECDEF by the JCS. A listing can be found later in this section under "JCS Concept of Operations for Southeast Asia with Respect to South Vietnam."
 2. CINCPAC CY 66/67 Requirements and Capabilities Programs, Serial, 000438, 20 Oct 66.

and counterambush techniques.

b. Impeding movement of men and material from NVN into SVN by authorized crossborder operations against enemy infiltration routes, forces and base areas in Laos, Cambodia and the DMZ.

c. Developing, extending and holding secure areas of SVN by continuous military operations and area occupation. US forces, RVNAF and FWMAF would intensify counter guerrilla operations. These operations would be designed to deny enemy access to food and other support from the people and country side, as well as to steadily improve security throughout SVN.

d. Initiating Revolutionary Development (RD) and civic action programs as soon as practicable in areas as they were secured. US forces would vigorously support and participate in the programs by providing areas of logistic, sanitation, medical, communications, and construction support and assist in the control of resources and the population.

Air Operations

~~(S)~~ The scope of air operations set forth by CINCPAC included:¹

a. Taking the war to the enemy in North Vietnam by conducting air attacks against military installations, power plants, POL installations and industrial facilities in NVN that support aggression. LOC facilities would be attacked to impede movement within, into or out of NVN. Air attacks would be designed to progressively reduce the NVN capability to support and direct military operations in SVN and to force upon the enemy major replenishment, repair, and construction effort.

b. Maintaining air supremacy over Laos, Vietnam and adjacent waters by attacking enemy aircraft, SAM sites, AAA forces and their supporting command, combat and logistics structures. Air defense would be provided as necessary.

c. Interdicting LOCs, and harrassing, destroying and disrupting enemy forces and bases by armed reconnaissance within NVN and its coastal waters and within Laos.

1. CINCPAC CY 66/67 Requirements and Capabilities Programs, Serial 000438, 20 Oct 66.

d. Detecting by air reconnaissance, Chinese Communist military and naval movements, and NVN movements over infiltration routes through Laos, Cambodia and the DMZ.

e. B-52 strikes supporting sustained and large scale operations against major enemy forces, bases, war zones, and other troop concentrations.

f. Supporting US, ARVN, and FWMAF large-scale offensive operations, clearing and securing actions, guerrilla warfare and special operations.

g. Providing airlift, material and logistical support to US military, GVN and other agency RD programs and airlift support to military operations.

h. Supporting psychological operations from the air and conducting air-sea operations.

i. Preparing to conduct aerial mining of ports, inland waterways and coastal waterways to restrict or close ports, harbors, and water LOCs in NVN.

Naval Operations¹

~~(S)~~ CINCPAC's projected naval operations included:

a. Being prepared to conduct shore bombardment of enemy LOCs, port facilities and other coastal military facilities in NVN. Also, being prepared to conduct a mining campaign of ports, inland and coastal waterways of NVN and to institute a maritime quarantine, when authorized, to impede movement into, within and out of NVN.

b. Destroying or immobilizing enemy military seaborne traffic and providing anti-aircraft and anti-submarine protection.

c. Detecting and restricting enemy seaborne infiltration from the 17th parallel to the Cambodian border and beyond the Cambodian

1. CINCPAC CY 66/67 Requirements and Capabilities Programs,
Serial 000438, 20 Oct 66.

border when necessary.

d. Conducting amphibious operations against the enemy to destroy, seize, hold or raid hostile areas of vital importance.

e. River Assault Groups participating in joint and coordinated riverine operations in the Mekong Delta area and other inland waterways.

f. Conducting mine countermeasure operations to clear waterways, ports and harbors within SVN and providing shore bombardment and gunfire support to forces operating in SVN.

g. Providing sealift of US, RVNA and FWMA operating forces and conducting air-sea rescue operations.

h. Providing sealift, material and logistical support to US military, GVN and other agency RD programs.

i. Conducting surface and subsurface operations to detect Chinese Communist military and naval movements.

Operations of the RVNAF

(S) On 1 November 1966, RVNAF-JGS and COMUSMACV promulgated the Combined Campaign Plan 1967.¹ The plan stated that the mission of the RVNAF and the US/FWMAF was to defeat the VC/NVA forces and extend GVN control throughout the country. Although, the RVNAF was assigned the primary responsibility for supporting Revolutionary Development and the US/FWMA forces were assigned the primary mission of destroying main VC/NVA forces and bases, the plan states there would be no clear cut division of responsibility. As in 1966 most of RVNAF was committed to defend key population, food producing and government centers; protect and control national resources; conduct clearing and securing operations; identify and eliminate the VC guerrilla and communist infrastructure; open and secure land and water LOC; and Revolutionary Development.²

1. Point Paper, J551, 26 Nov 66, Subject: Combined Campaign Plan 1967.

2. RVNAF-JGS and USMACV, Combined Campaign Plan 1967.

PACOM Force Requirements for Southeast Asia

(S) On 1 January 1967 the approved Program 4 force level projected forward to 30 June 1968 was 469,300 troops, a level considerably below the 522,000 troops recommended by the JCS. ¹

(S) On 15 March 1967² CINCPAC requested COMUSMACV to provide him with a resume of a MACV study, then being made, of force requirements projected through FY 68. It was anticipated that this information would be needed at the 19 March meeting with the President at Guam. The resume, received on 18 March³ indicated a requirement for an additional 2 1/3 division equivalents to be in-country as soon as possible but not later than 1 July 1968. This, in effect, constituted a six month extension of COMUSMACV's CY 67 program. This would permit the shifting of force programming from a calendar year to a fiscal year basis. The MACV plan envisioned a Minimum Essential Force (MEF) and an Optimum Force.

(S) On 24 March⁴ the JCS established an urgent requirement to provide the JCS with the CINCPAC FY 68 force requirements as soon as possible. The JCS wanted to consider, at the earliest possible time, a detailed analysis of the Minimum Essential Force requirements and a general addressal of the Optimum Force requirements submitted by COMUSMACV on 18 March 1968. Time-phased troop lists with the best possible detailed supporting data and justification were to be submitted by COMUSMACV to the JCS by 282300Z March 1967. CINCPAC's comments on the above time-phased troop lists, supporting data and time-phased troop lists with justification for forces other than for SVN, and comments and recommendations for updating the concept, rationale for increased forces, logistics implications and problem areas were to be submitted by CINCPAC to the JCS by 311200Z March 1967. ⁵

(S) The deadlines established by JCS were met and CINCPAC also

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1. See Chapter IV, Vol II, CINCPAC Command History 1966 for detailed discussion of Program 4, force deployments; JCS 7864/142144Z Nov 66.
 2. CINCPAC 150151 Z Mar 67.
 3. COMUSMACV 09101/180403Z Mar 67.
 4. JCS 9881/242358Z Mar 67.
 5. To keep up with the rapid action which was required, a force requirements task group was established and was operational at CINCPAC during the period 27 Mar - 3 Apr 67.

furnished the JCS with additional off-shore requirements on 7 April 1967. The following is a resume of the CINCPAC FY 68 force requirements and related data:¹

a. Minimum Essential Force (Required as soon as possible but not later than 1 Jul 68)

(1) Composition:

- 2 1/3 Divisions
- 5 Tactical Fighter Squadrons (TFS)
- 1 Troop Carrier Squadron (C-130)
- 11 Aviation Companies
- 8 Separate Artillery Battalions
- 1 Automatic Weapon (Self Propelled) Battalion (AW(SP) BN)
- 6 Engineer Battalions
- 3 Naval Mobile Construction Battalions (NMCB)
- 9 LST
- 2 River Assault Squadrons
- Plus augmentations to all services.

Total personnel - 80,576

(2) Employment: COMUSMACV's plan for employment of the Minimum Essential Force revealed that he intended to deploy as follows:

(a) An infantry division of nine infantry battalions and an armored cavalry regiment with requisite combat support and combat service units to replace the force in Quang Tri Province. This force would have the mission of conducting containment operations then being conducted by the Marines. The armored cavalry regiment would have the additional missions of providing LOC protection in northern I CTZ and securing civilians displaced by military operations in Quang Tri Province.

(b) An infantry division force consisting primarily of seven infantry battalions, one tank battalion and one mechanized infantry

1. CINCPAC 310917Z Mar 67; COMUSMACV 09101/180403Z Mar 67; CINCPAC J5, Monthly Historical Submission, 18 Apr 67.

battalion would be deployed to Quang Ngai Province. This force would be employed to maintain continuous pressure on the enemy, to eliminate his forces and base areas and to remove his control over large population and food resources. This force would relieve Marine units currently conducting containment operations and free them to further expand their tactical areas, deny the enemy access to food and population resources and secure major LOCs.

(c) Two of the three NMCB's would be employed in support of the forces in northern I CTZ. These units ~~would~~ be engaged in port construction tasks and LOC upgrading, particularly Route 9.

(d) The other NMCB would be employed in the southern zone of I CTZ to provide required construction for over-the-shore operations, increased port throughput capability at Chu Lai and LOC improvement.

(e) To assure requisite waterway mobility for the Mekong Delta Riverine Assault Force (MDRAF), the two RAS plus associated support would be employed in the Mekong Delta. The additional mobility would permit properly configured offensive operations to be launched by the MDRAF and a greater degree of population and LOC control.

b. Optimum Force (May be required beyond FY 68):

(1) Composition: The optimum force is composed of the Minimum Essential Force plus:

- 2 1/3 Divisions
- 5 Tactical Fighter Squadrons (TFS)
- 12 Aviation Companies
- 1 Patrol Squadron (VP)
- 7 Separate Artillery Battalions
- 2 Engineer Battalion
- 4 Navy Mobile Construction Battalion (NMCB),
- 2 Construction Battalion Maintenance Unit (CBMU)
- Plus augmentations

Total personnel - 199,017

(2) Employment: Employment of the Optimum Forces would provide for execution of those missions envisioned for the MEF plus the following:

(a) Four brigades in II CTZ would be employed as follows: one in Binh Dinh Province to establish and maintain security in the northern portion; one in the western highlands to reinforce units already deployed there and to assist in the conduct of offensive and containment operations; one in southeastern II CTZ to establish and maintain security in Binh Thuan Province; and one Ban Me Thuot to conduct sustained offensive operations, to provide a secure environment for RD, to counter infiltration from Cambodia and to support operations in the vicinity of II CTZ and III CTZ boundary.

(b) An airmobile division in Bien Hoa Province of the III CTZ which would be employed to maintain the protective shield around Saigon, facilitate RD operations, conduct operations against the VC 5th Division and reinforce as required the U. S. 9th Division (The Optimum Force package includes other forces whose employment is not described).

(c) On examination, the additional requirement recommended by COMUSMACV and CINCPAC revealed that the planned employment of the forces was in consonance with CINCPAC's "Concept for Vietnam" and the Combined Campaign Plan, 1967.¹

JCS Views and Recommendations of FY 68 PACOM Force Requirement

(15) On 20 April² 1967, the CJCS provided the Secretary of Defense with the JCS views on the need for and the estimated capability to provide additional forces requested by COMUSMACV and CINCPAC (on 31 March and 7 April 1967).³ The JCS pointed out that:

a. The forces were in addition to Program 4.

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1. A discussion of the "Concept for Vietnam," the Military Strategy for Vietnam and the objectives and tasks which support the strategy will be found in the beginning of this chapter.
 2. JCSM-218-67, 20 Apr 67.
 3. Discussed above.

b. The 7,822 spaces approved by SECDEF on 8 April 1967 for PRACTICE NINE would apply against the requested FY 68 forces.

c. CINCPAC had requested the reactivation of two battleships on 19 April 1967 and that the JCS would advise SECDEF at a later date concerning their review of this request.

d. Beyond the immediate FY 68 forces requested, COMUSMACV and CINCPAC had indicated the need for another two and one-third division equivalents, five more TFS, plus the required ~~combat~~ support and combat service support and that additional Navy combat ships might be required.

~~(S)~~ The JCS summarized the situation in Vietnam for the SECDEF as follows:

"a. There are three general areas of military effort that should be pursued in the conduct of the war:

(1) Operations against the Viet Cong/North Vietnamese Army (VC/NVA) forces in SVN while concurrently assisting the South Vietnamese Government in their nation-building efforts.

(2) Operations to obstruct and reduce the flow of men and materials from North Vietnam (NVN) to SVN.

(3) Operations to obstruct and reduce imports of war-sustaining materials into NVN.

"b. In the first area, the United States and its allies have achieved considerable success in operations against VC/NVA forces. However, sufficient friendly forces have not been made available to bring that degree of pressure to bear on the enemy throughout SVN which would be beyond his ability to accommodate and which would provide the secure environment essential to sustained progress in Revolutionary Development. The current reinforcement of I CTZ by diversion of forces from II and III CTZs reduces the existing pressure in those areas and inevitably will cause a loss of momentum that must be restored at the earliest practicable date.

"c. In the second area, US efforts have achieved appreciable success. Greater success could be realized if an expanded system of

targets were made available.

"d. In the third area, relatively little effort has been permitted. This failure to obstruct and reduce imports of war-sustaining materials into NVN has affected unfavorably the desired degree of success of operations in the other areas."

JCS Concept of Operations for Southeast Asia with Respect to Vietnam

(TS) The JCS furnished the SECDEF their concept of operations for Southeast Asia with respect to Vietnam. The concept outlined the military strategy for the conduct of the war in Southeast Asia and reinforced concepts previously recommended by the JCS.¹ The concept² covered operations of U.S., South Vietnam, and allied military forces and encompassed the concepts set forth, through 20 April 1967, by CINCPAC and COMUSMACV for the conduct of the war.

a. National Objective. To attain a stable and independent non-communist government in South Vietnam.

b. Military Contributions. The military forces of the United States and its allies are employed in pursuit of the national objective. Actions taken by these forces had been and would continue to be in the general areas of military effort outlined above in the JCS summary.

c. Military Objectives. The military objectives remained the same:

"a. To make it as difficult and costly as possible for NVN to continue effective support of the VC and to cause NVN to cease direction of the VC insurgency.

"b. To defeat the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese Armed Forces in SVN and force the withdrawal of NVA forces.

"c. To extend Government of South Vietnam dominion, direction, and control over South Vietnam.

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1. Until 20 Apr 67 the last concept provided SECDEF by JCS was contained in JCSM 702-66, 4 Nov 66, Subject: "Deployment of Forces to Meet CY 67 Requirements (U)."
 2. Annex A, JCSM-218-67, 20 Apr 67.

"d. To deter the Chinese communists from direct intervention in Southeast Asia and elsewhere in the Western Pacific and to be prepared to defeat such intervention if it occurs."

d. Military Operations. Military operations would continue to be conducted in coordination with appropriate political, economic and sociological programs of U.S., other Free World and host country agencies. Combat operations, as in the past, would be mounted from South Vietnam, the South China Sea, Guam and Thailand and supported by PACOM forces in the Philippines, Okinawa, Japan and Taiwan. An integrated and expanded air and naval campaign would be conducted against North Vietnam and the infiltration route through the DMZ, Laos and the South China Sea. Intensified offensive ground, air and naval operations would be conducted concurrently against VC/NVA forces in SVN and in immediately adjacent areas near the DMZ and in Laos in order to create a secure environment in which Revolutionary Development could progress. With the deployment of additional forces, actions in the south would be expanded. The concept provided for bringing significantly greater power to bear on the enemy in a relatively short time so that it would be beyond the enemy's ability to accommodate or counter.

e. Rationale for PACOM FY 68 Forces. The rationale for FY 68 Forces as furnished to the SECDEF by the JCS was contained in Annex B, JCSM-218-67, 20 Apr 67, and is summarized as follows:

(1) The forces for SVN would be needed primarily to offset the enemy's increased posture in the vicinity of the DMZ and to improve the environment for Revolutionary Development in I and IV CTZs. To achieve the secure environment for lasting progress in SVN, there was a need for additional military forces to destroy the enemy main force, locate and destroy district and provincial guerrilla forces, and to provide security for the population. The increased effort to offset VC/NVA main force pressure had diminished the military capability to provide a secure environment for villages and hamlets. Thus, forces would have to be added and deployed to provide both direct and indirect support to Revolutionary Development.

(2) Three tactical fighter squadrons for Thailand and the additional naval forces in the South China Sea and the Gulf of Tonkin would be required to bring increased pressure to bear on NVN.

f. Military Services Capability to Meet the PACOM Force Requirement.¹ The military services capability to meet the force requirements were determined under two alternative cases. The summary of the Services capability furnished SECDEF by the JCS is as follows:

"a. Case I - No Reserve callup or extension of terms of service. Present tour and rotation policies would be maintained. By July 1968, only a one and one-third Army division force, a part of the mobile riverine force, and no additional Marine Corps forces could be in place in SVN. A second Army division force to fill out the FY 1968 requirement probably could not be provided until the first half of FY 1970. The additional 8" gun cruiser, five additional destroyers, and about half of the in-country naval forces could be provided in FY 1968, but only by the undesirable expedient of extending present periods of deployment. The three TFS in Thailand and five in SVN requested by CINCPAC could be furnished in FY 1968. Three TFS in SVN would be required to meet the need for air support of the one and one-third divisions that could be deployed in FY 1968.

"b. Case II - Callup of Reserves and a twelve-month involuntary extension of terms of service. Present tour and rotation policies would be maintained. A Reserve callup and the collateral actions enumerated below would enable the services to provide the major combat forces required in PACOM not later than end FY 1968. The forces would include one and one-third Army divisions, three US Air Force TFS, one Marine division/wing team which includes two TFS, the major portion of the mobile riverine force, naval patrol forces, and most of the required support forces for SVN: three US Air Force TFS in Thailand; one additional 8" gun cruiser and five additional destroyers."

g. The JCS recommended that:

"a. The military strategy for the conduct of the war in Southeast Asia, as described in Appendix A, be approved in principle.

"b. The list of forces in Appendix C, Case II, less forces approved on 8 April 1967, be approved for deployment.

1. See Appendix C, JCSM-218-67, 20 Apr 67 for a detail listing.

"c. Authority be obtained for a Reserve callup for a minimum of 24 months and involuntary extension of terms of service for twelve months in order to meet FY 1968 force requirements and to prepare for possible future requirements.

"d. To support the preceding recommended actions, authority be granted to provide for:

(1) Access to equipment from sources in the following priority:

(a) CONUS depot assets and programmed production deliveries not committed to higher priority requirements.

(b) Operational project stocks.

(c) Contingency stocks.

(d) Reserve components not scheduled for callup.

(e) Pre-positioned equipment in Europe.

(f) Diversion of items for recently activated units.

(g) Drawdown from nondeploying active units in CONUS.

(2) Reopening of CONUS inactive installations, as required.

"e. An early decision be provided on both funding in addition to the FY 1968 budget and increased end strengths to support all aspects of the deployment of FY 1968 forces."

Secretary of Defense Reaction

~~(S)~~ Initial SECDEF reaction to JCSM 218-67, 20 April 1967 was indicated by Deputy SECDEF Vance's request that the JCS prepare an analysis of two alternative force postures.¹ These two courses were:

1. JCS 4082/011836Z May 67.

(1) Course A which would add a minimum of 200,000 men and greatly intensify military actions outside the south, especially against the north; and (2) Course B which would confine troop increases in FY 68 to nine battalions, approximately 10,000 men, which could be generated without calling up the reserves in the next year.

PACOM Action Leading to Program 5 Forces

(TS) The JCS requested CINCPAC's comment on the Dep SECDEF requirement. On 6 May 1967¹ CINCPAC forwarded his comments to the JCS as requested and recommended that:

- a. The Minimum Essential Force and other off-shore forces be readied and deployed in FY 68.
- b. Steps be taken to ensure availability in the US of additional forces required to deploy the COMUSMACV Optimum Force.
- c. The air campaign be expanded and naval surface forces strengthened.
- d. Authority be obtained to fully implement CINCPAC strategy.

(TS) On the same date (20 April 67) that the JCS published JCSM 218-67, CINCPAC received COMUSMACV's letter² of 5 April 1967 which consolidated and amplified MACV's messages of 18 and 28 March 1967 and constituted the MACV force requirements for FY 68 as of 5 April 1967. On 19 April 1967³ COMUSMACV notified CINCPAC that due to necessary redeployments in-country, revision of the composition and deployment of the 2 1/3 division Minimum Essential force was required:

- 1 Infantry Division (9 Inf Bns) - Quang Tri Province
- 1 Infantry Brigade - Quang Ngai Province
- 1 Infantry Division (8 Inf Bn, 1 Mech Bn) BEAR CAT (III CTZ)

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- 1. CINCPAC 060705Z May 67.
 - 2. Letter, MACJ3, HQUSMACV, 5 Apr 67, Subject: "FY 68 Force Requirements (U)," MACV Serial 0004327; CINCPAC Serial 0001198.
 - 3. MACV 13010/191125Z Apr 67.

~~(S)~~ On 1 May 1965, the JCS¹ requested comments on the revised COMUSMACV troop request and changes, if any, to the rationale for the Optimum Force discussed in the MACV letter of 5 April 1967. On 3 May 1967 CINCPAC² replied to the JCS request, however, his reply addressed only the MACV message of 19 April 1967. CINCPAC concurred in MACV's revised Minimum Essential Force composition and location since the proposal was compatible with the strategy and concept for the war in SVN.

~~(S)~~ CINCPAC had requested COMUSMACV to furnish him comments on any change in the rationale for the Optimum Forces discussed in MACV letter of 5 April 1967. On 3 May 1967 COMUSMACV pointed out that his rationale of 5 April 1967 was still considered valid although in-country redeployments had caused changes in both initial deployment areas and composition of forces.³ The requested total force of 4 2/3 divisions (42 maneuver battalions) and 10 tactical fighter squadrons had not changed. The revised composition and location of the MACV Optimum Force of 4 2/3 divisions was as follows:

| | | |
|-----------------|------------------|---------------------|
| 1 Inf Div | 9 Inf Bns | Quang Tri Province |
| 1 Inf Bde | 3 Inf Bns | Quang Ngai Province |
| 1 Inf Bde | 3 Inf Bns | Binh Dinh Province |
| 1 Mech Bde | 3 Mech Bns | Pleiku Province |
| 1 Inf Bde | 3 Inf Bns | Darlac Province |
| 1 Mech Bde | 3 Mech Bns | Binh Thuan Province |
| 1 Inf Div | 8 Inf, 1 Mech Bn | Exploiting Force |
| 1 Airmobile Div | 9 Bns | Exploiting Force |

~~(S)~~ On 19 June 1967 SECDEF⁴ approved 10 of the 19 Army units that had been deferred without prejudice on 9 December 1966. This resulted in an increase of 1,287 spaces making a total of 323,735 authorized Army spaces and an overall total of 484,509 OSD approved spaces for RVN.⁵

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1. JCS 4077/011615Z May 67.
 2. CINCPAC 032116Z May 67.
 3. MACV 14745/041235Z May 67.
 4. JCS 2472/99, 22 Jun 67, Subject: "Deployment Adjustment Request (19 Units for SVN) (U)."
 5. For a more detail breakdown of authorized spaces in PACOM as of 2 Jun 67 see below, "OSD Program #4 Development, Strength Accountability and Procedure."

~~(S)~~ CINCPAC¹ had requested COMUSMACV to furnish him any desired changes to JCSM-218-67 of 20 April 1967 (Minimum Essential Force, FY 68) by 18 July 1967. COMUSMACV, on 30 June,² requested his suspense date be changed from 18 July to 15 August. The extension of the suspense date was based on the assumption that there would probably be some changes in the FY 68 force requirements due to the pending SECDEF visit to RVN. CINCPAC notified COMUSMACV that the new suspense date would be determined following the SECDEF visit based on an "as soon as possible" criterion.

~~(S)~~ During the period 7-11 July 1967 the SECDEF visited RVN and discussed force requirements for RVN. At the end of the period he was provided five packages dealing with the various aspects of the FY 68 force requirements. These packages were compiled from the material presented to Mr. McNamara in formal briefings at Saigon during his visit and from COMUSMACV FY 68 force requirements presented to him prior to his visit.³ As a result, the SECDEF on 13 July requested the CJCS to provide him with a detailed troop list of forces for COMUSMACV within a strength ceiling of 525,000.

~~(S)~~ A recapitulation of the SECDEF Program 4 end strengths, including changes through 39,⁴ is presented here in order to provide a comparison with Program 5 which will be discussed in subsequent paragraphs.

| | <u>USA</u> | <u>USN</u> | <u>USAF</u> | <u>USMC</u> | <u>TOTALS</u> |
|------------------|----------------|---------------|----------------|---------------|----------------|
| Vietnam | 323,735 | 30,039 | 56,148 | 74,550 | 484,472 |
| Thailand | 11,322 | 444 | 32,687 | | 44,453 |
| Okinawa | 14,997 | 1,900 | 15,889 | 13,360 | 46,146 |
| Japan | 7,400 | 6,300 | 19,900 | 2,587 | 36,187 |
| Philippines | 300 | 5,600 | 17,800 | 700 | 24,400 |
| Guam | 100 | 4,600 | 4,000 | 300 | 9,000 |
| Taiwan | 1,000 | 700 | 6,800 | | 8,500 |
| Ocean Area PACOM | | 42,000 | | | 42,000 |
| TOTALS | 358,854 | 91,583 | 153,224 | 91,497 | 696,158 |

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1. CINCPAC 060502Z Jun 67.
 2. COMUSMACV 21561/010010Z Jun 67.
 3. Point Paper, J554, CINCPAC, 7 Aug 67, Subject: "JCSM-416-67, US Force Deployment Vietnam (U)."
 4. JCS 2343/855-43, 6 Jul 67.

(S) On 20 July 1967, CJCS forwarded JCSM-416-67 to the SECDEF. This memorandum was in response to Mr. McNamara's request of 13 July 1967, for a detailed troop list which would provide specified forces for COMUSMACV within a troop ceiling of 525,000. The JCS pointed out that shortly after the SECDEF's request, members of SECDEF's staff orally informed the Joint Staff that elements of the 9th Marine Amphibious Brigade (MAB) and five tactical squadrons, not all of which were to deploy, were to be included in the 525,000 ceiling. The JCS nonconcurred in this. They reasoned that the 9th MAB was the PACOM reserve, subject to employment in other PACOM areas and that the tactical fighter squadrons which were to be maintained in a ready-to-deploy status outside of RVN should not be included unless they were actually deployed in-country.

(S) The forces included in the JCS troop list¹ were less than those recommended by them in JCSM-218-67, 20 April 1967. In addition, 12,545 military spaces would have to be converted to civilian spaces in order to bring the military strength down to 525,000. A summary of the troop list is as follows:

| <u>UNIT ORGANIZATION</u> | <u>SVC STR</u> | <u>ARMY</u> | <u>NAVY</u> | <u>AF</u> | <u>MC</u> |
|--|---------------------------|-------------|-------------|-----------|--------------------------|
| Program 4 (SVN 9th MAB to incl 2 VMA Sqdns | 484,472 6,720 <u>a</u> | 323,735 | 30,039 | 56,148 | 74,550 6,720 <u>a</u> |
| MACV FY 67 Additive Requirements | 9,497 | 7,108 | 200 | 1,386 | 803 |
| American Division <u>b</u> 11th Lt Inf Bde <u>c</u> | 5,610 | 5,610 | | | |
| TAC Ftr Sqdns (Two A-1 Sqdns) | 963 | | | 963 | |
| Mobile Riverine Force, GAME WARDEN and MARKET TIME Rqmts | 3,604 | | 3,604 | | |
| 101st Abn Div (-) | 19,103 | 19,103 | | | |

1. JCSM-416-67, 20 Jul 67.

| <u>UNIT</u> <u>ORGANIZATION</u> | <u>SVC STR</u> | <u>ARMY</u> | <u>NAVY</u> | <u>AF</u> | <u>MC</u> |
|--|----------------|-------------|-------------|-----------|-----------|
| I CTZ Log and Const Rqmts | 3,968 | 3,968 | | | |
| US Advisory Program Expansion | 2,577 | 2,577 | | | |
| Tac Ftr Sqdns d] (One A-1, one F-4 Sqdn) | 1,031 | | | 1,031 | |
| Reorganization 198th Inf Bde (No added strength) | - | | | | |
| TOTAL | 537,545 | 358,133 | 37,811 | 59,528 | 82,073 |
| Contractor/Direct Hire | -12,545 | | | | |
| | <u>525,000</u> | | | | |

- a) Displays average strength to support the temporary deployment to SVN of three BLT s, two HMM, and two VMA/VMFA.
- b) To be formed in-country, which will include the 198th Bde (approved in Program 4), 11th Inf Bde, additional brigade in-country, and re-assignment of approximately 2,400 additional personnel in-country assets.
- c) Strength includes a fourth infantry battalion; all battalions with four rifle companies each.
- d) Maintained in ready status for future deployment to SVN as directed.

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(S) On 31 July 1967 the approved Program 4 forces in-country were:

| | <u>US Army</u> | <u>USN</u> | <u>USAF</u> | <u>MC</u> | <u>TOTAL</u> |
|----------|----------------|------------|-------------|-----------|--------------|
| Vietnam | 302,249 | 28,284 | 77,181 | 55,599 | 463,313 |
| Thailand | 10,691 | 363 | 27,945 | 39 | 39,038 |

(S) In his memorandum of 10 August to CJCS, SECDEF tentatively approved for planning the majority of the forces the JCS ~~proposed~~ in their JCSM-416-67 of 20 July 1967.² On 17 August 67, the JCS furnished CINCPAC with tables which reflected those forces tentatively approved for planning. The tables constituted Program 5 and superseded Program tables through Change #39. The tentatively approved force level end strengths for SVN through FY 69 were:

| | <u>Army</u> | <u>Navy</u> | <u>AF</u> | <u>USMC</u> | <u>TOTAL</u> |
|--------------------|-------------|-------------|-----------|-------------|--------------|
| Program 4 | 323,735 | 30,039 | 56,148 | 74,530 | 484,472 |
| FY 68 Added Forces | 33,297 | 4,234 | 2,242 | 7,523 | 47,296 |
| Civilianization | -5,414 | 812 | - 542 | 0 | -6,768 |
| <hr/> | | | | | |
| Program 5 | 351,618 | 33,461 | 57,848 | 82,073 | 525,000 |

The Program 5 forces included the 9th MAB and those tactical air squadrons ready for deployment. SECDEF had in effect overruled the JCS nonconcurrence. He did authorize the reduction of the force proposed by the JCS (537,545) by civilianization of 12,545 military spaces in order to stay within the ceiling of 525,000 military spaces.

(S) In addition to tentatively approving forces for SVN, the SECDEF memorandum of 10 August 1967 requested the JCS to furnish him by 15 September 1967 a refined troop list of forces to be deployed. To

1. Monthly Historical Submission, J5543 (CINCPAC), 8 Aug 67 for the month of July 67.
2. J5 Brief No. 256-67 (Brief for JCS Papers), 6 Sep 67, Subject: "JCS 2472/136 of 17 Aug 67, Subject: Southeast Asia Deployments Program 5 (U)."

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this end a CINCPAC Force Requirements Working Group convened at CINCPAC Headquarters 23-30 August 1967. The mission¹ of the group was to:

- a. Prepare a refined troop list and deployment dates of CINCPAC requirements for SVN based on the forces proposed by JCSM-416-67.
- b. Develop a monthly schedule for substitution of civilian contractor and direct hire personnel for selected military support units.
- c. Reconcile Program 4 end strengths.
- d. Establish logistics requirements related to the proposed deployment.

~~(S)~~ The CINCPAC Force Requirements Working Group reviewed the MACV Adjusted Force Requirements for FY 68, which resulted from JCSM-416-67, and developed the CINCPAC Program 5 Refined Troop List. The group was composed of representatives of CINCPAC Component Commanders, COMUSMACV, USARV, NAVFOR V, III MAF, 7TH AF, DA, CSAF, CNO, CMC, JCS and OSD.² The group developed the following breakout of Program 5 spaces:

| | <u>Army</u> | <u>Navy</u> | <u>AF</u> | <u>MC</u> | <u>TOTAL</u> |
|-----------------|----------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|----------------|
| Requirement | 358,475 | 37,522 | 59,309 | 82,239 | 537,545 |
| Civilianization | -9,595 | -2,050 | - 600 | - 300 | 12,545 |
| | <u>348,880</u> | <u>35,472</u> | <u>58,709</u> | <u>81,939</u> | <u>525,000</u> |

~~(S)~~ The CINCPAC Refined Troop List Southeast Asia Deployment Program 5 was submitted to the JCS as enclosure (1) to CINCPAC letter, serial 000450, dated 1 September 1967. In the letter Admiral Sharp emphasized that:

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- 1. CINCPAC 120410Z Aug 67.
 - 2. Monthly Historical Submission, J5543 (CINCPAC) 9 Sep 67 for month of Aug 67, item: "Southeast Asia Deployment Program 5 (U)."

a. The refined troop list provided the optimum mix of forces which could be obtained within the 525,000 ceiling and that the directed inclusion of 1164 spaces to provide hospital facilities for civilian war casualties necessitated removal of that number of forces from the troop list. "In addition, many other units and personnel which were required could not be included within the ceiling."

b. The 12,545 military spaces that were to be civilianized was considered near the upper limit of such substitutions and was contingent on the timely availability of additional funds. The direct-hire plan required approximately \$4.4 millions if FY 68 O&M funds and \$15.7 million in FY 69 O&M funds.

c. The impact of Program 5 deployments on piaster expenditure rates was under study and would be reported later.

d. Deployments and redeployments could be supported logistically although certain ports would be saturated for limited periods of time; however, these conditions were manageable.

e. The construction program to support Program 4 and 5 requirements would require additional funds in the neighborhood of \$216.2 millions.

f. Through inactivation, reorganizations and strength changes 5,453 spaces had been saved in Program 4. These spaces were used to add needed forces to the refined troop list. Other priority units could be added if the 6,720 spaces for the 9th MAB could be dropped from the 525,000 ceiling and accounted for as part of out-of-country forces.

~~(S)~~ Admiral Sharp closed his letter by stating that the forces in the refined troop list were essential to the conduct of the war in SVN and the approval for early deployment was recommended. It should be noted that the Program 5, Refined Troop List did not represent CINCPAC force requirement which was higher than the ceiling of 525,000 space imposed by SECDEF.

~~(S)~~ The Joint Chiefs of Staff reviewed the CINCPAC Refined Troop List, Southeast Asia Deployment Program 5 and on 15 September 1967 submitted their recommended refined troop list for SVN for FY 68 (Program 5).¹ The JCS recommended Program 5 totals were the same as

1. JCSM 505-67 dated 15 Sep 67, Subject: "US Force Deployments - Vietnam (U)."

recommended by CINCPAC. The below table summarizes the JCS recommendation:

| | <u>ARMY</u> | <u>NAVY</u> | <u>AF</u> | <u>MC</u> | <u>TOTAL</u> |
|------------------|-------------|-------------|-----------|-----------|--------------|
| Program 4 | 323,735 | 30,039 | 56,148 | 74,550 | 484,472 |
| CY 67/68 Added | | | | | |
| Forces | 39,365 | 7,483 | 3,161 | 7,689 | 57,698 |
| Civilianization | -9,595 | -2,050 | -600 | -300 | -12,545 |
| Adjust to Prog 4 | -4,625 | 0 | 0 | | -4,625 |
| JCS Recommended | | | | | |
| Program 5 | 348,880 | 35,472 | 58,709 | 81,939 | 525,000 |

Southeast Asia Deployments are summarized as follows:

| | <u>Program 4</u> <u>Thru Ch #39</u> | <u>Program 5</u> <u>JCS Proposed</u> |
|--------------------------|--|---|
| U.S. Maneuver Bns | 90 | 106 |
| Artillery Bns | 61 2/3 | 67 2/3 |
| Engineer Bns | 53 | 55 |
| Fighter-Attack A/C | 1,033 | 1,074 |
| Helicopters | 3,202 | 3,581 |
| In-country Naval Vessels | 443 | 605 |

(S) On 6 October 1967,¹ the SECDEF approved for deployment to SVN those forces recommended by the JCS on 15 September 1967 in JCSM-505-67 (Refined FY 68 (Program 5) Troop List).

(S) Including the 525,000 spaces authorized for SVN, the authorized end strengths for FY 69 contained in the Southeast Asia Deployment Program 5 was as indicated below:²

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1. Point Paper, J5543, CINCPAC, 7 Oct 67, Subject: "Southeast Asia Deployment Program 5 (U)."
 2. Point Paper, J554, CINCPAC, 24 Oct 67, Subject: "Southeast Asia Deployment Program 5 (U)."

| | <u>USA</u> | <u>USN</u> | <u>USAF</u> | <u>USMC</u> | <u>TOTAL</u> |
|------------------|----------------|---------------|----------------|---------------|----------------|
| Vietnam | 348,900 | 35,500 | 58,700 | 81,900 | 525,000 |
| Thailand | 12,200 | 500 | 33,100 | | 45,800 |
| Okinawa | 15,000 | 1,900 | 15,800 | 7,400 | 40,100 |
| Japan | 7,400 | 6,300 | 19,900 | 2,600 | 36,200 |
| Philippines | 300 | 5,600 | 18,300 | 700 | 24,900 |
| Guam | 100 | 4,600 | 4,000 | 300 | 9,000 |
| Taiwan | 1,000 | 700 | 6,800 | | 8,500 |
| Ocean Area PACOM | | 42,200 | | | 42,000 |
| TOTALS | 384,900 | 97,300 | 156,600 | 92,900 | 731,500 |

NOTE: All figures rounded off.

~~(TS)~~ On 13 October the SECDEF placed a ceiling of 45,724 US military spaces for Thailand and at the same time required that future recommendations for new units or augmentations to Thailand follow the same ground rules that applied to SVN.¹ The Thailand ceiling was increased in November to 46,626 spaces when the SECDEF approved Air Force Deployment Adjustment Request 67-104.²

~~(TS)~~ CINCPAC on 21 May submitted comments to the JCS on a proposed plan for minimal military facilities and personnel requirements as a supplement to US aid programs to carry out the Civilian War Casualty Program. Admiral Sharp told the JCS that the implementation of the program without providing the necessary additional resources would have an adverse effect on his capability to support military operations.³ He requested 1164 spaces to support the Civilian War Casualty Program, as directed by SECDEF.⁴ The plan was approved by OSD without providing additional military personnel or funds for construction of facilities and operation of the program.⁵

~~(TS)~~ On 8 October, Admiral Sharp in reclama to the OSD action recommended that the program either be operated outside the US military hospital system, or the capability of the US military hospital

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1. J5 (CINCPAC) Monthly Historical submission for October 67, dated 7 Nov 67, entitled: SEA Deployment Program 5 (U) (J5542).
 2. J5 Brief 322-67, 17 Nov 67, CINCPAC Control 00639-67.
 3. CINCPAC 210951Z May 67; CINCPAC 080725Z Oct 67.
 4. Letter, J554 Hq CINCPAC, Ser 000450, Sep 67.
 5. JCS 4294/182124Z Aug 67.

system be expanded by providing additional facilities and personnel over and above programmed resources. ¹


~~TOP SECRET~~ A graphic presentation of US and Allied maneuver forces, battalion-size or larger, and their disposition during CY 1967 are shown on the accompanying four charts.

1. CINCPAC 080725Z Oct 67.

**US/ALLIED MANEUVER FORCES
(BATTALION SIZE OR LARGER)**

SUMMARY


| | |
|--------------|------------|
| I CORPS | 23 |
| II CORPS | 40 |
| III CORPS | 39 |
| IV CORPS | 0 |
| TOTAL | 105 |



As of 30 JANUARY 1967

US/ALLIED MANEUVER FORCES (BATTALION SIZE OR LARGER)


| SUMMARY | |
|--------------|------------|
| I CORPS | 32 |
| II CORPS | 37 |
| III CORPS | 34 |
| IV CORPS | 2 |
| TOTAL | 105 |



As of: 5 JUNE 1967

**US/ALLIED MANEUVER FORCES
(BATTALION SIZE OR LARGER)**


| SUMMARY | | |
|---------|-------|-----|
| I | CORPS | 33 |
| II | CORPS | 38 |
| III | CORPS | 35 |
| IV | CORPS | 2 |
| TOTAL | | 108 |



As of: 26 SEPTEMBER 1967

**US/ALLIED MANEUVER FORCES
(BATTALION SIZE OR LARGER)**

| SUMMARY | |
|--------------|------------|
| I CORPS | 39 |
| II CORPS | 41 |
| III CORPS | 41 |
| IV CORPS | 3 |
| TOTAL | 124 |



As of: 31 DECEMBER 1967

~~SECRET~~

OSD Program 4 - Development, Strength Accountability and Procedures

~~(S)~~ Late in December 1966 there were uncertainties as to: (1) the precise force structure included within Program 4; (2) the procedures and instruction in recommending force additions to Program 4 for RVN, Thailand and other off-shore PACOM areas; and, (3) procedures to be followed in handling recommended additional TDY personnel to RVN and off-shore PACOM areas.

~~(S)~~ On 19 December 1966 COMUSMACV outlined for CINCPAC the inconsistencies among the various references pertaining to the force levels authorized in Program 4. To solve this problem and the associated tight control on spaces exercised at OSD level, COMUSMACV recommended that procedures be established for MACV to control, with CINCPAC and JCS approval, the spaces authorized within established ceilings. ¹ CINCPAC Component Commanders did not concur in COMUSMACV's proposal, nor did Admiral Sharp. His guidance to the CINCPAC Staff was, "J5: CINCPAC will control as at present." ²

~~(S)~~ It was obvious to all concerned that an early resolution of differences in the requested program as opposed to the OSD program had to be made before Program 4 could be fully implemented. In this regard COMUSMACV ³ recommended that a conference be convened at CINCPAC's headquarters on or about 16 January 1967 to: (1) identify problem areas; (2) develop procedures for problem solutions; and (3) delineate responsibilities and clarify functions of the various headquarters in relation to the overall Program 4 package.

~~(S)~~ On 4 January 1967 CINCPAC announced that a conference would be held during the period 16-19 January 1967 and that the conference agenda would include a presentation by a JCS representative to clarify Program 4 strengths and guidelines under which force requirements would be processed in Washington. ⁴ The tentative agenda for the conference was published on 11 January and it included the following items: ⁵

-
1. COMUSMACV 53780/190735Z Dec 66.
 2. "SHARPGRAM" 1226, 27 Dec 66.
 3. COMUSMACV 00178/030148Z Jan 67.
 4. CINCPAC 040326Z Jan 67.
 5. CINCPAC 112306Z Jan 67.

~~SECRET~~

- a. Discussion of Program 4 and guidelines for changes, additions and deletions to the program by a JCS representative.
- b. Discussion of problem areas and recommendations by representatives of the Departments of the Army and Navy, and Headquarters of the Air Force and Marine Corps.
- c. Discussion of problem areas and recommendations by representatives of COMUSMACV and COMUSMACTHAI.
- d. Preparation of a CINCPAC draft instruction.

The conference was held as scheduled, 16-19 January, and the agenda was essentially as announced on 11 January 1967. On 2 February 1967, CINCPAC¹ requested comments from his Component Commanders and the various agencies represented at the conference on a draft message proposed for dispatch to the JCS. The message set forth the bookkeeping errors and minor adjustments for all Services that caused discrepancies between the actual 31 August 1966 strength figures and those shown in JCS and OSD documents. After receipt of the Component Commander's comments the draft message was finalized.²

~~(S)~~ On 19 February 1967 CINCPAC³ notified the JCS that a detailed review of PACOM forces in place as of 31 August 1966 had been conducted in connection with the Program 4 Strength Accounting Conference held 16-19 January 1967 at CINCPAC Headquarters. The review disclosed that bookkeeping errors and minor adjustments had caused discrepancies between actual 31 August 1966 strengths and the figures shown in JCSM-702-66. To correct the situation, CINCPAC recommended that OSD be requested to approve the revised 31 August 1966 figures as follows:

-
1. CINCPAC 020045Z Feb 67.
 2. CINCPAC 190017Z Feb 67.
 3. Ibid.

Revised 31 Aug 66 Strength Figures

| <u>(1) RVN</u> | <u>PREVIOUS STRENGTH</u> | <u>REVISED STRENGTH</u> |
|----------------|------------------------------|--|
| Army | 170,830 | 176,894 |
| Navy | 21,737 | 20,418 (Recommend retention of 1,319 spaces in end FY 68 Navy ceiling) |
| Air Force | 40,572 | 40,801 |
| Marine Corps | 55,364 | 55,364 |
| TOTAL | <u>288,503</u> | <u>293,477 (4,974 Increase)</u> |

(2) THAILAND

| | | |
|---|---------------|-----------------------------|
| Army, Navy and Marine Corps - no change | | |
| Air Force | 22,947 | 23,025 |
| TOTAL | <u>29,841</u> | <u>29,919 (78 Increase)</u> |

(3) OKINAWA

| | | |
|---|---------------|-------------------------|
| Army, Navy and Marine Corps - no change | | |
| Air Force | 16,089 | 16,011 |
| TOTAL | <u>38,764</u> | <u>38,686 (78 less)</u> |

(4) PHILIPPINES

| | | |
|---|---------------|--------------------------|
| Army, Navy and Marine Corps - no change | | |
| Air Force | 17,937 | 17,708 |
| TOTAL | <u>24,916</u> | <u>24,687 (229 less)</u> |

| | <u>FY 68 End Strengths</u> | | |
|-------------------------------|----------------------------|-----------------|----------------|
| <u>RVN</u> | <u>PHILIPPINES</u> | <u>THAILAND</u> | <u>OKINAWA</u> |
| Army (Add) 4,944* | N/C | N/C | N/C |
| Air Force (Add) 229 (Sub) 229 | | (Add) 78 | (Sub) 78 |
| Navy N/C | N/C | N/C | N/C |
| Marines N/C | N/C | N/C | N/C |

*Adjusted from 6,064, as 1,120 spaces included in Program 4 actually closed in August 1966.

(S) On 15 March 1967, the JCS submitted the adjusted 31 August 1966 in place and FY 68 end strengths to SECDEF for approval. The figures submitted were the same as furnished by CINCPAC except that the JCS recommended a reduction of 1,321 Navy spaces in RVN. CINCPAC had recommended that 1,319 Navy spaces be retained in the FY 68 Navy RVN ceiling. On 31 March 1967 SECDEF approved¹ the adjusted strengths as recommended by the JCS:

| | <u>RVN</u> | <u>PHILIPPINES</u> |
|--------------|------------|--------------------|
| Army | + 4944 | N/C |
| Navy | - 1321 | N/C |
| Air Force | + 229 | - 229 |
| Marine Corps | N/C | N/C |
| N Adjustment | + 3852 | - 229 |

As a result of the SECDEF's approval the planned end of June 1968 strengths for RVN under Program 4 were:

| | |
|--------|---------|
| USA | 316,217 |
| USMC | 71,000 |
| USAF | 55,975 |
| USN/CG | 28,431 |
| | 471,623 |

(S) Even though the planned end of June 1967 strength had been adjusted and the in-country RVN strength as of 31 August 1966 established, accounting procedures still needed to be improved. To this end CINCPAC on 25 March 1967² proposed to the JCS the establishment of a Debit Account for RVN Program 4 strength as an urgent requirement.

(S) The proposal was designed to improve procedures for making minor changes in strength of units approved for deployment and units in-country. The proposal would also integrate long-lead-time units into the RVN Program 4 strength ceilings. The guidelines for Program 4 in effect at the time of the message, had the effect of establishing a strength ceiling for RVN which required the nomination of a corresponding number of approved spaces as trade-offs for any strength increase,

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1. SECDEF Memo (unnumbered) to CJCS, 31 Mar 67.
 2. CINCPAC 250022Z Mar 67.

however small.

~~(C)~~ Restructuring actions had to be taken to accomplish the trade-offs. The administrative process by which the proposed trade-off spaces were derived and presented to OSD for approval was time consuming and costly from a man-hour standpoint. Particular difficulty was experienced in indentifying trade-off spaces for new long-lead-time units. At the time units were requested it was not known for certain what spaces could be best offered as trade-offs. As a result, the spaces offered for trade-off at the time a new unit was requested would probably be different than those that might more logically be offered at the time the unit closed in-country.

~~(C)~~ To provide better flexibility in trade-off-actions, CINCPAC proposed that COMUSMACV be authorized to plan and program against the end-FY 68 approved strength without concurrent trade-off action, keeping in mind that the end FY 68 ceilings must be achieved. Changes (increases) to the Program 4 forces would continue to be requested in the normal manner.

~~(C)~~ CINCPAC would administratively control the proposed actions by use of deployment adjustment requests (DAR). DARs would carry an impact statement of the proposed action on the Military Service account. JCS deployment messages would carry the number of spaces generated and the total spaces for which trade-offs had to be furnished. Trade-off spaces could be furnished at any time to maintain a reasonable debit account. By withholding deployment orders of units programmed to deploy during the last few months of FY 68, the SECDEF could insure that the end-FY 68 ceiling would not be exceeded.

~~(C)~~ On 2^o April 1967, the JCS¹ informed CINCPAC that OSD had approved CINCPAC's request except that actions resulting in strength increases would be offset by trade-offs of an equal number of spaces at the end of each calendar quarter. OSD indicated to the JCS that consideration would be given to extending the above procedure to small new requirements (50 men or less) or provide a small revolving account up to 500 spaces. This consideration would be dependent upon results obtained from monitoring the manning adjustment account.

(U) On 16 May 1967 as a follow-on to its 29 April 1967 messages, the JCS notified CINCPAC that the approved CINCPAC Debit/Credit Accounting for Program 4 strengths would be maintained in the Operations Directorate of the Joint Staff. Procedures established by the JCS to monitor the

1. JCS 4031/291549Z Apr 67.

program were as follows:

- "a. Each change in strength will be processed on either a deployment adjustment request (DAR) or deployment adjustment notification (DAN) form.
- "b. Each DAR/DAN processed will reflect the current status of the debit/credit account for the service concerned and upon approval will be distributed to interested commands.
- "c. A monthly recap of debit/credit status will be provided to all concerned.
- "d. CINCPAC will be apprised of the debit/credit status for each service in sufficient time to permit nomination of trade-off spaces, if required, to balance the debit accounts by end each calendar quarter."

~~(S)~~ In light of the established Debit/Credit Program 4 accounting procedures, the need to develop implementing instructions and the need to reconcile strength figures, a second CINCPAC strength accounting conference was held 22-25 May 1967 at CINCPAC headquarters. Representatives from JCS, ASD/SA, Military Services, COMUSMACV, COMUSMACTHAI, CG USARV, COMNAVFOR, COMMANDER 7th AF, CG USARSUPHAI and the PACOM Component Commanders participated.

~~(S)~~ The two important results of the conference were:

a. The development of accounting procedures that would provide timely information to all concerned.

b. An agreement by the participating representatives as to the military services strength figures.

The following is a summary of the strength figures arrived at during the conference:

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

RVN ↓

| | <u>Army</u> | <u>Navy*</u> | <u>Air Force</u> | <u>Marine Corps</u> |
|------------------------------|-------------|--------------|------------------|---------------------|
| As of 31 Mar 67 (In-Country) | 316217 | | | |
| PRACTICE NINE (Add-Ons) | 6231 | | | |
| 31 Aug 66 Adjusted | | 20416 | 40801 | 55364 |
| TDY | | 600 | 2700 | |
| Total Annexes | | 9023 | 13292 | 15686 |
| Increase in Program 4 | | | | 3500 |
| Major Adjustments | | | -608 | |
| End FY 68 Auth. Str. | 322448 | 30039 | 56185 | 74550 |

THAILAND

| | | | | |
|----------------------|-------|-----|-------|---|
| 31 Aug 66 Adjusted | 6566 | 287 | 22947 | |
| Total Annexes | 4705 | 157 | 9783 | |
| Transfer to RVN | | | -164 | |
| End FY 68 Auth. Str. | 11271 | 444 | 32566 | 0 |

OKINAWA

| | | | | |
|----------------------|-------|---|-------|-------|
| 31 Aug 66 Adjusted | 13200 | | 16089 | 10168 |
| Total Annexes | 1884 | | | 3192 |
| DAR | -87 | | -200 | |
| B-52 Support | | | | |
| End FY 68 Auth. Str. | 14997 | 0 | 15889 | 13360 |

↓ Ltr, Hq CINCPAC, 2 Jun 67, Serial 001016, Subject: Program 4 Strength Accounting. This Letter has a more detailed breakdown of the reconciled strength figures derived at the May conference.

The reconciled figures in the cited letter were considered to be correct as of 2 Jun 67 and constituted a basis for recommendations by the JCS to OSD for changes to Program 4 and for subsequent deployment programming actions.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

JAPAN

| | <u>Army</u> | <u>Navy*</u> | <u>Air Force</u> | <u>Marine Corps</u> |
|----------------------|-------------|--------------|------------------|---------------------|
| 31 Aug 66 Adjusted | 6141 | | | 2857 |
| Total Annexes | 134 | | | 445 |
| Rotations/Deployment | | | | -715 |
| | <hr/> | <hr/> | <hr/> | <hr/> |
| END FY 68 Auth. Str. | 6275 | 0 | 0 | 2587 |

PHILIPPINES

| | | | | |
|----------------------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| 31 Aug 66 Adjusted | | 6825 | 19447 | |
| Total Annexes | | 230 | | |
| AF Program Actions | | | 371 | |
| | <hr/> | <hr/> | <hr/> | <hr/> |
| END FY 68 Auth. Str. | 0 | 7055 | 19818 | 0 |

* Only the following figures were available for Pacific Ocean Area (POA) and Guam:

End FY 68 authorized strength:

POA - 4600

Guam - 486

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CINCPAC REVISED PROGRAM & STRENGTH RECAPITULATION:

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

| Service: | RVN | Thailand | Okinawa | Japan | Philippines | Guam | Pacific Ocean Area | Total |
|--------------|---------|----------|---------|-------|-------------|------|--------------------------|---------|
| Army | 322,448 | 11,271 | 14,997 | 6,275 | | | | 354,991 |
| Navy | 30,039 | 444 | | | 7,055 | 486 | 4,600 | 42,624 |
| Air Force | 56,185 | 32,566 | 15,889 | | 19,818 | | | 124,458 |
| Marine Corps | 74,550 | | 13,360 | 2,587 | | | | 90,497 |
| <hr/> | | | | | | | | |
| TOTAL: | 483,222 | 44,281 | 44,246 | 8,862 | 26,873 | 486 | 4,600 | 612,570 |

(S) The accounting procedures developed at the 22-25 May conference were used as a basis for CINCPAC to recommend to JCS amplification of the Debit/Credit program procedures already established:¹

a. The submitting agency would provide, at the time of submission to the JCS, copies of DARs or DANs by airmail to CINCPAC, PACOM Component Commanders, COMUSMACV, MACV Component Commanders, COMUSMACTHAI, CGFMFPAC, and CGUSARSUPTHAI.

b. The JCS would inform all concerned by message when DARs were approved by OSD.

c. The JCS would provide by message a monthly status of Program 4 strength accounts to the military services and those agencies listed in a. above.

(S) On 16 June 1967 CINCPAC² changed the procedures for Program 4 strength accounting and guideline instructions for future force developments relating to the conflict in Southeast Asia. The purpose of the change was to establish a more positive CINCPAC control over all new units to enter or to be activated in Thailand and to provide for appropriate coordination with the American Embassy in Bangkok.

~~(S)~~ Prior to this new instruction the military services were authorized to inactivate or activate units in Thailand as long as strength ceilings were not violated. COMUSMACTHAI and CINCPAC had monitored these actions and there had been no requirement to inform the US Ambassador to Thailand of the actions. The change involved the activation of new units (inactivation remained unchanged). Activation of units would be accomplished through military service channels only after approval by CINCPAC or higher DOD authority and coordination with the American Embassy in Bangkok. New units, provisional units included, which would not cause an overall increase to US strength in Thailand had to be approved by CINCPAC prior to activation. New units which resulted in an overall increase to US strength in Thailand had to be approved by CINCPAC, the JCS and OSD prior to activation. Additionally, CINCPAC requested that he, COMUSMACTHAI and the American Embassy be notified of all changes in unit designation or names.

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1. CINCPAC 292011Z May 67.
 2. CINCPAC 170408Z Jun 67.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(S) On 27 June 1967¹ CINCPAC reemphasized the need to adhere to guideline instructions for force development for RVN which had been promulgated in CINCPAC messages 252050Z Feb 67 and 170408Z June 67. At the same time CINCPAC provided additional guidance for force development in RVN, specifically with respect to nominations of trade-off spaces. As pointed out earlier, when additional forces for RVN were requested, the SECDEF required a concurrent nomination trade-off of a like number of spaces at the same time. CINCPAC advised the Component Commanders and COMUSMACV that consideration should be given to: (1) nominating lower-priority units for trade-off and at the same time state the impact on operations should the nominated unit be deleted; and (2) designating a unit for trade-off whose mission was expected to terminate in the future (end CY 67 or CY 68) and should subsequent operational situations dictate in-country retention of the unit beyond the designated trade-off date, then another trade-off unit should be proposed. CINCPAC further advised that if trade-offs were not possible because of the large number of spaces such as 834 spaces for Long Range Patrols, a particularly strong justification and impact statement would be extremely important.

1. CINCPAC 270100Z Jun 67.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Combat Service Support Staffing In SVN

(S) In a memorandum¹ to the CJCS, the SECDEF on 23 May 1967, informed General Wheeler that he thought the ratio of combat to support personnel might be too low. The SECDEF pointed out that while the US Army maneuver battalions, combat support battalions, organic and non-organic aviation units, division and brigade staffs and similar units accounted for 165,000 or 50% of the Army's 322,000 force, a very high percentage of the remaining 157,000 troops probably should be categorized as combat service support. Mr. McNamara felt that a review of combat service support would be appropriate in order to validate factors used in deployment planning and that the recent JCS recommendation for an increase in force levels for SVN made an immediate review of Army combat service support essential. He directed that the following actions be taken:

a. A unit-by-unit, function-by-function review of the 1st Logistical Command staffing versus Program 4 tasks to determine whether all units in-country or programmed were required in view of the sharply improved logistic posture and support provided from other sources. (The approved Program 4 end strength for the 1st Logistical Command was 70,000 which exceeded by 4,000 the 66,000 spaces in the approved Army maneuver battalions. Until the review was completed and acted on by him, the SECDEF planned to defer approval for deployment of 1st Logistical Command units not then covered by JCS deployment messages--units with closure dates after August 1967.) The suspense date for this review was 1 July 1967.

b. Follow-on studies of the staffing of Navy and Marine Corps logistic organizations in I Corps Tactical Zone; Air Force logistic support; and all major headquarters staffs, including MACV, USARV, 7th Air Force, NAVFORV, I FFV, II FFV and III MAF were required to be prepared and submitted at two week intervals.

(C) DJSN-676-67 established the schedule for the studies and also required that CINCPAC analyze and evaluate the staffing of Headquarters MACV. This was to be accomplished within 90 days after MACV moved into its new headquarters building.

(S) On 13 June 1967, the SECDEF² directed the CJCS to include in the studies an analysis of each essential combat service support function

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1. Memorandum from SECDEF for CJCS, 23 May 67.
 2. Memo for CJCS from SECDEF, 13 Jun 67, Subj: "Increased Use of SVN Civilians for US Troop Support (C)."

~~SECRET~~

to determine to what extent it could be performed by SVN civilian personnel. To the CINCPAC staff the implication of the studies was an increased use of SVN civilians which could produce trade-offs that might provide additional combat spaces and assist the RD program by involving additional civilians in the war effort. This would make them more self-sufficient and put them under more positive control and supervision of the RVN government.

(S) On 27 May 1967, CINCPAC requested COMUSMACV to furnish an appraisal of the impact of delaying deployment of the 1st Logistical Command units for 60-90 days.¹ This requirement was later overtaken by events when on 11 July the JCS provided the SECDEF with the FY 68 Force Requirements for Vietnam.

(S) On 7 August 1967, the JCS requested that the SECDEF authorize the deployment of ten Army units scheduled for assignment to the 1st Logistical Command.² The SECDEF approved deployment of two units and continued to defer deployment of the other eight (A COSTAR Maintenance Support Battalion and seven truck companies). Mr. McNamara stated:

"I am continuing to defer deployment of the other 8 units. The COSTAR Maintenance Support Battalion (FRN 26H698) should be included in the Army's reexamination of in-country maintenance requirements and capabilities referred to in the Combat Service Support Study.

"The seven truck companies are deferred pending a reevaluation by USARV of the actual capability of the units already in-country and a study of alternative ways to improve their productivity. The Army's combat service support study indicates that the requirement for truck units has been computed on the basis of 50 percent of the capability normally expected of such units. Any reclama should consider the added workload resulting from Program 4 forces yet to close and Program 5 force level increases together with the increased capability due to improved roads, increased deliveries, materials handling equipment, and improved security."

It appeared that SECDEF still questioned the ratio of combat to support personnel.

(S) The JCS requested CINCPAC to furnish them additional justification for reclama action by 16 September 1967. CINCPAC in turn informed the JCS on 16 September that COMUSMACV had the requirement under study

- 1. CINCPAC 272257Z May 67.
2. JCS 4958/282232Z Aug 67.

~~SECRET~~

the JCS could expect a reply by 30 September 1967.¹ On 30 September, CINCPAC furnished the JCS with an interim reply. COMUSMACV had not completed the study and CINCPAC's position on the study could not be established by the new suspense date of 30 September.²

(S) CINCPAC provided the JCS additional justification on 15 October and recommended that three medium truck companies be deployed in October 1967, three more in November 1967, and the Maintenance Support Company be deployed in October 1967. Trade-offs were obtained by inactivating 26 units identified as not required by the COMUSMACV Combat Service Support Staffing Study.³

RVNAF Force Levels

(S) In May 1966 the SECDEF temporarily froze the RVNAF authorized strength at the end FY 66 force level of 633,645 spaces. This included 315,660 regular and 317,985 paramilitary forces. Later CINCPAC was authorized to adjust between forces within the overall approved force level as required during the temporary freeze. In recognition of inflationary trends and limited manpower resources COMUSMACV established the RVNAF FY 67 force level at 622,153 spaces. This was approved by the Mission Council.⁴

(S) COMUSMACV on 26 April 1967 requested approval of a FY 68 RVNAF force level of 678,728, which increased the end FY 66 force level by 52,094 spaces and the FY 67 (MACV approved) force level by 63,586.⁵ CINCPAC concurred in this request and on 3 June 1967 recommended to the JCS that it be approved.⁶ On 24 June 1967 CINCPAC received a joint MACV-US EMBASSY message⁷ which urged the immediate approval of the RF/PF forces listed in the proposed FY 68 RVNAF force level. It was reasoned that programs dependent upon the additional RF/PF spaces should start as soon as possible since significant lead-

1. CINCPAC 162115Z Sep 67.

2. CINCPAC 300231Z Sep 67.

3. CINCPAC 150053Z Oct 67; DA 827260/092235Z Jul 67; CINCPAC 290253Z Aug 67.

4. JCSM-530-67, 28 Sep 67, Subj: "Increase in FY 1968 RVNAF Force Level (U)."

5. COMUSMACV 13808/261145Z Apr 67.

6. CINCPAC 030131Z Jun 67.

7. MACV 20703/240432Z Jun 67.

~~SECRET~~

time was required to recruit and train RF/PF forces before they could be deployed. As a corollary action, MACV was urgently studying the number of additional advisors required. The number required plus justification would be forwarded through service channels immediately upon completion of the study.

(S) On the same date (24 June), the JCS¹ requested that CINCPAC provide additional information so they could complete their study of the FY 68 RVNAF force level. The JCS specifically required the following additional information:

- a. Inflationary impact to include estimated piaster cost for FY 68.
- b. Estimated dollar costs to US services, both one-time and recurring.
- c. Additional US advisory spaces generated by the proposed increase.

(S) In answer to the JCS request for estimated piaster cost for FY 68, MACV, on 7 July 1967, furnished a figure of 2339.4 million piasters.² Information regarding the estimated dollar costs and additional advisory spaces was not furnished at that time. However, on 26 July 1967, COMUSMACV³ in a reevaluation of RVNAF force requirements recommended that his original request for a FY 68 force level of 678,728 spaces be increased to 685,739 spaces, a net increase of 7011 spaces, at the same time COMUSMACV requested that a modified FY 69 force level of 763,953 spaces be approved for programming purposes. CINCPAC forwarded his concurrence with the MACV request to the JCS on 29 July 1967 and added that his approval was contingent upon GVN implementation of the necessary manpower mobilization measures to support the proposed force level.⁴

(S) The added piaster cost (4.7 billion), the one time added US dollar cost (\$410,227,632) and the recurring cost (\$47,472,144) for the revised FY 68 RVNAF force level was furnished to the JCS.⁵ All costs were

1. JCS 8787 (SACSA)/241659Z Jun 67.
2. COMUSMACV 22387/071055Z Jul 67.
3. COMUSMACV 24830/261220Z Jul 67.
4. CINCPAC 292045Z Jul 67.
5. JCSM-530-67, 28 Sep 67, Subj: "Increase in FY 1968 RVNAF Level (U)."

~~SECRET~~

to be borne by the US government. The additional advisors required to support the program were included in Program 5.

~~(S)~~ On 28 September 1967¹, the JCS made the following recommendations to SECDEF:

"a. Approval of FY 1968 RVNAF force level of 685,739 contingent upon execution of necessary manpower mobilization measures by the GVN.

"b. That funds be provided to support the recommended increase.

"c. That CINCPAC continue to be authorized to adjust between forces within the overall approval level."

The JCS made no recommendation concerning the CINCPAC/MACV request for a FY 1969 RVNAF increase to 763,953 for programming purposes. They decided to consider it separately after approval of the FY 68 increase.

~~(S)~~ A recapitulation of the then current and proposed force level is shown below:

Regular

| <u>Service</u> | <u>End FY 66 Force Levels</u> | <u>MACV Approved FY 67 RVNAF Force Levels</u> | <u>Proposed Change</u> | <u>FY 68 Total</u> |
|----------------|-----------------------------------|---|----------------------------|------------------------|
| Army | 277,363 | 383,207 | +14,966 | 298,173 |
| Navy | 15,833 | 16,076 | - 112 | 15,964 |
| Air Force | 15,292 | 15,687 | + 761 | 16,448 |
| Marines | <u>7,172</u> | <u>7,189</u> | <u>+ 132</u> | <u>7,321</u> |
| Total | 315,660 | 322,159 | +15,747 | 337,906 |

1. JCASM-530-67, 28 Sep 67, Subj: "Increase in FY 1968 RVNAF Level (U)."

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| <u>Service</u> | <u>End FY 66 Force Levels</u> | <u>MACV Approved FY 67 RVNAF Force Levels</u> | <u>Proposed Change</u> | <u>FY 68 Total</u> |
|-------------------------------|-----------------------------------|---|----------------------------|------------------------|
| <u>Paramilitary Force</u> | | | | |
| RF | 141,731 | 152,516 | +32,229 | 184,745 |
| PF | 176,254 | 147,478 | +15,610 | 163,088 |
| Total | <u>317,985</u> | <u>299,994</u> | <u>+47,839</u> | <u>347,833</u> |
| Grand Total | 633,645 | 622,153 | +63,586 | 685,739 |

~~(S)~~ On 11 October the JCS advised CINCPAC that the SECDEF had approved the FY 68 RVNAF force level of 685,739 and included authority for COMUSMACV to adjust within that level. The FY 69 force level would be considered at a later date.¹ On 24 October General Thieu signed a decree implementing partial mobilization which provided the manpower necessary for the increase.²

~~(S)~~ In their message on 11 October the JCS requested the Secretary of Defense be furnished the following information prior to his considering the FY 69 RVNAF force level:³

- (1) Equipment costs and impact on equipping U. S. Forces.
- (2) Shortage of qualified officers.
- (3) Understrength ARVN units.
- (4) Manpower studies.
- (5) Impact of additional piaster expenditures.

~~(S)~~ The JCS and the SECDEF were informed that the one-time cost would be \$29,375,894 and that recurring cost would be \$119,819,728.

-
1. JCS 8670/112108Z Oct 67.
 2. EMBSAIGON 967/261300Z Oct 67.
 3. JCS 8670/112108Z Oct 67.

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There would be no impact on US forces in VN if the equipping of the RVNAF were done outside of COMUSMACV resources. The shortage of qualified officers would be alleviated by the retention of some 2000 officers and 6500 NCOs who would be eligible for discharge in 1968.¹

~~(S)~~ In regards to understrength ARVN units, it was determined that generally the total assigned strengths of the RVNAF was sufficient to bring units up to assigned strength; however, the pipeline personnel (training, hospital) were creating the shortages. An increase in the size of the pipeline in FY 68 would solve that problem. It was conceded that increased piaster spending might adversely affect the SVN economy but the military necessity for the forces was an overriding factor.

Free World Military Assistance Forces (FWMAF)

(U) The purpose of this part of the history is to record and bring up-to-date the contributions, both military and non-military made by Free World nations to South Vietnam. It is particularly appropriate that this contribution be recorded as part of the PACOM Force Requirement in Southeast Asia because of the interrelationship and impact made by FWMAF on the forces furnished by the U. S. and SVN.

~~(S)~~ In both the month of April and December 1964, President Johnson urged the nations of the Free World to contribute toward SVN's struggle with the VC insurgency. Although SVN made formal requests to specific nations for assistance, much of the planning behind these requests was conducted by the U.S.² A special staff agency was established at MACV to organize and to coordinate the FWMA effort. The CINCPAC Policies and Procedures Manual provided guidance for establishing, coordinating, and utilizing FWMAF (other than US) in RVN. Representatives of all Free World nations active in SVN were provided office space and flags of all member nations flew in front of the building housing the offices.

(U) Since 30 June 1964, 39 countries, including the US, have contributed non-military assistance to SVN. The US AID in SVN estimated that a total of \$50,000,000 aid-in-kind had been contributed from April 1964 to about 1 January 1967.³ (The figure of \$55,000,000 should not be

1. COMUSMACV 120655Z Nov 67,

2. Point Paper, J5312, CINCPAC, 1 Mar 67, Subj: "Free World Military Assistance Headquarters Visit."

3. Point Paper, J555, CINCPAC, 27 Mar 67: No subject.

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used as a firm figure since it is at best an estimate. For example, the AID estimate did not include the \$21,500 contribution for relief and medical supplies made by Uruguay.) The July 1967 edition of the Southeast Asia Fact Book¹ summarized the Free World Assistance to Vietnam through 31 July 1967. The data in the Southeast Asia Fact Book is based on MACV reports and is at variance with the AID estimate. On the other hand some of the information is additional data. The table below shows the AID recapitulation and immediately following the table is additional information from Southeast Asia Fact Book. No attempt has been made to reconcile the two sources due to press of time. However, the discrepancies between the two are noted.

Argentina (\$290,000) - 5,000 tons of wheat flour.

* Australia (\$9,746,500) - Economic aid ranging from medical teams to school books.

Belgium (\$57,000) - Medicines and an ambulance and scholarships for nine Vietnamese to study in Belgium.

Brazil (\$73,000) - Medical supplies and coffee.

* Canada (\$4,180,000) - Economic aid ranging from medical assistance to food and construction of a science auditorium at Hue University.

Costa Rica (\$7,000) - Ambulance

Denmark (\$26,000) - Medical assistance.

Ecuador (\$2,160) - Medical supplies.

* France (\$8,236,000) - Professional and training personnel, and low interest credits for economic development.

* Germany (\$16,364,128) - Non-military instruction, medical aid, refugee help, credits for industrial development.

1. Southeast Asia Fact Book, July 67, DIAISUP-182-67 (Published by DIA-JCS) CINCPAC CNTL 003755-67.

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- Great Britain (\$2,326,048) - Economic aid ranging from road building equipment to education and medical help.
- *Greece (\$5,000) - Medical supplies.
- Guatemala (\$7,500) - Medical supplies.
- Honduras (\$3,000) - Drugs and dry goods for refugees.
- India (\$8,850) - Cloth, training.
- Ireland (\$2,800) - Flood relief.
- Iran (\$240,000) - Petroleum products and a medical team.
- Israel (\$500) - Pharmaceutical supplies for flood victims.
- Italy (\$450,000) - A surgical team and science scholarships.
- *Japan (\$2,860,000) - Economic aid ranging from medical supplies to transistor radios and aid in building a dam to produce power.
- Korea - Medical aid.
- Laos (\$6,167) - Flood relief.
- Liberia (\$50,000) - Medical assistance.
- Luxembourg (\$20,000) - Plasma and blood transfusion equipment.
- Malaysia (\$188,000) - Training of Vietnamese military and police officials in counterinsurgency and supply of transportation equipment.
- New Zealand (\$1,534,000) - Economic assistance in medicine and education.
- The Netherlands (\$1,716,740) - Medical and social welfare assistance.
- Norway (\$3,650) - Flood relief.

Pakistan (\$5,000) - Flood relief.

Philippines (\$5,000) - Clothing, food, medical supplies.

Spain (\$2,000) - Medical assistance.

Switzerland (\$90,000) - Medical help and microscopes for the University of Saigon.

ROC (\$776,025) - Economic aid in agriculture, ~~medicine~~, education and electrical development.

Thailand (\$20,000) - Economic aid ranging from rice to roofing and materials and medical supplies.

Turkey (\$2,000) - Medicines.

Venezuela (\$100,000) - Rice for refugee relief and medical assistance.

* Southeast Asia Fact Book

Australia - On 1 February 1967 the Australian Government approved an increase in its non-military aid to \$2,000,000 during FY 67.

Canada - Approximately \$6,000,000 as opposed to \$4,180,000 listed above.

France - Since 1956 France has contributed about \$115 million. At the present time France contributes about \$4 million in aid annually.

Germany - On 29 June 1967 the Cabinet voted \$6.25 million for new aid to SVN.

Greece - Approximately \$15,000 in medical supplies as opposed to \$5,000 listed above.

Japan - \$55 million in economic assistance primarily through reparation. (Apparently USAID did not include reparation as aid.)

Uruguay - \$21,500 for relief and medical supplies (not included above).

Tunisia - Made available a number of scholarships.

(S) In May 1966, CINCPAC submitted to the JCS a list of types of FWMAF units which could be used to fill shortfalls in rounding-out CY 66 and CY 67 force requirements.¹ After the SECDEF approved the Program 4 forces, there were shortfalls in the CINCPAC and the JCS recommended force list. The JCS, therefore, requested that CINCPAC update the list of FWMAF that could be used to fill shortfalls.² On 19 January 1967, CINCPAC furnished the up-dated list which could be used in soliciting FWMAF contribution to SVN in CY 67. A partial listing of types of units are indicated below:

a. Army Forces

(1) Combat:

Combat units - maneuver battalions (maximum number available) and airbase defense companies.

(2) Combat support:

AAA Bns (AW); aviation units (helicopter companies); field artillery battalions; military intelligence units; signal cable construction units.

(3) Combat service support:

Engineer units (construction, light equipment, dump truck, firefighting, utility and civic action); medical units (civic action, helicopter ambulance); QM units (petroleum and ammunition); TC units (truck, medium boat, barge teams and tug crews).

b. Navy Forces

(1) Surface patrol craft for MARKET TIME operations.

(2) Destroyer-type ships.

(3) Patrol aircraft.

(4) Survey ships.

1. CINCPAC 012337Z May 66.

2. JCS 282321Z Dec 66.

- (5) Hospital ships.
- (6) Logistics craft to support Delta bases.
- (7) Helicopter gun ships.
- (8) Patrol boats for harbor defense.
- (9) Minesweeping craft for rivers.

c. Air Force:

Transport squadrons and tactical fighter squadrons. However, the need for compatibility of air base facilities required a case by case consideration.

FWMAF in SVN as of 1 January 1967 were as follows:

Free World Military Assistance Recap

| <u>Country</u> | <u>Strength</u> |
|-----------------------------------|-----------------|
| <u>Korea</u> | 45,605 |
| 2 Inf Divisions | |
| Marine Brigade | |
| Construction Support Group | |
| Logistical Command | |
| Naval Transport Group | |
| <u>Australia</u> | 4,533 |
| HQ AAFV | |
| 2 Battalion Task Force | |
| Special Air Service Sqdn | |
| Combat Support & Logistical Units | |
| Advisors | |
| <u>New Zealand</u> | 155 |
| Arty Btry | |
| CMD/LOG Elements | |
| <u>Philippines</u> | 2,063 |
| Civic Action/PSYWAR/Med Teams | |

| <u>Country</u> | <u>Strength</u> |
|------------------|-----------------|
| <u>Thailand</u> | 224 |
| AF Det | |
| <u>China</u> | 30 |
| Advisory Group | |
| PSY-OPS Advisors | |
| <u>Spain</u> | 12 |
| Medical Team | |
| TOTAL | 52,622 |

(S) During the month of July 1967, Mr. Clark Clifford, Chairman, Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board and General Maxwell Taylor conducted a round of visits to Manila Pact countries to discuss additional FWMAF. Prior to these visits, the countries had been notified of the US desire for additional FWMAF. The forces desired during FY 68 consisted of the following:¹

- a. Korea - an infantry division (14,216) a logistical slice (22,000), a long range patrol company (118), total 36,334.
- b. Australia - two battalion combat teams (2,166), a logistical slice (600), and a special air service (111), total 2,877.
- c. New Zealand - one battalion combat team (1,025) a logistical slice (300), and a special air service (111), total 1,436.
- d. Thailand - one brigade force (5,027) and a logistical slice (4,452), total 9,479.
- e. Philippines - a civic action group, total 2,048.

(S) Turkish Troop Contribution to SVN

In April 1967, the President of Turkey was scheduled to visit President Johnson. In anticipation that the Turkish President might offer assistance to SVN by providing military forces, the JCS requested CINCPAC to provide them with comments on the possible use of Turkish forces in SVN.² On 22 March 1967 after receiving comments and

1. Monthly History Submission, J5523, CINCPAC for Aug 67, dated Sep 67.
2. Monthly Historical Submission, J5, CINCPAC, 12 Apr 67, item: Turkish Troop Contribution to SVN (U) (J5543); JCS 8625/131959 Mar 67.

recommendations from COMUSMACV and CINCPACFLT, CINCPAC provided the JCS his views which were in addition to those of COMUSMACV and CINCPACFLT. In essence, the JCS was informed that a self contained, completely equipped and properly augmented unit employed away from large population centers of SVN would be desirable. Additionally, Turkish naval units with U.S. built ships to support Seventh Fleet operations would also be desirable.¹

~~(S)~~ A detailed discussion of FWMA forces by country will be found in Annex A (COMUSMACV Command History 1967), ~~CINCPAC~~ Command History 1967. It includes the augmentation of Republic of Korea forces and the arrival of the Royal Thailand Army Volunteer Regiment (RTVAR) in SVN.

~~(S)~~ The following is a recapitulation of the FWMAF strength for CY 1967:²

| | <u>Australia</u> | <u>China</u> | <u>Korea</u> | <u>NZ</u> |
|-----|------------------|--------------|--------------|-----------|
| Jan | 4646 | 30 | 45,953 | 149 |
| Feb | 4685 | 28 | 46,095 | 159 |
| Mar | 5064 | 31 | 46,014 | 165 |
| Apr | 5346 | 31 | 45,671 | 191 |
| May | 5535 | 31 | 45,425 | 380 |
| Jun | 5895 | 31 | 45,617 | 374 |
| Jul | 5336 | 31 | 47,695 | 369 |
| Aug | 5836 | 31 | 47,950 | 354 |
| Sep | 5950 | 28 | 47,989 | 372 |
| Oct | 5989 | 28 | 48,050 | 382 |
| Nov | 6006 | 26 | 47,633 | 356 |
| Dec | 6715 | 31 | 47,802 | 522 |

1. CINCPAC 222325Z Mar 67; COMUSMACV 9202/190431Z Mar 67; CINCPACFLT 192144Z Mar 67.

2. Data was taken from the 1967 "MACV Monthly Evaluation Reports," prepared by J3, MACV.

| | <u>Philippines</u> | <u>Spain</u> | <u>Thailand</u> |
|-----|--------------------|--------------|-----------------|
| Jan | 2065 | 12 | 224 |
| Feb | 2065 | 12 | 229 |
| Mar | 2067 | 12 | 229 |
| Apr | 2089 | 12 | 230 |
| May | 2069 | 12 | 230 |
| Jun | 2067 | 12 | 230 |
| Jul | 2057 | 12 | 195 |
| Aug | 2061 | 12 | 688 |
| Sep | 2053 | 12 | 2383 |
| Oct | 2061 | 13 | 2397 |
| Nov | 2022 | 13 | 2413 |
| Dec | 2020 | 13 | 2205 |

(C) On 27 October the Secretary of State requested CINCPAC's views regarding a Nicaraguan offer to send ten Guardia Nacional (National Guard) lieutenants to SVN to serve in a noncombatant role such as training Vietnamese troops.¹ The American Embassy in Saigon and COMUSMACV commented to the effect that the officers were not considered useful in any capacity and opposed the concept of military assistance in the form of individuals or small detachments not capable of performing military functions on their own.

(C) CINCPAC informed the JCS that he was inclined to agree with the position of the American Embassy and COMUSMACV. However, he felt that the offer should be accepted in this case. He reasoned that the U. S. had requested assistance and Nicaragua had responded. This response might lead to more meaningful contributions by other Central and South American allies regardless of the manner in which the Nicaraguan officers would be used. Such contributions would help to show free-world political solidarity with the SVN in its struggle against communist aggression.³

Increased Thai Forces to RVN

(S) On 7 October, in a meeting between the SECDEF and Thai officials, the SECDEF stated that the U. S. was prepared to assist the Thai Government with the following in return for an additional 10,000 troops:⁴

1. SECSTATE 61161/272308Z Oct 67.
2. AMEMB Saigon 9461/281140Z Oct 67.
3. CINCPAC 300130Z Oct 67.
4. SECSTATE 50591/071752Z Oct 67.

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- a. The cost of training and equipping the 10,000 troops.
- b. The cost of the overseas allowance for each of the 10,000 troops.
- c. Provide equipment for rotational troops during training.
- d. Provide equipment for a HAWK battery and training costs for Thai troops who would man the battery.
- e. Increase MAP for FY 68 and FY 69 from \$60 million to \$75 million.

~~(S)~~ On 27 October, US Ambassador to Thailand Unger informed Secretary of State Rusk of the Thai's views regarding the SECDEF proposal:¹

- a. Thailand agreed to deploy a 10,000 man unit when the unit was ready and agreed that the unit was an additional contribution even though they planned to withdraw in September 1968 the RTAVR that was already in SVN. Ambassador Unger and the SECSTATE agreed that this met the requirement.
- b. On the force composition, Thailand leaned heavy on support elements. Ambassador Unger felt that a satisfactory solution for a better ratio of combat versus support troops could be worked out. The SECSTATE thought at least half of the troops should be combat infantry types.
- c. Thailand was not specific in regards to rotational training. However, both Ambassador Unger and the SECSTATE thought this could be solved.
- d. Thailand indicated a need for new training areas but Ambassador Unger and SECDEF remained firm in their position that existing sites should be utilized or improved.
- e. The Thai's repeated their original request for a HAWK battalion to be manned by US troops until such time as Thai troops were trained. The Ambassador felt that he could negotiate a solution

1. AMEMB BANGKOK 5177/271701Z Oct 67; SECSTATE 62177/310148Z Oct 67; SECSTATE 650881/042204Z Nov 67.

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whereby one battery would be supplied immediately and another battery at the time the battalion was actually deployed. He recommended US manning of the battalion but the SECSTATE remained adamant in his position that the HAWK battalion should not be manned by US troops. Ambassador Unger made a reclama to this and the SECSTATE relented.

f. The Thai Government requested an \$85 million MAP level for FY 68 and 69 as opposed to the proposed \$75 million. However, the SECSTATE held firm on the \$75 million.

~~(S)~~ The Thai Government announced in early November that it would send an additional division of troops to SVN.¹ Preliminary planning indicated the first half of the division would be activated in February 1968 and deployed in August 1968. The second half would be activated in August 1968 and deployed in March 1969.²

Additional Republic of China (ROC) Support to SVN

~~(S)~~ SVN officials proposed that a 200 man ROC augmentation composed of equipment repair specialists be attached to RVNAF support units. US Chief of MAAG, China stated the ROC Army was capable of providing the support and believed the ROC would approve the proposal. CINCPAC concurred in the desirability of the proposal and recommended to the JCS that DOD and STATE "approval in principle" be sought.³

Impact of Piaster Ceiling on Force Requirements for SVN

(U) "A vigorous effort by CINCPAC and COMUSMACV to reduce piaster spending by the U. S. Department of Defense forces in South Vietnam has been highly succesful...in view of the success in reducing piaster expenditures, piaster expenditure limitation is not considered to have been a substantial factor in the decision, made in July 1967, on the additive forces for South Vietnam for FY 1968...in late 1966, limitation on piaster expenditures was a factor with regard to the decision to deploy additional U. S. troops to South Vietnam."⁴

(U) In 1966, following a decision made by President Johnson, Secretary of Defense McNamara established limitations on piaster

1. AMEMB Bangkok 59877141130Z Nov 67.

2. DA 840155/162000Z Nov 67.

3. CHMAAG Taipei 170841Z Nov 67; CINCPAC 022330Z Dec 67.

4. Hearings before the Preparedness Investigative Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate, 16 Aug 67.

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expenditures for the last two quarters of CY 66.¹ Some of the background leading to the decision was recorded by J72, CINCPAC on 27 June 1967 in a Point Paper on South Vietnam entitled, "Piaster Inflationary Impact." The Point Paper enumerated the following facts bearing on the problem:

"a. The conditions created by the war have hampered South Vietnam's ability to produce and distribute the limited number of commodities normal to its economy. The additional demands for goods and services to support the military effort are far greater than the economy can provide. This imbalance exerts inflationary pressures which undermine the social and economic structure of the country and jeopardize the underlying objectives of the entire U. S. effort to win the war in Vietnam.

"b. Until 1965, South Vietnam's cost-of-living index had been increasing at the rate of about 5% per year. It turned sharply upward in mid-1965, rising 30% during the last half of the year and 75% from June 1965 to June 1966. VC efforts to disrupt the economy and the massive increases in U. S. and GVN military spending were leading inflationary factors. Assistance from the International Monetary Fund led to a currency devaluation in June 1966 which succeeded in holding money supply and prices only relatively stable during the remainder of 1966. In July 1966 the Index increased roughly another 25% and continued to rise for the remainder of 1966, but at a more moderate rate. Nevertheless, there continues to be a serious inflationary threat for 1967.

"c. Our national objectives in South Vietnam require that activities in support of our military operations not result in economic inflation and general disruption of the local way of life to the extent that our combat successes are undermined through impaired government operations and popular discontent. The goal of the DOD is to hold the piaster expenditures to a realistic level while avoiding any reduction of military effectiveness through careful management by joint commanders and their components. Periodic limitations are established by SECDEF to control piaster expenditures."

(U) The following are specific steps taken in SVN to control piaster expenditures:

a. Reduced contractor effort and increased use of military units to support the military construction program.

1. See Piaster Expenditure Program, pages 444-448 in Vol II, CINCPAC Command History 1966.

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b. Instituted an austere construction program to assure that only essential projects were funded, thereby reducing contractor workload and employing military self-help to the maximum .

c. Restricted official in-country procurement to the purchase of nine commodities. Except for emergency situations, or for single procurement costing \$250 or less, all other commodities were procured out-of-country or through normal supply channels.

d. Moved military units and personnel from leased facilities and housing to military cantonments as rapidly as construction was completed.

e. Controlled interservice competition for local goods and services by coordinating procurement actions and stabilizing local prices for rentals, goods, beverages, laundry, entertainment, and the like.

f. Publicized the program to instill an awareness of, and to motivate DOD personnel to, the importance of limiting their personal spending of piasters. This was to be accomplished by indoctrination through Commander's Call, local publications, posters and individual handouts.

g. Diverted pay of individuals by encouraging participation in the Uniformed Services Savings Deposit Program, MPC 5% Checking Account Plan and U. S. Savings Bond purchases, expanding merchandise handled in exchanges, increasing out-of-country R&R, and improving on-post recreational facilities.

~~(S)~~ The following table summarizes expenditures in relation to ceilings in billions of piasters for the last half of CY 66:¹

1. Point Paper, J72, CINCPAC, 25 Jan 67, Subj: "DOD Piaster Spending Reduction Program, SVN"; CINCPAC 290035Z Jan 67.

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| | <u>3rd Qtr CY 66</u> | | | <u>Last Half CY 66</u> | | |
|---------------------------|----------------------|----------------|----------------|------------------------|----------------|----------------|
| | <u>Expend</u> | <u>Ceiling</u> | <u>Balance</u> | <u>Expend</u> | <u>Ceiling</u> | <u>Balance</u> |
| Operation and Maintenance | 3.758 | 3.7 | (.058) | 7.742 | 7.9 | .158 |
| Construction | 1.216 | 1.3 | .084 | 2.888 | 3.1 | .212 |
| Personal | <u>4.111</u> | <u>4.0</u> | (.111) | <u>6.990</u> | <u>7.0</u> | <u>.010</u> |
| Total DOD | 9.085 | 9.0 | (.085) | 17.620 | 18.0 | .380 |
| Joint Support | 2.914 | 3.6 | .686 | 5.714 | 6.4 | .686 |

(S) As indicated in the above table, overall expenditures for the last half of CY 66 were 380 million piasters less than the 18 billion piaster ceiling (9 billion piaster ceiling per quarter). Third quarter O&M and Personal expenditure ceilings were exceeded. This was caused by an approximate 21.9 percent increase in troop strength and pre-Christmas shopping. Savings in Construction areas during the six-month period was most significant. This appeared to be the beginning of a trend.

(S) The SECDEF established ceilings, excluding Joint Support, for the first and second quarters of CY 67 were 10.5 and 11.0 billion piasters, respectively.¹ It was expected that expenditures for the same periods would approximate the ceilings. The total expenditures for CY 67 were projected at 44.3 billion piasters and was estimated to be sufficient to support the Program 4 force requirements.² This was approximately 2 billion piasters more than the SECDEF target of 42.0 billion piasters. It appeared that the SECDEF target for CY 67 would not be sufficient to support the required forces.

(S) On 10 February 1967,³ J72 (Comptroller) CINCPAC reviewed piaster expenditures for the previous six months and found that some success had been achieved in the Construction and O&M areas. The average expenditure for the previous six months for construction was 6 million per month as opposed to the estimated 7.5 million. Based on

1. Point Paper, J72, CINCPAC, 25 Jan 67, Subj: "DOD Piaster Spending Reduction Program, SVN"; SECDEF 1969/212339Z Dec 66.
2. CINCPAC 240217Z Dec 66.
3. J72/Memo/0001-67, 10 Feb 67, Subj: "Annual Piaster Requirements (U)".

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the trends found in his review, the Comptroller projected new piaster expenditure rates for CY 66 and concluded that if the new estimates proved valid, the 42 billion piaster ceiling would support the 46 billion piaster force plan submitted in October 1966. This would then permit the introduction of additional troops or, if this course of action was not considered feasible, additive forces below the 46 billion piaster plan could be introduced without adverse effects on piaster ceilings. If the January and February 1967 expenditures validated the new projections, CINCPAC could consider a reclama to the JCS and to the SECDEF on the 46 billion piaster force plan. If CINCPAC decided to do this he had to be prepared to accept a possible reduction by OSD in the piaster ceiling. If OSD did reduce the piaster ceiling it could be concluded that force level availability and not economic objectives would govern the decision.

(S) On 21 February 1967, CINCPAC asked COMUSMACV to provide comments on areas where additional expenditures were required and where additional forces were needed to round out his in-country forces, even if it meant exceeding Program 4 ceilings.¹ COMUSMACV replied to the CINCPAC request on 26 February 1967. He stated that the trends on piaster savings noted by CINCPAC were essentially the same as those noted by MACV. Based on this and other factors, COMUSMACV reasoned that it would be appropriate to reclama in-country force levels even though he felt OSD would be inclined to reduce the piaster ceiling. He further stated that his staff was studying the situation and that his recommendations would be forwarded as soon as possible. Also on 26 February 1967, CINCPAC provided the JCS with further comments and recommendations on piaster saving proposals and proposals for adjusting Program 4 troop ceilings.² These comments answered JCSM 937-66.³ The CINCPAC memorandum set forth the JCS proposals followed by CINCPAC's answer to each proposal:

a. Proposal. "Piaster savings can be realized by employing military vice civilian construction personnel." CINCPAC commented that piaster expenditures for civilian employees were higher than those of military personnel. In addition, a forced phase-down of civilian contractor capability resulting from the limited 675 MILCON Program

1. Point Paper, J5542, CINCPAC, 15 Apr 67, Subj: "Force Requirements for RVN (U)."
2. CINCPAC 261930Z Feb 67.
3. JCSM-937-66, 2 Dec 66, Subj: "Deployments to Southeast Asia and Other PACOM Areas (U)."

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approved by SECDEF would automatically reduce piaster expenditures.

b. Proposal. "Forces deployed to RVN, which are embarked, quartered and supported in ships and waterborne craft, should not be charged against RVN piaster ceilings." This proposal was commented on in detail and is summarized as follows: "A total of 3,341 spaces are considered as embarked, quartered and supported in ships and waterborne craft. Because of the nature of this duty, the shipboard personnel do not exert an influence on piaster expenditures. The 1,660 spaces of two infantry battalions associated with MRF would fall into the same category. Therefore, these personnel should not be included in those strengths from which piaster expenditures projection data are derived."

c. Proposal. "Personnel in hospitals in RVN and on R&R out-of-country should not be included in strength ceilings associated with piaster expenditures." CINCPAC commented that: "Personnel out-of-country on R&R are not a part of the in-country present for duty strength. Patients hospitalized in-country do not contribute a significant amount of piaster expenditures. The strength of personnel in these categories, including out-of-country hospitalized patients in other PACOM areas, should not be considered when establishing force ceilings based on piaster spending." Actually R&R had a very favorable influence on the piaster problem. Troops were not only out of the piaster spending area for a short time but also took with them their savings which were to be used for R&R. In addition to R&R and personnel in hospitals, another area that had a favorable impact on piaster ceilings was the so called "non-effective" group. Personnel in confinement, temporary duty out-of-country, etc. were in this category. In all three categories the Army averaged 4,550 personnel, Navy/Marine Corps 3,550 and the Air Force 1,660 - a total of 9,700 personnel.

(S) In conclusion, CINCPAC recommended that the overall Program 4 strength authorization be increased by approximately 13,041 spaces; 3,341 spaces for forces deployed to RVN which are embarked, quartered and supported in ships and waterborne craft and 9,700 spaces for non-effective forces assigned RVN. He also recommended that the overall strength adjustment of 13,041 spaces be allocated to the Military Services as follows:

~~SECRET~~

| | |
|-----------------|-------|
| a. Army | 6,258 |
| b. Navy | 2,683 |
| c. Air Force | 1,600 |
| d. Marine Corps | 2,500 |

Subsequently, by informal staff action, the JCS was advised that the piaster ceiling would support the proposed 13,041 increase.

On 2 March 1967,¹ the JCS acknowledged CINCPAC's message of 26 February 1967, by stating that his recommendations were appreciated and that the information furnished by CINCPAC would be kept under review pending: (1) further clarification of piaster expenditure status and trends; (2) decisions on other force level proposals under consideration; and (3) favorable opportunity to use contents in connections with future force requirements.

On 5 March 1967, CINCPAC notified COMUSMACV that an early position on the piaster ceiling would be needed before the full-scale April-June 1967 review of the MACV piaster ceiling. CINCPAC planned to review MACV's study and then to ask the CJCS to feel out the Washington reaction to CINCPAC's position.² On 6 March 1967, it was learned, informally, that the MACV staff was hard at work on the piaster and additional force studies but it would be a matter of weeks before the studies would be ready for CINCPAC.³ In the meantime, MACV was preparing its quarterly report of estimated piaster expenditures which was due in OSD on 20 March 1967.⁴ This report, received at CINCPAC headquarters on 8 March 1967, indicated the total estimated requirements for the last three quarters of CY 67 to be 28.621 billion piasters. Since the first quarter expenditures appeared not to exceed 9.5 billion, the total requirement for CY 67 was estimated at that time to be 38.121 billion as opposed to the 42 billion piaster target established by the SECDEF. It became more and more evident that the SECDEF piaster target was obtainable.

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1. JCS 7706/030019Z Mar 67.
 2. Point Paper, J5542, CINCPAC, 15 Apr 67, Subj: "Force Requirements for RVN (U)."
 3. Point Paper, J5542, CINCPAC, 14 Mar 67, Subj: "Status of Proposals for Adjusting Program #4 Troop Ceilings and Piaster Savings."
 4. Ibid.

~~SECRET~~

(S) As pointed out earlier in this chapter, CINCPAC requested COMUSMACV to furnish him with a resume of the MACV piaster and additive troop studies not later than 18 March 1967. The reply was received by the suspense date and the information was available to Admiral Sharp at the Guam conference. The minimum essential force requirements, discussed earlier in this chapter, proposed by MACV could be supported within the 42 billion piaster limitation.¹

(S) On 14 March 1967, the Secretary of the Navy demonstrated for the SECDEF that there was a predicatable number of chargeable Marines that were out-of-country (SVN) at any given time. Since these individuals were included in the chargeable strength ceiling, their organizations were penalized when engaged in combat operations.² As a result, the SECDEF approved a 3,500 increase in Marine strength in Program 4.³

(S) In light of the OSD approval, CINCPAC felt the time was propitious to update the data he had submitted to the JCS on 26 February 1967 and then recommend the JCS to submit the updated data to the SECDEF. Accordingly, he directed CINCUSARPAC, CINCPACFLT, CINCPACAF and COMUSMACV to furnish him with the necessary information not later than 1 June 1967.⁴

(S) On 17 June 1967, CINCPAC informed the JCS that approval of the additive 3,500 spaces to compensate for out-of-country non-effectives had established a principle that was equally applicable to all military services. Consequently, an up-date of out-of-country non-effectives for all services was as follows:

| | |
|-----------|--------|
| Army | 13,262 |
| Navy | 3,589 |
| Air Force | 4,554 |

Accordingly, he recommended that Program 4 space ceilings for RVN be increased by 21,405 spaces.⁵

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1. Point Paper J72, CINCPAC, 6 Apr 67, Subj: "DOD Piaster Spending Reduction Program, SVN."
 2. SECNAV Memo for SECDEF, 14 Mar 67.
 3. SECDEF Memo for CJCS, 12 Apr 67, Subj: "Marine Corps Out-of-country Non-Effectives (U)."
 4. CINCPAC 242212Z May 1967.
 5. CINCPAC 170350Z Jun 67.

~~SECRET~~

~~(S)~~ The effectiveness of the actions taken to control piaster expenditures is reflected in the following table expressed in billions of piasters.

| <u>Period</u> | <u>Ceiling</u> | <u>Expenditures</u> | <u>% of Ceiling</u> |
|-----------------|----------------|---------------------|---------------------|
| Jul - Sep 1966 | 9.00 | 8.53 | 94.8% |
| Oct - Dec 1966 | 9.00 | 9.09 | 101.0% |
| Jan - Mar 1967 | 10.50 | 8.53 | 81.3% |
| Apr - June 1967 | 10.5 | 8.42 | 80.2% |

~~(S)~~ On 24 June 1967, CINCPAC submitted the semi-annual Format B Piaster Expenditure Projection to the JCS¹ as required by the Piaster Expenditure Reduction Program. The projections reflected the then-current piaster expenditure date of 37,517 billion piasters.

| | |
|----------------|-------|
| Jul - Sep 1967 | 9,352 |
| Oct - Dec 1967 | 9,231 |
| Jan - Mar 1968 | 9,603 |
| Apr - Jun 1968 | 9,331 |

The 37,517 billion piasters total was considered sufficient to support an end strength of 570,122 US military, 56,937 FWMA forces and 9,312 DOD civilians and construction employees.²

~~(S)~~ The JCS advised CINCPAC on 10 August 1967 that the SECDEF had established, on 5 August, the following expenditure ceiling for the last two quarters of CY 67:³

| | |
|----------------|----------------|
| Jul - Sep 1967 | 8.6 B piasters |
| Oct - Dec 1967 | 9.2 B piasters |

During this same period, Program 5 was being developed and discussed. Using the ceiling of Program 5, CINCPAC reestimated the FY 68 piaster expenditure projections and submitted the following to the JCS:⁴

1. CINCPAC 240429Z June 67.
2. Point Paper, J72, CINCPAC, 6 Oct 67, Subj: "DOD Piaster Expenditure Ceilings."
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.

~~SECRET~~

| | |
|----------------|--------------------------|
| Jul - Dec 1967 | 9.213 B piasters |
| Oct - Dec 1967 | 10.270 B piasters |
| Jan - Mar 1968 | 10.236 B piasters |
| Apr - Jun 1968 | <u>10.579 B piasters</u> |
| Total | 40.298 B piasters |

In September 1967, it was determined that actual expenditures, 3,074 billion for July and 3,065 billion for August, were exceeding the SECDEF ceiling of 8.6 billion piasters for the third quarter of CY 67.

(S) On 20 September, CINCPAC requested that the ceilings be increased to 9.4 B piasters for the third quarter of CY 67 and to 10.270 B piasters for the fourth quarter of CY 67 to compensate for the increased expenditures.¹ When the CINCPAC and MACV Comptroller representatives attended the October 1967 piaster meeting in Washington, D. C., they were advised that CINCPAC's recommendation should be submitted after the September expenditure report.

(S) The second-half expenditures, July-September, totaled 11,951 billion piasters or 67.1% of the ceiling. Based on this data, CINCPAC recommended an 18.5 billion piaster ceiling, 700 million piasters above the established amount.² On 2 December, the JCS advised that no change in ceiling was contemplated at that time. Moreover, if the CINCPAC projection of 18.5 billion piasters materialized there would be no cause for concern since the overall CY 67 spending would be considerably below the target of 42 billion.³

(S) In early October the GVN issued a decree changing the rate on purchases of official-use piasters from 80 piasters to 118 piasters to the dollar. This resulted in a favorable effect on DOD appropriated and non appropriated funds.⁴

(S) On 18 December, CINCPAC recommended approval of his 42 billion CY 68 piaster expenditure projection to the JCS. This projection was higher than his earlier projections primarily because of in-

1. CINCPAC 201900Z Sep 67.
2. Point Paper, J72, CINCPAC, 28 Nov 67, Subj: "DOD Piaster Expenditure Reduction Program."
3. JCS 4179/020147Z Dec 67.
4. COMUSMACV 131055Z Oct 67.

~~SECRET~~


creased local national hire included in Program 5, wage increases and an additional 1.5 billion piasters to support the CORDS program.¹

(U) Actual piaster expenditures in billions, versus ceilings for CY 1967 are shown on chart, "Piaster Expenditures vs Ceilings, Calendar Year 1967."

1. CINCPAC 180002Z Dec 67.

PIASTER EXPENDITURES VS CEILINGS CALENDAR YEAR 1967

B
I
L
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S



| | | | | |
|--------------------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| TOTAL EXPENDITURES | 8.535 | 8.420 | 8.904 | 8.680 |
| PERSONAL | 3.268 | 3.425 | 3.588 | 3.331 |
| O&M | 3.888 | 3.872 | 4.490 | 4.550 |
| CONST | 1.379 | 1.123 | .826 | .799 |

NOTE: CY67 CEILING-38.8B: 1st QTR 10.5B; 2nd QTR--10.5B; 2nd HALF-17.8B

Proposed Organization Of A Constabulary In SVN

~~(S)~~ In November 1966, the US Embassy in Saigon proposed the organization of a constabulary for SVN.¹ This new organization, to be created from SVN Regional and Popular Forces (RF/PF), would have an impact on RVNAF force requirements. At the time of the proposal, MACV was participating in an inter-agency study of the subject. Even though it could not provide substantive comments on the subject until the study was complete, MACV concurred in the creation of the proposed constabulary.

~~(S)~~ CINCPAC informed the JCS on 20 November 1966, that he concurred in the need for such a force and furnished general comments for consideration:

a. Superimpose the constabulary mission upon the RF/PF.
This would:

- (1) Provide continuity of military forces at the province and district level.
- (2) Utilize an existing organization, training base and a US advisory establishment.
- (3) Improve support to RF/PF units.
- (4) Provide a vehicle for integrating other paramilitary forces.
- (5) Provide a negotiating point to designate the RF/PF as police units.

b. In establishing the constabulary, insure that:

- (1) The decision was left to GVN.
- (2) The regional organization and manning of the present RF/PF was not changed.
- (3) A non-US in-country advisory establishment was created.

1. Point Paper, J552, CINCPAC, 21 Nov 66, Subj: "Organization of Constabulary in Vietnam."

(4) The military capability of SVN was not degraded.

~~(S)~~ On 10 February 1967, the JCS requested detailed comments on the establishment of a constabulary¹ in SVN for interdepartmental consideration. On 28 February 1967 COMUSMACV provided CINCPAC with preliminary comments. He stated that he did not agree with the inter-agency study prepared in Saigon and that his staff was in the process of completing an independent study and when completed his comments would be preliminary in nature. He felt that:

a. The constabulary should be established by a GVN decree under a civil agency.

b. It should be integrated into the military establishment during war or national emergency.

c. The Office of Civilian Operations was not the appropriate executive agency to be charged with the overall advisory and assistance effort to the constabulary.

d. The cadre should come from all of the armed forces. (CINCPAC was on record with the JCS to superimpose the constabulary as the RF/PF.)

e. The Police Field Forces should not be used as a nucleus because of its past performance.

f. The constabulary should be deployed in secure areas initially.

~~(S)~~ It was apparent that there was a major disagreement between MACV's study and the interagency over comments in subparagraphs c, d and e in the paragraph above.² CINCPAC forwarded these comments to the JCS.

~~(S)~~ CINCPAC received the MACV "National Constabulary Study-NCR" and forwarded it to the JCS in early May. The study provided more detailed information on COMUSMACV's original position. CINCPAC concurred in COMUSMACV's views and supported COMUSMACV's position that the constabulary should be an elite, highly motivated, professional organization and should be integrated into the defense establishment during

1. Point Paper, J552, CINCPAC, 1 Mar 67, Subj: "Organization of Constabulary in Vietnam."

2. Point Paper, J552, CINCPAC, 15 Jun 67, Subj: "National Constabulary for RVN."

a state of war or national emergency. CINCPAC also considered that MACV was the appropriate agency to be responsible for providing advice and assistance to the constabulary.¹

~~(S)~~ CINCPAC then requested COMUSMACV to conduct further analysis and to consider in more detail the manpower, logistics and communications requirements to support the constabulary.² On 8 June, COMUSMACV requested that further action on the establishment of the constabulary be held in abeyance until a restudy of the situation was made viewed in the light of the integration of US civil/military responsibilities to support the Revolutionary Development Program in Vietnam.³

Combined Campaign Plan 1968⁴

~~(S)~~ The RVNAF, Joint General Staff and MACV developed the Combined Campaign Plan for 1968. The major objectives of the plan, essentially the same as the Combined Campaign Plan for 1967, were as follows:

a. Seek out and destroy communist forces and infrastructure by applying unrelenting pressure across the board.

b. Extend GVN control in RVN, emphasizing territorial security, opening and securing LOC, resources control, and other operations in support of pacification.

~~(S)~~ From these tasks COMUSMACV in coordination with the RVNAF selected twenty-five goals for 1968. The goals, which provided a vehicle for quantitative measurement of progress and contrasted sharply in number with the seven goals established for 1967, were as follows:

a. Render ineffective all known enemy main force units.

b. Inflict losses on the VC/NVA forces at a rate greater than the enemy can replace.

c. Increase by 50% the number of enemy weapons taken in 1967.

1. Point Paper, J552, CINCPAC, 15 Jun 67, Subj: "National Constabulary for RVN."
2. CINCPAC 160001Z May 67.
3. COMUSMACV 081130Z Jun 67.
4. Point Paper, J3B35 (CINCPAC), 28 Dec 67, Subj: "Combined Campaign Plan 1968 (U)."

- d. Neutralize a minimum of 80% of known base areas.
- e. Increase the effectiveness of coastal surveillance and interdiction of inland waterways to deny their use to the enemy.
- f. Increase surveillance and operations along corps, province and district boundaries.
- g. Improve the use and integration of RVNAF and U.S. Agency Intelligence collection assets.
- h. Intensify intelligence collection by increasing the number of reconnaissance patrols.
- i. Triple the number of volunteer informers.
- j. Improve the processing and exploitation of PW's and detainees.
- k. In support of the pacification effort increase the number of ARVN battalions.
- l. Increase the number of RD campaign areas.
- m. Increase the number of pacified hamlets.
- n. Improve the handling and care of refugees.
- o. Increase the number of Hoi Chanh over the number taken in 1967.
- p. Neutralize the VC infrastructure, particularly in the priority areas for pacification.
- q. Relieve the national PFF from security missions and target them against the VC infrastructure.
- r. Secure a greater number of lines of communication so that the flow of commerce can be increased.
- s. Meet the approved RVNAF force levels.

- t. Increase effectiveness of RVNAF with emphasis of RF/PF.
- u. Improve morale, welfare and patriotic sentiment of RVN-
AF personnel.
- v. Develop a balanced logistical system in RVNAF respon-
sive to tactical operations.
- w. Improve the outpost system by constructing a selected
number of new outposts in each corps and repairing 50% of ~~those~~ now in
existence which are considered useful.
- x. Meet approved requirements for organizing, equipping and
training hamlet and village defense forces.
- y. Protect 95% of the rice harvested in contested rice deficit
areas and secure major salt producing areas in the coastal provinces.

~~(TS)~~ The concept of operations for the 1968 Combined Campaign Plan provided for an input of combined military power and application of civilian skills and economic resources into priority areas; the control or domination of which was essential to the accomplishment of the tasks. Within this context, forces were to be deployed into three mutually supporting roles:

- a. Frontier Defense Forces to operate along the DMZ and opposite the enemy's Cambodian and Laotian sanctuaries to prevent major incursions into South Vietnam.
- b. Mobile Strike Forces to seek out and destroy VC/NVA forces and neutralize his main base areas in SVN.
- c. Territorial Security Forces to be committed behind the protective shield of the frontier defense and mobile strike forces in support of the GVN pacification program.

~~(TS)~~ The military effort was to provide territorial security at a level adequate to permit the destruction of the VC infrastructure and the uninterrupted and accelerated progress of political, economic, sociological and psychological programs of GVN.

~~(TS)~~ RVNAF would have the primary responsibility for supporting

pacification with priority of effort to providing territorial security for selected priority areas to include responsibility for providing territorial security for selected LOCs. US/FWMAF would have primary responsibility for:¹

- (1) Destroying the VC/NVA main forces, base areas and resources.
- (2) Conducting containment operations along the DMZ and adjacent border sanctuary areas to deny the enemy infiltration and invasion routes.
- (3) Assisting and reinforcing RVNAF as necessary in opening and securing LOCs, providing security for selected priority and protecting national resources.

1. Point Paper, J3B35, CINCPAC, 28 Dec 67, Subject: "Combined Campaign Plan 1968 (U)."

SECTION II - OPERATIONS, SOUTHEAST ASIA

(U) "Allied strategy for the war consists of three elements -- our ground and air campaign in South Vietnam, the Revolutionary Development or nation building program in South Vietnam, and our air offensive against North Vietnam. The three elements are interdependent and mutually supporting -- victory depends on success in all three.

".....(in) our ground and air campaign in South Vietnam, we are making steady progress in neutralizing the enemy's base areas, finding and destroying his supplies, and driving him into sparsely populated areas where food is scarce. Enemy loss rates are about 50 percent greater than last year. The constant mauling the enemy suffers, coupled with disease, shortages of ammunition, food and medicines, is affecting his morale and effectiveness.

"I do not want to overstate our gains. The communist forces in South Vietnam retain a dangerous capability for terrorism and guerrilla warfare."

Admiral U. S. G. Sharp¹

(U) This section of Chapter IV discusses operations conducted in Southeast Asia with emphasis on South Vietnam. Ground operations have not been included because of the extensive coverage in Annex A. On the other hand CINCPAC's air operations have received considerable coverage.

1. Address by Admiral U. S. G. Sharp, USN, Commander in Chief Pacific before the Delegates of the 41st Annual Convention of the Propeller Club and the American Merchant Marine Conference, Royal Hawaiian Hotel, Honolulu, Hawaii, 11 October 1967.

Review of Military Operations in Vietnam, 1966

~~(TS)~~ In a message to the JCS on 14 January 1967, CINCPAC reviewed the progress made during 1966 in the war for Vietnam and visualized conditions for 1967 in light of past experiences. CINCPAC pointed out that the balanced and effective military force deployed to South Vietnam had forced the enemy to revert to defensive employment of his main force units. As a result of these operations, the enemy had been denied a military take over of South Vietnam. On the other hand, the enemy continued to engage in overt warfare and retained the capability to deploy substantial additional regular forces in South Vietnam. He was supported by major infiltration routes through Laos and strong evidence indicated logistical support was also coming through Cambodia. At the same time, the enemy maintained the capability to deploy substantial additional regular forces to SVN and to actively pursue subversion and insurgency in Thailand. The enemy had been doing this, though limited in scope. ¹

~~(TS)~~ CINCPAC reiterated the military strategy for the conduct of the war in Vietnam that he had set forth in his CY 66/67 Requirements and Capabilities Programs. He reviewed ROLLING THUNDER operations and pointed out that little had been accomplished in preventing external assistance to North Vietnam. The key port of Haiphong, through which 85 percent of NVN's import flowed, had been placed out of bounds except for POL strikes. Although some progress was made in destroying those resources that contributed to the support of aggression the amount was minor in comparison to what could have been accomplished. He cited as an example, "of the 104 numbered targets in Northeast NVN only 20 were hit in 1966." Although the task of harassing, disrupting and impeding movement of men and material had received primary emphasis the enemy accommodated to air attacks on his LOC by hiding and dispersing his logistic activity. Even so, the attacks on his LOC forced him to pay a tremendous price in effort in order to continue infiltration of men and material into South Vietnam." In the final analysis CINCPAC concluded that in 1966 the ROLLING THUNDER objective of applying steady and adequate pressure against the enemy was not achieved due to the restrictions which resulted in inefficient use of airpower. ²

~~(TS)~~ CINCPAC reported that after a comprehensive review of ROLLING THUNDER operations, which included the objectives, results and future courses of action, he had concluded that the basic objectives

1. CINCPAC 142104Z Jan 67.
2. CINCPAC's concept of operation for ROLLING THUNDER during 1967 is discussed in "ROLLING THUNDER" in this chapter.

and tasks that he had set forth for ROLLING THUNDER were still valid and that effective operations in support of ROLLING THUNDER tasks, together with continued successful operations in SVN, offered the greatest prospects for bringing the war to a successful conclusion on terms advantageous to the US and its allies.

(TS) CINCPAC proposed to the JCS that naval surface operations in 1967 should be authorized in the DMZ area and that the limits imposed in 1966 should be extended northward. Since the naval gunfire effort against coastal waterborne logistic traffic in 1966 proved to be an effective compliment to ROLLING THUNDER operations, the extension northward would compound enemy logistic problems by forcing him to transport additional materials over an already overtaxed land LOC.¹

(TS) CINCPAC summarized the enemy's capabilities. He told the JCS that the enemy could disengage many of his main force units almost at will by returning to his sanctuaries in Laos, Cambodia and North Vietnam where friendly ground forces were not permitted to search out the enemy, thus the enemy could pace the ground war to his advantage. CINCPAC stated that it would be an over-simplification to suggest that the enemy had reverted to tactical guerrilla action as his primary modus operandi. "The enemy knows he cannot defeat and eject the US/FWMAF by large unit operations because of his vulnerability to air, artillery and tactical mobility of US and allied forces. Therefore, the enemy will attempt to operate in any mode, or combination of modes, at times and places of his choosing which offer a good probability of success. It would be erroneous to conclude the VC/NVA main forces are no longer dangerous, or that integrity of units had been destroyed or that the enemy's logistical capability was less than needed to continue the war. It appears more likely that the enemy is avoiding major contact, using his sanctuaries, fighting defensively when forced to do so and attempting to rebuild and reinforce for operations at an opportune time. The enemy will probably intensify tactical guerrilla warfare without fragmenting main force units or discarding plans for their buildup and use. The enemy remains dangerous and his strategy hinges on prolonging the war and outlasting our determination to see the job done."

(TS) CINCPAC's comments on Revolutionary Development indicated that the program was just getting underway and that growth of the program would be slow and painstaking. Every effort would be made to

1. Naval surface operations conducted during 1967 are discussed under Naval Operations in this chapter.

strengthen the program and assist the GVN in that important undertaking.

(TS) CINCPAC concluded his message to the JCS by stating "Our goal for 1967 is to increase the prospects for an early end to the conflict in SVN which is satisfactory to the US, to the Republic of Vietnam, and to those nations which are providing Free World Military Assistance Forces. To achieve this goal at the earliest possible time, we must step up the air war against North Vietnam thus imposing a steadily increasing cost for Hanoi for their aggression."

Holiday Stand-Downs in Vietnam

(TS) Prior to 1967, three stand-downs (cease-fires) were observed in SVN; Christmas 1965 - 30 hours, Tet 1966 - over four days, and Christmas 1966 - 48 hours. On 22 November 1966,¹ the JCS notified the SECDEF that they strongly opposed any stand-downs in military operations during holiday seasons. However, if a cease-fire were directed it should be limited in order to minimize the significant military advantage of the enemy. Also, bombing stand-downs should be limited to a maximum of 48 hours, and CINCPAC should be allowed to strike unusually lucrative or threatening military targets in NVN which might develop. This action supported CINCPAC's position.

(TS) During 1967 four stand-downs were observed; New Years - 48 hours, Tet - over 5 days, Buddha's birthday - 24 hours and Christmas - 24 hours. As in the case of all previous stand-downs, the cease-fires in 1967 were beneficial only to the enemy. He was granted the opportunity to conduct major resupply operations and to reconstitute and replenish his forces, all of which cost the US-FWMA forces greater casualties.

(TS) COMUSMACV, CINCPAC and the JCS voiced their objections to granting the enemy immunity during these periods. They recommended an expanded military policy that would permit appropriate counter-measures by US, FWMA and RVN forces in order to deny the enemy the ability to exploit stand-downs.² For Tet (8-11 February 1967) CINCPAC and the JCS recommended among other measures that authority be granted to strike major resupply activity south of 19° north latitude. This was denied.

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1. JCS 2343/984-4, 22 November 1966; JCS 2472/177-1, 19 October 1967.
 2. J3, CINCPAC Brief 32-67, 6 February 1967; JCS 262312Z January 1967; CINCPAC 301900Z January 1967; JCS 2472/177-1, 19 October 1967.

~~(TS)~~ Intensive photographic reconnaissance conducted over NVN during the period of Tet in 1967, supplemented by visual sightings from ships and aircraft, revealed significant logistic movements of materiel by water, truck and rail transport. As a result of this reconnaissance CINCPAC estimated that NVN had moved between 22,300 and 25,100 tons of supplies from the North into the area below 19 degrees north latitude between the period 080700 to 120700 February 1967. DIA's findings closely paralleled CINCPAC's. ¹

~~(TS)~~ Evidence indicated that the NVN had anticipated and calculated in all their planning, the probability of a bombing pause during Tet and took full advantage of the situation.

~~(TS)~~ On Buddha's birthday, 23 May 1967, ² another stand-down was observed. This time CINCPAC was authorized to conduct both SEA DRAGON operations and air strikes against any observed substantial military resupply activity in NVN south of 20 degrees north latitude.

~~(TS)~~ On 13 October 1967, ³ Ambassador Bunker submitted to the Secretary of State a recommended US position for the Christmas, New Year and Tet holidays. The recommended position was agreed upon by both Ambassador Bunker and General Westmoreland. They anticipated that proposals for a stand-down during these holidays would be forthcoming and they wanted to avoid being pre-empted by Hanoi or the NLF. If pre-empted, the US and its allies would again be placed in the adverse political-psychological position of countering the Hanoi-NLF proposals. To preclude this situation Ambassador Bunker and General Westmoreland wanted the official US position be determined at the earliest possible time and in no event later than the end of October 1967.

~~(TS)~~ It was pointed out in the message that all concerned should be positively appraised of the risks attending a military stand-down. To this end an overall review of enemy actions during previous stand-downs was set forth. It was obvious from the review, that militarily no cease-fires should be observed during the forthcoming holidays. It was equally obvious that precedent and public pressures would necessitate some action for the Christmas and Tet holidays. In the event stand-downs

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1. CINCPAC 242256Z February 1967; Enclosure B, JCS 2472/177-1, 19 October 1967.
 2. Enclosure B, JCS 2472/177-1, 19 October 1967; JCS 3879/281441Z April 1967.
 3. AMEMB Saigon message to State, 8432/130935Z October 1967.

were observed, they recommended a maximum acceptable schedule:

- a. For Christmas 1967, a twenty-four hour period with justification based on religious consideration.
- b. For New Years 1967-68, no justification existed. If imposed the cease-fire should not exceed twenty-four hours.
- c. For Tet 1968, forty-eight hours with a fall back position of seventy-two hours. ¹

~~(TS)~~ Ambassador Bunker stated that he and General Westmoreland had concluded that rules governing stand-downs should be more binding. "Future agreements, if such became necessary, should impose a total freeze on logistics and force repositioning on both sides." This prohibition was to be applied to all movements of military personnel and materiel regardless of where they might occur, within country or, into country in both North and South Vietnam and their contiguous waters. ²

~~(TS)~~ On 20 October 1967, CINCPAC commented on Ambassador Bunker's message. ³ He told the JCS that he also felt that the official US position should be announced at the earliest opportunity to preclude pre-emption by either Hanoi or the NLF and that he was opposed to any stand-down. He pointed out that previous stand-downs had not affected Hanoi's willingness to negotiate nor to diminish military actions in SVN to any discernible degree. Conversely, the enemy had shown only flagrant disregard for the terms of previous stand-downs, using them for massive resupply efforts. He pointed out that the air campaign in NVN and the SEA DRAGON operations had been effective in creating critical supply problems for the enemy. Removal of this pressure accrued advantage only to the enemy. It had to be assumed that the enemy would subvert any stand-down to reorganize, reposition and resupply his forces resulting in the exertion of pressure against friendly forces in I Corps. Admiral Sharp related this to the enemy pressure on Con Thien and other outposts in the DMZ during 1967. CINCPAC concluded his comments to JCS with a strong recommendation that there be no stand-down of military operations during any holiday period. He did not comment on Ambassador Bunker's and General Westmoreland's joint position on a possible total freeze on logistics and force repositioning on both sides.

1. AMEMB Saigon message to State, 8432/130935Z October 1967.
2. Ibid.
3. CINCPAC 200132Z October 1967.

~~(TS)~~ On 23 October 1967,¹ the JCS recommended to the SECDEF that the United States urge the Republic of Vietnam and its allies to announce their intention not to stand-down for any holiday period as soon as possible. The JCS requested that their views be made known to the President and further recommended that a proposed joint State/Defense message, which they had prepared, be passed to the State Department for concurrence and dispatch.

~~(TS)~~ The JCS also stated that they were particularly concerned with the military implications of the total freeze recommended by Ambassador Bunker. They pointed out that the enemy had demonstrated he could carry out his logistic and replacement activities clandestinely while we could not. Therefore, the total freeze concept would place the US-GVN-FWMA forces in an untenable position if, for any reason, a stand-down were extended.

(U) The 31 October 1967 deadline passed and no official US position had been announced. On 18 November 1967, the Honolulu Advertiser printed an announcement made by the VC in a radio broadcast. The radio broadcast stated that the NLF was ordering a suspension of military attacks during the period midnight 23 December to midnight 26 December 1967 - 3 days for Christmas; during the period midnight 29 December to midnight 1 January 1968 - 3 days for New Years; and from midnight 26 January 1968 to midnight 2 February 1968 - 7 days for Tet. For the third consecutive year the enemy was first to announce holiday cease-fires.

~~(TS)~~ On 9 December the JCS² noted that the U.S. had made a decision to institute stand-downs of military activity for 24 hours at Christmas and New Years and 48 hours at Tet (1968). They recommended to the SECDEF a modification of the rules of engagement promulgated in 1966. The modifications provided CINCPAC authority to counter major resupply and infiltration activities detected during the stand-down period. The proposed departures from previous stand-down instructions were included in Admiral Sharp's instructions to COMUSMACV, CINCPACAF and CINCPACFLT on 19 December. His instructions were as follows:³

-
1. JCSM-567-67, 23 October 1967, for SECDEF, Subject: Holiday Stand-downs in Vietnam (U).
 2. JCSM-687-67, 9 Dec 67.
 3. CINCPAC 190445Z Dec 67. Note: Underlined paragraphs are departures from 1966 instructions.

a. In SVN

(1) Initiate no military offensive operations except in response to:

(a) Enemy initiatives endangering the safety of US/RVN/FWMA forces.

(b) Abnormally great enemy resupply of infiltration into the southern part of the DMZ and the area immediately south thereof.

(c) Abnormally great enemy resupply activities other than in subparagraph a(1)(b), above, which fulfill any of the following criteria:

1. Are in such proximity to friendly units and/or installations as to constitute a direct threat to friendly forces:
or

2. In other locations involve supplies in quantities sufficient to indicate abnormally great resupply operations.

(2) COMUSMACV is authorized to react to the above enemy actions in accordance with his existing authorities. Report actions taken under this authority immediately to CINCPAC, information JCS.

(3) Assume full alert posture and continue all security precautions, to include patrol activity. Be prepared with ready reaction forces to respond to any VC/NVA initiative.

(4) Forces in contact with VC/NVA forces will not break contact unless VC/NVA effort to withdraw is clearly evident or until the operation concerned is otherwise concluded.

(5) Continue MARKET TIME and GAME WARDEN.

(6) Conduct intensified aerial reconnaissance throughout period, and continue search and rescue operations as required.

(7) If deemed necessary for security of US/RVN/FWMA forces, appropriate air and/or naval operations are authorized in support of the above operations. For this purpose, ARC LIGHT may be requested through normal channels.

(8) Operations conducted pursuant to foregoing will avoid, whenever possible, hamlets and villages in order to minimize impact on civilian population.

b. In NVN

(1) Suspend normal armed reconnaissance, air strikes, and SEA DRAGON operations during period.

(2) South of 20 degrees north latitude, COMUSMACV, CINCPACFLT and CINCPACAF as applicable may authorize SEA DRAGON operations, air strikes, and artillery fire against observed abnormally great military resupply and against any activities that pose a direct and immediate threat to friendly forces. SEA DRAGON ships will not deliver fire against fixed shore targets except in self-defense.

(3) North of 20 degrees north latitude, CINCPACAF and CINCPACFLT may authorize air strikes against any targets that pose an immediate and direct threat to our forces, such as movement of SAMs to extend additional SAM defenses south of 20 degrees north latitude.

(4) Conduct intensified aerial reconnaissance and continue search and rescue operations as required.

(U) On 15 December 1967, the SVN government announced a 24 hour truce to run from "6 P M Christmas Eve to 6 P M Christmas Day, Saigon time." ¹ The stand-down went into effect as announced.

(U) On 30 December, COMUSMACV notified Admiral Sharp and General Wheeler that the SVN government publicly announced on that day that a New Years cease-fire would be in effect from "311800H December 1967 to 020600H January 1968." The same instructions governing military cease-fire activities at Christmas were observed during the New Years cease-fire. ² Prior to this date it was announced that the stand-down would last from "6 P M, 31 December to 6 P M, 1 January 1968." However, it was extended twelve additional hours, until 6 A M, 2 January 1968, by the GVN in response to the appeal made by Pope Paul VI to make January 1, 1968, a "day of peace." ³ The stand-down for New Years began at 310800 December 1967 as scheduled. ⁴

1. Associated Press, Saigon 15 Dec 67.

2. COMUSMACV 311028Z Dec 67.

3. UPI, Saigon 30 Dec 67.

4. CINCPAC Command Center, 0730 Briefing Notes, 31 Dec 67.

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Air Operations Southeast Asia 1967

(S) "In pursuit of our objectives in Southeast Asia, we find the United States and North Vietnam each engaged strategically in an offensive and a defensive campaign. In the South, we are essentially fighting a defensive action. We are defending the people of South Vietnam from aggression. The enemy is attacking from sanctuaries across the DMZ, from Laos, and from Cambodia, and moves his forces at will across these borders. While we have blunted his initiatives by tactical offensive operations, political restraints rule out ground operations which would deprive the enemy of these sanctuaries.

"The opposite holds for the air war in the North, here we hold the initiative. We are conducting a strategic offensive. The enemy is forced to react at places and times of our choosing. We are attacking his base areas, the sources of his aggression. Large portions of his weapons, material and manpower, which otherwise would find their way into South Vietnam, are consumed in the process. We must continue these operations in the North. They are the offensive element of our strategy. No war has ever been brought to a successful conclusion by defensive action alone."

Admiral U. S. G. Sharp¹

(S) Air operations in Southeast Asia expanded during 1967 in an attempt to maintain increased pressure on NVN. Although the pressure was not as intensive as it could have been, due to restrictions imposed by higher authorities, it was greater than in 1966.

(S) This section on air operations discusses operations in NVN, ROLLING THUNDER; operations in Laos, BARREL ROLL/STEEL TIGER; SAC B-52 operations, ARC LIGHT; and selected items of significance to CINCPAC. The history of air operations in Southeast Asia in this volume is not all inclusive. Additional information can be found in the histories prepared by CINCPACFLT and CINCPACAF.

Source: Statement by Admiral U. S. G. Sharp, US Navy, CINCPAC before the Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee, Senate Armed Services Committee, 9 August 1967.

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ROLLING THUNDER

Concept of Operations for 1967

~~(TS)~~ On 12 January 1967, CINCPAC briefed General Earle Wheeler, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, on CINCPAC's concept for conducting ROLLING THUNDER operations in 1967. The concept was preceded by a restatement of Admiral Sharp's 1966 objectives and tasks to accomplish the objectives. The objectives and tasks which remained valid for 1967 were as follows:

a. Objective - "to bring increasing pressure on NVN so as to cause NVN to cease supporting, controlling and directing insurgencies in Southeast Asia."

b. Tasks -

"(1) Reduce or deny external assistance.

"(2) Increase pressure by destroying in depth those resources that contribute most to the support of aggression.

"(3) Harass, disrupt and impede movement of men and materials to SVN." ¹

~~(TS)~~ These tasks were considered interdependent and, in a broad sense, represented a three pronged approach which required an integrated targeting concept responsive to the collective accomplishment of the tasks. ²

~~(TS)~~ Admiral Sharp pointed out to General Wheeler that the accomplishment of these tasks was dependent on the application of increased pressures. The application of steadily increasing pressure was denied to him in 1966 through operational restrictions and as a result the tasks were not fulfilled. CINCPAC then pointed out that the best way to increase pressure was to apply continuing steady power, on a long term targeting basis, against key target systems. ¹

1. CINCPAC Briefing for Gen Wheeler, CJCS, 12 Jan 67 in CINCPAC Command Center. Copy of briefing on file in Historical Branch, CINCPAC.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.

(15) Admiral Sharp's concept for a long term targeting program emphasized target systems and stressed a steady weight of effort on a continuing basis, since a majority of the targets were in Route Package VI (RP-VI) the concept focused primarily in that area. An analysis of the target structure revealed six basic target systems:

- a. Electric power system.
- b. War supporting industry.
- c. Transportation support facilities.
- d. Military complexes.
- e. Petroleum.
- f. Haiphong and other ports. ¹

(16) To implement the program, CINCPAC recommended that: ²

- a. A program be established and approved based on the six basic target systems.
- b. Initially, approximately eighty prime targets be approved for strike.
- c. Approximately fifteen new targets from the authorized total be struck each month with the objective of sustaining a steady level of destruction, thus increasing the pressure on NVN on a continuing basis.
- d. The Haiphong port complex be attacked on a "close the ring" basis, destroying targets in a specific order of priority.
- e. All systems be struck to avoid stereotyped pattern rather than eliminating one system at a time.

1. CINCPAC Briefing for Gen Wheeler, CJCS, 12 Jan 67 in CINCPAC Command Center, Copy of briefing on file in Historical Branch, CINCPAC.

2. Ibid

f. The power system be earmarked for early destruction but not to the extent of concentrating on power alone.

~~(TS)~~ Admiral Sharp concluded that to follow the trend of "no definite goal," the objective would not be achieved.

~~(TS)~~ On 18 January, Admiral Sharp, in a message, restated his targeting and operational concept to the JCS. ¹ He recommended the following parameters in implementing the program against the six basic target systems. ²

"a. All targets in each of the target systems that require approval by higher authority be approved as a package. This would allow maximum flexibility in the timing of strikes, taking into consideration intelligence and weather factors.

"b. A steady level of pressure be assured by striking about fifteen new targets each month. The objective would be to avoid peaks and depressions. If we are to increase pressure on Hanoi, a steady program of disruption against the basic target systems is necessary.

"c. The six target systems be considered as a single package, with each system inter-related to the other. Accordingly, the systems should be attacked as a package, rather than one system at a time.

"d. The power system and the Haiphong/Port system be assigned priority of effort, but not to the extent of concentrating on these two systems alone.

"e. The Haiphong port complex be recognized as a target system within itself. As such, targets within the Haiphong complex should be attacked with a specific order of target priority. The objective would be to cause ship off-loading delays, increase bottle-necks, and eventually force most of the shipping out of the harbor for off-loading purposes. Mining of Haiphong would of course be most effective in closing the port but is not included in this proposed program."

~~(TS)~~ A breakdown by target system of those targets proposed for strike under the concept was furnished to the JCS with the comment that the concept had "finite limits" and "finite goals" and therefore could not be considered as "open ended." The program of necessity was dynamic.

1. CINCPAC 182210Z Jan 67.

2. Ibid.

Some targets would probably require periodic restrike, others would not. New targets would probably be generated as the enemy adjusted and when major targets were destroyed or disrupted, minor targets which had been considered not worth the risk would become of primary significance. ¹

~~(S)~~ The following number of targets by system were recommended: ²

- a. Electric Power System - 7 targets, all required the JCS approval.
- b. War Supporting Industries - 10 targets, all required the JCS approval.
- c. Transportation Support Facilities - 20 targets, 13 of the 20 required the JCS approval.
- d. Military complexes - 44 targets, 26 required the JCS approval.
- e. POL System - 26 targets, 8 required the JCS approval.
- f. Haiphong and Other Ports - 28 targets, 22 required the JCS approval.

In all, 89 targets that required the JCS approval were recommended. Of the 89 only 30 were approved as indicated below: ³

| <u>Target System</u> | <u>Approved</u> | <u>Requested</u> |
|-------------------------|-----------------|------------------|
| Military Complex | 19 | 26 |
| Thermal Power | 5 | 7 |
| War Supporting Industry | 1 | 10 |
| Transportation Support | 2 | 13 |
| Haiphong Port Package | 3 | 22 |
| Other Ports | 0 | 3 |
| POL | 0 | 8 |

(S) Within the restrictions imposed the targeting concept was implemented.

1. CINCPAC 182210Z Jan 67.
 2. Ibid.
 3. Chronology of the War in NVN (ROLLING THUNDER), 28 Dec 67, prepared by Cdr T. B. Wood, USN, J3, Hq CINCPAC, hereafter cited as ROLLING THUNDER Chronology.

Restrictions

(U) "In an effort to cause us to reduce our pressures, the communist capitals have subjected the Free World to a well directed and unremitting psychological campaign. The theme of this campaign is stop the bombing. Many have been influenced by it. From around the world we are told that our bombing is ineffective and unwise, that if we would only stop, peace would follow."

Admiral U. S. G. Sharp¹

(TS) CINCPAC on 8 April 1967² published his Basic Operating Order: "ROLLING THUNDER (RT)/BLUE TREE (UE) (U)" which set forth the restrictions applicable to ROLLING THUNDER. These restrictions had been imposed by higher authority and were as follows:

"(1) Use of classified ordnance is not authorized.

"(2) Utmost caution will be exercised during attack of all targets, including those developed by armed recce, to avoid striking populated areas. Collateral damage will be kept to a minimum consistent with desired objective.

"(3) The following targets will not be attacked unless specifically authorized by CINCPAC directive:

(a) Former JCS Tgt Nr 38; JCS Tgt Nrs 19, 39.21, 48, 49, 51, and 63.11.

(b) Locks, dams (including the JCS numbered locks and dams) and hydro power plants.

(c) Watercraft which are obviously fishing boats, or appear to be engaged in fishing.

(d) Clusters of sampans or house boats in populated areas which are probably water homes.

1. Address by Admiral U. S. G. Sharp, USN, CINCPAC, before the delegates of the 41st Annual Convention of the Propeller Club and the American Merchant Marine Conference, Royal Hawaiian Hotel, Honolulu, Hawaii, 11 October 1967.

2. CINCPAC 080408Z Apr 67.

(e) Naval craft north of 2042N (sic) and outside of 3NM limit of NVN coast and offshore islands unless U.S. aircraft are fired upon by these vessels.

"(4) The following areas are designated as prohibited areas in which no strikes are authorized except as specifically directed in the "execute" message:

(a) Hanoi prohibited area: The area within 10 NM of the center of Hanoi (210137N/1055121E).

(b) CHICOM buffer zone: The area within 30 NM of the CHICOM border from the Laotian border east to 106E, and thence within 25 NM of the CHICOM border to the Tonkin Gulf.

"(5) The following are designated as restricted areas. Strikes in these areas can be made only repeat only against targets specifically stated in the OORDER and in execute messages. See paras 4b(5)(7)(8) and (9) for authorized targets. (These paragraphs are reproduced here for the convenience of the reader:

(4b(5) Recognized military targets of opportunity in the vicinity of target areas and within or along authorized armed recce routes, and NVN craft or NVN units which fire upon our aircraft, enroute to or from missions, may be attacked and destroyed.

(4b(7) Attacks may be conducted against previously authorized and struck the JCS numbered targets, provided no restrictions currently exist. (See para 4c(3)(a) for exceptions.)

(4b(8) Except when located in populated areas, attacks are authorized against dispersed POL targets (including POL barges, tank cars) and SAM support areas within the Hanoi/Haiphong restricted areas. (This does not repeat not include Hanoi prohibited area.) Except for strikes on POL barges, these targets will be struck only after positive identification and after prior notification to CINCPAC/JCS by flagging JOREP/OPREP-1 as QUOTE Special Strike UNQUOTE.

(4b(9) Aircraft overflying Laos returning to Thai bases are authorized to attack targets in Laos. Targets attacked must be currently authorized targets and conducted under current BR/SL operating rules.

(a) Hanoi restricted area: The area within 30 NM of the center of Hanoi excluding Hanoi prohibited area, para 4c(4)(a) above. (The area within 10 NM of the center of Hanoi.)

(b) Haiphong restricted area: The area within 10 NM of the center of Haiphong (205122N/1064110E).


"(6) Tactics for conducting strikes will be planned so that flight paths to and from target areas and in the vicinity of targets will not approach closer than 20 NM to the CHICOM border. However, actual attack(s) must be within the authorized armed recce area.

"(7) Aircraft engaged in immediate pursuit are authorized to pursue enemy aircraft into CHICOM buffer zone, restricted and/or prohibited areas, but in no event closer than 12 NM to the CHICOM border. When engaged in immediate pursuit in connection with affording protection to strike forces, U.S. forces are not repeat not authorized to attack NVN air bases from which aircraft may be operating. This does not prohibit attacking the pursued aircraft.

"(8) Active ECM will be employed only as previously authorized.¹...."

~~(18)~~ On 6 August CINCPAC requested the JCS for strike approval of targets in the Hanoi and Haiphong areas and on 9 August the JCS approved sixteen targets for strike; ten were in the Buffer Zone, and the remaining six included Wailut Naval Base and targets in the Hanoi area. On 19 August, the JCS prohibited further strikes within the Hanoi prohibited area.² This pattern continued throughout the remainder of 1967.

1. CINCPAC 010332Z Oct 66 and CINCPAC 080037Z June 66 authorized employment of ECM.
2. ROLLING THUNDER Chronology.



US Marine Corps Photo

Above, Marine A-4's enroute to targets in Route Package 1. Opposite page (top), Air Force F-105's refueling from a KC-135 tanker enroute to targets in northern North Vietnam. Strikes in the Hanoi area required refueling both enroute and egressing. Below, a Navy F-4C positioned on the catapult of the flight deck ready for takeoff.



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Operations

(U) This section presents the monthly ROLLING THUNDER operations highlights. These highlights, in the main, are taken directly from the ROLLING THUNDER Digest.¹

(S) January - The interdiction program against NVN during January was nearly equal to December 1966 - 6,732 attack sorties versus 6,633 in January. Unfavorable weather persisted throughout the month, however, continued use of MSQ-77 (Combat Proof) radar controlled ~~ordnance~~ delivery enabled U.S. aircraft to maintain "presence" over NVN.


(S) Adverse weather conditions in the northern section of NVN precluded full scale attacks on fixed targets and greatly reduced the armed reconnaissance effort. The Combat Skyspot (MSQ-77) radar method of bombing in southern Route Packages; small force attacks by 7th Fleet A-6's utilizing radar bombing during periods of bad weather, mostly at night; and the 7th AF F-105's employing radar and low level navigation in conditions of low ceilings and visibility, all combined to keep continuous pressure around-the-clock on the enemy.

(S) The poor weather directly affected the effort applied to the different Route Packages. As indicated on Chart, "Distribution of Attack Sorties by Route Package", during January, RP-1 received 43 percent of the total attack sorties, while RPs-V, VIA and VIB combined received only 13 percent of the total effort in NVN. Combat Skyspot was the mainstay in the southern Route Packages, accounting for a large percent of the effort, and at times was the only means of delivery.

(S) Of special significance was the implementation of RT-53 on 24 January and RT-54 on 23 February 1967. Combined, they authorized strikes against 16 JCS targets in the northeast quadrant of NVN. At the same time RT-54 extended SEA DRAGON operations from 19° to 20° north latitude; the mining of inland waterways south of 20° north latitude; and authorized artillery fire north of the DMZ. These represented positive steps towards increasing the pressure against the Hanoi regime.

1. The ROLLING THUNDER Digest is an official quarterly publication published by CINCPAC and is a comprehensive report of ROLLING THUNDER operations. Unless otherwise indicated all data presented in ROLLING THUNDER operations were taken directly from the four RT Digests published in CY 1967. The RT Digests were prepared by LTC W. N. Tomlin, USAF, J3A523, CINCPAC.

ROLLING THUNDER



| DISTRIBUTION OF ATTACK SORTIES BY ROUTE PACKAGE | | | | | | | |
|--|---------------|-----|-----|-----|----|-----|-----|
| Month | Route Package | | | | | | |
| | I | II | III | IV | V | VIA | VIB |
| January | 43% | 6% | 16% | 22% | 4% | 7% | 2% |
| February | 64% | 6% | 10% | 12% | 2% | 3% | 3% |
| March | 60% | 9% | 11% | 8% | 4% | 3% | 5% |
| April | 49% | 11% | 13% | 6% | 5% | 7% | 8% |
| May | 39% | 13% | 19% | 11% | 3% | 10% | 6% |
| June | 36% | 13% | 17% | 11% | 4% | 14% | 5% |
| July | 38% | 8% | 7% | 10% | 4% | 14% | 19% |
| August | 48% | 8% | 10% | 7% | 2% | 12% | 13% |
| September | 56% | 8% | 7% | 8% | 3% | 9% | 9% |
| October | 41% | 3% | 6% | 11% | 3% | 16% | 20% |
| November | 52% | 5% | 7% | 11% | 5% | 7% | 13% |
| December | 57% | 8% | 7% | 10% | 4% | 7% | 7% |

Source: ROLLING THUNDER Digest, Editions 3-6 HQ CINCPAC.

(S) CINCPAC initiated the ROLLING THUNDER Target List (RTTL) which consisted of PACOM developed war supporting targets and the most significant JCS numbered targets.

(S) Although inclement weather over NVN seriously hampered air operations, 12 of the 16 JCS targets were struck with the remainder scheduled to be attacked at the earliest possible time that weather permitted.

(S) SAM Firings. The number of reported SA-2 missile firings reached a new high in January. There were 266 firings reported as compared to the previous high of 232 during August 1966. Two 7th AF aircraft were lost to missiles during the month; however, SAM losses were down by almost 80 percent from December 1966. Twenty new SAM sites were photographed, supporting the prediction that the number of firing units, estimated at 30, would increase in coming months.

(S) There was relatively little change in total number of AAA. Based upon pilot reports, there appeared to be a trend toward increasing the AAA in RP-I but no movements were observed.

(S) As of the end of January, there were 31 active Early Warning sites, seven Ground Controlled Intercept (GCI) sites, and eight Naval radar sites in NVN. It was estimated that the Naval radar sites were capable of tracking surface vessels out to 85-95 nautical miles (NM), "painting" aircraft out to 40 NM at low altitudes and as far as 100 NM at 20,000 feet or higher. The radar and GCI coverage improved along all approach routes to NVN.

(S) MIG Activity. January photography revealed two MIG-15/17's at Kien An airfield. Normally, this base supported only light transports and helicopters. It was very likely that as a logical extension of NVN fighter defenses both Kien An and nearby Cat Bi would support additional MIG's in the future. The 40 MIG-21's and 51 MIG-17's sighted during January was a significant increase over December sightings. In addition, there were 16 aerial engagements plus 18 encounters with no contact being made. The most significant air-to-air engagement of the war occurred on 2 January. This counter-air mission was nicknamed "Operation BOLO" and simulated a typical RT strike, except that F-4C's were substituted for the F-105's to encourage the launch of MIG aircraft. Six IRON HAND flights of F-105's, two CAP flights of F-104's and 12 flights of F-4C's, all equipped with QRC-160 ECM pods, entered the area just north of Hanoi. Entry to the target area simulated the normal route for

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F-105 strikes into the area. The result of "Operation BOLO" was seven MIG-21's destroyed and no U.S. losses. This well planned, well executed, and highly successful mission not only caused destruction of seven MIG's, but must have struck a serious blow to the morale of the NVN's Air Force. Two days later two more MIG's were shot down, bringing a total of nine MIG's destroyed during January.

~~(S)~~ As a result of continued poor weather, the interdiction program against NVN's support of the insurgency in SVN continued on a slight downward trend.

~~(S)~~ February - The continued poor weather and the Tet stand-down reduced the number of attack sorties during February. A total of 5,588 attack sorties were flown during February as compared to 6,023 in January. As an example of the distribution of effort caused by the poor weather during February; RP-I received 03.0 percent of the effort, while the remaining attack sorties were fairly equally distributed among the other Route Packages. The 7th AF aircraft, during the few short periods of good weather occurring inland, struck three RT-53 targets. The 7th Fleet was unable to strike any of the RT-53 targets; however, two of the RT-54 targets were struck. Use of preplanned alternate targets and diversions of strikes into suitable weather areas permitted maximum use of attack sorties and held cancellations and aborts to a minimum.

~~(S)~~ MIG Activity. The MIG activity was relatively low with eight encounters and two engagements involving a total of 23 MIG aircraft. This was the lowest level of MIG activity since November 1966 and was considerably lower than the 23 encounters and 16 engagements during January. This pattern of reduced enemy air activity usually followed enemy air losses, probably for re-evaluation of tactics and increased training.

~~(S)~~ SAM Firings. The number of SAM firings reported also decreased and was the lowest since October 1966. There were 113 firings reported for February which was slightly less than one-half the number reported during January.

~~(S)~~ The number of occupied gun positions continued to decrease. It was first noted during January and a similar decrease was reported in February. During the month, the total number of prepared positions increased by 681, while the number of occupied positions decreased by 84. Poor weather and/or camouflage may have affected these figures. Based on the increased number of prepared positions, the number of occupied positions was probably higher than indicated.

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(S) March - The seasonal northeast monsoon weather continued to restrict air activity throughout NVN. Restricted visibility and low cloud conditions were prevalent throughout the month. The air effort in NVN was up 52 percent over that of February in spite of the adverse weather throughout most of the month. The pressure on NVN was up in all the Route Packages and continued around-the-clock, as evidenced by the fact that the 7th Air Force flew 28 percent, and the 7th Fleet 15 percent, of their sorties at night, and air strikes against targets in Route Packages - I, II, III, and IV were conducted every day of the month. However, there were days when Combat Skyspot equipment provided the only method of delivery. In Route Packages - V and VI, the more tangible results were obtained from the strikes on ROLLING THUNDER 54 JCS Targets. The 7th Air Force and the 7th Fleet scheduled daily missions to strike these targets but were often diverted or cancelled due to adverse weather. In spite of the poor weather, small force attacks were conducted by the 7th Fleet using A-6's in bad weather, and mostly at night, and by 7th Air Force F-105's employing low level navigation under low ceilings and reduced visibility.

(S) SAM Firings. There were 139 SAM firings reported for the month with three U.S. aircraft lost to SAM defenses. This was considerably lower than the 266 reported firings during January and up slightly from the 113 reported during February.

(S) There continued to be increasing evidence of the presence of SAM equipment and installations in the area of the DMZ. Three FAN SONG radar signals were intercepted from this area and an unoccupied site was identified and confirmed. This site posed a serious threat to air operations in the area of the DMZ and represented the southern most deployment of a SAM unit.

(S) MIG Activity. During March, there were 21 encounters with MIG aircraft resulting in six engagements. U.S. pilots shot down two MIG-17's with no U.S. losses. The score for air-to-air engagements since 1 January 1967, stood at 12 enemy aircraft destroyed with no losses to U.S. aircraft.

(S) The number of AAA positions and guns in NVN continued to increase. The number of known prepared positions increased by almost 2,000 during the month while the number of occupied gun positions increased by 57.

(S) The 7th Fleet introduced the WALLEYE air-to-surface guided

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bomb into combat operations in NVN on 11 and 12 March. A total of seven WALLEYEs were delivered on pre-selected targets and seven direct hits were reported. Taking advantage of clearing weather on the 11th and 12th of March, WALLEYE weapons were employed in carefully controlled strikes against the Sam Son Army Barracks, Phy Dien Highway Bridge, and the Thanh Hoa Railroad/Highway Bridge. Excellent results were obtained against all targets.

(S) The WALLEYE is a free-fall glide bomb utilizing a TV guidance system. A picture of the target area is presented to the pilot of the launching aircraft prior to launch. The pilot selects the aiming point which must contrast with the background and transmits it to the weapon. After launch, the pilot breaks away and the weapon proceeds on a homing trajectory. The weapon weighs 1100 pounds and contains a 450 pound warhead.

(S) April - The attack sorties flown in NVN in April totaled 8,919, an increase of 415 attack sorties over March. The unfavorable weather conditions, caused by the northeast monsoon season, persisted in the northern areas of NVN until the 18th when favorable weather began and generally remained throughout the month. With the improved weather in the latter half of the month, air activity was accelerated and by 21 April all RT-54 targets had been attacked. Receiving RT-55 execute order, effective 23 April, and with the good weather, 7th AF and CTF-77 again launched major attack forces. By 28 April, all RT-55 authorized targets except one had been struck.

(S) The change in the monsoon in the northern areas and the relatively large number of sorties flown in Route Package - VI resulted in a more favorable spread in attack sorties throughout NVN.

(S) Prime targets for air attacks in RPs-I through IV were the enemy's means of transporting supplies. The attacks against supplies extended into the supply storage areas, transshipment points and military complexes. Ferry slips, landings and their associated storage areas were also destroyed. Bridges, railroad rolling stock, rail yards, rail lines, and roads were interdicted in all Route Packages. In the four southern RPs the enemy continued to pay a high price in manpower, equipment, LOCs and associated support areas that were damaged or destroyed.

(S) MIG Activity. Reactions to U.S. air strikes by enemy aircraft increased substantially during April. Most of the MIG activity occurred during the last half of the month and was related to strikes against selected

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airfields and other JCS targets critical to the enemy's war-sustaining capability. During April, there were 50 engagements, 29 encounters, and 43 sightings for a total of 122 incidents. Nine MIG's were shot down plus three probables, while seven U.S. aircraft were lost to MIG's, the highest loss of the war. During January, February and March of this year no U.S. aircraft were lost to MIG's. During the same period enemy losses totaled eleven. A modification of SAM/MIG tactics was apparent in the close commitment of SAM's and MIG's in a near simultaneous time frame. Additionally, camouflaged MIG's were sighted during April.

(S) SAM Firings. Reported SAM firings during April exceeded the number of any previous month. Duplicate sightings due to the number of SAM's fired made it difficult to determine an accurate count for the month of April. An estimated 246 SAM firings occurred which accounted for five U.S. losses: one F-105 and four A-4C's. The aircraft kill per missile firing for April was approximately 1:49.

(S) May - The trend of air operations for May was one of continued increase. The total attack sorties for May was 11,426, an increase of 2,511 over the April total. The total for May was the greatest since September of 1966. The characteristic reversal of the weather pattern over NVN and Laos, as a result of the monsoon transition, caused a shift in location and intensity of the strike effort in the north. The improved weather conditions in NVN and the expanded target base, particularly in RP-VI, resulted in significant increases in the air effort in this area.

(S) Continuing the trend established in April, defensive reactions to our strikes increased. The repeated attack against the "hard" targets in the Hanoi and Haiphong areas produced a shift in the concentration of AAA and SAM to these zones.

(S) ROLLING THUNDER-55 was replaced by RT-56 on 2 May. The RT-55 JCS targets were attacked by over 200 sorties, 20 of which were flown in May. RT-56 added 10 JCS targets, four of which had been in previous RT operations orders. All RT-56 targets were struck during May.

(S) The distribution of attack sorties around-the-clock was a continued priority. Towards this end 7th AF flew 1,443 night attack sorties, which constituted 28 percent of the total 7th AF attack sorties in NVN; CTF-77 flew 625 sorties at night, 11 percent of its effort; and the FMAW flew 153 night attack sorties, 35 percent of its total attack sorties.

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(S) The enemy's transportation, LOC's, supply storage, and military assembly areas were primary targets. The large number of trucks, WBLC, and secondary explosions indicated that the enemy had increased his supply activity, or that more targets were being located and destroyed.

(S) MIG Activity. Strike forces, especially those of the 7th AF continued to receive strong resistance from the enemy's MIG force. There were 170 air incidents reported, an increase of 48 over April. There were 72 engagements, four encounters, and 66 sightings. These engagements resulted in the destruction of at least 26 enemy aircraft and one probable with the loss of two 7th AF aircraft. CTF-77 aircraft were credited with six of the 26 kills. In one 12 minute engagement on 20 May, 7th AF pilots destroyed four MIG-17's. This was the longest dogfight of the war and was also the first in which a pilot was credited with two kills. Fifteen additional enemy aircraft were destroyed on the ground during May. MIG activity fell off sharply during the latter part of the month.

(S) SAM Firings. The number of firings in May was assessed at 431, a new record. Seven U.S. aircraft were lost to SAM's during the month. The high thus far was in December 1966 when nine aircraft were downed by SAM's. At the end of May the overall aircraft kill ratio per missile fired was 1:39. By the end of May the total number of SAM's fired in 1967 exceeded the total fired for 1965 and 1966 combined.

(S) Of continuing concern was the enemy's effort to maintain a SAM threat in RP-I. Since a site was discovered and destroyed in RP-I on 29 and 30 April, sporadic ELINT intercepts and occasional sightings of possible SAM associated equipment indicated the continued presence of at least one SAM firing unit in RP-I area. The enemy employed good electronic discipline, excellent camouflage, and frequent movement to avoid detection. Through May, six sites were identified and attacked in RP-I.

(S) June - Again in June, the total attack sorties against targets in NVN increased. During the month 11,526 attack sorties were flown, an increase of 100 over May and 2,611 more than the April total. The continued good weather permitted maximum effort against all fixed targets and LOC's in NVN. Of signal interest was the concentrated program against the enemy's land transportation along the major supply lines from China. The main effort was concentrated primarily on classification yards; however, repair facilities, railroad bridges and adjacent highway bypasses, and support areas were also attacked. The results were

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excellent, particularly in the entrapment of rolling stock and its subsequent destruction. Simultaneous armed reconnaissance of the road and canal structures contributed to intensifying the overall logistical problems in NVN.

(S) The generally good weather in NVN resulted in one of the longest runs of favorable weather conditions since the RT program began. Air attacks were flown in favorable weather on all but a few days of the month, and on those days, the adverse weather was generally in isolated areas. This, combined with the "spread out" nature of LOC targets, resulted in a marked increase in the number of attack sorties in RP-VIA.

(S) ROLLING THUNDER 55 and 56. Again, as in the previous quarter, two new RT operations were implemented - - RT-55 on 22 April and RT-56 on 2 May. Combined, they authorized strikes against 17 JCS targets in the northeast quadrant of NVN.

(S) SAM Firings. The 205 SAM firings reported during June were approximately 50 percent of the record number of 431 SAM's fired during May. This reduction could have resulted from a partial depletion of their stockpile. Although 205 firings represented a decrease and figures of this magnitude are no longer unusual, it should be pointed out that the 200 mark was exceeded only twice during 1966. In 1967 there were only two months when firings were below 200. Two aircraft were lost to SAM's during the month. The overall aircraft kill ratio per missile fired stood at 1:41, while the ratio for 1967 was 1:62.

(S) MIG Activity. After the record level of MIG activity during the first weeks of May, there was a marked decrease in defense reactions. Except for one brief firing pass on 30 May, MIG's engaged U.S. forces on 2 June for the first time since 24 May. During 2 through 10 June, there were a total of 25 engagements which resulted in five MIG's shot down with no U.S. losses. Although MIG aircraft were sighted in the air after 10 June, no attempts were made to engage U.S. aircraft. There were two encounters and 27 sightings during the month in addition to the 25 engagements. The decline in activity reflected the heavy losses inflicted on the enemy earlier during May and early June.

(S) July - The attack sorties in NVN continued at the same high level as in May and June. During July, 11,337 attack sorties were flown as compared with 11,426 during May and 11,526 during June. Emphasis centered on the enemy's transportation system and supply storage areas. The rail systems between the Chinese border and the Hanoi area provided

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
a lucrative target base. Against these systems, U.S. pilots had outstanding success in attacks on boxcars, locomotives, and rail yards.

(S) During July, favorable weather existed in the northern areas of NVN approximately 66 percent of the month. This allowed a record number of attack sorties to be flown in RP-VI. RP-VIA received 14 percent and VIB received 19 percent of the total attack sortie effort. In comparison, during February, at the height of the northeast monsoon, only three percent of the total effort was expended in RP-VIA and only three percent in VIB. At the same time, 64 percent was flown in RP-I during February versus 37 percent in July.

(S) The preponderance of the strikes during July were against the transportation systems with emphasis on the LOCs in the northern regions of NVN. These attacks caused multiple management and logistic problems, reduced the flow of imports into the country, and degraded NVN's capability for sustained large scale military operations in SVN.

(S) Restrikes against the NVN electrical power system during July produced tangible, measurable results. The operations of NVN's chemical, fertilizer, paper and textile plants were seriously curtailed by the power outage. Increasing numbers of portable generators were being utilized throughout the city to furnish emergency power.

(S) ROLLING THUNDER 57. On 20 July, RT-56 was replaced by RT-57. RT-57 authorized sixteen targets for attack. A total of 124 attack sorties were flown against eight of the sixteen targets during the remaining 11 days of July.



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(S) SAM and MIG Activity. In July, 37 aircraft (18 USAF, 18 USN, 1 USMC) were lost in NVN. Of these, six were lost to SAMs (5 USN, 1 USMC) but none were lost to MIGs. Three MIG-17s were destroyed in the air, with one additional MIG-17 and one MIG-21 probably destroyed. The defensive environment in NVN was expected to adjust continually to meet varying attack patterns. Reactions were intensified against forces penetrating closer to the center of the Hanoi and Haiphong complexes.

(S) August - The primary effort during August was directed against the Northeast rail lines. The primary purpose was to isolate Haiphong from Hanoi and Hanoi-Haiphong from the rest of the country and against those LOC's radiating southward to the DMZ. In RP's-VIA and VIB, a total of 2,835 attack sorties were flown with the major portion of this effort directed towards the LOC's. This was 24 percent of the total attack effort expended in NVN during August.

(S) Although the period of favorable flying weather was about 20 percent less than in July, 11,634 attack sorties were flown during August, the highest monthly effort since September 1966. Although weather influenced the effort in the northern RPs, a well balanced campaign was maintained. Twenty-five percent of the August attack effort was expended in RPs-VIA and VIB compared to 33 percent for July. Conversely, the sorties flown in RP-I increased from 38 percent in July to 47 percent in August.



(S) WALLEYE. [redacted] Pilots of the 7th AF utilized the weapon for the first time during August, dropping two spans of a bridge with the first two weapons. Prior to this time, TF-77 pilots possessed the only WALLEYE capability in SEA. [redacted]

The weapon continued to demonstrate excellent accuracy; however, usage was still closely controlled because of the limited number expected to be available in the then immediate future.

(S) SAM and MIG Activity. The enemy defense capability remained nearly the same with AA continuing to be the most effective element of the

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system. During August, 38 U.S. aircraft were downed over NVN. Two U.S. aircraft were lost to MIG's and four MIG's were shot down by U.S. pilots. SAM firings reached a new high in August with 440 sighted. Eight U.S. aircraft were downed by SAM's, a ratio of one loss to 55 SAM's fired as compared with the ratio for May through July of one to 49.

(S) September - The primary effort during September was directed against the Northeast Sector of NVN to include the RT-57 targets and the NE rail lines. In conjunction with the effort against the NE rail lines, the isolation of Haiphong and Hanoi received top priority.

(S) Poor weather in northern NVN severely hampered ROLLING THUNDER operations in that area during September. A total of 8,540 attack sorties were flown throughout NVN as compared with 11,634 total attack sorties flown in August. The poor weather conditions not only restricted the total effort; the distribution of attack sorties was affected by weather cancellations and diverts from the northern to the southern RPs. The sortie effort in RPs-VIA and VIB decreased from 25 percent during August to 18 percent in September. At the same time, the air effort in RP-I increased from 48 percent during August to 56 percent in September. In addition to the weather factor, the high priority assigned to the air support of ground forces in the DMZ area of RP-I accounted for a portion of this increase.

(S) Operation NEUTRALIZE. This operation in the DMZ area in support of the U.S. ground forces commenced on 11 September. From that date through 30 September, a total of 1,064 ordnance delivery sorties were flown. During the period approximately 200 secondary fires and 55 secondary explosions were observed and 124 enemy killed were directly attributed to Operation NEUTRALIZE. Toward the end of the month the withdrawal of large elements of the enemy forces around Con Thien to positions north of the Ben Hai River in the DMZ was noted. On 25 September SEA DRAGON forces were also made available and moved to the DMZ area for naval gunfire support.

(S) Of the 63 total targets authorized during RT-57, 21 were unstruck as of 30 September. Eight of these were in the Hanoi prohibited area, and could not be attacked because of the air strike restriction which began 24 August and continued in effect throughout September. The remaining unstruck targets were repeatedly fragged for strike, but poor operational weather caused diversions and cancellations.

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~~(S)~~ SAM and MIG Activity. During the month there were five new SAM sites detected; however, the number of SAM battalions believed to be in NVN remained at about 30, indicating the NVN were relying on mobility of the existing equipment and personnel to maintain a missile threat. There were 169 reported SAM firings in September resulting in the loss of two U.S. aircraft. This was about one-fourth the record number of 440 fired during August 1967. MIG activity continued increasingly to degrade friendly strikes in NVN. During September, 48 aircraft were forced to jettison their ordnance as a defensive tactic when attacked. This was the highest number jettisoned in any one month in 1967, approximately double the previous high of 28. During the month there were 16 hostile engagements between MIG's and U.S. aircraft which accounted for one U.S. aircraft lost and no MIG's shot down.

~~(S)~~ October - The primary effort during October was in the northeast sector of NVN and the striking of the newly assigned RT-57 Alpha targets. Equal priority was assigned to the isolation of the port of Haiphong from the remainder of NVN through the destruction and disruption of major targets in the vicinity of Haiphong and along the major LOC's leading out of Haiphong. Every attempt was made to maintain a balanced effort in the Southern Route Packages; however, weather had a major effect on air operations in the south, especially RP-I, with numerous missions being cancelled, rescheduled, or diverted to other areas. Operation NEUTRALIZE, the air effort in the DMZ area of RP-I, continued to receive an appreciable weight of effort.

~~(S)~~ A total of 8,987 attack sorties were flown in NVN during October, an increase over the September total of 8,540. Because of the better than anticipated weather in the northern area, the sortie distribution in RPs-VIA and VIB increased from 18 percent during September to 36 percent in October, an increase of 100 percent. Correspondingly, RP-I decreased from 56 percent to 41 percent of the total effort in NVN. The better than planned weather in the northern areas, the poor weather in the Southern Route Packages, and the reduced requirement for support of Operation NEUTRALIZE accounted for the shift in sortie distribution during October.

~~(S)~~ Armed recce operations against logistic vehicles of all types in

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NVN increased over the preceding month. Sightings of logistic vehicles by pilots were up slightly for rail, motor and watercraft. This in turn resulted in an overall increase in the logistic vehicles destroyed or damaged. Rail units destroyed or damaged was up 100 percent over September; highway transport was down approximately 38 percent; and watercraft was up 22 percent. A total of 1,548 logistic vehicles were destroyed or damaged during October as compared to 1,435 in September, an overall increase of eight percent.

(S) Of interest was the dispersion pattern of NVN ~~railroad~~ rolling stock which was observed by study of reconnaissance photography taken during daylight hours on 18 October. The photography revealed the location of 2,079 units of rolling stock, about 95 percent of NVN's estimated inventory. Of the 2,079 units detected, 1,671 were in the sanctuaries of Hanoi, Haiphong, or the buffer zone contiguous to Communist China.

(S) As of 31 October, Annex A of the RTTL contained 420 targets of which 305 had been attacked one or more times. The improved operational weather in the latter third of the month and the lifting of the restriction on targets within 10 miles of Hanoi on the 23rd permitted a 60 percent increase in strike sorties on the RT-57 Alpha targets over last month. A total of 972 sorties were flown against 39 of the RT-57 Alpha targets. In addition to the eight targets in the Hanoi prohibited area released on the 23rd, there were eight new targets added to the RT-57 target list. These add-on's contained seven targets in the immediate Haiphong area plus a port facility near Haiphong. The latter was not struck due to the continuing presence of foreign shipping in the port area. Transportation, power, and air defense systems were dealt severe blows as a consequence of the 23 October authority to re-enter the 10 NM circle around Hanoi and to strike the add-on targets in Haiphong.

(S) NVN Airfields. Strikes against key NVN airfields, including Phuc Yen and Haiphong/Cat Bi for the first time, during the month resulted in a degradation of aircraft installation facilities as well as a rapid decline in the number of enemy fighter aircraft available in-country. Hanoi's international airfield at Gia Lam and the air defense associated equipment at Bac Mai were the remaining key air defense capabilities not yet struck. Although crater repair activities returned the runways of the main jet

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airfields to serviceability, a large part of NVN's aircraft facilities remained destroyed. Vital ground support equipment, including refueling vehicles, starter units, and oxygen and weapons system handling equipment, was believed to have been severely damaged or destroyed.

(S) MIG Activity. From a total of about 25 MIG's present in-country at the beginning of October, no more than about 10 operational aircraft remained at the month's end. A total of 20 MIG aircraft were destroyed or damaged during the month. Two MIG-21 and six MIG-17's were destroyed in the air and 12 MIG-17/21 were destroyed or damaged on the ground during the attacks on Phuc Yen Airfield. Only three U.S. aircraft were downed in aerial combat. Several NVN MIG aircraft were believed to have deployed to China, where an estimated 60-80 were located by the end of the month.

(S) SAM Firings. An estimated total of about 580 SAM's were fired at U.S. aircraft during the month, a new high for monthly totals. The previous high was about 440 SAM's fired during August 1967. Eight U.S. aircraft were destroyed by SAM's or damaged sufficiently to cause pilot ejection, while 13 aircraft received repairable SAM damage. The firing of three SAM's at B-52 aircraft from just north of the DMZ on 29 October confirmed the active SAM threat carried in the DMZ area since June of this year.

(S) November - The primary effort during November was planned for RPs-V and VI with continued emphasis on RT-57 Alpha targets, northeast LOC's and the isolation of Haiphong and Hanoi. Adverse weather throughout November precluded execution of the planned air effort in the northern RPs.

(S) The poorer than average weather resulted in a decrease in total attack sorties in NVN. During November, 7,268 attack sorties were flown as compared with 8,987 in October. The persistently poor weather in the northern RPs resulted in a redistribution of sortie effort within the RPs. During October, RP-VI received 36 percent of the total effort; while in November, RP-VI received only 20 percent. At the same time, the air effort in RP-I increased from 41 percent in October to 52 percent in November. The sortie distribution for the other RPs remained nearly the same as in previous months.

(S) Armed recce operations against logistic vehicles of all types in NVN was at a lower tempo and pilot sightings decreased slightly compared to October's activity. Over 2,200 attack sorties were flown against

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logistic targets, resulting in the destruction or damage to 1,470 units of all types.

(S) In spite of poor weather over the northern RPs, a sufficient number of the critical railroad bridges and bypasses were struck to keep some rail lines closed or in a shuttle status. Although RR #5 and #9 were "open" during the month, the importance of these two rail lines was considerably diminished due to the destruction of much of the Thai Nguyen Industrial Complex. Because of this, the primary effort was directed towards the interdiction of RR #1 and #2 from China, RR #4 and #6 extending south from Hanoi, and RR #3 from Haiphong to Hanoi.

(S) As of 30 November, the ROLLING THUNDER Target List contained 436 targets of which 316 have been struck one or more times. This reflected a change from 420 targets as of 31 October, a net gain of 16 targets. During November, about 300 attack sorties were flown against Alpha targets as compared to about 970 in October, a reduction in effort of nearly 68 percent due to poor weather.

(S) The add-on of 14 targets to the RT-57 Alpha Target List on 8 November increased the list to a total of 85. Of the 85 targets, 25 were struck one or more times during November. Eleven of the 85 targets remained unstruck as of 30 November, primarily due to the adverse weather in the northeast sector. The total damage level to the six basic target systems remained relatively unchanged. The rail and road transportation system from China was partially restored when the repairs were made to the Doumer and Pont des Canal Railroad/Highway Bridges. The restoration time for these two bridges was four to six weeks. The POL system remained at a static 65 percent destroyed, with imports nearly equalling consumption plus losses to U.S. air strikes.



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(S) NVN Airfields. Weather caused the diversion of several strikes against NVN airfields, but all jet-capable airfields except Hanoi's Gia Lam were hit at least once during November. Runways were rendered temporarily unserviceable, but most of these fields were operational by the end of the month. Hanoi's Gia Lam remained on the restricted target list. Enemy fighters were believed to be operating primarily from Phuc Yen, Kep and Gia Lam with alternative use of Chinese Communist airfields for staging.

(S) MIG Activity. From 5-8 November, U.S. aircraft encountered aggressive MIG hit and run tactics, suggesting skilled GCI/pilot operations. Six U.S. aircraft were downed by MIG's during the month. The recent success of MIG-21's against U.S. strike formations was characterized by firing ATOLL air-to-air missiles in a single high speed pass, tail approach intercept. Close GCI coordination and control resulted in positioning the MIG's before positive visual acquisition and the attacks were commenced when the rearmost element in the U.S. formation could be determined. MIG-17's were also noted as being more effective during the period and flights were conducted well outside areas where they had normally been employed in the past. Only two MIG-17's were downed during November. NVN MIG count showed some 15 MIG's in-country with about 60 MIG's in China at the end of November.

(S) SAM Firings. The three SAM's fired at B-52 aircraft from just north of the DMZ on 29 October confirmed the active SAM threat now carried in the DMZ and RP-I area. Although no B-52 aircraft were downed by enemy action, Hanoi claimed the destruction of three of the bombers by SAM's. It was apparent that the B-52 strikes hurt NVN's ground operations in the DMZ area and Hanoi could be expected to maintain a SAM presence there. It was estimated NVN would further expand the SAM threat to the Mu Gia Pass.

(S) December - Weather continued to be the dominant factor influencing ROLLING THUNDER operations during December. With the exception of the 14th through the 19th, poor weather existed during the entire month over most of NVN. The characteristic monsoon condition resulted in ceilings ranging from 500 to 5,000 feet with extensive fog further restricting visibility. As the Northeast monsoon increased in intensity, the attack sorties decreased correspondingly.

(S) A total of 8,987 attack sorties were flown during October and 7,268 during November. The planned effort for December was 9,252 attack sorties of which 5,728 were flown, the difference due either to

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weather cancellations or aborts. Of the sorties flown, approximately half were diverted to other than planned targets or RP areas. Concurrently, with the decrease in sorties and increase in diverts, the distribution of sorties among the RPs continued to decrease in the northern areas and increase in the southern areas.

~~(S)~~ Although the reconnaissance effort was affected by the adverse weather, a total of 1,359 recce sorties were flown, of which 902, or 66 percent, were successful against their assigned targets or areas of coverage. The photo, visual, SLAR and IR reconnaissance effort during the last week of December was accelerated because of the Christmas and New Years stand-down. A concentrated effort was made to monitor logistic vehicle movement just prior to, during, and after the stand-downs.

~~(S)~~ As of 31 December, Annex A to the ROLLING THUNDER Target List contained 450 targets of which 320 had been attacked one or more times. The number of targets in each of the four appendices were: Appendix I - 81; Appendix II - 90; Appendix III - 39; and Appendix IV - 240. This represented a net gain of 14 targets since 30 November. Adverse weather was again responsible for a continuation of the downward trend in Alpha strike sorties to a low of 164 during December as compared to 300 for November and 972 for October. The total damage level to the six basic target systems remained relatively unchanged during the month of December.

~~(S)~~ Strike efforts were concentrated against the complex of highway and railway bridges in Hanoi, Hai Duong and Haiphong. Both the Doumer (JCS-12) and Canal des Rapides (JCS-13) Railway and Highway Bridges at Hanoi were extensively damaged during the period 14-18 December. Based on experience with enemy repair efforts after previous interdictions in August and September, at least four to six weeks would be required to re-open those vital railway and highway bridges. Follow-on strikes seeding DST MK-36 in the vicinity of Canal des Rapides Bridge and the three by-passes associated with the Doumer Bridge complicated reconstruction and impeded the flow of material. Other key LOC targets struck included the Hai Duong Railway and Highway Bridge, Haiphong Highway Bridge and Kien An Highway Bridge. DST MK-36's were also seeded in the vicinity of these key bridges as well as other key waterways vital to the egress of logistics from the Haiphong area. Approximately 3,400 MK-36's had been seeded in RP-VI as of 31 December. Total MK-36's emplaced in NVN along principal LOC's in the month of December was in excess of 7,300.

~~(S)~~ Air strikes were conducted during December on Kien An, Yen Bai,

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Hoa Lac, Kep, and Phuc Yen airfields rendering each of them at various times temporarily unserviceable. However, all major airfields, with the exception of Haiphong/Cat Bi were considered serviceable on 31 December 1967. No strikes were conducted against the power and industrial target systems, and the number of strikes made on POL and military systems were limited because of poor operational weather.

~~(S)~~ Armed recce operations against vehicles of all types in NVN was less than in previous months. Poor weather reduced the tempo of operations and limited pilot sightings of the LOC traffic. The ~~logistic~~ vehicles destroyed or damaged by approximately 1,400 armed recce sorties exceeded 942. Armed recce and strikes against the northern LOC's were limited due to the poor weather conditions with the exception of the few good days in the middle of the month.

~~(S)~~ MIG Activity. MIG engagements during the month indicated an increasing and well coordinated GCI-aircraft effort to intercept U.S. strike forces. On 17 December the NVNAF began to combine reactions by both MIG-17's and MIG-21's during a total of nine engagements. Two days later, there were combination attacks by these types totalling 15 engagements. This effort was characterized by moving the MIG-17's further from their bases instead of holding them in local orbit, by launching more than a pair of MIG-21's in the initial reaction, and by using both MIG-21's and MIG-17's in coordinated high and low passes from more than one quadrant. Multi-directional and successive passes kept U.S. MIG-CAP flights in constant reaction to warning broadcasts as enemy fighters moved into the engagement area. In addition, as CAP flights were drawn off in pursuit, other MIG's attacked from another quadrant. MIG prepositioning varied with the approach pattern of strike forces but usually occurred soon after strike ingress from the western border or when the strike forces reached about 30 miles offshore. When strike ingress did not follow the predicted pattern or when strikes approached from both directions simultaneously, the MIG reaction appeared to be less intense. Four confirmed and one probable enemy fighters (MIG-17's) and three U.S. fighters were downed in air encounters during the period. Two, possibly three, MIG's were destroyed on the ground. Enemy fighter OB at the end of December stood at an estimated 20-25 aircraft in-country.

~~(S)~~ SAM Activity. A total of 246 SAM's were observed firing at U.S. strike forces during December, resulting in the downing of two U.S. aircraft. SAM effectiveness thus dropped drastically from the average aircraft loss ratio to SAM of 1:55 for the entire year.

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Selected ROLLING THUNDER Strikes and Bomb Damage
Assessment (BDA)

(U) The following 1967 strikes were selected as representative of the type targets struck on a daily basis by pilots of the 7th AF and Task Force 77 (TF-77).

~~(S)~~ Thai Nguyen Railroad Spur. This target was struck on 17 and 29 January. On 17 January, 47 sorties expended 227 bombs and 38 CBU cannisters on the target. BDA photos revealed that the classification yard and repair and servicing area received severe damage. In the repair and servicing area where 20 craters were noted, one railroad car and one large transshipment or repair building were destroyed. In the Classification Yard, all tracks were cut, rendering the yard unserviceable. A total of 21 rail cars and two locomotives were either destroyed or damaged. In the area of the spur leading to the steel mill, four rail cars and one large repair building were damaged and the rail spur was interdicted in two places. In summary, a total of 28 pieces of rolling stock, including three locomotives, were destroyed or damaged and two main components of the target were rendered unserviceable.

~~(S)~~ The newly completed rail line between Kep and Thai Nguyen was struck three times by 30 sorties. This was the first time this line was attacked. On 17 January, the most important strike against the line was conducted against a major bridge, the Dong Mue Railroad bridge, and resulted in dropping the center span. This plus the other strikes against the rail line was believed to have resulted in its being closed to through traffic for at least 12 days.

~~(S)~~ Thanh Hoa Rail Complex. Strikes against the Thanh Hoa Rail complex on 4 and 5 February were highly successful. The entire complex required major reconstruction effort before it would be operational again. The rail siding and turning wye were both destroyed as well as the five through tracks. Forty-two associated storage buildings were also destroyed.

~~(S)~~ The 7th Fleet A-6 strikes against an industrial storage area north of the rail yard resulted in 80 percent destruction of the target. During this same period, the Thanh Hoa Railroad-Highway Bridge was again rendered temporarily unserviceable. Moderate damage to the eastern abutment, and approximately 20-25 feet of decking was destroyed. It was estimated that 36-40 hours would be required to effect temporary repairs.

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~~(S)~~ Thai Nguyen Iron and Steel Mill. This major NVN industrial target was struck on 10 and 11 March. Assessment for both strikes revealed the following damage:

- a. Coal-Ore Open Storage. Two conveyors and one steam line collapsed, four rail lines interdicted and one crane damaged.
- b. Sintering Plant. Heavy damage to the conveyor.
- c. Foundry and Machine Shop Area. Heavy damage to one light machine shop. Direct hits on three foundries with undetermined internal damage.
- d. Administration Area. Heavy damage to one administration building.
- e. Thermal Power Plant. Light damage to steam line and possible damage to power plant from near miss.
- f. Open Hearth. Three direct hits on building, probable heavy damage internally.
- g. Firebrick Production. Heavy damage to one production building and one support building. Roof damage to three support buildings, and two material preparation buildings adjacent to the area also sustained heavy damage.
- h. Rolling Mill. Three direct hits on the rolling mill with probable heavy internal damage.

~~(S)~~ Viet Tri Thermal Power Plant. This target was struck for the first time on 12 March. Pilots reported one large secondary explosion from the generator hall boiler house and numerous fires. A photograph taken during the second strike on 19 March revealed that the generator and boiler house sustained heavy damage with interiors gutted by fire on the 12 March strike. Also, the coal treatment building was destroyed and the transformer yard sustained heavy damage.

~~(S)~~ Hon Gai Explosive Storage Area. This target was struck twice on 10 March and once on 11 March. BDA photography acquired after the second strike on 10 March indicates that of the 12 explosive storage buildings, two were destroyed and four damaged. Overall, approximately 24 percent of the explosive storage area was destroyed.

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(S) Hanoi Railroad Car Repair Yard. This JCS target was attacked by F-105's dropping 500, 750 and 3,000 pound bombs on the 25th and 28th of April with excellent results. A total of 48 buildings were destroyed and 26 damaged. In addition, six pieces of rolling stock were destroyed and two locomotives damaged in the marshalling yard. An estimated 85 percent of the target was destroyed or damaged.

(S) Hanoi Railroad and Highway Bridge. This JCS target was struck on the 26th and 29th of April. BDA coverage obtained on 30 April revealed two spans were dropped and the target was classified as ~~un~~re-viceable. Damage was evidently caused by a direct hit which destroyed the supporting concrete pier.

(S) Hoa Lac Airfield. The harassment and disruption of Hoa Lac Airfield continued during this period with strikes on 8, 19 and 21 May. Photography obtained on 20 May revealed four craters interdicting the runway. Two dummy MIG-21's and a dismantled MIG-17 were located in the dispersed revetments.

(S) Northeast Rail Line. The Yen Vien Railroad Classification Yard, Vu Chua Railroad Yards, Bac Le Railroad Yard, Bac Giang Railroad Yard, and Kep Railroad Yards #1 and #2 were struck on 21 May. Pilots reported these yards interdicted and 48 of the 73 pieces of rolling stock sighted were destroyed or damaged. A BDA photo of Kep Railroad Yard #1 showed impact points throughout the yard and all rails in the yard severed. At least five pieces of rolling stock were destroyed or damaged.

On the same day, prestrike photos revealed 27 pieces of rolling stock occupying Bac Giang Railroad Yard. Post-strike BDA taken on 21 May revealed that all rail lines in the yard were interdicted. Six pieces of rolling stock were destroyed. As a result of efforts along the Northeast Rail Line, through traffic on this vital LOC was undoubtedly hampered.

(S) Nguyen Khe Storage Area. This target was struck on 12, 14, and 22 May with combinations of CBU's and GP bombs. Aircraft attacking this facility on 14 May obtained strike photography which showed bomb impacts covering almost the entire open storage and warehouse area. BDA of 20 May revealed that in Area 1, two buildings were destroyed and two heavily damaged. In Area 2, open storage, the rail lines were interdicted and six buildings were destroyed and three damaged. A morning follow-on strike was conducted on 22 May. Pilots reported that Area 1 appeared to be completely destroyed and wide-spread damage in Area 2.

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~~(S)~~ Thai Nguyen Iron Ore Processing Plant. This target was struck on 18 June by eight aircraft dispensing 36X750 bombs and eight CBU's. Subsequent strikes on 28 June caused extensive additional damage to this facility.

~~(S)~~ Ha Gia Railroad Bridge. The bridge is 329 feet in length and is on the Thai-Nguyen to Hanoi Rail Line (RR #5). Post-strike photos taken on 12 June verified pilot reports of severe structural damage and that the southern span had been dropped. Surveillance photography obtained on 19 June revealed that the bridge was still unserviceable; however, 21 June coverage showed that a new span had been completed and the bridge was serviceable. The time lapse between destruction of the target and serviceability confirmed the estimate of 6-10 days to repair this type of bridge.

~~(S)~~ Kep Airfield. Kep Airfield was struck by two waves of CTF-77 aircraft on 7 June. BDA photography obtained during and immediately after the strike revealed three craters on the northeast end of the runway and two additional craters adjacent to the runway, plus five damaged MIG 15/17's.

~~(S)~~ Phu Xuyen RR Yard. Struck on 1 July and 27 pieces of rolling stock were destroyed or damaged. In addition, extensive damage was inflicted on the rail lines throughout the yard.

~~(S)~~ Son Tay Army Barracks. This target was struck on 28 July and 1 August. BDA coverage obtained on 2 August showed the total damage obtained by both strikes. A total of 25 buildings were destroyed or damaged.

~~(S)~~ Bac Giang TPP. Strikes against the electrical power system were conducted as part of the continuing effort to insure that this vital system remained unserviceable. The Bac Giang TPP was struck on 1 August and heavily damaged.

~~(S)~~ Kep Railroad Yard #1 and #2. The Kep RR Yards were struck on 1, 4 and 5 October. Twenty-two pieces of rolling stock were destroyed or damaged in Yard #2 and 21 units in Yard #1.

~~(S)~~ Phuc Yen Airfield. Coordinated PACAF-PACFLT strikes against Phuc Yen Airfield commenced on the afternoon of 24 October, followed by combined restrike action on the 25th. A total of 12 MIG's were destroyed or damaged, the main runway received 39 craters, and extensive damage

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occurred in the adjacent revetted area.

~~(S)~~ Uong Bi Thermal Power Plant. The Uong Bi TPP was subjected to strikes on 26 and 30 October. A total of four WALLEYES were expended with two directed against the boilerhouse, one against the transformer yard, and one against the generator hall. BDA photography of 30 October revealed severe damage to the boilerhouse with two boilers probably heavily damaged and one moderately damaged. The water intake was interdicted and the transformer yard cratered.

~~(S)~~ Hanoi Transformer Station. On 6 November, strike aircraft completed the destruction of the already heavily damaged Hanoi Transformer Station. Post-strike coverage disclosed the remains of the switch house.

~~(S)~~ Hanoi Bac Mai Airfield. The primary objectives of the Bac Mai Airfield strike of 17 November were the Air Force Headquarters' underground bunker and the communications buildings. A total of 52 buildings were destroyed or damaged with a direct hit on the underground bunker. The communications buildings were also damaged as were several barracks adjacent to the runway.

~~(S)~~ Hanoi Concrete Products Plant. On 19 November, the Hanoi Concrete Products Plant was struck with approximately 65 percent of the target sustaining damage. Additionally, seven buildings in the target area were destroyed or damaged.

~~(S)~~ Duc Noi Railroad Yard. The Duc Noi Railroad Yard, six miles north of Hanoi, was struck on 20 November. A total of 20 units of rolling stock was damaged or destroyed during the attack in addition to numerous rail interdictions.

~~(S)~~ Hanoi RR-Highway Bridge Over Red River. Damage was inflicted on the Hanoi RR-Highway Bridge by strikes conducted between 14-18 December. The 4th, 5th and 6th spans, which comprised an 800 foot over water section of the bridge, were destroyed while the 2nd and 7th spans were damaged.

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Effectiveness of Bombing North Vietnam¹

(U) "...Some people say that the bombing was supposed to stop infiltration -- but infiltration continues -- therefore, that bombing is a failure. We did not expect to stop infiltration. We did expect to reduce the flow of goods, thus limiting the number of troops that he could support and force the enemy into a tremendous logistic effort. This we have done. Over one million workers and troops are assigned to defense, repair and reconstruction tasks."²

Admiral U. S. G. Sharp

~~(S)~~ The major effect of the bombing attacks in NVN has been and continued to be the forcing of Hanoi to accommodate to the disruption of normal economic activity and its war making potential. Attacks on NVN's transportation and distribution system, power system, war supporting industry and military and port complexes reduced NVN's capability to sustain overt military operations in SVN.³

~~(S)~~ The bombing of the rail, road and waterway nets forced Hanoi to divert some 500,000 to 660,000 civilians from full-time and part-time war related jobs to reconstruction of this system. The diversion of the people from the agriculture sector resulted in lower food production which necessitated a sharp increase in food imports. The bombing attacks on NVN caused Hanoi to rely more and more on external assistance.⁴

~~(S)~~ Despite the bombing there was no indication that the leadership⁵ in Hanoi was being forced to the wall. All evidence indicated that NVN leaders still exercised firm control over the populace.

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1. Point Paper, J2222 (CINCPAC), 3 Aug 67, Subject: Effectiveness of Bombing - NVN (U).
 2. Address by Admiral U. S. G. Sharp, CINCPAC, before the delegates of the 41st Annual Convention of the Propeller Club and the American Merchant Marine Conference, Royal Hawaiian Hotel, Honolulu, Hawaii, 11 October 1967.
 3. Point Paper, J2222, (CINCPAC), 3 Aug 67, Subject: Effectiveness of Bombing - NVN (U).
 4. Ibid.
 5. Ibid.

Requirement for Improved All-Weather Capability

(TS) Southeast Asia's monsoonal climate with attendant limited visibility conditions and the necessity to apply constantly increasing pressure on NVN required sufficient all-weather aircraft to be available to conduct 24 hour operations. The A-6A was the only aircraft that was effectively utilized for night all-weather bombing.¹



US Navy Photo

The Navy and Marine A-6A provided a true all-weather bombing capability in Southeast Asia. During the northeast monsoon, these aircraft insured that US air presence was maintained over North Vietnam.

(TS) In addition to the A-6A, the MSQ-77 and the TPQ-10 were used for all-weather strikes. However, these systems could not provide a capability against targets in RP-II, III, IV, V or VI, due to their limited range and the mountainous terrain. Both systems were effective only

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1. Point Paper J3B14 (CINCPAC) 13 Jul 67, Subject: "Requirements for All-Weather Bombing Capability (U)."; CINCPAC 240315Z Mar 67; CINCPAC 082145Z Apr 67.

against fixed targets and controlled only one aircraft each five minutes. ¹

~~(IS)~~ To increase the all-weather capability, CINCPAC directed those III MAF A-6 assets with full systems operational be made available and employed in the ROLLING THUNDER program in support of 7th AF and CTF 77 with the following provisions: ²

a. Support of USMC ground forces would have highest and overriding priority. Command and control procedures to remain effective and aircraft would continue to operate from their ~~present~~ bases.

b. Marine A-6 aircraft made available by COMUSMACV, would support CTF 77 and 7th AF with strikes against targets in the RT area north of RP-I.

c. In view of CTF 77 experience with A-6 operations, Marine A-6 strikes for an initial four to six weeks would be coordinated with CTF 77 and conducted in CTF 77 area of responsibility.

d. After initial shakedown with CTF 77, Marine A-6 aircraft made available by COMUSMACV would be utilized against most suitable targets available, with target selection and coordination as agreed to by the 7th AF - CTF 77 Coordination Committee.

e. When full system A-6 aircraft were made available for operations North of RP-I, COMUSMACV would receive compensatory support as required: CTF 77 would provide A-1/A-4 aircraft for strikes in-country, Laos, or RP-I; 7th AF Thai based aircraft would provide strikes in Laos or RP-I.

~~(IS)~~ On 8 April, CINCPAC notified the JCS of his requirement for additional all-weather aircraft and the action he had taken with regard to the III MAF A-6A's. In view of the demonstrated all-weather capability, he recommended to the JCS that additional A-6A's be assigned to CVA's deployed to SEASIA by increasing the nine plane squadrons to 15 plane squadrons. He pointed out that a minimum of 30 A-6 aircraft should be aboard CVA's at Point YANKEE. ³

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1. Point Paper J3B14 (CINCPAC) 13 Jul 67, Subject: "Requirements for All-Weather Bombing Capability (U)."; CINCPAC 240315Z Mar 67; CINCPAC 082145Z Apr 67.
 2. CINCPAC 240315Z Mar 67.
 3. CINCPAC 082145Z Apr 67.

Deployment of F-111 to Southeast Asia

(TS) In the JCS memorandum 371-67 of 11 August 1967, the JCS notified CINCPAC that the SECDEF had approved the proposed combat testing of the F-111 in Southeast Asia. The plan for deployment of six F-111 was called Project COMBAT LANCER and the tentative readiness deployment date was 15 January 1968.

(TS) In October a JCS review of the status of Project COMBAT LANCER indicated the 15 January 1968 deployment date was feasible. Personnel manning was established at 32 officers, 310 enlisted and 35 contractor engineering technical service personnel and the bed-down base would be Takhili, Thailand for a 179 day TDY operational test. It was planned that the F-111 would be employed in single-aircraft sorties day or night against high-value radar targets in North Vietnam and Laos. ¹

(TS) The final decision on the deployment readiness of Project COMBAT LANCER would be dependent upon the results of a USAF operational readiness pre-overseas movement inspection scheduled for 11-15 December 1967. ²

ROLLING THUNDER Charts

(U) ROLLING THUNDER charts on the following pages were prepared in order to provide a ready reference for the user of this history. These charts cover the following categories of data:

- a. US/VNAF sorties.
- b. USAF, USN and USMC attack sorties by type aircraft.
- c. USAF, USN and USMC aircraft attrition rate by type aircraft and type loss.
- d. Enemy air-to-air attrition.
- e. Enemy losses by target category.
- f. Disposition of tactical aircraft units.

1. J3 Brief No. 323-67, CINCPAC CS #000712-67, Subject: "Deployment of the F-111 to Southeast Asia (JCSM-688-67 of 20 Nov 67(S) [sic]"


2. Ibid.

(U) It should be noted that there is an occasional minor discrepancy between the narrative and the charts. This is due primarily to the change from an unknown status to another status as a result of an update in the OPREP-5 report.

~~(S)~~ It is quite possible and probable that discrepancies exist between the data presented here and the data published by the Services. However, it is very doubtful if the discrepancies are flagrant. The data for the following charts are taken from the OPREP-5 and are as accurate as the report.

(U) ROLLING THUNDER chronology. A chronology of ROLLING THUNDER operations was prepared by Commander T. Barkley Wood, USN, J3A52, this headquarters and covers the period 10 July 1964 through 31 December 1967. This chronology is published as Appendix 1, to this chapter, to preserve it for posterity.

US/VNAF SORTIES-ALL SERVICES ROLLING THUNDER 1967



SOURCE: LTC G. W. COWAN, USAF, J3A528-CINCPAC

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USAF SORTIES 1967
SORTIES BY TYPE AIRCRAFT

| Aircraft | Combat Sorties | | | | |
|------------|----------------|----------------|------------|-------|-------|
| | @ Attack | CAP/ Escort | # Recce | Other | Total |
| USAF A-1 | 287 | 92 | 1 | 159 | 539 |
| A-26 | 42 | 1 | | | 43 |
| A-37 | | | | | |
| AC/RC-47 | 4 | | 472 | 35 | 511 |
| F-4 | 27066 | 3732 | 14 | 195 | 31007 |
| F-5 | | | | | |
| F-100 | 191 | 4 | 75 | 534 | 804 |
| F-102 | | 62 | | | 62 |
| F-104 | 2 | 1604 | | | 1606 |
| F-105 | 25672 | 111 | 10 | 9 | 25802 |
| B-57 | 952 | 1 | | | 953 |
| RB-57 | | | 3 | 1 | 4 |
| EB/RB-66 | | | 661 | 5134 | 5795 |
| RF-4 | | 1 | 6411 | 435 | 6847 |
| RF-101 | | | 2967 | 2 | 2969 |
| EC-121 | | | 1 | 941 | 942 |
| C-123 | | | | 7 | 7 |
| C/HC-130 | | | 581 | 856 | 1437 |
| EC/KC-135 | | | 10 | 13358 | 13368 |
| T-28 | 78 | | | | 78 |
| O-1/2 | | | | 5819 | 5819 |
| C-97 | | | | 1 | 1 |
| Helos | | 3 | | 187 | 190 |
| TOTAL USAF | 54294 | 5611 | 11206 | 27673 | 98784 |

@ Includes: Strike, Armed Recce and Flak Supp.

Includes: Visual, Photo, IR, Elint, Slar, RDF/E1

Source: LTC G. W. Cowan, USAF, J3A528 - CINCPAC: OPREP-5.

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USN/USMC SORTIES 1967
SORTIES BY TYPE AIRCRAFT

| Aircraft | Combat Sorties | | | | |
|------------|----------------|----------------|------------|-------|-------|
| | @ Attack | CAP/ Escort | # Recce | Other | Total |
| USN/AEA-1 | 3124 | 2513 | 175 | 3033 | 8845 |
| A/EA/RA-3 | 3 | | 884 | 5066 | 5953 |
| A-4 | 29968 | 126 | 282 | 2391 | 32767 |
| A/EA-6 | 3225 | 1 | 22 | 34 | 3282 |
| F-4 | 3847 | 7663 | 272 | 61 | 11843 |
| F-8 | 2556 | 6138 | 245 | 217 | 9156 |
| RA-5 | | | 1057 | 150 | 1207 |
| RF-8 | | 1 | 1226 | 2 | 1229 |
| E-1 | | | 2 | 1449 | 1451 |
| E-2 | | | | 1494 | 1494 |
| C-1 | | | | 7 | 7 |
| A-7 | 204 | 18 | | 55 | 277 |
| Helos | | 25 | | 500 | 525 |
| TOTAL USN | 42927 | 16485 | 4165 | 14459 | 78036 |
| USMC A-4 | 2117 | 5 | | | 2122 |
| A/EA-6 | 2894 | 5 | 2 | 1033 | 3934 |
| F-4 | 2878 | 82 | 2 | 3 | 2965 |
| F-8 | 1078 | | | 2 | 1080 |
| F-9 | 9 | 1 | | 5 | 15 |
| RF-4 | | | 473 | 5 | 478 |
| EF-10 | | | | 2294 | 2294 |
| TOTAL USMC | 8976 | 93 | 477 | 3342 | 12888 |

@ Includes: Strike, Armed Recce and Flak Supp.

Includes: Visual, Photo, IR, Elint, Slar, RDF/E1

Source: LTC G. W. Cowan, USAF, J3A528 - CINCPAC; OPREP-5.

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USAF AIRCRAFT ATTRITION 1967
(By Type Aircraft)

| Aircraft | Aircraft Losses | | | | |
|------------|-----------------|-------|--------|------|-----------------|
| | Combat | | | OPNL | Total Rate % |
| | ATK | Other | Rate % | | |
| USAF A-1 | 2 | 1 | .56 | | .56 |
| A-26 | | | | | |
| A-37 | | | | | |
| AC/RC-47 | | | | | |
| F-4 | 44 | 16 | .19 | 1 | .20 |
| F-5 | | | | | |
| F-100 | | 4 | .50 | | .50 |
| F-102 | | | | | |
| F-104 | | | | 3 | .19 |
| F-105 | 93 | | .36 | 1 | .36 |
| B-57 | 2 | | .21 | | .21 |
| RB-57 | | | | | |
| EB/RB-66 | | 1 | .02 | | .02 |
| RF-4 | | 17 | .26 | 1 | .26 |
| RF-101 | | 6 | .20 | | .20 |
| EC-121 | | | | | |
| C-123 | | | | | |
| C/HC-130 | | | | | |
| EC/KC-135 | | | | | |
| T-28 | 1 | | 1.28 | | 1.28 |
| O-1/2 | | 3 | .05 | | .05 |
| C-97 | | | | | |
| Helos | | 1 | .53 | | .53 |
| TOTAL USAF | 142 | 49 | .19 | 6* | .20 |

* Operational loss of 25 Thailand based aircraft not included.

Source: LTC G. W. Cowan, USAF, J3A528 - CINCPAC; OPREP-5.

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USAF AIRCRAFT ATTRITION 1967
SAM Combat Losses By Type Aircraft - NVN

| Aircraft | Jan | Feb | Mar | Apr | May | Jun | Jul | Aug | Sep | Oct | Nov | Dec | Total |
|------------|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-------|
| F-4 | 2 | | 1 | | | | | | | 1 | | | 4 |
| F-105 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 3 | | | | | 3 | 7 | | 17 |
| EB/RB-66 | | 1 | | | | | | | | | | | 1 |
| RF-4 | | | | | | | | 1 | 1 | | 2 | | 4 |
| RF-101 | | | | | | 1 | | 1 | | | | | 2 |
| O-1/2 | | | | | 1 | | | | | | | | 1 |
| TOTAL USAF | 3 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 4 | 1 | | 2 | 1 | 4 | 9 | | 29 |

MIG Combat Losses by Type Aircraft - NVN

| Aircraft | Jan | Feb | Mar | Apr | May | Jun | Jul | Aug | Sep | Oct | Nov | Dec | Total |
|------------|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-------|
| USAF A-1 | | | | 1 | | | | | | | | | 1 |
| F-4 | | | | | 2 | 1 | | 2 | | 1 | 1 | 2 | 9 |
| F-105 | | | | 5 | | | | | | 2 | 3 | 1 | 11 |
| RF-101 | | | | | | | | | 1 | | | | 1 |
| TOTAL USAF | | | | 6 | 2 | 1 | | 2 | 1 | 3 | 4 | 3 | 22 |

Source: LTC G. W. Cowan, USAF, J3A528 - CINCPAC OPREP-5.

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USAF AIRCRAFT ATTRITION 1967
GROUND FIRE Combat Losses By Type Aircraft - NVN

| Aircraft | Jan | Feb | Mar | Apr | May | Jun | Jul | Aug | Sep | Oct | Nov | Dec | Total |
|--|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-------|
| USAF A-1 | | | | | | 1 | | | | | | | 1 |
| F-4 | 2 | | | 3 | 5 | 5 | 3 | 6 | 3 | 2 | 3 | 2 | 34 |
| F-100 | | | | | | | | 1 | | | 1 | 1 | 3 |
| F-105 | 1 | | 5 | 4 | 4 | 5 | 10 | 7 | 3 | 10 | 4 | | 53 |
| B/RB-57 | | | | | | | | | 1 | | | | 1 |
| RF-4 | | | 1 | | | | | | 1 | | 1 | | 3 |
| RF-101 | | 1 | | | | | | | | | | | 1 |
| T-28 | | | | | | | 1 | | | | | | 1 |
| O-1/2 | | 1 | | | | | | | | | 1 | | 2 |
| HH-3 | | 1 | | | | | | | | | | | 1 |
| TOTAL USAF | 3 | 3 | 6 | 7 | 9 | 11 | 14 | 14 | 8 | 12 | 10 | 3 | 100 |
| UNKNOWN Combat Losses By Type Aircraft - NVN | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Aircraft | Jan | Feb | Mar | Apr | May | Jun | Jul | Aug | Sep | Oct | Nov | Dec | Total |
| USAF A-1 | | | | | | | | 1 | | | | | 1 |
| F-4 | | | 3 | | | 2 | 2 | 2 | | 1 | 2 | 1 | 13 |
| F-5 | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| F-100 | | | | | | | | | | | | 1 | 1 |
| F-105 | 2 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 3 | | 1 | | | 1 | | 1 | 12 |
| B/RB-57 | | | | | | 1 | | | | | | | 1 |
| EB/RB-66 | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| RF-4 | 4 | | | 1 | | | 1 | 2 | 1 | | 1 | | 10 |
| RF-101 | | | | | 1 | | | | 1 | | | | 2 |
| TOTAL USAF | 6 | 1 | 5 | 2 | 4 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 2 | 2 | 3 | 3 | 40 |

Source: LTC G. W. Cowan, USAF, J3A528 - CINCPAC; OPREP-5.

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USAF AIRCRAFT ATTRITION 1967
OPERATIONAL Losses By Type Aircraft - NVN

| Aircraft | Jan | Feb | Mar | Apr | May | Jun | Jul | Aug | Sep | Oct | Nov | Dec | Total |
|--|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-------|
| F-4 | | | | | | | | | 1 | | | | 1 |
| F-104 | 2 | | | | 1 | | | | | | | | 3 |
| F-105 | | | | | | | | | | 1 | | | 1 |
| RF-4 | | | | | | | | | | 1 | | | 1 |
| TOTAL USAF | 2 | | | | 1 | | | | 1 | 2 | | | 6 |
| OPERATIONAL Losses By Type Aircraft - THAILAND | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Aircraft | Jan | Feb | Mar | Apr | May | Jun | Jul | Aug | Sep | Oct | Nov | Dec | Total |
| USAF A-1 | 1 | | 1 | | | | | | | | | | 1 |
| F-4 | | | 1 | 1 | 1 | 2 | | | 1 | 2 | | | 8 |
| F-102 | 1 | | | | | | | | | | | | 1 |
| F-104 | 1 | | | | | | | | | | | | 1 |
| F-105 | | | 1 | 1 | | | 1 | | 2 | 6 | | | 11 |
| EB/RB-66 | | | | | | | | | | | 1 | 1 | 2 |
| RF-101 | | | 1 | | | | | | | | | | 1 |
| TOTAL USAF | 3 | | 3 | 2 | 1 | 2 | 1 | | 3 | 8 | 1 | 1 | 25 |

Source: LTC G. W. Cowan, USAF, J3A528 - CINCPAC; OPREP-5.

USN/USMC AIRCRAFT ATTRITION 1967
(By Type Aircraft)

| Aircraft | Aircraft Losses | | | | |
|-------------------|-----------------|-----------|------------|-----------|-----------------|
| | Combat | | | OPNL | Total Rate % |
| | ATK | Other | Rate % | | |
| USN A/EA-1 | 5 | | .06 | 5 | .11 |
| A/EA/RA-3 | 1 | 1 | .03 | 3 | .08 |
| A-4 | 67 | | .20 | 16 | .25 |
| A/EA-6 | 9 | | .27 | | .27 |
| F-4 | 12 | 10 | .19 | 14 | .30 |
| F-8 | 9 | 8 | .19 | 8 | .27 |
| RA-5 | | 4 | .33 | 4 | .66 |
| RF-8 | | 2 | .16 | | .16 |
| E-1 | | | | 1 | .07 |
| E-2 | | | | | |
| C-1 | | | | | |
| A-7 | 1 | | .36 | | .36 |
| Helos | | 2 | .38 | 3 | .95 |
| TOTAL USN | 104 | 27 | .17 | 54 | .24 |
| USMC A-4 | 4 | | .19 | | .19 |
| A/EA-6 | 4 | | .10 | | .10 |
| F-4 | 3 | | .10 | | .10 |
| F-8 | | | | | |
| F-9 | | | | | |
| RF-4 | | | | | |
| EF-10 | | | | | |
| TOTAL USMC | 11 | | .07 | | .07 |

Source: LTC G. W. Cowan, USAF, J3A528 - CINCPAC; OPREP-5.

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USN/USMC AIRCRAFT ATTRITION 1967
SAM Combat Losses By Type Aircraft - NVN

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| Aircraft | Jan | Feb | Mar | Apr | May | Jun | Jul | Aug | Sep | Oct | Nov | Dec | Total |
|----------------|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-------|
| USN A/EA-1 | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| A/EA/RA-3 | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| A-4 | | | 1 | 4 | 2 | 1 | 3 | 4 | 1 | 2 | 1 | | 19 |
| A/EA-6 | | | | | 1 | | | 1 | | | | 1 | 3 |
| F-4 | | | | | 2 | | | 1 | | 1 | 1 | | 5 |
| F-8 | | | | | 1 | | 2 | | | 1 | | | 4 |
| A-7 | | | | | | | | | | | | 1 | 1 |
| SH-3 | | | | | | | 1 | | | | | | 1 |
| TOTAL USN | | | 1 | 4 | 6 | 1 | 6 | 6 | 1 | 4 | 2 | 2 | 33 |
| USMC A-4 | | | | | | | 1 | | | | | | 1 |
| TOTAL USMC | | | | | | | 1 | | | | | | 1 |
| TOTAL USN/USMC | | | 1 | 4 | 6 | 1 | 7 | 6 | 1 | 4 | 2 | 2 | 34 |

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MIG Combat Losses By Type Aircraft - NVN

| Aircraft | Jan | Feb | Mar | Apr | May | Jun | Jul | Aug | Sep | Oct | Nov | Dec | Total |
|----------------|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-------|
| A-4 | | | | | | | | | | | | | 1 |
| F-4 | | | | | | | | | | | | 2 | 2 |
| TOTAL USN | | | | | 1 | | | | | | | 2 | 3 |
| TOTAL USMC | | | | | | | | | | | | | 0 |
| TOTAL USN/USMC | | | | | 1 | | | | | | | 2 | 3 |

Source: LTC G. W. Cowan. USAF, J3A528 - CINCPAC; OPREP-5.

USN/USMC AIRCRAFT ATTRITION RATE 1967
GROUND FIRE Combat Losses By Type Aircraft - NVN

| Aircraft | Jan | Feb | Mar | Apr | May | Jun | Jul | Aug | Sep | Oct | Nov | Dec | Total |
|----------------|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-------|
| USN A/EA-1 | | | | | 1 | | 1 | | | | | | 2 |
| A/EA/RA-3 | | | | | | | | | | 1 | | | 1 |
| A-4 | 2 | | | 2 | 8 | 1 | 6 | 2 | | 5 | 1 | | 27 |
| A/EA-6 | 1 | | | 1 | | | | | | | | | 2 |
| F-4 | | 1 | | 1 | 1 | 1 | | 1 | | | | 2 | 7 |
| F-8 | 1 | | | 1 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 1 | | 1 | | 1 | 10 |
| RA-5 | | 1 | 1 | | | | | 1 | | | | | 3 |
| RF-8 | | | | | | 1 | | | 1 | | | | 2 |
| TOTAL USN | 4 | 2 | 1 | 5 | 12 | 5 | 8 | 5 | 1 | 7 | 1 | 3 | 54 |
| USMC A-4 | | | 1 | | | | | 1 | 1 | | | | 3 |
| F-4 | | | | | | | | | 1 | | | | 1 |
| TOTAL USMC | | | 1 | | | | | 1 | 2 | | | | 4 |
| TOTAL USN/USMC | 4 | 2 | 2 | 5 | 12 | 5 | 8 | 6 | 3 | 7 | 1 | 3 | 58 |

UNKNOWN Combat Losses By Type Aircraft - NVN

| Aircraft | Jan | Feb | Mar | Apr | May | Jun | Jul | Aug | Sep | Oct | Nov | Dec | Total |
|----------------|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-------|
| USN A/EA-1 | | | 3 | | | | | | | | | | 3 |
| A/EA/RA-3 | | | 1 | | | | | | | | | | 1 |
| A-4 | 3 | | 1 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 5 | 1 | | 4 | 1 | 1 | 20 |
| A/EA-6 | | | 1 | | | | | 2 | | | 1 | | 4 |
| F-4 | 1 | 1 | | 1 | 1 | 1 | | | | 1 | 1 | 1 | 8 |
| F-8 | | | 1 | | 1 | 1 | | | | | | | 3 |
| RA-8 | | | | | 1 | | | | | | | | 1 |
| SH-3 | | | | | 1 | | | | | | | | 1 |
| TOTAL USN | 4 | 1 | 7 | 2 | 5 | 4 | 5 | 3 | | 5 | 3 | 2 | 41 |
| USMCA-4 | | | | | | | | | | | | | 0 |
| A/EA-6 | | | | 1 | | | | 1 | | 1 | 1 | | 4 |
| F-4 | | | | | | | | | 1 | 1 | | | 2 |
| TOTAL USMC | | | | 1 | | | | 1 | 1 | 2 | 1 | | 6 |
| TOTAL USN/USMC | 4 | 1 | 7 | 2 | 5 | 4 | 5 | 4 | 1 | 7 | 4 | 2 | 47 |

Source: LTC G. W. Cowan, USAF, J3A528 - CINCPAC; OPREP-5.

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
USN/USMC AIRCRAFT ATTRITION 1967
Operational Losses By Type Aircraft - NVN

| Aircraft | Jan | Feb | Mar | Apr | May | Jun | Jul | Aug | Sep | Oct | Nov | Dec | Total |
|-----------------------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|-----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|-----------|
| USN A/EA-1 | 1 | 1 | 2 | | | | | 1 | | | | | 5 |
| A/EA/RA-3 | | | | | | | 1 | | | 1 | 1 | | 3 |
| A-4 | | 1 | 1 | | | | 11* | 2 | 1 | | | | 16 |
| F-4 | 1 | 2 | | 2 | 1 | | 7* | | | 1 | | | 14 |
| F-8 | | 1 | 2 | | 1 | 1 | 1 | | 2 | | | | 8 |
| RA-5 | | | | | | | 3* | 1 | | | | | 4 |
| E-1 | | | | | | | | | | 1 | | | 1 |
| SH-3/UH-2 | | | | | | | | 1 | | 1 | | 1 | 3 |
| TOTAL USN | 2 | 5 | 5 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 23 | 5 | 3 | 4 | 1 | 1 | 54 |
| TOTAL USMC | | | | | | | | | | | | | 0 |
| TOTAL USN/USMC | 2 | 5 | 5 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 23 | 5 | 3 | 4 | 1 | 1 | 54 |

* USN: 11-A4, 7-F4, 3 RA5 destroyed by fire/salt water on CVA.


Source: LTC G. W. Cowan, USAF, J3A528 - CINCPAC; OPREP-5.

U.S. LOSS RATES - NVN - CY 67




SOURCE. LTC G.W. COWAN. USAF. J3A528-CINCPAC

USAF LOSS RATES - NVN - CY 67




SOURCE: LTC G.W. COWAN, USAF, J3A528-CINCPAC

USN LOSS RATES - NVN - CY 67




SOURCE: LTC G.W. COWAN, USAF, J3A528-CINCPAC

USMC LOSS RATES - NVN - CY 67



SOURCE: LTC G.W. COWAN, USAF. J3A528-CINCPAC

VNAF LOSS RATES - NVN - CY 67



SOURCE: LTC G.W. COWAN, USAF, J3A528-CINCPAC

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ENEMY AIR-TO-AIR ATTRITION 1967*

| Month | USAF | | USN | | USMC | | TOTAL | |
|-------|------|-----|------|------|------|------|-------|------|
| | Con. | Pro | Con. | Pro. | Con. | Pro. | Con. | Pro. |
| JAN | 9 | | | | | | 9 | 0 |
| FEB | | | | | | | 0 | 0 |
| MAR | 2 | | | | | | 2 | 0 |
| APR | 8 | 2 | 1 | 1 | | | 9 | 3 |
| MAY | 20 | 1 | 6 | | | | 26 | 1 |
| JUN | 5 | 3 | | | | | 5 | 3 |
| JUL | | 1 | 3 | 1 | | | 3 | 2 |
| AUG | 2 | | 2 | | | | 4 | 0 |
| SEP | | 1 | | | | | 0 | 1 |
| OCT | 6 | 1 | 2 | | | | 8 | 1 |
| NOV | 3 | | | | | | 3 | 0 |
| DEC | 3 | 2 | 1 | | | | 4 | 2 |
| TOTAL | 58 | 11 | 15 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 73 | 13 |

* In addition to air-to-air losses ten MIGs were destroyed on the ground and five were probably destroyed: 3 (May), 6 (June), 1 (Dec) and 5 probables (Oct).

Legend: Con - Confirmed
Pro - Probable

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ENEMY LOSSES FOR 1ST QUARTER CY 1967

| Target Category | Destroyed | | | Damaged | | | Total D/D | |
|----------------------|------------|------------|------------|-------------|------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|
| | Jan | Feb | Mar | Jan | Feb | Mar | Des | Dam |
| AA/AAA Sites | 29 | 13 | 19 | 45 | 28 | 9 | 61 | 81 |
| Sam Sites | 1 | 0 | 1 | 3 | 0 | 2 | 2 | 5 |
| Communication Sites | 3 | 0 | 2 | 4 | 4 | 8 | 5 | 16 |
| Military Areas | 0 | 0 | 69 | 31 | 11 | 26 | 69 | 68 |
| POL Areas | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 4 | 0 | 6 |
| Staging/Supply Areas | 0 | 1 | 2 | 20 | 20 | 59 | 3 | 99 |
| Buildings | 55 | 62 | 93 | 37 | 15 | 59 | 210 | 111 |
| LOC's | 50 | 24 | 66 | 322 | 202 | 408 | 140 | 932 |
| Ports | 1 | 0 | 0 | 5 | 3 | 4 | 1 | 12 |
| Power Plants | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 4 | 0 | 6 |
| Railroad Yards | 0 | 0 | 0 | 11 | 2 | 2 | 0 | 15 |
| Motor Vehicles | 23 | 51 | 109 | 37 | 71 | 108 | 183 | 216 |
| RR Rolling Stock | 54 | 59 | 18 | 67 | 39 | 38 | 131 | 144 |
| Water Vehicles | 171 | 163 | 241 | 445 | 330 | 430 | 575 | 1205 |
| TOTAL | 387 | 163 | 620 | 1029 | 726 | 1161 | 1160 | 2916 |

Legend: DES - Destroyed
DAM - Damaged

Source: ROLLING THUNDER Digest, Editions 3-6 HQ CINCPAC.

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ENEMY LOSSES FOR 2D QUARTER CY 1967

| Target Category | Destroyed | | | Damaged | | | Total D/D | |
|----------------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|
| | Apr | May | Jun | Apr | May | Jun | Des | Dam |
| AA/AAA Sites | 40 | 66 | 53 | 55 | 217 | 199 | 159 | 471 |
| Sam Sites | 0 | 11 | 4 | 7 | 39 | 27 | 15 | 73 |
| Communication Sites | 1 | 2 | 1 | 7 | 9 | 15 | 4 | 31 |
| Military Areas | 1 | 11 | 3 | 25 | 102 | 58 | 15 | 185 |
| POL Areas | 0 | 0 | 0 | 10 | 23 | 29 | 0 | 62 |
| Staging/Supply Areas | 4 | 6 | 0 | 65 | 153 | 200 | 10 | 418 |
| Buildings | 138 | 191 | 118 | 76 | 104 | 84 | 447 | 264 |
| LOC's | 105 | 126 | 127 | 623 | 778 | 742 | 358 | 2143 |
| Ports | 3 | 1 | 0 | 11 | 4 | 3 | 4 | 18 |
| Power Plants | 2 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 2 | 9 | 2 | 14 |
| Railroad Yards | 0 | 1 | 1 | 5 | 25 | 52 | 2 | 82 |
| Motor Vehicles | 142 | 356 | 370 | 121 | 241 | 317 | 868 | 679 |
| RR Rolling Stock | 99 | 82 | 269 | 25 | 50 | 335 | 450 | 410 |
| Water Vehicles | 519 | 705 | 490 | 635 | 1020 | 736 | 1714 | 2391 |
| TOTAL | 1054 | 1558 | 1436 | 1668 | 2767 | 2806 | 4048 | 7241 |

Legend: DES - Destroyed
DAM - Damaged

Source: ROLLING THUNDER Digest, Editions 3-6 HQ CINCPAC.

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ENEMY LOSSES FOR 3D QUARTER CY 1967

| Target Category | Destroyed | | | Damaged | | | Total D/D | |
|----------------------|-------------|-------------|------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|
| | Jul | Aug | Sep | Jul | Aug | Sep | Des | Dam |
| AA/AAA Sites | 48 | 77 | 22 | 235 | 228 | 142 | 147 | 605 |
| Sam Sites | 3 | 8 | 0 | 29 | 34 | 13 | 10 | 76 |
| Communication Sites | 4 | 1 | 2 | 16 | 13 | 7 | 7 | 36 |
| Military Areas | 15 | 10 | 13 | 55 | 65 | 87 | 38 | 217 |
| POL Areas | 1 | 0 | 0 | 26 | 17 | 6 | 1 | 49 |
| Staging/Supply Areas | 1 | 5 | 0 | 167 | 371 | 180 | 6 | 718 |
| Buildings | 104 | 261 | 131 | 100 | 146 | 83 | 496 | 329 |
| LOC's | 83 | 102 | 53 | 651 | 755 | 378 | 238 | 1784 |
| Ports | 1 | 6 | 0 | 5 | 13 | 1 | 7 | 19 |
| Power Plants | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 2 |
| Railroad Yards | 1 | 0 | 0 | 34 | 20 | 10 | 1 | 64 |
| Motor Vehicles | 486 | 802 | 257 | 372 | 594 | 241 | 1545 | 1207 |
| RR Rolling Stock | 177 | 144 | 20 | 234 | 181 | 79 | 331 | 544 |
| Water Vehicles | 282 | 580 | 347 | 389 | 1095 | 557 | 1129 | 2041 |
| TOTAL | 1206 | 1996 | 845 | 2314 | 3533 | 1784 | 4047 | 7631 |

Legend: DES - Destroyed
DAM - Damaged

Source: ROLLING THUNDER Digest, Editions 3-6 HQ CINCPAC.

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ENEMY LOSSES FOR 4TH QUARTER CY 67

| Target Category | Destroyed | | | Damaged | | | Total D/D | |
|----------------------|-----------|------|-----|---------|------|------|-----------|------|
| | Oct | Nov | Dec | Oct | Nov | Dec | Des | Dam |
| AA/AAA Sites | 47 | 23 | 12 | 137 | 114 | 66 | 82 | 317 |
| Sam Sites | 1 | 3 | 0 | 14 | 16 | 11 | 4 | 41 |
| Communication Sites | 3 | 0 | 0 | 9 | 17 | 12 | 3 | 38 |
| Military Areas | 48 | 20 | 3 | 91 | 38 | 25 | 71 | 154 |
| POL Areas | 1 | 0 | 0 | 6 | 4 | 1 | 1 | 11 |
| Staging/Supply Areas | 2 | 4 | 2 | 105 | 126 | 75 | 8 | 306 |
| Buildings | 365 | 629 | 179 | 208 | 180 | 98 | 1173 | 486 |
| LOC's | 29 | 26 | 22 | 293 | 318 | 204 | 77 | 815 |
| Ports | 0 | 1 | 0 | 11 | 7 | 4 | 1 | 22 |
| Power Plants | 0 | 0 | 0 | 5 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 6 |
| Railroad Yards | 0 | 0 | 0 | 7 | 5 | 3 | 0 | 15 |
| Motor Vehicles | 112 | 79 | 141 | 196 | 131 | 217 | 332 | 544 |
| RR Rolling Stock | 52 | 61 | 41 | 162 | 138 | 83 | 154 | 383 |
| Water Vehicles | 374 | 352 | 54 | 668 | 709 | 306 | 780 | 1683 |
| TOTAL | 1034 | 1198 | 554 | 1912 | 1803 | 1106 | 2786 | 4821 |


Legend: DES - Destroyed
DAM - Damaged

Source: ROLLING THUNDER DIGEST, Editions 3-6 HQ CINCPAC.

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**DISPOSITION
TACTICAL AIRCRAFT UNITS
REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM**

| SUMMARY | |
|--------------|------------------|
| LOCATION | NO. of SQUADRONS |
| DA NANG | 7 |
| CHU LAI | 7 |
| PLEIKU | 0 |
| PHU CAT | 2 |
| TUY HOA | 3 |
| NHA TRANG | 1 |
| CAM RANH | 4 |
| PHAN RANG | 5 |
| BIEN HOA | 7 |
| BIEN TUY | 1 |
| 3 CARRIERS | 15 |
| TOTAL | 52 |



AS OF 1 DEC 1967

Air Operations in Laos

~~(S)~~ Air combat operations in Laos were an essential part of the overall campaign against communist aggression in Laos and SVN. In 1967, tactical air continued its mission of locating and striking the enemy, his LOCs and his logistic bases in Laos. Significant numbers of NVN personnel and large quantities of supplies and equipment were infiltrated into and through Laos to SVN. This traffic passed over approximately 1000 miles of fair-weather motorable roads, small trails and waterways in the Laos Panhandle.

~~(S)~~ At the end of January 1967, J2, CINCPAC¹ prepared an analysis of the effects of air operations in Laos for 1966. This analysis concluded that the overall effects of air strikes in Laos were "good" and that increases in sortie rates were invariably accompanied by an excessive increase in road cratering. Road cratering and bridge destruction, conducted in an attempt to slow or stop the infiltration of enemy troops and supplies through Laos into SVN, proved to be an inefficient use of air power. This type damage to the enemy LOC was easily repaired or bypassed. Actually, sorties scheduled for or diverted to Laos could have been used more effectively on RLAF targets or against targets of opportunity under FAC direction.

~~(S)~~ In the early part of 1967, air operations in Laos were to be closely monitored to determine if the trend noted in late 1966 towards increased emphasis on the destruction of validated RLAF targets would continue. Hopefully, this would reduce the number of interdiction sorties on roads, bridges and fords. In January 1967, there was an increase in the monthly sortie rate and it was not accompanied by an increase in road cratering. This was the beginning of the desired trend.

Constraints

~~(S)~~ In 1967, air operations in Laos were conducted under constraints that precluded the degree of flexibility required to make maximum use of friendly air power. Most of these constraints were of long standing and for background see pages 523-530, Volume II, CINCPAC Command History, 1966.

~~(S)~~ In a message on 14 February 1967, COMUSMACV expressed

-
1. J2/Memo 0023-67, 30 January 1967, from MGEN Brown (J2) to Admiral Sharp, Subject: Effects of Air Operations in Laos, CY 66 (C).

concern over the lack of relaxation in various restrictions imposed on air operations in Laos. ¹ The restrictions imposed in most cases resulted from State Department guidance to Ambassador Sullivan or from Premier Souvanna Phouma's concern over U.S. pilots attacking friendly Laotian villages.


~~(TS)~~ CINCPAC analyzed each of the restrictions addressed by COMUSMACV and concluded that generally Ambassador Sullivan had responded favorably to requests for relaxation of restrictions. In some cases, political overtones appeared to outweigh military considerations. However, this was to be expected. ²

~~(TS)~~ COMUSMACV pointed out specific restrictions that he wanted relaxed. He felt that the restriction which prevented the attack on enemy construction and repair crews working at distances greater than 200 yards from roads, except on a case by case clearance by the American Embassy, was too restrictive. This restriction was maintained consistently due to the Ambassador's concern for the safety of road watch teams and other friendlies who were briefed in advance to stay at least 200 yards away from all roads. ³

~~(TS)~~ Another restriction questioned by COMUSMACV was the prohibition against the use of aerial delivered riot control agent CS at selected interdiction points in order to delay enemy effort to repair roads which had been subjected to air attacks. This restriction was based on political pressures that precluded the use of CS agents. Ambassador Sullivan felt that the military benefits would be marginal and that the adverse propaganda resulting from the U.S. using "poison gas" in Laos would be untenable. He did concur, however, in a proposal to use CS agents in the recovery of combat aircrews in Laos. ⁴

~~(TS)~~ As the year wore on the rules of engagement were relaxed to some extent and by the end of July Laos, south of Nape Pass, had been divided into four zones for STEEL TIGER operations as indicated on following map of the STEEL TIGER area. ⁵

-
1. MACV 01567/141325Z Feb 67 (BOM).
 2. Point Paper J365, CINCPAC, 20 Feb 67, Subject: Restrictions of Air Operations in Laos.
 3. Ibid.
 4. Ibid.
 5. OUSAIRA Vientiane 030310Z June 1967; CINCPAC 072142Z June 1967; Point Paper J3B212, CINCPAC, 28 July 1967, Subject: STEEL TIGER/TIGER HOUND (U).



a. Zone I was designated as "TIGER HOUND Special Operating Area." Armed reconnaissance was authorized to be flown on all roads, tracts, paths and rivers, with air strikes conducted against all enemy activity.

b. Zone II was a STEEL TIGER armed reconnaissance zone where targets of opportunity could be attacked day or night if located within 200 yards of a motorable trail or road. Targets on motorable trails and roads, including bridges and fords, had to be outside villages to be eligible as targets of opportunity. Fixed targets and targets of opportunity located beyond the 200 yard limit could be attacked:

(1) If the target was a validated RLAFF priority "A" or "B" target.

(2) If approval had been obtained from AIRA Vientiane, AIRA Savanaket, or BUTTERFLY FAC.


(3) If the target had been validated by a RLAFF observer aboard ABCCC.

Any weapon position observed to be firing at friendly aircraft could be struck without FAC. This same provision applied to searchlights when it was positively determined by the observer that the searchlights were high intensity anti-aircraft and located in or very close proximity to authorized strike areas. Finally, Combat Proof (MSQ-77) could be used in all weather conditions, day or night, to drop ordnance or validated RLAFF priority "A" or "B" targets or any other target appropriately validated by AIRA/Embassy Vientiane.

c. Zone III was a STEEL TIGER FAC control zone. All strikes, whether against fixed or fleeting targets, had to be under positive FAC or MSQ radar control.

d. Zone IV was a STEEL TIGER controlled zone. All strikes required the approval of the American Ambassador, Vientiane as well as positive FAC control.

(15) Other restrictions included the prohibition of the use of classified ordnance and the limitation on the use of napalm. Napalm could be used only against vehicles and truck parks which were listed on the RLAFF numbered target list. No publicity regarding the use of napalm in Laos was authorized. In areas A, B, and C, shown on following map of the BARREL ROLL area, targets of opportunity located more than 200 yards



from an identifiable motorable route or trail could not be attacked except for targets marked by the RLAF, or in response to hostile ground fire, and trucks outside the area of a fixed installation. Additionally, aircraft launched from Thailand were not permitted to strike targets in SVN. ¹

Procedures²

~~(TS)~~ Aircraft of the 7th AF, augmented by U.S. Pacific Fleet aircraft in excess of ROLLING THUNDER sortie requirements, were employed on STEEL TIGER missions under the operational control of COM-USMACV. Aircraft were armed with unclassified ordnance, including napalm, for the type target to be attacked. Priority of targets for armed reconnaissance were military vehicular and troop movements, troop concentration, and key RLAF targets. A lesser emphasis was placed on storage areas, truck parks, way stations, and AAA sites located on or near roads designated for armed recce. FAC's controlled strikes conducted against military boats and barges on sections of rivers designated by the American Ambassador, Vientiane. Friendly roadwatch teams, equipped with radios, were dispersed throughout Laos to assist in early identification of enemy movements and to call in air strikes while the target location was still known.

Summary of Air Operations in Laos³

~~(S)~~ During the dry season in Laos, notably January, February, March and April 1967, the sortie rate increased. In January, 5489 sorties were flown. This was the first time since April 1966 that the figure of 5000 sorties had been exceeded. In February, air operations in Laos reached the highest level since January 1966 - 6608 were flown. A daily average of 236 sorties per day, the highest daily average since U.S. air operations in Laos began. The totals for March and April

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1. Point Paper, J3B212, CINCPAC, 28 July 1967, Subject "STEEL TIGER/TIGER HOUND" (U); Point Paper, J3B25, CINCPAC, 5 August 1967, Subject: "BARREL ROLL/STEEL TIGER" (U).
 2. Ibid.
 3. Sources for the "Effects of Air Operations in Laos" include the monthly reports by J2, CINCPAC to Admiral Sharp (These reports are J2 memorandums 0035-67 (11 Feb 67), 0059-67 (13 Mar 67), 0087-67 (8 Apr 67), 00127-67 (13 May 67), 00181-67 (12 Jul 67), 00218-67 (7 Aug 67), 00257-67 (12 Sep 67), 00284-67 (7 Oct 67), 00327-67 (7 Nov 67), 00363-67 (14 Dec 67), Unnumbered (undated Jan 68); Southeast Asia Military Fact Book, (Joint DIA-JCS Publication) April and July 1967.

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indicated the beginning of a decline. The shifting of the northeast monsoon (dry season) to the southwest in early May caused more than a 50 percent reduction in sorties over the month of April from 4801 to 2363. This decline continued through August and in September, 1609, and October, 2909, the rate began to increase. This increase continued through November, 4327, and December, 6468.

~~(S)~~ A detail breakdown of ordnance expending sorties is shown in the following chart, "Air Operations in Laos 1967."

BARREL ROLL Area (BR)

~~(S)~~ January - Approximately two-thirds of the total strike sorties flown were against 25 RLAFF fixed targets. The remaining sorties were in close air support of Forces Armee Royale (FAR). Weather curtailed air operations to the extent that there were only 19 days in January when ten or more sorties per day were flown. On six days no sorties could be flown. Nevertheless, enemy losses were significant. Forty-seven vehicles and 150 structures were destroyed or damaged.¹

~~(S)~~ February - Weather again curtailed air operations in the BARREL ROLL area. There were only 13 days when ten or more sorties per day were flown, and again there were ten days when no sorties were flown. Approximately one-half of the sorties were against 27 RLAFF fixed targets. Due to poor weather, in many instances, pilots were unable to obtain bomb damage assessment (BDA).

~~(S)~~ March - As in February, poor weather was a big factor in determining BDA. Thirty-eight percent of the sorties were flown against 26 RLAFF validated targets.

~~(S)~~ April - During April only 242 sorties were flown due to adverse weather. Strike results were less than impressive. Most significant BDA was the destruction or damage of 35 trucks and 54 secondary explosions.

~~(S)~~ May-June - Weather improved slightly and as a result sorties increased to 349 for May and to 370 for June.


~~(S)~~ July - With a decline in weather, sorties dropped to 320. Enemy losses declined accordingly.

1. See Chart "Air Operations in Laos - Enemy Losses 1967."

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AIR OPERATIONS IN LAOS 1967

(ORDNANCE EXPENDING SORTIES)



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AIR OPERATIONS IN LAOS - ENEMY LOSSES 1967
BARREL ROLL (BR) STEEL TIGER/TIGER HOUND (SL/TH)
(DAMAGED/DESTROYED - DA/DE)

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| | VEHICLES | | | BOATS (WBLC) | | | STRUCTURES | | |
|-------|-------------|----------------|----------------|--------------|----------------|----------------|-------------|----------------|----------------|
| | BR DA/DE | SL/TH DA/DE | TOTAL DA/DE | BR DA/DE | SL/TH DA/DE | TOTAL DA/DE | BR DA/DE | SL/TH DA/DE | TOTAL DA/DE |
| JAN | 27/20 | 130/85 | 157/105 | 11/5 | 6/2 | 17/7 | 118/32 | 81/38 | 199/70 |
| FEB | 3/11 | 158/134 | 161/145 | 0/0 | 17/3 | 17/3 | 15/21 | 171/96 | 186/117 |
| MAR | 12/14 | 144/99 | 156/113 | 0/0 | 13/1 | 13/1 | 48/21 | 128/30 | 176/51 |
| APR | 30/5 | 135/102 | 165/107 | 0/0 | 11/12 | 11/12 | 29/2 | 206/106 | 235/108 |
| MAY | 12/13 | 43/50 | 55/63 | 0/6 | 9/34 | 9/40 | 25/1 | 182/45 | 207/46 |
| JUN | 28/15 | 25/4 | 53/19 | 0/1 | 29/35 | 29/36 | 69/15 | 229/33 | 298/48 |
| JUL | 12/18 | 10/17 | 22/35 | 3/0 | 13/39 | 16/39 | 22/16 | 94/13 | 116/29 |
| AUG | 23/12 | 22/9 | 45/21 | 0/3 | 1/2 | 1/5 | 34/17 | 45/13 | 79/30 |
| SEP | 11/25 | 22/10 | 33/35 | 0/30 | 4/7 | 4/37 | 55/3 | 29/5 | 84/8 |
| OCT | 3/10 | 76/27 | 79/37 | 0/0 | 22/14 | 22/14 | 26/27 | 57/23 | 83/50 |
| NOV | 12/9 | 764/101 | 776/110 | 1/0 | 13/4 | 14/4 | 51/17 | 64/42 | 125/59 |
| DEC | 32/17 | 1084/144 | 1116/161 | 2/1 | 5/5 | 7/6 | 18/10 | 69/22 | 87/32 |
| TOTAL | 205/169 | 2613/782 | 2818/951 | 17/46 | 143/158 | 160/204 | 520/182 | 1355/466 | 1875/648 |

668

AIR OPERATIONS IN LAOS - ENEMY LOSSES 1967
 BARREL ROLL (BR) STEEL TIGER/TIGER HOUND (SL/TH)
 (DAMAGED/DESTROYED - DA/DE)

| | BRIDGES | | | AAA/AW | | | SECONDARY EXPLOSIONS | | | INTERDICTION POINTS | | |
|-------|-------------|----------------|----------------|-------------|----------------|----------------|----------------------|-------|-------|---------------------|-------|-------|
| | BR DA/DE | SL/TH DA/DE | TOTAL DA/DE | BR DA/DE | SL/TH DA/DE | TOTAL DA/DE | BR | SL/TH | TOTAL | BR | SL/TH | TOTAL |
| JAN | 3/3 | 44/35 | 47/38 | 10/2 | 38/4 | 48/6 | 26 | 655 | 681 | 51 | 738 | 789 |
| FEB | 1/2 | 22/15 | 23/17 | 2/0 | 30/7 | 32/7 | 28 | 901 | 929 | 30 | 740 | 770 |
| MAR | 0/1 | 5/8 | 5/9 | 0/1 | 37/14 | 37/15 | 59 | 700 | 759 | 45 | 558 | 603 |
| APR | 0/0 | 19/11 | 19/11 | 1/0 | 90/11 | 91/11 | 54 | 1801 | 1855 | 10 | 370 | 380 |
| MAY | 0/1 | 10/6 | 10/7 | 17/5 | 18/10 | 35/15 | 53 | 868 | 861 | 10 | 382 | 392 |
| JUN | 0/0 | 3/0 | 3/0 | 20/0 | 14/4 | 34/4 | 96 | 317 | 413 | 11 | 113 | 124 |
| JUL | 0/0 | 3/1 | 3/1 | 18/11 | 5/2 | 23/13 | 85 | 163 | 248 | 16 | 71 | 83 |
| AUG | 1/3 | 4/6 | 5/9 | 24/18 | 12/2 | 36/20 | 105 | 298 | 403 | 29 | 67 | 96 |
| SEP | 0/1 | 3/6 | 3/7 | 18/31 | 8/4 | 26/35 | 76 | 271 | 347 | 13 | 114 | 127 |
| OCT | 2/1 | 25/16 | 27/17 | 31/14 | 41/52 | 72/66 | 91 | 968 | 1059 | 13 | 364 | 377 |
| NOV | 1/0 | 23/45 | 24/45 | 7/4 | 199/121 | 206/125 | 94 | 2326 | 2420 | 76 | 627 | 703 |
| DEC | 0/0 | 41/66 | 41/66 | 12/4 | 183/159 | 195/163 | 96 | 2898 | 2994 | 51 | 890 | 941 |
| TOTAL | 8/12 | 202/215 | 210/227 | 160/90 | 675/390 | 835/480 | 863 | 12106 | 12969 | 355 | 4980 | 5360 |

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~~(S)~~ August - With improving weather, the number of sorties flown increased to 425. Enemy losses also increased, particularly trucks, structures and AAA/AW destroyed.

~~(S)~~ September - Total sorties decreased from 425 to 399. The number of vehicles and structures destroyed decreased but there was an increase in AAA destroyed and secondary explosions.

~~(S)~~ October - Sorties increased significantly, from 399 in September to 595 in October.

~~(S)~~ November - Total sorties increased from 595 to 641. However, there was a decrease in AAA destroyed but a significant increase in structures destroyed.

~~(S)~~ December - Sortie rates in the BARREL ROLL area continued to increase, 858 sorties were flown during the month. The increase in the sortie rate was accompanied by an increase in the number of vehicles and AAA/AW destroyed.

STEEL TIGER/TIGER HOUND Area

~~(S)~~ January - Ninety percent of the strike effort in Laos was devoted to the Panhandle and 30 percent of these sorties were against 108 RLAFF fixed targets. The remainder of the effort was armed recce and FAC controlled strikes against targets of opportunity. The 30 percent effort against fixed targets was considered significant since in 1966 the weight of effort never exceeded 25 percent in any given month. Armed recce, particularly at night, was very successful in locating 865 enemy trucks. Of the number located 215 were either destroyed or damaged. On 24 and 25 January, XM-47 gravel mines were employed for the first time in Laos. USAF A-1E aircraft seeded Route 92 with 22,800 mines. The results of strikes in the STEEL TIGER area were not commensurate with the increase in sorties. The reason for this was attributed to saturation of FAC's, low fuel states as a result of diversions from ROLLING THUNDER, fewer validated targets, and limited interdiction points. ¹

~~(S)~~ February - The strike effort in the Laos Panhandle increased to 95 percent as opposed to 90 percent in January; however, the sortie rate against RLAFF fixed targets decreased to 17 percent from a high of

1. Southeast Asia "Air Operations," January 1967, published by Hqs PACAF and sources cited for "Effects of Air Operations in Laos."

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30 percent in January. The trend of increased emphasis on night armed recce continued with good success in locating and destroying or damaging enemy trucks. The most significant results achieved by air strikes in the area were the 901 secondary explosions reported. This represented a serious blow to the enemy's logistic effort.

~~(S)~~ March - As in the past two months the Panhandle received the preponderance of the strike effort in Laos, approximately 90 percent for the month of March with one-third of the sorties being used against 129 RLAf fixed targets. The increase in sorties on RLAf fixed targets and the number of night armed recce sorties were noteworthy in that the trend in these efforts continued.

~~(S)~~ April - There were 1801 secondary explosions in the area -- an increase of 150 percent over the 700 recorded for March. Enemy vehicle activity was heavy as a result of his resupply effort prior to the onset of the southwest monsoon. This effort was hampered by a loss of 237 vehicles either destroyed or damaged.

~~(S)~~ May - The two most significant actions to take place during the month were an eight day, joint USAF-RLAF, concentration against Route 110, the Sihanouk trail, and the armed recce on Route 922 on 8 May which caused 112 secondary explosions and many secondary fires. There was a relative absence of ground fire against strike aircraft in South Laos and a corresponding increase in AAA activity in RP-I.¹


~~(S)~~ June - July - August - During these three months the sortie rates declined steadily. During June the most significant item reported was an increase in boat destruction. This was followed by a decrease in boat destruction in July. In August there was an increase in secondary explosions.

~~(S)~~ September - Combat sorties increased from 755 in August to 1,192 in September. However, there was a general decrease in enemy losses in all categories. This decrease was due, in part, to dropping ordnance under MSQ-77 control in adverse weather.

~~(S)~~ October - Total sorties increased from 1210 in September to 2,314 in October. This sortie increase was accompanied by a significant increase in enemy losses in all categories. The enemy suffered the

1. Southeast Asia "Air Operations," May 1967 published by Hqs PACAF and sources cited for "Effects of Air Operations in Laos."

AIR OPERATIONS IN LAOS 1967 - DAY ARMED RECCE (ORDNANCE EXPENDING SORTIES)




■ BARREL ROLL

■ STEEL TIGER/TIGER HOUND

AIR OPERATIONS IN LAOS 1967 - NIGHT ARMED RECCE

(ORDNANCE EXPENDING SORTIES)




BARREL ROLL

STEEL TIGER/TIGER HOUND

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AIR OPERATIONS IN LAOS 1967 - RLAF NUMBERED TARGETS (ORDNANCE EXPENDING SORTIES)



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highest losses since April 1967. The primary reason for the success of the armed recce sorties was the shift of the monsoon which improved flying conditions.

(S) November - Total sorties in the STEEL TIGER/TIGER HOUND were increased from 2314 in October to 3686 in November. The increase in sorties was accompanied by a significant increase in enemy losses. Compared to October, secondary explosions more than doubled and destruction of AAA/AW sites increased four times. The 764 vehicles destroyed was the highest recorded in one month since air operations began in Laos. Of the sorties flown, night armed recce comprised 45 percent of the total and accounted for 75 percent of the trucks destroyed.

(S) December - In southern Laos the total sorties increased from 3686 in November to 5610 in December. During the month a total of 1084 vehicles were destroyed, the highest monthly total since the start of STEEL TIGER operations. In addition to the increase in the destruction of vehicles, there was also an increase in the number of bridges destroyed, secondary explosions, and interdiction points.



USAF Photo


F-100D aircraft used for armed reconnaissance or close air support.

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RLAF T-28 Operations

(S) An analysis of RLAF air operations was not included in the CINCPAC monthly analysis of air operations in Laos in 1966. However, it was included in 1967 because of the effectiveness of the RLAF air operations. For example, the U.S. Air Attache, (AIRA) Vientiane reported that more than 6000, T-28 sorties were flown by RLAF pilots in 1967 inflicting significant damage to Communist forces. During 1967, the AIRA furnished weekly operational summaries on RLAF T-28 operations but did not give detailed target information and bomb damage assessment. ¹

(S) January - RLAF pilots flew 688 sorties in close support operations -- 508 in the BARREL ROLL area and 80 in the STEEL TIGER area. T-28 strikes were conducted on troop concentrations, gun positions, bunkers, caves, buildings and bridges. According to ground reports, one strike in the BARREL ROLL area resulted in an estimated 100 enemy casualties. Total T-28 assets as of 31 January 1967 were 49 aircraft. ²



RLAF T-28 Aircraft

1. J2 Memo 0035-67, 11 Feb 67 from MG Brown to Admiral Sharp, Subject: "Effect of Air Operations in Laos, January 1967."

2. Ibid.

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~~(S)~~ February - This month 758 sorties were flown, 628 in the BARREL ROLL area and 130 in the STEEL TIGER area. FACs and pilots estimated 80 to 100 percent of their ordnance hit in the target areas with an overall evaluation of results as excellent. Targets struck included troop concentrations, gun positions, POL and ammunition storage, buildings, trucks and tanks. Seven T-28 aircraft were destroyed during the month. On 2 February, the enemy destroyed six in an attack on Luang Prabang Airfield. The seventh plane was destroyed on take-off from Pakse Airfield. Forty-two T-28s remained in the inventory. ¹

~~(S)~~ March - The RLAF flew 635 sorties on close air support operations and route interdiction -- 501 in the BARREL ROLL area and 134 in the STEEL TIGER area. This was a decrease of 123 sorties under the February total and was attributed to bad weather. Pilots and FAC's reported 250 enemy troops killed, six guns and ten military boats destroyed, and numerous road cuts, secondary explosions and fires. One aircraft was lost due to engine failure over enemy territory. The T-28 inventory at the end of March was 41. ²

~~(S)~~ April - Continued adverse weather restricted RLAF air operations. A total of 589 sorties were flown in support of FAR operations. Beginning with the month of April 1967 and continuing through the remainder of 1967 reports indicated only the total number of sorties flown with no breakdown for either BARREL ROLL or STEEL TIGER areas. The same applies to T-28 aircraft inventory. ³

~~(S)~~ May - June - July - August - The RLAF sortie rate increased from 589 in April to 769 in May and to 786 in June despite poor weather. In July, the sortie rate decreased to 590 and to 437 in August. Results of sorties were reported as good for all four months. ⁴

~~(S)~~ September - A total of 381 combat sorties were flown against

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1. J2 Memo 0059-67, 13 March 1967 from Captain McElwain, USN to Admiral Sharp, Subject: "Targeting Action and Effects of Air Operations in Laos, February 1967 (C)."
 2. J2 Memo 0087-67, 8 April 1967, from MG Peterson to Admiral Sharp, Subject: "Targeting Actions and Air Operations in Laos, March 1967 (C)."
 3. J2 Memo 00127-67, 13 May 1967, from MG Peterson to Admiral Sharp, Subject: "Effects of Air Operations in Laos, April 1967 (C)."
 4. J2 Memos unnumbered and undated for May 67; 00181-67, 12 July 67; 00218-67, 7 August 1967; 00257-67, 12 September 1967. All were from MG Peterson to Admiral Sharp. Subject of memos were "Effects of Air Operations in Laos, May, June, July, August 1967."

troop concentrations and storage areas with no BDA reported. During September the conduct of operations by RLAF personnel came under question and the following on the subject is quoted from J2 (CINCPAC) Memo 00284-67, 7 October 1967, Subject: "Effects of Air Operations in Laos, September 1967 (C)."

"a. The Vientiane Joint Operations Summaries for Laos during September reported that RLAF operations were seriously hampered by low morale, inefficiency of RLAF personnel, poor leadership, poor equipment, and no discipline. The lack of discipline ~~was~~ shown on 5 September when RLAF personnel refused to load strike aircraft. The Operations Summary reported the primary contributing factors to this state of affairs are: RLAF officers are generally weak and absent from duty for long periods of time, low pay, inadequate quarters, and poor messing facilities. On 15 September General Sourith, RLAF Commander, told two U.S. advisors that he is tired of being the RLAF Commander; he stated that he doesn't get any help in running the RLAF and it has become a great burden to him personally."

~~(S)~~ October - RLAF combat sorties increased from 381 in September to 529 in October. Again troop concentrations, storage areas and truck parks were attacked with good results. ¹

~~(S)~~ November - RLAF sorties increased to 1,159, more than double the October effort. Targets consisted primarily of troop concentrations, storage areas and truck parks. Results were reported as excellent. ²


~~(S)~~ December - RLAF sorties decreased from 1,159 in November to 542 in December. Troop concentrations were struck primarily with very little BDA reported. ³

Target Validation in Laos

~~(S)~~ U.S. air participation in Laos and the planning coincident thereto had to have approval of the U.S. Ambassador to Laos prior to implementation.

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1. J2 Memo 00327-67, 7 November 1967, from MG Peterson to Admiral Sharp, Subject: "Effect of Air Operations in Laos, October 1967 (U)." (All months previous to this the subject was classified as confidential.)
 2. J2 Memo 00363-67, 14 December 1967 from MG Peterson to Admiral Sharp, Subject: "Effects of Air Operations in Laos, November 1967 (U)."
 3. Information obtained from a draft prepared by Capt. W.R. Walton, USAF, J2436, Hq CINCPAC, (4 January 1968).

AIR OPERATIONS IN LAOS 1967 - RLAF T-28 OPERATIONS (BARREL ROLL/STEEL TIGER)



■ DAILY AVERAGE

■ TOTAL SORTIES PER MONTH

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This policy was established by President Johnson since Laos did not have, "U.S. forces under area military command." Consequently all air targets in Laos had to be validated by the U.S. Ambassador. The channel for validation was through the U.S. Air Attache (AIRA) to Laos.¹ This situation existed in 1966 and continued in effect through 1967.

~~(S)~~ January - As of 1 January 1967, there were 488 validated targets. During the month sixteen new targets were validated -- five in the BARREL ROLL area and eleven in the STEEL TIGER area. Four BARREL ROLL targets were dropped as no longer having military significance. Thus, at the end of January there were 500 validated RLAFF targets. The sixteen targets added in January consisted of ten truck parks, five storage areas and one communications site.²

~~(S)~~ February - During the month eighteen new RLAFF targets in the STEEL TIGER area were validated; seven truck parks, six storage areas, two interdiction points and three military areas. Four targets in the STEEL TIGER area were deleted as no longer having military significance. At the end of February there were 514 validated targets.³

~~(S)~~ March - In March one target in the BARREL ROLL area was deleted and five new targets added. Nineteen were added in the STEEL TIGER area. The total number of RLAFF validated targets at the end of March was 537.

~~(S)~~ April - Twenty-two new RLAFF targets were added in April, eleven in BARREL ROLL and eleven in the STEEL TIGER area. The new validated targets consisted of nine truck parks, eight storage areas, and five interdiction points. One target was deleted in the STEEL TIGER area making a total of 558 validated targets at the end of April.⁵

~~(S)~~ May - During May eleven new targets were added; ten in the STEEL TIGER area and one in BARREL ROLL area. Targets consisted

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1. AIRA/EMB Vientiane, 00476/110703Z March 66.
 2. J2 Memo 0035-67, 11 February 1967, MG Brown to Admiral Sharp, Subject: "Effects of Air Operations in Laos, January 1967 (C)."
 3. J2 Memo 0059-67, 13 March 1967, from Capt. McElwain, USN, to Admiral Sharp, Subject: "Effects of Air Operations in Laos, February 1967 (C)."
 4. J2 Memo 0087-67, 8 April 1967, from MG Peterson to Admiral Sharp, Subject: "Effects of Air Operations in Laos, March 1967 (C)."
 5. J2 Memo 00127-67, 13 May 1967, from MG Peterson to Admiral Sharp, Subject: "Effects of Air Operations in Laos, April 1967 (C)."

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primarily of truck parks and storage areas. As of 30 May, 569 RLAf targets were validated. ¹

(S) June - Eleven new targets were approved in June consisting primarily of truck parks and way stations. This action brought the end of month total to 580 validated targets. ²

(S) July - Thirty-seven targets were deleted in July; thirty-five in the STEEL TIGER area and ten in the BARREL ROLL area. Five new targets were added in STEEL TIGER and four in BARREL ROLL. As of 31 July there were 552 validated targets. ³

(S) August - Four new RLAf targets, truck parks and vulnerable road segments, were validated in the STEEL TIGER area. This increased the total of validated targets to 556. ⁴

(S) September - December - During this period one new target was added to the BARREL ROLL area and one target was deleted in the same area. As of 31 December, there were 556 validated RLAf targets; 412 in STEEL TIGER area and 144 in BARREL ROLL area. The following chart is a recapitulation of RLAf validated targets for 1967. ⁵

PRAIRIE FIRE (SHINING BRASS) Reconnaissance Teams

(S) PRAIRIE FIRE ground reconnaissance teams played an important role in target acquisition in Laos air operations. These teams directed air strikes against targets infiltrated by them with good results. ⁶

(S) During February, ground reconnaissance teams had their greatest success since the beginning of the air effort in Laos. In exploitation of ARC LIGHT strike Kontum 502, SHINING BRASS forces were committed to the area and uncovered numerous large enemy storage and base areas. The entire enemy complex was designated SLAM III and an extensive air effort was mounted against it. Nearly 500 tactical air sorties

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1. Interview between Capt. W.R. Walton, USAF, J24321, CINCPAC and LTC J.R. Johnson, CINCPAC Command Historian, 22 December 1967.
 2. Ibid.
 3. Ibid.
 4. Ibid.
 5. Ibid.
 6. J2 Memo 0087-67, 8 Apr 1967, from MG Brown to Admiral Sharp, Subject: "Effects of Air Operations in Laos, January 1967 (C)."

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RLAF VALIDATED TARGETS 1967

| End of: | SL (+) | BR (+) | SL (-) | BR (-) | Change | Total |
|----------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|-------|
| Dec 66 | | | | | | 488 |
| Jan 67 | 11 | 5 | 0 | 4 | +12 | 500 |
| Feb 67 | 18 | 0 | 4 | 0 | +14 | 514 |
| Mar 67 | 19 | 5 | 0 | 1 | +23 | 537 |
| April 67 | 11 | 11 | 1 | 0 | +21 | 558 |
| May 67 | 10 | 1 | 0 | 0 | +11 | 569 |
| June 67 | 11 | 0 | 0 | 0 | +11 | 580 |
| July 67 | 5 | 4 | 35 | 2 | -28 | 552 |
| Aug 67 | 4 | 0 | 0 | 0 | + 4 | 556 |
| Sep 67 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 556 |
| Oct 67 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | - 1 | 555 |
| Nov 67 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | + 1 | 556 |
| Dec 67 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 556 |

Legend:

STEEL TIGER - SL
BARREL ROLL -BR

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conducted strikes against storage depots, caches and troop concentrations. Approximately 250 secondary explosions occurred as a result of the strike effort. SHINING BRASS teams directed air strikes against three additional infiltrated targets during the month. A total of 561 sorties, including SLAM III, were flown in support of SHINING BRASS teams. ¹

(S) Although the results of PRAIRIE FIRE team efforts for the other months in 1967 were not as significant as in February, their efforts proved their value in developing targets in the Laos Panhandle.

Use of Propeller and Jet Aircraft in Laos. ²

(S) In late December 1967, the JCS furnished CINCPAC a SECDEF memorandum and study concerning the use of propeller and jet aircraft in Laos. The study was based on an analysis of operations in Laos during the first nine months of 1967 and concluded that propeller aircraft were nine times as effective as jet aircraft in destroying trucks and water craft in Laos.

(S) The study indicated that:

- a. Jet aircraft flew 22,599 sorties (74 percent of the total



F-4H Aircraft


US Navy Photo

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1. J2 Memo 0059-67, 13 Mar 67, from Capt McElwain to Admiral Sharp, Subj: "Targeting Actions and Effects of Air Operations in Laos, Feb 67 (C)."
 2. J3 Brief 344-67, Hq CINCPAC, 27 Dec 67, Subj: "The Use of Propeller and Jet Aircraft in Laos (JCS2344/134(U)." CINCPAC Control 00732-67.

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attack sorties), and destroyed or damaged 366 vehicles (25 percent of the destroyed or damaged moving vehicles), for a rate of 1.5 per 100 attack sorties at a cost of \$700,000 per truck or water vessel destroyed or damaged.

b. Propeller aircraft flew 7,810 sorties (26 percent of the total attack sorties), and destroyed or damaged 966 vehicles (72 percent of the destroyed or damaged moving vehicles), for a rate of 12.8 per 100 attack sorties, at a cost of \$55,000 per truck or water vehicle destroyed or damaged.



A-1E Aircraft

USAF Photo

(S) The study found that the loss rates for propeller aircraft operating in Laos were 4.3 times greater than the jet loss rates. Propeller aircraft sustained twelve losses for an attack loss rate of 1.54 aircraft per 1000 sorties while jet aircraft sustained eight losses for an attack loss rate of 0.35 per 1000 sorties.

(S) An analysis of the projected inventory considered by the study found that it was possible to increase the Southeast Asia A-1 force in the near term by two additional squadrons of eighteen aircraft during 1968 -- one squadron in January and another in July. The study also found that the deployment of two A-1 squadrons as replacement for two F-4 squadrons in Thailand would:

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- a. Increase the destruction or damage to moving vehicles by approximately 1,300 vehicles per year.
- b. Not reduce the number of jet sorties planned for NVN.
- c. Increase the total losses of pilots and aircraft by eight and eighteen respectively. A-1 aircraft losses would be increased by 26 aircraft; F-105 losses would increase by seven aircraft and F-4 losses would decrease by fifteen aircraft.
- d. Result in an estimated net saving of \$20.8 million a year in jet aircraft replacement costs.
- e. Save \$6.9 million each year in operating expenses.
- f. Not result in an increased cost for training an additional 54 A-1 aircraft pilots.

(S) The JCS requested¹ CINCPAC to comment on the summarized SECDEF study. On 26 December² CINCPAC responded to the JCS request and non-concurred in the proposition to substitute two A-1 squadrons for two F-4 Thailand based squadrons. CINCPAC reasoned that the substitution would reduce the total jet strike capability in Southeast Asia. Some flexibility in aircraft utilization would be lost since A-1 aircraft could not operate in highly defended areas of NVN and portions of Laos. Although A-1 aircraft would be more proficient in a truck killing role in the Laotian enemy air defense environment, a reduction in the jet strike capability was considered undesirable when related to the overall campaign in Southeast Asia. CINCPAC countered by stating that if additional propeller aircraft were available, they could be better utilized by increasing the number of aircraft assigned to squadrons already deployed in Southeast Asia.

SAC B-52 Strikes in Southeast Asia (ARC LIGHT)

Approval Authority for ARC LIGHT Missions

(S) Approval authority for ARC LIGHT missions was less centralized in 1967 than in 1966.³ As 1967 began, COMUSMACV had been

1. JCS 5606/201740Z December 1967.

2. CINCPAC 262003Z December 1967.

3. See (SAC-B-52 Strikes in Southeast Asia - ARC LIGHT), Volume II, CINCPAC Command History 1966 for background on strike approval authority that carried over into 1967.

UNCLASSIFIED



USAF Photo

B-52 bombers releasing their bombs on suspected artillery positions near the Demilitarized Zone.

UNCLASSIFIED

granted authority to approve strikes in SVN which did not involve deep overflight in Cambodia, Laos, NVN or the DMZ while CINCPAC monitored and retained veto authority. Strikes in the DMZ south of the Provisional Military Demarcation Line (PMDL) were approved by CINCPAC and strike approval in Laos, NVN and the DMZ north of the PMDL was still being retained by the JCS. ARC LIGHT targets were selected by COMUSMACV based on the most up-to-date intelligence available.¹

(S) In addition to the JCS final approval for targets to be struck in Laos, the U.S. Ambassador in Vientiane sent his concurrence or non-concurrence on the targets to the Secretary of State. In 1966 and in the first part of 1967, many of the Laos targets submitted by COMUSMACV were disapproved by the U.S. Ambassador to Vientiane Sullivan. His disapproval was usually based on one or more of the following reasons: target was close enough to friendly Laotians to enable them to identify the aircraft as B-52's; targets so close to civilians or roadwatch teams that they might be killed or injured; and, sufficient target information had not been given. The Ambassador on two occasions asked Souvanna's permission to make ten strikes on targets which might be noticed by friendly Laotians. In each case permission was granted. However, the Ambassador used caution and discretion in deciding which targets to ask permission to strike.²

(S) On 3 March 1967, CINCPAC-CINCSAC were given joint authority to approve strikes in Laos subject to American Embassy Vientiane concurrence with each strike.³ And on 16 March 1967, COMUSMACV was given approval authority for targets in the DMZ south of the PMDL with CINCPAC monitoring and retaining veto authority.⁴

(S) CINCPAC recommended to the JCS on 11 September that he be authorized to approve ARC LIGHT strikes in NVN south of 17 degrees - 10 minutes North latitude.⁵ After considering the recommendations the JCS concurred with CINCPAC and 2 October forwarded the request for

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1. Point Paper, J362, Hq CINCPAC, 4 Jan 67, Subject: "ARC LIGHT Operations (U)": Point Paper, J2434, Hq CINCPAC, 5 Jan 67, Subject: "Evaluation of ARC LIGHT (U)."
 2. Point Paper, J2434, Hq CINCPAC, 20 Feb 67, Subject: "Evaluation of ARC LIGHT in Laos (S)."
 3. JCS 031626Z Mar 67.
 4. Point Paper, J2434, Hq CINCPAC, 14 Mar 67, Subject: "Evaluation of ARC LIGHT (U);" ARC LIGHT Basic Operations Order, 16 Mar 67.
 5. CINCPAC 111245Z Sep 67.

delegation of authority to SECDEF for approval. ¹ On 1 December 1967, the JCS notified CINCPAC that CINCPAC-CINCSAC were granted joint authority to approve ARC LIGHT ² strikes in NVN as requested below 17° 10' North latitude.

~~(S)~~ At the end of 1967 authority to approve ARC LIGHT strikes and the category of targets were as follows: ³

| <u>Category</u> | <u>Location</u> | <u>Approval</u> |
|-----------------|--|----------------------------|
| I | SVN, including DMZ South of PMDL | COMUSMACV |
| II | NVN | JCS |
| II | DMZ North of PMDL to 17 degrees - 10 minutes North latitude | CINCPAC |
| III | Most of Laos | CINCPAC/AMEMB Vientiane |
| III ALFA | Southeast portion of Laos | CINCPAC/AMEMB Vientiane |

ARC LIGHT Sortie Rates

~~(S)~~ As of 1 January 1967, a total of 725 ARC LIGHT sorties per month were authorized. This was an increase of 125 over the JCS authorized rate of 600 sorties for December 1966. ⁴ On 1 February 1967, the rate was increased to 800 sorties per month and this allocation remained in effect throughout 1967. By the end of the year, 450 sorties per month were flown from U-Tapao, Thailand and 350 from Andersen AFB on Guam. ⁵

~~(S)~~ On 1 May 1967, CINCPAC concurred in the COMUSMACV recommendation to gradually increase the ARC LIGHT sortie rate to 1200 sorties per month by January 1968. A gradual increase was recommended because

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1. J3 Brief 270-67, J3B22, Hq CINCPAC, 13 Oct 67, Subject: "ARC LIGHT Operations (U)."
 2. JCS 012351Z Dec 67.
 3. Point Paper, J3B22, Hq CINCPAC, 7 Oct 67, entitled "ARC LIGHT."
 4. Point Paper J362, Hq CINCPAC, 4 Jan 67, Subject: "ARC LIGHT Operations (U)"; Command Center 0730 Briefing Notes, 1 Jan 68.
 5. Command Center 0730 Briefing Notes, 1 Feb 67; Point Paper, J3B22, Hq CINCPAC, 9 Dec 67, entitled, "ARC LIGHT."

of the limited availability of MK-82 and M-117 bombs for ARC LIGHT expenditure. To meet the recommended sortie rate of 1200 sorties effective January 1968, MK-82 bomb production rate had to be increased to reach a production level of 186,500 per month not later than October 1967. ¹ On 15 December 1967, Chief of Staff of the Air Force notified CINCPAC that SECDEF had approved the necessary increase in production of MK-82 bombs to sustain the 1200 sorties beginning February 1968.

~~(TS)~~ The recommended gradual increase in ARC LIGHT sorties was as follows: ²

| <u>Month</u> | <u>Sorties Per Month</u> |
|----------------|--------------------------|
| June 1967 | 800 |
| July 1967 | 850 |
| August 1967 | 900 |
| September 1967 | 900 |
| October 1967 | 950 |
| November 1967 | 1000 |
| December 1967 | 1000 |
| January 1968 | 1200 |

~~(TS)~~ The number of B-52's required and the basing of these planes were an integral part of the 1200 sortie consideration and are discussed in the sub-section entitled "Basing of B-52's."

~~(TS)~~ On 17 October 1967, the JCS ³ advised CINCPAC that they had not recommended to SECDEF a permanent increase of 1200 sorties but had recommended to him a capability for a surge to 1200 sorties per month. At the same time the JCS offered CINCPAC the opportunity to submit additional justification for a 1200 sortie rate on a continuing basis. On 13 November, CINCPAC advised the JCS that even though he still thought that his recommended sortie rate would have a significant impact on the enemy he did not have any additional explicit data to support his recommendation. ⁴ On 10 November, a B-52 surge capability to 1200 sorties per month was approved. However, the JCS 2472/166-7 which

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1. CINCPAC 010651Z May 67; Point Paper J3B11, Hq CINCPAC, 25 Aug 67, Subject: Alternative Courses of Action to Increase B-52 Sortie rates; CSAF 152111Z Dec 67.
 2. Ibid.
 3. JCS 9080/171813Z Oct 67.
 4. CINCPAC 130155Z Nov 67.

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announced the approval was not received by CINCPAC. ¹ On 4 December 1967, the JCS ² announced that the CINCPAC recommended sustained rate of 1200 sorties had been approved and that February 1968 was the target date rather than January 1968. The availability date of bombs from increased production was the major determining factor. The JCS also stated that an emergency surge capability to 1200 sorties per month would be available on 15 December 1967; however, SAC requested that the surge not be directed unless an "emergency" condition existed.

(S) The ARC LIGHT sorties flown during 1967 are reflected on the two accompanying charts entitled "ARC LIGHT SORTIES 1967 (AMMUNITION)" and "ARC LIGHT SORTIES 1967 (LOCATION)." ³

Basing of B-52's

(S) One of the most, if not the most, significant limiting factor that had a serious impact on increasing B-52 ARC LIGHT sorties, was the shortage of suitable bases. During 1966, many attempts were made to solve this problem. Consideration was given to basing B-52's at Kadena Air Base, Okinawa, Mactan Air Base, Clark Air Base, Sangley Point Naval Air Station, a proposed Laong Site, all in the Philippines; Ching Chuan Kang Air Base, Taiwan; and U-Tapao, Thailand. At the end of the year no formal decision had been made on any proposed B-52 basing plan. ⁴

(S) On 2 March, the Royal Thai Government agreed to the use of U-Tapao for B-52's and OSD approved initiation of construction to support ARC LIGHT operations from there. ⁵

(S) The SECDEF told CINCPAC to proceed immediately with essential

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1. J3 Brief 322-67, J3B211, Hq CINCPAC, 4 Dec 67, Subject: "Revised Southeast Asia Air Munitions Requirements Through CY (8 (U))."
 2. JCS 4267/041607Z Dec 67.
 3. The reason for the difference in the totals for each month between the two charts is unknown. It may be due to the time differential. The first chart (Ammunition) was based on Zulu time and was prepared by J3B22, Hq CINCPAC. The second chart was prepared by the CINCPAC Historian based on data published monthly in "Southeast Asia Air Operations," Jan-Dec 67, published by Hq PACAF. Whether local or Zulu time was used in the PACAF publication is unknown. Press of time prevented further research in this area.
 4. Pages 556-561, Volume II, CINCPAC Command History 1966.
 5. Point Paper, J315, Hq CINCPAC, 14 Mar 67, Subj: "B-52 Basing, U-Tapao."

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SECTION VII - PERSONNEL ACTIVITIES

Military Personnel Strength in Southeast Asia

(S) The buildup of US military personnel strength in South Vietnam during 1967 was as listed below.¹

| <u>Service</u> | <u>31 Mar 67</u> | <u>30 Jun 67</u> | <u>30 Sep 67</u> | <u>31 Dec 67</u> |
|----------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|
| Army | 290,589 | 313,453 | 314,591 | <u>331,089</u> |
| Navy | 24,682 | 28,477 | 29,789 | 31,669 |
| Marine Corps | 75,351 | 76,438 | 74,877 | 78,013 |
| Air Force | 55,810 | 55,737 | 56,811 | 55,908 |
| Coast Guard | 450 | 496 | 495 | 476 |
| | <u>446,882</u> | <u>474,601</u> | <u>476,563</u> | <u>497,155</u> |

(S) These personnel were assigned as follows:

| | | |
|--------------|--------------------------------------|-----------------|
| MACV - Staff | Army | 2,222 |
| | Navy | 301 |
| | Marine Corps | 182 |
| | Air Force | 570 |
| Units | USMACV (Field) | 6,047 |
| | NAVADVGRP | 514 |
| | AFADVGRP | 493 |
| | USARV | 306,157 |
| | III MAF | 81,110 |
| | COMNAVFORV | 27,330 |
| | AF Units | 54,754 |
| | Miscellaneous (includes Coast Guard) | 856 |
| | | <u>*480,536</u> |

*Does not include 16,619 transients and patients.

1. COMUSMACV Monthly Strength Reports.

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~~(S)~~ Military personnel strength in Thailand as of 31 December was as follows:¹

| | | |
|--------|--------------------------|------------------|
| Staffs | USMACTHAI/JUSMAGTHAI | 738 |
| | DEPCHJUSMAGTHAI | 118 |
| | SEATO | 71 |
| | Research and Development | 21 |
| Units | Army | 9,742 |
| | Navy | 683 |
| | Marine Corps | 17 |
| | Air Force | 33,127 |
| | | <u>44,517</u> |

~~(S)~~ The total force in both South Vietnam and Thailand on 31 December 1967 was 541,672.

Joint Tables of Distribution - Vietnam

Headquarters, COMUSMACV

(U) On 23 May CINCPAC submitted to the JCS a revised JTD for Headquarters, USMACV with a recommended strength of 2,136 spaces for immediate approval.² This represented an increase of 148 spaces from the previous JTD. No approval of that JTD was ever received from the JCS. Monthly summaries from the JCS indicated a strength of 2,604 on 14 September, falling to 2,112 on 8 December. These changes in strength resulted from changes in missions and the shifting of missions and functions to other JTD organizations.

Air Force Advisory Group

(U) On 16 February COMUSMACV submitted a proposed Air Force Advisory Group JTD,³ and CINCPAC recommended approval.⁴ The JCS approved the JTD as submitted except to require relocation of the information function.⁵ The approved total of 493 represented an increase

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1. COMUSMACTHAI US Armed Forces Troop List and Strength Report as of 31 December 1967.
 2. USMACV ltr, 13 Feb 67.
 3. USMACV ltr, 16 Feb 67, Subj: AF ADV GP JTD.
 4. CINCPAC ltr Ser 1104, 17 Mar 67, Subj: AF ADV GP JTD.
 5. JCS 271603Z Apr 67.

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ARC LIGHT SORTIES 1967 - AMMUNITION

| | <u>GP</u> | | <u>BLU-3B</u> | | <u>TOTAL</u> | | <u>DEVIATION</u> | |
|--------------|-------------|--------------|---------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|------------------|---------------|
| | <u>Auth</u> | <u>Flown</u> | <u>Auth</u> | <u>Flown</u> | <u>Auth</u> | <u>Flown</u> | <u>GP</u> | <u>BLU-3B</u> |
| JAN | 705 | 717* | 20 | 17 | 725 | 734* | +12 | -3 |
| FEB | 780 | 693 | 20 | 14 | 800 | 707 | -87 | -6 |
| MAR | 780 | 798 | 20 | 11 | 800 | 809 | +18 | -9 |
| APR | 780 | 796** | 20 | 24 | 800 | 820** | +16 | +4 |
| MAY | 780 | 790 | 20 | 15 | 800 | 805 | +10 | -5 |
| JUN | 780 | 826 | 20 | 18 | 800 | 844 | +46 | -2 |
| JUL | 780 | 819 | 20 | 18 | 800 | 837 | +39 | -2 |
| AUG | 780 | 831 | 20 | 0 | 800 | 831 | +51 | -20 |
| SEP | 780 | 830 | 20 | 3 | 800 | 833 | +50 | -17 |
| OCT | 780 | 833 | 20 | 15 | 800 | 848 | +53 | -5 |
| NOV | 780 | 817 | 20 | 0 | 800 | 817 | +37 | -20 |
| DEC | 780 | 808 | 20 | 0 | 800 | 808 | +28 | -20 |
| TOTAL | 9285 | 9558 | 240 | 135 | 9525 | 9693 | +273 | -105 |

*Includes 59 M-35 sorties on PINK ROSE II
 **Includes 15 M-35 sorties on PINK ROSE III

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ARC LIGHT SORTIES 1967
(LOCATION)

| <u>1967</u> | <u>DMZ</u> | <u>NVN</u> | <u>SVN</u> | <u>LAOS</u> | <u>TOTAL</u> | <u>BOMBS</u> |
|-------------|------------|------------|------------|-------------|--------------|---------------------|
| JANUARY | 51 | | 573 | 101 | 725 | 15,456 |
| FEBRUARY | 12 | | 620 | 78 | 710 | 19,996.9 |
| MARCH | | | 586 | 217 | 803 | 21,917 |
| APRIL | 18 | | 485 | 320 | 823 | 21,296 |
| MAY | 27 | | 689 | 96 | 812 | 20,343 |
| JUNE | | | 671 | 161 | 832 | 20,424 |
| JULY | 30 | | 600 | 206 | 836 | 20,861 |
| AUGUST | | 117* | 596** | 116 | 829 | 23,157.8 |
| SEPTEMBER | 322 | 266 | 245 | | 833 | 24,441 |
| OCTOBER | 240 | 214 | 354 | 39 | 847 | 25,229 |
| NOVEMBER | 81 | 63 | 541 | 131 | 816 | 24,050 |
| DECEMBER | 182 | 77 | 306 | 243 | 808 | 24,620 |
| TOTAL | 963 | 737 | 6166 | 1708 | 9674 | 237,550.7 (tons) |

* Includes sorties in NVN DMZ

** Includes sorties in SVN DMZ

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construction. He made approximately \$9 million available to CINCPAC for the construction program. The funds were available on a temporary basis within the Department of the Air Force. SECDEF requested recommendations for any further reprogramming and also stated that since there were no overriding operational requirements to carry out the program on a crash basis, all implementing actions related to construction and support requirements should proceed in an orderly fashion. ¹

~~(S)~~ The JCS² requested a coordinated CINCSAC-CINCPAC deployment plan. In response to this request the following proposed deployment schedule, which took into consideration the JCS desire for ~~April~~ April deployment, was submitted to the JCS:

- a. Deploy three aircraft on or about 4 April 1967.
- b. Deploy three additional aircraft on or about 18 April 1967.
- c. Growth to fifteen B-52's at the best possible rate.

~~(S)~~ COMUSMACTHAI, in a forecast of U-Tapao capabilities, estimated that five ammunition holding pads, would be completed on 7 April. These pads would support only three B-52's. He estimated that five additional ammunition pads to support three additional B-52's would be ready by 1 May 1967. The deployment date for the remaining nine B-52's was still contingent upon completion dates of construction and the arrival of necessary support troops. PACAF and CINCPAC representatives held a conference during 15-17 March 1967 and proposed a phased growth to achieve a fifteen aircraft Forward Operating Base (FOB) by 15 November 1967. ³

~~(S)~~ A Joint Planning Conference at Bangkok, Thailand during the period 27-31 March 1967, developed a revised deployment schedule. The proposed schedule provided for the attainment of a fifteen aircraft FOB by mid-July. Although CINCPAC had proposed a deployment schedule for the first six aircraft he had not proposed a schedule of deployment for the remaining nine. His position in the matter was that the basing of the B-52's was dependent on the growth capability of U-Tapao and that every effort

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1. Point Paper, J315, Hq CINCPAC, 14 Mar 67, Subject: "B-52 Basing, U-Tapao.
 2. Ibid.
 3. Point Paper, J3B15, Hq CINCPAC, 17 April 1967, Subject: "B-52 Basing U-Tapao (S) [sic]; Point Paper JB315, Hq CINCPAC, 8 May 67, Subject: "B-52 Basing, U-Tapao (U)."

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would be made to bed-down the entire force as soon as possible. CINCPAC appreciated the advantage of early ARC LIGHT operations from U-Tapao and took the additional actions necessary to achieve a fifteen aircraft capability by 1 July 1967. ¹

~~(S)~~ As of 8 May 1967, all preliminary actions necessary to deploy the fifteen B-52's by 1 July 1967 had been taken. Construction was underway to support the entire force and the minimum additional construction required for the fifteen B-52 FOB consisted of the following: ²

a. A taxi loop with eight stubs with a beneficial occupancy date (BOD) of 15 June 1967. Stubs were necessary to prevent parking of aircraft on the main ramp. A condition which would present an unacceptable safety hazard.

b. Eight ammunition storage modules (BOD 30 June 1967) required to support fifteen sorties per day.

c. An inland ammunition road (BOD 1 July 1967) required to support sustained operations.

~~(S)~~ No problems were anticipated in the munitions and fuel area. All necessary Army support units had already closed at Sattahip and the planned deployments for the remaining nine operational aircraft had been concurred in by all concerned. Three aircraft were to deploy on 22 May and six to deploy on 30 June 1967. ³

~~(S)~~ A proposal to increase the ARC LIGHT sortie rate from 800 to 1200 is discussed in "ARC LIGHT Sortie Rates" above. Once again the requirement for an increase in sortie rates was accompanied by a requirement for an increase in aircraft, the expansion of base facilities and/or the requirement for new bases as well as the necessary logistical support.

~~(TS)~~ To provide an ARC LIGHT force capable of producing 1200 B-52

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1. Point Paper, J315, Hq CINCPAC, 7 April 67, Subject: "B-52 Basing, U-Tapao (U)."
 2. Point Paper, J3B15, Hq CINCPAC, 8 May 67, Subject: "B-52 Basing, U-Tapao (U)."
 3. Ibid.

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sorties, three aircraft basing options were studied by CINCPAC:¹

a. Bed-down of aircraft for Option I:

| <u>Base</u> | <u>B-52</u> | <u>KC-135</u> | <u>Sorties</u> |
|------------------|-------------|---------------|----------------|
| Andersen | 49 | | 525 |
| U-Tapao | 15 | | 450 |
| Kadena | 15 | | 225 |
| Ching Chuan Kang | | 15 | |
| Kadena | | 35 | |
| | <u>79</u> | <u>50</u> | <u>1200</u> |

Note: 21 B-52 and 5 KC-135 additional aircraft required above those in PACOM for ARC LIGHT support.

b. Bed-down of aircraft for Option II:

| <u>Base</u> | <u>B-52</u> | <u>KC-135</u> | <u>Sorties</u> |
|------------------|-------------|---------------|----------------|
| Andersen | 62 | | 750 |
| U-Tapao | 15 | | 450 |
| Kadena | | 48 | |
| Ching Chuan Kang | | 15 | |
| | <u>77</u> | <u>63</u> | <u>1200</u> |

Note: 19 B-52, and 18 KC-135 additional aircraft required above those in PACOM for ARC LIGHT support.

c. Bed-down aircraft for Option III:

| <u>Base</u> | <u>B-52</u> | <u>KC-135</u> | <u>Sorties</u> |
|-------------|-------------|---------------|----------------|
| Andersen | 23 | | 300 |
| U-Tapao | 30 | | 900 |
| Kadena | | 26 | |
| | <u>53</u> | <u>26</u> | <u>1200</u> |

Note: Less aircraft than those already in PACOM were required -- 5 B-52's and 19 KC-135's less.

1. Point Paper, J3B11, Hq CINCPAC, 25 Aug 67, Subj: Alternative Courses of Action to Increase B-52 Sortie Rates; CINCPAC 192230Z Aug 67.

(1) To support the increase to 1200 sorties per month the following requirements, by option, were estimated: ¹

a. Option I:

- (1) Kadena construction, four million dollars for upgrading taxiways.
- (2) Possible additive construction requirements at Ching Chuan Kang (CCK) as result of on-site survey.
- (3) Additional cargo handling personnel, material handling and transportation equipment at Guam due to increased ammunition throughput requirements.
- (4) Additional stevedore labor for handling increased ammunition at Okinawa.
- (5) Possible \$1.67 million for renewal and modernization of Army POL pipeline system at Okinawa due to continued high usage.
- (6) Additional 323 qualified military support personnel.

b. Option II:

- (1) Possible additive construction requirements at CCK as result of on-site survey.
- (2) Additional cargo handling personnel, material handling and transportation equipment at Guam due to increased ammunition throughput requirements.
- (3) Additional 220 qualified military support personnel.

c. Option III:

- (1) Additional \$29.9 million construction at U-Tapao as follows:

1. CINCPAC 192230Z Aug 67.

| <u>Item</u> | <u>Scope</u> | <u>Cost (\$000)</u> |
|---|----------------|---------------------|
| Parallel runway, taxiway, and overruns | LS | 12,900 |
| Parking stubs with taxiways | LS | 5,410 |
| Site preparation | LS | 1,000 |
| Dorm, Amn | 1,600 man | 1,120 |
| OQ | 243 man | 552 |
| Revetments | LS | 500 |
| Utilities | LS | 3,500 |
| Warehouse, supply/equipment | 25,000 sf | 300 |
| Storage, open | 500 sf | 7 |
| Storage, shed | 1,500 sf | 11 |
| Dining hall | 400 seat. cap. | 550 |
| POL | 80,000 bbl | 330 |
| Buildings, miscellaneous | 12,000 sf | 205 |
| Parking, vehicle | 14,610 sf | 15 |
| Ammo storage (30-Day Level) | | |
| 30 Five-cell modules | | |
| 3 Covered | | 348 |
| 27 Uncovered | | 2,982 |
| Pad, ammo holding | 10 | 170 |
| | | <u>Total 29,900</u> |

(2) Additional 1,860 military support personnel, at U-Tapao.

(3) Possible PCS of second LARC company for ammunition handling.

~~(1C)~~ Options I and II appeared to be capable of providing the 1200 sorties per month by January 1968. However, both of the options raised politically sensitive problems concerning support of offensive operations in Southeast Asia from Okinawa and Taiwan bases. On 19 August, in a message to the JCS, Admiral Sharp stated:¹

"...In Option I, B-52 ARC LIGHT strikes would be flown from Okinawa and tanker support from Taiwan. This combination presents political problems. While technically not necessary to obtain approval of U.S. military operations from Okinawa from any other nation, the prospect of sustained combat operations from that location would likely

1. CINCPAC 192230Z Aug 67.

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raise problems vis a vis Japanese-U.S. relations. A problem of lesser magnitude would be that of permanent basing of KC-135 tankers on Taiwan for support of ARC LIGHT strikes. While use of CCK is approved as a storm divert base, approval for permanent use as a combat support base, while probably feasible from the GOC standpoint, might raise questions regarding CHICOM reactions.

"The desirable flexibility inherent in operations from three bases in Option I is valid. The U.S. position for possible future operations in Asia would be improved. This consideration appears ~~equally~~ valid with respect to Thailand basing improvements.

"Option II requires the least initial dollar cost. It also requires the greatest number of aircraft and maximum flight time requirements. From these two aspects it is less desirable than Options I and III. The cost to support the additional aircraft and increased flight hours required must be considered from a long run standpoint.

"Option III construction costs of \$29.9 million at U-Tapao are high; however, these costs would be rapidly amortized by savings in operational funds resulting from the reduced number of aircraft and decreased aircraft flight time required. These operating cost savings are estimated to exceed two million dollars a month. It would appear that the additive personnel requirements at U-Tapao could be partially offset by the reduction in personnel requirements at Andersen to support the reduced number of B-52 aircraft. The major disadvantage in Option III is that, standing alone, it will not provide the 1,200 ARC LIGHT sorties per month until well after the Jan 68 desired date since the BOD for basing 30 B-52 aircraft at U-Tapao would be approximately one year from the beginning construction date.

"In any of the proposed ARC LIGHT force basing options, current restrictions on B-52 operations over Laos must be considered. Under current rules, a sufficient B-52 force must be based outside Thailand to provide the required B-52 sorties for strikes in Laos. While attempts are being made to lift the current restriction, there is no assurance that these will be successful."

~~(S)~~ CINCPAC recommend that:¹

- a. Option III be approved as the long range plan to provide

1. CINCPAC 192230Z Aug 67.

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1200 ARC LIGHT sorties per month.

b. Nine hundred ARC LIGHT sorties per month be approved commencing immediately.

c. Until facilities for basing 30 B-52's at U-Tapao were available, the build-up to 1200 sorties per month, utilizing features proposed in Option II be as follows:

| <u>Month</u> | <u>Sorties Per Month</u> |
|----------------|--------------------------|
| September 1967 | 900 |
| October 1967 | 950 |
| November 1967 | 1000 |
| December 1967 | 1000 |
| January 1968 | 1200 |

d. An alternative force mix of Thailand based KC-135 and B-52 aircraft should be examined for feasibility.

(S) At about the same time, OSD was analyzing various courses of action to determine the best method to increase the sortie rate and as a result determined the number of B-52's at U-Tapao should be increased from fifteen to twenty-five and the additional required B-52's should be based at Guam. CINCPAC in coordination with CINCSAC and CSAF were directed to develop an implementing plan to accomplish the SECDEF approved 1200 sortie rate which would be effective 1 February 1968. The plan was forwarded on 30 December and it provided for the deployment of five B-52's to U-Tapao on 1 February and five more by mid-June contingent upon completion of the required additional construction. ¹

ARC LIGHT Operations

(S) January - Eighty-one targets were struck by B-52's: 59 in SVN, 13 in Laos and 9 in the DMZ. This was the largest number of targets struck since ARC LIGHT operations began. Fifty-nine sorties were flown against two PINK ROSE targets. ²

(S) February - Ninety-four targets were struck; eighty-four in SVN,

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- 1. Interview between LTC Edmund G. Smith, J3B15, Hq CINCPAC and LTC Johnson, CINCPAC Historian.
 - 2. J2 History Items for January 1967.

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9 in Laos and one in the DMZ. No ARC LIGHT targets were hit during the Tet stand-down from 080700H to 120700H February. The threat of SA-2 deployment into or near the DMZ during Tet halted ARC LIGHT strikes in and north of the DMZ for the remainder of the month. ¹ One DMZ strike was diverted by the JCS because of a possible threat posed by a SA-2. ² On 16 February the JCS made it clear that there would be no risks taken with B-52's. ³

~~(TS)~~ March - On 10 March, COMUSMACV requested CINCPAC to cancel the requirement for post-strike mosaics on BDA photographic missions that could not be flown within fourteen days of an ARC LIGHT strike. The reason the request was submitted was due to poor weather conditions which often delayed photo reconnaissance for several weeks. Thus, the value of the photos diminished considerably and at the same time a backlog of photo requirements developed. ⁴ The JCS, DIA, CINCSAC and CINCPAC agreed with the proposal. MACV would be specifically tasked for photo coverage of an unusual target if a requirement existed after fourteen days. ⁵ On 4 March, CINCPAC directed that no B-52 missions would be flown within 20 nautical miles of the PMDL until further evaluation of the SAM threat in the vicinity of the DMZ was accomplished. ⁶ This restriction prevented the striking of valuable targets in northern Quang Tri province, the DMZ and NVN during the month of March. Also during March, COMUSMACV implemented a plan to integrate B-52 strikes into the Laos LOC interdiction campaign. The program involved six interdiction points on routes 911, 912, 91 and 92. One and two plane B-52 strikes were flown against two targets nightly. A total of 138 ARC LIGHT sorties were flown against those interdiction points. ⁷

~~(TS)~~ April - For more than thirty days there was still a lack of evidence to either support or deny the existence of SA-2 missiles in the vicinity of the DMZ. Consequently, CINCPAC requested COMUSMACV to schedule targets in this area with a gradual northward movement to permit an evaluation of a possible SAM threat. ⁸ Around the middle of the month strikes up to and in the DMZ were resumed. However, on 29 April

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1. J2 History Items for February 1967.
 2. JCS 140207Z Feb 67.
 3. NMCC 162359Z Feb 67.
 4. COMUSMACV 100225Z Mar 67.
 5. CINCPAC 290406Z Mar 67.
 6. CINCPAC 041938Z Mar 67.
 7. J24 (Hq CINCPAC) History Items for Mar 67.
 8. CINCPAC 080330Z Apr 67.

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a SAM site was reported as occupied just north of the DMZ. Operations in the DMZ were again halted while the site was destroyed. ¹ A total of 118 targets were struck during April; 78 in SVN, 33 in Laos and 7 in the DMZ. ²

~~(S)~~ May - B-52 strikes were resumed in the DMZ on 3 May. ³ However, the SAM threat once again increased to the point where CINCPAC and CINCSAC ceased ARC LIGHT operations in the DMZ and in SVN within 20 nautical miles of the demarcation line. ⁴ COMUSMACV proposed changing alternate targets on a weekly basis. Alternate targets would remain valid for seven days or until stricken whichever was sooner, or, otherwise invalidated by COMUSMACV. Repeated strikes against alternate targets would not be executed. ⁵ SAC proposed that the alternate targets not be changed until struck by a minimum of three aircraft per square kilometer of target area. ⁶ COMUSMACV included SAC's proposal in a new recommendation. They recommended that alternate targets could be replaced at any time for one of the following reasons: (a) lack of intelligence to warrant retention; (b) struck by a minimum of three aircraft per square kilometer; and, (c) expiration of target clearance by Field Forces or Corps. ⁷ During the month, 114 targets were struck; 95 in SVN, 14 in Laos, 4 in the DMZ and 1 in NVN. ⁸

~~(S)~~ June - The SAM threat in the DMZ continued; however, CINCPAC recommended resumption of operation in the DMZ area and the JCS concurred provided the targets were of high value and high priority. ⁹ In turn, CINCPAC directed COMUSMACV to resume operations in the area with the proviso that all targets in the DMZ, NVN and within twenty nautical miles of the DMZ in SVN would be submitted to CINCPAC for approval. ¹⁰ On 13 June, the JCS granted CINCPAC approval authority for ARC LIGHT targets in the DMZ, including those targets partially in NVN. ¹¹ During June, 114 targets were struck; 20 in Laos and 94 in SVN. Of the twenty targets

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1. CINCPAC 290620Z Apr 67.
 2. J24 (Hq CINCPAC) History Items for Apr 67.
 3. Ibid.
 4. CINCSAC 122320Z May 67; CINCPAC 131854Z May 67.
 5. COMUSMACV 100646Z May 67.
 6. CINCSAC 241355Z May 67.
 7. COMUSMACV 021313Z May 67.
 8. J24 (Hq CINCPAC) History Items for May 67.
 9. CINCPAC 042024Z June 67; JCS 072111Z June 67.
 10. CINCPAC 090325Z June 67.
 11. JCS 131600Z June 67; CINCPAC 050258Z May 67.

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struck in Laos, 19 were in the SLAM V area. ¹

~~(S)~~ July - The SAM threat in the DMZ area continued; however, high priority targets in the DMZ and just north of the DMZ were struck using extensive TINY TIM in conjunction with SAC ECM. COMUSMACV recommended that the monthly ARC LIGHT evaluation report be discontinued since the weekly report he was required to submit contained the same details as the monthly report. ² CINCPAC and DIA concurred and the report was discontinued. ³ During July, 124 targets were struck; 93 in SVN, 26 in Laos, 4 in the DMZ and 1 in NVN. ⁴

~~(S)~~ August - As a result of an enemy build-up in the DMZ area, numerous strikes were conducted in that area. During August, a total of 110 targets were struck; 70 in SVN, 15 in Laos, 24 in the DMZ and 1 in NVN. ⁵

~~(S)~~ September - On 17 September, the first positive sighting of SA-2 missiles firing at B-52 aircraft over Southeast Asia occurred. At 1005Z hours a flight of three B-52's at 16° 50' W - 106° 53' E enroute to ARC LIGHT target N-41 observed two SAMs followed by detonations. One detonation was estimated one nautical mile high at the "1130 o'clock" position and the other detonated approximately one-half nautical mile away. No damage was sustained. ⁶ A total of 95 targets were struck; 23 in SVN, 58 in the DMZ and 14 in NVN. ⁷

~~(S)~~ October - On 26 October ARC LIGHT target P-17, 29 kilometers NNE of Mu Gia Pass was struck. This was the northernmost strike in NVN since the inauguration of the ARC LIGHT program. Two days later, 28 October, the second positive sighting of SAMs fired at B-52's in Southeast Asia took place. This incident occurred after a flight of six B-52's had struck target P-21 in NVN. ⁸ No aircraft were lost. A total of 104 targets were struck during October; 23 in NVN, 33 in the DMZ, 43 in SVN and 5 in Laos. ⁹

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1. J24 (Hq CINCPAC) History Items for June 67.
 2. COMUSMACV 070807Z June 67.
 3. CINCPAC 180457Z July 67.
 4. J24 (Hq CINCPAC) History Items for July 67.
 5. J24 (Hq CINCPAC) ARC LIGHT History for Aug 67.
 6. 7th AF 180859Z Sep 67.
 7. J24 (Hq CINCPAC) ARC LIGHT History for Sep 67.
 8. 3d Air Div 291350Z Oct 67; J24 (Hq CINCPAC) ARC LIGHT History for Oct 67.
 9. J24 (Hq CINCPAC) ARC LIGHT History for Oct 67.

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~~(S)~~ November - ARC LIGHT target Q-45 in NVN was struck on 26 November. The target was 34 kilometers north of Mu Gia Pass making it the northernmost target struck in NVN since ARC LIGHT operations began. It was five kilometers deeper in NVN than target P-17 discussed in October operations. During the month, 39 strikes, 275 sorties, were flown in support of Operation McARTHUR (DAK TO). A total of 108 targets were struck in November; 71 in NVN, 11 in the DMZ, 73 in SVN and 15 in Laos. ¹

~~(S)~~ December - On 20 December the third sighting of SAMs fired at B-52's occurred when target R-22 was struck in NVN. No damage to the ARC LIGHT force was caused by the SAMs. A total of 104 targets were struck during December; 6 in NVN, 25 in the DMZ, 29 in Laos and 44 in SVN. ²

ARC LIGHT Bomb Damage Assessment (BDA)

~~(S)~~ Effects of B-52 strikes in Southeast Asia cannot be measured intrinsically nor can definite military damage levels be measured. Even so, CINCPAC is aware of the high level interest in ARC LIGHT strike results and has taken steps to insure that COMUSMACV furnishes BDA on a timely basis. The information is furnished in a series of reports on each strike usually in the following order: (a) immediate photo interpretation reports (IPIR); (b) report on visual reconnaissance; (c) ground follow-up report when possible; and, (d) detailed BDA from a photo read-out. Additionally, COMUSMACV reports results obtained from POW interrogations and agents on an "as received" basis. ³

~~(S)~~ Thorough results of Laos strikes were seldom obtained in 1967 since ground troops could not often exploit the targets. Most of the strikes were deep in enemy territory, in areas of thick jungle covers, and visual and photo reconnaissance was virtually useless. ⁴

~~(S)~~ In SVN and the DMZ numerous destroyed fortifications and KBAs were counted by visual and ground reconnaissance, as well as photo read-out. However, the indirect effects could not be evaluated and as a result may have surpassed the direct effects in importance. The strikes were

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1. J24 (Hq CINCPAC) ARC LIGHT History for Nov 67.
 2. J24 (Hq CINCPAC) ARC LIGHT History for Dec 67.
 3. Point Paper J2434, Hq CINCPAC, 29 July 67, Subject: "Evaluation of ARC LIGHT (U)."
 4. COMUSMACV 250435Z July 67.

valuable in breaking up enemy concentrations, disrupting the enemy's supply and communication lines, harassing or penetrating his otherwise inaccessible base areas and creating a psychological fear among the enemy. ¹

~~(S)~~ The number of enemy killed or wounded by ARC LIGHT sorties was impossible to determine. Actually more enemy may have been killed or wounded than was estimated. For example, the DIA recently published an interrogation report that lends some credence to this possibility: ²

"A VC guerrilla captured in Hau Nghia Province has revealed that he was assigned to a burial detail following a B-52 strike in the vicinity of Khanh Hamlet, Duc Hoa District, in mid-March. He stated that 500 to 600 men were bivouaced in the area at the time of the strike and that most of them were sleeping in one and two man "trenches". He stated that approximately 70 percent of the trenches collapsed. The source could not make an accurate estimate of the number of survivors but believed the total was less than 300, many of whom appeared to be seriously wounded."

~~(S)~~ The psychological effect of B-52 raids on the enemy is not measurable but an indication of their effect is indicated in the following quote from a RAND study:

"Respondents tended to regard the B-52's as an especially dangerous U.S. aircraft and some made the statement that the B-52's are an indication of great US - GVN strength. In fact, some of the interviewees who had not actually experienced a B-52 attack seemed to express more fear of this weapon system than did some of the soldiers who had actually been attacked. ³

~~(S)~~ While a precise ARC LIGHT contribution to the overall war effort was difficult to qualify and segregate, there can be no doubt that the ARC LIGHT contribution has been significant. Ground force commanders testify to the value of these strikes which have killed numerous enemy troops and have destroyed quantities of enemy material. ARC LIGHT strikes reduced enemy effectiveness and thereby reduced friendly losses. ⁴

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1. COMUSMACV 250435Z July 67.
 2. DIA Intelligence Bulletin 147-67, 31 July 1967.
 3. Quarterly Report, RAND Corp., 28 Oct 66, Subject: "VC Motivation and Morale Project."
 4. CINCPAC 012030Z June 67.

Restrictions on ARC LIGHT Flights from U-Tapao, Thailand

~~(TS)~~ On 2 March 1967, permission was granted by the Royal Thai Government to base B-52's at U-Tapao. Attendant with this permission were four restrictions on ARC LIGHT operations emanating from U-Tapao. These restrictions were:

- a. Overflight of Laos from U-Tapao enroute to and from targets in Vietnam or Laos.
- b. Bombing in Laos by U-Tapao based planes.
- c. Daylight overflight of southeastern Laos when required to provide optimum axis of attack for targets in Vietnam.
- d. Daylight bombing missions in Laos only in unusual circumstances. (This was equally applicable to B-52 strikes from Andersen AFB.)¹

Overflights of Laos

~~(S)~~ On 4 January 1967, CINCSAC, in anticipation of approval to base B-52's at U-Tapao, requested the JCS to obtain blanket approval for overflight of Laos.² In reply on 26 January, the JCS informed CINCPAC-CINCSAC that in view of the possibility of political complications in Laos, if and when B-52 operations from U-Tapao were approved, the JCS did not wish to request approval for overflight of Laos until the operation was established and the political climate was favorable. In the meantime, CINCPAC-CINCSAC were to continue developing a coordinate plan for overflight that the JCS had requested on 12 January 1967. The JCS also told CINCPAC-CINCSAC to obtain American Embassy, Vientiane comments with the understanding that the implementation date would be subject to the Ambassador's evaluation of the Laotian political situation after B-52's were operating from U-Tapao.³

~~(S)~~ On 27 January the Secretary of State amplified the basic guidance provided by the JCS. He recommended that Ambassador Sullivan's

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1. Point Paper, J3B22, Hq CINCPAC, 27 July 67, Subject: "ARC LIGHT (U)."; Interview with LTC L. C. Hutchins, J3B22, CINCPAC and LTC J. R. Johnson, CINCPAC Command Historian.
 2. CINCSAC DO 00036/041530Z Jan 67.
 3. JCS 4634/261616Z Jan 67.

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suggestion that a pattern be established which would route all flights out of Sattahip, south of Cambodia and then north into strike zones be adopted. In Ambassador Sullivan's opinion, it was advisable to let the route become public knowledge. Once the pattern was established in the public mind, consideration could then be given to overflight of Laos if the situation warranted. ¹

~~(S)~~ The route south of Cambodia was implemented and on 5 July the JCS requested CINCPAC's comments on the overflight restriction. ² CINCPAC stated on 14 July that economy and timeliness of response, the two major reasons for basing B-52's at U-Tapao were reduced by this restriction. Since more than fifty percent of the ARC LIGHT targets were located in northern SVN, southeastern Laos, the DMZ and southern NVN, considerable savings could be realized by routing these missions over Laos. He commented further to the effect that KC-135 operations in Laos had become so routine that at high altitudes the inexperienced eye could not distinguish between the B-52 and the KC-135. B-52's striking targets farther south in SVN would continue to use the established route south of Cambodia. ³

~~(S)~~ CINCPAC was informed by the JCS that they had been reviewing the "American Embassy, Vientiane" restrictions on the overflight of Laos, daylight bombing of Laos and the requirement for cover strikes in an adjacent province of SVN. In the same message, the JCS again requested CINCPAC-CINCSAC to develop a coordinated position as to whether it was essential that immediate relief be obtained from those restrictions. Response was to be made by 6 November. ⁴

~~(S)~~ CINCPAC replied on 8 November and on 5 December the restrictions on overflight of Laos from U-Tapao and the daylight bombing in Laos were lifted. At the same time the requirement for cover strikes in SVN was removed. ⁵

Bombing in Laos by U-Tapao Based B-52's

~~(TS)~~ On 11 April 1967, the American Embassy, Bangkok informed CINCPAC that Thailand Prime Minister Thanom intended to require approval for B-52 operation from U-Tapao before launch. ⁶ At that time

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1. SECSTATE 126224/270419Z Jan 67.
 2. JCS 9570/051956Z Jul 67.
 3. CINCPAC 140752Z Jul 67.
 4. JCS 9401/201451Z Oct 67.
 5. JCS 441/052158Z Dec 67; CINCPAC 080331Z Nov 67.
 6. AMEMBASSY BANGKOK 13146/110826Z Apr 67.

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the procedure for U.S. Thai based aircraft required that 7th AF to submit proposed missions to AMEMB BANGKOK for the purpose of securing Thai Government permission to launch from Thailand. The request was made the day before the strike and included the number of aircraft by type, base, target and time over target. The Embassy recommended this procedure be enlarged to include B-52 operations in order to preclude multiple requests and avoid inviting special attention to B-52 operations. If this was not considered feasible the Embassy would handle as a separate request on a routine bases.

~~(S)~~ CINCPAC concurred in AMEMB BANGKOK suggestion that the then present procedures be expanded to include B-52 operations provided the information furnished by the 7th AF was closely held in U.S. channels and that targets and target times were not included in approval requests to the Thai Government. ¹

~~(S)~~ AMEMB BANGKOK confirmed that the information was closely held in U.S. channels as a matter of course. However, it would have to furnish the information if requested by the RTG. ²

~~(S)~~ CINCPAC informed AMEMB BANGKOK that his major concern was the possibility that information on strikes in Laos provided to the RTG might reach the Royal Lao Government and/or Souvanna through official channels and shatter any attempt to continue official denial of these operations. ³

~~(S)~~ It became apparent that the word "jeopardize", used by CINCPAC, was received in Bangkok as "compromise." AMEMB BANGKOK continued to talk about security of the B-52 strike information while CINCPAC was talking about the B-52 operations in Laos being placed in jeopardy through the possibility of the information inadvertently reaching Souvanna or the RLG through official channels. As long as Souvanna did not officially know of B-52 operations in Laos, "credible denial" could be maintained. ⁴ On 6 September 1967, the JCS authorized strikes in Laos by U-Tapao-based B-52's. The procedures used in scheduling the strikes were essentially the same as recommended by AMEMB BANGKOK on 11 April 67. ⁵

1. CINCPAC 130002Z Apr 67.

2. AMEMB BANGKOK 13256/130617Z Apr 67.

3. CINCPAC 221655Z Apr 67.

4. Point Paper, J3B22, Hq CINCPAC, 27 Jul 67, Subject: "ARC LIGHT (U)."

5. JCS 062204Z Sep 67.

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Daylight Overflight of Southeastern Laos

(S) Until late June 1967, SAC was required to submit requests for approval of daylight overflights to the American Embassy, Vientiane (AMEMB VIENTIANE) prior to mission execution. In some cases approval was received too late or the request was disapproved. ¹ On 24 June 1967, CINCPAC requested AMEMB VIENTIANE to give blanket approval for daylight overflights of southeastern Laos. ² The AMEMB replied on 28 June and approved a smaller area on a trial basis. ³ Although the approved area was not the most desirable size, it did not present untenable operational limitations. ⁴ This entire restriction was lifted by the JCS on 5 December 1967. ⁵

Daylight Bombing Missions in Laos

(S) In late October 1966, U.S. Ambassador to Laos Sullivan required virtually all ARC LIGHT overflights of Laos, whether or not bombing that country's territory, be conducted at night to avoid detection. ⁶ On 14 July 1967, CINCPAC told the JCS that he considered it essential to schedule daylight strikes in southeastern Laos in order to obtain scheduling flexibility and make the most efficient use of the B-52 force. He added that it was particularly important in view of the fact that a cover strike in SVN had to be scheduled in conjunction with each strike in Laos. The limitation imposed by the necessity of scheduling missions in pairs for the hours of darkness significantly reduced operational flexibility with respect to target selection. ⁷

(S) Later, CINCPAC again requested relief from this restriction and it was approved on 6 December 1967. ⁸

ARC LIGHT Conferences

(S) Two ARC LIGHT conferences were held during 1967. The first conference was convened at Camp Smith on 16 February and ended on 17

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1. Point Paper, J3B22, Hq CINCPAC, 27 Jul 67, Subject: "ARC LIGHT (U)."
 2. CINCPAC 240017Z June 67.
 3. AMEMB VIENTIANE 280442Z June 67.
 4. Point Paper, J3B22, Hq CINCPAC, 27 Jul 67, Subj: "ARC LIGHT (U)."
 5. JCS 441/052158Z Dec 67.
 6. AMEMB VIENTIANE 220835Z Oct 66.
 7. CINCPAC 140752Z July 67.
 8. JCS 441/052158Z Dec 67.

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February. Representatives from the JCS, USAF, CINCPAC, CINCSAC, MACV, PACAF, PACFLT, 7TH AF and AIR DIV attended. The purpose of the conference was twofold:

a. Thoroughly educate all attendees in the most significant facets of ARC LIGHT operations by an exchange of information, ideas and requirements.

b. Identify and resolve problems wherever possible or, generate actions which would culminate in resolution of problems ~~not~~ within the authority of the conferees to decide. ¹

~~(S)~~ Several briefings on ARC LIGHT operations and procedures were given followed by discussions on the following subjects.

- a. Operations from U-Tapao.
- b. Reporting of strike results.
- c. Second MSQ runs.
- d. Use of Quick Reaction Force (QRF), Inflight Diverted Force (IDF), and Ground Diverted Force (GDF).
- e. Use of BLU munitions.
- f. Use of M-35 munitions.
- g. Tactics.
- h. Message traffic and precedence.
- i. Clearance (airspace) procedures.
- j. Miscellaneous.
- k. SAM threat - TINY TIM.

It appears that all objectives of the conference were reached. ²

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- 1. Letter, serial 00417, Hq CINCPAC, 10 Mar 67, Subject: "ARC LIGHT Conference (U)," with enclosure (1) "ARC LIGHT Conference Report."
 - 2. Ibid.

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~~(S)~~ The second conference was held during the period 7-8 September at Headquarters, 3d Air Division, Andersen AFB, Guam. The same headquarters were represented as at the first conference with the addition of Southeast Asia Military Air Reservation Facility (SEAMARF).

~~(S)~~ The purpose of the conference was fivefold:¹

- a. Update and educate all conferees on the changes undergone in the ARC LIGHT operations during the past year.
- b. Discuss the capability of ARC LIGHT forces.
- c. Identify common problems and where possible generate necessary staff actions to resolve problems.
- d. Discuss new concepts.
- e. Recommend actions to higher authority.

~~(S)~~ Briefings about force capabilities, Diverted Force (DF) concepts, alternate and secondary targets, weaponeering and TINY TIM were given. In addition, the following subjects were discussed:²

- a. Diverted Force concept.
- b. Bomb damage assessment and weaponeering.
- c. GCI radar locations.
- d. B-52 operations at U-Tapao.
- e. TINY TIM and threat diversion.
- f. Operational security.

All objectives within the authority of the conferees appears to have been reached.³

1. J24 Memo, 13 Sep 67, Subject: "ARC LIGHT Conference," with enclosure (1) "ARC LIGHT Conference Report."

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid.

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PINK ROSE

(S) During 1967 a total of three PINK ROSE operations were conducted. PINK ROSE I took place on 18 January when thirty B-52's dropped incendiary bombs in a previously defoliated area in War Zone "D". PINK ROSE II was conducted on 28 January when twenty-nine B-52's dropped incendiary bombs on a previously defoliated area in War Zone "C". Neither strike accomplished the objective of generating a large fire storm. Target materials which were not completely dry and rain which fell shortly after the PINK ROSE I strike contributed to the poor results. Even though weather conditions for PINK ROSE II were satisfactory, only an estimated five percent of the target area was burned. However, during the fire caused by the raid, there were fifteen secondary explosions. ¹

(S) PINK ROSE III mission was flown on 4 April by fifteen B-52's. This mission was directed toward burning out tree cover in an area frequented by NVA/VC troops. As in the case of PINK ROSE I and II, a fire storm failed to develop as hoped even though the incendiary bomblets were dropped with a density three times greater than employed on the earlier strikes. Dense smoke partially obscured visual damage assessment; however, numerous small secondary explosions were detected in the target area. ²

(S) The 7th AF reported on 4 April that the bomblet impact pattern and density in PINK ROSE II were excellent and 6 April stated that the tactical effectiveness of the PINK ROSE technique was clearly demonstrated to be unsatisfactory as a method for clearing jungle canopy. ³ On 12 April, CINCPAC requested COMUSMACV's evaluation of the PINK ROSE tests and techniques. ⁴

(S) COMUSMACV replied on 22 April that: ⁵

"a. In all three PINK ROSE ignitions the prior defoliation reportedly was effective and the incendiary bomb dispersal pattern was excellent. In the latter two ignitions optimum weather conditions prevailed and on PINK ROSE III the target area was reduced to one-third its

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1. Southeast Asia Air Operations, Jan 67, Hq PACAF, published monthly; SSGT J. E. Daniels USA, J243, Hq CINCPAC.
 2. Southeast Asia Air Operations, Apr 67, Hq PACAF, published monthly.
 3. CINCPAC 120401Z Apr 67.
 4. Ibid.
 5. COMUSMACV 220150Z Apr 67.

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original size in order to increase the fire bomb concentration. The technique appears to have been given a fair trial under conditions which were more idealized than normally might be expected in a combat operational environment. In spite of this, the desired fire storm did not result and there was no burn-off of the jungle canopy.

"b. It is the considered opinion of this Headquarters that the PINK ROSE technique is ineffective as a method for clearing jungle canopy."

~~(C)~~ No additional PINK ROSE strikes were made during the remainder of 1967.¹

1. Interview with Maj J. F. Delaney, USMC, J2432, Hq CINCPAC and LTC Johnson, CINCPAC Command Historian.

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Naval Surface OperationsSEA DRAGON - Naval Gunfire


(S) The primary mission of SEA DRAGON operations was the interdiction of waterborne logistics craft (WBLC). The secondary mission was to attack logistic, coastal defense and military targets ashore in coordination with ROLLING THUNDER Operations.¹

(S) Authority to employ naval surface ships to interdict NVN military and logistic WBLC was granted on 16 October 1966. On 27 February 1967, the area of operation was extended to twenty degrees north as indicated on the following "SEA DRAGON Operation" map. At the same time, naval gunfire against military and logistic targets ashore was also authorized. To carry out its secondary mission, SEA DRAGON forces were increased to one cruiser and four destroyers composing two separate task units. Attendant with the increase of ships, there was a decrease in WBLC traffic during the first quarter of CY 1967.

(S) During April, SEA DRAGON forces continued pressure on WBLC, overland LOC's, GCI, EW radar and AAA sites, and other military targets along the coastline of NVN between 17° North and 20° North. In May the number of WBLC destroyed or damaged increased over the previous months of 1967. Additionally, ten trucks were destroyed and several direct hits were made on a bridge. On 22 May, elements of SEA DRAGON forces in coordination with 7th AF ROLLING THUNDER operations struck the Quang Khe Ferry complex in RP-1 and destroyed at least 40 WBLC. The purpose of this operation was to disrupt the enemy's intention to move supplies on Buddha's birthday.² At the beginning of June seven ships were assigned to the SEA DRAGON forces; however, by the end of June this number had been reduced to five. In mid-June as a counter to shore battery fire and a possible enemy surface-to-surface missile threat, SEA DRAGON forces modified their surveillance patrols with an experimental tactic. Patrols were moved out to 20 nautical miles offshore and from this line, the ships moved in quickly toward the coast, bombarded their target and moved out again. The number of WBLC destroyed or damaged in June dropped sharply from the two preceding months in the second quarter of FY 67.³ As indicated

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1. Point Paper, J382 (CINCPAC), 15 Mar 67, Subject: "SEA DRAGON [sic] (U):" ROLLING THUNDER Digest, Edition 3, Mar 67, Hq. CINCPAC.
 2. ROLLING THUNDER Digest, Edition 4, Jun 67.
 3. Pacific Area Naval Operations Review, Jun 67 Hq CINCPACFLT.

SEA DRAGON OPERATIONS



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on chart, "SEA DRAGON Operations," more WBLC were damaged and destroyed during the second quarter of CY 67 than any other quarter. During July there was a noticeable decrease in WBLC sited and destroyed or damaged in comparison to June. The reduction may have been due to a decrease in the availability of WBLC or a reluctance on the part of the enemy to expose the WBLC available to him. On the other hand there was a significant increase in the number of land targets struck, 518 as compared to March, the second highest month, when 374 NVN land targets were struck. SEA DRAGON forces tripled the July WBLC damaged or destroyed in August when 245 WBLC were damaged or destroyed. Over 1000 fixed or moving targets were taken under fire. In September, SEA DRAGON forces continued patrolling between the 17th and 20th North parallels. However, the number of WBLC sited decreased considerably over the previous month as did the number damaged and destroyed. Late in September, SEA DRAGON forces moved to the DMZ area and provided naval gunfire for land forces. While the SEA DRAGON forces were supporting the forces in the DMZ a marked increase in WBLC and truck convoy activity took place. As a result the SEA DRAGON forces were returned to naval operations but maintained a quick reaction posture to return to the DMZ, if required. ¹

~~(S)~~ During the fourth quarter of CY 67 there was a 62 percent decrease in the number of WBLCs detected compared to the third quarter. This decrease could be attributed to a combination of poor weather, the seeding of river mouths with MK-36 Destructors and the continued deterrent of SEA DRAGON forces. Significantly, 1707 land targets were struck as compared to 1258 in the third quarter, a 36 percent increase. ²

~~(S)~~ On 22 October the USS NEWPORT NEWS and HMAS PERTH became the first SEA DRAGON units to take NVN prisoners. The two ships recovered seven survivors from an enemy WBLC which had been sunk by a U.S. air attack. ³

~~(S)~~ Also in October, several destroyers effectively used SNOOPY, a unique combination featuring a drone antisubmarine helicopter (DASH) equipped with a TV camera, to direct 5 inch gunfire onto NVN logistic

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1. ROLLING THUNDER Digest, Edition 5, Sep 67.
 2. ROLLING THUNDER Digest, Edition 6, Dec 67.
 3. Pacific Area Naval Operations Review, Oct 67.

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
SEA DRAGON OPERATIONS

| Month | WBLC | | Log TGTS | Coast DEF | NVN Land TGT |
|-----------|----------|---------|-------------|--------------|-----------------|
| | Detected | Des/Dam | Des/Dam | Des/Dam | Struck |
| January | 306 | 193 | 0 | 12 | 20 |
| February | 215 | 91 | 0 | 13 | 96 |
| March | 41 | 17 | 29 | 77 | 374 |
| April | 373 | 219 | 14 | 59 | 253 |
| May | 635 | 257 | 21 | 32 | 291 |
| June | 362 | 172 | 21 | 28 | 297 |
| July | 163 | 79 | 17 | 15 | 518 |
| August | 387 | 245 | 13 | 20 | 476 |
| September | 174 | 94 | 19 | 18 | 264 |
| October | 103 | 43 | 7 | 2 | 601 |
| November | 66 | 47 | 29 | 12 | 566 |
| December | 109 | 50 | 26 | 15 | 540 |


Legend: DES - Destroyed
DAM - Damaged
WBLC - Waterborne logistic craft

Source: ROLLING THUNDER Digest, Editions 3 - 6, Hq. CINCPAC.

UNCLASSIFIED



US Navy Photos
The heavy cruiser USS NEWPORT NEWS. Above, empty 8" casings scattered on the deck of USS NEWPORT NEWS after rendering naval gunfire support.



UNCLASSIFIED

traffic and other military targets. SNOOPY enhanced a ship's ability to spot gunfire; however, a thorough combat evaluation of SNOOPY had not yet been made. ¹

~~(S)~~ During 1967 the number of ships assigned to SEA DRAGON forces at any one time fluctuated. In one instance there were eight ships assigned; however, the normal composition consisted of five ships--a cruiser and four destroyers operating in two groups.

~~(S)~~ Damage to US ships from NVN coastal defense artillery was considered light in comparison to damage and destruction caused by US ships. Although the accuracy of NVN crews improved throughout the year, it appears that evasive action and other tactics employed by US ships offset the improved accuracy of NVN gun crews. The following incidents of damage to US and allied ships were reported for 1967. ²

June - USS STODDERT received superficial damage from flying shrapnel of detonating projectiles.

July - On 31 July the USS AULT was slightly damaged by flying shrapnel.

August - The USS SAINT PAUL received minor structural damage and one officer was wounded from flying shrapnel. The USS RUPERTUS and the USS BERKLEY were hit by shell fragments and received minor damages.

September - On 1 September, the USS SAINT PAUL was hit by an enemy round on the starboard side forward approximately two feet above the waterline. Three staterooms were heavily damaged, but no casualties. On 13 September the USS DAMATO took two direct hits. One projectile exploded below the bridge in the Captain's inport cabin and the other projectile hit the Antisubmarine Rocket (ASROC) deck. The ASROC was damaged but again no casualties.

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1. Pacific Area Naval Operations Review, Oct 67.
 2. Data taken from "Pacific Area Naval Operations" for the months of January, February and June, through November 1967.

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October - On 18 September HMAS PERTH took a direct hit just forward of the after gun mount. The explosion left a two foot hole in the deck, lightly damaged the interior of the after deckhouse, rendered the TARTAR missile launcher inoperable and wounded four men.

November - On the 12th the USS GOLDSBOROUGH was hit by shrapnel which damaged the TARTAR missile launcher but caused no personnel casualties.

Naval Gunfire (NGF)

~~(TS)~~ On 25 February 1967, Admiral Sharp submitted a proposal to the JCS to alleviate a shortage of ships which were required to support the SEA DRAGON-NGF program. ¹ Prior to this COMUSMACV had stated a requirement for one 8 inch gun cruiser, two 5"/54 and four 5"/38 gun destroyers and one IFS/LSMR (Inshore Fire Support/Medium Landing Ship Rocket) continuously on station for NGF support in SVN. ²

~~(TS)~~ CINCPAC proposed that ships or crafts be obtained to relieve the DERs (Escort Ship, Radar Picket) used for MARKET TIME operations. In turn the DERs would relieve the DD (Destroyers) of less demanding roles. The relief of the DERs could be effected by expediting delivery schedule of PGMs (gunboats); substituting Coast Guard high endurance cutters (WAPG and WAVP); or by additional Free World Military Assistance forces. ³

~~(TS)~~ Admiral Sharp stated that the activation of two CA (heavy cruisers) for assignment to PACFLT would alleviate the 8 inch cruiser shortage. With a base of four CA/CAG in Seventh Fleet and two in the Atlantic Fleet, it would be possible to maintain two CA/CAG in the Seventh Fleet continuously, thus insuring that at least one to be available for NGF support at all times. He then pointed out that the need for destroyers would only partially be met by the measures he had recommended. The shortfall of two DDs would remain to be filled out of CINCLANT resources. In summary, Admiral Sharp stated there was a requirement for seven additional destroyers and two additional cruisers to prosecute naval gunfire missions effectively in Southeast Asia. These shortages would be alleviated provided

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1. CINCPAC 250354Z Feb 67.
 2. COMUSMACV 54938/290945Z Dec 66.
 3. CINCPAC 250354Z Feb 67.

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his recommended actions were implemented. ¹

~~(IS)~~ In reply, prompt action was taken to deploy five high endurance Coast Guard cutters and two PGMs to partially fill Admiral Sharp's request. ²

~~(IS)~~ On 2 April, CINCPACFLT ³ recommended the transfer of five 5"/38 DEs from Program V, Reserve and Guard Forces, to program II, General Purpose Forces, as an interim measure to provide early assets in a timely manner. Admiral Sharp informed the JCS that he did not concur in this recommendation. His rationale for the nonconcurrence included the following: ⁴


- a. DEs would still have limited capability with only 2-5" guns.
- b. Ammunition storage would be limited.
- c. Fire control capability would be limited even with MK1A computer and stable element conversion.
- d. Ships would be vulnerable and have austere capability to perform general DD tasks.

He then recommended the following actions to satisfy PACOM requirements over the long term: ⁵

- a. Continue negotiations for FWMAF assistance particularly, for ships with guns superior to 5"/38.
- b. Activate additional destroyers from the reserve fleet. Five DDs to be expedited for deployment to the Seventh Fleet as soon as possible. (A total of 15 destroyers were required to maintain five DDs continuously in WESTPAC on a long term basis).
- c. Activate two 8" cruisers as previously recommended.

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1. CINCPAC 250354Z Feb 67.
 2. CINCPAC 110317Z Apr 67.
 3. CINCPACFLT 022212Z Apr 67.
 4. CINCPAC 110217Z Apr 67.
 5. Ibid.

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US Navy Photo

USS NEW JERSEY (BB-62), shown in action during the Korean War, was selected to be reconditioned to provide naval gunfire support.

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~~(S)~~ On 12 April 1967, CINCPAC recommended the activation of two Iowa-class battleships in addition to the two 8" cruisers. He told the JCS that he considered it prudent to relate his previous recommendations for additional ships (DDs and CAs) to the long term need for heavy naval gunfire of the type available only in the Iowa-class battleship. He told the JCS that the case for NGF support in SVN was substantiated through examination of results obtained thus far. Known damage inflicted upon the enemy during the period of 1 March 1966 through 28 February 1967 included: 16,666 structures destroyed, 22,803 damaged and 2008 VC observed killed. Vegetation ~~and~~ bad weather prevented observation of probable additional damage. NGF had disrupted enemy movements and positions throughout the coastal reaches of I and II CTZ relieving pressure on Allied ground forces.¹ Admiral Sharp pointed out to the JCS that:²

"The enemy is certain to react to the damage he has received along the coast of NVN from Naval gunfire. He will position increasing numbers of coastal defense guns using artillery of greater range capability. Recent gunfire encountered by our ships has been increasingly accurate and intense. Eventually we may face a Soviet-made surface-to-surface missile.

"As the enemy increases his coastal defense in NVN, cruisers will have to replace destroyers for many of the gunfire tasks. While cruisers are far less vulnerable than destroyers to enemy action, the battleship is the ultimate in invulnerability. The heavier armor and general construction of a battleship gives it the capability to face any conventional threat. Further, the 16" gun firing a 1900 pound projectile and carrying 154 pounds of explosive is markedly superior to lighter weight weapons in both effectiveness and psychological impact.

"Reference C³ sets forth CINCPAC's earlier views relative to activation of a battleship, concluding that the advantages afforded by the availability of such a ship for naval gunfire justified such action. Specific factors upon which this recommendation was based included the desirability of opening a band of valid targets from Hon Gay to the Delta, the great selectivity and accurate control of both the main and secondary batteries, and the significant psychological impact on the

1. CINCPAC 121432Z Apr 67.
2. Ibid.
3. CINCPAC 031215Z Mar 66 stated advantage of BB such as increased range, destruction power, all weather capability and psychological impact.

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enemy. Time and cost of activation was considered within the framework of this evaluation. Thirteen months have now passed since this initial recommendation, and [sic] period during which significant progress could have been made toward readying two battleships for combat operations.

"Two 8" cruisers now in the Pacific Fleet are committed to SEA DRAGON operations. Destroyers are extended to their limits. In order to maintain existing pressure against NVN coastal targets while providing support to troops ashore, recommend action be taken to activate two 8" cruisers and two Iowa-class battleships. Such a posture will not permit the optimum positioning of three cruisers and a battleship on continuous gunfire station as desired, but will represent a marked improvement in our present meager assets."

~~(S)~~ One battleship was approved and the Chief of Naval Operations, on 1 August 1967 directed the activation of the USS NEW JERSEY to fill the requirement. ¹

~~(S)~~ At the end of 1967 action was still pending on the request for heavy cruisers and five additional destroyers. ²

USS FORRESTAL

~~(TS)~~ In addition to SEA DRAGON - NGF requirements, another requirement for navy assets came about as a result of an accident to the USS FORRESTAL. On 29 July 1967, a missile from one aircraft fired into another aircraft. A fire resulted and spread to other aircraft being positioned for an 1100 hour launch. Fuel tanks, rockets and bombs of nearly all of these aircraft exploded and caused serious losses. After reevaluation of the initial report of losses it was determined on 31 July that there were 129 dead, seven missing and 64 injured personnel. ³ Twenty-one aircraft were destroyed and 30 received major damage. The FORRESTAL was so extensively damaged that it was removed from YANKEE Station for repair.

~~(TS)~~ To maintain the level of sortie effort in NVN (ROLLING THUNDER) during the period of reduced CVA capability, CINCPAC requested

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1. CNO 012200Z Aug 67.
 2. Interview by LTC Johnson, Command Historian and Commander R. T. Whitlock, J3B42, CINCPAC.
 3. CINCPAC Command Center Briefing 0730 Briefing Notes, 29 and 31 Jul 67.

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authority to temporarily deploy two Japan-based Marine squadrons to Chu Lai; to deploy F-100 aircraft and B-57 aircraft from Clark Air Base for temporary augmentation to SVN in-country operations; and to deploy on an expedited basis an additional F-4 squadron. The JCS recommended that the SECDEF approve the CINCPAC request except for deployment of the F-4 squadron.¹ The SECDEF approved the deployment of the two Marine and one Air Force tactical squadrons to SVN until 15 November 1967.²

Mining of North Vietnam Waters

(S) The mining of NVN rivers South of 20 degrees North was authorized for the first time by the JCS on 23 February 1967.³ PACFLT began mining operations on 26 February when the Song Ca and the Song Giang rivers were mined in March.⁴ All mines were sown in the mouths of these rivers. The mines were designed to restrict passage of waterborne logistic craft through the use of bottom mines sensitive to magnetic and accoustical influences.⁵

(S) On 26 February, CINCPAC and COMUSMACV received a joint State-Defense message from the SECDEF furnishing public affairs guidance. Based on current planning factors mining operations were scheduled to occur at approximately 261400Z (2200 Hotel Saigon time), February 1967. In light of this, SECDEF requested (if operations went as scheduled), COMUSMACV to release the following information at the earliest practical time the following morning:

"As we have reported, the North Vietnamese are making increased use of waterborne logistic craft to infiltrate men and supplies into South Vietnam. To counter this, the United States is emplacing a limited number of air-delivered nonfloating mines in selected river areas in the Southern portion of North Vietnam. This action poses no

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1. J3 Brief No. 235-67, 1 Sep 67, CS 000512-67, Subject: "Replacement of USS FORRESTAL Air Operations Capability (JCSM-468-67 of 24 Aug 67)(U)."
 2. JCS 2472/136-11, 18 Oct 67.
 3. Point Paper, J381, CINCPAC, 15 Mar 67 entitled "Offensive Mining North Vietnam."
 4. Ibid.; ROLLING THUNDER Digest Edition 3, Mar 67.
 5. RT Digest, Mar 67.

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danger to deep-water maritime traffic." ¹

~~(S)~~ The message recommended the release be made 0830 Hotel, Saigon time, Monday morning after confirmation of the mission. In response to queries, it was permissible to point out that Haiphong, Hon Gai and Cam Pha were deep-water ports and, therefore, no mines had been placed near them. Attention was to be invited to the use of mines by the enemy against shipping in the Saigon channel which had resulted in damage and casualties. ²

~~(S)~~ Previous to the receipt of authority to mine south of 20 degrees North, CINCPAC had requested authority to conduct offensive mining against NVN ports north of 20 degrees North with the initial effort directed at Haiphong. This request was not granted in spite of the fact that 85 percent of NVN imports are routed through Haiphong. Without these vital imports NVN's ability to continue its aggression would be seriously curtailed.

~~(S)~~ While the effectiveness of the mining of the five rivers discussed earlier cannot be documented because of a lack of reliable intelligence, it is apparent from the dramatic slow down in river traffic that the mining coupled with SEA DRAGON operations had been effective.


MARKET TIME OPERATIONS

~~(S)~~ The mission of MARKET TIME forces was the interdiction of waterborne infiltration of men and material destined for enemy forces in SVN. An average of over 200 US-VNN patrol vessels were assigned to MARKET TIME forces continuously throughout the year. This operation was a COMUSMACV responsibility and was conducted by Task Force 115 under COMUSMACV's naval component commander. ³ The following chart "MARKET TIME Patrol Areas", indicates area of operation.

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1. SECDEF (7258 ASD(PA)) 260042Z Feb 67.
 2. Ibid.
 3. Point Paper, J38, CINCPAC, 3 Jun 67, Subject: "MARKET TIME"; Point Paper, J3B4, CINCPAC, 18 Sep 67, Subject: "Evaluation of Sea Campaign against NVN Infiltration. (U)", Chapter IV, Volume II, page 597, CINCPAC Command History 1966.

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US Navy Photo

Crew of Vietnamese Navy junk searching for enemy supplies or personnel on the Co Chien River in the Mekong Delta.

~~(S)~~ On 5 April 1967, Admiral Sharp pointed out to General Westmoreland that it had been 19 months since the last comprehensive command-wide review of anti-sea infiltration activities in SVN. At the time of the review certain assumptions had been made in estimating detection probabilities, search rate, and other factors used in planning MARKET TIME operations. Admiral Sharp felt it advisable to compare past assumptions with existing realities as many changes had occurred since the review. He told COMUSMACV he was sending a five man team to RVN to assist in a review of MARKET TIME operations and requested that a study group, including the five man team, be established.

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The study group was to examine USN, US Coast Guard and VNN operations, area of operations, patterns of operations and probabilities of detection, with the overall objective of determining how to maximize the effectiveness of MARKET TIME and optimum future force requirements.¹

~~(S)~~ The study, completed in May, concluded that:²


- a. Probability of detecting steel hull infiltrators was - .94.
- b. Probability of detecting wooden hull infiltrators - .70.
- c. Probability of boarding craft engaged in intra-coastal trans-shipment - .25.
- d. MARKET TIME force levels should be maintained.

GAME WARDEN Operations

~~(S)~~ The primary mission of GAME WARDEN forces was to interdict the Viet Cong water LOC in the Mekong Delta and the Rung Sat Special Zone (RSSZ). By controlling the major waterways vital to VC transportation and basic to the whole economy of the region, GAME WARDEN forces participated in the pacification of the Mekong Delta Region and the Rung Sat Special Zone. The method of controlling the water arteries was by river patrols and inshore surveillance to enforce curfews and prevent VC infiltration, movement, and resupply along the Delta estuary coast and across the rivers of the Mekong Delta and the RSSZ. River operations were conducted by PBRs (River Patrol Boats) and inshore surveillance by LSTs anchored off the river mouths.³

~~(S)~~ River patrols were conducted by PBR sections consisting of two boats, in mutual support, backed by a Light Fire Team (LFT) consisting of two armed helicopters conveniently located for rapid response to assist the PBRs when needed.⁴ Forces available to CTF 116

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1. CINCPAC 052009Z Apr 67.
 2. Point Paper, J3B4, CINCPAC, 18 Sep 67, Subject: "Evaluation of Sea Campaign against NVN Infiltration (U)."
 3. Point Paper, J3B42, CINCPAC, 24 Nov 67, Subject: "Status of GAME WARDEN Operations (U)."
 4. Ibid.



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(responsible for conducting GAME WARDEN operations) fluctuated from 120 PBR, 3 PACV (Patrol Air Cushion Vehicle), 11 MSB (Mine Sweeping Boats), 8 helicopters in January 1967 to a high of 120 PBR, 22 UH-1B helicopters, 12 MSB, 3 LSTs and two SEAL detachments by the end of 1967. ¹

~~(C)~~ The PBR force was scheduled to increase from 120 PBRs to 200 by February 1968, thus providing for an additional 40 sections. The additional sections imposed a requirement for additional armed helicopters to support the sections. ²

~~(S)~~ On 25 July, COMNAVFOR made known to CINCPACFLT the impending requirement for additional helicopters. To this requirement Admiral Sharp told his staff, "We should give strong support to this program." ³

~~(S)~~ On 20 August, Admiral Sharp in a message to the JCS made known his desire to support the GAME WARDEN requirements when he recommended that: ⁴

"a. Sufficient AH-16 helos or helos of similar characteristics be provided to GAME WARDEN to assure availability of fifty operational aircraft at all times.

"b. Army helicopter training facilities be made available to assist in acceleration of Navy training program.

"c. The effectiveness of GAME WARDEN can be measured to a considerable degree by VC reaction. The VC reacted strongly. Engagement with the enemy occurred almost on a daily basis. VC mining attempts and ambushes were frequent but the kill ratio was heavily in favor of GAME WARDEN." ⁵

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1. Point Paper, J3B42, CINCPAC, 24 Nov 67, Subject: "Status of GAME WARDEN Operations (U)"; Point Paper, J381, CINCPAC, 5 Jun 67, Subject: "GAME WARDEN."
 2. COMNAVFOR 250049Z Jul 67.
 3. Hand written note made by Admiral Sharp on CINCPAC 250049Z Jul 67.
 4. CINCPAC 202240Z Aug 67.
 5. Point Paper, J3B42, CINCPAC, 24 Nov 67, Subject: "Status of GAME WARDEN Operations (U)."

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Electronic Warfare

(U) The air war over North Vietnam sharply focused attention on the role of electronic warfare¹ in tactical combat operations. In South-east Asia the use of electronic warfare in counterinsurgency and anti-infiltration activities also expanded rapidly in 1967.

(U) In the air war, electronic countermeasures (ECM) devices were carried by penetrating aircraft for self-protection and by electronic warfare aircraft to provide support for strike and reconnaissance missions. Penetrating aircraft carried their own "black boxes" to warn them when they were "painted" by hostile ground based or airborne intercept radar, and to enable them to counter those threats by evasive action or electronic jamming. Electronic warfare aircraft were specially configured platforms that supported strike and reconnaissance missions; they provided jamming and/or threat warning support. Stand-off ECM aircraft, typically EB-66 aircraft, remained outside the range of hostile surface-to-air missiles (SAM) to give ECM aid to penetrating strike aircraft.

(U) CINCPAC's interest in electronic warfare intensified in 1967. His Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations briefed a CINCSTRIKE seminar at Orlando Air Force Base, Florida on 7 December. In that presentation,² he outlined the principal activities of CINCPAC in electronic warfare, principally concerning the air war in Vietnam. The following discussion is based on that briefing.

~~(U)~~ The North Vietnamese air defense environment was the most dense and sophisticated ever engaged. Of some 8,000 antiaircraft artillery type guns, about 950 were radar controlled. Since the first SA-2 missile site was discovered on 25 April 1965, more than 260 sites had been prepared, with an estimated 25 to 30 SAM firing battalions operational and moving from site to site as dictated by the tactical situation. In North Vietnam, locating the numerous field sites was a major problem. Some were in populated places and some in

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1. The JCS defined electronic warfare as that division of the military use of electronics involving actions taken to prevent or reduce an enemy's effective use of radiated electromagnetic energy and actions taken to insure our own effective use of radiated electromagnetic energy. (JCS Pub-1, Dictionary of United States Military Terms for Joint Usage, 1 Jan 66.)
 2. A copy of which is maintained in the History Branch files.

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densely wooded areas, which required intense photographic interpretation to identify.

(S) The presence of the surface-to-air missiles took a significant toll. In addition to actual hits -- it caused jettisoning, less accurate bombing, and initially, particularly, lower flight altitudes, which placed aircraft within automatic weapons and light flak ranges.

The enemy's small Air Force had lost 96 MIG aircraft in air-to-air combat compared to 39 US aircraft lost to the MIGs, but it showed increasing aggressiveness in pressing attacks when to their advantage, ducking into China when not to their advantage, and exhibiting improved skill in execution of attacks. The MIGs also forced strike aircraft to jettison ordnance -- 104 tons in September 1967 and 156 tons in October.

The North Vietnamese radar order of battle had grown from 64 sets in May 1965 to around 340 sets in late 1967.


To counter these threats the United States combined tactics and technology. To suppress and destroy North Vietnam's SA-2 system, CINCPAC directed the IRON HAND¹ support operation, using SHRIKE missiles and other assorted weapons. Other US support resources included defensive ECM, including radar homing and warning, and active ECM on all strike, patrol, and reconnaissance aircraft, and also support jamming, passive ECM, signal intelligence, and air control aircraft.

We lost 107 aircraft directly to the SAM between the first kill on 24 July 1965 and November 1967. By comparing loss rates to visual sightings of SAMs, the missiles were determined to have been highly effective when first encountered, but this effectiveness dropped sharply with the introduction of ECM-carrying aircraft. SAMs remained about three percent effective through most of 1966, dropping to two percent or less for the first nine months of 1967.

(S) The ECM equipment that provided protection against the SA-2s also allowed aircraft to ingress and egress at higher altitudes. They


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1. IRON HAND flights were led by Air Force F-105F and F-4 WILD WEASEL aircraft. WILD WEASEL aircraft were equipped with special radar receiving and homing systems. CINCPAC support for SAC ARC LIGHT operations was called TINY TIM, which included both ECM and IRON HAND support.

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USAF Photos

Above, SAM site 25 miles northwest of Hanoi. This 700' by 450' site contains six launching pads with five missiles visible and is representative of fixed SAM installations. Below, camouflaged SAM transporters. Although the SA-2 launchers are not easily seen, the vehicle tracks reveal a temporary field deployment of an SA-2 SAM missile.



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were thus out of the range of light antiaircraft artillery and automatic weapons, which continued to account for about 75 percent of our combat losses.

~~(S)~~ The SA-2 system was degraded by the introduction of IRON HAND operations (and the SHRIKE particularly) as FAN SONG radar transmission times were reduced to counter the effectiveness of this anti-radiation missile. The shorter time on the air decreased the data counts for the SA-2 computers, degrading the overall effectiveness of the system.

~~(S)~~ The enemy, however, continued to devise new and improved tactics and techniques and his training was much improved in late 1967. By that time the enemy's toll of US resources tasked for various electronic warfare roles was 21 WILD WEASEL aircraft, 45 other IRON HAND aircraft, and 5 ECM aircraft.

~~(S)~~ At the outset CINCPAC had only ECM support aircraft for air operations over North Vietnam. Very few reconnaissance and generally no attack aircraft had any self-protection ECM. We had at that time 22 aircraft that could provide both active and passive support.¹ In addition, eight aircraft were available to perform electronic reconnaissance and threat warning operations in the Gulf of Tonkin.²

~~(S)~~ By late 1967 essentially all strike, reconnaissance, and support aircraft that penetrated the higher threat areas of North Vietnam were equipped with both warning and jamming capabilities against SA-2 and antiaircraft artillery fire control radars.

~~(S)~~ Although ECM efforts over North Vietnam had produced excellent results, and the SAM-aided air defense system was not what it could have been, there was still much room for improvement. In measuring our mission effectiveness, we continued to lose aircraft, jettison ordnance, and miss targets, due in part to an electronically aided air defense system.

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1. These were 4 EB-66C, 12 EA-1F, and 6 EF-10B.
 2. These were 5 EA-3B, 2 RA-5C, and 1 BIG LOOK, which was an EC-121 equipped to perform electronic reconnaissance and signal intelligence collection, fuzing the data while on station to provide MIG and SAM alerts to combat aircrews. Among related programs added later was COMBAT APPLE, a SAC EC-135 that also provided MIG alerts from signal intelligence.

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~~(S)~~ Other electronic warfare endeavors in Southeast Asia included the Airborne Radio Direction Finding program, the largest electronic warfare operation in South Vietnam, which used electronic warfare equipped aircraft to determine the location of Viet Cong and North Vietnamese Army units and which gathered information on which a great many ARC LIGHT strikes were planned. Adjuncts to this program were the Army's CEFLIEN LION and the Air Force's COMPASS DART "Q" communications jamming aircraft, but these had not yet been employed in the jamming role.

~~(S)~~ Land and sea application of electronic techniques also expanded in 1967. Low-level sensors were used in anti-infiltration programs. These techniques included detection of electromagnetic emissions in the infra-red spectrum and the emissions from vehicle ignition systems.

~~(S)~~ Electronic "blocking" operations were conducted by ships in the Tonkin Gulf. Enemy trawlers and junks continued to shadow our carriers. To hamper their intercept of our communications, we positioned ships with blocking transmitters, or jammers, between the enemy ships and our carriers, primarily during launch operations.

~~(S)~~ Our ships in the Tonkin Gulf operated with relatively immunity from radar-directed weapons systems. The enemy had been detected using coastal radars, however, to illuminate SEA DRAGON, shore bombardment ships, and search and rescue ships, possibly using radar data as an assist for counter-fire. CINCPAC was alert to the possible enemy use of the STYX, or other electronically aided weaponry, against surface vessels. Some US ships had a limited self-protection capability in the form of on-board passive ECM, noise jammers, deception repeaters, and chaff mortars.

~~(S)~~ MUSCLE SHOALS was an elaborate array of electronic devices in the North Vietnam-South Vietnam-Laos border area to assist in combating infiltration from the north. As the effectiveness of that program increased, it could be anticipated that the enemy would attempt to jam it, read out our intelligence from it, or otherwise exploit it electronically. CINCPAC initiated preparations to employ electronic counter-measures to nullify the enemy's efforts.

(U) CINCPAC's command and management functions increased as electronic warfare's magnitude, complexity, and our reliance on it grew. He made several necessary organizational changes.

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(S) In February 1967 he established the Pacific Command North Vietnamese Air Defense Analysis and Coordinating Group (NADAC)¹ to coordinate and integrate recommended actions directed towards degrading or destroying SAM, antiaircraft artillery, and MIG defenses and their associated control systems. The group was tasked to coordinate studies and analyses relative to enemy terminal threats, enemy command and control systems, electronic warfare material requirements, air control procedures, and the integration of intelligence and reconnaissance capabilities. It was also tasked to review recommendations on research and development programs to provide follow-on systems such as sensors, weapons, ECM, and support systems.

(S) In early 1967 CINCPAC also established an ECM Sub-Committee under the NADAC group to work in coordination with CINCPAC's Research and Engineering Consultant and to study matters related to ECM and its application to ROLLING THUNDER operations in particular. Specific tasks were to assess across-the-board ECM capabilities of tactical air craft penetrating North Vietnam, review equipment delivery programs, monitor problem areas related to ECM in Southeast Asia, and perform continuing evaluation of the effectiveness of both active and passive ECM operations.

(S) A review by CINCPAC of our capability to react rapidly to possible North Vietnamese air defense changes, particularly in regard to the SAM, indicated that a supplemental immediate reaction capability was needed to assist tactical forces in maintaining an edge vis-a-vis the enemy.

(S) In June, therefore, CINCPAC (with the approval of the JCS and the Deputy Director of Defense Research and Engineering) formally established the PACOM Quick Reaction Capability (QRC) Electronic Warfare Engineering Effort. He nicknamed it FRIDAY NIGHT. It was designed to place engineering talent closer to the problem and avoid some of the iterative procedures normally involved in developing or adapting hardware to meet a military need. Each of CINCPAC's component command commander's existing electronic warfare organizations was augmented with a QRC staff liaison representative and a field team. The field teams were to work through their Service QRC channels, with parallel actions to CINCPAC to assist in expediting the administrative and review processes. The QRC liaison representatives would perform technical advisory functions for CINCPAC through the NADAC group.

1. CINCPACINST 03124.1, 16 Feb 67.

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The requirements that necessitated joint action would be validated by CINCPAC to the JCS and to the Director of Defense Research and Engineering.

(U) FRIDAY NIGHT was not intended as a replacement for any of the traditional Service functions, but rather to complement the systems by compressing the time cycle for identifying joint operational electronic warfare requirements.

~~(S)~~ Management of electronic warfare assets in Southeast Asia became more complex as our requirements for support resources increased to correspond with increases in the magnitude and diversity of air operations and with the spread and diversity of the enemy's radar order of battle. CINCPAC believed that the penetrating strike aircraft carried just about all of the ECM they could usefully manage. Therefore, the need remained to employ electronic warfare aircraft capable of providing across-the-board active and passive ECM support to strike operations.

~~(S)~~ CINCPAC continued his efforts to obtain additional ECM resources, while attempting to use existing assets to the maximum. To provide the minimum electronic warfare support for strike aircraft as operations in Route Package 6 intensified and as more ARC LIGHT strikes were directed at the Demilitarized Zone area, CINCPAC asked the JCS for authority to retain 13 EB-66Bs, which had been scheduled for replacement. The JCS approved the request.

~~(S)~~ CINCPAC also directed his air component commanders to establish a coordinated priority and management system for daily assignment of electronic warfare support assets for particular missions. A scheduling board was organized within the framework of the Commander, Task Force 77/7th Air Force Coordinating Committee to help achieve the flexibility desired by tactical commanders for individual Service operations. While effective management could achieve optimum use of available aircraft, it could not overcome the problem of shortages. Some missions were still being cancelled for lack of ECM support aircraft.

~~(C)~~ CINCPAC established a PACOM Air Defense Analysis Facility under CINCPACAF to perform in-depth analyses of the enemy's air defense system, operations, and capabilities. (This organization is discussed in greater detail in Chapter I). The facility was to be supported by a cryptologic support group provided by the Director of the

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National Security Agency. It also received assistance in the area of ECM effectiveness evaluation from the COMFY COAT operations of the Air Force Security Service. The COMFY COAT product was to be integrated into the facility's overall defense analysis considerations.

(S) PACOM Electronic Intelligence (ELINT) Center personnel prepared the finished electronic order of battle information and in-depth analyses on which the programs discussed above were often based. They also studied the capabilities and limitations of offensive and defensive electronics systems. Their attention to and recommendations on electronic reconnaissance taskings and procedures, as well as their extensive liaison with the tactical passive ECM units, contributed materially toward improving our intelligence support.

(C) Likewise, the various military and civilian units working under the direction of the National Security Agency, Pacific accomplished a necessary service with their collection and analysis of signal information. Their signal intelligence product was a vital cog for the pursuit of effective military operations in Southeast Asia, as well as for keeping abreast of enemy intentions in other areas of the PACOM.

(S) From the sometimes frustrating and costly events related to electronic warfare in Southeast Asia, there were significant lessons to be learned, or relearned. These are quoted from the presentation to the CINCSTRIKE seminar.

(S) "Our initial planning did not take into account the willingness of the Soviets to provide North Vietnam with a sophisticated electronically-aided air defense and, more importantly, the ability of the North Vietnamese to rapidly assimilate and integrate this system.

(S) "Since World War II, little in resources has been available for tactical electronic warfare R&D and procurement. The result -- hastily improvised hardware, expensive aircraft modifications and short-fuzed development programs. It is essential that we pursue a broad-based program which provides capabilities to meet the whole spectrum of our electronic warfare requirements.

(S) "To many, low level penetration was the answer to radar controlled anti-aircraft artillery and missiles. The counter to this was recognized quickly, and the extremely rapid build-up of small caliber anti-aircraft artillery and automatic weapons has taken its toll. Although our

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ECM allows higher altitude penetration, we still must go down through the stuff to deliver ordnance effectively. Electronic warfare can't solve this problem. We haven't the answer -- but one is urgently needed.

(S) "One of the best countermeasures against any radar is a 2.75 rocket in the magnetron. Unfortunately, in North Vietnam, visual location of radars is an almost impossible task. Systems on our electronic warfare aircraft can narrow location to five miles, and in some cases to one mile. From there it requires photography. This exposes a costly recce asset and more often than not the target moves before strike aircraft can be brought to bear....

(S) "Integrated air defense nets employing high-powered, multi-beam radars such as BARLOCK are almost impossible to jam effectively from long distance. Limited ECM aircraft militate against exposure of these assets in high threat areas. Therefore, we are faced with a dilemma -- risk already critical resources, or accept reduced jamming effectiveness. Two electronic warfare solutions are open at the moment -- use higher power jamming systems or program attrition for ECM support aircraft. I might add that this is one problem area that certainly requires more attention."

(S) The list of aids offered by electronics was long and continued to grow. Successful combat operations could be expected to become more and more dependent of our ability to exploit or degrade the enemy's electronic capability. To accomplish this, electronic warfare must be integrated into all phases of air, land, sea, and space operations to provide a solid base for any contingency. Only through integration into the operational command structure, as well as those that support it, can electronic warfare be expected to function optimally. In this continuing integration process, professional management was the key. It should be insured that all levels of management are manned at all times with the professionally trained and experienced personnel required to conduct electronic warfare effectively.

(S) Our loss rates were being held to a reasonably low level in Southeast Asia. There didn't appear much prospect for further reductions without the introduction of more effective equipment. It was necessary to be alert for enemy counter actions that could tip the scale the other way.

(S) Electronic warfare had mostly addressed our reactions -- reactions to enemy build-up and to new enemy capabilities and techniques.

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The need to take the initiative -- to cause the enemy to remain off balance -- was more important and not yet achieved.

Revolutionary Developments

(U) On 9 May 1967, President Johnson assigned General Westmoreland the responsibility for direction of all U.S. civilian and military pacification activities and assigned Ambassador Komer as COMUSMACV's deputy to manage these activities.¹ The reorganization required to direct the pacification effort and actions taken to accomplish the mission is covered in detail in Annex A (COMUSMACV's 1967 Command History) to this history.

(U) As a result of the President's action, CINCPAC's responsibilities and interest in RD were expected to expand commensurately with the increased emphasis being placed on pacification.

(U) In anticipation of a CINCPAC requirement to provide assistance to COMUSMACV in fulfilling his RD support mission, each CINCPAC staff division or office, except J75, was directed to designate one or more of its staff personnel as primary RD action officer(s) for their respective division or office. This procedure insured the development of a reservoir of RD expertise throughout the CINCPAC Staff.²

(U) J5 remained as the focal point for general CINCPAC action relating to RD. Within the Southeast Asia Plans and Policy Branch of J5, a new section - J555 (Civil-Military Relations) was established to provide "greater responsiveness to new and rapidly changing requirements in areas involving civil-military relationships inherent in Revolutionary Development, Pacification, and Nation Building in Southeast Asia."³

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1. Briefing presented to the Secretary of Defense, 7 July 1967 at Hq MACV. Copy on file in History Branch, Joint Secretariat, CINCPAC.
 2. J01/Memo/71-67 of 29 Sep 67, Subject: "CINCPAC Staff Revolutionary Development (RD) Support (U)"; J55, CINCPAC, Monthly Historical Submission, Oct 67.
 3. Ibid.

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(U) On 11 October 1967,¹ CINCPAC requested COMUSMACV to coordinate with the American Embassy in Saigon and jointly define the terms "Pacification," "Revolutionary Development," and "Nation Building." COMUSMACV replied to this request on 7 November and furnished the following definitions:²

a. Pacification-"is the military, political, economic, and social process of establishing or reestablishing local government responsive to and involving the participation of the people. It includes the provision of sustained, credible territorial security, the destruction of the enemy's underground government, the assertion or reassertion of political control and involvement of the people in government, and the initiation of economic and social activity capable of self-sustenance and expansion. The economic element of pacification includes the opening of roads and waterways and the maintenance of lines of communication important to economic and military activity."

b. Revolutionary Development-"the leading edge of pacification, is the formalized Government of Vietnam program, under the sponsorship of the Ministry of Revolutionary Development, in specified hamlets generally within RD campaign areas. It includes the local security for those hamlets and the political, economic, and social activities at that level."

c. Nation Building-"is the economic, political, and social activity having an impact nation-wide and/or in urban centers. It is related to pacification in that it builds on the results of pacification and contributes to the establishment of a viable economic and social community."

(U) To insure consistent usage, CINCPAC, on 16 November, requested the JCS to initiate action to have the US Government departments and agencies adopt the terms as defined by COMUSMACV-American Embassy Saigon. Final action on this request was not expected until early 1968.³

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1. CINCPAC 110107Z Oct 67.
 2. J555, CINCPAC, History Submission, 11 Dec 67, entitled, "Pacification/Revolutionary Development (RD) - Recent Developments (U)"; COMUSMACV 36548/071045Z Nov 67.
 3. CINCPAC 160641Z Nov 67.

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SECTION III - SPECIAL WARFARE

(U) This portion of the history deals with CINCPAC's actions and decisions regarding Special Warfare activities in Southeast Asia. Due to their extremely sensitive nature certain operations have been omitted. Those operations covered below are also sensitive and should be treated accordingly.

PRAIRIE FIRE (SHINING BRASS)

~~(TS)~~ The nickname SHINING BRASS was replaced by the nickname PRAIRIE FIRE effective 1 March 1966. The unclassified meaning of these nicknames was "Special Operations Southeast Asia." PRAIRIE FIRE operations involved small ground force teams launched from SVN into Laos under the auspices of COMUSMACV MACSOG for the purpose of conducting cross-border operations which included reconnaissance, operations, exploitation operations, and supporting operations.¹

~~(TS)~~ The concept for PRAIRIE FIRE operations was divided into three phases:²

a. Phase I: Reconnaissance patrols (3 USASF/7VN) infiltrated by helicopters (restricted to a 12 kilometer penetration depth) into selected target areas in Laos with the mission of reconnoitering to confirm targets for air strikes. Air strikes were to be requested through the USAF TIGER HOUND system.

b. Phase II: Force tailored to the mission of infiltrating into Laos by helicopter to exploit situations developed by Phase I operations. Air strikes were to be requested through USAF TIGER HOUND system. As 1967 began, the force was restricted in size to one platoon accompanied by three US Army Special Forces advisors and restricted to a 10-kilometer penetration depth.

c. Phase III: Deep penetration/protracted duration and development of resistance movement with selected ethnic groups.

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1. CINCPAC 252107Z Feb 67.
 2. Point Paper, J3322 CINCPAC, 26 Jan 67, Subject: SHINING BRASS (U) CROSS BORDER SVN/LAOS (TS). Hereafter referred to as Point Paper J3322, CINCPAC, 26 Jan 67.

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~~(TS)~~ By the end of 1966, authority had been granted to conduct Phases I and II; however, CINCPAC did not visualize requesting authority for Phase III until mid-1967. ¹

~~(TS)~~ The PRAIRIE FIRE operating zone extended from the Southwest corner of the DMZ to the Cambodian border with depth variance into Laos of 5 kilometers in the vicinity of the DMZ to a 20 kilometer average to the Cambodian border. ²

~~(TS)~~ As of 26 January 1967, approximately 130 PRAIRIE FIRE missions had been successfully completed. These operations (Phase I and II) were conducted simultaneously from three widely separated forward operational bases (Kontum-Dak To, Kham Duc and Khe Sanh) in the SVN/Lao border area. In the conduct of these operations, PRAIRIE FIRE teams observed enemy movement, uncovered enemy storage/staging facilities, conducted psywar operations, emplaced anti-personnel devices on LOC, tapped enemy telephone lines, captured or killed enemy personnel, exercised air strike capability, validated SAC targets, conducted bomb damage assessment following air strikes and provided reconnaissance for major ground operations as directed by COMUSMACV. ³

~~(TS)~~ As of 26 January, the status of PRAIRIE FIRE forces and aircraft was as indicated: ⁴

| | <u>Auth</u> | <u>Opnl</u> | <u>Recruiting/Training</u> |
|---|-------------|-------------|----------------------------|
| a. Reconnaissance Teams (Spike Team) | 20 | 17 | 3 |
| b. Exploitation Forces: | | | |
| (1) Battalions: | | | |
| (Haymaker Force) | 3 | 0 | 3 |
| (2) Companies: | | | |
| (Havoc Force) | 12 | 6 | 6 |
| c. Aircraft: | | <u>Opnl</u> | <u>In Maint</u> |
| (1) Helicopter | | | |
| (VNAF H-34) | | 5 | 4 |
| (2) Fixed Wing (VNAF U-17) | | 1 | 0 |
| (3) Fixed Wing (VNAF O-IE) | | 1 | 0 |

1. Point Paper J3322, CINCPAC, 26 Jan 67; CINCPAC Command History 1966, Volume II, pages 629-632.

2. Point Paper, J3322, CINCPAC, 26 Jan 67.

3. Ibid.

4. Ibid.

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(TS) By the first week in December 1967 over 350 PRAIRIE FIRE missions had been successfully completed. By the same time, the status of PRAIRIE FIRE forces and aircraft was as indicated:¹

| | <u>Auth</u> | <u>Opnl</u> | <u>In Trng</u> | <u>Filling</u> |
|-----------------------------|-----------------|-----------------|----------------|-----------------|
| a. Spike Teams | 54 ² | 19 | 2 | 33 |
| b. Exploit Forces | | | | |
| (1) Battalions | 3 | 0 | 1 | 2 |
| (2) Companies (4Co/Bn) | 12 | 3 | 5 | 4 |
| (3) Platoons | 36 | 14 | 6 | 16 |
| c. Aircraft | | | | |
| (1) Helicopters (VNAF H-34) | | <u>Attached</u> | <u>Opnl</u> | <u>In Maint</u> |
| (2) Fixed Wing (VNAF U-17) | | 14 | 13 | 1 |
| | | 2 | 1 | 1 |

(TS) On 3 February 1967, Admiral Sharp recommended to the JCS that the SHINING BRASS area west of Quang Tri be expanded to a depth of 20 kilometers and that CINCPAC be delegated authority to approve all SHINING BRASS (PRAIRIE FIRE) operations as coordinated with the American Embassy, Vientiane. Admiral Sharp pointed out that the Communists were in complete control of the eastern side of the Laos Panhandle, which included the SHINING BRASS (PRAIRIE FIRE) zone and that with increased flexibility to conduct operations into a slightly expanded area astride Route 9 in the north, the SHINING BRASS (PRAIRIE FIRE) program could become a major intelligence asset in COMUSMACV's efforts to counter infiltration through the Laos Panhandle. He stated that the area was used as a sanctuary by the enemy and that only through the recent specially authorized deep penetrations of SHINING BRASS (PRAIRIE FIRE) teams that a terminus of major infiltration route through Laos into SVN had been discovered.³

(TS) He concluded his message with a recommendation that the following be authorized:⁴

- a. Expansion of the temporary 5 kilometer zone in the northern sector to a depth of 20 kilometers.

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1. Point Paper, J3A322, CINCPAC, Subject: "PRAIRIE FIRE (U) CROSS BORDER SVN/LAOS (TS)."
 2. Thirty-four teams were scheduled to support MUSCLE SHOALS.
 3. CINCPAC 030325Z Feb 67.
 4. Ibid.

- b. Infiltration of reconnaissance teams and exploitation forces by helicopter to the limits of the SHINING BRASS zone, or not to exceed 40 kilometers.
- c. Expansion of authorized exploitation forces to permit multiple platoon size operations of not more than three platoons for any one operation.
- d. Employment of exploitation forces as frequently as necessary to exploit targets of opportunity in order to obtain hard intelligence and identify targets for ARC LIGHT and tactical air strikes.

~~(S)~~ On 25 February 1967, the PRAIRIE FIRE operating zone was extended from a point approximately 30 kilometers above the DMZ, south to the Cambodian border with a depth variance into Laos of 20 kilometers in the north to a 30 kilometer average in the south. At the same time CINCPAC was granted authority to approve PRAIRIE FIRE operations within the following terms of reference:¹

- a. Use of helicopters was authorized to full depth of PRAIRIE FIRE zone.
- b. Employment of exploitation forces was authorized to full depth of entire PRAIRIE FIRE zone of operations.
- c. Multi-platoon exploitation force operations were authorized, not to exceed the commitment of three (3) platoons in any single operation with no limitation on total consecutive commitments for the duration of the operation.
- d. CINCPAC had to insure that a mutually acceptable system of coordination was maintained with the U.S. Ambassador in Laos.

~~(S)~~ CINCPAC, on 1 April 1967, recommended to the JCS that he be granted authority to conduct Phase III operations in SVN for later expansion into Laos.² On 20 April the JCS forwarded a recommendation supporting CINCPAC's position to the SECDEF. The report of the SEACORD Conference, 1 August 1967 indicated approval in principle

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- 1. Point Paper, J3322, CINCPAC, 15 Mar 67, Subject: "PRAIRIE FIRE (U) CROSS BORDER SVN/LAOS (TS);" JCS 7248/251907Z Feb 67.
 - 2. Point Paper, J322, CINCPAC, 6 Apr 67, Subject: PRAIRIE FIRE (U) CROSS BORDER SVN/LAOS (TS).

of the Phase III concept recommended by CINCPAC. COMUSMACV and Ambassador Sullivan agreed to review the details so that Ambassador Sullivan could assess the political implications. Later, Mr. Sullivan indicated that it was not possible to give a clear political assessment and recommended further discussion which was agreed to by Saigon. The discussions culminated in an agreement between Forces Armee Royale (FAR) and GVN to conduct guerrilla operations in southeastern Laos - PRAIRIE FIRE area. Ambassador Sullivan considered these agreements to be politically feasible and were concurred in by COMUSMACV.¹

~~(TS)~~ Based on Ambassador Sullivan's political assessment and the FAR/SVN agreements, COMUSMACV submitted a modified Phase III concept for approval. The essentials of the concept were:

- a. Phase III was to be conducted in current PF area of operations.
- b. Command of guerrilla units was to be exercised by selected FAR personnel.
- c. Command of overall effort would be exercised by a joint FAR/GVN staff.
- d. Training would take place at Ban Houei Sane, Laos.
- e. U.S. finance and guidance would be provided through the GVN.
- f. US participation would be limited to liaison.

The main differences between the original concept and the modified version were in the areas of command and control and US participation. In the modified version the US would not exercise any influence over the program but would provide financial and logistical assistance.² At the end of 1967 the conflict had not been resolved.

SOUTH PAW

~~(TS)~~ In April 1967, COMUSMACV submitted to CINCPAC a proposal for regular ARVN units to conduct operations in Laos. The proposal envisioned two phases:

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1. Point Paper, J3A322, CINCPAC, 11 Dec 67, Subject: "PRAIRIE FIRE (Phase III) (U); CROSS BORDER SVN/LAOS (TS)."
 2. Ibid.

a. Phase I (SOUTH PAW): The purpose of the operations was to intensify interdiction of NVA infiltration by employment of a task force comprised of PRAIRIE FIRE forces, a reinforced ARVN Airborne or Ranger battalion, helicopter lift, helicopter gun ships, and tactical aircraft.

b. Phase II (HIGH PORT): This phase considered the employment of larger ARVN forces, a division sized unit, in sustained operations against enemy forces and bases in Laos. CINCPAC did ~~not~~ approve the proposal. He felt that for political and practical reasons an increase in PRAIRIE FIRE operations was more acceptable.¹

~~(TS)~~ In July, the SECDEF at the Saigon Conference asked for General Westmoreland's specific recommendations on expanded operations to destroy enemy forces and equipment in the Laotian Panhandle. On 10 July, COMUSMACV submitted his recommendations to the SECDEF. The recommendations included initiating Phase III of PRAIRIE FIRE and SOUTH PAW.²

~~(TS)~~ COMUSMACV's SOUTH PAW proposal envisioned the conduct of ground or airmobile operations across the Laos border by regular RVN units up to brigade sized units against known enemy base areas. This type operation would pit Vietnamese against Vietnamese in Communist controlled areas for short duration missions of 3 to 7 days. Tactical air and B-52 support would be provided as required and command and control of ground operations would be exercised from a provisional CP established at a Forward Operating Base (FOB). The task force commander and the intelligence and operations staff would consist of Vietnamese with US advisors experienced in cross border operations. Approximately 25 advisors would be required with a three battalion force in addition to US personnel that normally accompany the PRAIRIE FIRE elements. Protection and support for the raid task force would be dependent upon artillery and tactical air.³

~~(TS)~~ CINCPAC did not agree with the proposal and on 21 July he recommended against the use of regular ARVN units in Laos. He further recommended that the scope and intensity of PRAIRIE FIRE operations be expanded rather than conduct SOUTH PAW operations.⁴

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1. Point Paper J3B32, CINCPAC, 27 Jul 67, Subject: "SOUTH PAW (U)."
 2. Point Paper, J3B3 (A), CINCPAC, 8 Dec 67, Subject: "SOUTH PAW (U)."
 3. Ibid.
 4. Ibid.

(TS) The JCS, on 7 September, notified CINCPAC that the SECDEF had concurred in their recommendation not to initiate SOUTH PAW at that time. However, on 16 September, SECDEF requested the JCS to reconsider the concept and provide him with their views. CINCPAC on 3 October, after reconsidering additional factors provided by COMUSMACV, again recommended to the JCS that SOUTH PAW not be implemented at this time. CINCPAC's recommendation was based on the following rationale:¹

a. Proposed actions in Laos had to be considered in light of U. S. objectives in that country. One such objective was to increase secure areas without committing U.S. prestige or ground forces. Another was to impede NVN's continued use of infiltration routes and safe havens. These objectives required careful examination of the political and military aspects before initiating overt ground operations which would extend the battlefield into Laos.

b. A sizable and balanced program (PRAIRIE FIRE) to counter infiltration into Laos was under way. This effort would augment the initiation of MUSCLE SHOALS.

c. Importance of further disrupting NVN forces and support areas in Laos was recognized. However, commitment of regular ARVN forces could initiate an open ended chain of requirements, including the commitment of U. S. ground forces to assist the ARVN if they got into trouble.

d. ARVN forces were fully committed to other tasks.

e. Sizable support requirements would be generated by airmobile raids of brigade size.

f. Employment of regular ARVN forces could not be done covertly. Thus, an overt violation of the Geneva Accords could jeopardize Souvanna Phouma's government.

g. Destruction of enemy forces and bases in Laos should be done at minimum cost and risk - both political and military. Air power could accomplish this as pin point intelligence was made available. PRAIRIE FIRE operations have done this with considerable effectiveness.

(TS) On 3 November 1967, the JCS informed CINCPAC that the SECDEF told them he appreciated their reconsideration of SOUTH PAW and concurred

1. Point Paper, J3B3 (A), CINCPAC, 8 Dec 67, Subject: "SOUTH PAW (U)."

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in their recommendation that SOUTH PAW should not be implemented at that time.¹

DANIEL BOONE

(TS) In 1966 the SECDEF approved CINCPAC's recommendation to develop a ground cross border capability for operations in Cambodia. (The development of this capability is discussed in Chapter IV, CINCPAC Command History 1966, pages 633-635.) At the beginning of 1967, out-of-country (out of SVN) operations were not authorized nor had approval been requested.

(TS) On 30 April 1967, CINCPAC requested authority to conduct limited ground reconnaissance/intelligence activities in the tri-border area of Cambodia. This request was necessary in view of the enemy's capability of attacking through the western highlands of Pleiku, and Kontum in battalion strength. Thus, it became urgent to obtain early information regarding his intentions. Reconnaissance in Cambodia in the tri-border area would provide early warning of enemy movement towards the isolated CIDG/USASF camp at Dak-To, a prime target for enemy attack and a launch point for PRAIRIE FIRE operations.²

(TS) On 22 May 1967, the JCS notified CINCPAC that approval was granted to initiate cross border operations into northwestern Cambodia subject to restrictions:³

- a. Area of operations was limited as specified by the JCS.
- b. Only reconnaissance teams could be committed and teams could not exceed an overall strength of 12 men, to include not more than 3 US advisors.
- c. Tactical air strikes and/or the commitment of exploitation forces were not authorized across the SVN Royal Cambodian Government (RKG) border of Cambodia.

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1. Point Paper, J3A22, CINCPAC, 13 Nov 67, Subject: "SOUTH PAW (U)."
 2. Point Paper, J3A322, CINCPAC, 8 May 67, Subject: "DANIEL BOONE (U)."
 3. Point Paper, J3A322, CINCPAC, 16 June 67, Subject: "DANIEL BOONE (U);" JCS 5937/221958Z May 67.

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d. Infiltration and exfiltration of Cambodia was to be by foot. Exfiltration by helicopter was authorized in emergency situations only.

e. Duration of infiltration was to be held to the minimum time required for investigation.

f. Teams would take all possible precautions to avoid contact with Cambodian military forces or civilian population in the area.

g. The purpose of the operations was intelligence collection and/or verification. Teams would engage in combat only as a last resort to avoid capture.

h. No more than 3 reconnaissance teams could be committed on operations into Cambodia at any one time.

i. The total number of missions could not exceed 10 in any 30-day period.

~~(TS)~~ On 29 May, the SECDEF amended the restrictions by permitting the use of approved PRAIRIE FIRE areas for infiltration or exfiltration of DANIEL BOONE reconnaissance teams. Additionally, he permitted use of forward air controlled (FAC) aircraft to penetrate the Cambodian border the minimum distance in the DANIEL BOONE area to support emergency, exfiltration of DANIEL BOONE teams, and for this purpose only. Also, SECDEF required direct coordination with the American Embassy, Vientiane in those cases where DANIEL BOONE operations involved Laos. If Ambassador Sullivan nonconcurrent the mission could not be conducted.¹

~~(TS)~~ On 23 September, the DANIEL BOONE boundary at the Laos-Cambodian border was adjusted to coincide with the PRAIRIE FIRE boundary. On 20 October, the JCS notified CINCPAC that the original area of operation was extended southward to the Gulf of Siam at a uniform depth of 20 kilometers into Cambodia. This area in turn was divided into two zones:²

a. Zone A - from the triborder area to Route 13. In this zone limitation on the number of missions at any one time was removed, but

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1. Point Paper, J3A321, CINCPAC, 16 June 67; Subject: "DANIEL BOONE (U)."; SECDEF 6599/292257A May 67.
 2. Point Paper, J3A321, CINCPAC, 4 Nov 67, Subject: "DANIEL BOONE (U)."

operations could not exceed thirty during any thirty day period. No more than five of these could be helicopter operations. Helicopter infiltrations could not exceed a depth of ten kilometers.

b. Zone B - from Route 13 to the Gulf of Siam. Request for authority to conduct operations in Zone Bravo would be considered on a case-by-case basis only.

~~(TS)~~ Operations in the area defined on 20 October were subject to the additional restrictions:¹

a. Only reconnaissance teams could be committed. These teams could not exceed an overall strength of 12 men, to include not more than 3 US advisors.

b. Tactical air strikes and/or the commitment of exploitation forces were not authorized across the SVN/RKG border of Cambodia.

c. Except for five helicopter missions discussed in Zone A above, infiltration and exfiltration of Cambodia would be by foot. Exfiltration by helicopter of foot-infiltrated teams was authorized for emergency situations only.

d. Duration of infiltration would be held to minimum time required for investigation.

e. Teams would take all possible precautions to avoid contact with Cambodian military forces or civilian population in the area.

f. The purpose of the operations was intelligence collection and/or verification. Teams would engage in combat only as a last resort to avoid capture.

~~(TS)~~ CINCPAC had requested authority to employ FAC aircraft to support DANIEL BOONE operations and on 23 December the JCS notified CINCPAC that authority was granted. FAC aircraft could be used for reconnaissance and control purposes in Cambodia on the basis of two reconnaissance flights per DANIEL BOONE mission and for control of authorized helicopter infiltration missions.²

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1. Point Paper, J3A321, CINCPAC, 4 Nov 67, Subject: "DANIEL BOONE (U)."
 2. Point Paper, J3A321, CINCPAC, 23 Feb 68, Subject: "DANIEL BOONE (U)."

~~(TS)~~ As of 31 December 1967, 108 missions had been conducted by DANIEL BOONE forces.¹

Operation YORK

~~(TS)~~ On 3 December 1967, COMUSMACV, in an action message to CINCPAC and information to the JCS, requested permission to conduct ground operations (YORK) which envisioned the possible use of ARVN forces to penetrate and destroy Base Areas 607 and 611 which ~~extended~~ into Laos.²

~~(TS)~~ Actually YORK was to be a series of operations, a three phased campaign striking north through the western portion of I CTZ: YORK I - DOXA, YORK II - western Quang Nam, and YORK III - A SHAU valley. It was proposed to use both US and ARVN forces.³

~~(TS)~~ On 6 December the JCS approved the YORK operation. This action by the JCS in effect reversed the previously stated position of CINCPAC and conflicted with the JCS and the SECDEF position not to implement the SOUTH PAW concept at that time.⁴ In actuality, the JCS approved YORK without a recommendation from CINCPAC. The approval was based on a JCS information copy of the COMUSMACV message to CINCPAC which proposed the operation. The operation was scheduled to commence on or about 3 February 1968.⁵

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1. COMUSMACV, MACSOG 6679 301252Z Dec 67.
 2. Point Paper, J3B31, CINCPAC, 9 Dec 67, Subject: "Background Brief of YORK (S)"; COMUSMACV 030136Z Dec 67 (BOM).
 3. Ibid.
 4. Ibid.; JCS 061930Z Dec 67.
 5. Per interview between LTC D. H. Reynolds, J3B31, CINCPAC and LTC Johnson, Command Historian.

SECTION IV - CAPABILITIES OF FRIENDLY FORCES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

(S) "It is apparent that the communists' confrontation with the United States has focused increasingly on Vietnam. Here, the North Vietnamese are attempting to extend their control over all of Vietnam, testing the feasibility of the so-called 'Wars of National Liberation,' a strategy championed by the Chinese. The success or failure of the communists' use of 'revolutionary warfare' to take over other nations will be determined in Southeast Asia. Today, the ultimate success of this strategy must appear doubtful, even to the Chinese....

"We depend on our Allies in the Western Pacific to complement and reinforce United States military power. With the exception of Japan, the economies of our Asian Allies severely limit the resources they can devote to the maintenance and modernization of their forces. Their capabilities depend heavily on United States Assistance.

"...I wish to support Secretary McNamara's recommendation to transfer the Thai and Lao programs from the Military Assistance Program to the regular Defense Budget. The open warfare in Laos and the mounting insurgency in Thailand are directly related to our confrontation in Vietnam. The requirements in Laos fluctuate rapidly depending to a great extent on the actions initiated by the Pathet Lao and their North Vietnamese reinforcements. Many military actions in eastern Laos are directed against the logistic pipeline that the North Vietnamese use to support their forces in South Vietnam. As you know, it has now been announced publicly that Thailand provides the bases from which we launch a large portion of our air effort against North Vietnam and its supply routes to the south. Over 35,000 U.S. troops are now stationed in Thailand. Under these conditions, proper management techniques dictate that the support for our total effort in Southeast Asia should be derived from one management system. This will provide flexibility and efficiency at the lowest cost to meet the overall threat. The Military Assistance Program was neither designed nor intended to fight a war. Its purpose is to provide forces for internal security, deterrence and initial defense. Furthermore, by placing the support of these two countries in the regular Defense Budget, our Military

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Assistance Programs for other Pacific Command recipients will achieve greater stability in that these programs will cease to be a source of funds to meet the conditions in Thailand and Laos. "

Admiral U. S. G. Sharp¹

Military Assistance Program, Southeast Asia

Introduction

~~(C)~~ During 1967, the U. S. Military Assistance Program (MAP) achieved its primary objectives of providing MAP-supported nations in Southeast Asia "with requisite capabilities to maintain their own internal security and to counter Communist-directed subversion or insurgency;" in fact, the demonstrated "U. S. determination to preserve freedom in Southeast Asia had a very beneficial effect on the resolve of free world nations in the Pacific to contribute to their common security, and to develop a sense of regional cooperation for their mutual benefit. The example of Free World Military Assistance Forces sent to Vietnam illustrates a basic willingness on the part of these nations to contribute to their common security. "2

~~(C)~~ As of mid-1967, there was still a wide range in military effectiveness of MAP-supported Allied nations, not only in Southeast Asia, but in all of PACOM. Through MAP, on the other hand, these nations had also been provided important improvements in terms of organization and command, contingency planning, logistics efficiency, and uniformity of weapons and equipment. Moreover, with the Communist plans for "Wars of National Liberation" being frustrated in Vietnam by the free world forces of the Pacific, bolstered by the armed might of the U. S. , success "in Vietnam, combined with appropriate continuation of regional MAP support, as an integral part of the U. S. assistance program, will assist in providing the secure conditions required for economic and political growth of the nations in the Pacific region. "3 Indications that there recently have been signs of an effective and desirable counter to

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1. CINCPAC 13 Apr 67 MAP Statement.
 2. CINCPAC MA Plan for PACOM Region FY 68-73, dtd 10 Aug 67,
p. B-2-1.
 3. Ibid.

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Communist aggression by Asian nations have been a new trend towards regional cooperation through Asian-Pacific Nations meetings, and the forceful overthrow of Communism in Indonesia which might have been a dramatic result of the firm U.S. position in Vietnam.

~~(S)~~ As described in last year's history, the decision was made to shift the expenses of a country at war--in this case, South Vietnam--from the fiscal year programming of PACOM MAP to that of the regular budget of the Department of Defense. This conversion from MAP to the Services became the responsibility of the respective PACOM component commands. At the end of 1966, "the transfer of responsibility for support of allied forces in Vietnam had progressed smoothly with a minimum of impairment of support of" U.S., Republic of Vietnam, and Free World Military Assistance Forces (FWMAF).¹ The same rationale led the Secretary of Defense to propose in early 1967 to the U.S. Congress that Laos and Thailand fell into a similar category of being actively involved, or engaged in open hostilities, in the conflict in Southeast Asia. Therefore, the necessary Congressional enactments on 5 June 1967 provided the authority to transfer the military assistance programs in both these countries to DOD appropriations effective 1 July. This subject is fully covered earlier in this history, specifically, in the subsection, entitled "Transfer of Laos and Thailand MAP to DOD Budget," in Chapter II.

(U) Actually, this section in Chapter IV is designed to cover only those items concerning MAP in Southeast Asia that are not elsewhere treated, such as the "Transfer of Laos and Thailand MAP to DOD Budget" was in Chapter II. Moreover, the annual histories submitted by both COMUSMACV and COMUSMACTHAI, which are attached as Annexes A and B to CINCPAC Command History 1967, should provide a treasuretrove of detail on this subject for anyone who is interested. In addition, personnel matters concerning MAP activities are discussed in both Chapter I and II of this history, while Chapter II also covers in detail the MAPs in both Burma and Malaysia, as well as Indonesia and the Philippines, which some geographers insist properly belong in the area encompassed by the term Southeast Asia.

1. CINCPAC Command History 1966, p. 176; for further background see also pp. 173-175.

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T-28D Aircraft/Availability/Replacement

~~(S)~~ On 19 August 1967, the Secretary of Defense requested CINCPAC's "recommendations concerning future programs in Laos and Thailand for T-28D and/or replacement aircraft."¹ This question had been raised since there were sufficient T-28Ds for the CINCPAC projected attrition rates to sustain operations in Laos and Thailand through FY 69, but a decision on a replacement aircraft for the T-28D had been deferred, pending further studies, tests, and evaluations. According to the Department of the Air Force, continued the Secretary, "the A-37B is the most cost-effective candidate aircraft available for the Strike-Recon functions in the COIN environment."²

~~(S)~~ In reply on 9 October 1967, CINCPAC advised the Secretary of Defense of the following:

The FY 69-70 dollar programs for Laos are based on continuation of the T28D. If additional T28D A/C are not available from other sources, CINCPAC reaffirms position that best course of action is to provide these A/C from Thailand and provide Thai with a suitable replacement. FY 69 program for Thai, as presented to OASD on 26 Sep 67, contains requirement for \$5.008 million for ten COIN A/C as the initial buy to activate a fifth COIN FTR SQ in FY 70. The FY 69 program for Laos contains requirements for \$4.9 million for attrition T28D A/C. If T28D's are redistributed from Thailand to Laos, this \$4.9 million could be added to Thai ceiling to procure additional COIN A/C as replacements for the redistributed T28D's. When a proven COIN A/C can be made available, the Thailand and Laos programs can be readjusted.³

~~(S)~~ Furthermore, CINCPAC had reservations about the A-37B being a suitable replacement for the T-28D. Although the A-37B appears to be better suited for MAP from a cost effectiveness standpoint, he felt that, until final test and evaluation were completed, the "suitability of this A/C as a replacement for the T28D is undetermined."⁴

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1. SECDEF 4366/191948Z Aug 67.
 2. Ibid.
 3. CINCPAC 092227Z Oct 67.
 4. Ibid.; J5 History, Hq CINCPAC, Sep 67.

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Thailand

(S) "Returning to Thailand, we find a country that fully supports United States Government policies in Southeast Asia. This is evidenced by their public statements and by the decision to provide a Thai combat unit to Vietnam. Thailand has further agreed to B-52 basing on her soil in support of the war in Southeast Asia. We continue to depend upon Thailand's bases and facilities to support our air operations in Laos and North Vietnam. The United States Air Force has about 200 fighter type aircraft and 35 refueling aircraft on six of Thailand's bases. U.S. aircraft based in Thailand have averaged over 4,500 sorties each month in missions against North Vietnam and North Vietnamese lines of communications in Laos. Our helicopters, staging from Thailand, have rescued over 250 aircrew members in Laos and North Vietnam.

"During the past year there has been an escalation in communist subversive activity in Thailand. Communist China and North Vietnam direct, train and provide assistance to the Communist insurgent groups in Thailand's northeast. There is Communist subversive activity along the Thai-Malaysian border and attempts to penetrate the hill tribes in the north. In the face of these threats, the Thais have moved to strengthen their security forces in these critical areas. Communist guerrillas, supported by China and North Vietnam, are expected to accelerate their activity in Thailand, and probably will do so regardless of the outcome of the war in Vietnam. The United States should continue to render assistance to enable the Thais to cope with these threats.

"The FY 68 program for Thailand--whether funded by the Department of Defense or under Military Assistance--will enhance the capability of the Thai forces to counter communist aggression and subversion. Concurrently, the program will contribute to stability and internal security. In addition, the program will provide for modernization and maintenance of existing equipment. We believe Thailand can and will make every effort to utilize properly our Military Assistance investment."

Admiral U. S. G. Sharp¹

1. CINCPAC 13 Apr 67 MAP Statement.


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THAILAND

AS OF 1 NOVEMBER 1967

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| BASIC INFORMATION | |  | OVERALL OBJECTIVE | U.S. DIPLOMATIC MISSION |
|---|--|---|--|--|
| AREA 200,000 SQ M POPULATION 31 MILLION ANNUAL GROWTH 3-3.3% ARABLE LAND PER CAPITA 0.8ACRE LITERACY RATE 60% | LIFE EXPECTANCY 48 YEARS GROSS NAT. PROD 1965 (E.L.) \$3.8 BILLION PER CAPITA \$120 DEFENSE BUDGET SELF FINANCED 1967 \$133 MIL. AS % GNP 3.0 AS % CENTRAL GOV-EXP. 15.0 | | PROMOTE THAI/U.S. RELATIONS IN RECOGNITION OF THAILAND'S VITAL IMPORTANCE TO U.S. MILITARY POSTURE IN SEASIA; INSURE RETENTION OF U.S. BASE RIGHTS; INCREASE THE EFFICIENCY OF THAI ARMED FORCES; AND ENCOURAGE THAI MILITARY SUPPORT OF SEATO. | U.S. AMBASSADOR HON. LEONARD UNGER U.S. AID DIRECTOR MR. HOWARD L. PERSONS COMUSMACV & CHIEF JUSMAG-THAI MR. HAL D. MCCOY, USA |
| KING - Phumiphon Adundet PRIME MINISTER SUPREME COMMANDER THAI ARMED FORCES - FIELD MARSHAL Thanom Kittikachorn CINC NAVY - ADM Charoon Chalermtiarana CINC AF - AIR MARSHAL Boonchoo Chandrubeksa CINC ARMY - GEN Praphat Charusathien | | | MAP OBJECTIVE (1) Assist Thailand in defending its independence and sovereignty against Communist aggression, infiltration, insurgency and subversion. (2) Assist Thailand in increasing the safety and stability, and improving the economic status, of the strategically important North, Northeast, and Southern Peninsula with particular emphasis on greater countersubversion and anti-guerrilla capabilities. (3) Assist Thailand to make a force contribution for the defense of Free World countries threatened by Communist aggression in Southeast Asia. (4) Ensure the availability for United States Military Forces of base and port facilities; overflight rights; in-transit or staging services; and landing privileges. | |
| MAJOR FORCE OBJECTIVES | | TOTAL COUNTRY FORCES | COMBAT CAPABILITY | |
| ARMY | 4 INF DIVS, 2PSY WAR CO, 1 RCI(SEP) 1 SF GRP, 1 ABN BN, 1 ARMY BR(155), 3 ENGR BN 1 HECH CAV REGT(SEP) 1 ARMY BN(CMD) | 3 INF DIVS, 1 SPECIAL FORCE GP, 1 CAV DIV, 1 ARMY BN, 1 ENGR BN 1 RCI, 1AAA BDE(1AAA BN) 1 ABN BN. | MAINTAIN INTERNAL SECURITY AND OFFER LIMITED RESISTANCE TO EXTERNAL AGGRESSION. | |
| NAVY | 6 DE/DF, 40 PATROL CRAFT, 32 MINWARFARE, 1 ASWBOT 2 MHC, 7 LANDING SHIPS, 1 SEAL UNIT, 1 MAR BRIG 12 S2F ACFT | 1DE, 10PF, 7PC, 8SC, 6PCM, 1PCE, 2HMR, 4MSC, 2MRK, 1MSF, 6RPC, 10MSB, 31ST, 2151L, 31SM, 115SL, 10AUX, 31AMPHER CRAFT, 11SERVICE CRAFT. AIRCRAFT: 100-160, 652F, 11F INF BNS(MARINE), 1BDE (MARINE), 100F BN, 15VC BN (MARINE). | MARITIMELY SAFE FACTORY, PATROL CAPABILITY IN GULF OF THAILAND AND INTERNAL WATERWAYS. | |
| AIR FORCE | 1 TACTICAL FTR(JET)SQN, 1 TRNSP SQN, 1 RECON SQN, 6 TAC COMPOSITE SQNS, 6 HELICOPTER SQNS, 1 AWX INTCP SQN | 1 PHOTO RECC & TRNG SQDN, 1AIR DLF SQDN, 4COMPOSITE SQNS(1TAC FTR-BNR & 3OTHER-INSURGENT) 3 TAC FTR & TRNG SQDN, 1 TRSP & RECC SQDN, 1 PROF FLYING SQDN, 1 TRSP SAR & TRNG SQDN 1 ADMINISTRATIVE SUPPORT SQDN | LIMITED AIRBORNE OPERATIONS AND CLOSE SUPPORT OF THE ARMY; DAY AIR DEFENSE. | |

SOURCE: PACOM Digest, Nov 67, p. 140.

Brief History of Thailand MAP

(S) "The Military Assistance Program (MAP) for Thailand was initiated in 1950. It has provided over \$667 million through FY 67 in programs designed to improve the Royal Thai Armed Forces (RTARF), and has made possible the welding of small, fragmented units into a relatively modern, effective force. RTARF total strength has increased from approximately 67,000 to 138,000 (as of 30 April 1967). With MAP support, the Royal Thai Army (RTA) has progressed to a substantial 4 1/3 divisions; the Royal Thai Navy (RTN) has developed into a small but relatively effective operational fleet, with limited capabilities in patrol, amphibious, anti-submarine and mine warfare operations; the Royal Thai Marine Corps (RTMC) has improved its operational capability; and the Royal Thai Air Force (RTAF), with 10 tactical aircraft squadrons, is steadily improving its tactical ground and counterinsurgency support capability.

(S) "The Thailand MAP has made a direct contribution in support of U.S. Southeast Asia and SEATO contingency plan capabilities, as well as current U.S. operations. The Special Logistics Actions Thailand (SLAT) program, which provided railroad equipment and funds for airfield construction and advance supply depots, and completion of the MAP funded Bangkok By-Pass Road from Chachoengsao to Kabinburi have been used to support U.S. unilateral operational needs as well as Thai, U.S. and SEATO logistical and operational requirements.

(S) "Though the RTARF have not yet attained a mission capability level commensurate with U.S. regional objectives, meaningful progress has been made because of the Military Assistance Program. Without MAP, both internal and external. This in turn could have resulted in an additional drain on available PACOM military resources."¹

MAP Support for Volunteer Defense Corps (VDC)

(S) On 29 March 1967, COMUSMACTHAI proposed MAP support for an austere program of advice, training, and material to selected units of the Thailand Volunteer Defense Corps (VDC).² When CINCPAC queried him on 5 April as to the adequacy of advisors to support these

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1. CINCPAC MA Plan for Thailand FY 68-73, Vol. I, p. C-1.
 2. COMUSMACTHAI 291031Z Mar 67.

~~SECRET~~

proposed additional VDC elements, COMUSMACTHAI replied on 13 April that the "difficulties in gaining approval for manning required for an adequate advisory effort in Thailand are well-known by CINCPAC," but he went on to explain that "the requirement to provide training advice and assistance to VDC," which represented a significant proportion of Thailand's counterinsurgency security forces in the field, still remained.¹

~~(S)~~ Although CINCPAC concurred in the VDC proposal on 22 April, he did take exception to COMUSMACTHAI's suggestion that the VHF-FM-1 one-watt transceiver, which had been used by the Thai police and village radio system, should be provided to the VDC through MAP. "Since the FM-1 radio is not available through MAP," commented CINCPAC, he recommended "that the radio be obtained from AID."² In reply on 28 May, however, COMUSMACTHAI frankly stated that his "position is that a single manager should program for VDC and that MAP, as opposed to split MAP/AID funding, is desirable to make such a single manager system work."³ CINCPAC, in turn, requested COMUSMACTHAI to furnish additional information in order to develop support for his proposal that a single manager should program for the VDC.⁴

~~(S)~~ On 14 June 1967, COMUSMACTHAI provided CINCPAC with the requested additional information, and indicated that the number of VDC units to be supported and the magnitude of support required would be greater than originally proposed. "A Five-Year Program for VDC," he further stated, "is currently in preparation at USMACTHAI. The study when completed will reflect force objectives and will include MAP and AID support requirements."⁵ Two days later, the American Embassy at Bangkok reported that the Thais, in an effort to revitalize the VDC, were moving ahead with the consolidation of the Peoples Action Teams (PAT) Program into the VDC structure. The Embassy also stated that a survey team would visit selected villages to determine security requirements and resources needed, with the first visit to be completed by 24 June 1967.⁶

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1. COMUSMACTHAI 131925Z Apr 67; CINCPAC 051830Z Apr 67; J5 History, Hq CINCPAC, Apr 67.
 2. CINCPAC 22227Z Apr 67.
 3. COMUSMACTHAI 281701Z May 67.
 4. J5 History, Hq CINCPAC, May 67.
 5. COMUSMACTHAI 141130Z Jun 67.
 6. AMEMB Bangkok 16166/160915Z Jun 67; J5 History, Hq CINCPAC, Jun 67.

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~~(S)~~ CINCPAC dispatched a message to COMUSMACTHAI concerning his proposal for a single manager to program for the VDC on 21 June 1967. In it, he said that a decision on the proposal "will be withheld pending examination of the study... and recommendations of the survey team;" he also requested a "copy of study and survey report be furnished when completed."¹

Providing M-16 Rifles

~~(S)~~ "On 1 December 1966 JCS reallocated the XM16E1 rifle for the period November 1966 through June 1967;" at the same time, provision was made for the "delivery of 4000 rifles (XM16E1) to Thailand in increments of 1,000 beginning with March 1967 production."² Then, on 18 March 1967, the Secretary of Defense announced that "4,000 M16A1 rifles with spares and ammunition had been funded in the FY 67 Thai MAP."³ During the period, March to June 1967, these rifles, ammunition, and spares were shipped to Thailand. It was the Secretary of Defense's opinion that these rifles, plus the 500 previously delivered to the Royal Thailand Army (RTA), would "establish a pool from which M16A1 rifles can be supplied to all RTA units actively engaged in internal security operations."⁴

Policy Guidelines for U.S. MA to Thai Counterinsurgency Effort

~~(S)~~ In September 1967, the "threat to Thailand's security posed by insurgency continues to be a major problem... U.S. assistance to the Thai National Police and the Thai Armed Forces through AID and MAP has considerably enhanced Thai performance in counterinsurgency operations, but even with such assistance the task of the Thai forces is a difficult one."⁵ By the end of the year, the outlook did not appear any brighter:

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1. CINCPAC 210331Z Jun 67.
 2. Point Paper, J4221, Hq CINCPAC, 5 May 67, Subj: XM16E1 (now designated M16A1) Rifles for ROKA, ARVN, ROK and RVN MC and Thai MAP.
 3. Point Paper, J3B33, Hq CINCPAC, 5 Aug 67; Subj: M16A1 Rifles for ROKA, ARVN, ROKMC, VNMC, THAI MAP and LAOS (C).
 4. Point Paper, J4221, Hq CINCPAC, 24 Oct 67, Subj: Status of M16A1 Rifles.
 5. Journal MA, Sep 67, p. 174.

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"A brief comparison of communist activity in Thailand in 1966 and 1967 reveals several facts. The communist movement gained momentum steadily throughout 1966, although the level of activity fluctuated from month to month. In 1967, after peaking in March, it began to lose momentum gradually and declined during the last three quarters of the year. However, the level of activity in these periods remained higher than in any quarter of 1966 and trended upward in the final month of 1967.

"The above developments reflect the impact of Royal Thai Government countermeasures against communist subversion. . . . However, suppressive operations were not sufficient to effect a reduction in insurgent strength or to prevent harassment of security and protection forces. . . .

"Insurgency in Thailand obviously did not mushroom in 1967 as the Communist parties of Thailand, China and North Vietnam hoped. . . . Although little progress was made in preparing for a 'war of liberation,' in a country that was not ripe for revolution anyway, the venture in Thailand contributed to communist objectives in other ways. The modest resources expended by the communists forced the diversion of far greater Thai resources from development to internal security programs. The US military and economic aid burden was increased substantially. Also, for the expenditure of a few hundred guerrillas, thousands of Thai troops with their associated equipment, which might otherwise have gone to South Vietnam, were tied down in Thailand. "1

~~(S)~~ In March 1967, meanwhile, the JCS had forwarded to the Secretary of Defense for approval certain guidelines, which they "considered consistent with the advisory and training role and present U.S. military assistance activities in Thai counterinsurgency. "2 Following a DOD review, the title of the policy guidelines was changed

1. LtCol R. A. Henderson, USAF, Hq CINCPAC, "Thailand-Internal Security Developments during the last Quarter of 1967, " PACOM Intelligence Digest, No. 3-68, dtd 16 Feb 68, pp. 14-15.
2. J5 History, Hq CINCPAC, Jul 67.

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to "Policy Guidelines for U.S. Military Assistance to the Thai Counterinsurgency Efforts," and the slightly amended version was approved on 30 June 1967 by the Deputy Secretary of Defense. Copies of the new guidelines were mailed on 7 July 1967.¹

~~(S)~~ As far as CINCPAC was concerned, there was one change to the guidelines that he considered significant: that portion pertaining to the use by CINCPACAF of air commando aircraft. "The amended Guidelines specifically prohibited aircraft uses which were to be permitted in a non-combat support function by the proposed Guidelines."² On 14 July 1967, the JCS directed CINCPAC to "provide guidance to COMUSMAGTHAI/CHJUSMAGTHAI and CINCPACAF in accordance with approved policy guidelines."³

~~(S)~~ The CINCPAC forwarded the JCS-requested amended guidance to the appropriate commands on 1 August 1967. On the same day, the American Ambassador to Thailand expressed his view that the amended policy guidelines "would be regarded by the Thai as a violation of an understanding and cancel favorable response to proposed additional troop contribution for FWMAF in SVN."⁴ By 11 August, CINCPAC was dispatching messages that delayed implementation of the sentence in the new policy guidelines pertaining to the use of Air Commando aircraft; this action was taken in response to a directive from the JCS at the request of the OSD until a review could be made of the guidance.

~~(S)~~ On 17 August, the Secretary of Defense modified the guidelines to permit certain uses of Air Commando aircraft in Thailand. However, this change was a slight one as the amended sentence sent to the JCS clearly indicates:

Air Commando aircraft will not be used in Thailand for air lift, leaflet drop, aerial broadcasts, surveillance activities and other activities which might be construed as being in support of Thai internal security operations except on the basis of overriding considerations and then only when recommended by the US ambassador and after approval by appropriate authorities in Washington.⁶

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1. JCS 1365/141925Z Jul 67
 2. J5 History, Hq CINCPAC, Jul 67.
 3. JCS 1365/141925Z Jul 67.
 4. J5 History, Hq CINCPAC, Aug 67.
 5. CINCPAC 110624Z Aug 67; JCS 3586/102143Z Aug 67.
 6. SECDEF 4196/172339Z Aug 67.

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~~(S)~~ The American Ambassador in Bangkok, meanwhile, had requested the Secretary of State on 23 August for continued use of Air Commando aircraft to assist certain Thai efforts to contain and eliminate insurgency.¹ This request was approved by the Secretary of Defense on 29 August with only certain limitations, for he realized "that immediate withdrawal and denial of current level of support might precipitate crisis which would affect our broader relations with Thai."² On the same date, the JCS was directed to "prepare and submit for Washington approval, in coordination with ambassador, a plan to achieve an orderly withdrawal from Thailand by not later than March 31, 1968 of sufficient of those units of the 606th which engage in operations prescribed by Ref (A), so that remaining aircraft will have no time available for non-US use."³

~~(S)~~ On 6 September 1967, the JCS directed CINCPAC to dissimulate to appropriate commands those changes to the policy guidelines as authorized by the Secretary of Defense on 29 August, as well as beginning preparation of the requested plan.⁴ CINCPAC provided the necessary guidance to the appropriate commands on 10 September, which included the following sentence at the end: "Requests for support of Thai internal security operations that are recommended by the U. S. Ambassador, as an exception to the policy stated herein, will be submitted by CINCPAC to the JCS for consideration."⁵ At the same time, CINCPAC stated that "CINCPACAF, in coordination with COMUSMACTHAI and AMEMB Bangkok, is requested to prepare a plan in accordance with the guidance" given by the Secretary of Defense.⁶

~~(S)~~ For MAP planning purposes, CINCPAC requested COMUSMACTHAI's "estimate of impact of SECDEF policy implementation on present and proposed military assistance program for FY 68 thru FY 70 funding of aircraft for RTARF set forth in" Thailand FY 68-73 MAP Plan.⁷ Within nine days of being queried, COMUSMACTHAI replied on 21 September 1967 that time limitations precluded consideration of requirements beyond FY 68. However, he went on, the impact of the policy of the Secretary of Defense upon implementation on the present MAP FY 68 program would affect aircraft

1. J5 History, Hq CINCPAC, Aug 67.
2. SECDEF 5068/292344Z Aug 67.
3. Ibid.
4. JCS 5584/062121Z Sep 67.
5. CINCPAC 101455Z Sep 67.
6. Ibid.
7. CINCPAC 122125Z Sep 67.

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funding only by the increase of two C-123s and base facilities for a total cost of \$1.19 million. He ended his report with the following paragraph:

"The above requirements represent our preliminary analysis of the impact and cost: further refinement based on availability of ramp area and personnel facilities, will be included in the overall plan being developed which will take into account all RTG requirements for air support of COIN operation. MAP costs associated with increased COIN missions by the RTAF cannot be imposed upon the present austere RTAF MAP dollar ceiling program, but must be supported as an add-on to the current MAP program, since new policy guidance generated the requirement. "1

(S) On 4 December 1967, CINCPAC officially promulgated by letter a revised set of policy guidelines for U. S. military assistance to Thai counterinsurgency efforts. Actually, the "revised policy guidelines are exactly the same as the original guidelines except for two changes. The first change permitted on-going air support programs to continue but within certain limitations. In connection with this change, CINCPAC was required to submit a plan for withdrawing sufficient 606th ACS assets from Thailand so that remaining aircraft will not have time available for non-U. S. use. The second change broadens the requirement for obtaining requests for exceptions to the guidelines. "2

(S) As far as the requested plan was concerned, CINCPAC responded to this requirement on 1 January 1968. His response to higher headquarters stated that air commando support of Thai counterinsurgency operations was virtually terminated and, by 31 March 1968, no support within intent and meaning of Thai guidelines would be performed except in an overriding circumstance and even then only after appropriate approvals had been obtained. He, therefore, recommended that there be no withdrawal of 606th (recently redesignated 56th ACW) assets from Thailand. In addition, CINCPAC recommended that two C-123 aircraft and a 20-man U. S. Mobile Training Team (for maintenance) be provided to RTAF through MASF. ³

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1. COMUSMACTHAI 211100Z Sep 67.
 2. J5 History, Hq CINCPAC, Dec 67.
 3. Ibid. ; CINCPAC 010209Z Jan 68.

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Replacement C-47 for Thailand

(S) On 16 December 1967, COMUSMACTHAI informed CINCPAC that a Royal Thailand Air Force (RTAF) C-47 aircraft, equipped with searchlights and mini-guns, crashed and burned on the runway of the Nakhon Phanom RTAF Base during the night of 12 December. The individual alleged to be responsible for the accident was an USAF Staff Sergeant, who perished in the crash. "To forestall any unfavorable repercussion," COMUSMACTHAI "requested that CINCPAC take necessary steps to provide the RTAF with a replacement C-47 aircraft equipped with miniguns either from in-theater assets or from other sources at no cost to MAP."¹ He also asked for guidance as to what assurance he could give the Thailand government that the aircraft would be replaced.²

(S) CINCPAC advised COMUSMACTHAI on 19 December that no "commitment should be made to the RTG until investigation is completed and further guidance is provided."³ At the same time, he notified CINCPACAF that, upon completion of the investigation, CINCPAC would expect the necessary information and/or recommendations on which to base a reply to COMUSMACTHAI.

(S) By the end of the year, CINCPACAF had not yet replied to CINCPAC's request. He had, however, taken definite steps to resolve this problem. On 30 December 1967, he recommended to the CSAF that the USAF should declare a C-47 excess and provide it to Thailand. Moreover, "pending permanent resolution of problem," he requested the 7th Air Force to "investigate feasibility providing acft on temporary loan basis" until such time as CSAF could provide one permanently.⁴

UH-1D Helicopters for Thailand

(S) On 16 April 1967, the Thailand FY 68-72 MAP Special Study was completed, as requested by the American Ambassador to Thailand. Approximately a month later, on 25 May, CINCPAC provided MA Plan guidance for Thailand based on the \$40 million annual dollar ceiling of the Secretary of Defense and, five days later, furnished additional CINCPAC

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1. COMUSMACTHAI TAFAGOP 00252/160508Z Dec 67.
 2. Ibid. ; J5 History, Hq CINCPAC, Dec 67.
 3. CINCPAC 192007Z Dec 67.
 4. CINCPACAF DM/DO/3022267 Dec 67.

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guidance and instructions applicable to the development of the Thailand MA Plan. Then, on 8 June, the Secretary of Defense requested CINCPAC to expedite the review of the Thailand FY 68-72 Special Study, and to furnish additional information concerning UH-1D helicopters. CINCPAC's reply on the issue of helicopters was forthcoming on 24 June, when he recommended to the JCS that ten UH-1Ds should be added to the Continuing Resolution Authority (CRA) funding for Thailand FY 68 MAP.¹

~~(S)~~ The JCS came back on 30 June, requesting CINCPAC's comments on two questions. One was the apparent duplication of helicopter requirements that were reflected in: (1) a requirement to equip RTA Air Mobile Companies, contained in the Thailand FY 68-72 MAP Special Study, which had been prepared for the American Ambassador by COMUSMACTHAI, and (2) a requirement for a helicopter squadron for the RTAF contained in Annex J, JSOP 69-76. The other was the apparent inconsistency between CINCPAC's request of 24 June, when he asked for the early funding of 10 UH-1Ds for the RTA in the FY 68 MAP, and the absence of a stated requirement for RTA Air Mobile Companies in Annex J, JSOP 69-76.²

~~(S)~~ Actually, these seemingly inconsistencies could be explained quite simply. The Thailand Ministry of Defense and the Supreme Command Headquarters had decided--subsequent to the CINCPAC JSOP submission, but prior to the preparation of the Thailand FY 68-72 MAP Special Study--that the helicopter lift capability, in the form of Air Mobile Companies, should be in the RTA rather than in the RTAF. This Thai Government decision had been reflected in the Thailand FY 68 MAP data base update, which had been forwarded to the Secretary of Defense on 2 May 1967. In addition, this decision of Thailand was reconfirmed to CINCPAC by COMUSMACTHAI on 16 June 1967.³

~~(S)~~ Based on this Thai decision, CINCPAC intended that his "JSOP update submission due in JCS by 15 Oct 67, will reflect this change."⁴ Accordingly, CINCPAC so informed the JCS on 10 June 1967.

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1. J5 History, Hq CINCPAC, Jul 67; CINCPAC 240030Z Jun 67.
 2. Ibid., JCS 9270/301931Z Jun 67.
 3. COMUSMACTHAI MACTCS/161400Z Jun 67; J5 History, Hq CINCPAC, Jul 67.
 4. CINCPAC 101135Z Jul 67.

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Early Delivery of F-5As

(S) Two MAP-provided F-5Bs were delivered to the Royal Thai Air Force (RTAF) in March 1966.¹ The intention was to equip the RTAF with a squadron of 18 F-5s with incremental deliveries through 1970. This phase-in of F-5As to modernize the Thai capabilities in the air was directly dependent upon funds provided by the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) via means of dollar guidelines for current, budget, and plan years. Within the dollar guidelines established for Thailand, this F-5A requirement would have to compete with other investment items for funding priority.

(S) Both CINCPAC and COMUSMACHTHAI had originally planned on a \$70 million dollar guideline for FY 67 Thailand MAP, which allowed the programming of 8 F-5As. OSD, however, had subsequently revised this guideline down to \$60 million, with the result that COMUSMACHTHAI reduced the number of F-5A aircraft in the FY 67 program to a new figure of 4. On 19 December 1966, OSD approved the four aircraft with associated equipment and supplies in Thailand FY 67 MAP.² Normally, the lead time for delivery of F-5As is approximately two years following official funding; however, in this instance, political pressures for earlier delivery had a marked effect upon the timetable.

(S) This allocation of four F-5As marked "the first programming of the 'A' (single place) version," and these jet fighters were scheduled to become part of the normal complement of the RTAF's 13th Squadron at the Don Muang Air Base.³ That the Thailand government desired additional F-5As was indicated by the 300 RTAF personnel that had been trained in-country by a U.S. Maintenance Mobile Training Team in anticipation of receiving additional aircraft. CINCPAC first became aware of this great desire of the Thais on 18 January 1967, when COMUSMACHTHAI informed him that "informal information learned during recent visit to Thailand by Secretary of the Air Force is that four (4) F-5A aircraft may be delivered to Thailand in the near future."⁴ If this information was true, then COMUSMACHTHAI would need expeditious delivery of spare parts and equipment to properly support the aircraft upon their arrival.

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1. Unless otherwise cited, the information contained in this subsection on Thai F-5As was derived from: Point Paper, J4332, Hq CINCPAC, 20 Feb 67, Subj: F5A Aircraft for Thailand; J4 History, Hq CINCPAC, Jan 67.
 2. CINCPAC 200511Z Jan 67.
 3. Journal MA, Jun 67, p. 158.
 4. COMUSMACHTHAI TAFAGM-4 01407/181030Z Jan 67.

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(S) Since CINCPAC had not received any information concerning the expedited delivery of F-5As for the RTAF, he dispatched a query on 20 January 1967 to the Chief of Staff, Hq USAF, with an information copy to OSD, requesting official information in this matter.¹ The Secretary of Defense replied four days later that:

As you know the two F-5 aircraft in the \$35 million FY 67 MAP were scheduled for delivery in March 1968 and the two additional F-5 aircraft in the \$25 million program increase would have been scheduled for delivery at some later date under normal programming. Through extraordinary measures it has been possible to divert aircraft from earlier production and to schedule delivery of 4 F-5A in Thailand for June 1967.²

(S) Upon receipt of this information, CINCPAC immediately notified ASD/ISA that the "accelerated delivery of four F-5As to Thailand will require extraordinary logistic action" and requested the necessary expedited funding action to accomplish this action.³ In reply, the Secretary of Defense advised CINCPAC that the necessary action was being taken to fund the necessary program lines, and that the Chief of Staff, Hq USAF, had been authorized to initiate supply action pending receipt of a MAP Order from ASD/ISA. As reported elsewhere in June 1967, the delivery of these jet fighters "has been expedited to assure their arrival, via surface transport, before the end of FY 1967. Concurrent spare parts, three spare engines, and aerospace ground equipment are also being provided."⁴ Thus, the early delivery of the F-5As for political reasons was successfully accomplished.⁵

Request for Substitution of Aircraft

(S) Prior to 19 July 1967, approval had been given to the "allocation of one (1) UC-45J for Army element MACTHAI/JUSMAG. . . Detailed justification emphasized need of C-45 or equivalent aircraft to provide multi-engine acft reliability, speed and range necessitated by weather

1. CINCPAC 200511Z Jan 67.
2. SECDEF 4398/241318Z Jan 67.
3. CINCPAC 250433Z Jan 67.
4. Journal MA, Jun 67, pp. 158-9.
5. Journal MA, Sep 67, p. 175.

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conditions, time/distances, precipitous jungle terrain, extended overwater routes."¹ On that date, however, COMUSMACTHAI requested CINCPAC's approval for the substitution of one U-8F aircraft and 600 flying hours in place of the one UC-45J and 600 flying hours. His rationale for this substitution was that a \$45,000 modification was needed on the UC-45J and, in addition, the plane had a fault in the main wing spar, the cost of which, added to that of the modification, would involve a large expenditure for an obsolete aircraft.²

(S) On 10 August 1967, after listing the facts that "have necessitated re-evaluation of the assignment of the UC-45J in support of MACTHAI/JUSMAG missions," CINCPAC recommended to the JCS that: "One U-8F aircraft be substituted for one UC-45J in MACTHAI/JUSMAG authorization."³ This aircraft should be authorized 600 flying hours, continued CINCPAC, and funding support would continue to be shared by DA and MAP. In reply on 16 August, the JCS stated that the proposed substitution could not be favorably considered, primarily because "it is undesirable to further mix types by assignment of a U-8F," but that a future solution could be had by amending COMUSMACTHAI's aircraft allocation "to delete one UC-45J, 600 hours, in Thailand and substitute therefore one U-1, 600 hours," with funding support to be shared by both DA and MAP.⁴ CINCPAC, in turn, informed COMUSMACTHAI of the JCS decision on 23 August 1967.⁵

(U) Again, on 21 September 1967, COMUSMACTHAI requested substitution authority, this time to retain one U-8F until one U-1A was assigned and to release one UC-45J and one U-8D after receipt of two U-21As.⁶ CINCUSARPAC answered on 10 October with the recommendation that COMUSMACTHAI retain the UC-45J until receipt of one U-1A with an estimated delivery date of February 1968. Furthermore, in the event that the UC-45J did not meet mission requirements, then HQ CINCUSARPAC would take the necessary action to provide a loan of one U-1A.⁷

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1. COMUSMACTHAI 190737Z Jul 67.
 2. Ibid., J5 History, Hq CINCPAC, Jul 67.
 3. CINCPAC 102335Z Aug 67.
 4. JCS 3997/161551Z Aug 67; J5 History, Hq CINCPAC, Aug 67.
 5. CINCPAC 230202Z Aug 67.
 6. COMUSMACTHAI 210415Z Sep 67.
 7. CINCUSARPAC 35852/102328Z Oct 67.

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~~(C)~~ On 12 October 1967, CINCPAC advised COMUSMACTHAI that his authorization was for only two multi-engine aircraft. Therefore, the UC-45J should be retained until receipt of the U-1A and, if necessary, CINCUSARPAC should be requested to provide interim aircraft support. 1

1. CINCPAC 121840Z Oct 67.

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Laos

(S) "Laos retains a critical position within the framework of communist and Free World efforts in Southeast Asia. The Royal Lao Government continues to cooperate with us at the risk of inviting communist charges of connivance with the United States in violation of the Geneva Accords. Royal Lao forces are showing slow but steady improvement in their ground operational capability. Their small Air Force continues to play a key role in localizing and limiting Pathet Lao and North Vietnamese combat operations. Our support of the Royal Lao Government has permitted its forces to maintain the status quo.

The proposed program for Laos, like that of Thailand, is not included in the Military Assistance Program Fiscal Year 1968 Estimates. However, regardless of the source of funds, the program will follow the pattern established in recent years. It will provide the training, the relatively unsophisticated equipment, and the ammunition that is required to assist the Royal Lao Government in retaining control over the territory it now holds."


Admiral U. S. G. Sharp¹

1. CINCPAC 13 Apr 67 MAP Statement.

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LAOS

AS OF 1 NOVEMBER 1967

| BASIC INFORMATION | |  | OVERALL OBJECTIVE | U.S. DIPLOMATIC MISSION |
|---|---|--|--|--|
| AREA 91,000 Sq MI. | ARABLE LAND PER CAPITA 4 ACRES | | TO PREVENT COMMUNIST TAKE-OVER IN LAOS. | U.S. AMBASSADOR MON. WM. N. SULLIVAN |
| POPULATION 3,059,000 | LITERACY RATE 15% | | | U.S. AID DIRECTOR MR. JOSEPH A. MENDENHALL |
| ANNUAL GROWTH 2.4% | LIFE EXPECTANCY ... 35 YEARS | | | DEPUTY CHIEF JUSMAG THAILAND COL ROBERT S. FERRARI, USA |
| GROSS NAT PROD \$17J NTL | PER CAPITA \$66.00 | | MAP OBJECTIVE | |
| <p>KING - Sri Savang Vathana PRIME MINISTER, MINISTER OF DEFENSE, MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, MINISTER OF SOCIAL ACTION, MINISTER OF VETERANS AFFAIRS AND LEADER OF THE NEUTRALIST FACTION Prince Souvanna Phouma VICE PREMIER, MINISTER OF EDUCATION, AND LEADER OF RIGHTIST FACTION - Leuam Insislenmay VICE PREMIER, MINISTER OF ECONOMIC PLANNING AND LEADER OF THE COMMUNIST FACTION - Prince Souphanouvong</p> | | | <p>TO ASSIST LAOS ARMED FORCES TO ATTAIN AND MAINTAIN THE CAPABILITY TO DEFEND THE AREAS UNDER GOVERNMENT CONTROL AT THE TIME OF THE SIGNING OF THE GENEVA AGREEMENTS.</p> | |
| | MAJOR FORCE GUIDELINES | TOTAL COUNTRY FORCES * | COMBAT CAPABILITY | |
| ARMY | FAR FORCES: 10GM, 24 INF BNS, 6 ARN BNS, 42 VOL-UNTEER BNS, 4 FLD ARTY, 4 RECON TRPS, 7 ENG BN, 59 PARAMIL COS, 1 PSY WAR BN, 1 RIVER GP BN. NEUTRALIST FORCES: 2 RANGER BN, 11 INF BNS, 2 FLD ARTY BNS. | FAR FORCES: 24 INF BNS, 6 PARA BNS, 38 VOL BNS, 4 ARTY BNS, 4 ARMD COS, 7 ENGR BNS, est. 58 PAR-AMILITARY COS. NEUTRALIST FORCES: 9 INF BNS, 5 PARA BNS, 1 ARTY BN. | MAINTAIN MINIMUM SECURITY IN NON-COMMUNIST AREA MAIN POPULATION CENTERS. PROVIDE VERY LIMITED GROUND DEFENSE AGAINST LOCAL COMMUNIST INSURGENCY. | |
| NAVY | NONE | FAR RIVER FLOTILLA: 47 RIVER CRAFT INCLUDING 6 LCM, 22 MINOR CRAFT - YP, 12 YF, 1 YFD SERVICE CRAFT, 6 - 50 TON RIVER TRANSPORTS. | MAINTAIN MINIMUM SECURITY OF RIVER ROUTES IN CONSERVATIVE AREA AND PROVIDE LIMITED LOGISTIC SUPPORT FOR CONSERVATIVE FORCES. | |
| AIR FORCE | 4 TAC FTR WINGS, 4 AIRLIFT WINGS. | TACTICAL AIR COMMAND, MILITARY AIRLIFT COMMAND, AIR MATERIAL COMMAND, TRAINING WING: 1 T-28, 1U-34, 19 C-47, 15 MISCELLANEOUS. 48 T-28 AVAILABLE FOR USE IN LAOS, ONLY 1 IS LAOS OWNED; ADDITIONALLY 15 UH-34's OPER BY AIR AMERICA. | PROVIDE LIMITED FIGHTER BOMBER, LOGISTIC AND RECONNAISSANCE SUPPORT TO GROUND FORCES. | |

SOURCE: PACOM Digest Nov 67, p. 136.

* DOES NOT INCLUDE PATHET LAO OR DISSIDENT NEUTRALIST MILITARY FORCES

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Brief History of DEPCHJUSMAGTHAI MAP

(S) "The Forces Armees (FA) have increased in size from a small, constabulary force at the inception of the Military Assistance Program (MAP) to a fully organized Forces Armees Royal (FAR) and Forces Armees Neutralist (FAN). Included in the FAR is the Royal Lao Air Force (RLAF). It was believed by some that after the 1964 coup the FAR/FAN would be organized as the 'Lao National Army', with one General Staff organization responsible for the administration, tactical direction, and logistical support of both elements (FAR/FAN) of the conservative army. In practice the FAN has maintained a separation from the FAR which was necessary to maintain an appearance of compliance with the Geneva Agreements. The FAN have kept a liaison group in Vientiane to coordinate matters of common interest. Until recently, the lowest level of common direction has been the Office of the Minister of Defense headed by the Prime Minister, Souvanna Phouma. During the past year liaison groups have been placed with offices of the FAR General Staff and the unity between the FAR and the FAN is currently at a higher level than at anytime in the past. Several operations have been coordinated successfully; however, much work remains to be done before effective central control of all fighting forces is established.


(S) "The FAR and FAN are almost totally dependent upon military aid from the U.S. The only significant Laotian contribution to the support of the armed forces is that some locally produced food is supplied and that uniforms are being tailored from MAP furnished material. The political impact of MAP has been pronounced, as the armed forces are the most influential and dominant force in Laos. MAP has provided a medium through which the United States has influenced the development of Laos' defense forces along lines most beneficial to them and to the United States, thus ensuring that the Lao effort complements and augments the United States capability for free world defense in Southeast Asia. Progress has been made in many areas, e.g., standardization of the FAR military organization along U.S. lines; standardization of equipment and training; and acceptance of the U.S. military attache influence in tactical operation concepts. This pro-U.S. orientation at the individual level has been fostered by Military Assistance training to include close personal and professional relationships between U.S. and Lao military personnel at CONUS training courses.

(S) "Improvement has occurred in the tactical employment of the FAR and FAN. Rather than complete reliance on the static defense system advocated by the French, the FAR/FAN forces have improved their patrolling

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techniques and now, to a greater degree, seek out and engage Lao Peoples Liberation Army (LPLA) and North Vietnamese units. The use and appreciation of a mobile defense system, and use of close air support, can be attributed to the advisory action of members of the attache staff. On several occasions, FAR/FAN battalion size units have planned and executed successful combined operations against LPLA and North Vietnamese units much larger than their own.

(S) "A major consideration in assessing the past accomplishments of the MAP in Laos is the fact that the equipment and training received by the FAR/FAN from the United States has made a significant contribution to Laos' readiness to defend itself against Communism. The training formerly conducted by MAAG personnel in Laos generated a limited self-teaching capability in the Lao service schools and military academy. In 1964, training was resumed through the MAP.



AF

(S) "In October 1962, as a result of the Geneva Agreements, military personnel were required to leave Laos. Thailand offered a sanctuary and MAAG Laos has since operated from Bangkok under the cover name of Deputy Chief, JUSMAG/Thailand (DCH). In-country advisory duties have been performed by the augmented attache staffs. The AID mission was designated the implementing agent for the MAP in-country, and it was limited to determining requirements, receipt and delivery of MAP goods; also, where possible, limited logistical advisory and technical service assistance. USAID has contracted with American companies for fixed wing air transport services in support of the Royal Lao Government, including military forces."1

Proposed Change to DEPCHJUSMAGTHAI OPlan 64-66

(S) Both CINCPAC OPlan 64-66 and DEPCHJUSMAGTHAI OPlan 64-66 "provide for establishment in Laos of a Military Assistance and

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1. CINCPAC MA Plan for DEPCHJUSMAG Thailand FY 68-73, Vol 1, pp. C-1 and C-2.

Advisory Organization titled US Supply and Training Mission, Laos (USSATM, Laos). "¹ In the early part of 1967, DEPCHJUSMAGTHAI was in the process of rewriting his OPlan 64-66. One minor change, which would require CINCPAC's approval, was to call USSATM, Laos, instead the Joint U. S. Military Advisory Group, Laos (JUSMAG, Laos). The rationale given for this proposed revision was:

"a. Military Advisory Group is more commonly used and better understood than SATM.



"c. The current mission of Deputy Chief with its attendant complexities would be more clearly understood and appreciated if there were a subsequent association with JUSMAG, Laos as opposed to USSATM, Laos. "²

~~(TS)~~ CINCPAC admitted to DEPCHJUSMAGTHAI on 11 March 1967 that the present name of USSATM, Laos, was selected originally for political reasons. Moreover, he went on:

The political considerations regarding Laos remain essentially the same today as in 1964. If a decision is made to introduce the SATM into Laos, the U. S. may wish to preserve as long as possible its public posture of conformance with the Geneva Accords and might not wish to draw attention unnecessarily to the presence of a U. S. military organization in Laos. The title, Supply and Training Mission, does not directly refer to a military organization and does not have obvious association with military assistance. Therefore, it is not considered advisable to change the name as recommended.... ³

Loss of Aircraft

~~(S)~~ Six T-28D aircraft and two H-34 helicopters were "destroyed or damaged on ground at Luang Prabang airfield" during the night of 1 February 1967 as a "result of sneak enemy ground attack. "⁴ As the American Embassy

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1. DEPCHJUSMAGTHAI 5092/230830Z Feb 67.
 2. Ibid.
 3. CINCPAC 112213Z Mar 67.
 4. AMEMB Vientiane 4692/021100Z Feb 67.

stated on the following day the raid against the "aircraft which have fully proved their combat effectiveness in northern operations over past six months. . . . need replacement for destroyed T-28s as quickly as possible in order to maintain defenses in Northern Laos. . . ."1

(S) Quick action was taken as far as replacing these aircraft. On the same day as the request, 2 February 1967, the Secretary of Defense notified CINCPAC that "ten (10) T-28 attrition aircraft for Laos MAP now at McClellan AFB, Calif, for loading SS Croatan scheduled for sailing 11 February."2 This sailing was subsequently confirmed, the estimated time of arrival (ETA) [REDACTED] was 18 March 1967.3 4FAF

Proposed Sale of Helicopters

(S) Upon the establishment of the International Control Commission (ICC) in Laos in 1962, the U. S. sold the ICC four UH-34D helicopters for use by the ICC.4 The sale terms contained a proviso that the U. S. would have the option and first priority in buying back the helicopters once they were no longer required by the ICC. At the same time, arrangements were also made to have Air America (AA) provide the maintenance on the ICC UH-34Ds.

(S) In 1967, for a variety of reasons, the primary one being the failure of responsible countries to provide operating funds for the ICC, the Commission found itself in financial straits to the tune of approximately \$800,000 of debt. About \$300,000 of this sum had been accumulated as an indebtedness to AA for the maintenance of the four helicopters. A recent determination by the ICC found no further need for at least two of the UH-34Ds. In fact, one helicopter was leased to AA, with the rental payments being used to pay part of the total bill owed AA. By fall, ICC desired to sell at least two of the helicopters in order to liquidate some, if not all, of their debt.

(S) Starting in October 1967, the U. S. has been considering a proposal whereby the U. S. would buy these two UH-34Ds back through its MAP at \$150,000 each. This amount would defray the AA bill owed by

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1. AMEMB Vientiane 4691/021100Z Feb 67.
 2. SECDEF 5365/022133Z Feb 67.
 3. COMSTSPAC 212309Z Feb 67; J4 History, Hq CINCPAC, Feb 67.
 4. Unless otherwise cited, the information contained in this subsection has been derived from: J5 History, Hq CINCPAC, Oct 67; J5 History, Hq CINCPAC Nov 67.

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the ICC, which the U.S., in fact, has already paid. These two helicopters would replace two in Laos MAP future deliveries. 1

[REDACTED]

(S)

[REDACTED]

MAP Support for Human Subsistence

"On 4 April 1967, [REDACTED] requested CINCPAC support for a proposal to shift funding of subsistence from AID to MAP for about 90,600 military, paramilitary and dependents in military regions I and II, at a cost of about \$12 million annually." 5

These Laotians had originally received subsistence from AID because they were genuine refugees, who had been chased from their homes but had elected to remain in the mountainous regions supplied by air drop. Eventually, some of these refugees were armed and became paramilitary units. They remained eligible for AID support, since they were essentially static home defense units. Within the last two years

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1. SECDEF 1476/272305Z Oct 67; DEPCHJUSMAGTHAI 071030Z Nov 67.
 2. CINCPAC 161930Z Nov 67; SECDEF 3511/230038Z Nov 67.
 3. AMEMB Vientiane 2951/281113Z Nov 67; AMEMB Vientiane 3068/030846Z Dec 67.
 4. AMEMB Vientiane 2667/100846Z Nov 67.
 5. J5 History, Hq CINCPAC, May 67.

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however, these paramilitary units have been converted into mobile strike forces and transferred about like regular Laotian Armed Forces, thus shifting them from the refugee category into the status of military with associated dependents. Moreover, the Royal Laotian Government (RLG) could not supply these particular individuals, since air drops in the terrain and weather encountered in Northern Laos requires a higher degree of skill and special techniques than possessed by Laotian pilots.

~~(S)~~ Meanwhile, on 2 May 1967, DEPCHJUSMAGTHAI had submitted a program change to CINCPAC, adding approximately \$12.18 million for rice, food additives, rope, pallets, parachutes, and air contract services to Laos MAP to handle the new human subsistence requirement.² Later, this figure was reduced by \$1.5 million for food, because of a miscalculation in Vientiane.³ Immediately upon receipt of DEPCHJUS-MACTHAI's message, CINCPAC MAP planners began staffing a position for CINCPAC to forward to DOD for action.⁴

~~(S)~~ By 11 June 1967, CINCPAC was ready to forward a recommendation to the Secretary of Defense concerning the provision of subsistence to 47,600 Lao troops and 43,000 dependents. He concluded that:

The decision whether subsistence for Lao forces should be funded under AID or MAP/MASF should be based on many competing factors. If Laos program is shifted to MSAF, it will continue to be subject to dollar ceiling limitations. The addition of approximately 10.5 million dollars in subsistence requirements, previously funded under AID, to the FY 68 and subsequent year programs would of course reduce the amount of Service funds available for other requirements.⁵

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1. AMEMB Vientiane 7272/230511Z May 67.
 2. DEPCHJUSMAGTHAI 540/020312Z May 67.
 3. AMEMB Vientiane 7272/230511Z May 67; AMEMB Vientiane 7571/060605Z Jun 67.
 4. J5 History, Hq CINCPAC, May 67.
 5. CINCPAC 112152Z Jun 67.



D i

(S) As 1967 grew to a close, CINCPAC MAP planners were awaiting a decision from Washington as to whether or not MAP would fund the portion of Laos subsistence that was in question. In this matter the position of CINCPAC was:

So long as present Geneva Agreement restrictions limit DepChief entry into and control of MAP items in Laos, [redacted]

[redacted] and as the proposal carries with it no intent to change the current AID system now in effect, no tangible justification has been offered to support the proposal.³

Request for M-16 Rifles

(S) On 23 May 1967, [redacted] reported to the State Department of a discussion which

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1. AMEMB 1651/230626Z Sep 67.
 2. Ibid.; Point Paper, J5322, Hq CINCPAC, 2 Oct 67, Subj: Funding of portion of Human Subsistence for Laos Forces and dependents (S).
 3. Ibid.

he had with the King of Laos, Sri Savang Vathana, who had made a request for M-16 rifles. The King stated that he would like to equip one elite Groupe Mobile (GM)--about 1,800 men--with the M-16 rifles. j

[REDACTED]


(S) Four days later, CINCPAC queried DEPCHJUSMAGTHAI about the matter.² "At first blush," replied DEPCHJUSMAGTHAI on 7 June, "this headquarters, from our detached vantage point, is hard pressed to justify on purely military grounds the proposal outlined in Ref B to furnish approx 1800 M16's to a select FAR GM."³ He then went on to discuss in some detail his objections to the proposal. At the end of his message to CINCPAC, however, he stated that: "Cognizance is taken of the political aspects of the proposal and if considered paramount, objections cited in the foregoing are withdrawn."⁴

(S) Meanwhile, a meeting was set up at Udorn, Thailand, where representatives of the Country Team could discuss the subject of M-16 rifles in detail and to determine specific requirements. Upon the conclusion of this meeting, CINCPAC was to peruse the findings of the Country Team representatives and then make his recommendations known to the JCS, who had indicated that 2,000 M-16 rifles could be made available from the September 1967 production, if necessary.⁵

- [REDACTED] b.
1. AMEMB Vientiane 7270/250509Z May 67; J5 History, Hq CINCPAC, May 67.
 2. CINCPAC 270415Z May 67.
 3. DEPCHJUSMAGTHAI DCH-L 5248/070845Z Jun 67.
 4. Ibid.
 5. Ibid.; J5 History, Hq CINCPAC, May 67; JCS 6806/012152Z Jun 67.
 6. AMEMB Vientiane 7940/261129Z Jun 67.
 7. CINCPAC 290023Z Jun 67.

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1. SECDEF 9368/302231 Z Jun 67; J5 History, Hq CINCPAC, Jun 67.

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South Vietnam

(S) "There is no doubt but for our efforts and sacrifices, South Vietnam would have collapsed militarily and politically to communist control, and Laos, Cambodia and Thailand would be faced directly by a similar fate. Although the length of this conflict is not yet predictable, the course upon which we have embarked successfully to bring it to an end is a necessary and a sound one. We face a complex situation which will demand constant review of our tactics, adequacy of our forces and effectiveness of our operations against the enemy. In my opinion, the most important requirement for success is a demonstrated determination to stick to our guns.

"Our goal for 1967 is to increase the prospects for an early end to the conflict in South Vietnam which is satisfactory to the U. S., to the Republic of Vietnam, and to those nations which are providing Free World Military Assistance Forces.

"In conclusion--prospects for achieving our objectives are excellent. We have firm and determined Allies in that part of the world who do not flinch in their fight for freedom and who provide us operational and support bases. In effect, we have a combined Free World force, made possible and developed through Military Assistance Programs. These Allied forces, backed by U. S. strength, are maintaining a strong bulwark against communist subversion and expansion--internally and externally. The tremendous resources we are now committing to Vietnam make it in our best interest to continue the relatively modest Military Assistance Programs for the defense and internal security of the area. It is this type of effort on our part that can help prevent 'future Vietnams.' I urge your continued support of the Military Assistance Program. "

Admiral U. S. G. Sharp¹

1. CINCPAC 13 Apr 67 MAP Statement.


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REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM

AS OF 1 NOVEMBER 1967

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| BASIC INFORMATION | |  | OVERALL U.S. OBJECTIVE | U.S. DIPLOMATIC MISSION |
|--|--|---|---|---|
| AREA | 63,000 SQ MI | | | TO ATTAIN A STABLE AND INDEPENDENT NONCOMMUNIST GOVERNMENT IN SOUTH VIETNAM FUNCTIONING IN A SECURE ENVIRONMENT |
| POPULATION | 16.3 MILLION | | RVN PROGRAM OBJECTIVE US SERVICE SUPPORT FOR VIETNAM IS DESIGNED PRIMARILY TO DEVELOP SVN FORCES CAPABLE OF DEFEATING COMMUNIST EFFORTS TO SEIZE CONTROL OF THE GOVERNMENT. | |
| ANNUAL GROWTH | 2.4% | | | |
| ARABLE LAND PER CAPITA | 1.1 ACRE | | | |
| LITERACY RATE | 50-65% | | | |
| LIFE EXPECTANCY | 30-35 YEARS | | | |
| CROSS NAT PROD 1967(E) (in constant prices) | \$2.3 BILLION | | | |
| PER CAPITA | \$154.0 | | | |
| DEFENSE BUDGET SELF-FINANCED 1967(F) | \$236.4 MILLION | | | |
| AS % OF GNP | 2.9 | | | |
| AS % OF CENTRAL GOVT EXP | 33.7 | | | |
| CHAIRMAN - LIE NGUYEN VAN THIEU PRIME MINISTER - Air Vice Marshal NGUYEN CAO KY SAIL DEFENSE - GEN CAO VAN VIEN CHIEF, JOINT GEN STAFF - GEN CAO VAN VIEN COMMANDER VNAF - AVM NGUYEN CAO KY COMMANDER VNR - CAPT TRAN VAN CHON COMMANDER VNR - MG LE NGUYEN KHANG | | | | |
| MAJOR FORCE OBJECTIVES | | TOTAL COUNTRY FORCES | COMBAT CAPABILITY | |
| ARMY (ARVN) | (4 CORPS), 10 INF DIVS, 1 SEP INF REGT, 7 INF BN (SEP), 1 ARN DIV (8 BNS), (1 HONOR CD BN), 10 ARMD CAV SQNS, 26 ARTY BNS, 20 RNCR BNS, 1 SF GRP, 5 PSYWAR BNS, 8 MP BNS, 20 ENCR BNS, 2 SEP RNCR COS. PARAMIL FORCES: 38 RT COS, 1097 COS, 4659 PLATS. | 4 (CORPS), 10 INF DIVS, 1 SEP INF REGT, 1 ARN DIV, 10 ARMD CAV GRPS, 20 RNCR BNS, 26 ARTY BNS, 6 MARINE BNS, 6 MP BNS, 1 SF GRP, 5 PSYWAR BNS, PARAMIL FORCES, 851 COMPANIES, 4,049 PLATOONS. | MAINTAIN INTERNAL SECURITY IN MAJOR POPULATION CENTERS AND ALONG SELECTED LINES OF COMMUNICATIONS, AND OFFER EFFECTIVE RESISTANCE FOR LIMITED TIME AGAINST ATTACK BY EXTERNAL FORCES. | |
| NAVY (VNN) | 40 PBR, 11 RIV, ASLT GP (RAG), 20 RFC, 36 ASPH, 66 CM, 36 LCVP, 1 RTEG, 8 PCE, 22 PCM, 20 PCF, 3/12 MSC/MIMS, 20 COASTAL GRPS, 255 JUNKS, 6 MARINE INF BNS, 5/5 LSI/SSN, 5/7 LSH/LSSL. | 13 RAG, 1 RTEG, 28 JUNK DIVS, 23 PATROL (PCE, PC, PCM), 13 MINE WARFARE (MCS, MSB/YP), 197 AMPHIB SHIPS & CRAFT, (LSL, LSSL, LSH, LCU, LCM, LCVP), 3 AUX CRAFT, 14 SERVCRAFT, 360 JUNKS, 80 ASST'D RIVER CRAFT. | CHARGED WITH PATROLLING INLAND WATERWAYS AND COASTAL WATERS. SUPPORTS ARMY COUNTERINSURGENCY ACTIONS. MARINE BRIGADE UNDER ARVN CONTROL AS GENERAL RESERVE ELEMENT. | |
| AIR FORCE (VNAF) | 9 TAC FTR SQDNS, 4 LIAISON SQDNS, 1 RECON SQDN, 1 TRANS SQDNS, 1 TAC HELO SQDN, 4 TRANS HELO SQDNS. | (5 WINGS), 7 FTR SQDNS, 5 HELO SQDNS, 4 LIAISON SQDNS, 3 TRANS SQDNS, 1 SCHOOL SQDN, 1 RECON SQDN. | CAPABLE OF CONDUCTING STRIKE OPERATIONS; PROVIDING CLOSE TACTICAL SUPPORT FOR ARMY, AND LIMITED AERIAL SUPPLY AND SUPPORT OF ARN OPS. | |

SOURCE: PACOM Digest, Nov 67, p. 139.

Brief History of Vietnam MAP

(U) "The US Military Assistance Program in Vietnam had its origins in the small MAAG Indochina established as a result of the Pentalateral Agreement of 23 December 1950, a mutual defense assistance treaty with France and the Associated States of Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam. The MAAG was established to administer equipment sent to the French (and through the French to indigenous forces in the area) to combat the spread of communism in Southeast Asia. In 1954, following the French defeat at Dien Bien Phu and the subsequent partition of Vietnam under the Geneva Accords, the French began to withdraw their forces and the Republic of Vietnam assumed direct command of its own forces. Shortly thereafter, MAAG Indochina was split into MAAG Vietnam and MAAG Cambodia.

~~(S)~~ "The subsequent MAAG-Vietnam effort for several years was on a modest scale with only a few hundred US military advisory personnel. In 1961, in direct response to the increasing trend of insurgent activity and to the announced intentions and actions of the North Vietnamese Communists in directing and supporting this insurgency, plans were formulated for a major increase in US material aid and advisory effort. The authorized strength of RVNAF in 1961 was 170,000 and the paramilitary was authorized 119,100. The buildup leveled off in 1963 with an authorized strength of RVNAF of 22,000 and paramilitary of 193,000. Additional buildup occurred in 1964-1965 and by early 1965 RVNAF total authorized strength was 614,351 of which the RF/PF authorized strength was 322,187. Due to a sharp increase in Viet Cong (VC) and North Vietnamese Army (NVA) units in South Vietnam, the FY 66 and FY 67 RVNAF force structure was increased in December 1965. New RVNAF authorizations were established at 631,457 for FY 66 and 621,993 for FY 67 to include RF/PF authorizations of 319,999 for FY 66 and 299,994 for FY 67....

~~(S)~~ "Military assistance, both investment and operating costs, in proportion to the RVNAF force increase, provides not only the equipage for these forces but also facilities such as cantonments, airfields, and shipyards. Military assistance has increased from \$171.9 million in FY 62 to a projected value of \$716.4 million for FY 68."¹

1. CINCPAC MA Plan for Vietnam FY 68-73, dtd 1 Aug 67, Vol. I, p. C-1.

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Military Objectives of Vietnam MAP

(S) "The objective of military assistance to the Republic of Vietnam (RVN) is to defeat communist efforts to seize control of the Government of Vietnam (GVN). This objective includes the development and maintenance of suitably balanced forces that will become capable of defending the nation against either internal or external aggression, so that a militarily secure posture exists within which control by the GVN over its territory and people can be extended, consolidated and sustained. As these purposes are achieved, and the Vietnamese government and economy grow stronger and less dependent on outside assistance or military participation in civil government, the military objectives should shift toward maintaining an active and reserve armed force sufficient to provide for the defense of the nation."¹

U. S. Support of RVNAF to Achieve MAP Objectives

(S) "Military Assistance provided the RVNAF with materiel and training support for 621,993 authorized personnel in FY 67. The revised FY 68 requirement is 685,739, and, for programming purposes, the requirement for FY 69 is 763,953. RVNAF is basically an eleven division force, ten infantry and one airborne, reinforced and supported by a Marine brigade; five Air Force (VNAF) tactical wings composed of six fighter, five helicopter, three transport, one reconnaissance and four liaison squadrons; and a Navy composed of sea units, river assault forces, and coastal armed junks, totalling approximately 700 ships and craft....

- (S) "The military requirements for FY 68-69 include the following:
- a. Military police guard companies (POW camps), four in FY 68 and four in FY 69.
 - b. One battalion and one panel bridge company in FY 68.
 - c. Field Hospital, 400 bed, type A; one in FY 68.
 - d. Transportation company, medium truck, three in FY 68.
 - e. Military police battalions, two in FY 69.

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1. CINCPAC MA Plan for Vietnam FY 68-73, dtd 1 Aug 67, Vol. I, p. A-1.

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f. Transportation company, terminal service, eliminate one type A company in FY 68, and increase two type B units in FY 69.

g. 4.2 inch mortar platoons, increase of ten for armor units in FY 69.

h. 80th Ordnance Rebuild Depot, increase capability through an increase of 306 spaces.

i. Increase of approximately 14 craft for naval patrol capability.

j. Improve naval base logistics.

k. VNAF equipment modernization and conversion program to provide:

(1) Conversion of three A-1 fighter squadrons to three A-37 jet fighter squadrons.

(2) A squadron of UH1D turbine powered helicopters.

(3) Conversion of one transport squadron to C-119 aircraft.

(5) "Manpower resources available in FY 68 will support the force structure requirements for FY 68. The FY 68 requirements were structured around the currently authorized forces and are necessary to provide a balanced force structure. Limitations on manpower resources and economic considerations may preclude significant expansion of the RVNAF for the foreseeable future."

(6) Counterinsurgency: "In the development of forces it is necessary to provide materiel and training support, and to develop and maintain bases, facilities, and an associated environment. In addition, supporting logistic organizations must be developed concurrently with the development of combat forces to insure adequate supply and support of operations. Military assistance is supporting RVNAF in conducting a military offensive in conjunction with US/FWMAF to defeat the VC/NVA main forces. Military assistance is aiding RVNAF in conducting Revolutionary Development to restore and maintain security and establish firm government control. Revolutionary Development is conducted by

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both military and civil elements. It includes the extension of operating government to the populated areas, destruction of the VC infrastructure, organization of the population, improvement of social-economic conditions, and the prevention of incursion of VC/NVA main forces into areas undergoing Revolutionary Development. In secured areas, nation building will be in progress; in other areas, Revolutionary Development will be underway; while in less secure areas, the military offensive will be continued. As the insurgency is brought under control the RVNAF must assist GVN civil agencies in maintaining internal security.

(S) "Limited War: Improving rapport with the populace and the experience received by elements of the RVNAF in actual combat, in training, in schooling, from the advisory effort, plus the planned improvement in forces, a more balanced force structure, and improved equipment, all combine to increase the capability of the forces to conclude successfully the present hostilities. This in turn will better prepare them to withstand overt aggression and to conduct successfully operations under the concept of limited war.

(S) "Contingency: Achievement of the planned objectives by RVNAF eventually should permit a reduction in US funding support of the RVNAF. In addition, the accomplishment of Revolutionary Development Program objectives will result in the achievement of US contingency objectives, i. e., free RVN forces for repelling or holding an external attack, further development of forces within the SEATO area for mutual defense tasks, and making available facilities capable of supporting SEATO military operations. However, it should be noted that the Republic of Vietnam is not a formal member of the SEATO organization but is covered by the provisions of a protocol to the SEATO Treaty (Manila Pact)."¹

1. CINCPAC MA Plan for Vietnam FY 68-73, dtd 1 Aug 67, Vol. I, pp. A-3 - A-5.

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SECTION V - COMMUNICATIONS AND ELECTRONICS

Integrated Wideband Communications System

(C) Approval, funding, installation, and implementation of the Southeast Asia communications systems, those that were a part of the Defense Communications System and those that were not, were delayed in Washington for what CINCPAC considered unsatisfactory periods of time.¹

(C) Centralized control of operations, the rapid pace of operations, and centralized and complex management of resources in Southeast Asia had created an unprecedented demand for rapid exchange of information both within the area and throughout the PACOM. In Southeast Asia the immediate communications demands had been marginally met by deploying all mobile equipment that could be spared worldwide. Mobile equipment was being replaced by fixed plant equipment, but demand on the system continued to rise at such a rate that the third major increment of the fixed plant system--the Integrated Wideband Communications System (IWCS)--was under construction in 1967, a fourth awaited funding, and mobile equipment was still being newly committed to the area. As parts of the IWCS became operational, the displaced transportable equipment was relocated to strengthen the system.

(C) IWCS Phase I was requested by CINCPAC in October 1964, approved in Washington in August 1965, and contracts were awarded in September 1965. Phase II was requested in October 1965, approved in February 1966, and added to the basic contract immediately. Phase III was requested in March 1966, approved in August, with contracts awarded in November 1966.

(C) Not until the end of 1967 were Phases I and II substantially completed, however. Phase III was roughly scheduled for completion by late 1968. With less than half the system operational, the cost was already \$300 million. An additional funding deficit for Phase III existed (\$50 million for construction and \$20 million for operations and maintenance) and awaited approval by the Secretary of Defense, who had already cut it during his 1966 review. CINCPAC was concerned whether the funding for Phase III would be provided before the contractors² had to begin demobilizing.

1. Point Papers J623, 15 Jun, 3 Jul, 4 Aug 67.

2. Page Communications Engineers in Vietnam and the Philco Corporation in Thailand had the contracts for all three phases.

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(C) Some reasons for delays in Washington were as follows. Communications requirements were processed entirely independently from the base development plans or command, control, and management programs that required them, and the communications programs required a longer lead time. There was a reluctance to approve more than some unspecified absolute minimum of communications facilities needed to meet only the most urgent requirements. This approach resulted in a system with little built-in expansibility and questionable flexibility, which used more and more temporary expedients to cope with unprogrammed requirements or system casualties.

(C) CINCPAC believed that the cost of associated communications should be an integral part of the base plan or the command, control, and management concept it supported. He also believed the cost of engineering for future expansion and a moderate initial capability in excess of minimum need to be both reasonable and cost effective.


(C) There had been no indication at CINCPAC's Headquarters or the national level that lack of long-lines communications (as distinguished from air-ground or ground unit organic communications, etc.) had been a limiting factor in the planning or conduct of operations, or in management of material or personnel. Nevertheless, COMUSMACV and CINCPAC were convinced that the present programs were inadequate. The Secretary of Defense considered costs to be staggering and was reluctant to approve more until existing programs were proved in operation to be inadequate.

(C) In June 1967 COMUSMACV submitted to CINCPAC his requirements that constituted Phase IV of the IWCS; COMUSMACTHAI submitted his in July.¹ CINCPAC validated the major portion of both (reducing Vietnam requirements a greater amount than Thailand) and forwarded the recommendations to the JCS in August.² Cost was not determined but was expected to be several tens of millions.

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1. J6 History, Jun, Jul 67.
 2. Significant items not favorably considered by CINCPAC were: 120-voice channel submarine cables from Da Nang to Vung Tau and from Vung Tau to Sattahip and a 60-voice channel submarine cable from Nha Trang to Vung Tau, all paralleling the existing 60-channel cable. Significant items approved were a tropospheric scatter radio system Long Binh-Ban Me Thout-Pleiku to provide a north-south system via sites other than coastal bases; extension of the IWCS into Khe Sanh; establishment of a high capacity microwave axis Bang Pla-Khorat-Udorn and a high capacity microwave axis Warin-Khorat, the latter two systems to replace existing limited capacity tropospheric scatter systems.

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SOUTH VIETNAM IWCS - AREA I




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SOURCE: PACOM Digest, Feb 68, p. 61.

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THAILAND IWCS-AREA II



SOURCE: PACOM Digest, Feb 68, p. 60.

(C) In October the JCS instituted a change in the method to be used by CINCPAC in submitting his IWCS requirements.¹ He had been submitting then on a system basis, that is, a tropo system of 60 channel capacity between two specified locations. These were based on listings of specific circuit requirements but were not exactly tailored to the specific circuit list. The revised JCS direction required that only the circuit lists would be forwarded, with determination of system changes required to carry the validated circuits to be done in Washington.

(C) This procedural change had two major effects. One was that the validity of each circuit would have to be certified by so many people, the COMUSMACV or COMUSMACTHAI component command commander originating it, by COMUSMACV or COMUSMACTHAI, by CINCPAC, by the JCS, and by the Secretary of Defense. Approximately 5,000 circuits were listed as requirements in 1967. The second effect was that system configuration planning was taken from the operational commander and vested in the Defense Communications Agency in Washington.

(C) At the end of the year IWCS Phase IV was being held by the JCS without action pending review and re-submission by COMUSMACV and COMUSMACTHAI of their lists of individual circuit requirements.

Submarine Coastal Cable

(C) A 60-channel submarine cable became operational along the coast of South Vietnam and over to Thailand in May.² A first increment interconnected Da Nang, Qui Nhon, Nha Trang, and Vung Tau in Vietnam with Sattahip, Thailand. A second interconnected Qui Nhon, Cam Ranh Bay, and Vung Tau, all in Vietnam. Each cable head also interconnected with the Integrated Wideband Communications System and with satellite communications systems.

Secure Tactical Voice Communications

(S) CINCPAC had submitted urgent requirements to the JCS in August 1966 for a tactical short range radio secure voice capability for Southeast Asia.³ This system was to consist of KY-8, KY-28, and KY-38 wideband ciphony⁴ equipment.

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1. J6 History, Oct 67.
 2. J6 History, Mar, Dec 67.
 3. J6 Brief 00180-67, 13 Dec 67.
 4. Ciphony was a word coined from cipher and phonics and was used to describe sophisticated voice encryption techniques.

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(S) The original KY-28 requirement CINCPAC had submitted was for 7,546 sets.¹ The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Installations and Logistics was also concerned with the tactical secure voice equipment program for Southeast Asia, partly because of the urgent operational need for the equipment that had been described by CINCPAC. In October 1967, when requirements from the Services for KY-28 sets had grown to 10,884, the Assistant Secretary wanted to know if that number was necessary. CINCPAC therefore validated and justified the larger requirement.² The original submission in 1966, he said, was for equipment for a smaller force in Southeast Asia and it included no spares, maintenance floats, or training equipment. CINCPAC continued to monitor requirements among the Services and planned to monitor progress of the installation and implementation of the tactical secure voice capability.

Use of Secure Voice Equipment by RVNAF

(S) The loan of secure voice equipment to the Republic of Vietnam's Armed Forces (RVNAF) was suggested by COMUSMACV and recommended to the JCS by CINCPAC.³ CINCPAC recognized that Defense Department policy did not preclude release of specific communications security equipment to friendly governments, but that release approval was granted on a case-by-case basis by the US Communications Security Board based on the recommendations of the Director of the National Security Agency.

(S) CINCPAC noted to the JCS that Free World Military Assistance Forces (FWMAF) had been given permission to use US secure voice facilities where necessary for their missions in Vietnam. Foreign allies were integral to the operations in the MACV Joint Operations Center, and used the equipment there, but it was under the complete control of US personnel and the foreign allies did not view its internal workings or have access to the keying material.

(S) CINCPAC said the basic issue was whether it was better to risk foreknowledge by the enemy of forthcoming operations than to provide secure equipment to our allies, recognizing the possibility of imparting to friendly forces advanced technology in voice encryption techniques earlier than they could have learned them on their own. CINCPAC recommended the loan of secure voice equipment to selected RVNAF

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1. CINCPAC 112340Z Aug 66.
 2. J6 History, Dec 67.
 3. CINCPAC 211935Z Jul 67.

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and FWMAF elements subject to the condition that all maintenance would be by US personnel, that only US manufactured, controlled, and supplied keying material would be used, and that the degree of physical security for loaned equipment would be specified for each selected element's location.

~~(S)~~ It was decided in Washington not to grant approval to the whole concept, COMUSMACV was notified, and the matter was closed.¹

Communications Support for Korean Forces in Vietnam

~~(S)~~ In March CINCPAC approved action by COMUSMACV to provide a backup high frequency radio capability² for voice communications between Korean Forces in Vietnam and the Korean Army Headquarters in Seoul, Korea.³ CINCPAC asked COMUS Korea to provide similar or equal radio equipment for use in the Seoul terminal. This action constituted a change from the previous policy followed by CINCPAC in which communications service between Free World Military Assistance Forces and their home nations was provided by use of channels in the US Defense Communications System.

Message Traffic - Routing and Handling in Southeast Asia

~~(S)~~ Traffic flow patterns and circuit configurations in Southeast Asia were not such as to result in timely passing of messages, according to a February CINCPAC survey.⁴ A team of CINCPAC and CINCPACAF representatives therefore visited Southeast Asia to take on the spot corrective actions, mostly implementing previously formulated CINCPAC instructions. A special flag word routing indicator was inserted in messages destined for the JCS and CINCPAC. As a result, by 4 March, messages bearing the CINCPAC common use indicator had decreased from 65 percent of the traffic to 18 percent, while messages bearing a CINCPAC special operational traffic indicator had increased from only 35 percent to 82 percent of the traffic, greatly speeding message flow.

~~(S)~~ During this visit and subsequent visits the Joint Pacific (JP) Network circuits in Southeast Asia were reconfigured. JP circuits from

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1. J6 Brief 00132-67, 30 Aug 67.
 2. KWM-2 HF SSB equipment.
 3. J6 History, Mar 67.
 4. Ibid.

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the major relay at Kunia were terminated in several different facilities in the Saigon area. These circuits were consolidated into the new Air Force Command and Control relay at Tan Son Nhut Air Base. All tributaries (including Navy and Marine Corps JP circuits) within South Vietnam were fed into this relay and automatically processed to end locations. This greatly reduced misrouting and allowed direct flow of traffic to end locations. At the end of the year, 98 percent of all operational traffic was routed over the PACOM Joint Command and Control Network.

Improved Communications for SAC between Guam and Vietnam

(C) On 3 October CINCSAC asked CINCPAC for faster secure voice communications between the 3rd Air Division on Guam and the SAC Advanced Echelon in Vietnam. The matter had been discussed before and CINCPAC had provided SAC with a manual preempt capability¹ on an existing common user, long-haul conditioned circuit between the Joint Overseas Switchboards in Guam and Vietnam.² CINCSAC, however, still wanted a completely dedicated circuit. On 7 October CINCPAC again recommended command and control override on an existing common user circuit. CINCPAC said that completely dedicated circuitry could not be provided because of the shortage of high quality trunking in the PACOM.³ CINCSAC asked again for a dedicated circuit and CINCPAC referred the matter to the JCS, who, in November, directed that the CINCPAC solution be used.⁴ The Defense Communications Agency was tasked to provide SAC the secure voice capability by use of a common user circuit with command and control override.

Southeast Asia Integrated Tactical Air Control System

(C) The concept for the Southeast Asia Integrated Tactical Air Control System (SEAITACS) was approved by the JCS in May 1965. It provided for the integration of Military Assistance Program and US owned heavy radar and gap filler radar sites in South Vietnam and Thailand with associated communications links to comprise the air defense system. It was more than 80 percent complete by the end of 1967 and scheduled to be fully operational in 1969.⁵

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1. To be replaced by an auto-preempt capability when appropriate equipment was installed.
 2. J6 History, Mar 67.
 3. CINCPAC 070117Z Oct 67.
 4. J6 Brief 167/67, 15 Dec 67.
 5. J6 History, Dec 67.

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(S) Problems associated with one radar site programmed as part of the SEAITACS arose and were resolved in 1967. In February the Thai Government withdrew approval for construction of the Chiang Moi radar site at Doi Poi and suggested that another location be selected. The Air Force validated its need for a site somewhere in the area and eventually the Thai Government, the US Ambassador, COMUSMACTHAI, and CINCPAC approved selection of a site at Doi Inthanon. It was to be collocated with an Integrated Wideband Communications System site and was roughly scheduled for operation toward the end of 1969.¹

LORAN Equipment

(S) The Long Range Air Navigation (LORAN) system in Southeast Asia had become operational in 1966,² but equipment modifications were still in progress. In January 1967 CINCPAC recommended to the JCS that LORAN D avionics equipment be procured with a selective capability for both Universal Transverse Mercator (UTM) and latitude-longitude readouts to enhance close support operations by providing a common reference for ground and airborne users.³

(S) Earlier, the Department of the Army had planned to procure LORAN manpack receivers with a UTM readout. In March the Army advised that contractor proposals for UTM readout manpacks were unsatisfactory and asked whether receivers with only time difference readouts would be acceptable. CINCPAC replied that they would be, on an interim basis, but recommended continuing development of a common system to provide ground, vehicular small boat, and aircraft with selective capability for both UTM and latitude-longitude readout.⁴

COMUCMACV's Village-Hamlet Communications Study


(U) CINCPAC advised the JCS in December that the study completed by COMUSMACV on village-hamlet communications appeared responsive to the Defense Department requirement for such a study and that it offered a short-range solution for compatible communications between military and civil agencies.⁵ CINCPAC recommended, however, that

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1. J6 History, Jan-Mar, Jun, Jul 67.
 2. CINCPAC Command History, 1966, p. 696.
 3. J6 History, Jan, Feb 67.
 4. J6 History, Mar 67.
 5. J6 History, Dec 67.

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a study be undertaken to find a less costly, more feasible long-range solution than the one recommended by COMUSMACV, which was to provide additional amplitude modulated radios to military units for communications to civil agencies in the villages.


Monitoring MUSCLE SHOALS Sensors



~~(S)~~ Precise identification of the offending emitters was the hard part; when they were identified, corrective action could be taken. CINCPAC took the following actions in November. In Vietnam the National Police were being equipped with radios that could operate on the MUSCLE SHOALS sensor band, so CINCPAC asked COMUSMACV about the feasibility of having the police use only frequencies below the sensor operating range in the areas north of Da Nang. Sonobuoy transmissions in the Gulf of Tonkin had been picked up in the area where MUSCLE SHOALS aircraft would operate, so CINCPAC asked CINCPACFLT about the feasibility of excluding sonobuoy training within the problem area. CINCPACFLT agreed to exclude training there.² Non-tactical radios used in support of air base operations at Nakhon Phanom and Mukdahan were re-crystalized to new frequencies out of the sensor band. The head of the Defense Communications Planning Group, who had also been concerned with the problem, sent representatives to Thailand in early November to take tape recordings so that language specialists could locate and identify other sources of interference. CINCPACAF reported to CINCPAC in November that 22 of the 31 sensor channels were free of significant interference.

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1. J6 History, Nov 67.
 2. CINCPACFLT 171757Z Nov 67.

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1. J6 History, Jan, Feb 67.



SECTION VI - INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

(U) Some activities of the Intelligence Division staff in support of operations in Southeast Asia may also be discussed in Chapter I.

Automatic Data Processing

~~(S)~~ The CINCPAC staff worked to apply automatic data processing techniques to the collection and analysis of certain intelligence.¹ An Enemy Personnel Statistics System was developed to fully exploit narrative information contained in prisoner-returnee interrogation reports and captured documents. Selected data was extracted for data processing storage and retrieval.

~~(S)~~ An automated file was also developed to assist in determining the destructive capabilities of the Mark 36 Destructor.²

~~(S)~~ An enemy prisoner of war questionnaire was developed to ferret out and consolidate information relating to the effects and effectiveness of US air operations over North Vietnam.³

Statistics Standardization

~~(S)~~ A conference was held at CINCPAC's Headquarters on 6 February, by direction of the Chairman of the JCS, to standardize methods for developing and presenting statistics of enemy order of battle and infiltration trends in Vietnam.⁴ Attendees included representatives of the Secretary of Defense, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, the Central Intelligence Agency, COMUSMACV, and CINCPAC and his component command commanders. At the conference significant progress was made toward adoption of a standardized methodology throughout the intelligence community.

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1. J2 History, Dec 67.
 2. Ibid.
 3. Ibid.
 4. J2 History, Feb 67.

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Mapping, Charting, and Geodesy

~~(S)~~ South Vietnam was one of the best mapped countries in the world and certainly the best mapped country in which US Forces had ever been engaged.¹ Complete country coverage by the 1:25,000 scale pictomaps had been completed in 1966. Standard coverage by 1:50,000 scale topographic maps and 1:250,000 scale Joint Operations Graphics in both air and ground versions was complete and recent. Nevertheless, CINCPAC received continuing new requirements from COMUSMACV for new or modified products, which, after validation, were assigned to PACOM mapping elements or through the Defense Intelligence Agency to CONUS map and chart agencies.

~~(S)~~ New map or chart products introduced in 1967 included 1:12,500 scale pictomaps with hydrographic detail covering six Mobile Riverine Force base areas in the Mekong Delta area; 1:50,000 scale orthophoto mosaics with the LORAN C² lattice overprinted to facilitate operations in the MUSCLE SHOALS area; 1:100,000 scale topographic maps covering all of South Vietnam on 89 map sheets;³ and 12 new multicolor 1:50,000 scale hydrographic "field charts" produced on board a Navy survey ship in Vietnam from newly acquired data.⁴

~~(S)~~ The coasts of South Vietnam had complete naval combat chart coverage at 1:50,000 scale, produced during 1966 and 1967, but most of it was below standard in accuracy and completeness due to lack of modern surveys. To improve the charts and general knowledge of critical inshore coastal waters, all five hydrographic survey ships of the Navy had been operating in South Vietnam,⁵ and had completed soundings along the Delta coast, in the Nha Trang area, and between Da Nang and Hue. In June CINCPAC tasked COMUSMACV to delineate and assign priorities for hydrographic surveys on the West Coast of South Vietnam. CINCPAC concurred with those he recommended and validated them to the Defense Intelligence Agency, at the same time providing the Naval Oceanographic

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1. Briefing prepared by the Chief of the Intelligence Division's Mapping, Charting, and Geodesy Branch summarizing the activities of his branch in 1967.
 2. Long-range navigation.
 3. These were photo reductions of 1:50,000 maps reprinted at the smaller scale to retain detail but cover a larger area on one map sheet.
 4. The first such charts produced aboard ship since World War II.
 5. CINCPAC Command History, 1966, p. 774.

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Office with general guidance for hydrographic specifications for South Vietnam as had been requested.¹ Sounding operations on the West Coast began in October.

~~(S)~~ Aerial Survey Team 3 of the 1370th Photo Mapping Wing arrived in Vietnam in August on temporary duty in response to an urgent mapping requirement in support of MUSCLE SHOALS. Augmented by HIRAN² ground electronic stations, they accomplished various other photo acquisition and survey tasks. CINCPAC validated in September a COMUSMACV requirement for controlled aerial photography of South Vietnam to support Project WAYSIDE concepts and to revise 1:50,000 scale maps and 1:25,000 scale photomap supplements.³ The Defense Intelligence Agency therefore authorized extending the assignment of the survey team in Vietnam until December 1968 to obtain the necessary HIRAN-controlled aerial mapping photography and airborne geodetic trilateration data.

Photogrammetric Control for Artillery

~~(C)~~ Establishment of supplementary position control points by photogrammetric methods for artillery use in Vietnam had been suggested by COMUSMACV. The Defense Intelligence Agency had said that results of the system exceeded the capabilities of the weapons systems involved. CINCPAC then tasked COMUSMACV and CINCUSARPAC for further tests and evaluations of the technique over standard artillery control methods.⁴ Field tests in Vietnam proved the validity of the method and CINCPAC validated the requirement to the Defense Intelligence Agency in August.⁵

~~(C)~~ New HIRAN-controlled aerial cartographic photography for all of South Vietnam was being obtained by the 1370th Photo Mapping Wing and a prototype format for publication of the required data was being developed by a joint effort by CINCPAC, CINCUSARPAC, COMUSMACV, and the CG, USARV.

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1. J2 History, Jun 67.
 2. High precision short-range navigation.
 3. J2 History, Sep 67.
 4. J2 History, Mar 67.
 5. J2 History, Aug 67.

Magnetic Anomaly Survey

(S) CINCPAC validated and sent to the Defense Intelligence Agency in June a magnetic anomaly survey requirement for South Vietnam.¹ The survey, as stated by COMUSMACV, was required on a country-wide basis to establish the existence or non-existence of magnetic anomalies, followed by a fine grain survey to determine necessary magnetic corrections if and wherever anomalies existed. The data was urgently required in support of COMPASS DART operations of the 7th Air Force. The Defense Intelligence Agency accepted the requirement and tasked the Navy to accomplish it using a Project MAGNET aircraft under the technical control of the Navy's Oceanographic Office.


Tactical VFR Chart and Tactical Aerodrome Directory

(U) COMUSMACV had stated and CINCPAC had validated requirements for a tactical visual flight rules chart and a tactical aerodrome directory. Differences arising from a Defense Intelligence Agency review were resolved at CINCPAC's Headquarters at a June conference. At that time the agency validated both products, the visual flight rules chart to be produced by the Air Force's Aeronautical Chart and Information Center and the aerodrome directory by a subordinate element of that agency in Hawaii.²

Vietnam-Cambodia Border Areas Marked on Maps

(U) COMUSMACV established military operational boundaries for several disputed areas along the South Vietnam-Cambodia boundary.³ They were overprinted on existing map stocks.

Thailand Maps and Mapping




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1. J2 History, Jun 67.
 2. Ibid.
 3. J2 History, Apr 67.
 4. J2 History, Jun 67.



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1. J2 History, Feb, Mar 67.



of 10 officers and a decrease of 10 enlisted personnel from the previous JTD. One officer and two enlisted were transferred to the Hq USMACV staff to establish a Systems Analysis Office.¹ This action reduced the JTD to a total of 490 as of 8 December. On 5 October COMUSMACV requested revision of the JTD to delete 29 spaces from the original 493.² The JCS approved the reduction leaving a total of 464 spaces authorized as of 15 December.³

Naval Advisory Group

(U) On 24 January COMUSMACV submitted a JTD for the Naval Advisory Group with a recommended increase of 18 spaces.⁴ The JCS approved a total of 518 spaces, three less than requested.⁵ As of 8 December the strength was 518.⁶

ARVN Military Assistance

(U) On 4 March CINCPAC submitted to the JCS a revised JTD for ARVN Military Assistance totaling 222 spaces.⁷ JCS approval was received in April.⁸ COMUSMACV requested on 20 June a transfer of 142 spaces, 141 from the Field Advisory Element JTD, one from Headquarters, COMUSMACV, and an addition of seven spaces for a commissary advisory function.⁹ The JCS approved the increase in November.¹⁰ These actions brought the JTD total to 371 as of 16 December.

MAC Studies and Observation Group

(U) Authorized strength of the MACSOG JTD remained at 260 throughout the year.¹¹

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1. JCS 042119Z Dec 67.
 2. USMACV ltr, 5 Oct 67, Subj: AF ADV GP JTD.
 3. JCS 151551Z Dec 67.
 4. USMACV ltr 24 Jan 67, Subj: Naval Advisory Group JTD.
 5. JCS 281648Z Apr 67.
 6. JCS Manpower Summary, 8 Dec 67.
 7. CINCPAC ltr Ser 989, 4 Mar 67.
 8. JCS 031636Z Apr 67.
 9. COMUSMACV ltr, 20 Jun 67.
 10. JCS 141452Z Dec 67.
 11. JCS Manpower Summaries, 1967.

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Field Advisory Elements, USMACV

(U) On 11 February COMUSMACV submitted a revised JTD for FY 68 reflecting a total requirement of 5,669 spaces for Field Advisory Elements. This represented an increase of 233 spaces.¹ CINCPAC recommended approval.² In April COMUSMACV requested an additional 692 spaces to augment the Revolutionary Development Program.³ The JCS approved a total of 5,879, which represented approval of the original 233 increase and 215 of the later request.⁴ These increases were added to a base of 5,431, which was 5 less than the base used by COMUSMACV in developing the proposed JTD submitted in February. COMUSMACV submitted emergency changes under Program 5 for an additional 2,823 spaces during November.⁵ The JCS approved a total of 8,543 spaces on 29 December.⁶

Armed Forces Radio and Television Service

(U) Authorized strength of the Armed Forces Radio and Television Service JTD remained at 161 throughout the year.⁷

Joint US Public Affairs Office

(U) On 4 March CINCPAC submitted to the JCS a proposed JTD for the Joint US Public Affairs Office (JUSPAO) totaling 41 spaces.⁸ The JCS approved 36 spaces of the 41 requested.⁹ On 14 April COMUSMACV submitted a new proposed JTD totaling 116 spaces,¹⁰ which the JCS approved in October.¹¹ This increased requirement was generated by the need for JUSPAO support of the Revolutionary Development Program.

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1. USMACV ltr, 11 Feb 67, Subj: JTD FAE, USMACV.
 2. CINCPAC 230448Z May 67.
 3. USMACV ltr, 26 Apr 67, Subj: JTD FAE, USMACV.
 4. JCS 122126Z Jul 67.
 5. COMUSMACV 210210Z Nov 67; COMUSMACV 290155Z Nov 67.
 6. JCS 292048Z Dec 67.
 7. JCS Manpower Summaries, 1967.
 8. CINCPAC ltr Ser 990, 4 Mar 67.
 9. JCS 171851Z Apr 67.
 10. USMACV ltr, 14 Apr 67.
 11. JCS 172059Z Oct 67.

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Advance Research Projects Agency

(U) On 4 March CINCPAC submitted to the JCS a revised JTD totaling 14 spaces,¹ which the JCS approved in May.² A manpower survey conducted by CINCPAC during November reflected a requirement for 15 spaces including 12 military, one US civilian, and two Local Nationals. The matter was pending at the end of the year.

USMACV Manpower Management Survey

(U) In July the JCS directed CINCPAC to conduct a manpower management study of the Headquarters USMACV staff, the Advance Research Projects Agency, ARVN Military Assistance, the Joint US Public Affairs Office, and the Armed Forces Radio and Television Service.³ CINCPAC issued implementing instructions.⁴ Phase I of the study consisted of an orientation conducted in-country from 1 thru 10 July, followed by a planning conference held at CINCPAC's headquarters at Camp Smith in August. The orientation phase was concluded with a briefing of COMUSMACV's staff on 31 October. Phase II, the work measurement phase, was conducted from 1 through 15 November. Phase III, the analysis phase, was conducted from 17 through 30 November.

(U) A team composed of 16 Army, 15 Air Force, and 3 Navy personnel conducted the study. They collected over 297,000 random observations and conducted over 300 formal and 400 informal interviews. The team consisted of a Flag Officer and senior officers from each functional area to review random sampling data and manpower recommendations on the spot in order to apply the required judgement factors to the statistical data. The senior CINCPAC representative interviewed the chief of each staff agency to determine the impact survey recommendations would have on each staff section. As a result of an evaluation of the statistical data, staff recommendations, and leadership interviews, the majority of survey reclama actions were solved on the spot. Approximately 3,000 manpower billets were evaluated in 26 USMACV staff agencies.

(U) The survey team validated 1,944 spaces in Headquarters, USMACV, which had a JTD of 1,988 spaces. Survey results were still under study by the CINCPAC staff at the end of the year.

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1. CINCPAC ltr Ser 988, 4 Mar 67.
 2. JCS 191450Z May 67.
 3. JCSM 524-67, 26 Jul 67, CPRS 00436-67.
 4. CINCPAC Note 005042, 11 Sep 67.

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Merged USMACTHAI/JUSMAGTHAI JTD

(C) After the Secretary of Defense had approved the organizational merger of the two staffs, COMUSMACTHAI/CHJUSMAGTHAI had proposed a 1 July 1966 JTD of 1,097 spaces for his organization, a proposal that was approved by CINCPAC and forwarded to the JCS on 12 March 1966.¹ This represented an increase of 334 spaces over the separate 1965 JTDs for the two organizations.² In August the Secretary of Defense asked for a review of the increased spaces requested for possible savings and reductions. COMUSMACTHAI therefore recommended a reduction of 168 spaces, which included 16 spaces for the Vietnam R&R program. CINCPAC restored those R&R spaces and on 8 October 1966 forwarded to the JCS a recommendation for approval of 945 spaces, a reduction of 152 from his original recommendation.

(C) On 18 March 1967 CINCPAC requested JCS support in obtaining early approval of the proposed JTD for the merged USMACTHAI/JUSMAGTHAI headquarters.³ The proposed JTD was for 1 July 1966, but it had not yet been approved. In reply, the Chairman of the JCS stated that the Secretary of Defense had returned the document to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Systems Analysis for additional information on 10 March and that the information was being prepared within the Secretary's office.⁴

(C) Meanwhile, pending approval of the JTD, the expedient of assigning temporary duty (TDY) personnel to support critical requirements continued.⁵ Early in the year CINCPAC's component command commanders, supported by the Services, had provided 37 replacement personnel for 180 days TDY.

(C) During June it again became necessary to replace TDY personnel while waiting for approval of the JTD and 24 personnel were provided by the same means.⁶

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1. CINCPAC ltr ser 00417, 12 Mar 66.
 2. Point Paper J12, 15 Sep 67.
 3. CINCPAC 180454Z Mar 67; CINCPAC Command History, 1966, p 468.
 4. JCS 1341/301528Z Mar 67.
 5. CINCPAC Command History, 1966, p 469.
 6. CINCPAC 140438Z Jun 67.

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(U) (S) In July 1967 the Secretary of Defense and the JCS approved a total of 828 manpower spaces for the FY 68 USMACTHAI/JUSMAGTHAI JTD and requested submission of a new manpower document.¹ These were the first firm manpower spaces approved for USMACTHAI/JUSMAGTHAI since the 1 July 1965 JTDs and increased by only 65 spaces the 1 July 1965 authorizations for the two organizations before their merger.

(S) On 28 September CINCPAC forwarded a Joint Manpower Program to the JCS recommending approval of billets for 369 officers, 361 enlisted personnel, 12 US civilians, and 86 local wage rate personnel for a total of 828.² The JCS approved it on 13 October.³

(S) On 11 November 1967, COMUSMACTHAI alerted CINCPAC regarding areas where assistance would be required to support the proposed enlarged Royal Thai Army force to South Vietnam.⁴ Immediate personnel requirements to augment the Army Advisory Group, Bangkok staff were six officers and one enlisted. In addition, 9 officers and 13 enlisted were required as field advisors to the force. This request was forwarded to the JCS on 1 December 1967.⁵

DEPCHJUSMAGTHAI JTD

(S) The Joint Manpower Program (JMP) for 1 July 1967 for the DEPCHJUSMAGTHAI was forwarded to the JCS on 12 January 1967. CINCPAC requested early approval of 103 military billets, 6 US civilians, and 175 local wage rate personnel.⁶ In addition, billets for 108 military, 2 US civilians, and 3 local wage rate personnel were recommended for the "Channel for Support of Attaches." These manning requirements were being met through a combination of permanently assigned and temporary duty personnel until fully qualified permanently assigned personnel were available to fill each position. On 8 April, a second request was forwarded to the JCS requesting approval of two additional Army billets and extension of the JMP through FY 69.⁷ On 10 April the JCS approved the original submission of 12 January.⁸

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1. JCS 1226/131406Z Jul 67.
 2. CINCPAC ltr 5320 ser 01046, 28 Sep 67.
 3. JCS 8882/132134Z Oct 67.
 4. COMUSMACTHAI 110600Z Nov 67.
 5. CINCPAC 010434Z Dec 67.
 6. CINCPAC ltr 5300 ser 0056, 12 Jan 67.
 7. CINCPAC 080341Z Apr 67.
 8. JCS 2382/102237Z Apr 67.

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4 (S) In July, the Secretary of Defense requested immediate action to establish a US civilian billet for an assistant to Mr. Peer DeSilva, whose title would be Special Assistant for Counterinsurgency.¹ This position was established and filled by Mr. John Eisenhower.

(S) On 3 August the JCS approved the increase requested by CINCPAC on 8 April.²

Service Responsibility for Manning Positions of COMUSMACTHAI/
JUSMAGTHAI and DEPCHJUSMAGTHAI

(U) The JCS requested CINCPAC's views on Service affiliation of the replacement COMUSMACTHAI/JUSMAGTHAI upon reassignment of Major General Stilwell in the summer of 1967.³ CINCPAC recommended and the JCS approved that the COMUSMACTHAI/JUSMAGTHAI position continue to be manned by an Army General Officer.⁴ Major General Hal D. McCown, USA, assumed duties as COMUSMACTHAI/JUSMAGTHAI in early July.⁵

(U) In June CINCPAC recommended to the JCS that the Army continue to man the DEPCHJUSMAGTHAI position.⁶ The JCS approved the recommendation in August 1967.⁷

Southeast Asia Benefits

(S) CINCPAC continued to be concerned about inequities in the various financial benefits authorized for certain military personnel in Southeast Asia. In January the JCS advised CINCPAC⁸ that the Secretary of Defense had under study a CINCPAC request that the combat zone income tax exemption be extended to personnel in Laos and certain personnel (members of combat flying crews) in Thailand.⁹ In March CINCPAC again spoke of

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1. SECDEF 9711/06153Z Jul 67.
 2. JCS 2946/031438Z Aug 67.
 3. JCS 4923/282018Z Jan 67.
 4. CINCPAC 080404Z Feb 67 (SSO).
 5. COMUSMACTHAI 101205Z Jul 67.
 6. CINCPAC 142030Z Jun 67 and JCS Memo SM-508-66 of 25 Jun 66.
 7. JCS 3302/081907Z Aug 67.
 8. JCS 3554/131618Z Jan 67.
 9. CINCPAC Command History, 1966, p 787.

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inequities in benefits among US personnel in Southeast Asia who faced combat conditions.¹ He recommended that all personnel who received hostile fire pay should also receive the combat zone tax exemption, the \$50 customs exemption for mailed gifts, and free mailing privileges.

~~(S)~~ In May CINCPAC recommended that all military personnel stationed in Thailand, whether receiving hostile fire pay or not, be entitled to the tax and custom exemptions and free mailing privileges.² The JCS recommended that an appropriate executive order be issued to provide these privileges to all personnel in Laos and Thailand.³

~~(S)~~ In June the Department of the Army proposed that personnel from Laos visit Thailand once a month to make them eligible to obtain the benefits without the requirement for publication of a classified executive order.⁴ CINCPAC replied to the JCS⁵ that this solution was not feasible or justifiable and recommended establishment of administrative procedures to expand the fringe benefits to personnel in Laos. In late June the JCS quoted the Deputy Secretary of Defense who stated that the Secretary of the Air Force had been tasked with the preparation of proper legal instruments to extend the benefits to all personnel in Laos and Thailand.⁶

~~(S)~~ At the end of the year, benefits were still diverse and were authorized as follows. All personnel stationed in South Vietnam received hostile fire pay, the combat zone tax exemption, a \$50 customs exemption for mailed gifts, and free mailing privileges. Personnel who flew tactical sorties over North Vietnam, or South Vietnam from bases outside of Vietnam, received combat zone tax exemption and hostile fire pay. Personnel who transited Vietnam received only combat zone tax exemption. All personnel stationed in Laos received hostile fire pay only, as did personnel who flew tactical sorties over Laos. Action to provide additional benefits to all personnel in Laos and Thailand was still awaited by CINCPAC at the end of the year.

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1. CINCPAC 240318 Mar 67.
 2. CINCPAC 022222Z May 67.
 3. JCS 4642/061858Z May 67.
 4. DA 817705/022148Z Jun 67.
 5. CINCPAC 152231Z Jun 67.
 6. JCS 8348/201937Z Jun 67.

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~~(S)~~ In the matter of awards and decorations, CINCPAC disapproved a COMUSMACTHAI request to award the Armed Forces Expeditionary Medal to personnel who had served in Thailand since May 1962.¹

~~(S)~~ In January the JCS disapproved a CINCPAC request that all military personnel stationed in Laos after 1 January 1966 be awarded the Armed Forces Expeditionary Medal.²

~~(S)~~ In October the US Army Attache, Laos pointed out to CINCPAC that Air Force personnel in Laos were authorized to receive the Vietnam Campaign and Service Medals.³ CINCPAC recommended that these awards also be given to Army and Navy personnel in Laos.⁴ This request was approved by the JCS in November.⁵

Rest and Recuperation

~~(S)~~ At the beginning of 1967, nine major rest and recuperation (R&R) sites were in use with the following numbers of personnel authorized to visit them at any one time.⁶

| | |
|--------------|-------|
| Bangkok | 747 |
| Hawaii | 942 |
| Hong Kong | 747 |
| Kuala Lumpur | 166 |
| Manila | 300 |
| Penang | 166 |
| Singapore | 166 |
| Taipei | 747 |
| Tokyo | 1,000 |

In addition to these nine major sites, a supplemental program was conducted by the III Marine Amphibious Force to Okinawa on a space available basis,⁷ and Guam became a limited R&R site for US Servicemen of Guamanian origin effective 1 January.⁸

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1. CINCPAC Command History, 1966, p 782; CINCPAC ltr ser 01310, 28 Dec 66.
 2. JCS 3554/131618Z Jan 67; CINCPAC Command History, 1966, p 781.
 3. USARMA Laos 834/160830Z Oct 67.
 4. CINCPAC 270059Z Oct 67.
 5. JCS 3295/211735Z Nov 67.
 6. CINCPAC 180034Z Feb 67.
 7. CINCPAC 070548Z Feb 67.
 8. CINCPAC Command History, 1966, p 777.

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(U) All major R&R sites were being supported by Military Airlift Command commercial contract carriers except Manila, and CINCPAC had directed CINCPACAF to provide military airlift to support the Manila requirement until he received approval to use Military Airlift Command contract carriers.¹ The JCS advised in December that negotiations for contract carrier landing rights at Manila would be suspended until the political climate was more favorable.²

(S) CINCPAC took action as necessary during 1967 to insure that the FY 67 objective of 250,000 completed R&R trips was accomplished and to insure that the requirement for 400,000 R&R trips estimated by COMUSMACV for FY 68 could be met.³

(S) He approved increases in the maximum number of personnel authorized to visit the major sites listed as follows:⁴

| | | |
|-----------|-------|--|
| Bangkok | 996 | Effective 1 April |
| Hong Kong | 830 | Effective 1 March |
| | 996 | Effective 1 August |
| Penang | 249 | Effective 1 July |
| Singapore | 300 | Effective the date accommodations and airlift became available. |
| Taipei | 830 | Effective 1 April |
| Hawaii | 1,570 | Effective 1 April, but hotel accommodations limited daily use of Hawaii to a maximum of 1,458 ⁵ personnel during the main tourist months. Approval was granted to increase to 1,685 during April, May, June, September, October and November 1968. ⁶ |

(S) Based on a survey team report on the desirability of establishing R&R sites in Australia, CINCPAC in May requested that the JCS approve

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1. CINCPAC 250434Z Jan 67.
 2. JCS 4985/122308Z Dec 67.
 3. COMUSMACV 031001Z Feb 67.
 4. CINCPAC 010416Z Mar 67; CINCPAC 120105Z May 67; CINCPAC 200227Z Jan 67; COMUSTDC 130116Z Dec 66; CINCPAC 302040Z Oct 66.
 5. CINCUSARPAC 11111/222248Z Apr 67.
 6. CINCPAC 190313Z Dec 67; CINCPAC 190312Z Dec 67.

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implementation of R&R to Sydney on 1 September and expansion of the program to the Gold Coast area¹ as demand and experience caused a need for further increase.² Action was taken through State Department channels to obtain the approval of the Government of Australia to implement the R&R program and the US Ambassador in Canberra advised on 3 August that Australia had approved the plan.³ CINCPAC charged his representative in the Philippines⁴ with the responsibility for budgeting and administering the Australian R&R program.⁵ R&R to Sydney began on 3 October and the reception and hospitality extended R&R participants was warm and enthusiastic.⁶ CINCPAC's November review of the projected R&R program determined that the Gold Coast R&R site would not be needed unless unforeseen contingencies developed.⁷

(S) These CINCPAC actions allowed the FY 67 objective of 250,000 R&R trips to be exceeded by 22,319 trips,⁸ and allowed enough flexibility in overall daily authorized program capacities to insure that COMUSMACV's FY 68 requirements (400,000) could be met.⁹

(U) Several additional significant events took place in the R&R program during 1967. With a view toward increasing the morale of the US Forces in Vietnam who would be taking R&R in Hawaii, CINCPAC requested that the Commanding Officer of the Military Airlift Command determine the possibility of obtaining reduced commercial airline fares for wives traveling from CONUS to Hawaii to meet their husbands.¹⁰ This request resulted in the commercial airlines allowing wives of R&R personnel to fly from the West Coast of the CONUS to Hawaii and return at a 25 percent reduced fare beginning 24 June.¹¹

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1. A surfing area, about 30 miles south of Brisbane; the principal town was Surfers Paradise.
 2. CINCPAC 020326Z May 67.
 3. AMEMB Canberra 527/030707Z Aug 67.
 4. His staff was larger and therefore he could handle the program better than CINCPAC's Representative in Australia.
 5. CINCPAC 081912Z Aug 67.
 6. COMUSMACV 35490/280926Z Oct 67.
 7. CINCPAC 192221Z Nov 67.
 8. CINCPAC 080240Z Jul 67.
 9. COMUSMACV 35490/280926Z Oct 67.
 10. CINCPAC 080417Z Mar 67.
 11. COMAC 20345/011557Z Jun 67.

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(C) In May the JCS requested CINCPAC's comments on a proposal to establish R&R centers in Ceylon and India. ¹ CINCPAC's reply pointed out that it did not appear practicable or desirable to establish R&R sites at these locations because of their limited capability to support an adequate program and the area's lack of appeal to Servicemen. ²

(C) In late November the JCS advised that the Secretary of Defense had requested that the planned FY 68 R&R participation to Hawaii (7,290 per month) be reconsidered with a view toward increasing the program to the maximum the available facilities would support in order to take full advantage of balance of payment benefits. ³ CINCPAC requested CINCUSARPAC to determine if any monthly increases could be accommodated in Hawaii and requested COMUSMACV's comments. ⁴ COMUSMACV replied that the increase was dependent on available accommodations and troop desire, and that the latter could only be determined by time and experience. In view of the time factor, he recommended that no increase be undertaken during the third quarter of FY 68 and pointed out that fourth quarter expansion should only be made if it could be included in December planning of fourth quarter requirements. ⁵ A CINCPAC review indicated that Hawaii R&R participation could be increased during April, May, June, September, October, and November 1968, and CINCPAC directed that COMUSMACV increase the Hawaii R&R level to an on-ground daily strength of 1,685 during this period. ⁶

(C) The US Ambassador in Kuala Lumpur recommended on 24 November that Penang R&R flights be cancelled until further notice because of mass demonstrations and violence throughout the city. ⁷ COMUSMACV diverted Penang bound flights to other sites and requested permission to exceed the approved daily 996 on-ground level at Bangkok for the period from 1 December through 10 December, which was granted. ⁸ Normal R&R flights to Penang were restored on 11 December. ⁹

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1. JCS 4496/051553Z May 67.
 2. CINCPAC 120407Z May 67.
 3. JCS 3828/282216Z Nov 67.
 4. CINCPAC 010208Z Dec 67.
 5. COMUSMACV 40629/051126Z Dec 67.
 6. CINCPAC 190313Z Dec 67; CINCPAC 190312Z Dec 67.
 7. AMEMB KUALA LUMPUR 1995/240529Z Nov 67.
 8. COMUSMACV 38529/250859Z and 38757/280710Z Nov 67; CINCPAC 282106Z Nov 67; COMUSMACTHAI 290308Z Nov 67; CINCPAC 292106Z Nov 67; COMUSMACV 40167/011142Z Dec 67; COMUSMACTHAI 020528Z Dec 67.
 9. AMEMB KUALA LUMPUR 2113/010602Z and 2220/110856Z Dec 67.

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(U) ~~(S)~~ In July the Secretary of the Air Force recommended to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower that the current R&R program be extended to include US combat aircrews stationed in Thailand and that an in-country R&R program be established for all non-combat personnel who were serving in Thailand on unaccompanied tours. In response to an inquiry, CINCPAC forwarded his comments on the Secretary of the Air Force proposal.¹ On 9 November the JCS advised that R&R for Thailand and Laos based aircrews regularly engaged in flying combat missions was approved for implementation but that an R&R program for non-combat personnel was disapproved.² CINCPAC in turn directed COMUSMACV, in coordination with COMUSMACTHAI, CINCPACAF, and the DEPCHJUSMAGTHAI to develop a plan to implement the R&R program for Thailand and Laos based aircrews.³ As of 31 December this plan had not been forwarded to CINCPAC.

(U) ~~(S)~~ In response to a request from the JCS, CINCPAC commented on a Secretary of Defense position that all R&R transportation provided to Australian Forces in Vietnam taking R&R in Australia would be non-reimbursable, but that transportation to other sites and all transportation provided New Zealanders from Vietnam would be reimbursable.⁴ CINCPAC concurred with the COMUSMACV position that the disadvantages involved would greatly outweigh the advantages to be gained from providing any R&R transportation for Australian and New Zealand Forces on a reimbursable basis and recommended reconsideration of the Secretary's position.⁵ The Secretary, however, agreed with his Deputy Assistant for East Asia and Pacific Affairs, and directed that transportation provided for Australian Forces taking R&R to sites other than in Australia and all R&R transportation provided for New Zealand Forces be on a reimbursable basis.⁶ CINCPAC directed COMUSMACV to implement this direction by the Secretary of Defense.⁷

(U) COMUSMACV advised that Royal Thai Forces in Vietnam would be eligible for participation in the out-of-country R&R program and that in accordance with existing military and financial working arrangements, all US R&R transportation support would be on a non-reimbursable basis.

1. CINCPAC 252009Z Sep 67.
2. JCS 2493/092240Z Nov 67.
3. CINCPAC 112051Z Nov 67.
4. JCS 2199/252116Z and 9582/052052Z Jul 67.
5. COMUSMACV 28937/310101Z Aug 67; CINCPAC 022046Z Sep 67.
6. JCS 8881/132133Z Oct 67.
7. CINCPAC 170250Z Oct 67.

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USMACV Tour Extension Plan

~~(S)~~ A plan to establish minimum two year tours for selected key MACV command, staff, and advisory officers was proposed in 1966.¹ CINCPAC received a comprehensive Tour Extension Plan from COMUSMACV on 24 February in which the key officers were offered two options. They might elect to accept the assignment of government quarters for their families at Clark Air Base in the Philippines and to exercise leave entitlement under the provisions of Public Law 89-735 for periodic family visits, or they might elect to accept an option that authorized leave to CONUS or some other area of selection under the provisions of the same Public Law.²

~~(S)~~ CINCPAC asked his component command commanders to comment on the plan.³ Each concurred and indicated that no morale problems were anticipated as the result of its implementation. CINCPACFLT qualified his concurrence with the comment that the plan appeared to offer a morale inducement only to those who volunteered for tour extension.⁴

~~(S)~~ Few officers selected the Clark Air Base housing option; therefore, the plan was held at CINCPAC pending receipt of a housing utilization agreement between COMUSMACV and the Commander, 13th Air Force.⁵ When this agreement was received on 11 May, the plan was modified accordingly and submitted to the JCS on 12 May.⁶

~~(S)~~ The US Ambassador in Manila was unable to obtain coverage for families of the MACV officers under the Military Bases Agreement and suggested that this coverage be obtained through the expedient of assigning the sponsors to Clark Air Base with duty station in Vietnam.⁷ CINCPAC recommended this measure to the JCS and received approval in June.⁸

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1. CINCPAC Command History, 1966, p. 782.
 2. COMUSMACV ltr MACJ1, 19 Feb 67.
 3. CINCPAC ltr ser 0239, 28 Feb 67.
 4. CINCPACFLT spdltr ser 7/0501R, 6 Mar 67.
 5. COMUSMACV 10682/310629Z Mar 67.
 6. CINCPAC ltr ser 0536, 12 May 67.
 7. AMEMB Manila 12904/240409Z Jun 67.
 8. JCS 9371/302238Z Jun 67.

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~~(S)~~ The plan was approved by the Secretary of Defense on 26 September. He limited to 12 USMACV families, within the overall total of 100, the number allowed to relocate to Clark Air Base housing before 1 January 1968.¹ CINCPAC requested removal of the 12 family ceiling and the restrictions on the time period in which the special 30-day leave under Public Law 89-735 could be granted.²

~~(S)~~ The JCS advised that it was the decision of the Secretary of Defense to allow the provisions of Public Law 89-735 and the 1967 ceiling of 12 USMACV families to remain in effect. The JCS further advised that 1967 requirements for Clark Air Base quarters in excess of the 12 authorized would be processed on a case-by-case basis.³

US Personnel Missing and Taken Prisoner

~~(S)~~ Information concerning US personnel missing or taken prisoner in South Vietnam, in North Vietnam, and Laos remained extremely sketchy.

~~(S)~~ By the end of 1967, 648 US personnel had been reported as missing over North Vietnam. Intelligence sources indicated that 209 of those US Servicemen were being held prisoner there. In South Vietnam 173 had been reported as missing in action, of which only 19 were known to have been captured (see the accompanying table). In Laos there were 52 missing, two of whom were confirmed as captured. Five US personnel were missing over China and one of those had been confirmed as captured.⁴

~~(S)~~ In February the Viet Cong released two US soldiers, Private (E-2) Charles E. Crafts and Sergeant (E-5) Sammie Norman Womack,⁵ in South Vietnam.

~~(S)~~ In November the National Liberation Front (the political arm of the Viet Cong) released three US Army enlisted personnel, Sergeants Daniel L. Pitzer, Edward R. Johnson, and James E. Jackson, Jr.⁶ The release was effected through Cambodia, but the subjects were not turned over to US authorities until they reached Algiers. Preliminary reports indicated that they had not been brainwashed, and their debriefing continued.

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1. JCS 7313/262151Z Sep 67.
 2. CINCPAC 070250Z Oct 67.
 3. JCS 4251/021714Z Dec 67.
 4. Compiled by CINCPAC from Department of Defense Statistics.
 5. AMEMB SAIGON 18725/230913Z Feb 67.
 6. AMEMB SAIGON 10333/031040Z Nov 67.

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US Forces - Missing in Action,
 Captured or Interned, and
 Non-Hostile Missing

1 January 1961 through 31 December 1967

| | South Vietnam | | | North Vietnam | | | Laos | | | China | | |
|--------------|---------------|------|-----|---------------|------|-----|------|------|-----|-------|------|-----|
| | MIA | CPTR | NHM | MIA | CPTR | NHM | MIA | CPTR | NHM | MIA | CPTR | NHM |
| Army | 64 | 9 | 24 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Navy | 5 | 0 | 0 | 80 | 107 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 4 | 0 | 0 |
| Marine Corps | 56 | 5 | 0 | 11 | 5 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Air Force | 29 | 5 | 0 | 348 | 97 | 0 | 47 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 |
| 823 Total | 154 | 19 | 24 | 439 | 209 | 0 | 50 | 2 | 0 | 4 | 1 | 0 |

Total Missing in Action: 647
 Total Captured: 231
 Total Non-Hostile Missing: 24

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Communist Prisoners of War

(S) In January CINCPAC took action to clarify categorization of Communist prisoners. This action was based upon an apparent disparity of statistics. CINCPAC requested COMUSMACV's comments on the move toward prisoner reclassification.¹ COMUSMACV replied that the problems were recognized and that continuing action was being taken.² An intelligence conference convened at Camp Smith in February, and attended by representatives of the Secretary of Defense, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, CINCPAC, COMUSMACV, and other agencies, determined that in all subsequent reporting only enemy personnel confined in Army of (South) Vietnam (ARVN) prisoner of war (PW) camps would be counted as PW.

(S) A need for a camp to imprison North Vietnamese Army and "hard core" Viet Cong PW was recognized in an April JCS-COMUSMACV study. As a result, an off-shore PW camp on Phu Quoc Island was constructed. Initial capacity of this camp was 2,000 but it was to be expanded to an ultimate capacity for 10,000.³

(S) As of 31 December the number of PW in ARVN PW camps was 9,743, located as follows:⁴

| | III MAF | I Corps | II Corps | III Corps | IV Corps | Phu Quoc |
|--------------------------------------|------------|------------|-------------|--------------|-------------|----------|
| Normal capacity | | 2,000 | 3,000 | 2,000 | 2,000 | 2,000 |
| With minor in- camp modifications | | 2,500 | 4,000 | 2,500 | 2,500 | 2,500 |
| Present occupancy | 17 | 1,438 | 1,683 | 1,952 | 1,736 | 2,917 |

(S) Continuing effort had been expended in rescreening prisoners to properly classify them as PW, civil dependents, or innocent civilians. In July COMUSMACV reported that these efforts had found that 322 inmates carried as PW were in effect civil dependents.⁵ The Secretary of State directed that no transfers be made until classification methods were

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1. CINCPAC 200216Z Jan 67.
 2. COMUSMACV 261240Z Jan 67.
 3. COMUSMACV 090851Z Apr 67.
 4. COMUSMACV 101240Z Nov 67.
 5. COMUSMACV 111219Z Jul 67.

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clarified and approved. He subsequently agreed to the rescreening with the following provisions: (1) captives should initially be held as suspects until a determination was made; (2) members of the North Vietnamese Army and Main Force Viet Cong units should be treated as PW even though not engaged in belligerent acts when captured; and (3) screening teams should reclassify as innocent civilians those captives about whom reasonable suspicion of criminal activity did not exist.

~~(S)~~ The rescreening continued. At the end of 1967 it appeared that there were no major problems concerning enemy PW. CINCPAC continued to monitor this matter to insure that the treatment of enemy PW was in accord with international agreements.

US Casualties - 1967

(U) The numbers of US personnel killed, wounded, and missing in action in Southeast Asia during 1967 are shown in the accompanying tables.

Special Service Support to Korean Units in Vietnam

~~(S)~~ During the visit of President Johnson to Korea in October 1966 an offer was made to provide additional special service support to Korean units in Vietnam. A plan was prepared by the Koreans and forwarded to CINCPAC by COMUS Korea.¹ CINCPAC replied that the plan appeared to be ambitious and requested that it be coordinated between COMUS Korea and COMUSMACV prior to the forwarding of a final plan to CINCPAC.² A COMUS Korea study and a COMUSMACV plan were then transmitted to CINCPAC on 5 May.³ As CINCPAC had to submit a detailed plan to the JCS for approval, the "comparison study" prepared by COMUS Korea was not suitable and was returned to him on 1 June with a request to convert it into a detailed plan.⁴ He did so and in June sent it to CINCPAC,⁵ who endorsed it to the JCS in August recommending approval.⁶ In October the JCS stated that this plan was under study and requested details on the level and type of US and Korean special service

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1. COMUS Korea ltr USFK AJ, 17 Jan 67.
 2. CINCPAC 022111Z, Feb 67.
 3. COMUS Korea ltr USFK CS, 5 May 67.
 4. CINCPAC 300406Z May 67.
 5. COMUS Korea ltr USFK AJ, 23 Jun 67.
 6. CINCPAC first endorsement ser 0898, 22 Aug 67.

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US Casualties
By Service and Month 1967

Killed in Action

| | Jan | Feb | Mar | Apr | May | Jun | Jul | Aug | Sep | Oct | Nov | Dec | Total |
|--------------|-----|-----|-----|-----|------|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-------|
| Army | 346 | 470 | 589 | 396 | 543 | 489 | 372 | 284 | 274 | 504 | 677 | 499 | 5443 |
| Navy | 17 | 16 | 19 | 18 | 57 | 21 | 38 | 31 | 37 | 16 | 15 | 26 | 311 |
| Marine Corps | 134 | 166 | 313 | 280 | 624 | 304 | 349 | 215 | 445 | 201 | 181 | 240 | 3452 |
| Air Force | 23 | 10 | 23 | 16 | 9 | 16 | 22 | 5 | 19 | 12 | 8 | 9 | 172 |
| Total | 520 | 662 | 944 | 710 | 1233 | 830 | 781 | 535 | 775 | 733 | 881 | 774 | 9378 |

Wounded in Action

| | Jan | Feb | Mar | Apr | May | Jun | Jul | Aug | Sep | Oct | Nov | Dec | Total |
|--------------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|-------|
| Army | 2100 | 2558 | 3737 | 2890 | 3767 | 2915 | 2657 | 2220 | 2384 | 2366 | 2728 | 3251 | 33573 |
| Navy | 72 | 107 | 128 | 138 | 303 | 222 | 317 | 222 | 354 | 163 | 136 | 178 | 2340 |
| Marine Corps | 1263 | 1131 | 2360 | 1885 | 4192 | 1787 | 2433 | 2134 | 4115 | 1571 | 1269 | 1385 | 25525 |
| Air Force | 21 | 57 | 89 | 51 | 118 | 22 | 64 | 28 | 56 | 22 | 32 | 27 | 587 |
| Total | 3456 | 3853 | 6314 | 4964 | 8380 | 4946 | 5471 | 4604 | 6909 | 4122 | 4165 | 4841 | 62025 |

Missing in Action

| | Jan | Feb | Mar | Apr | May | Jun | Jul | Aug | Sep | Oct | Nov | Dec | Total |
|--------------|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-------|
| Army | 0 | 1 | 2 | 5 | 6 | 8 | 9 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 14 | 1 | 48 |
| Navy | 4 | 2 | 7 | 0 | 6 | 2 | 5 | 5 | 1 | 10 | 8 | 0 | 50 |
| Marine Corps | 0 | 2 | 0 | 4 | 1 | 5 | 1 | 3 | 3 | 4 | 6 | 3 | 32 |
| Air Force | 15 | 11 | 10 | 20 | 15 | 14 | 15 | 25 | 12 | 18 | 29 | 24 | 208 |
| Total | 19 | 16 | 19 | 29 | 28 | 29 | 30 | 33 | 16 | 34 | 57 | 28 | 338 |

support provided Korean forces and a comparison with the support provided US forces.¹ This request was passed to COMUSMACV, who responded that Korean forces were receiving special service support on the same basis as comparable US and other Free World Forces.² This information was passed to the JCS on 27 November.³

~~(C)~~ The Secretary of Defense disapproved the plan on 15 December.⁴ His decision was based on previous dollar commitments made to Korea and the absence of a commitment compelling US approval of this proposal, the impact the plan would have on reprogramming available service resources, and the fact that Korean forces were already receiving special service support comparable to that received by US and other Free World Forces in Vietnam.

US Military Presence in Thailand

~~(S)~~ During the month of April, the King of Thailand; the Prime Minister, Field Marshal Thanom Kittikachorn; and the Deputy Prime Minister, General Praphat Charusathien, commented both publicly and privately concerning the presence and freedom of movement of US Armed Forces personnel in Thailand.⁵

~~(S)~~ As requested by CINCPAC,⁶ COMUSMACTHAI evaluated the situation and concluded that the comments made had a rather narrow focus and that none had disparaged the overall conduct of US military personnel in Thailand or suggested that the interlace between the Thai civilian community and US Forces was anything but good. The focus had been on proliferation of entertainment establishments of questionable standards in the immediate area of US military installations up-country and the Sattahip, U-Tapao area; there had been no mention of Bangkok.⁷

~~(S)~~ Local commanders in concert with US Embassy personnel had met with Thai officials to develop means and improve methods to preserve

1. JCS 1601/302229Z Nov 67.
2. COMUSMACV 38404/241208Z Nov 67.
3. CINCPAC 272347Z Nov 67.
4. J1 Brief 2-68, 5 Jan 68.
5. AMEMB Bangkok 13179/111209Z; 13261/131115Z; and 13338/141219Z Apr 67; AMEMB Bangkok AIRGRAM A-915, 21 Apr 67.
6. ADMINO CINCPAC 172010Z Apr 67.
7. COMUSMACTHAI 250820Z Apr 67.

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the excellent relationships between US Forces and Thai communities. Again the Thai officials were concerned most with the proliferation of entertainment establishments and preserving Thai customs regarding the restrictions on public display of affection between the sexes. In May CINCPAC advised the JCS of his military evaluation of this situation.¹ In response the JCS requested comments on specific areas of interest for the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower.² On 19 May COMUSMACTHAI commented on in-country programs designed to insure that US troop presence and activities in Thailand would not be offensive to Royal Thai officials.³ CINCPAC concurred and forwarded his plans to the JCS. Meetings and conferences by COMUSMACTHAI, US Embassy representatives, and Thai officials continued, and the matter seemed to be under control for the remainder of 1967. The incident rate based on infractions involving US Servicemen was extremely low during this period.⁴

Dependent Travel to Thailand

(U) In January the Chief of Staff Air Force advised CINCPACAF that his proposed amendment of Air Force regulations to restrict dependent travel to Thailand was in conflict with COMUSMACTHAI's overall policy on dependent travel and recommended that discrepancies be resolved by CINCPAC.⁵ In February CINCPACAF requested restricting dependent travel to Thailand for all Air Force personnel stationed outside the city of Bangkok.⁶ CINCPAC forwarded this proposal to COMUSMACTHAI on 20 February.⁷

(U) In June COMUSMACTHAI, supported by the US Ambassador, recommended advanced application for accompanied tours for personnel assigned to the Bangkok-Don Muang area and individual application for all other personnel. He also recommended designating COMUSMACTHAI as the overseas commander in Thailand to approve or disapprove all requests for dependent travel.⁸ CINCPAC supported a uniform policy

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1. CINCPAC 020337Z May 67.
 2. JCS 4722/082124Z May 67.
 3. COMUSMACTHAI 190302Z May 67; CINCPAC 292301Z May 67.
 4. COMUSMACTHAI 301319Z Apr 67.
 5. HQ USAF (AFSTPEB) ltr, 9 Jan 67, Subj: Proposed Changes to Atch 36, AFM 75-4 (Thailand).
 6. CINCPACAF ltr DP, 3 Feb 67, Subj: Dependent Travel to Thailand.
 7. CINCPAC First Endorsement ser 850, 20 Feb 67.
 8. COMUSMACTHAI 161311Z Jun 67.

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on dependent travel to Thailand and the designation of COMUSMACTHAI to approve requests. ¹ Action by the JCS was awaited at the end of the year.

Foreign Procurement Limitations - Post Exchange Activities - Thailand

(U) On 13 January the Thailand Regional Exchange was established, placing all exchange activities in Thailand under the Army and Air Force Exchange Service (AAFES). Formerly the Navy had provided service for the Bangkok area and the AAFES, Philippine Region had provided service to up-country personnel. The Bangkok Exchange was transferred from the Navy to the AAFES on 26 January. ²

(U) This action caused a loss of foreign procurement merchandise capability by exchange activities in Thailand in that the Navy had previously granted an exception to the International Balance of Payments Program for the Bangkok area Exchange by permitting offshore procurement of merchandise in an amount not to exceed 25 percent of total sales for the preceding calendar year quarter. The AAFES was limited to offshore procurement for merchandise of foreign origin not to exceed \$10 per month for each permanently assigned military man.

(U) In February, COMUSMACTHAI requested restoring this exception, formerly authorized by the Navy, permitting offshore procurement not to exceed 25 percent of total sales or increasing offshore procurement to \$15 per authorized exchange patron. ³ CINCPAC recommended approval of either proposal to the JCS on 6 March. ⁴ The JCS recommended adoption of the \$15 per capita proposal to the Secretary of Defense on 7 April. ⁵ On 3 August the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower reviewed all proposals submitted by the military departments regarding offshore procurement of foreign merchandise for sale in exchanges and approved a program to limit all foreign item buys to a fixed percentage of total overseas exchange sales. For the period 1 July to 31 December 1967 a base of 27.5 percent of the total sales was permitted; a base of 25 percent of total sales applied for the period of 1 January to 30 June 1968.

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1. CINCPAC ltr ser 2973, 17 Aug 67.
 2. USARPAC-PACAF PACJBD 03737/201900Z Dec 66.
 3. COMUSMACTHAI ltr SABC, 4 Feb 67, Subj: Foreign Procurement Limits.
 4. CINCPAC First Endorsement Ser 994, 6 Mar 67.
 5. JCS Memo DJSM-1040-67, 25 Aug 67.

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These percentages applied by overseas area and were to be administered by the AAFES Headquarters through their various subordinate headquarters. Headquarters, Pacific Exchange System in Honolulu implemented this plan within the PACOM. The Secretary of Defense's decision resolved the COMUSMACTHAI request.¹

Military Exchanges in South Vietnam

(U) In mid-November informal information received from the Headquarters, Pacific Exchange System indicated that about seven percent of the exchange merchandise bound for sale through US military exchanges in Vietnam was lost because of damage and mysterious disappearances. CINCPAC considered this loss rate highly unacceptable and asked CINCPACAF to provide detailed formal information on the losses.²

(U) The Chairman of the Pacific Joint Board of Directors for the Army and Air Force Exchange and Motion Picture Services, Pacific replied to CINCPAC for CINCPACAF.³ He advised that the estimated loss for the nine months from February through October 1967 was \$13.7 million (at cost) or approximately six percent of retail sales during the same period (\$229 million). A breakdown of these estimated losses was as follows:

Spoilage and Damage (due to inferior or inadequate warehousing and damage in transit) - \$3.3 million.

Accountability (the difference between goods on hand as reflected in records and the actual goods on hand at the time of physical inventory) - \$6.2 million.

In-transit (the difference between vendor's invoice cost and documented receipts at Vietnam depots after seven months was allowed for transit; if this merchandise was subsequently received or determined to be in inventory it was then deducted from the losses) - \$4.2 million.

(U) The board chairman indicated that the following steps were being taken to reduce the losses:

a. The number of experienced US exchange civilian management personnel was being increased.

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1. Assistant SecDef (Manpower) Memo, 8 Aug 67.
 2. CINCPAC 192204Z Nov 67.
 3. Pacific Joint Board of Directors Army and Air Force Exchange and Motion Picture Services, PACEX - PM ltr, 11 Dec 67.

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b. An aggressive training program was being conducted for local national employees.

c. Exchange control procedures by port operation detachments were being instituted to improve recording and documentation of losses.

d. Commands were providing increased military transportation under security control.

e. Sea-van container service had been implemented to transport merchandise from the CONUS to Vietnam.

f. Continuous efforts were being made to acquire adequate warehouse facilities in Vietnam.

g. An electronic computer capability had been established to improve inventory management.

Local National Civilian Personnel Policy - Thailand

(U) In May COMUSMACTHAI recommended changes in separation allowance benefits and recruitment incentive practices for Thai local national personnel.¹ CINCPAC recommended approval to the Navy's Office of Civilian Manpower Management (OCMM).² In July the separation allowance provisions of the proposal were approved, but additional information was requested on the recruitment incentive proposal.³ In August additional recommendations were forwarded to the OCMM.⁴ Approval in September changed the term "recruitment incentive" to "dislocation allowance" and provided COMUSMACTHAI with details for administering this allowance.⁵

Holidays for Local Nationals - Thailand

(U) Change II to the Thailand Local National Personnel Administration Manual for Defense Department agencies in Thailand promulgated a change

1. COMUSMACTHAI ltr MACTJ13, 10 May 67.
2. CINCPAC ltr 14 ser 2319, 27 Jun 67.
3. OCMM 251230Z Jul 67; CINCPAC ltr 14 ser 903, 23 Aug 67.
4. CINCPAC ltr 14 ser 0899, 23 Aug 67.
5. OCMM ltr OCMM 0332.6:gh, 15 Sep 67; CINCPAC 230150Z Sep 67.

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in holiday policy to provide 13 in lieu of 10 holidays per year. The change was predicated on a US Embassy, Thailand decision, as the Thailand Labor Law guaranteed a total of 13 holidays per year.¹ CINCPAC requested COMUSMACTHAI to obtain the views of the Ministry of Interior as to whether the substitution of US holidays would satisfy the requirements of the Thailand labor laws.² At the end of the year the matter was under discussion among COMUSMACTHAI, US Embassy personnel, and Thailand Government officials.³

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1. COMUSMACTHAI Form DA 2496, MACTJ13, 8 May 67.
 2. CINCPAC ltr 14 ser 0901, 23 Aug 67.
 3. CINCPAC 240411Z Oct 67; COMUSMACTHAI 280508Z Oct 67.

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SECTION VIII - LOGISTICS

(S) During 1967 there were a number of significant improvements in logistic support of combat operations in RVN and associated military operations in SEAsia. CINCPAC was active in the implementation of a systematic program for the allocation and distribution of supplies and munitions in order to further rectify and preclude shortages that had affected operations in 1966. Logistical support operations during 1967 were more responsive to combat requirements throughout RVN and Thailand, and as logistic performance improved no combat operations were curtailed in 1967 because of a lack of logistic support. A number of general supply activities were implemented in support of RVNAF and FWMA forces in RVN. Maintenance of major unit equipment was requiring special attention at the end of the year.

(S) The increased munitions production during the year was effectively controlled by intensified management of major items. The CINCPAC controlled allocation and distribution system covered a wide spectrum of responsibilities, including projected and actual production, refinement of data on varying consumption rates, the development of a highly responsive inventory, transfer, and allocation system, and the gradual rebuilding of reserve stockage levels in SEAsia and other PACOM areas. These accomplishments were coupled with an effort to modernize munitions reserves in PACOM. Munitions storage problems were closely supervised.

(S) Transportation achievements during the year surpassed all previous sealift and airlift performance records. Both sealift and airlift assets were increased in both quantity and types of service provided. Associated problems that were addressed by CINCPAC in order to expedite passenger and cargo movements included shipping and airlift availability, route management, and improvement of port facilities.

(S) POL support in RVN and Thailand was increased in consonance with the increased consumption rates due to tactical requirements and force buildup. Movement capabilities and storage facilities were supervised to keep pace with changing requirements and planning for future storage requirements in RVN and Thailand continued.

(S) In the military construction program the basic major facilities in RVN such as ports, airfields, depots and headquarters were essentially completed during the year. By the end of 1967 approximately 72 percent

of funded construction of operational, logistical, and personnel support facilities to accommodate the Program 5 troop strength of 525,000 plus plus 55,000 FWMAF personnel had been completed.

Logistics Planning for RVN

Planning for Program 5 Deployments

~~(S)~~ In August the Secretary of Defense tentatively approved the Program 5 force ceiling of 525,000 troops for deployment to Southeast Asia.¹ The JCS requested that CINCPAC provide a detailed troop list of additional forces to be deployed.² The JCS also requested that attention be directed to the civilianization of military spaces in order to reduce the total number of military personnel in RVN.³

~~(S)~~ CINCPAC sponsored a planning conference in Hawaii during the period from August 23 to 1 September. In addition to the detailed troop list and civilianization program, attention was directed to an appraisal of current and projected logistic capability for support of Program 5 forces deployed to carry out COMUSMACV operational concepts. Tonnage requirements, and the ability of port and air terminals to handle the projected tonnages, were received and an estimate of additional construction requirements was made. It was concluded that Program 5 and related redeployments would be supported with the existing transportation terminals; however, additional construction funds would be required to provide additional associated logistic facilities.⁴ A civilianization program was drawn up which, under optimum conditions, would yield a total of 12,545 military spaces for conversion to civilian contract and direct hire personnel. These conclusions were included in the logistics appendix to the Southeast Asia Deployment Program 5 which was forwarded to the JCS in September.⁵

Planning Factors

(U) During the period from October 1966 to September 1967 a detailed study of logistics planning factors in RVN was conducted by the

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1. SECDEF Memo for CJSC, 10 Aug 67, Subj: FY 68 Force Requirements for SVN, Program 5.
 2. JCS 2950/031504Z Aug 67.
 3. JCS 3632/111703Z Aug 67.
 4. Monthly Historical Submission, CINCPAC, J5221, Dec 67.
 5. CINCPAC ltr ser 000450, 1 Sep 67.

Planning Research Corporation under an Advanced Projects Agency (ARPA) contract. The final report of this study which was forwarded in October 1967, recommended an extension of the ARPA contract to conduct a follow-on study.¹ The purpose of the follow-on study was to develop a stronger statistical base over a longer period of time for all classes of supply and to convert data to the new system of 10 classes of supplies. A basic requirement of the full implementation of the revised supply structure was to develop planning factors and stockage objectives for each of the 10 new classes of supplies. Accordingly, the JCS agreed with the MACV recommended follow-on study and requested CINCPAC comments, recommendations and advice concerning any problems related to the implementation of the new 10-class supply structure.² CINCPAC considered it essential that planning factors for RVN be re-examined and verified in order to prepare for the conversion to the 10-class supply system and to further current actions to reduce stock levels and purify stocks in RVN.³

Automated Reporting of Support Units in RVN

~~(S)~~ In April 1967 an ADP project to report on combat service support units in RVN became operational. This program provided an automated capability to produce an up-to-date station list for units deployed to RVN. Data was provided on combat, combat support and combat service support units, by service, function, location, strength, port of support and closure date.⁴

Post-Hostilities Planning

~~(TS)~~ At the Post-Hostilities Planning Conference held at CINCPAC early in the year (see Section I of this Chapter) a Logistics Committee was formed to direct attention to logistic aspects of post-hostility actions. The committee discussed withdrawal requirements, priorities for disposal of excess equipment and supplies, reconstitution of prepositioned stocks in WestPac, and transportation assets and schedules. The Logistic Committee made the following recommendations:

a. That logistic planning factors be used in the CINCPAC OPlan 67-68 "Withdrawal of US/FWMA from South Vietnam".

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1. COMUSMACV, MACJ44, ltr, 31 Oct 67.
 2. JCS ltr, J4DM-539-67, 5 Dec 67.
 3. CINCPAC, J4122, Brief for JCS Papers, 174-67, 15 Dec 67.
 4. Monthly Historical Submission, J4121, CINCPAC, Apr 67.

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b. That six priorities be established for the disposition of excess equipment and supplies, namely; to US forces in PACOM; to other US forces; to other US agencies in RVN; to MAP in RVN; to other MAP assisted allies; and to be disposed in place by public sale.

c. That component commanders identify their war reserve materiel requirements and outline their plans to reconstitute prepositioned stocks.

d. That planning should avoid the use of intermediate offshore staging in so far as possible.

e. That shortages in RVN of packaging materials, pallets and containers be identified as limiting factors in the CINCPAC OPlan.

f. That the JCS be requested to give first priority in the allocation to PACOM of MAC and MSTs transportation resources to accomplish the movement requirements of the CINCPAC OPlan.

g. That the CINCPAC OPlan address total capabilities and requirements for withdrawal and that COMUSMACV be tasked to prepare a detailed supporting plan when directed.

~~(S)~~ In January a draft Logistic and Personnel Concept for Withdrawal in Six Months was forwarded to COMUSMACV and component commanders for their comments and recommendations.¹ These recommendations were incorporated into the Logistic Annex to CINCPAC OPlan 67-68. The plan was completed in March and provided for an orderly withdrawal and redeployment of US and FWMA forces, supplies, equipment and assets from RVN within a six-month period. COMUSMACV and the component commanders were tasked with appropriate missions to withdraw logistical elements, provide logistical support of the MAAG, turn over facilities, prepare various other PACOM installations for the receipt of units and materiel.²

Common Supply System in RVN

~~(S)~~ Efforts continued during the year to further the implementation of a single, integrated, Army operated logistic system in support of all

1. CINCPAC ltr ser 00023, 13 Jan 67.
2. Monthly Historical Submission, J4116, CINCPAC, Jan, Mar 67; CINCPAC ltr ser 000165, 31 Mar 67.

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US, RVNAF and FWMA Forces in RVN in accordance with past guidance from the Secretary of Defense. By late 1966 the Army 1st Logistical Command was providing Class III packaged POL products to all CTZs and Class I subsistence and 3500 common supply items in Classes II and IV to forces in the II, III, and IV CTZs. On 12 December 1966 the Secretary of Defense addressed a memorandum to the Service Secretaries and the CJCS which recognized the progress made toward a responsive common supply system in RVN. However, the Secretary of Defense stated that procedures were not sufficiently developed to greatly expand the Army operated system in II, III and IV CTZs nor to extend it to the I CTZ. Guidance for further expansion and implementation of the system was given and the Secretary of the Army was tasked to draft a detailed plan for the RVN common supply system by 31 March 1967. DA hosted a conference in February 1967 which was attended by representatives of all services.¹ Problems of implementation and reimbursement procedures were addressed and a revised Army plan was drafted and submitted to the Secretary of Defense on 9 May. Approval of this plan was withheld by SECDEF pending DA presentation of more complete and definitive requirement data, establishment of the necessary Army supply management capability in RVN, and the resolution of inter-service concepts.²

~~(S)~~ In July the JCS informed CINCPAC that interservice concepts had been resolved by the military departments in Washington. It was agreed that Army managed items would not be stocked in I CTZ by the Navy and that the Navy in I CTZ would expand only DSA, GSA and ATAC integrated management items. It was also agreed that MILSTRIP procedures would be used in the Army system which would be expanded to include common supply medical support and provide for the processing of RVNAF requisitions. A final point of agreement was that in the final stages of implementation all common supply stocks in RVN would be owned by the Army.³ DA was tasked to submit by the end of November a revised plan which incorporated these interservice agreements. At the end of the year the DA plan was being staffed in Washington.

~~(S)~~ In view of the desire of the SECDEF to implement the Army common supply system through the military services without direct

1. DA 152243Z Aug 67.
2. JCS 2315/349-26, Subj: Responsive Logistic Support for Combined Operations in the Republic of Vietnam.
3. Brief for JCS Papers, J223, CINCPAC, 12 Jul 67.

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involvement of the JCS, CINCPAC's responsibilities were limited to monitoring to assure continuity of adequate logistic support of combat operations in RVN.¹ It should be noted, however, that the ultimate goal of the SECDEF was that the Army common supply system should eventually be extended to include I CTZ, the operational zone for which the Navy provided logistic support. Preliminary planning in this direction was continued by all services. However, CINCPAC recommended in mid-1966 that the Army system not be extended to I CTZ.² CINCPAC continued to retain this position and the concept of continuing Navy support responsibilities in I CTZ as long as Navy and Marine forces were the dominant users was shared by CINCUSARPAC, CINCPACFLT and CG, FMFPAC. The rationale of this position was contained in a message to CINCPAC from CINCPACFLT in November. CINCPACFLT pointed out the expanded range of common items which would attend the extension of the DA common supply system to I CTZ. Some unfavorable possible consequences discussed by CINCPACFLT were duplication of effort, increases in requisitioning time and stock investment levels, a less responsive support system and an increase in number of personnel and costs. CINCPACFLT stated that the effectiveness of Navy support being provided in I CTZ was well substantiated and recommended that CINCPAC reiterate a previous statement of this position to the JCS.³ CINCPAC informed CINCPACFLT that there were informal indications that DA would recommend to the SECDEF that extension of the Army common supply system to I CTZ be deferred, thus CINCPAC delayed further recommendations until notification of a decision by the SECDEF.⁴

Support Responsibilities in I CTZ

~~(S)~~ Following the realignment of logistic support responsibilities in the fall of 1965 and the activation of COMNAVFORV in April 1966 the military services cooperated in providing various logistic support in the four CTZs. However, in April 1967 COMNAVFORV requested clarification of support responsibilities in I CTZ, particularly regarding the support of MACV advisors in the northern CTZ.⁵ CINCPACFLT forwarded COMNAVFORV's request for clarification, and referred to earlier CINCPAC guidance and the realignment concept which envisioned

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1. Point Paper, J4223, CINCPAC, 20 Nov 67, Subj: Common Supply System in RVN.
 2. CINCPAC 232132Z Jul 67.
 3. CINCPACFLT 190157Z Nov 67.
 4. CINCPAC 290238Z Nov 67.
 5. COMNAVFOR 260824Z Apr 67.


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single (Army) service support for all MACV advisors in RVN.¹ It was noted that COMUSMACV's position was that the support of MACV advisors in the I CTZ was the responsibility of the Navy. In June CINCPAC addressed the problem of support responsibility in I CTZ and amplified previous instructions and guidance. Regarding advisor support in I CTZ, CINCPAC confirmed that the assignment of responsibility to COMNAVFORV to provide administrative and logistic support to MACV advisors in I CTZ was fully consistent with other responsibilities assigned to COMNAVFORV.² CINCPAC also clarified the responsibility for logistic support in the southern area of I CTZ. CINCPACFLT was responsible for logistics-over-the-shore (LOTS) operations in support of Duc Pho; and for the delivery of cargo by shallow draft shipping from Chu Lai and Danang. Army users were responsible for receipt, temporary storage and overland movement of cargo from the beach. Army users were also responsible for overland delivery of cargo from Chu Lai in the southern areas of I CTZ when inclement weather precluded LOTS operations. CINCPAC also amplified a previous instruction concerning the responsibility for Common User Land Transportation (CULT).³ The extent of CINCPACFLT responsibility for CULT was defined as not including organic unit transportation which should be used for distribution beyond base depots in port areas. CINCPACFLT would only furnish CULT in secure areas of I CTZ on an as-required basis and when mutually agreed upon by the MACV component commanders in coordination with COMUSMACV.

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1. CINCPACFLT 302312Z Apr 67; CINCPAC 241945Z Apr 65.
 2. CINCPAC 060353Z Jun 67.
 3. CINCPACINST 4600.3B, 3 Apr 67.

SEASIA AIR MUNITIONS DISTRIBUTIONS

AS OF 1 JANUARY 1968



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SOURCE: PACOM Digest, Feb 68, p. 110.

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
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SEASIA AIR MUNITIONS EXPENDITURES JAN 1966 THRU DEC 1967

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SOURCE: PACOM Digest, Feb 68, p. 111.

RVN Port Congestion and Management

(S) The month of March 1967 was the turning point in the achievement of adequate surface port throughput capability to assure the continued input of logistics required to support forces in Vietnam and to maintain established levels of supply. The backlog of cargo to be off-loaded and the number of ships in RVN were at the lowest since the US forces buildup began.¹

(S) As the RVN port congestion was alleviated, the JCS stated a DOD request for an analysis of each RVN port for each of the remaining months of 1967. The intent was to insure that any excess RVN port capability was utilized efficiently. Attention was to be directed particularly to high-cost lighterage which was to be shifted to meet changing port workloads or phased out as applicable.² At CINCPAC's request COMUSMACV provided a port analysis which CINCPAC forwarded to the JCS with concurrence.³ COMUSMACV was requested to provide additional information regarding the disposition of the equipment of the three LARC V companies at Cam Ranh Bay when the companies were inactivated as proposed.⁴ COMUSMACV replied that the equipment would be reported for disposition upon deactivation or reorganization of the LARC companies.⁵

(S) In view of the overall improvement in all RVN port operations CINCPAC began to consider means to increase indigenous participation in RVN port operations. COMUSMACV was tasked in August to prepare a joint AID/MACV plan to phase out military responsibilities in the Port of Saigon. CINCPAC requested that this plan be expanded so as to encompass measures to increase indigenous participation in the operation of permanent up-country RVN port facilities in order to further reduce military operations in all RVN ports.⁶ COMUSMACV responded by stating that, while the joint AID/MACV plan was indirectly related to the future turnover of up-country RVN military port facilities, the plan was not considered an appropriate vehicle to address up-country port problems. COMUSMACV stated, however, that the joint AID/MACV plan would contain an annex pertaining to the training of GVN personnel in Saigon Port and that the annex may be relevant to the problem of

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1. Monthly Historical Submission, CINCPAC, J4811, Mar 67.
 2. JCS 9056/161242Z Mar 67.
 3. CINCPAC 230053Z Mar 67; COMUSMACV 070703Z Apr 67.
 4. ADMINO CINCPAC 162208Z Apr 67.
 5. COMUSMACV 030506Z May 67.
 6. ADMINO CINCPAC 130345Z Sep 67.

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providing technical expertise for the operation of up-country ports. COM-USMACV considered that the most practical way to provide trained personnel for the operation of up-country ports was to expand the existing AID advisory effort at the up-country ports.¹

Munitions Storage Capability in RVN and Thailand

~~(S)~~ CINCPAC continued to review the munitions storage capability in PACOM in order to accommodate the increased stockage objectives of the components, particularly CINCPACAF and CINCPACFLT. Early in the year it appeared that increased production capability to meet 45-day stockage objective of optimum munitions would require a corresponding increase in storage facilities in PACOM. At Da Nang in February there was a requirement for storage capability of 8,922 short tons, while the existing capability was 3,700 tons of which 2,500 tons was substandard. Additional construction, sufficient to satisfy projected requirements through July, was programmed.² At Cam Ranh Bay it was determined early in the year that the tri-service storage area was being overbuilt to some extent.

~~(S)~~ The Thailand bases of Korat and Thakli were overcrowded early in the year and CINCPAC asked COMUSMACTHAI about the availability of alternate storage areas to accommodate CINCPACAF requirements. A study was conducted by 7/13 AF and CINCPAC was informed through COMUSMACTHAI that approximately 6,000 tons of excess munitions could be accommodated for one year in SALTSHAKER facilities.³ CINCPAC concurred in this plan for storage of USAF munitions and requested that COMUSMACTHAI obtain the agreement of the Royal Thailand Army.⁴

~~(S)~~ In April CINCPAC requested that the component and subordinate commanders update the Munitions Storage Reports which had last been submitted in October 1966. CINCPAC requested that information on newly constructed sites be included and that the reports be forwarded by

1. COMUSMACV 030830Z Oct 67; Monthly Historical Submission, CINCPAC, J5533, 9 Oct 67.
2. Point Paper, J4711, CINCPAC, 6 Feb 67, Subj: Ammunition Storage Capability RVN and Thailand.
3. CINCPAC 060428Z Jan 67; Point Paper, J4711, CINCPAC, 6 Feb 67, Subj: Ammunition Storage Capability RVN and Thailand; Monthly Historical Submission, J4711, CINCPAC, Feb 67.
4. CINCPAC ltr 471, ser 00846, 10 May 67.

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early May in order to prepare for a conference on PACOM ammunition storage facilities which was held in May.¹ Prior to the conference an updated Munitions Storage Facilities Report was submitted to the JCS with the information that CINCPAC planned to implement this report semi-annually beginning 1 October and to use ADP.² At the May conference on munitions storage, representatives of the JCS, the Services, Component Commanders and CINCPAC presented updated information on current facilities and future requirements. CINCPAC concurred in the presentations made at the conference.³

~~(S)~~ Other actions taken by CINCPAC relative to ammunition storage included the transfer of air munitions in Thailand to make provisions for DYE MARKER munitions, and to relieve storage space at Guam by transferring M36 incendiary clusters.⁴

Support of ROKFV

Equipment for ROKFV

~~(S)~~ In March the ROK Minister of Defense met in Washington with the Secretary of Defense and the US made a commitment to provide additional equipment for the ROKFV. This commitment included M-16 rifles, M-113 armored personnel carriers, and helicopters for a ROKFV Corps Aviation Company.⁵ Thereafter the Secretary of Defense requested a comparison of support and equipment levels of ROKFV and US forces in Vietnam. It was further requested that major areas of ROKFV support and major items of equipment that were significantly below US force levels be identified.⁶ At CINCPAC's request, COMUSMACV provided the required information. COMUSMACV stated that ROKFV had 84.4 percent of the authorized major items of equipment. The equipment status of the various ROKFV technical services varied from a low of 74.8 for engineer equipment to a high of 98.8 percent for weapons. In comparison, US units in Vietnam generally possessed 95 percent of authorized major items of equipment. COMUSMACV thus pointed out that, with certain exceptions, the support provided to ROKFV was generally equivalent to that provided US Forces. The exceptions were radio sets (AN/PRC-25), M-16 rifles, M-113 armored personnel carriers, D7, D8 and H16M

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1. CINCPAC ltr 471, ser 0428, 28 Apr 67.
 2. CINCPAC ltr 471, ser 00918, 19 May 67.
 3. CINCPAC 070244Z Jun 67.
 4. CINCPAC 090501Z Aug 67; CINCPAC 270102Z Sep 67.
 5. Memo of Conversation, ASD/ISA, I-21854/67 of 20 Mar 67.
 6. SECDEF 241704Z Mar 67.

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tractors and vehicle repair parts. COMUSMACV provided a detailed explanation of the status of these shortages and remedial action being taken.¹ During March and April ROKFV was issued 44 additional M-113 armored personnel carriers.²

Korean Combat Meal

~~(S)~~ In May 1966 the ROK Minister of Defense requested that COMUSKOREA obtain the authority and a USG commitment to procure in Korea a locally produced kim-chi "C" ration for the ROKFV. COMUSMACV concurred in the need for such a ration and its development under the cognizance of COMUSKOREA.³ OSD informed the Korean Minister of Defense in June 1966 that the US was interested in the Korean combat ration but could make no commitments until the ROK had developed the ration further. The ROK formed a prime contract company to control production of the ration with the assistance of sub-contracted producers. By September 1966 samples of the ROK "C" ration were sent to the US Army Natick Laboratory for testing.⁴ In the face of considerable ROK pressure for USG approval it was necessary for the Secretary of State to make it clear that the US decision to approve the ration would not be made until the Natick tests were completed in April 1967.⁵ Meanwhile, COMUSMACV recommended that the ROKFV be provided one meal per day of the Korean combat ration, and that purchase authority and funds be granted for troop testing of the ration in Vietnam.⁶ In late 1966 and during the early months of 1967 there was considerable discussion of the Korean ration problem among the commanders and agencies concerned, including the JCS, CINCPAC, COMUSMACV, COMUSKOREA, and US Embassy in Korea and the ROK Minister of Defense. Among the problems that were being resolved were procurement procedures, the desire that US financial support not adversely affect the balance of payments, and the desirability of waiting for the results of the Natick tests rather than proceeding immediately with large scale troop utilization-tests in Vietnam. The ROKFV requested that the Military Working Agreement between

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1. CINCPAC 290303Z Mar 67; COMUSMACV 031017Z Apr 67; CINCPAC 080339Z Apr 67.
 2. Point Paper, J4221, CINCPAC, 5, May 67, Subj: Shortages of M-113 APC's.
 3. COMUSK 140550Z May 66; COMUSMACV 251321Z May 66.
 4. COMUSK 060955Z Oct 66.
 5. SECSTATE 212127Z Nov 66.
 6. COMUSMACV 220325Z Oct 67; COMUSMACV 281310Z Nov 67.

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ROKFV and COMUSMACV be amended so that funding of the special dietary items would be shifted from the ROKG to the USG.

~~(S)~~ On 15 March 1967 the Secretary of Defense informed the ROK Minister of Defense that the US did not favor purchase of the ration with dollars because of the adverse effects on the balance of payments and that an exchange agreement would be necessary. Various offset financial arrangements were studied.¹

~~(S)~~ Meanwhile in early April the Natick Laboratory tests of the Korean Combat Ration were completed and the favorable report included only minor recommendations for the improvement of production. The ROKG indicated a willingness and capability to make these improvements. About the same time COMUSMACV reported that there was an abnormally high waste of US C rations by ROKFV troops and that the continuing lack of a combat ration satisfactory to individual Korean tastes was adversely affecting troop morale and well being.² Despite these developments, the Secretary of Defense indicated that the balance of payments problem had not yet been resolved and that a kim-chi supplement was being considered rather than a full ROK combat ration.³ COMUSMACV and COMUSKOREA did not favor the resort to a kim-chi supplement and based on their recommendations CINCPAC informed the Secretary of Defense in some detail of his views. CINCPAC stated that the US C ration was not acceptable to the ROK soldier, who over a period of time lost weight while rejecting and wasting the US ration. CINCPAC stated that an unfavorable impact of the ration problem on ROK troop morale was becoming increasingly clear and that the alternative of providing a kim-chi supplement was not an adequate solution, in part because the ROK troops would eat the kim-chi and reject the US C ration, thereby increasing waste and dietary imbalance. CINCPAC emphasized the need for a ration suitable to sustain the ROK soldier over extended periods of combat rather than a supplement that catered to taste. CINCPAC recommended that one Korean Combat Ration per day be furnished each man in the ROKFV.⁴

~~(S)~~ Increased attention was focused on providing the simplest and most effective means of financing the Korean Combat Ration and in April

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1. Point Paper, J4223, CINCPAC, Subj: Korean Combat Ration.
 2. COMUSMACV 031220Z Apr 67.
 3. SECDEF 061749Z Apr 67.
 4. CINCPAC 082251Z Apr 67.

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the Country Team in Korea recommended a Tied Letter of Credit offset arrangement to satisfy balance of payments requirements.¹ CINCPAC concurred with this arrangement and COMUSKOREA recommended that AID procedures be utilized if the Tied Letter of Credit method was adopted.

~~(S)~~ The Secretary of Defense continued to favor the concept of a dietary supplement and in May a program was approved which would have provided kim-chi and peppers once daily to each soldier in the ROKFV.² The US Ambassador in Seoul informed the Secretary of Defense that the ROKG did not consider the kim-chi supplement an adequate solution to their troop morale and welfare problem. The ROK suggested again the Korean Combat Ration, less rice, be provided on the basis of one daily meal per man.³ The issue was resolved in deference to ROK desires in June during Vice President Humphrey's visit with ROK President Park. The US Vice President informed President Park that the US would furnish the Korean Combat Ration rather than the kim-chi supplement.⁴ In July arrangements were made to finance the ration through a Special Letter of Credit and in August COMUSMACV completed planning to begin transporting and issuing the new ration.

~~(S)~~ The JCS approved COMUSMACV's plan to provide one Korean Combat Meal daily to each of the 47,860 ROKFV troops in Vietnam, beginning in December 1967. It was agreed that the ROK Ministry of Defense would purchase the ration and the US would reimburse the ROKG through a Special Letter of Credit handled by AID. Procurement would be entirely in ROK hands, with the US delivering the rations to Vietnam in US ships. In Vietnam the ROKFV would take delivery, store and distribute the rations.⁵ There was a brief production delay at the end of the year, however, issue of the new ration to ROKFV troops was scheduled to begin in mid-January 1968.

Proposed Korean Logistic Service Corps

~~(S)~~ After the Korean Defense Minister proposed in mid-1966 to establish a Korean Logistic Service Corps (KLSC) for duty in Vietnam

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1. AMEMB Seoul 210245Z Apr 67; CINCPAC 292352Z Apr 67; COMUSK 190526Z May 67.
 2. SECSTATE 252055Z May 67.
 3. AMEMB Seoul 150035Z Jun 67.
 4. AMEMB Seoul 010410Z Jul 67.
 5. JCS 6345/142149 Sep 67; Monthly Historical Submission, J5312, CINCPAC, 12 Jan 68.

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CINCPAC reviewed the plan and concluded that exorbitant pay scales would make the plan too expensive and that alternative plans should be considered. Two other plans were developed including a KLSC for support of ROKFV and a Korean Civil Action Corps (KCAC) for assisting the Revolutionary Development program in Vietnam. Both plans would utilize discharged ROKFV personnel at existing military pay and allowance rates. CINCPAC viewed both plans with considerable reservation but favored the KCAC plan on a limited trial basis.¹

~~(S)~~ In January the US Ambassador in Seoul proposed sending a US team to Vietnam to discuss Korean civil assistance to RVN. In response to a request for guidance from Washington, the Secretary of State advised that the team consider the KLSC and KCAC as separate projects.² The team from Seoul developed an outline of possible programs for ROK assistance, however, the final report of the team enumerated numerous factors that made introduction of large numbers of Korean personnel into South Vietnam inadvisable. High on the list of problems was the sensitivity of Vietnam workers and unions to the introduction of additional third country nationals and the ambivalent attitude of the Vietnamese people towards the Koreans. There was a potential problem in placing the ROK service units under non-GVN agencies. Major items of equipment were not available and there were questions about security, housing, food, transportation, maintenance, extension of privileges, language difficulties and funding sources. Despite these potential problem areas, the team identified programs for the KCAC concept including civil assistance of skilled technicians in the fields of public works, health, refugees, education, veterans rehabilitation, and agriculture. Proposed KCAC support of the USAID Office of Civil Operations included housing construction, repair of vehicles by mobile teams, the provision of personnel for supply management, logistics and skilled blue collar work. Under the KLSC concept a battalion-size test program was suggested.³ Focusing on the KLSC concept, COMUSMACV forwarded a proposed TOE and cost estimates for a pilot test of a 1,026-man KLSC and requested CINCPAC's concurrence for submission to Seoul.⁴ CINCPAC concurred

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1. CINCPAC Command History, 1966, Vol II, p. 770; CINCPAC 240201Z Dec 66.
 2. AMEMB Seoul 060935Z Jan 67; AMEMB Seoul 060940Z Jan 67; SECSTATE 142300Z Jan 67.
 3. AMEMB Saigon 241145Z Jan 67; AMEMB Seoul 120015Z Feb 67.
 4. COMUSMACV 200340Z Feb 67; COMUSMACV 041154Z Mar 67; COMUSMACV ltr, 10 Mar 67, Subj: KLSC Cost Estimate.

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in COMUSMACV's proposal for planning purposes only until some of the problems associated with Korean assistance were resolved. ¹

~~(S)~~ During a visit of the Korean Prime Minister to Saigon in February, the subject of Korean civil assistance was discussed with Prime Minister Ky. This discussion centered on a Korean proposal to establish two 1,500-man KLSC units, one for each of the ROKFV division areas. The mission of the units would encompass both logistic support of the Korean divisions and civic action. ²

~~(S)~~ CINCPAC's position in March on the KLSC and KCAC proposals was that neither would replace any significant number of US logistic units or personnel and that of the two, the KCAC alternative had the best political and military potential while the KLSC had little of either and was not recommended. CINCPAC considered that a small field test of either concept was essential and that critical automotive and construction equipment would have to be provided from other than PACOM sources. ³

~~(S)~~ In late March COMUSMACV modified his position on the KLSC and provided comments on the resolution of some of the problem areas. CINCPAC concurred in COMUSMACV's desire to advance a preliminary plan for a 1,026-man pilot KLSC to the US Ambassador in Saigon. ⁴ Despite ROK Government pressure, COMUSMACV, COMUSK and CINCPAC continued to favor testing only a single pilot unit before acceptance of the concepts. The PACOM joint commanders continued to have reservations about the establishment of KLSC-type units in Vietnam, and in April similar reservations were expressed by the Secretary of Defense. The lack of funding sources, the disproportionately high cost, the non-availability of equipment and the reduction of the RVN workforce were cited by the Secretary of Defense as reasons for his request that CINCPAC discourage any further discussion of the KLSC. COMUSMACV and COMUSK were so informed. ⁵

~~(S)~~ Despite the indications in April that the establishment of a KLSC-type unit in Vietnam was ruled out, during the following month there appeared to be a continuing high-level interest in Washington in

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1. ADMINO CINCPAC 012215Z Mar 67.
 2. AMEMB Saigon 221200Z Feb 67; COMUSMACV 010425Z Mar 67.
 3. Point Paper, J5331, CINCPAC, 2 Mar 67, Subj: KLSC.
 4. COMUSMACV 290335Z Mar 67; CINCPAC 072133Z Apr 67.
 5. SECDEF 150511 Apr 67; CINCPAC 180200Z Apr 67.

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finding areas for productive utilization of significant numbers of Koreans other than combat troops in the overall effort in RVN. The Secretary of State requested that the US Ambassador in Saigon take a fresh look at the entire problem with emphasis on use of Korean personnel in a manner that would free GVN and FWMA forces for combat duty.¹ The Embassy in Saigon reported that the GVN continued to be ready to consider Korean teams similar to the PHILCAGV for pacification work in operational areas of the ROKFV.²

Support of Additional RTA Division in RVN

(S) In August COMUSMACTHAI submitted preliminary views on the deployment of an additional 10,000-man RTA contingent to Vietnam. CINCPAC requested additional information on the impact of this deployment on the Thai counterinsurgency effort and on current training programs.³ COMUSMACTHAI replied that deployment of the 10,000-man RTA force was feasible either as two separate brigades or as a division-minus, provided that training and deployment were incremental. COMUSMACTHAI stated that the short-term impact on available resources would be significant and would limit RTA expansion of internal security operations. However, COMUSMACTHAI noted some long-range benefits that would accrue to the RTA including counterinsurgency experience applicable to Thailand and the reestablishment of a centralized training program. Depending on the availability of equipment, COMUSMACTHAI estimated that augmentation required to deploy one brigade would be available by July 1968 and the second brigade by February 1969. Because of the relatively slow reaction time for certain supply items experienced by the RTAV already in Vietnam, it appeared that supply procurement lead time would be a critical factor in equipping and training the proposed force.⁴ COMUSMACV expressed enthusiasm for the prospect of additional Thai combat power in Vietnam, but also expressed considerable reservations about logistic support problems and stated that the timing of the larger deployments was believed to be optimistic.⁵ Arrangements with the Thai Government were made in October and in November, Thailand announced that an additional division would be sent to Vietnam. (See Section I of this Chapter.)

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1. SECSTATE 190015Z May 67.
 2. AMEMB Saigon 011145Z Jun 67.
 3. COMUSMACTHAI 120110Z Aug 67; CINCPAC 262354Z Aug 67.
 4. COMUSMACTHAI 290855Z Aug 67.
 5. COMUSMACV 281130Z Aug 67; Point Paper, J552, CINCPAC, 31 Aug 67, Subj: Proposed Increase of Thai Armed Forces Deployment to Vietnam.

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~~(S)~~ An accelerated target date of 22 January 1968 was established for the beginning of training of the RTA division. Because lengthy supply lead times were inconsistent with this target date, COMUSMACTHAI requested expedited funding and supply actions including DOD approval of \$23 million for TOE and TA material, \$2.9 million for the development and construction of a training site, and authority to draw equipment from US Army controlled stocks in Thailand. The Secretary of Defense promptly approved the \$23 million for equipment and material.¹ In early December CINCPAC dispatched a team with USARPAC representation to Thailand to assist COMUSMACTHAI in planning and implementation of the RTA division training. DA assigned certain supply priorities and granted authority to issue equipment and supplies from operational stocks in Thailand.² CIN- USARPAC requested the \$2.9 million from DA for the construction and rehabilitation of training facilities, but went ahead with an authorization for the Pacific Naval Facilities Engineering Command to obligate these funds.³

~~(S)~~ In December COMUSMACTHAI presented the first total estimate of approximately \$80 million to be borne by the US for the cost of equipment (including M16A rifles), materiel, preparation of training facilities, pay and allowances for the training and deployment of the RTA division.⁴ CINCPAC forwarded this planning requirement to the JCS with the recommendation that action be taken to fulfill the requirements. The JCS informed CINCPAC that initial distribution must be made from theater assets.⁵ Thus, arrangements were made with DA and CINCUSARPAC to release from Hawaii assets the 2320 M16A rifles required for training purposes and for their shipment to Thailand in early 1968.⁶ At the end of the year plans were being coordinated with COMUSMACV and COMUSMACTHAI to provide the total of 4943 M16 rifles required by the RTA division. Information was provided regarding US Army controlled assets available in Thailand for the support of the RTA division and at the end of the year Theater assets were undergoing final screening in preparation for the submission to DA of requisitions for the balance of support requirements.⁷

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1. SECDEF 020142Z Dec 67.
 2. DA 042316Z Dec 67.
 3. CINCUSARPAC 130456Z Dec 67.
 4. COMUSMACTHAI 061140Z Dec 67.
 5. JCS 192117Z Dec 67.
 6. CINCPAC 220415Z Dec 67.
 7. Monthly Historical Submission, J422, CINCPAC, Dec 67.

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AID Support from Military ResourcesAID-Defense Department Program Realignments

(S) The Secretary of Defense made the determination in late 1966 that certain specific services formerly performed by AID in Vietnam were the appropriate functional responsibility of the Department of Defense.¹ Sixteen functions were identified by the Secretary of Defense and appropriate military components were designated to assume immediate responsibility. In December 1966 amendments were made to service budget estimates to include the costs of these expanded functions. The JCS requested that CINCPAC assess the impact of these additional responsibilities on force levels, programmed construction and the DOD piaster ceiling.² CINCPAC provided an initial assessment of additional resources required to support the realignments. CINCPAC estimated that 5,858 military spaces above Program 4 forces levels would be needed in addition to \$37.1 million for FY 67 construction and an increase of 2 billion piasters in the military ceiling.³

(S) In February COMUSMACV requested that he be designated DOD control authority over the AID-Defense program in Vietnam.⁴ CINCPAC recommended that the JCS delegate directive authority over the realignment programs to CINCPAC and that CINCPAC be authorized to redelegate this authority to COMUSMACV.⁵ Meanwhile COMUSMACV proceeded with the complex coordination between the various agencies including AID Vietnam and the MACV components to complete the orderly transfer of program responsibility. A meeting in Washington was sponsored in March by DA to discuss arrangements and procedures affecting the agencies and commands in Vietnam. CINCPAC recommended that the JCS coordinate these arrangements in order to assure joint direction and control of the AID-Defense programs. In April the JCS provided guidance to CINCPAC under which program directive authority was delegated to COMUSMACV.⁶ Meanwhile COMUSMACV continued to refine program definitions and

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1. CINCPAC Command History, 1966, Vol II, p. 752.
 2. JCS 9910/082154Z Dec 66.
 3. CINCPAC 280116Z Jan 67.
 4. COMUSMACV 260900Z Feb 67.
 5. CINCPAC 160241Z Mar 67.
 6. JCS 112316Z Apr 67; CINCPAC 190052Z Apr 67.

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requirements for military resources while at the Departmental level in Washington actions to program, budget and fund various projects were in several stages of completion.¹

~~(S)~~ By mid-1967 some changes in the original sixteen AID-Defense programs had been made. DOD support of the refugee program was re-cinded by the State Department and responsibility reverted to AID. Support of the Vietnam television service was assigned directly to DA and support of the air traffic control program was also no longer delegated to PACOM but was to be programmed, funded and managed by CSAF.²

~~(S)~~ In May COMUSMACV, with the concurrence of AID, requested a major revision of the AID-Defense budget for FY 67 in order to reduce the funding requirements of five of the programs and to increase funds for the highway maintenance program.³ CINCPAC concurred in this reprogramming action and requested early approval by the JCS.⁴ The Secretary of Defense requested assurance that the highway maintenance program meet the criteria for proper expenditure of O and M funds. The Secretary of Defense requested information on those programs planned for reduced funding, particularly the Saigon Port program.⁵ COMUSMACV provided additional information and analysis on the highway maintenance program and the reduction of scope of certain programs.⁶ CINCPAC concurred in COMUSMACV's plan and pointed out that the increased scope of the highway maintenance program would greatly assist in preserving the contractor capability in Vietnam until such time as a decision was made regarding the extent of additional forces to be deployed.⁷ The Secretary of Defense authorized the reprogramming of available funds that were not required for other programs.⁸ In mid-year a deficit in DA funding threatened to curtail the support for the highway maintenance program. After exchange of messages CINCUSARPAC released \$12.0 million to the highway maintenance program and indicated that DA had made this amount available in lieu of the

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1. Point Papers, J4114, CINCPAC, 20 Feb, 14 Mar, 14 Apr 67, Subj: AID/DOD Program Realignment for Support of Operations in Vietnam.
 2. Point Paper, J4414, CINCPAC, 27 Jun 67, Subj: AID/DOD Program Realignment for Support of Operations in Vietnam.
 3. COMUSMACV 021140Z May 67.
 4. CINCPAC 050407Z May 67.
 5. SECDEF 102047Z May 67.
 6. COMUSMACV 140540Z May 67; COMUSMACV 151156Z May 67.
 7. CINCPAC 212310Z May 67.
 8. SECDEF 101447Z Jun 67.

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amount of \$29.33 million which CINCPAC and COMUSMACV had previously confirmed as available to reprogram for highway maintenance.¹

~~(S)~~ DA continued to indicate that there were financial problems that would impact on the AID-Defense programs. As the FY 68 military budget was being considered in Washington CINCUSARPAC stated that DA had indicated serious financial strains existing in Army FY 68 operation and maintenance funds.² One of several program reductions proposed in PACOM included a \$25 million decrease in AID-Defense funding from \$43.7 million to \$18.7 million. COMUSMACV commented ~~on the~~ proposed reduction of FY 68 funds and stated that as a minimum the \$43.7 level must be maintained. CINCPAC concurred in the MACV requirement and recommended that the JCS support the budget level of \$43.7 that was being provided under continuing resolution authority.³ The JCS responded by stating \$43.7 million remained available for FY 68 AID-Defense programs and that this would be confirmed by DA after the passage of the DOD Appropriations Act.⁴ In November CINCPAC supported a request from COMUSMACV that an additional \$35 million be provided through service channels in FY 68 for the highway program.⁵ The Secretary of Defense thereafter advised CINCPAC that \$40.9 was to be provided for upgrading roads and waterways in Vietnam, and that an additional \$27 million could be provided through the FY 68 MILCON Program passed by Congress on November 21. He noted, however, that there was no provision for the additional \$35 million for highways in the AID-Defense realignment package.⁶

AID and Commercial Cargo Discharge at Saigon

~~(S)~~ In July 1966 the Secretary of Defense directed that MACV assume responsibility for the discharge and delivery of AID and commercial cargo at the Saigon Port in order to relieve a large backlog that had accumulated. Despite the military assistance in handling AID cargo, congestion of the Port of Saigon remained critical during 1966. At the beginning of 1967 there was over 200,000 short tons of goods available in the Saigon Port

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1. CINCPAC 150830Z Jun 67; DA 171929Z Jun 67; CINCPAC 260534Z Jun 67; CINCUSARPAC 302336Z Jun 67.
 2. CINCUSARPAC 050406Z Aug 67.
 3. COMUSMACV 130220Z Aug 67; CINCPAC 212224Z Aug 67.
 4. JCS 011419Z Sep 67.
 5. CINCPAC 040401Z Nov 67.
 6. SECDEF 012100Z Dec 67.

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for discharge and from 650 to 700 loaded barges plus 20 to 25 ships waiting for discharge.¹ The Secretary of Defense continued to consider a contingency plan submitted by COMUSMACV in December 1966 for the complete takeover of the Port of Saigon by the US military. Such takeover was not favored by COMUSMACV or CINCPAC and alternative measures such as improvement of the commercial barge operation and military responsibility for additional AID commodities were recommended.² In January, the Secretary of Defense was not completely satisfied with these alternatives and requested a revised plan that would significantly increase the throughput of AID and commercial cargo. COMUSMACV and the US Embassy were requested to immediately address the problem of discharging cargo from the barges.³ The US Embassy restated the view that it was not politically possible or desirable for the US to try to take over the Port of Saigon. The Embassy stated that recent and planned improvements in barge operations would alleviate port congestion.⁴ The Secretary of Defense again stated that improvements in throughput must be forthcoming or US military takeover would be necessary. The Secretary of State also requested an assessment as to whether the GVN would permit a full takeover of the Saigon Port.⁵

~~(S)~~ CINCPAC strongly supported the views expressed by the US Embassy in Saigon and advised the JCS that in addition to the negative political implications, a takeover would be inconsistent with nation-building objectives in Vietnam. CINCPAC also stated that there was no assurance that a takeover would solve the basic problem and that extraordinary action to clear the port by bolstering the RVN effort toward self-accomplishment would be the most effective means.⁶

~~(S)~~ One of the key elements upon which relief of congestion at the Port of Saigon depended was reduction in the large number of barges loaded with AID and commercial cargoes. As the year began the 650 to 700 barges under load constituted a problem in which the Secretary of Defense took a direct interest. A weekly barge status report from COMUSMACV was initiated in December 1966. This report indicated that despite aggressive

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1. CINCPAC Command History, 1966, Vol II, p. 748; Point Paper J481, CINCPAC, 5 Jan 67, Subj: Receipt of AID/Commercial Cargoes at Saigon.
 2. Point Paper, J481, CINCPAC, 14 Mar 67, Subj: Receipt of AID/Commercial Cargoes at Saigon.
 3. SECDEF 4607/252255Z Jan 67.
 4. AMEMB Saigon 17227/030400Z Feb 67.
 5. SECSTATE 130474/030143Z Feb 67.
 6. CINCPAC 122053Z Feb 67.

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action by COMUSMACV and AID the total number of barges under load increased during the first months of the year. The reasons for the continuing large backlog of unloaded barges included: failure of importers and consignees to remove cargo from the port area; market congestion of certain import items; lack of warehouse space; and shortage of discharge sites for barges.

~~(C)~~ Early in the year COMUSMACV and AID took several actions to reduce the turnaround time of barges in the Saigon Port. A Barge Control Center was established to inventory the barges and direct the rapid discharge of a ratio of both older and newly loaded barges. Cargoes were located and identified and customs procedures were expedited. The construction of additional discharge points, warehouses and storage areas was expedited. Despite these measures there was a high peak of 969 barges underload in late February and another high in mid-March of 966. However, by late March and April efforts of COMUSMACV and AID began to bring about a decrease in the backlog of barges. By mid-April the backlog was lowered to 720 barges and thereafter a steady decline in the backlog continued until mid-year when the problem was no longer serious.¹

~~(C)~~ During January and February progress was made in clearing the Port of Saigon. In addition to the improvement in barge operations, MACV provided strong advisory service to the GVN Port Director. The backlog of AID cargo awaiting discharge on deep draft ships was reduced significantly and by the end of February the Defense Department dropped the pressure to put into effect the MACV plan for military takeover of the port. During the succeeding months commercial port operations continued to improve and in August COMUSMACV reported that the port was operating effectively.² In response to a prior request from the JCS for information regarding the status of the revised MACV Saigon Port Plan, CINCPAC recommended that the requirement for revision and further comment on the plan be cancelled.³ The JCS then assigned CINCPAC the responsibility for submitting a joint AID/MACV plan to reduce and eventually to eliminate US military responsibility for the support of AID cargo operations in Saigon Port.⁴ COMUSMACV informed

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1. Point Paper, J481, CINCPAC, 4 Apr 67, Subj: Aid and Commercial Barge Operation at Saigon.
 2. COMUSMACV 160433Z Aug 67.
 3. JCS SASM 231757Z May 67; JCS SASM 222-46Z Aug 67.
 4. JCS SASM 302028Z Aug 67.

CINCPAC that the estimated completion date for the joint AID/MACV plan was 1 December 1967.

Transportation

Study of Scheduled Sealift Services

~~(C)~~ The JCS requested that a detailed study of scheduled sealift requirements of cargo movements in PACOM during the 12 months beginning in March 1967 be made.¹ In turn, CINCPAC, requested that the component commanders, joint commands and Chief, WestPac Transportation Office furnish data on shipping requirements by tonnage, commodity and routes. Comments and recommendations were also solicited regarding schedule frequencies, routes, ports of call, types of service, methods of according priorities for discharge and evaluations of LST, RO/RO, Reefer, and SEA EXPRESS services.² From the resulting study a revised concept termed "periodic sealift service" was developed. The periodic sealift concept was based on an allocations system which provided the benefits of scheduled service to the shippers without the disadvantages of cost and restricted use of assets inherent in rigidly scheduled service. This concept was approved and COMSTSFE was requested to initiate periodic sealift service on a pilot scale in July.³ The following routes were selected for periodic sealift service:


- a. Naha - Danang (deep draft)
- b. Yokohama - Saigon (deep draft)
- c. Naha - Chu Lai (shallow draft)

(U) CINCPAC monitored the periodic sealift service during the year and in November advised COMSTS that an evaluation of the service would be submitted at the end of the year. CINCPAC stated that this evaluation would reflect the viewpoints of shippers, receivers and comments provided by MSTSF. ⁴

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- 1. JCS SASM 665-66, 19 Dec 66.
 - 2. CINCPAC 240010Z Jan 67.
 - 3. Monthly Historical Submission, J4811, CINCPAC, Apr 67.
 - 4. CINCPAC 260043Z Nov 67; Monthly Historical Submission, J481, CINCPAC, Nov 67.

PACIFIC SEALIFT ROUTES MSTS

AS OF 1 JANUARY 1968



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
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SOURCE: PACOM Digest, Feb 68, p. 113.

MSTSPAC/FE NUCLEUS (USNS) SEALIFT CAPABILITY

AS OF 1 JANUARY 1968



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SOURCE: PACOM Digest, Feb 68, p. 112.

PACOM Ship Inventory and Port Status Reporting System

(U) In coordination with the JCS and COMUSMACV a plan for ADP system to report on the status of ships and ports in PACOM was developed by CINCPAC during the latter months of 1966. By January 1967 a draft manual of the system was completed and forwarded to JCS. The purpose of the PACOM Ship Inventory and Port Status Reporting System was to mechanize ship and port status information for rapid automatic transmission, receiving and processing at CINCPAC and at key user locations in PACOM. Details of the system were presented in early February to the logistic and ADP support activities of COMUSMACV, COMUSMACTHAI, COMSTSFE, and CHWTO. The proposed system as outlined by CINCPAC was enthusiastically received by these PACOM logistic activities.¹

(U) Programming of the Ship Inventory and Port Status Reporting System was essentially completed in mid-year and testing and debugging of the system was begun. Acceptance tests were slowed in July by equipment malfunctions and unforeseen programming problems. User tests in November gave unsatisfactory results and were discontinued. NAVCOSSACT directed the contractor (Planning Research Corporation) to reassess the program and to develop a new schedule for programming the system. At the end of the year new decision tables were being prepared to correct logic errors in the program and a new schedule calling for implementation in mid-1968 was established.²

PACOM Joint Transportation Board

~~(S)~~ The PACOM Joint Transportation Board (JTB) held five meetings during the year to review theater and SEAsia transportation capabilities and requirements.³ Among the agenda items and problem areas discussed during the JTB meetings were the following:

- a. AID cargo handling by MACV at RVN ports.
- b. The Saigon Port Plan.
- c. Containership service in PACOM.⁴
- d. Bangkok and Sattahip port problems.

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1. Monthly Historical Submission, J481, CINCPAC, Jan 67; Monthly Historical Submission, J413, CINCPAC, Feb 67.
 2. Monthly Historical Submission, J412, CINCPAC, Jun, Jul, Nov and Dec 67.
 3. CINCPAC Command History, 1966, Vol. I, p. 52.
 4. CINCPAC ltr ser 00195, 3 Feb 67.

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- e. Scheduled sealift study.
- f. Automated port and ship status reporting system. ¹
- g. Control of cargo shipments to Bangkok and Sattahip.
- h. Shipment of perishables to RVN. ²

Establishment of WestPac Transportation Office in Thailand

(C) Late in 1966 CINCPAC requested that COMUSMACTHAI consider the establishment of a branch of the WestPac Transportation Office (WTO) in Thailand. ³ COMUSMACTHAI generally did not favor the establishment of a Thai branch of the WTO in part because he considered that the planned establishment of the Joint Transportation Movements Board (JTMB) would accomplish the same function of determining passenger and cargo movement priorities and modes of transportation. ⁴ In April, CINCPAC requested that COMUSMACTHAI reconsider his nonconcurrence in the need for the WTO branch. CINCPAC pointed out that since December 1966 transportation requirements to and from Thailand and in-country had increased. These increases included passenger, air mail and in-country priority cargo. CINCPAC noted that the frequency and magnitude of emergency airlift of munitions and attendant combat support had risen and that the deployment of RTA units to Vietnam would place further demands on the transportation system. In view of the changing situation, and since there were indications that the MACTHAI JTMB would not be organized in the near future, COMUSMACTHAI was further informed that the establishment of the two or three-man branch of the WTO was essential. ⁵ COMUSMACTHAI changed his original position and concurred in CINCPAC's proposal. However, COMUSMACTHAI pointed out that there was reluctance on the part of the Thai Government to approve the establishment of any new organizations or offices in Thailand. It was suggested that some existing unit be augmented with the WTO personnel to provide the local service. ⁶ In June CINCPAC sent a JTD change request to the JCS. There followed a

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- 1. CINCPAC ltr ser 00729, 25 Apr 67.
 - 2. Monthly Historical Submission, J4831, CINCPAC, Jun 67.
 - 3. ADMINO CINCPAC 200506Z Dec 66; CHWTO ltr ser 0197-66, 14 Dec 66.
 - 4. COMUSMACTHAI 101121Z Jan 67.
 - 5. CINCPAC 010358Z Apr 67.
 - 6. COMUSMACTHAI 280522Z Apr 67.

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delay in the receipt of approval from the JCS, and later in the year action requesting approval of the three spaces for the Thai branch of the WTO was included in a joint manpower recommendation which was being staffed at the end of the year for dispatch to the JCS. Meanwhile the functions of the Thailand branch of the WTO were being handled by personnel sent to Thailand on TDY.

Ship Delay Time in Southeast Asia Ports

~~(S)~~ Despite the CINCPAC shipping control efforts and the gradual increase in the receiving capabilities of RVN ports there were periods at various ports when arrivals exceeded immediate port capabilities. Among the measures taken to reduce ship delay time in ports was one which considered tonnage loads rather than cargo priorities. CINCPAC directed that RVN support ships carrying a minimum tonnage of 1500 M/T of general cargo and 1000 M/T of ammunition be discharged irrespective of the priority of the cargo remaining on board. This measure had limited application at Danang where delays were not serious.¹

~~(S)~~ In March the JCS expressed concern about a steady increase in demurrage charges caused by ship delays in RVN waters. CINCPAC was asked to provide recommendations to CONUS agencies which would enable them to assist in decreasing ship turn-around time.² COMUSMACV addressed the problems of reducing ship demurrage in RVN and noted a number of actions taken early in 1967 which had already resulted in considerable reduction of turn-around time during the first three months of the year. More realistic forecasting had reduced the number of ships in-country. However, COMUSMACV pointed out another key factor which was still contributing to ship delays and that was the multiple port loading of ships. COMUSMACV reemphasized his long-standing objective that single port loading of shipping be practiced to the maximum extent possible. COMUSMACV made other recommendations concerning the reduction of ship delay in RVN ports.³ The PACOM JTB considered the problem of demurrage costs was unavoidable. CINCPAC recommended to the JCS that the loading procedures suggested by COMUSMACV be considered, particularly the practice of loading for a single port of discharge. CINCPAC also recommended that COMSTS be

1. Monthly Historical Submission, J4812, CINCPAC, Jan 67.

2. JCS 9802/241702Z Mar 67.

3. COMUSMACV 020817Z Apr 67.

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tasked to provide additional comparative information on per diem billings of Berth Term/Contract shipping and COMSTSFE assigned shipping.¹ COMSTS provided information which revealed a number of difficulties in comparing data on the operation of Berth Term/Shipping and COMSTSFE assigned shipping.²

(U) In late April the JCS confirmed COMUSMACV's evaluation that ship delay billings were reduced during February and March. COMSTS was requested to provide a consolidated monthly report of delay billings for use by CINCPAC as a management tool to continue to monitor the problem of costs resulting from ship delays in SEAsian ports.³

Shipping Availability and Congestion in CONUS Ports

~~(S)~~ A deficit in available shipping to meet requirements for sealift from CONUS to RVN existed from mid-1966 until mid-1967. Although ship availability was improving in January 1967 there was still a short fall of some 118,000 Measurement Tons as the year began. There were a number of factors which contributed to the shipping deficit during the first months of 1967. There was a fundamental increase in shipping requirements for military cargo bound for RVN. In addition, there was a large increase in AID and Commercial cargo handled by the military transportation system. There were continuing delays in cargo discharge in RVN ports. High backlogs during the early months of the year were pronounced in the Port of Saigon while in other RVN ports there were ship delays occasioned by surges in ship arrivals and the influx of ammunition ships. The longer turn-around times in RVN ports reduced the movement capability of available ships. Also contributing to the shipping deficit was a West Coast shipyard workers' strike which continued into 1967. There were crew shortages that frequently delayed sailings from the West Coast and contributed to the problem of bunching of ships at their destinations.

~~(U)~~ In order to reduce the shipping deficit, foreign flag shipping was procured because of the limited availability of US flag ships. By March, 14 or 15 foreign flag ships were moving approximately 114,000 M/T per month. By mid-February the shipping deficit had been reduced and the CONUS backlog of cargo for RVN had been lowered to 50,000 M/T.

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1. CINCPAC 082305Z Apr 67.
 2. COMSTS 201350Z Apr 67.
 3. JCS 4012/282354Z Apr 67.
 4. Shipments that continued to be delayed were cement, lumber and post exchange supplies.

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Ship turnaround time in RVN ports continued to be reduced and military port throughput capability in RVN improved during 1967 with the increase from 24 to 32 deep draft shipping berths. MSTs shipping capability was ungraded later in the year with the initiation of direct containership service from CONUS to RVN.¹

SEA EXPRESS Shipping Service

~~(S)~~ The SEA EXPRESS (SEA-EX) shipping service was established in mid-1965 and has been providing an expedited sealift with weekly sailings from San Francisco to Saigon and Bangkok. The purpose of SEA-EX was to relieve over-taxed MAC airlift facilities of certain air-eligible shipments by providing expedited ocean transport with preferred handling from the shipping activity to the consignee.² During 1966 and 1967 SEA-EX designated cargoes were stowed on ships scheduled for direct passage to RVN ports. The amount of cargo on any one ship ranged from several hundred tons to 40 percent of tonnage on board. The system continued on occasion to be thwarted at Saigon because of discharge procedures. COMUSMACV policy on cargo discharge was based on the needs ashore of the entire contents of the ship rather than on the priority assigned to specific SEA-EX cargo, and it was not always practical to bring SEA-EX carriers to berth to discharge only SEA-EX cargo.³

~~(S)~~ In April CINCPAC was informed of the findings of an OSD study on SEA-EX operations, particularly as a substitute for airlift. It was noted that MAC was spending approximately \$600 million annually for commercial airlift augmentation, and that a significant amount of CONUS and PACOM airlifted cargo was questionable in terms of priority for air movement. The need to reduce MAC commercial airlift expenditures prompted OSD to implement controls to reduce the airlift and increase the effectiveness of SEA-EX shipping. OSD noted that up to 20 percent of surface cargo was moved by SEA-EX shipping and that delivery times were generally little better than that provided by other sealift. OSD

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1. Point Papers, J4811, CINCPAC, 5 Jan 67 and 18 Jan 67, Subj: Shipping Availability and Congestion in CONUS Ports; Point Papers, J4811; CINCPAC, 20 Feb 67, 15 Apr 67, and 5 May 67, Subj: Shipping Availability.
 2. JCS 0222256Z Jun 65.
 3. Point Paper, J481, CINCPAC, 19 Jan 67, Subj: Sea Express (SEA-EX) Service Shipments).

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reemphasized that SEA-EX cargo was to be top and block stowed, identified separately on manifests, and not accumulated into shipping lots but dispatched on the earliest available and most direct sailing. OSD requested that water terminal authorities clear only Transportation Priority 1 and 2 cargoes for SEA-EX shipment. In the matter of reduction of air shipments of questionable priority, OSD directed that specified commodities in lots of over 1,000 pounds be automatically challenged before air shipment was authorized.¹

(U) CINCPAC reaffirmed previous guidance requiring a special review of requisitions that called for airlift. Special challenging procedures similar to those set forth by OSD for CONUS export cargoes were established for PACOM originated cargoes. Instructions were also issued to reserve the use of PACOM air transportation only when it was required to satisfy urgent customer needs, and that in lieu of airlift the SEA-EX service should be used as an alternative mode of shipment for cargo which might normally have air priority.² The increased emphasis on challenging airlift requests resulted in the diversion of many shipments from air to surface movements. One item given special attention was the airlift of M-113 armored personnel carriers. CINCPAC stated that M-113s were not authorized airlift except on opportune retrograde air traffic.³ In response to a DA query CINCPAC advised that the new challenge procedures did not divert valid air shipments to sealift and if any adverse effects were experienced in the future, requests for exceptions would be considered.⁴

~~(S)~~ Late in the year OSD took further action to expand challenge procedures in order to further the use of SEA-EX shipping and reduce airlift requirements. In October OSD requested challenge of all shipments over 1,000 pounds and having a required delivery date more than 180 days later than the date offered for air movement. In December this challenge procedure was extended to all shipments in excess of 1,000 pounds regardless of the time factor in requisition and shipment. The new requirement included RED BALL and code 999 shipments. At the end of the year CINCPAC was evaluating the impact of the expanded airlift challenge procedures on PACOM logistic systems.⁵

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1. SECDEF 272158Z Apr 67.
 2. CINCPAC 130040Z May 67.
 3. CINCPAC 300114Z May 67.
 4. CINCPAC 070315Z Jul 67; Monthly Historical Submissions, J4821, CINCPAC, May Jul 67.
 5. Brief for JCS Papers, J48, CINCPAC, 16 Jan 68.

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LSTs in Support of RVN

(S) Shallow draft shipping requirements in support of RVN continued to exceed ship availability, particularly during the first quarter of 1967. The status of LST shipping that was available for RVN logistic support early in the year was as follows:

- a. 36 MSTSF E LSTs, manned by Japanese and Korean crews. These ships provided most of the intra-theater and coastal shallow draft sealift in SEAsia.
- b. 11 MSTSF E controlled LSTs, manned by US Navy personnel. These ships provided additional shallow draft support for RVN.
- c. 3 ROK, 2 GRC, and 1 Thailand LST provided coastal shallow draft support for RVN.
- d. CINCPACFLT provided additional LSTs as requested for special lifts supplementing MSTSF E assets.
- e. An average of 20 LSTs from MSTSF E and CINCPACFLT were continuously engaged in the movement of cargo in support of RVN requirements set forth by COMUSMACV.¹

(S) Since a number of LSTs were being utilized for deep draft intra-theater lifts MSTSF E provided additional small cargo ships after January. An additional interim measure to relieve the pressure on shallow draft LST assets was to detain some of the CONUS to RVN shipping resources and employ them on intra-theater runs. This additional deep draft shipping combined with the increasingly rapid turnaround times in RVN ports contributed substantially during the first quarter to decreasing the pressure on LST resources and permitted increased use of LSTs for deliveries to ports where only shallow draft ships could be received. Nevertheless, LST requirements in support of RVN continued to be sufficiently heavy as to maintain pressure on theater LST assets. The transshipment of cargo from major port areas in RVN to areas supported by over-the-beach operations continued to be a large operation. CINCPAC favored the continued development of deep water berths in various RVN ports such as Vung Ro, Qui Nhon and Vung Tau in order to reduce dependence on LST operations.

1. Point Paper, J4812, CINCPAC, 5 Jan 67, Subj: Shallow Draft Shipping Support of RVN.

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~~(S)~~ The need for armed LSTs and for a review of LST assets arose in March when COMUSMACV requested that six armed LSTs be provided, two of which would be used on the Danang-Dong Ha shuttle and four in support of operations in the Delta.¹ Since five MSTs controlled LSTs were scheduled for conversion to ROK civilian manning and removal of armament, CINCPAC provided CNO with alternative recommendations concerning the delay of this action.² CNO directed that the conversion of the five LSTs be delayed until requirements were resolved. Thereafter, CINCPAC requested that COMUSMACV study his LST needs and provide firm requirements, utilization data and operational information.³ This information was needed to determine what augmentation of MSTSF LST assets should be made from CINCPACFLT assets. COMUSMACV advised that there was a requirement for 38 LST, including 3 for the Mekong Delta Riverine Assault Forces (MDRAF) and 35 for current intra-RVN logistic support, PRACTICE NINE requirements, and FY 68 force requirements.⁴ CINCPACFLT reaffirmed the commitment of 3 LSTs for MDRAF in FY 68, but recommended that assets other than those of PACFLT be used for additional intra-RVN logistic support.⁵ COMSTSF stated that 35 LSTs could be provided for logistic support for a relatively brief period on an emergency basis. COMSTSF stated that on a long-term basis 26 LSTs (plus the 3 armed vessels for MDRAF) could be provided without degrading support to RVN from other PACOM ports. COMSTSF also indicated that the 26 LSTs were sufficient to meet COMUSMACV's requirements in part because of increased efficiency in utilization by COMUSMACV.⁶ At CINCPAC's request, COMUSMACV reviewed RVN LST utilization factors and re-evaluated LST requirements. In reply, COMUSMACV concurred with the MSTSF assessment that 26 LSTs were sufficient to move estimated monthly tonnage requirements but indicated that an additional 5 or 6 LSTs would be required by mid-1967 for support of operations in I CTZ.⁷

~~(S)~~ At the end of the year LST deployments, manning, locations and general missions were as depicted on the following chart.

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1. COMUSMACV 031205Z Mar 67.
 2. CINCPAC 010421Z Apr 67.
 3. CINCPAC 120338Z Apr 67.
 4. COMUSMACV 260926Z Apr 67.
 5. CINCPACFLT 270424Z May 67.
 6. COMSTSF 050249Z Jun 67.
 7. CINCPAC 132137Z Jun 67; COMUSMACV 011212Z Jul 67.

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STATUS OF LSTs TO SUPPORT PACOM OPERATIONS

| Control/Manning | Nr. | Armed Status | Locations | | Utilization of WestPac LSTs | | |
|-----------------------------|------|-----------------|-----------|-------|---------------------------------|---|--------------------|
| | | | E-Pac | W-Pac | Fleet Support | Logistic Support | |
| CINCPACFLT | 41 | | 11 | 30 | 27 | 3 | |
| LanShipRon 9 (Yokosuka) | (8) | Armed | (0) | (8) | (7) (1) | Tactical MDRAF | (0) |
| LanShipRon 1 (San Diego) | (19) | Armed | (11) | (8) | (3) (4) | Tactical Game Warden | (1) Danang Shuttle |
| LanShipRon 3 (Guam) | (14) | Armed | (0) | (14) | (8) (1) (1) (1) (1) | Tactical MDRAF Market Time Damaged due to broaching Trust Terr. Spt | (2) Danang Shuttle |
| MSTSFE | 47 | | NA | 47 | 0 | 47 | |
| Civilian Manned | 42 | Unarmed | | (42) | (0) | (15) Intra-PACOM (27) RVN | |
| LanShipRon 2 | (5) | Armed | | (5) | (0) | (2) Intra-PACOM (3) RVN | |
| THIRD COUNTRY | 4 | | NA | 4 | 0 | 4 | |
| ROK (Mil Manned) | (3) | Armed | | (3) | (0) | (3) RVN (ARVN) | |
| TOTAL | 92 | | 11 | 81 | 27 | 54 | |

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Self-Propelled Seagoing Barge for RVN

(U) COMSTS informed CINCPAC that a 300 foot prototype self-propelled open deck seagoing barge for use in RVN waters may be available in the future. The proposed shallow draft vessel had RO-RO discharge capability, and in addition to accommodating tanks, wheeled vehicles, and container cargo could provide for helicopter landing. COMSTS requested that CINCPAC assess the capabilities of the barge and advise them if the barge would enhance military operations in Vietnam.¹ The response of the cognizant PACOM commanders was generally very favorable to the acquisition and use of the barge.² COMUSMACV gave evidence of a strong interest in the barge for use in coastal cargo operations.³ COMUSMACV had previously cited the overall performance in RVN of the Beach Discharge Lighter (BDL) LTC JOHN U. D. PAGE, a craft with similar but more sophisticated characteristics than the self-propelled barge.⁴ COMUSMACV has also noted that commanders who had employed the BDL had emphasized a desire for more vessels of this type, and COMUSMACV had stated a requirement for a minimum of 4 BDLs as soon as possible.⁵ CINCUSARPAC was also very interested in use of the self-propelled barge for coastal operations after trial tests in RVN.⁶ CINCUSARPAC had strongly supported COMUSMACV's prior recommendation that 4 BDLs be procured expeditiously for use in RVN.⁷

(U) CINCPACFLT indicated that the self-propelled seagoing barge could be employed for trans-shipments to underdeveloped ports if the vessel were properly configured. CINCPACFLT requested additional information on the characteristics of the proposed barge.⁸ CINCPAC informed COMSTS that the self-propelled barge would enhance military operations in RVN. CINCPAC stated that it was assumed that appreciable cost differences and ready availability of the barge had prompted COMSTS's interest in it as opposed to the construction of additional BDLs with proven performance such as the LTC JOHN U. D. PAGE. Later in the year CINCPAC stated that development of the barge-type vessel was desirable

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1. COMSTS 090253Z Feb 67.
 2. CINCPAC 110520Z Feb 67.
 3. COMUSMACV 031210Z Mar 67.
 4. COMUSMACV 030108Z Jun 66.
 5. COMUSMACV 231000Z Jul 66.
 6. CINCUSARPAC 110352Z Mar 67.
 7. CINCUSARPAC 010418Z Oct 66.
 8. CINCPACFLT 210523Z Feb 67.

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to enhance the future military capability for over-the-beach operations. CINCPAC considered, however, that the establishment of quantitative requirements was premature and that feasibility studies and formal R&D evaluations were needed. CINCPAC suggested that the barge-type vessel should be field tested in an operational environment and that consideration be given to using the barge to replace part of the aging MSTs LST fleet. ¹

Containership Service to RVN

~~(S)~~ Arrangements to provide containership service from CONUS west coast terminals to RVN ports continued. ² Two types of containership service - helicopter off-load and conventional off-load - were under consideration to determine their relative acceptability for service in RVN. Early in the year COMSTS solicited contractor bids for the helicopter and conventional off-load systems. Bids were received by COMSTS and in February a meeting was held in Washington to consider the contractor offers and develop recommendations for the optimum type of containership service. The meeting was attended by representatives from CINCPAC and MACV. Attention tended to focus on the conventional off-load containership system, and COMSTS outlined the following concept which was later recommended to CNO and OSD for adoption:

- a. Container delivery of approximately 720,000 M/T per year equally distributed to the ports of Saigon, Cam Ranh Bay, Qui Nhon and Danang.
- b. Use of large self-sustaining vessels for single port discharge at Danang.
- c. Use of large non self-sustaining vessels for complete discharge at Cam Ranh Bay by crane and transshipment in smaller self-sustaining vessels to Saigon and Qui Nhon only.

~~(S)~~ COMSTS selected Sea Land Service, Inc. as the contractor and forwarded the proposed contract to OSD for approval. OSD requested clarification and justification and COMUSMACV provided this along with

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1. CINCPAC 112210Z Oct 67.
 2. CINCPAC Command History, 1966, Vol. II, p. 735.

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a plan for integrating the conventional containership service with the overall RVN logistic system.¹ In late March the JCS informed CINCPAC that OSD had approved the COMSTS containership service plan. Subsequently COMSTS awarded the contract to Sea-Land Service and partial service was scheduled to begin in mid-year.²

~~(S)~~ In July it was apparent that there would be a delay in implementation of the containership service. The contractor was experiencing a delay in the installation of the pier crane at Cam Ranh Bay.³ COMUSMACV and CINCPACFLT recommended that the contemplated partial service to Army ports beginning in August be delayed and that the ships scheduled for exclusive use at Danang begin operations there in August. CINCPAC advised COMSTS of his concurrence with this change and containership service began at Danang in August. By November conventional containership service was underway at Cam Ranh Bay, Qui Nhon, and Saigon.⁴

~~(S)~~ Meanwhile, continued consideration was given to the concept of helicopter off-load of self-sustaining containerships for logistic support of RVN operations. Discharge of containers could be accomplished by helicopter shuttle between ships and inland destinations. In January CINCPAC reassessed the requirement for the helicopter discharge concept. The JCS was informed that logistic off-load capabilities in RVN as forecast for 1968-1970 were sufficient to satisfy requirements, and that the helo discharge system could not be justified on the basis of discharge requirements. However, CINCPAC stated that the system may be justified on the basis of providing a capability for contingencies in SEAsia, and that the helicopter off-load was desirable at a minimum level.⁵ The helicopter off-load system was tested by an interested contractor on 27 January and the results were considered to have been very successful.⁶ Following the impressive contractor test, COMSTS sponsored a conference in order to

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1. Monthly Historical Submission, J483, CINCPAC, Feb 67; Point Paper, J4832, CINCPAC, 4 Apr 67, Subj: Containership Service to WestPac; COMUSMACV 160318Z Mar 67; CINCPAC 180436Z Mar 67.
 2. JCS 272252Z Mar 67.
 3. CINCPAC 070426Z Jul 67.
 4. CINCPAC 222336Z Jun 67; CINCPACFLT 140359Z Jul 67; COMUSMACV 210903Z Jul 67.
 5. CINCPAC 102350Z Jan 67.
 6. Point Paper, J4831, CINCPAC, 20 Feb 67, 14 Mar 67, Subj: Containership Service to WestPac.

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plan additional tests of the helicopter discharge concept. CINCPAC was represented at the conference where it was determined that SEAsia was the best place to test the concept.¹ COMSTS requested CINCPAC's comments on several proposed test sites. In response to a CINCPAC query, COMUSMACV advised that helicopter discharge of containerhips was desired at the port of Danang with possible extension to other shallow-draft ports in RVN. COMUSMACTHAI also made recommendations for the use of helicopter discharge at Sattahip and alternately at the port of Bangkok.² CINCPAC forwarded these recommendations with concurrence and thereafter COMSTS developed a six-month test plan to be conducted in I CTZ. The helicopter test plan was named Ship Helicopter Extended Delivery System (SHEDS). Changes were made in the SHEDS test plan on 5 October and these were scheduled to begin in July 1968 on a scale of 20,000 M/T per month. Containerized cargo from CONUS would be unloaded and delivered by helicopter to consignees in the Danang area. Additionally, containers would be restuffed at Danang, loaded on the containership by helicopter, and subsequently off-loaded by helicopter at ports north and south of Danang.³

Roll-on-Roll-off Shipping Service

~~(S)~~ Roll-on-Roll-off (RO-RO) shipping service expanded in 1966 and by November three ships were transporting requirements to RVN ports from Okinawa. It appeared in early 1967 that WestPac sealift movement requirements might level off or decline with the increased direct CONUS RVN shipments and because of shifts of supply items from the "push" system based on general requirements to normal requisitioning procedures.⁴ However, the three RO-RO ships serving Vietnam from Okinawa were fully utilized during the year and the numerous advantages of the RO-RO shipping system were increasingly apparent. The ships were capable of delivering high priority cargo, vehicles, special ammunition loads and sensitive cargos to the ports of Saigon, Cam Ranh Bay, Qui Nhon, and Danang. RO-RO deliveries had the advantages of rapid load and unload times, minimum port manpower and equipment requirements, minimum damage and pilferage, rapid port clearance of cargo, and the vehicles discharged were ready for immediate operations.

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1. COMSTS 031810Z Apr 67.
 2. COMUSMACV 170440Z May 67; COMUSMACTHAI 150701Z May 67.
 3. CINCPAC 140202Z Nov 67; COMUSMACV 031100Z Dec 67; Monthly Historical Submission, J483, CINCPAC, Apr, May, Nov, Dec, 67.
 4. CINCPAC Command History, 1966, Vol II, p. 732.

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Actual RO-RO Cargo Tonnage Shipped - 1967

| <u>Month</u> | <u>Okinawa-RVN</u> | <u>RVN-Okinawa</u> |
|--------------|--------------------|--------------------|
| June | 28,000 | 4,500 |
| July | 11,000 | 2,200 |
| August | 10,000 | 7,000 |
| September | 24,100 | 13,000 |
| October | 15,000 | 14,000 |
| November | 18,000 | 13,500 |

Toward the end of 1967 requirements were forecast for RO-RO shipping service which indicated to CINCPAC the need for a fourth RO-RO ship in PACOM to support operations in Vietnam and Thailand. In connection with discussions of the possible transfer of the USNS WILLIAM M. CALLAGHAN from CONUS operations, CINCPAC provided MTMTS with information that had been requested on specified ports. MTMTS was informed that Cam Ranh Bay could accommodate the larger WILLIAM M. CALLAGHAN, while Qui Nhon could not. Further details on ship characteristics were needed to evaluate Danang while the use of Sattahip was possible if the required agreement was obtained from the Thailand Government for use of the RO-RO system.¹ In December COMSTS indicated that a fourth RO-RO would not be assigned to intra-PACOM service unless a firm requirement was provided to COMSTFE.² At the end of the year CINCPAC requested data from CINCUSARPAC, CINCPACFLT, and CINCPACAF in order to provide COMSTFE with a consolidated six-month forecast of RO-RO requirements.³

Reduction of Berth Term and Space Charter Shipments to Thailand

(U) In May COMUSMATHAI requested that action be taken to reduce berth term and space charter shipments to Thailand and to utilize MSTs controlled ships to the maximum. COMUSMATHAI cited Bangkok port congestion, customs procedures, local priorities and high demurrage costs as reason to support this request. COMUSMATHAI favored the increased use of Sattahip which would be feasible if greater use was made of MSTs controlled shipping.⁴ This request was considered at the April meeting of the Joint Transportation Board. MSTs made the point that

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1. CINCPAC 290236Z Nov 67.
 2. COMSTS 282059Z Dec 67.
 3. CINCPAC 300429Z Dec 67.
 4. COMUSMATHAI 120435Z May 67.

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under governing laws and statutes, berth line operators could not be excluded from legitimate commerce including military cargo but could be encouraged to offer space on routes other than to congested areas.¹ CINCPAC requested that COMUSMACTHAI's recommendations be assessed and the JCS asked MSTTS and MTMTS to provide a coordinated recommendation on the use of MSTTS controlled shipping to Thailand.² Procedures were subsequently authorized by the JCS to make maximum use, on a trial basis, of MSTTS controlled ships for movement of military cargo to Thailand and provisions were made to consolidate general cargo into minimum shipment of 2,000 M/T per sailing. At CINCPAC's request, the JCS authorized an extension of these procedures until mid-Jan 1968.³ CINCPAC thereafter requested that CINCUSARPAC, CHWTO and PAMPA evaluate the effectiveness of these procedures and at the end of the year CINCPAC was preparing a recommendation to the JCS regarding the need to continue maximum use of MSTTS shipping to service Thailand.⁴

(U) In September COMUSMACTHAI requested that all US surface mail to Thailand be consigned to Sattahip.⁵ CINCPAC approved the request and tasked MTMTS, CINCUSARPAC and CINCPACFLT to carry out this procedure to the fullest extent possible. CINCPAC requested that mail be consolidated with general cargo on MSTTS controlled ships whenever possible.⁶

Airlift Requirements

(S) In December 1966, the JCS directed that theater commanders, including CINCPAC, assure that all theater airlift assets be fully utilized before any levies are made against MAC for intra-theater airlift support. Using this guidance CINCPAC directed that CINCPACAF conduct a series of three theater airlift studies for the periods of CY 67, FY 68 and CY 68. Theater Airlift Study CY 67 was completed by CINCPACAF at the end of January 1967 and thereafter briefed to CINCPAC, CSAF and the JCS. The PACAF study concluded that there would be adequate intra-theater MAC-PACOM airlift capability for CY 67 and that Tactical Air Command augmentation of MAC would not be required beyond February 1967. The study recommended that consideration of

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1. COMSTS 201350Z Apr 67.
 2. CINCPAC 160226Z May 67; JCS 192051Z 67.
 3. CINCPAC 040130Z Aug 67; JCS 112203Z Aug 67.
 4. CINCPAC 160218Z Aug 67.
 5. COMUSMACTHAI 080233Z Sep 67.
 6. CINCPAC 090630Z Sep 67.

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the deployment of two additional C-130 squadrons to PACOM be withheld for the time being. The study also concluded that improvements were required in air crew manning, higher priorities for materiel support of the airlift force, and reductions in ground handling time. CINCPAC endorsed the PACAF study which was well received at all echelons. ¹

~~(S)~~ CINCPAC initiated action to coordinate the FY 68 airlift study with the objective of refining the CY 67 conclusions, extending the evaluation period and evaluating progress in resolving problem areas. ² In April CINCPAC considered that any increase in MACV forces would impact on future studies, and noted that heavy March and April temporary augmentations of airlift in RVN disrupted the planned utilization of theater airlift resources in a manner that should be considered in the future studies. ³ The PACAF Airlift Study for FY 68 was completed in mid-year.

Automated Reporting of Intra-Theater Airlift Requirements

(U) In April representatives of CINCPAC visited the WestPac Transportation Office in Japan for the purpose of analyzing the manual methods of computing forecasts of WestPac airlift requirements and if possible to design an automated system to forecast requirements and prepare reports. It was determined that an automated system was feasible and desirable and system parameters, design criteria and formats for input and output were completed during the April visit. The system was completed and automated forecasting of WestPac airlift requirements began in May. ⁴

Special Priority Airlift Systems "999" and RED BALL

(U) During the year there was considerable discussion of the relative merits of the two priority airlift systems supporting RVN operations - "999" and RED BALL. Both systems were time-phased programs to expedite priority cargo from CONUS to the consumer in RVN. However, all RED BALL shipments were routed through Tan Son Nhut Air Base and in-country airlift was used for movement to final destinations. Such was

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1. PACAF/MAC, Theater Airlift Study CY 67, CPRS 001547, 31 Jan 67; Point Paper, J482, CINCPAC, Subj: PACOM Theater Airlift Studies 3 Apr 67.
 2. CINCPAC 240631Z Feb 67.
 3. Point Paper, J482, CINCPAC, Subj: PACOM Theater Airlift Studies, 15 Apr 67.
 4. Monthly Historical Submission, J412, CINCPAC, April 1967.

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not the case with "999" cargo which was sent direct from CONUS airheads nearest the final destination. General Accounting Office representatives criticized the efficiency of the Army's RED BALL system and COMUSMACV requested that USARV evaluate the system.¹ At the end of the year CINCPAC was monitoring the results of USARV's evaluation.²

New MAC Passenger and Cargo Channels

(U) Because of the variety of ways in which new proposals for the establishment of MAC channels were being handled, CINCPAC clarified procedures for the establishment of new cargo or passenger channels in PACOM. CINCPAC specifically requested that all communications regarding new channels include CINCPAC as an action addressee and CINCPACAF as an information addressee. CINCPAC also requested that CINCPACAF furnish comments on the availability of support when informed of new proposals.³ As the procedures were worked out it was agreed that new channels would be established by agreement between CINCPAC and the Secretary of the Air Force.⁴

~~(C)~~ During the later months of 1966, CINCPAC and COMUSMACV had urged that new MAC passenger and mail channels be established in RVN in order to relieve congestion at Tan Son Nhut Air Base, eliminate unnecessary in-country transshipments, and expedite mail deliveries. The major obstacle to the establishment of new routes was a GVN restriction which limited MAC contract carriers to the use of Tan Son Nhut Air Base and denied or severely limited landing rights to points elsewhere in RVN. Considerable friction had developed during 1966 between the GVN and the US flag air carriers operating in RVN. In November 1966, Premier Ky set forth some conditions under which broader clearance provisions were made. The GVN proposed that MAC contract carriers must carry only military personnel, equipment and not fly from one airfield to another within RVN. In addition, the MAC carriers would have to submit operational schedules to the GVN in advance and pay premium landing fees. The US Secretary of State, with the concurrence of DOD, informed the US Ambassador in Saigon that the GVN terms were unacceptable, and on 14 November Ambassador Lodge personally requested

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1. COMUSMACV 211123Z Nov 67.
 2. CINCPAC 272040Z Nov 67.
 3. CINCPAC 110400Z Feb 67.
 4. Point Paper, J4821, CINCPAC, 4 Apr 67, Subj: MAC Channels to SEAsia.

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blanket clearances for commercial military contract carriers. Premier Ky approved the request; however, during the succeeding months it became apparent that GVN officials below the Premier were not implementing the provisions for easier clearance. In March the Secretary of State asked the US Embassy in Saigon to request that the GVN issue instructions to clarify prior agreements and to prevent the continuing harassment of MAC contract carriers. CINCPAC advised COMUSMACV to discuss the matter with Premier Ky and General Vien, Minister of Defense. COMUSMACV discussed MAC charter operations with General Vien on the 28th of March. Following these talks there was a short lull in harassment of MAC charter operations, however, GVN officials continued to obstruct MAC charter operations.¹

~~(S)~~ Despite the continuing harassment by lower-level GVN officials Premier Ky's agreement with Ambassador Lodge served to permit the addition of new MAC channels into RVN. Thus, beginning in January 1967 there was considerable activity in establishing new channels in SEAsia. The following routes to RVN were established:

January

| | | |
|-------------------------|----|--------------|
| CONUS (McChord AFB) PAX | to | Cam Ranh Bay |
| CONUS PAX | to | Danang |
| CONUS (East Coast) PAX | to | Bien Hoa |
| CONUS (West Coast) PAX | to | Bien Hoa |
| CONUS Cargo-Mail | to | Cam Ranh Bay |
| CONUS Mail | to | Danang |

February

| | | |
|-----------------|----|--------|
| CONUS PAX Cargo | to | Pleiku |
|-----------------|----|--------|

March

| | | |
|-------------------------|----|--------------|
| CONUS (Kelly AFB) Cargo | to | Cam Ranh Bay |
|-------------------------|----|--------------|

~~(S)~~ In April COMUSMACV was studying a proposed new MAC channel for cargo from CONUS to Phu Cat in II CTZ. This route addition would replace the CONUS to Pleiku cargo channel. This change was approved by CSAF and operations began in October.² In May COMUSMACV requested that the passenger channel from CONUS-Clark-to-Pleiku be shifted to

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1. Point Papers, J4821, CINCPAC, 8 Feb 67, 21 Feb 67, 14 Mar 67, 24 Mar 67, 4 Apr 67, 15 Apr 67, and 5 May 67, Subj: MAC Contract (Charter) Flight Clearances in RVN.
 2. COMUSMACV 071408Z Jul 67; CINCPAC 120502Z Jul 67; CSAF 262101Z Jul 67.

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Cam Ranh Bay. Questions were raised by CWTO and CINCPACAF regarding the additional requirement and the capability of Cam Ranh Bay to absorb the added workload. COMUSMACV remained convinced that the switch of passenger service from Pleiku to Cam Ranh Bay would be practical and in August provided further justification for the change. CINCPAC supported the request and the change was made in August. ¹

~~(S)~~ In October, CG US Army Materiel Command recommended that the MAC cargo service from Dover to Cam Ranh Bay be extended to Danang or that a new cargo channel be established from Dover to Danang. ²

~~(S)~~ In addition to those servicing RVN there were new MAC channels established to support operations in Thailand. In March a MAC cargo service from Kelly Air Force Base to Udorn, Korat and Bangkok was established. In May CINCPACAF proposed the establishment of a new channel from CONUS through Guam to U-Tapao. As CINCPAC coordinated the discussion of this requirement a provision for passengers was included and later withdrawn because of the lack of passenger facilities at U-Tapao. Travis-Guam to U-Tapao cargo service was initiated on 15 June and subsequently limited passenger service was arranged. ³ As the year passed it became increasingly evident that additional passenger service to Thailand and within the country was needed. The only MAC Terminal in Thailand, at Don Moug Air Base near Bangkok, became increasingly congested due to the volume of passenger traffic handled daily. The US Embassy recommended opening a new MAC Terminal at U-Tapao to ease the workload at Bangkok. CINCPACAF also favored moving some of the terminal activity to other locations in Thailand. As the matter was under consideration, CINCPAC requested users to submit forecasts of requirements at five Thailand destinations in addition to Bangkok. CINCPAC also requested that the US Embassy provide information concerning the acquisition of additional landing rights for MAC charter aircraft at locations in Thailand other than Bangkok. COMUSMACTHAI was also interested in expanding MAC passenger service within Thailand and requested that two contract

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1. COMUSMACV 020512Z Aug 67; CINCPACAF 080241Z Aug 67; CINCPAC 091944Z Aug 67; Monthly Historical Submission, J4821, CINCPAC, May, Jun, Jul, Aug 67; Point Papers, J4821, CINCPAC, 4 Apr 67, 15 Apr 67, 5 May 67, and 26 Jun 67, Subj: MAC Channels to SEAsia.
 2. CINCPAC 070432Z Oct 67, CSAF 311858Z Oct 67; Monthly Historical Submission, J482, CINCPAC, Oct 67.
 3. Monthly Historical Submission, J4821, CINCPAC, Jun 67.

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channels be established in-country to handle increased demands. CINCPAC was informed that the 315th Air Division had the capability to handle internal Thailand passenger movements.¹

C-130 Requirements in RVN

~~(S)~~ During 1966 COMUSMACV had pressed for the deployment of two C-130 squadrons to RVN; however, late in the year the Secretary of Defense approved the concept of continuing to provide C-130 airlift support in RVN on a rotational basis from offshore points. CINCPAC endorsed CINCPACAF's recommendation that C-130 aircraft should not be based in RVN and that offshore beddown and existing command and control procedures should be continued. In June 1967 COMUSMACV requested that the number of rotational C-130 aircraft in RVN be increased before 1 July in order to meet operational requirements.² CINCPAC requested comments from CHWTO and CINCPACAF.³ CHWTO questioned the requirement; however, CINCPACAF approved the MACV plan and pointed out the need for additional PACAF support personnel in RVN.⁴ CINCPAC directed CHWTO to furnish the aircraft requested by COMUSMACV.⁵ The increased number of rotational C-130 aircraft was retained in RVN during the remainder of 1967. The continuing high RVN requirement and utilization prompted CINCPAC to recommend to JCS that the projected availability of C-130 aircraft be reviewed in order to assure future availability until a suitable replacement aircraft was provided. CINCPAC pointed out the demanding combat environment in which the C-130, C-123 and C-7A were operating and noted the concern expressed by Vice President Humphrey that possible future close down of C-130 production would have an adverse effect on the C-130 fleet.⁶

Space Available Mail

(U) In late 1966 Congress passed a law which expanded the authority to move first class mail, personal voice tape recordings and less than five pound packages by air on commercial airlines on a space available basis as space available mail (SAM). Thereafter, the requirement to


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1. AMEMB Bangkok 190616Z Nov 67; CINCPACAF 182235Z Nov 67; CINCPAC 282310Z Nov 67; Monthly Historical Submission, J4821, CINCPAC, Jun, Jul, and Nov 67.
 2. COMUSMACV 130221Z Jun 67.
 3. CINCPAC 212119Z Jun 67.
 4. CHWTO 260850Z Jun 67; CINCPACAF 270441Z Jun 67.
 5. CINCPAC 300614Z Jun 67.
 6. CINCPAC 110019Z Nov 67.

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PACIFIC AIRLIFT ROUTES

MAC

AS OF 1 NOVEMBER 1967



881

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SOURCE: PACOM Digest, Nov 67, p. 114.


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PACIFIC AIRLIFT ROUTES - INTER ISLAND

315th AIR DIVISION

AS OF 1 JANUARY 1968



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SOURCE: PACOM Digest, Nov 67, p. 115.

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move SAM greatly increased throughout PACOM. The high density of space-required traffic on commercial air carriers combined with the great increase in SAM traffic resulted in a backlog of SAM. By March there was a large accumulation of SAM on the West Coast.

(U) Military personnel in RVN had enjoyed the air mail privilege prior to the passage of the new law and had come to rely on air mail delivery. DOD requested that in order to relieve the West Coast backlog all first class mail continue to be sent by air but that SAM periodicals and parcels be sealifted. The MACV staff indicated anxiety over the proposed diversion of SAM from commercial airlift noting the morale factor and the possibility that failure to continue the airlift of SAM to RVN would be considered by the troops as a "breach of promise." The JCS ordered that all first class mail that could not be airlifted commercially be moved by MAC.¹ While the JCS investigated the legal aspects of moving SAM as space-required MAC movements, CINCPAC formulated a recommendation which incorporated additional views of COMUSMACV. CINCPAC recommended that priority be assigned to airlift of SAM backlog to RVN, and that special airlift by Air Reserve or Air National Guard units be employed. CINCPAC also recommended that authorization be granted to move first class SAM by MAC on a space-required basis.²

(U) In May the JCS promulgated SAM movement policy which provided that when adequate service on US commercial air carriers was not available and no space-available capability was offered by MAC, all first class mail would be moved by MAC on a space-required basis. All other SAM would be moved by the most expeditious sealift.

(U) By mid-year the SAM backlog was cleared up by the use of space-required MAC resources for first class mail and some sealift of parcel post.

(U) During a September conference of representatives of the military departments, DOD and MAC it was determined that sufficient airlift space was available to dispatch most personal parcel post by MAC channels to Da Nang, Cam Ranh Bay and Saigon. It was considered that the increased costs were not a conclusive factor in view of the high morale value of mail to the combat troops. DA requested CINCPAC comments on the change in

1. COMUSMACV 260750Z Mar 67; JCS 272255Z Mar 67.

2. CINCPAC 290218Z Mar 67; COMUSMACV 310235Z Mar 67; CINCPAC 010313Z Apr 67.

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handling of personal parcel post. There were mixed reactions expressed by COMUSMACV and the component commanders, but after considerable study CINCPAC recommended to DA that parcel post be routed by airlift to RVN points nearest the final destination and that minimum publicity be given the program. ¹

Petroleum, Oils and Lubricants - Southeast Asia

(S) The consumption of POL in Southeast Asia steadily increased throughout 1967. In each of the three quarters ending on the last day of June, September and December, record levels of consumption were achieved. ² The rate during the last quarter of the calendar year was a four percent increase over the previous one, for a total of 14.39 million barrels being consumed. "During 1967, the collective consumption of POL in RVN and Thailand amounted to 51.79 million barrels." ³

(S) CINCPAC began the year 1967 with the objective "of providing tankage for storing the equivalent of 30 days POL consumption." ⁴ By mid-year, tankage "availability continued to expand to meet increasing requirements for all products, but is lagging the CINCPAC objective of providing sufficient tankage for storing the equivalent of 30 days' consumption." ⁵ Unfortunately, the identical words also described the situation in this regard on the last day of September as well as the last day of 1967. ⁶

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1. Monthly Historical Submission, J482, CINCPAC, September, October 1967; Point Paper, J482, CINCPAC, 5 Oct 67, Subject: Diversion of Surface Parcel Post to Space-Available Mail (SAM).
 2. CINCPAC Measurement of Progress in Southeast Asia as of 30 June 1967, CINCPAC Ser: 001698-67, dtd 11 Sep 67, p. 134; CINCPAC Measurement of Progress in Southeast Asia as of 30 Sep 1967, CINCPAC Ser: 002255-67, dtd 20 Nov 67, p. 126; Draft Copy of CINCPAC Measurement of Progress in Southeast Asia as of 31 December 1967, p. 128, a xerox copy is in CINCPAC Command Historian's File.
 3. Ibid.
 4. CINCPAC Evaluation of Progress in Southeast Asia for Month of February 1967, CINCPAC Ser: 00664-67, dtd 13 Apr 67, p. Chart 30C.
 5. CINCPAC Measurement of Progress in Southeast Asia as of 30 June 1967, CINCPAC Ser: 001698-67, dtd 11 Sep 67, p. 134.
 6. CINCPAC Measurement of Progress in Southeast Asia as of 30 Sep 1967, CINCPAC Ser: 002255-67, dtd 20 Nov 67, p. 126; Draft Copy of CINCPAC Measurement of Progress in Southeast Asia as of 31 December 1967, p. 128, a xerox copy is in CINCPAC Command Historian's File.

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(U) This portion of the 1967 history dealing with POL in Southeast Asia covers only these topics not treated elsewhere. For instance, a part of Chapter I discusses POL from a PACOM-wide viewpoint. In addition, the first chapter's treatment of "The Middle East Crisis and POL for PACOM" gives a detailed account of this topic, not only from the wider PACOM view, but also for the impact of the Middle East Crisis upon POL for Southeast Asia.


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MILLIONS OF BARRELS

BULK POL DATA, PACOM

AS OF 1 JANUARY 1968



RECEIPTS DURING LAST 90 DAYS

TOTAL RECEIPTS 41.48

MILITARY STORAGE AVAILABLE

TOTAL STORAGE 35.22

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SOURCE: PACOM Digest, Feb 68, p. 117.

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POL Support for RVN

~~(S)~~ In December 1966, the JCS forwarded a draft JCS working paper, entitled "Evaluation of POL Support RVN," and requested CINCPAC's and COMUSMACV's comments on it. ¹ In the paper, the November 1966 Republic of Vietnam (RVN) POL situation was evaluated in order to analyze alternate future courses of action and to postulate an optimum course. Topics dealt with were in-country distribution and tankage, source of POL supply, and flow of gold considerations and tanker availability, and the basic thesis of the draft paper was:

... that the CINCPAC policy for tankage construction is inadequate to obtain and support an ample POL supply posture in RVN. Further that the CINCPAC 30 day construction policy does now and will continue to cause excessive MSTs tanker delays, excessive commercial tanker costs, needless outflow of old, and MSTs chartering of foreign flag tankers. ²

~~(S)~~ As background, CINCPAC in messages on 28 March and 21 April 1965 had outlined:

... the critical POL situation which prevailed in RVN during a period when commercial companies were declining to provide or develop additional POL support for US Forces which might be deployed to RVN. These two msgs provided the bench marks for determining the US construction effort necessary to supplement limited commercial facilities and distribution systems. ³

~~(S)~~ Moreover, on 13 November 1965, CINCPAC had set the limit on POL construction as 30-day supply capability (plus 10 percent storage factor) by base complex with additional tankage to accommodate the coastal redistribution mission of Cam Ranh Bay. ⁴ The JCS, meanwhile, in additional actions based on CINCPAC's requests, directed the MSTs to provide T-2 tankers for contingency floating storage against the potential loss of shore facilities at Nha Be and Danang. T-1 tankers were provided as

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1. JCS ltr J4DM-487-66 of 6 Dec 66.
 2. CINCPAC 180130Z Jan 67.
 3. Ibid.
 4. CINCPAC 132356Z Nov 65.

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coastal shuttles to replace overland rail and truck routes being interdicted by the Viet Cong.

~~(S)~~ On 3 January 1967, COMUSMACV furnished his comments on the JCS working paper, and these were considered in CINCPAC's reply that went forward on 18 January.¹ Detailed comments were provided by CINCPAC on in-country distribution and tankage but, for the other two subjects, source of POL supply and gold flow, he could not comment in detail, because of the worldwide implications surrounding these topics.²

~~(S)~~ CINCPAC concluded his message to the JCS:

... with considerable concern that much of the difficulty in POL support outlined in the working paper relates to lack of merchant shipping to handle the current SEASIA rqrmts without any reserve capacity to cope with war escalation and/or additional contingencies. The problem of US maritime capability is a distinct one of National interest which should be treated separately.³

(U) From 20 through 22 March 1967, POL representatives from Washington agencies and Southeast Asia met at Hq CINCPAC to discuss the existing POL support system for Southeast Asia and to explore new supply patterns which might be utilized during the period, 1 July to 31 December 1967.⁴ The prime area of concern shown by the Washington representatives was to reduce the number of floating storage vessels used in RVN where possible. One proposal that was explored, but not accepted as a working solution, was to support RVN by shuttle out of leased storage in the Philippines. The outcome of the meeting was that the Japan shuttle POL cargoes would be continued to RVN and even increased in number on 1 July 1967. Certain changes in the in-country distribution pattern would also be effected depending on the outcome of contract negotiations with the oil industry.⁵

~~(S)~~ Another conference on the same subject was held in Saigon from 18 through 23 September 1967.⁶ It was attended by representatives of the CINCPAC Joint Petroleum Office (JPO), DFSC Washington,

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1. COMUSMACV 030612Z Jan 67; CINCPAC 180130Z Jan 67.
 2. J4 History, Hq CINCPAC, Feb 67.
 3. CINCPAC 180130Z Jan 67.
 4. J4 History, Hq CINCPAC, Mar 67.
 5. CINCPAC ltr 4411 ser 0380 of 31 March 1967.
 6. CINCPAC 302141Z Aug 67; J4 History, Hq CINCPAC, Oct 67.

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COMUSMACV, and local RVN industry representatives. At the meeting, it was decided that the POL support pattern should be changed, with the result that the following breakout of support responsibilities was made:

| <u>Support Point</u> | <u>Original Plan for FY68</u> | <u>Revised OCT-DEC 67</u> | <u>Revised JAN-JUN 68</u> |
|----------------------|-----------------------------------|-------------------------------|-------------------------------|
| Danang | MSTS | MSTS | MSTS |
| Chu Lai | Shell | MSTS | MSTS |
| Qui Nhon | Shell | MSTS | Shell |
| Vung Ro | CRB Shuttle | Shell | Shell |
| CRB | MSTS | MSTS | MSTS/Shell |
| Nha Trang | CRB Shuttles | Shell | Shell |
| Phan Rang | CRB Shuttles | CRB Shuttles | CRB Shuttles |
| Saigon | comm'l* | comm'l | comm'l |
| Bangkok | comm'l | comm'l | comm'l |
| Sattahip | MSTS | MSTS/comm'l | MSTS/comm'l ¹ |

(*) "Comm'l" support means the companies of Shell, Esso, and Caltex.

(U) In mid-October, POL support in I Corps was causing considerable concern to the people involved in resupply operations. For example, all of the major POL discharge lines leading from deep water moorings at Danang and Chu Lai were out of commission for varying periods of time during the month. Although the reasons for the situation were varied, they were, in essence, bad weather, delayed repair work, and a less than ideal supply situation when the sea-load lines became inoperative.² In order to expedite the repair of all these lines, CINCPACFLT ordered a salvage ship and divers to Danang to accomplish this needed work. By the end of the month, the Danang sea-load lines had been restored, but the work on the Chu Lai lines was just beginning.³

(S) At year's end, COMUSMACV had the following to report about petroleum logistics during 1967:

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1. J4 History, Hq CINCPAC, Oct 67.
 2. CINCPAC 132341Z Oct 67; COMSERVPAC 151932Z Oct 67.
 3. J4 History, Hq CINCPAC, Oct 67.

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Monthly consumption of bulk petroleum products increased by approximately 521.5 M/BBLs from 31 Dec 66 to 31 Dec 67. At year end total consumption was running approximately 3,375.0 M/BBLs a month, an increase of approximately 20 percent from Dec 66. Improvements in petroleum logistics include: (a) Military tankage has been increased by 637.3 M/BBLs during CY67 to a new high by 31 Dec of 2,072.9 M/BBLs; (b) A T-5 tanker discharge facility was completed at Chu Lai enabling direct resupply of bulk petroleum by ocean tankers to meet the increasing Chu Lai requirements. In Da Nang, a second T-5 tanker discharge facility was constructed; (c) Two commercial T-1 shuttle tankers, being utilized in support of I & II CTZ, were released on 31 Dec 67 resulting in a net savings of approximately \$74,800 per month; (d) Pipelines connecting An Khe and Phu Cat with Qui Nhon were constructed. These pipelines improve the inland redistribution of bulk products and eliminate truck haul between the connected locations. ¹

(U) As for POL construction during the calendar year, COMUSMACV had the following comments:

(1) Hue. Construction was completed in Oct 67 of a two mile pipeline from the Port of Col Co ramp and a 34,000 BBL storage tank farm.

(2) Qui Nhon. A 193,000 BBL tank farm was completed during Nov 67; construction of a POL jetty with a capacity of 2,500 BBL/hr was completed during Dec 67.

(3) Pleiku. Construction of a 53 mile six-inch pipeline from An Khe to Pleiku is 80 percent complete.

(4) Cam Ranh Bay. Construction of a marine POL terminal facility and connecting pipeline to a 576,000 BBL tank farm is 90 percent complete. ²

(U) The year 1967 ended and the new one of 1968 dawned with no surcease of the difficulties of POL support for South Vietnam in sight.

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1. COMUSMACV, MACJ341, Subj: Year-end Wrap-up Report, CY 67, 3 Feb 68.
 2. Ibid.

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As an example, as of 29 December 1967, the commercial oil companies in South Vietnam had not yet received signed contracts for the military support that was to commence on 1 January 1968. These companies, however, did indicate that they would continue to supply POL to the U.S. Military in RVN uninterrupted, "pending receipt of new contracts from DFSC."¹

POL Storage at Cam Ranh Bay, South Vietnam

(S) As of 20 February 1967, read a CINCPAC document, the "need for additional POL tankage at Cam Ranh Bay (CRB) is urgent."² Actually, this development of a major POL facility at CRB had been planned as early as the summer of 1965.³ Progress toward this goal had been made in connection with the buildup in South Vietnam, but much still remained to be done as of February 1967.⁴ Unfortunately, this construction requirement had to compete for priority with other urgent construction projects. CINCPAC was "in the middle of this dilemma because the construction requirement is to ease an MSTs problem rather than a MACV problem."⁵

(S) In February 1967, a 400 million barrel terminal and a T-5 jetty were in the process of being shipped to Cam Ranh Bay from the West Coast of the U.S. Half of this terminal was earmarked for a Navy requirement and half for an Army requirement. Because of a lack of funds, however, the Navy was forced to defer its portion of this terminal. "Inasmuch as the terminal and T-5 jetty were procured as an integral unit, removal of the Navy portion is not deemed practical. As a result of the Navy action, CGUSAMC has held up shipment of the total package."⁶ During February, CINCPACAF was requested by CINCPAC to fund for the construction of the Navy portion of the terminal and to locate the 200 million barrels on-base at Cam Ranh Bay Airfield.⁷

(S) A swift completion of this tankage and jetty was desired by CINCPAC POL planners for this action would give Cam Ranh Bay "a redistribution capability without reliance on a floating terminal. It will

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1. J4 Chronology, Hq CINCPAC, Dec 67; COMUSMACV 290159Z Dec 67.
 2. Point Paper, J441, Hq CINCPAC, 20 Feb 67, Subj: POL Tankage - Cam Ranh Bay.
 3. CINCPAC 010055Z Jul 65.
 4. J4 History, Hq CINCPAC, Feb 67.
 5. Point Paper, J4411, Hq CINCPAC, 30 Mar 67, Subj: POL Construction SEA.
 6. J4 History, Hq CINCPAC, Feb 67.
 7. CINCPAC 182300Z Feb 67; CINCPAC 262124Z Feb 67.

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also permit release of the Nha Be contingency back-up T-2 to shuttle duties vice floating storage in Singapore."¹ Or, in other words, it would "enable a reduction in Singapore shuttles, eliminate Japan shuttles, and reduce T-1 utilization as T-2's take over support of the enclaves."²

(S) After considerable discussion with representatives of other headquarters, such as the JCS, MSTs, and MACV, CINCPAC dispatched a message on 3 April 1967 to COMUSMACV.³ It stressed the need for an acceleration of the POL tank construction at Cam Ranh Bay and asked COMUSMACV's opinion as to whether this long-programmed tankage could be built in the near future within existing resources. In the past, both the JCS and the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) had been looking critically at the tanker demurrage costs in South Vietnam. "CINCPAC has consistently stated the need for floating storage until Cam Ranh Bay POL facilities can properly handle the redistribution mission."⁴

(S) At that time, April 1967, the existing U.S. Air Force on-base tankage at Cam Ranh Bay was 70 million barrels out of a required 230 million barrels. Actually, the "need for this tankage is of much greater concern to the agencies responsible for tanker operations (JCS, MSTs, DFSC, CINCPAC) than to the customer - COMUSMACV. Yet, MACV controls the construction funds and must determine priority of work within his area of responsibility."⁵ As stated earlier, CINCPAC was caught in the cross fire of competing demands in this instance. Basically, he could do one of two things. First, he could request an accelerated construction of this 400 million barrel tankage in order to ease the anxieties of those agencies concerned over tanker operations. Or, he could send a strong message to the JCS, restating the need for the floating storage as a military requirement until such time as COMUSMACV would be able to complete the necessary POL tankage within the normal course of events, and requesting the JCS to so inform those agencies in Washington, D. C., which consistently object to the high operations and maintenance (O&M) expenditures.

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1. Point Paper, J4411, Hq CINCPAC, 30 Mar 67, Subj: POL Construction SEA.
 2. Point Paper, J441, Hq CINCPAC, 16 Jun 67, Subj: Construction of POL Tankage - Cam Ranh Bay.
 3. CINCPAC 030517Z Apr 67.
 4. J4 History, Hq CINCPAC, Apr 67.
 5. Ibid.; Point Paper, J4411, Hq CINCPAC, 30 Mar 67, Subj: POL Construction SEA.

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(S) As we have seen, CINCPAC selected the first course, as witness his message to COMUSMACV on 3 April 1967. Replies to this inquiry came on 11 and 25 April. They indicated that the terminal would probably be built, but no time frame was given.¹ "Although the proposal has been accepted by all parties concerned, actions to reprogram funds and initiate construction of the 200 Mbbbls tankage on-base at CRB are bogged down," read a CINCPAC document in June 1967.² In an attempt to get the project off the ground, CINCPAC requested COMUSMACV on 15 June to expeditiously reprogram FY 67S or FY 68 funds as necessary to coordinate construction planning and get action started.

(S) Apparently, all these actions by CINCPAC finally bore fruit, for the following was reported by J4 POL planners on 24 August 1967:

The Army will install the jetty and 200 Mbbbls tankage of the 400 Mbbbl system. . . . A pile driver is now in place and has begun to drive piles for the T-1 jetty. . . . The 200 Mbbbls tankage will be added to Army Tank Farm Nr. 1. . . . Tank erection is scheduled to begin in early SEP 67. . . . Plans are also now firm to erect the remaining 200 Mbbbls tankage adjacent to the existing on-base AF tank farm. Funding has been resolved. USARV is now in the process of finalizing the facility design and determining the construction schedule. . . . This project is now "on-track" and construction actions are progressing in an orderly manner.³

(S) No further difficulties plagued CINCPAC's POL planners on this project for the rest of the year. By the end of 1967, COMUSMACV was reporting that, as for the Cam Ranh Bay project, construction "of a marine POL terminal facility and connecting pipeline to a 576,000 BBl tank farm is 90 percent complete."⁴

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1. COMUSMACV 111208Z Apr 67; COMUSMACV 251300Z Apr 67.
 2. Point Paper, J441, Hq CINCPAC, 16 Jun 67, Subj: Construction of POL Tankage - Cam Ranh Bay.
 3. Point Paper, J44A, Hq CINCPAC, 24 Aug 67, Subj: Construction of POL Tankage - Cam Ranh Bay.
 4. COMUSMACV, MACJ341, Subj: Year-end Wrap-up Report, CY 67, 3 Feb 68.

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POL Support for Thailand

(S) Like the Allied effort in South Vietnam, the one in Thailand increasingly demanded larger and larger amounts of POL to sustain itself throughout 1967. "In Thailand, the consumption of POL reached a new high of 4.24 million barrels during the quarter ending 31 December 1967. This was 60,000 barrels, or one percent, more than the 4.18 million barrels consumed in the preceding quarter. POL consumed in Thailand during 1967 amounted to 15.25 million barrels. Actual tankage available at the end of December amounted to 1.63 million barrels, up from the 1.29 million barrels available at the end of the preceding quarter."¹

POL Support for Port of Sattahip, Thailand

(S) Actually, the decision to base B-52 bombers at U-Tapao Air Base in Thailand, presented few logistics problems from a POL standpoint.² As early as November 1966, the POL jetty at Sattahip was completed, with the result that 460 million barrels of JP-4 tankage was available when the first B-52s arrived in April 1967. In addition, tankage capable of holding another 400 million barrels was nearing completion, while tactical re-fueling equipment had already been prepositioned at U-Tapao.

(S) During April 1967, the JP-4 requirements at U-Tapao rose steadily until it approached the 400 million barrel mark. It was then anticipated that consumption rates would continue to rise above 500 million barrels a month in the near future.

(S) The POL facilities at the Port of Sattahip had been developed on a Tri-Service basis with the U.S. Navy funding the jetty, the U.S. Army funding the terminal and piping, and the U.S. Air Force funding the on-base storage. At the end of April 1967, however, the U.S. Navy no longer had any POL storage at Sattahip, and the operation there was strictly between the U.S. Army and U.S. Air Force. Those Navy planes that used U-Tapao Air Base received fuel on the basis of an Interservice Support Agreement (ISSA) with the U.S. Air Force.

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1. Draft Copy of CINCPAC Measurement of Progress in Southeast Asia as of 31 December 1967, p. 130. A xerox copy is in CINCPAC Command Historian's Files.
 2. Unless otherwise cited, the source for the information contained in this subsection on POL support for Sattahip was derived from: J4 History, Hq CINCPAC, Apr 67.

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~~(S)~~ In June, the POL consumption in Thailand hit a new high of 1.4 million barrels. Actually, 45 percent of this total was "at Sattahip reflecting the growing aircraft population there. Out of the 1,090 MBBLS of tankage programmed for Sattahip/U-Tapao, 910 MBBLS had been completed and are in use. "¹

POL Support to Up-Country Thailand

~~(S)~~ For some time, the adequacy of POL support to up-country Thailand had been a subject of controversy.² With the introduction of such operations as DYE MARKER, HARVEST REAPER, and other aircraft deployments, CINCPAC planners could expect in mid-1967 that there would be increased POL requirements in up-country Thailand. As a result, a survey team headed by Captain James J. Lynch, USN, Chief, Petroleum Office, J4, Hq CINCPAC, was dispatched to Thailand in late August 1967.³

~~(S)~~ After visiting all of the major up-country air bases in Thailand, the site survey team returned to Hq CINCPAC. Its Trip Report stated that:

- a. POL support could be sustained to all projected forces in Thailand.
- b. Movement of KC-135 aircraft out of Takhli was not critical to continued sustained POL supply to up-country bases.
- c. Some upgrading of POL facilities was desirable at Takhli, Udorn, Korat, Nakhon Phanom, and Ubon.⁴

~~(S)~~ Based on the results of this trip, CINCPAC was assured that the proposed base loading changes could be supported from a POL standpoint.⁵

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1. CINCPAC Measurement of Progress in Southeast Asia as of 30 June 1967, CINCPAC Ser: 001698-67, dtd 11 Sep 67, p. 136.
 2. COMUSMACTHAI 300830Z Jul 67; CINCPAC 121843Z Aug 67.
 3. CINCPAC 192216Z Aug 67.
 4. Trip Report of CINCPAC Site Survey Team dated 7 Sep 67.
 5. J4 History, Hq CINCPAC, Aug 67.

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POL Support for Laos

~~(S)~~ During November 1967, POL support to U.S. forces operating in Laos received considerable attention.¹ The two problems of greatest concern were: (1) contractual arrangements with Shell and Esso; and (2) the delivery methods of POL (especially aviation fuels) to dispersed locations in Laos.

~~(S)~~ CINCPAC, in order to simplify the POL operations in Laos, recommended on 11 November 1967 that a study be conducted concerning the supply contract problems in Laos and that a two-year, sole-source contract be awarded to the oil company having the best capability to support the POL requirements of the U.S.² During the last month of the year, the problem of POL delivery within Laos was still being studied; the two systems under consideration were a drum oriented system and an air-delivered bulk transfer system.³ The last significant occurrence was the proposal by CINCPAC on 20 December 1967 that a meeting be held on the Laos POL problems.⁴

Military Construction

Construction Funding - RVN and Thailand

~~(S)~~ Funding of Military Construction (MILCON) programs throughout the PACOM was discussed briefly in Chapter I. The largest construction requirements and the greatest funding needs continued to occur in Vietnam. Thailand's requirements were much less, but were greater than those for all of the rest of the PACOM. A summary listing of funds that had actually been appropriated for MILCON in support of Southeast Asia through the FY 67S (Supplemental) MILCON program is shown on the accompanying table.⁵

~~(S)~~ The Secretary of Defense formulated the FY 67S and FY 68R (Regular) MILCON programs. The FY 68R MILCON program totaled only \$98 million for PACOM construction and a \$200 million contingency fund. CINCPAC believed that the reduced program would not provide

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1. Unless otherwise cited, the information on POL Support to Laos has been derived from: J4 History, Hq CINCPAC, Nov 67.
 2. CINCPAC 110222Z Nov 67.
 3. AMEMB Vientienne 071055Z Dec 67.
 4. J4 Chronology, Hq CINCPAC, Dec 67.
 5. Point Paper, J4215, 20 Feb 68.

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Military Construction in Support of Southeast Asia Through 67S
(\$ in millions)

| <u>RVN</u> | <u>Army</u> | <u>Navy</u> | <u>Air Force</u> | <u>Total</u> |
|---------------|--------------|-------------|------------------|--------------|
| An Khe | 16.0 | | | 16.0 |
| Bien Hoa | 28.6 | | 35.7 | 64.3 |
| CRB | 69.6 | 21.0 | 58.7 | 149.3 |
| Can Tho | 67.7 | 8.4 | 4.7 | 80.8 |
| Chu Lai | | 60.1 | | 60.1 |
| Cu Chi | 27.4 | | | 27.4 |
| Danang | 10.7 | 160.1 | 22.7 | 193.5 |
| Hue/Phu Bai | 2.9 | 27.7 | | 30.6 |
| Long Binh | 121.7 | | | 121.7 |
| Nha Trang | 30.2 | | 17.6 | 47.8 |
| Phan Rang | 5.4 | | 34.1 | 39.5 |
| Phu Cat | | | 34.0 | 34.0 |
| Pleiku | 25.7 | | 9.0 | 34.7 |
| Qui Nhon | 51.1 | 3.4 | | 54.5 |
| Saigon | 87.0 | 16.9 | | 103.9 |
| Tan Son Nhut | 36.2 | 2.8 | 31.9 | 70.9 |
| Tuy Hoa | 11.4 | | 52.0 | 63.4 |
| Vung Tau | 21.8 | 3.4 | | 25.2 |
| Miscellaneous | <u>144.2</u> | <u>50.9</u> | <u>62.2</u> | <u>257.3</u> |
| Total RVN | 757.6 | 354.7 | 362.6 | 1,474.9 |

THAILAND

| | | | | |
|----------------|-------------|------|------------|-------------|
| Kamphaeng Saeh | | | 10.6 | 10.6 |
| Khorat | 21.2 | | 24.1 | 45.3 |
| Nakhon Phanom | 1.0 | | 11.9 | 12.9 |
| Nam Phong | | | 17.1 | 17.1 |
| Takhli | | | 16.0 | 16.0 |
| Sattahip | 47.5 | 14.1 | 92.2 | 153.8 |
| Ubon | | | 17.8 | 17.8 |
| Udorn | 5.9 | | 18.5 | 24.4 |
| Miscellaneous | <u>32.7</u> | | <u>4.8</u> | <u>37.5</u> |
| Total Thailand | 108.3 | 14.1 | 213.0 | 335.4 |

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facilities to accommodate all Program 4 forces, would require earlier than planned phase-down and demobilization of civilian contractor support, would provide no contingency funds in the FY 67S program, and failed to provide the minimum essential funds for LOC upgrading and repair.

~~(S)~~ CINCPAC therefore submitted a reclama for additional funds for those construction projects he considered most critical.¹ CINCPAC included only items he had previously validated. Army funds for cantonments in various locations in Vietnam and lesser amounts for storage facilities in Vietnam constituted the largest part (over \$100 million) of the reclama action. Various Air Force projects accounted for about \$21 million and Navy projects about \$4 million. The total reclama concerned about \$160 million but some was for PACOM projects outside of Southeast Asia. CINCPAC's reclama and all related requests were disapproved in Washington 1967.

~~(S)~~ CINCPAC considered new construction requirements in support of Program 5 force deployments as well as the scope of the Secretary of Defense's FY 68R program when he submitted follow-up requirements to support the COMUSMACV FY 68 force levels.² On 5 September CINCPAC recommended to the JCS a supplement to the FY 68 program of \$216.2 million (\$124.7 million for direct costs and new facilities and \$91.5 million in impact funding related to existing programs).

~~(S)~~ On 7 October CINCPAC submitted a follow-on recommendation that modified somewhat and superseded his September recommendation. In October he addressed time-phased requirements for funding by project, which permitted a reduction in requirements for COMUSMACV as they had been stated in September by about \$11.5 million. The new recommendation also affected the FY 69 MILCON program by adding to it eight projects for \$10.4 million. Funds recommended to support COMUSMACV's FY 68 force levels (in millions of dollars) were as follows:

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1. CINCPAC ltr Ser 00315, 23 Feb 67.
 2. CINCPAC ltrs Ser 001662, 5 Sep 67 and 001915, 7 Oct 67.

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| | <u>Army</u> | <u>Navy</u> | <u>Air Force</u> | <u>Total</u> |
|----------------------|--------------|--------------|------------------|--------------|
| FY 68 Contingency | 127.5 | 62.1 | 12.1 | 201.7 |
| FY 68 Supplemental | 70.4 | 43.9 | 23.1 | 137.4 |
| FY 69 Added Projects | 8.9 | - | 1.5 | 10.4 |
| | <u>206.8</u> | <u>106.0</u> | <u>36.7</u> | <u>349.5</u> |

This included \$145 million for urgent and unfunded projects in support of Program 4 force levels and \$205 million in support of Program 5. CINCPAC remarked that these adjustments highlighted the work involved trying to use peacetime procedures in the fluid situation in Vietnam.

(C) The complexity of preparing these funding recommendations was further illustrated by the fact that CINCPAC had prepared and submitted his FY 69 MILCON comments and recommendations the previous August.¹

(S) In addition to his specific funding recommendations, CINCPAC recommended that a Secretary of Defense contingency fund of \$100 million be included in the FY 69 MILCON Bill. He stated, "The history of urgent requirements for unprogrammed facilities in support of SEAsia operations is expected to continue and contingency funds will be required."

(U) In a departure from previous reviews, representatives of CINCPAC and his component command commanders participated in the in-country review of the Vietnam program by COMUSMACV. This procedure improved the flow of information among those concerned and insured better coordination of the programs submitted by the PACOM component commands.

(S) In the MACV review, action was taken to assure that troop lists used were approved Program 4 troop strengths; that all facilities requirements were based on planning factors and stockage levels as published in the 1 April Complex Review; that scopes included in the FY 68R program were added to earlier program assets reported in the Complex Review and deficiencies adjusted accordingly, after which the FY 69 Service requirements were checked against these adjusted deficiencies as a requirements ceiling; that the program was planned for a troop-contractor

1. CINCPAC ltr Ser 001438, 3 Aug 67.

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mix with contractor construction concentrated around major complexes for efficiency; and that construction would be accomplished within a time frame acceptable to COMUSMACV.

~~(C)~~ Funding amounts recommended by CINCPAC for FY 69R were \$437,362,000 for Vietnam and \$94,140,000 for Thailand, a reduction of \$237,067,000 from the original Service submissions.¹

~~(C)~~ Subsequently, CINCPAC increased his recommendation for the Air Force program at Nakhon Phanom, Thailand by \$3,748,000.²

~~(C)~~ The FY 69 MILCON program supported by the JCS to the Secretary of Defense essentially supported CINCPAC's Army and Navy programs.³ The Air Force program, however, was reduced from \$88 million to \$20 million in Vietnam and from \$44 million to \$13 million in Thailand. The Air Force's \$31 million "move out of Saigon earliest" program was not supported. Other items not supported were \$31 million for airfield matting replacement at Cam Ranh Bay, Phan Rang, and Nakhon Phanom; \$20 million for Air Force cantonments and utilities in Thailand; \$8 million for military assistance in Vietnam; and \$9 million for miscellaneous facilities at various locations in both countries.

~~(C)~~ Still later in the year the JCS forwarded to the Secretary of Defense their recommended program in support of FY 68 (Program 5) forces, for which CINCPAC's recommendation had been forwarded on 7 October.⁴ The JCS deferred comment on the urgent unfunded projects in support of Program 4. In support of Program 5 the JCS recommended a program totaling \$168.8 million, compared to CINCPAC's recommended \$204.7 million.⁵

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1. For Vietnam, CINCPAC's recommendation included Army, \$189 million; Navy \$160 million, and Air Force \$89 million. For Thailand it was Army, \$42 million; Navy, \$8 million; and Air Force \$44 million.
 2. CINCPAC 302015Z Aug 67.
 3. J4 Brief 0153-67, 14 Nov 67.
 4. J4 Brief 00173-67, 15 Dec 67.
 5. CINCPAC's recommendation had been broken down as follows: Army, \$133 million; Navy, \$69.3 million; and Air Force, \$2.4 million. The JCS recommended Army \$125.8 million, Navy \$40.6 million, and Air Force \$2.4 million.

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(S) They recommended that the projects be funded in FY 68; if funds were not available, they recommended that the projects be included in the FY 69 MILCON program.

(S) CINCPAC anticipated that there would be no FY 68 funding of these requirements.

Construction Capability

(S) Although the rate of construction had begun to decrease in 1967, CINCPAC wanted to retain a reasonable construction contractor capability in Vietnam.¹ CINCPAC acknowledged that construction troops did not have the capability (and would not in the foreseeable future) to respond adequately to major new construction requirements and he believed that in the open-ended situation faced in Vietnam the contractor should not be phased out.

(S) Maintenance of a construction contractor capability became a matter of concern when funding authorizations were for far less than the amounts CINCPAC had recommended. In October 1966² CINCPAC had recommended to the JCS that about \$300 million of the proposed FY 67 Supplemental Vietnam construction program be assigned to the contract construction effort. The program as approved resulted in a reduction in contractor funding to approximately \$100 million. This accelerated contractor demobilization, and a plan from COMUSMACV to accomplish this demobilization was forwarded to the JCS by CINCPAC on 11 April.

(S) Later, potential new construction requirements, generated by requested major additional forces for Vietnam, caused doubt to be cast upon the wisdom of hasty contractor demobilization. In May 1967 the JCS requested a reevaluation of the demobilization plan, in view of the many available methods to extend the contractor support. Some of these methods included transfer of assigned funds from the troop effort, infusion of Agency for International Development funds for LOC reconstruction, and the sale of long supply military construction program materials.

(S) COMUSMACV submitted a new construction contractor plan to CINCPAC, who forwarded it to the JCS on 29 July.³ Under this plan it would be possible to maintain a construction contractor capability at about 15,000 employees until October 1968 when FY 69 military

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1. Point Paper J4217, 21 Aug 67.
 2. CINCPAC 100116Z Oct 66.
 3. CINCPAC 290355Z Jul 67; J4 History, Jun, Jul 67.

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construction program funds became available. These employees would be limited to three enclaves (Da Nang, Cam Ranh Bay, and Saigon) with some capability to go out to outlying sites for a limited specific piece of work. After October 1968 sufficient funds would also be available for orderly contractor demobilization if demobilization was required. Also, the contractor could be maintained until that time without depending on the sale of materials or crisis funding.

~~(S)~~ The FY 69 military construction program proposed by CINCPAC would allocate enough work to the contractor to further extend him through the FY 69 funding period to about October 1969. The 15,000 employee level was based on Program 4 support requirements. Significant additional forces with consequent additional facility requirements could require a contractor level above 15,000 to insure timely construction.

~~(S)~~ In November 1967 CINCPAC, in anticipation of the reduced FY 68 military construction program for Vietnam, recommended to the JCS that the construction civilianization program be deferred.¹ In addition, for Vietnam he recommended adding a 600-man Air Force Civil Engineering Squadron and a Naval Mobile Construction Battalion. He recommended retaining an Army Engineer Battalion and a Naval Mobile Construction Battalion, both of which had been scheduled for civilianization. Lastly, he recommended deferral of 495 direct hires in five Army Engineering Construction Battalions. CINCPAC awaited a reply at the end of the year.

Construction Program Reviews

(U) In June CINCPAC provided his comments to the JCS on COMUSMACV's 1 April revision of the report entitled "Construction Program, South Vietnam, Status and General Requirements by Complex."² The report described the overall scope of facilities required to support Program 4 deployments and contained a recapitulation of existing and programmed construction. CINCPAC strongly supported COMUSMACV's discussion of problems associated with shifting requirements. He also stated that construction programs must remain flexible to provide under the dynamic situation in South Vietnam.

(U) In October CINCPAC furnished the JCS with a revision of the "Review of Thailand Construction" that had been originally requested by

1. CINCPAC 040401Z Nov 67.

2. CINCPAC ltr Ser 001102, 16 Jun 67; J4 History, Jun 67.

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the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Installations and Logistics on 1 September. ¹ COMUSMACTHAI had prepared the revision, assisted by representatives of CINCPAC and his component command commanders. CINCPAC commented when he forwarded it that all military construction programs in Thailand "have been managed effectively." ²

(U) In November the JCS advised that the review was responsive to the basic requirement but that they wanted the review prepared in the same format as the one prepared for Vietnam. ³ CINCPAC tasked ~~COMUSMACTHAI~~ and expected the revised review early in 1968.

Construction Management in RVN

~~(S)~~ Although numerous changes in management of the Southeast Asia support construction program had taken place since 1965, CINCPAC believed that there was still a need to simplify and to provide more flexibility in order to improve the system.

~~(S)~~ Prior to April 1965 programming, funding, and managing of the very small construction program in Vietnam were accomplished using standard peacetime procedures. Most US-funded construction was part of the Military Assistance Program. ⁴

~~(S)~~ In 1965 the Secretary of Defense revised some procedures to provide more flexibility to the program managers on behalf of COMUSMACV. Requirements for facilities would be submitted to CINCPAC and then forwarded through command channels as well as through Service channels to the Defense Department. Changed procedures in Vietnam permitted some relocating of approved construction to coincide with operational requirements and some minor increases in scope or additions to approved projects. All adjustments were subject to total Service appropriations for Vietnam, however, and increases therefore required concurrent reductions or deletions of other approved projects. Monthly reports of these changes and the reasons for them were required by the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Installations and Logistics.

~~(S)~~ These procedures resulted in delays for several reasons. Funding for a vaguely defined list of specific project requirements submitted far in

1. J4 History, Nov 67.
2. CINCPAC ltr Ser 001928, 7 Oct 67.
3. JCS 061511Z Nov 67.
4. Point Paper J4213, 4 Oct 67.

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advance was not compatible with the military situation in Southeast Asia where new requirements developed rapidly and where previously recognized requirements tended to change. Because existing funds had to be used the reprogramming flexibility that was provided was of limited value in satisfying new and increased requirements. Once funds had been obligated for material procurement, for example, they were no longer available for some other use. True contingency funds, in adequate amounts, were needed. Local commanders could take action to shift authorized projects only if the sums involved were less than \$1 million. Detailed project accounting and reporting were required, which took time and energy away from other facets of management but did not provide real accountability.

~~(S)~~ The Secretary of Defense took some other steps to improve procedures in 1966 when he concurred in the need for a Construction Director for COMUSMACV; on 15 February 1966 a separate special staff agency was created for this purpose. The new organization was given some further revised procedures that basically provided for restructuring certain supplemental and amended military construction programs into broad Functional Facility Category Groups, among which COMUSMACV could make certain transfers of authorization or funding (still notifying the Defense Department and the Services of any changes made).

~~(S)~~ This system continued in use until March 1967 when the Secretary of Defense again modified procedures, granting COMUSMACV still more authority to direct tentative reprogramming actions, within Service dollar authorizations, but still subject to later disapproval by the Secretary.

~~(S)~~ These various modifications provided some relief to the constraints of peacetime military construction procedures, but among constraints that still remained in 1967 were the extensive adjustments necessary after apportionment of funds because of the long time that had passed since the original submission. Significant amounts of authorized funds had to be placed in commitment accounts¹ and were thus not available to satisfy unforeseen urgent requirements. Military construction projects were required to absorb costs from battle damage or sabotage, but such costs could not be programmed. Lastly, as all

1. Such as the \$30 million reserved for contractor close out.

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construction had to be accomplished from available funds, any newly developed urgent requirement had to be funded at the expense of either other required construction or the very limited contingency funds.

~~(S)~~ CINCPAC believed that the construction funding and administration systems in Vietnam should be based on the existing wartime situation. The system in use needed an inordinate amount of effort and manpower for its administration and the fact that it had worked only meant that the required effort and manpower had been applied. A system based on wartime procedures supported by operations and maintenance funds ~~with~~ construction materials charged off upon shipment from CONUS would have been more responsive to operational needs. Such a system would also greatly reduce the personnel and effort required to administer the program. The existing management system contained a duplication of capabilities in the Services and in the unified command channels without compensatory reductions in personnel elsewhere.

~~(S)~~ CINCPAC believed that the most economic management could be achieved by the use of existing Service capabilities for detailed management and administration, limiting joint management to matters with inter-Service implications and establishment of priorities.

~~(S)~~ In September 1967 CINCPAC again passed some of his views on the subject of management in Vietnam¹ in reply to a JCS request for comments on a paper by Brigadier General D. A. Raymond, who had served as COMUSMACV's Director of Construction. In addition to his own comments in his "Observations on the Construction Program, RVN, 1 Oct 65 - 1 Jun 67," General Raymond included comments and recommendations of the Engineers of COMUSMACV's Service component command commanders, the Officer in Charge of Construction, and the principal civilian contractor.²

~~(S)~~ CINCPAC stated that General Raymond's comprehensive review not only provided a basis for further studies aimed at improving future similar operations, but also provided a basis for reexamination of existing procedures to provide a better management system for current operations. He noted the large amount of paper work by personnel in the active combat areas that was required by the Secretary of Defense and said that the management effort appeared excessive when compared on a dollar basis

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1. CINCPAC ltr Ser 0958, 7 Sep 67.
 2. Raymond Morrison Knutson - Brown Root Jones.

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with other procurement functions. He discussed various specific facets of Vietnam construction programs and problems that had been within his cognizance.

~~(C)~~ General Raymond had advocated better and more detailed base development planning to avoid crash, inefficient construction programs in the future. CINCPAC had been concerned with this problem for some time and since May 1966 had been translating his Service component command commander's base development plans into computer formats. Execution of further CINCPAC plans to enlarge this program would make it even more responsive to certain planning needs in this regard.

~~(C)~~ CINCPAC believed that further effort was warranted in development of current "on-the-shelf" facility concept packages, to include basic design and identification of pre-engineered and prefabricated facilities.

~~(C)~~ CINCPAC agreed that a certain amount of centralized control was required but he noted that it did not follow that the concept of a director of construction was the best means of providing that control. He noted duplication in management systems and stated that the necessary centralized control could be achieved by limiting joint management to matters with inter-Service implications, establishment of priorities, prevention of unnecessary duplication of facilities, and establishment of standards to assure economy and uniformity as required throughout the PACOM.

~~(C)~~ He agreed that the existing system of processing construction programs through both joint and Service channels required a duplication of effort and did not assure that the final programs were the best statement of theater needs. Programs were prepared long in advance, but in the dynamic atmosphere of combat operations both deployment and missions changed so rapidly that the programs finally approved required extensive adjustment.

~~(C)~~ The existing system for handling reprogramming actions was too complex and too voluminous in paperwork to be an effective management tool at the CINCPAC level.

~~(C)~~ CINCPAC said that the attempt to provide responsiveness to the operational commander while using a basic peacetime programming system was responsible for this major problem. He recommended further advances in funding in future concepts, to a level-of-effort basis with the funding level based on total time-phased requirements

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and with all construction operations and maintenance funded to provide maximum flexibility in the use of troops and contractors. He said that this approach probably would have reduced construction costs in Vietnam by permitting more efficient contractor operations over a long range and by requiring an overall program analysis rather than reviewing the program on the basis of individual detailed items. In any such situation as Vietnam the total available capability would be fully employed on construction and the capability required was the key question in establishing an efficient, responsive operation.

(S) CINCPAC supported a JCS proposal to analyze the Vietnam program further. He recommended that maximum advantage be taken of the opportunity to improve construction programming, funding and execution.

Construction Management in Thailand

(S) The question of the need for a Director of Construction in Thailand, similar to the one in Vietnam, kept coming up. CINCPAC did not believe such a director was needed for Thailand.

(S) In April 1966 the Secretary of Defense indicated to the Chairman of the JCS that he was inclined to believe that a "construction boss" was needed in Thailand and requested his comments.¹ The Chairman noted that the Construction Directorate in Vietnam had been successful in direction and control of the construction effort and that the separation of the Engineer functions from their place in the organization would permit the Engineer's undivided attention to the management of construction programs, with direct access to COMUSMACTHAI.

(S) CINCPAC, commenting on the matter in response to a JCS request, pointed up many dissimilarities between the situations in Thailand and Vietnam. There was less need for program flexibility in Thailand and capabilities to perform construction routinely there exceeded Vietnam capabilities. Creation of the directorate would not alleviate the major problem, which was the timely availability of construction funds. The Chairman of the JCS supported CINCPAC's position and on 3 August 1966 the Secretary of Defense reluctantly agreed that a construction directorate not be established in Thailand at that time.

1. Point Paper, J4217, 21 Aug 67.

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~~(S)~~ Meanwhile, in a continuing series of messages, CINCPAC defined the responsibilities of COMUSMACTHAI for construction management, urged an increase in the manning of COMUSMACTHAI's Engineer Branch, and requested early implementation of the newly-assigned responsibilities.

~~(S)~~ The question of the need for a Director of Construction was raised again during mid-April 1967, when a former chief of the Army Engineers reviewed construction in Southeast Asia. It was pointed out during the review that such a directorate should be functioning in the event of escalation of hostilities in Thailand.

~~(S)~~ Again, CINCPAC pointed out significant differences between the situations in the two countries. In Thailand the Services had managed their construction programs without centralized direction. In the absence of a demonstrated need, activation of another staff without compensatory reductions in other personnel requirements appeared unwarranted. He strongly recommended continuation of the existing workable system as the most efficient means of accomplishing the job.

~~(S)~~ The subsequent memorandum from the JCS to the Secretary of Defense made note of the terms of reference that outlined COMUSMACTHAI's responsibilities. It was also noted that the Secretary's approval of a modest personnel increase for the MACTHAI Engineer as had been requested by the JCS would provide a capability consistent with requirements. Again the Chairman of the JCS recommended against creation of a Director of Construction for Thailand. On 29 June the Deputy Secretary approved the Chairman's recommendation, but he further stated that at the end of six months the matter should be reviewed again.



SECTION IX - CINCPAC REPORTS ON PROGRESS OF THE VIETNAM
WAR DURING 1967

Strategy and Tasks

(TS) At the end of 1967, Admiral Sharp and his staff began to prepare a year-end review of Vietnam. On 1 January 1968 the completed report was forwarded to the JCS.¹ It examined the progress made in Vietnam during 1967 and the prospects for 1968. The strategy for Vietnam was used as the basis for evaluating the progress made. This strategy encompassed three interdependent tasks which together constituted the concept for the conduct of the war. These tasks were to:²

- a. Seek out and destroy communist forces and infrastructure in South Vietnam by offensive military operations.
- b. Take the war to the enemy in North Vietnam by unremitting but selective application of United States air and naval power.
- c. Extend the secure areas of South Vietnam by coordinated civil-military operations and assist the government of South Vietnam in building an independent, viable, non-communist society.

Military Operations

(TS) In regards to the first task Admiral Sharp reported that:³

"The combination of military operations in South Vietnam, North Vietnam and Laos during 1967 produced a definite shift in the military situation favorable to us. As a result the enemy is no longer capable of a military victory. In the south, this was made possible by the significant increase in the strengths and capabilities of allied forces. The increase in forces facilitated expansion of combat operations to an extent which denies the enemy the capability to conduct significant operations in the populated areas. Our operations, supported by close air and ARC LIGHT strikes, increasingly neutralized enemy base areas, located and destroyed

1. CINCPAC 010156Z Jan 68.

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid.

~~TOP SECRET~~

the supplies on which the enemy depends, and drove him into sparsely populated regions where food is scarce. Steady progress was made in seeking out and destroying communist forces and infrastructure. The overall trend in the enemy's losses from killed, wounded, disease, and capture was favorable to us, as was the overall trend in his defections. The proportion of population and area which he controls slowly but steadily declined. His in-country recruitment also declined significantly. Consequently, the replacement burden has fallen increasingly on the North Vietnamese. There is increasing evidence that North Vietnam is resorting to wider use of women in the labor force and to use 16-year old boys and men over 38 years of age to provide some of the badly needed military replacements. Shortages of food and medical supplies are taking their toll with deterioration of the morale and quality of the communist forces noted in some units-- especially those in isolated areas."

Enemy Strategy and Reaction

(S) Admiral Sharp then analyzed the enemy's¹ reaction to US, RVNAF and FWMAF military operations. He stated that:

"The enemy did not win a major battle in Vietnam in 1967. Most of his main forces have been driven to positions near the borders of South Vietnam where they take advantage of sanctuaries for protection and resupply. When our troops begin to punish them severely, they retreat across the borders, and avoid contact until they have refitted and prepared for another operation. Even then we have been able to detect impending major offensives and to mount spoiling attacks to knock them off balance and force them to fight defensively. The Dak To battle is a recent example.

"The enemy's strategy continues to reflect an effort to draw Allied forces into remote areas of his choosing, especially those areas adjacent to border sanctuaries, thereby enabling his local and guerrilla forces to harass, attack and generally impede the GVN nation building effort. He has shown a recent willingness to engage our forces in sustained combat. Recent large unit deployments from North Vietnam indicate that the enemy may be seeking a spectacular win in South Vietnam in the near future.

1. CINCPAC 010156Z Jan 68.

~~TOP SECRET~~

"Despite a general free world optimism regarding the progress reflected to date, we must not overlook the fact that the enemy has demonstrated a willingness to accept the situation as it exists, and continues to attack, harass, and terrorize in many areas of the countryside. The VC infrastructure persists as a significant influence over portions of the population. Infiltration from the north still continues at a high rate (estimated to be over 6,000 personnel per month). Enemy employment of artillery, rockets and mortars has shown a marked increase in both quantity and caliber (120mm mortars, 122/140 mm rockets, and 130mm field guns). Although these enemy capabilities are at times formidable in a local sense, they are not overpowering. Through careful exploitation of the enemy's vulnerabilities and application of our superior firepower and mobility, we should expect our gains of 1967 in South Vietnam to be increased many fold in 1968."

Taking the War to the Enemy in NVN

~~(TS)~~ In reporting the results of the second task (Taking the war to the enemy in NVN....), Admiral Sharp reiterated the three basic objectives of this task:¹

- a. To disrupt the flow of external assistance into North Vietnam;
- b. To curtail the flow of men and supplies from North Vietnam into Laos and South Vietnam; and,
- c. To destroy in depth those resources in North Vietnam that contribute to support of the aggression.

Reducing External Assistance

~~(TS)~~ In reference to reducing external assistance to NVN, Admiral Sharp stated:²

"The amount of external assistance to North Vietnam has continued to increase each year since the war began and with it the tonnage of goods imported into the country. In 1967, for example, sea import tonnages were almost 40 percent greater

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- 1. CINCPAC 010156Z Jan 68.
 - 2. Ibid.

than the 930,000 metric tons delivered in 1966. Mining and air strikes against port facilities have not been authorized where third country shipping could be endangered. However, systematic strikes on lines of communication have greatly impeded the flow of imported goods once within the country. From 1 January to 15 December 1967, a total of 20,143 attack sorties was flown in ROLLING THUNDER Route Package VIA and VIB. These sorties included attacks against war-supporting fixed targets as well as Key LOC targets to reduce the flow of imported material.

"The advent of good weather in late May permitted a concentrated strike effort against all of the northern rail-lines and within the Hanoi and Haiphong complexes directed toward reducing the flow of material. Strikes during the three months from June-August accounted for over 56 percent of the total trucks and rail rolling stock reported as damaged and destroyed for the entire year. A mid-year estimate indicated that approximately 30 percent of imported material was being destroyed by air strikes while in transit. Strikes against large military storage depots in the Hanoi and the Thai Nguyen area destroyed additional supplies which had arrived in NVN by rail and sea.

"Beginning in August, a major campaign was launched to isolate Hanoi and Haiphong from each other and from the northern and southern logistic routes. Major rail and highway bridges were rendered unserviceable as these targets were authorized for strike. Vital waterways were seeded with Destructor MK-36s to deter reconstruction and impede movement of watercraft. Of 77 targets in the ROLLING THUNDER target list associated with the isolation of Haiphong, 51 had been struck by mid-December. Of the unstruck targets, 23 are not authorized for strike, two are of low target value and one is located in close proximity to foreign shipping in Haiphong.

"The overall effect of our effort to reduce external assistance has resulted not only in destruction and damage to the transportation systems and goods being transported thereon but has created additional management, distribution, and manpower problems. In addition, the attacks have created a bottleneck at Haiphong where inability effectively to move goods inland from the port has resulted in congestion on the docks and a slowdown in off-loading ships as they arrive. By October, road and rail

interdictions had reduced the transportation clearance capability at Haiphong to about 2,700 short tons per day. An average of 4,400 short tons per day of imports had arrived in Haiphong during the year."

Impeding Movement of Men and Material

(16) The progress made toward the attainment of the objective of impeding movement of men and material southward was assessed as follows:

"Although men and material needed for the level of combat now prevailing in South Vietnam continue to flow despite our attacks on LOCs, we have made it very costly to the enemy in terms of material, manpower, management, and distribution. From 1 January through 15 December 1967, 122,960 attack sorties were flown in ROLLING THUNDER Route Packages I through V and in Laos. SEA DRAGON offensive operations involved 1,384 ship-days on station and contributed materially in reducing enemy seaborne infiltration in southern NVN and in the vicinity of the DMZ.

"Attacks against the NVN transport system during the past 12 months resulted in destruction of carriers, cargo carried, and personnel casualties. Air attacks throughout North Vietnam and Laos destroyed or damaged 5,261 motor vehicles, 2,475 railroad rolling stock, and 11,425 water craft from 1 January through 20 December 1967. SEA DRAGON accounted for another 1,473 WBLC destroyed or damaged from 1 January-30 November. There were additional enemy material losses from destroyed rail-lines, bridges, ferries, railroad yards and shops, storage areas, and truck parks. Some 3,685 land targets were struck by SEA DRAGON forces, including the destruction or damage of 303 coastal defense and radar sites. Through external assistance, the enemy has been able to replace or rehabilitate many of the items damaged or destroyed, and transport carrier inventories are roughly at the same level they were at the beginning of the year. Nevertheless, construction problems and delays have caused interruptions in the flow of men and supplies, caused a great loss of work-hours, and restricted movement particularly during daylight hours.

1. CINCPAC 010156Z Jan 68.

"Seaborne infiltration of enemy personnel and supplies is considered now to be a relatively small contribution toward meeting out of country requirements. MARKET TIME and SEA DRAGON operations have reduced this enemy capability. Still, as in the ground war, the enemy appears willing to accept losses and continues attempts to resupply in certain hard pressed combat areas.

"A primary effect of our efforts to impede movement of the enemy has been to force Hanoi to engage from 500,000 to 600,000 civilians in full-time and part-time war-related activities, in particular for air defense and repair of the LOCs. This diversion of manpower from other pursuits, particularly from the agricultural sector, has caused a drawdown on manpower. The estimated lower food production yields, coupled with an increase in food imports in 1967 (some six times that of 1966), indicate that agriculture is having great difficulty in adjusting to this changed composition of the work force. The cost and difficulties of the war to Hanoi have sharply increased, and only through the willingness of other communist countries to provide maximum replacement of goods and material has NVN managed to sustain its war effort.

"Muscle Shoals/Dye Marker operations are in the process of being implemented. Only one sub-system became operational during 1967 - the air supported anti-vehicular system (Mud River) in Central Laos. The remaining three sub-systems will be implemented during the first half of 1968. It is too early to evaluate the effectiveness of this program."

Destroying in Depth Resources in NVN

(TS) The third objective of the second task (Taking the war to the enemy in NVN.....), was to destroy in depth resources in NVN that contributed to support of aggression. In regards to this task Admiral Sharp stated:¹

"Air attacks were authorized and executed by target systems for the first time in 1967, although the attacks were limited to specific targets within each system. A total of 9,740 sorties was flown against targets on the ROLLING THUNDER target list from 1 January - 15 December 1967. The campaign against the power system resulted in reduction of power generating capability to approximately 15 percent of original capacity. Successful

1. CINCPAC 010156Z Jan 68.

strikes against the Thai Nguyen Iron and Steel Plant and the Haiphong Cement Plant resulted in practically total destruction of these two installations. NVN adjustments to these losses have had to be made by relying on additional imports from China, the USSR or the Eastern European countries. The requirement for additional imports reduces available shipping space for war supporting supplies and adds to the congestion at the ports. Interruptions in raw material supplies and the requirement to turn to less efficient means of power and distribution has degraded overall production.

"Economic losses to North Vietnam amounted to more than \$130 million dollars in 1967, representing over one-half of the total economic losses since the war began."

Enemy Reaction to Taking the War to NVN

~~(SS)~~ The enemy's reaction to US airstrikes was to increase its air defenses and make maximum use of standdowns (Tet, Christmas) to move massive amounts of supplies and men south. Admiral Sharp told the JCS that:¹

"Strikes over North Vietnam, particularly in the vital northeast sector, have encountered increased opposition from NVN. The net result for the year, however, has been a reduction in NVN's fighter aircraft capability and frequent disruption of operational airfields. At the beginning of the year, some 72 MIG fighters were in-country. They used the following airfields; Phuc Yen, Gia Lam, Cat Bi, and Kien An, and later, Hoa Lac. By late-October, strikes had been authorized and conducted against all of these airfields except Gia Lam. By the end of October and through December, only some 20 fighters were operating from airfields within NVN, with the balance operating from Chinese bases. From 1 January - 18 December 1967, the ratio of US aircraft to MIG aircraft downed in air encounters was about 1:3 (25 to 78) compared to the 1966 ratio of 1:2.5 (9 to 22).

"Probably the most positive reaction to US bombing strikes has been the enemy buildup of the ground components of the air defense system: SAMs, AAA, and the aircraft control and warning facilities. Although the estimated number of SAM battalions remained at about 25, the number of SAM sites discovered by the

1. CINCPAC 010156Z Jan 68.

beginning of the year was 151. By mid-December, the total SAM sites discovered has risen to 270, a net gain of 119 sites, however, 41 of these are not currently in use. Although some 3,400 SAM visual firings were noted from 1 January through mid December (compared to only 990 firings from 1966), SAM results actually declined by the average number of SAMs expended to down one US aircraft (56:1) in 1967 compared to the ratio for 1966 (33:1). The total number of AAA weapons increased from 7,126 to 7,959 for 1967, an addition of some 830 guns, mostly in the light caliber range (37mm and 57mm). In the vicinity of the DMZ, 85mm AAA guns were used for the first time as a threat to higher altitude operations. NVN electronic order of battle declined from some 400 to 300 radars during 1967, however, the effectiveness of the radar system continued to improve. Most of the radar decline was attributed to refinement of our order of battle holdings, inactivation of obsolete equipment, and a slight reduction in the enemy's use of fire control radars."

Nation Building Efforts in SVN

~~(TS)~~ During 1967 the nation building efforts were concentrated on laying a solid foundation for on-going programs. Admiral Sharp reported that gains were made in a number of significant areas; specifically, SVN political structure, US support in the pacification program, economic stability, population security and the Chieu Hoi program.¹

Political Structure

~~(TS)~~ "The most significant advance in the broad area of Nation Building during 1967 was registered in the political arena. The citizens of RNV elected and thereby legitimized their national government. Similarly, for the first time since the early days of the Diem regime, representative government was initiated at the village and hamlet levels. There are already fragmentary but nevertheless encouraging signs that the National Assembly is becoming constituent oriented."

US Organization of Pacification Support

~~(TS)~~ "During 1967 there was a reorganization and consolidation in US support of pacification. As a result, the program is buttressed with added resources, increased military support, and unified civil-military staffing."

1. CINCPAC 010156Z Jan 68.

Thus, we now have in MAC CORDS, a single, forcefully directed US pacification support organization."

Economic Stability

~~(S)~~ "Despite great stresses placed on a fragile economy, the threat of runaway inflation was checked throughout 1967. While the Saigon price index rose perceptibly during 1967, it was kept below the danger mark. More attention was focused on opening market areas and securing LOCs, such as the Mang Thit Nicolai waterway, vital to the economy of the country. As of 30 November, of roads considered essential to friendly operations, 91 (99.7)* percent were open and 54 (60.9)* percent secured; 53 (37.5)* percent of the railroads were open and 48 (41)* percent secured; and of the waterways in the National Priority Areas of III and IV CTZ's, 92 percent were open and 47 percent secured."

Population Security

~~(S)~~ "By GVN measurement, 64.9 (63.6)* percent of the population was considered secure day and night as of 30 November, a gain of 5.5 (3.9)* percent since 1 January. Similarly, 4,658 (4508)* hamlets are listed by the GVN as secured, compared to 4,401 as of 1 January. The Hamlet Evaluation System (HES) population and hamlet figures are even more favorable. While the increase in secured population consists to a large degree of refugees and urbanized population, the change must be viewed as an overall gain. Conversely, according to GVN figures, the percentage of population over which the VC maintained sustained control dropped during the year from 18 percent to 12.9 (12.8)* percent as of 30 November."

Chieu Hoi

~~(S)~~ "Although the number of returning Hoi Chanh has dropped sharply in recent months the overall total of 26,868 (27,178)* as of 15 December is 44 (34)* percent higher than for the same time last year and must be viewed as a measure of progress."

* The figure in parentheses is an up-date as of 31 December 1967 and has been provided for comparison purposes with the figures in subsections, "Economic Stability", "Population Security" and "Chieu Hoi. Source: MACV ltr. 3341 of 3 Mar 68, Subject: "Measurement of Progress."

Progress of RVNAF

(TS) After reporting on the progress of the three undertakings (tasks) which constituted the concept for the conduct of the war, Admiral Sharp reported on the programs designed to achieve overall improvement of the South Vietnamese Armed Forces. He pointed out the efforts to modernize the RVNAF which included: the issuance of M16 rifles to RVNAF airborne battalions and selected infantry and ranger units; the stressing of day patrols and night ambushes in support of Revolutionary Development; increasing intelligence gathering capability of the RVNAF; providing for twelve reconnaissance companies in the FY 68 force structure; organizing and training long range patrols; and, making the maximum and most efficient employment of reserve and regular units.

Leadership Progress


(TS) CINCPAC informed the JCS that even though adequate leadership remained a problem, a good start had been made in the slow process of building quality leadership. He cited examples of programs aimed at improving leadership and personnel effectiveness which included: a promotion system based on merit and better personnel management systems; upgrading RVNAF school system; increasing the length of the Military Academy course from two to four years with a revised curriculum and strengthened faculty and advisory effort; improving the Command and General Staff College in a similar manner; and, the establishment of a National Defense College in February 1968. Leadership courses were instituted for corps and division units and strong efforts were continuously made to improve the ARVN officer candidate program.

Impact of Free World Military Assistance Forces (FWMAF)

(TS) In his report Admiral Sharp commented on the outstanding performance of the Korean forces, the professional and effective performance of Thai troops as jungle fighters, and the enhancement of the operational capability the Australian-New Zealand Task Force by the arrival of the Third Battalion, Royal Australian Regiment and a second New Zealand rifle company.



2. Ibid.



Military Construction

~~(TS)~~ The military construction effort was directed toward the upgrading and expansion of combat bases, augmentation of the logistic infrastructure, upgrading lines of communication, and the initial construction of the DYE MARKER anti-infiltration obstacle system in northern I CTZ. Additional airfields and base areas were completed in the I CTZ. A C-130 airstrip and logistics base at Quang Tri City, an LST port at Cua Viet, and an interim LST ramp at Tan My. On the Delta area, the base area at Dong Tam was completed and the Qui Nhom depot was expanded and dispersed to a new site 15 miles west of Qui Nhom. COMUSMACV moved into his new headquarters at Tan Son Nhut and USARV and the 1st Logistical Command moved into new headquarters at Long Binh. ²



Improved Port Capability

(S) Sufficient port throughput capability was achieved in 1967 to assure the maintenance of established levels of supply. Newport became operational as a separate military port supporting military cargos for Saigon. In Thailand nearly all military cargo operations supporting the air war in NVN were shifted from Bangkok to Sattahip.¹

Support of Combat Forces

(S) During the year no combat operations had to be curtailed because of lack of logistic support; even in remote areas. An example of ingenuity and effort to insure logistical support of combat operations was the combined action of the Army-Navy-Air Force to support the southern-most elements of the Americal Division over the hazardous and insecure land LOC from Chu Lai and Qui Nhon, augmented by over the beach support at Duc Pho.²

Air Munitions

(S) The air munitions picture was improved considerably during 1967. Production satisfied approximately 95 percent of stated requirements for modern air munitions. Stockage objectives increased to a 45 day level except for five items. Monthly expenditures increased during 1967 from 63,000 tons in January to a high of 83,000 tons in December. Inventories of all munitions were reduced from 45,000 tons on hand in January to 20,000 tons on hand in December. The initial phase of rebuilding the PACOM air munitions war reserve was implemented.³

POL

(S) POL consumption in SEA totaled approximately 70 million barrels, 48 percent of the POL consumed in PACOM. In spite of the change to POL supply patterns caused by the Middle East Crisis in June, SEA military operations were not hampered because of a shortage of POL.⁴

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1. CINCPAC 010156Z Jan 68.
 2. Ibid.
 3. Ibid.
 4. Ibid.

Communications and Electronics

(SS) Substantially all of the 1965 programs for fixed trunk communications in SEA became operational in 1967, permitting implementation of high speed data and secure voice service. However, the inter-base switching program was delayed and the completion date was slipped to 1968. Expanded and improved satellite service to SEA was provided, including the COMPASS LINK photo transmission system. The manual interface between the USAF tactical air control system and the USN-USMC tactical data system improved the capability to control US ~~air~~ aircraft over NVN and to provide expedited MIG and SAM warning alerts. Plans called for full automatic interface to be completed in late 1968. The modernization of Army ground sets and the refitting of Army aircraft with new communications equipment, resulted in a vast improvement of Army tactical communications. Programs still outstanding at the end of 1967 included the long lines program, implementation of AUTODIN and AUTOSEVOCOM and improvements to the C-E posture of the RVNAF. ¹

Prospects for 1968

Combat Operations

(SS) Admiral Sharp told the JCS that:²

"Combat operations in SVN will be intensified in the forthcoming year. Increased combat strength under Program 5, as well as programmed additions to RVNAF and FWMA Forces during 1968 will provide increased allied capability to intensify in-country operations. Concept of operations envisions the introduction of military power, civilian skills and economic resources into selected priority areas. Within this context, forces are to be deployed in three mutually supporting roles. Frontier Defense Forces will operate along the DMZ and opposite the enemy's Cambodian and Laotian sanctuaries to prevent major incursions into South Vietnam. Mobile Strike Forces will seek out and destroy VC/NVA forces and neutralize his main base area. Territorial Security Forces, committed behind the protective shield of the frontier defense and mobile strike forces, will support the Pacification program. The RVNAF will have primary responsibility for supporting pacification with priority of effort to providing security for specified areas, to include responsibility for selected LOCs. US/FWMAF operations will concentrate on the destruction

1. CINCPAC 010156Z Jan 68.

2. Ibid.

~~TOP SECRET~~

of VC/NVA main forces, base areas and resources; denial of infiltration and supply routes; and in providing assistance and reinforcing the RVNAF as necessary in opening and securing vital LOCs, providing security for priority areas, and destruction of the VC infrastructure.

"It is intended to keep the enemy in SVN constantly on the move and deny him the opportunity to refit, resupply, rest or retrain in-country. The enemy losses in his main forces, destruction and neutralization of his in-country base areas and continued air and naval interdiction of his LOCs should force him to place greater reliance on sanctuaries in Cambodia, Laos and the northern DMZ. Infiltration should be restricted by the strong point obstacle system along the DMZ, by civilian irregular defense groups (CIDG) being redeployed to provide better surveillance and interdiction along the frontier, and by the prompt use of mobile strike forces. The attack on the VC infrastructure is expected to gain considerable headway during the next six months. Impact on the enemy should be increased casualties, desertions, sickness and lowered morale. His in-country recruiting potential will be reduced by acceleration of our military offensive and pacification efforts. Prisoners of war and ralliers should increase."

Nation Building

(S) Admiral Sharp discussed for the JCS the proposed overall nation building effort during 1968. He stated that:

"Our overall nation building effort in 1968 will focus on helping the GVN to provide security for its people and to develop a rapport with them. Our goal is to encourage the feeling among the populace that their government is deserving of their support. Among the more significant on-going programs which should enhance Nation Building are the following:

"a. There will be increased selectivity and better training of Province Chiefs, who, upon being granted more autonomy, should provide better administration at this key level.

"b. The GVN anti-corruption campaign should do much to strengthen the bond between the government and the people and make the GVN acceptable in the eyes of the people.

1. CINCPAC 010156Z Jan 68.

~~TOP SECRET~~

"c. Relief measures and, when required, vocational training for refugees and Hoi Chanh will be expanded so that they can find their places in the main stream of Vietnamese society. 1968 planning is based on 60,000 Hoi Chanh rallying to the side of the GVN and the generation of an additional 800,000 new refugees.

"d. A police force totaling 94,000 (including 22,500 Police Field Force Personnel) is envisaged by the end of CY 68. A high priority will be placed on improving prison systems and detention facilities.

"e. Every effort will continue to be made to hold the line against the corrosive effects of inflation. Stress will be placed on upgrading and maintaining LOCs necessary to expand economic development.

"f. During 1968 the Ministry of Revolutionary Development will emphasize the expansion of funded self-help projects in 5,800 hamlets as compared to 2,000 during 1967. This expansion should help prevent regression in those hamlets in which RD teams have accomplished their mission and are no longer present."

~~(TS)~~ Admiral Sharp concluded his year-end report by stating that:

"The air and naval campaign against North Vietnam continues to be the one element of our strategy where we truly have the initiative. We must continue to press this advantage. There is no doubt that our past efforts have hurt the enemy and that continued support of the war in South Vietnam is causing him severe hardships. To increase the effectiveness of our operations in SVN, the air and naval forces need additional operational latitudes, with such additional authorities, the air and naval campaign against NVN can be designed and executed to bring about a more rapid deterioration of the enemy's economy and total war supporting structure. When this curtailment of enemy efforts is achieved by drains on his resources, the ultimate result should be a reduction of the insurgency and aggression in South Vietnam to a level where effective internal political and military actions can achieve and maintain stability."

~~SECRET~~

CINCPAC Measurement of Progress in Southeast Asia

(S) A system for measuring progress of the war effort in Vietnam evolved from the goals established at the Honolulu Conference in February 1966. At the conference, attended by President Johnson, high ranking government officials of SVN, and others, six goals were established as objectives for operations in SVN during 1966. These goals became the basis for measuring progress.¹

(S) In October 1967, CINCPAC's strategy for Vietnam was promulgated and it included three interdependent undertakings which together constituted the concept for the conduct of military operations against North Vietnam and in Laos and South Vietnam.² The undertakings and the goals for each are shown below. Initially, there were only nine goals for 1967;³ however, another goal was added in March 1967--secure the water lines of communication in the National Priority Areas of III and IV Corps Tactical Zones.⁴ In July 1967, a second change occurred. The goal to open 65 percent of the railroads and secure those in National Priority Areas was changed to opening 55 percent of the railroads and securing those in the National Priority Areas of II and III Corps.⁵

(S) In the South the two undertakings included in CINCPAC's strategy were:⁶

- a. Seek out and destroy communist forces and infrastructure by expanded, offensive military operations.
- b. Extend the secure areas of South Vietnam by military operations and assist the GVN in building an independent, viable, non-communist society by civic actions coordinated with military operations.

(S) There were six goals for these undertakings toward which progress was measured:

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1. Chapter 4, Volume II, CINCPAC Command History 1966, pp 605-606.
 2. CINCPAC ltr, ser 000438, 20 Oct 66.
 3. Interview between LTC J. F. Jewell and F. E. Leavens, J3A5, and LTC Johnson, Command Historian; CINCPAC 090556Z Jan 67.
 4. CINCPAC 162232Z Apr 67.
 5. COMUSMACV 24773/260536 Jul 67.
 6. CINCPAC ltr ser 000438, 20 Oct 66.

~~SECRET~~

I. During CY 1967 begin to inflict losses on the VC-NVA forces at a rate which exceeds their input.

II. Neutralize the VC-NVA base areas in the first ten priority groupings.

III. Open 100 percent and secure 50 percent of the roads essential to friendly operations.

IV. Open 55 percent of the railroads and secure those in the national priority areas of II and III Corps.

V. Secure the water lines of communication in the National Priority Areas of III and IV Corps tactical zones.

VI. Increase the percentage of the population living in secured areas to 66 percent and secure or upgrade 1100 hamlets.

(S) In the North, the undertaking included in CINCPAC's strategy was to take the war to the enemy by unremitting but selective application of United States air and naval power thus reducing Hanoi's capability to support and direct military operations in South Vietnam.¹ There were four goals for this understanding toward which progress was measured:

VII. Achieve and maintain a level of damage to war supporting targets which will render those targets unusable for their intended purpose.

VIII. Reduce capability of NVN to move men and material within NVN and into SVN along all land and water lines of communication.

IX. As authorized, progressively reduce monthly military imports into NVN.

X. Reduce capability of NVN to interfere with our air operations over NVN, as measured by enemy aircraft inventory, SAM inventory, and the friendly aircraft loss rate.

Progress Toward 1967 Goals

(S) Goal I - During 1967 begin to inflict losses on the VC-NVA forces at a rate which exceeds their input. From data available it

1. CINCPAC ltr ser 000438, 20 Oct 66.

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
appears that Goal I for 1967 was achieved. As indicated on chart, "Goal I VC-NVA Losses Vs Input," the goal was definitely achieved for the first six months of 1967. However, the total reported input for the last six months of 1967 is probably misleading since a firm total input often lags many months behind actual events. Therefore, it is more appropriate to assess this goal only on a long term basis. In order to avoid being misled by the low reported figures for the period July-December 1967, MACV J2 estimated the total NVN personnel input to be 10,250 men per month. This estimate was based on experience which indicated approximately 6,750 men per month infiltrated from NVN to SVN and that approximately 3,500 men per month were recruited in SVN. Using the firm input figures for the first six months of 1967 and the MACV J2 estimate for the last six months, the enemy input was approximately 122,400. When compared with the 144,948 enemy losses, the losses exceeded the enemy input by 22,548.¹

~~(S)~~ Goal II - Neutralize the VC-NVA base areas in the first ten priority groupings. The 1967 Combined Campaign Plan established ten priority groupings of VC-NVA base areas and assigned priorities to the groups for neutralization. The 1967 goal required 100 percent neutralization of 41 base areas included in the first ten priority groupings. After a major update of VC-NVA base areas in SVN, which COMUSMACV completed on 1 October 1967, 12 of the 41 base areas selected for neutralization were dropped on 31 December. The 12 bases were abandoned by the enemy due to pressure by FWMAF. By the end of December, six of the remaining 29 base areas were neutralized and 13 were considered partially neutralized. As indicated on chart, "Goal II - Base Areas Neutralized," the 1967 goal was not met since only 52 percent of the designated base areas were neutralized. Although the goal of 100 percent neutralization was not met in 1967, it should be noted that of the original 41 base areas, 33 were temporarily neutralized during the year. This emphasized the temporary nature of base area neutralization and the necessity for constant reevaluating.²

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1. CINCPAC Measurement of Progress in Southeast Asia (as of 31 Dec 67) Draft, prepared by J3A5. (Hereafter cited as CINCPAC Measurement (as of 31 Dec 67).))
 2. CINCPAC Measurement of Progress (as of 31 Dec 67).

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GOAL I VC/NVA LOSSES VS. INPUT



LEGEND:

- RERORTED TOTAL INPUT (JUL-DEC SUBJECT TO MAJOR REVISION)
- TOTAL LOSSES
- MACV ESTIMATED INPUT


SOURCE: CINCPAC MEASUREMENT OF PROGRESS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA (AS OF 31 DEC. 67). DRAFT, PREPARED BY J3A5

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GOAL II

BASE AREAS NEUTRALIZED

(First Ten Priority Groupings)



LEGEND:

— PERCENT NEUTRALIZED

..... GOAL

SOURCE: CINCPAC MEASUREMENT OF PROGRESS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA
(AS OF 31 DEC. 67), DRAFT, PREPARED BY J3A5.

~~SECRET~~

(S) Goal III - Open 100 percent and secure 50 percent of the roads essential to friendly operations. The attainment of this goal was considered achieved. As indicated on chart, "Goal III - Road Goal," 99.7 percent of the roads were open and the securing of 50 percent was exceeded by 10.9 percent. Only 10 kilometers of a total of 1707.5 kilometers of roads programmed for security operations were closed on 31 December 1967. Roads were classified according to their average status during each month as follows:

SECURE - controlled by RVN-US-FWMAF during daylight hours with minimum security measures required. Isolated incidents may occur.

OPEN - used by RVN-US-FWMAF employing thorough security measures. Frequent incidents may occur. (Note: For the purpose of measuring the first part of the goal, roads OPEN and SECURE are combined as OPEN).


CLOSED - closed either by VC-NVA military control of the area or by extensive physical interdiction. Requires major military operations or engineering effort to open.¹

(S) Goal IV - Open 55 percent of the railroads and secure those in the National Priority Areas of II and III Corps.² The goal for measuring progress in railroad security established on 1 January 1967 was to open 65 percent of the railroads and secure those in the National Priority Areas. COMUSMACV, on 6 July 1967, approved a proposed change to the restoration (open) goals for the Vietnamese National Railway System (VNRS) submitted by the RVNAF Joint General Staff. Because of the close correlation between security status and restoration of the VNRS, the approved change to the restoration plans for the railroads made necessary a change in 1967 goals for measurement of progress. Thus the goal to open 65 percent of the railroads was changed to 55 percent. As indicated on chart, "Goal IV - Railroads Open-RVN," measurement of progress toward the 1967 goal of opening 55 percent of the railroads in SVN commenced at 36 percent on 1 July 1967. Progress toward attainment of the goal was achieved until December when considerable regression occurred. Final progress toward the goal stood at 37.5 percent. Since this figure is 17.5 percentage points below the 55 percent goal projection, the goal was not met. It should be noted that the chart also indicated that by the

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- 1. CINCPAC Measurement of Progress (as of 31 Dec 67).
 - 2. Railroads do not exist in the IV Corps Area.

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GOAL III ROAD GOAL



LEGEND:


- OPEN
- . SECURE
- GOAL

SOURCE: CINCPAC MEASUREMENT OF PROGRESS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA
(AS OF 31 DEC. 67) DRAFT, PREPARED BY J3A5.

~~SECRET~~

GOAL IV

RAILROADS OPEN-RVN



LEGEND:

— PERCENT OPEN

..... GOAL

SOURCE: CINCPAC MEASUREMENT OF PROGRESS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA
(AS OF 31 DEC. 67), DRAFT, PREPARED BY J3A5.

end 30 June 1967, 54 percent of the original 65 percent goal should have been reached. Railroads were classified according to their average status during each month as follows: (Actual conditions along portions of the railroad may, on occasion, reflect a greater degree of security than the established goal.)

OPEN - Segment of rail line between two terminals physically open. Security of surrounding area is such that thorough security measures, including armed escorts, are required for all trains. Frequent incidents may occur.*

SECURE - Segment of rail line between two terminals physically open. RVN-US-FWMAF control of the surrounding area is such that trains can operate during daylight hours with relative freedom from VC sabotage, attacks, or harassment. Armed escort not required. Isolated incidents may occur.

CLOSED - Rail line between two terminals does not meet the criteria for the SECURE or OPEN classifications.

(S) As shown on chart, "Goal IV - Railroads Secure in National Priority Areas," railroads in the I, II, and III Corps Areas were included in computations for the first six months of 1967. However, effective 1 July 1967 the goal was changed to secure the railroads in the II and III Corps Area. This was due to the closing of railroads in the I Corps Area by the VC-NVA. Thus, the I Corps Area was dropped.¹ The goal of securing the railroads in the National Priority Areas of II and III Corps was attained in November. Goal attainment resulted in significant relief of transportation problems in these areas.

Goal V - Secure the water LOC in the National Priority Areas of III and IV Corps Tactical Zones. Although the goal to secure 100 percent of the waterways was not met, a total of 92 percent of the vital waterways was in the OPEN category at the end of the year.


Waterways were classified according to their average status during each month as follows:

* For the purpose of measuring the first part of the goal, railroads OPEN and SECURE were combined as OPEN.

1. CINCPAC Measurement of Progress (as of 30 Jun 67).

GOAL IV

RAILROADS SECURE IN NATIONAL PRIORITY AREAS



LEGEND:

- PERCENT SECURE
- GOAL

SOURCE: CINCPAC MEASUREMENTS OF PROGRESS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA
(AS OF 31 DEC., 67), DRAFT PREPARED BY J3A5.

~~SECRET~~

SECURE - Controlled by RVN-US-FWMAF during daylight hours with minimum security measures required. Isolated incidents may occur.

OPEN - Used by RVN-US-FWMAF employing thorough security measures. Frequent incidents may occur.

CLOSED - Closed either by VC-NVA military control of the area or by extensive physical interdiction. Requires major military operations or engineering effort to open.

The chart, "Goal V - Waterways III and IV Corps," shows progress toward the goal of securing the waterlines of communication in the National Priority Areas of III and IV CTZ. The goal was approved during March 1967. COMUSMACV determined that 14 percent of the waterways were SECURE as of 31 March and a straight line projection for the goal began at that point.

(S) Goal VI - Increase the percentage of the population living in secured areas to 66 percent and secure or upgrade 1100 hamlets. As indicated on chart, "Goal VI - Population Control," the goal of 66 percent was not met. According to GVN evaluation and definition 63.6 percent of the population was under day and night government control at the end of the year, a four percent gain during 1967. Again by GVN evaluation, the VC controlled population decreased from 18 percent at the beginning of the year to 12.8 percent by 31 December.¹


(S) The goal of securing or upgrading 1100 hamlets during 1967 fell far short of the mark. As shown on chart, "Goal VI-Hamlet Status," the year began with 4,401 hamlets secure day and night and ended with 4,503 secured (day and night) at the end of 1967, a gain of 102 hamlets.² It should be noted that complete analysis of the hamlets in the GVN 1967 RD program was not available at the end of the year. Year end figures are therefore subject to revision. Details on upgraded hamlets are still being developed by MACCORDS.

1. CINCPAC Measurement of Progress (as of 31 Dec 67).

2. Ibid.

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GOAL V WATERWAYS III and IV Corps




LEGEND:

- - - PERCENT SECURE
- GOAL


SOURCE: CINCPAC MEASUREMENT OF PROGRESS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA
(AS OF 31 DEC 67) DRAFT, PREPARED BY J3A5.

GOAL VI POPULATION CONTROL



SOURCE: CINCPAC MEASUREMENT OF PROGRESS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA (AS OF 31 DEC. 67),
DRAFT, PREPARED BY J3A5.

GOAL VI HAMLET STATUS



LEGEND:

- SECURE DAY ONLY
- CONTESTED
- - - SECURE DAY AND NIGHT
- GOAL

SOURCE: CINCPAC MEASUREMENT OF PROGRESS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA
(AS OF 31 DEC. 67), DRAFT, PREPARED BY J3A5

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(S) In January 1967, a Hamlet Evaluation System (HES) was adopted. It was an automated procedure for evaluating pacification programs at the hamlet level, identifying significant problem areas and maintaining a hamlet data base. Data was organized by hamlet, village, district, province, region, and RVN as a whole and distributed in the HES Information Report which also served as an up-to-date gazetteer of all hamlets and villages in South Vietnam. HES underwent several refinements during the first 11 months of operation, most significant of which was the May 1967 revision of the Hamlet Evaluation Worksheet and improvement in both the US and GVN HES data bases. As of July 1967, the data base was considered reasonably reliable and increasingly greater use has been made of HES to perform special studies and analyses. The figures derived from HES indicate 66.9 percent of the population living in secured areas, and 5,340 hamlets secured by the GVN, an increase of 121 since July 1967. For purposes of consistency, however, GVN rather than HES criteria were used throughout the year to measure progress. (Commencing 1 January 1968 HES figures will be used to measure population security. Secured population will be considered to be that percentage of the population of RVN living in category "A", "B" and "C" hamlets plus the secure population of non-hamlet areas.)¹

(S) Goal VII - Achieve and maintain a level of damage to war supporting targets which will render those targets unusable for their intended purpose. The primary management tool used for evaluating the air campaign against NVN in support of the concept of operations was the ROLLING THUNDER Target List (RTTL). The RTTL was initiated in January 1967 and consisted of PACOM war supporting targets and the most significant JCS numbered targets. In June 1967 all the JCS numbered targets were incorporated in the RTTL.²

(S) The following table provides current data on the total number of targets, the number that were attacked at least once (initially struck) and the number that were considered unusable for each category. In addition, it indicates the number of unstruck targets remaining, and those that are not authorized for strike. An "unusable" target is one which has been assigned to Appendix IV of Annex Alpha to the ROLLING THUNDER Basic Operation Order. A target is assigned to Appendix IV when it receives a level of damage to such an extent that it no longer requires restrike or when it is abandoned. It should be noted that some targets merit only disruption and harassment; other targets such as power plants,

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1. CINCPAC Measurement of Progress (as of 31 Dec 67).
 2. This concept is discussed in Section II, Chapter IV, ROLLING THUNDER Operations; CINCPAC Measurement of Progress (as of 31 Dec 67).

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industries, barracks, and supply depots merit a high level of destruction in order to render them unusable for a prolonged period.¹

| CATEGORY | STATUS AS OF 31 DEC 67 | | | |
|---------------------------|------------------------|--------|-----------|------------------------|
| | TOTAL | STRUCK | UNSTRUCK | DESTROYED/ UNUSABLE |
| Air Defense | 31 | 21 | 10 (9) | 13 |
| Electrical Power | 24 | 14 | 10 (7) | 14 |
| Military Complexes | 148 | 115 | 33 (28) | 104 |
| POL Storage | 54 | 36 | 18 (3) | 29 |
| Transportation Facilities | 175 | 128 | 47 (33) | 75 |
| War Supporting Industries | 18 | 6 | 12 (10) | 5 |
| | 450 | 320 | 130 (90)* | 240 |

* () - Not authorized.

The results of the airstrikes against the six basic target systems were:²

a. Air Defense: The jet capable airfields at Kep, Kien An, Hoa Lac, Cat Bi, Bac Mai and Phuc Yen were attacked numerous times and damage was inflicted to aircraft and support facilities to temporarily disrupt NVN air defense operations. Forty-five percent of the 31 air defense targets were estimated to be unservicable or inactive. Gia Lam remained the only unauthorized and unstruck jet capable airfield in NVN.

Electrical Power: An estimated 80 percent of North Vietnam's

1. CINCPAC Measurement of Progress (as of 31 Dec 67).

2. Ibid.

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electric power capacity was destroyed. Fourteen of the 24 power targets were struck and 11 were inoperative. The remaining three installations were only partially operative.

Military Complexes: A total of 115 of 148 targeted military facilities were attacked and 70 percent were unserviceable or inactive.

POL Storage: An estimated 65 percent of the NVN POL storage capacity was destroyed and approximately 75,000 metric tons of storage capacity remained at numerous widely dispersed locations.

Transportation Facilities: Interdiction effort continued against the key lines of communication serving Hanoi and Haiphong. Forty-two percent of the transportation targets were unserviceable.

War Supporting Industries: Twenty-two percent of the targeted NVN industries were rendered inoperative. Thai Nguyen Iron and Steel Combine and the Haiphong Cement Plant remained inoperative at the end of 1967.

(S) Goal VIII - Reduce capability of NVN to move men and materials within NVN and into SVN along all land and water lines of communication. The destruction of NVN logistic vehicles, trucks, WBLC and railroad rolling stock, was 18 percent higher in 1967 than in 1966. Although war materials continued to arrive in the combat zones of Laos and SVN, the pressure against the enemy's logistic system appears to have degraded his capability to launch sustained large-scale military operations.¹ Details on destruction and damage to the enemy's logistics systems can be found in Air Operations Southeast Asia and Navy Surface Operations in Section II, Chapter IV.

(S) Goal IX - As authorized, progressively reduce monthly military imports into NVN. No direct measures have yet been authorized to reduce importation of military cargo into North Vietnam. Strikes against lines of communication emanating from the Haiphong port complex affected North Vietnam's ability to receive and distribute imports as reflected by the increasing stockpiles of material in open storage in Haiphong. Air strikes against the Northeast, Northwest and Hanoi-Haiphong rail lines seriously hampered and disrupted efficient flow of material into NVN over these arteries. Whether this resulted in an actual reduction in military imports or a reduction in lower priority cargo is unknown.²

1. CINCPAC Measurement of Progress (as of 31 Dec 67).

2. Ibid.

~~SECRET~~

(S) Ship arrivals for 1967 were about the same as in 1966. Of interest was a marked increase in the number of Soviet arrivals, 61 more than in 1966. Total imports in 1967 reached an all time high, increasing some 400,000 metric tons over 1966. A significant increase of bulk foodstuffs and general cargoes were noted. During 1967 the average number of days in port for Soviet ships was 18 days compared to 13 days in 1966.

(S) Goal X - Reduce capability of NVN to interfere with our air operations over NVN, as measured by enemy aircraft inventory, SAM inventory, and the friendly aircraft loss rate.

The jet fighter inventory in NVN was significantly reduced during the first of the year as intermittent air strikes against all jet capable airfields except Hia Lam forced the NVN to maintain most of their aircraft at fields in Southern China. By the year's end, improved tactics and a well coordinated radar ground controlled intercept network enabled the MIGs to continue as an effective element in the NVN air defense system.

During the year, SA-2 missiles were fired at a progressively increasing rate. SAM effectiveness in downing US aircraft remained relatively constant throughout the year, though the aircraft loss rate to SAMs was substantially lower than in 1966. The estimated number of SAM battalions remained at 30 throughout the last six months of the year.

The combat and attack loss rates showed an increasing trend throughout the year, but the yearly rates were slightly lower than in 1966.

At the end of the year there was no indication of any significant degradation of the overall NVN air defense posture.¹ See charts in ROLLING THUNDER Operations, Section II, Chapter IV for detailed information.

1. CINCPAC Measurement of Progress (as of 31 Dec 67).

1/11/11

Dear Sir,
I am writing to you regarding the matter of the
contract for the supply of goods to the
Government of Karnataka. I am pleased to
hear that you have agreed to the terms
of the contract and I am sure that the
supply of goods will be made in a timely
manner.

I am sure that you will be satisfied with
the quality of the goods and the service
provided by us. I am sure that you will
be pleased with the results of the
contract and I am sure that you will
be satisfied with the service provided by
us.

I am sure that you will be satisfied with
the quality of the goods and the service
provided by us. I am sure that you will
be pleased with the results of the
contract and I am sure that you will
be satisfied with the service provided by
us.

I am sure that you will be satisfied with
the quality of the goods and the service
provided by us. I am sure that you will
be pleased with the results of the
contract and I am sure that you will
be satisfied with the service provided by
us.

Yours faithfully,
[Signature]

SECTION X - ACTION TAKEN TO COUNTER COMMUNIST
AGGRESSION IN THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA (ROK)

(U) This part of the history has been prepared for the first time. In the past, coverage for ROK was limited to MAP and to the ROK Forces in Vietnam as part of the Free World Military Assistance Forces (FWMAF). Based on the increased aggression in ROK by North Korea in 1967, the tense situation that existed in early 1968 and the actual and possible impact on the situation in Southeast Asia, it was deemed appropriate to include in this chapter a brief account of the Communist aggression and action taken to counter that aggression. The MAP for the ROK has been included in Chapter II as in the past. The coverage of MAP includes some of the logistics planning necessary to counter NK aggression.

The North Korean Threat

~~(S)~~ In 1967 North Korea made a determined effort to initiate subversive war against the ROK. Guerrilla agent operations and related DMZ incidents increased markedly. Between 1961 and 1965, an average of 150 agents or collaborators were either killed or captured each year. In 1966 this figure increased to 204 and in 1967 the 204 figure was more than doubled - 470. In 1967 North Korean (NK) instigated DMZ incidents increased tenfold over 1966 - 44 to 445. The following charts, "Agent/Collaborator Apprehensions," and "DMZ Incidents" give a detail breakdown by month for years 1965-67.

~~(S)~~ The NK Intelligence Services reportedly geared training to produce about 500 agents a year or approximately double the estimation for recent years. Training emphasized the subjects of mountain survival, ambush techniques, assault methods for attacking installations, demolitions with emphasis on disrupting lines of communication, armed and unarmed combat and heavy doses of political doctrine. It was reported that some agent trainers were sent to Vietnam to study Viet Cong tactics and methods for inclusion in the NK guerrilla agent training curriculum.¹

~~(S)~~ Larger teams were composed of seven to nine members of high caliber professionals including officers, females and a political commissar type. The inclusion of a political officer in the standard infiltration team followed a similar pattern of communist infiltration in SVN, Thailand and Laos. These teams were well armed and equipped. Captured

1. Point Paper, J2241 (J2216) CINCPAC 22 Aug 67, Subject: "Guerrilla Agent Infiltration into South Korea Escalates. (U)."

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AGENT-COLLABORATOR APPREHENSIONS

| | Jan | Feb | Mar | Apr | May | Jun | Jul | Aug | Sep | Oct | Nov | Dec | Total |
|--------------|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-------|
| 1965 | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Agent | 1 | 2 | 17 | 6 | 5 | 7 | 15 | 10 | 18 | 6 | 12 | 3 | 102 |
| Collaborator | 0 | 0 | 6 | 16 | 3 | 10 | 1 | 0 | 21 | 2 | 0 | 6 | 65 |
| Total | 1 | 2 | 23 | 22 | 8 | 17 | 16 | 10 | 39 | 8 | 12 | 9 | 167 |
| 1966 | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Agent | 4 | 10 | 14 | 8 | 15 | 1 | 14 | 18 | 17 | 1 | 10 | 2 | 114 |
| Collaborator | 4 | 24 | 0 | 21 | 15 | 0 | 3 | 3 | 12 | 2 | 6 | 0 | 90 |
| Total | 8 | 34 | 14 | 29 | 30 | 1 | 17 | 21 | 29 | 3 | 16 | 2 | 204 |
| 1967 | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Agent | 5 | 2 | 18 | 36 | 25 | 80 | 109 | 45 | 27 | 17 | 4 | 5 | 373 |
| Collaborator | 4 | 1 | 8 | 19 | 15 | 1 | 15 | 19 | 5 | 8 | 1 | 1 | 97 |
| Total | 9 | 3 | 26 | 55 | 40 | 81 | 124 | 64 | 32 | 25 | 5 | 6 | 470 |

946

NOTE: Of the 470 persons apprehended as of 31 Dec 1967, 255 were NK infiltrators, 2 were ChiCom infiltrators, 200 were ROK -- recruited agents and collaborators, and 13 were Japan dispatched agents.

The agents missions were as follows:

- Espionage - 9
- Courier - 0
- Collaborator - 97
- Subversive - 165
- Provocateur - 2
- Escort - 17
- Assassination - 1
- Undetermined - 179
- Total - 470

Source: Commander Angelo R. Semararo, USN, J2216, CINCPAC.

DMZ INCIDENTS

| | Jan | Feb | Mar | Apr | May | Jun | Jul | Aug | Sep | Oct | Nov | Dec | Total |
|------|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-------|
| 1965 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 9 | 5 | 15 | 20 | 4 | 1 | 55 |
| 1966 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 1 | 3 | 1 | 3 | 5 | 4 | 18 | 4 | 3 | 44 |
| 1067 | *5 | 3 | 20 | 41 | 59 | 103 | 72 | 76 | 26 | 22 | 16 | 3 | 445 |

*Includes sinking of ROKN ship PCE 56 by NKA shore batteries.

Breakout of 1967 incidents:

| | |
|------------------|-----|
| Firefight | 124 |
| Counterintrusion | 295 |
| Harassing fire | 18 |
| Sabotage | 1 |
| Sightings | 7 |

DEFINITIONS:

Firefight - Both opponents engage in an exchange of fire.

Counterintrusion - UNC forces fire upon assumed hostile intruders/ infiltrators and do not receive return fire.

Harassing fire - UNC forces are fired upon but there is no return fire.

Sightings - Unidentified intruders are sighted but not fired upon.

Source: Commander Angelo R. Semararo, USN, J2216, CINCPAC.

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enemy communications equipment used by the teams was sophisticated, lightweight and transistorized. Team training and equipment indicated involvement in missions of longer duration and greater range. A captured enemy agent confessed that a team's mission was to recruit agents and establish bases for future operations. Evidence pointed to probing on the part of enemy agents to determine which areas in South Korea were most suitable for establishing bases from which to launch and maintain guerrilla operations. ¹

(S) NK infiltration by sea was normally conducted by special configured craft ranging in size from 25-70 plus feet. The 70 foot boats, capable of speeds in excess of 30 knots, were the type which had been most frequently detected. Their tactic was to leave NK ports and make a wide sweep out to sea and approach South Korea. Often they stopped at Shantung Peninsula when approaching from the West. ²

(S) Prognosis for successful enemy infiltration and guerrilla warfare operations is questionable. Each year brings more economic progress, social reform and government stability, reducing the chances of a peaceful communist takeover. However, dissident elements, which can be found in any country could be exploited by enemy agents. As of 22 August 1967, there were a total of eight known NK agent teams operating in South Korea with a possibility of more. It was estimated that the NK threat included a 10,000 man agent guerrilla force that could be used to harass the ROK. In keeping with its harassment policy, NK stepped up its campaign of USG-ROK-VN vilification at the Panmunjon MAC meetings. ³

Operations Against NK Infiltration and Against NK Agent-Guerrilla Activities in ROK

(S) The 151 mile DMZ was defended by means of a barrier located south of the Military Demarkation Line (MDL) and ten divisions (nine ROK and one US) deployed in conventional area defense formation. These

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1. Point Paper, J2241 (J2216), CINCPAC, 22 Aug 67, Subject: "Guerrilla Agent Infiltration into South Korea Escalates. (U)."
 2. Point Paper, J3B42, CINCPAC, 24 Nov 67, Subject: "ROK Seaborne Infiltration (C)[sic]."
 3. Point Paper, J2241 (J2216), CINCPAC, 22 Aug 67, Subject: "Guerrilla Agent Infiltration into South Korea Escalates (U)"; Point Paper, J5121, CINCPAC, 28 Aug 67, Subject: "Current Situation in Korea and Actions taken to Assist COMUSKorea."

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ten divisions were organized with 6 divisions under the First ROK Army; and one US and three ROK divisions under the First US Corps Group. These ten divisions manned 89 guard posts within the DMZ (forward of the barrier), supplemented by combat reconnaissance patrols and ambushes which operated between the guard posts and the General Outpost Line of the divisions. Also, just north of the barrier there were 94 outposts (93 manned by the ROK). All guard posts and outposts were located on dominant terrain along likely avenues of approach. The barrier construction varies. In front of the 2nd US Division the barrier was primarily concertina wire maze, which was in the process of being replaced by a 15 mile test barrier composed of different types of barrier material to include cyclone fence, barbed wire and intrusion detection devices. In front of the 15th ROK Division the barrier was a double sapling fence with booby traps, punji pits, mines, and warning devices located in between the two fences. Behind the barrier there were 1200-1500 ambush positions manned nightly by the US and the ROK. During the day, patrols and ambushes were conducted. Reaction forces in reserve were kept on the alert to reinforce when contact was made. In view of the rugged terrain these forces were hampered to a great extent by lack of adequate helicopter mobility. ¹

~~(S)~~ To combat seaborne intrusions the ROK Navy established 22 surface ship patrol areas surrounding the ROK coast. Six coastal radar stations are in operation, four under construction and five additional planned. The ROK Air Force flew 100 hours per month of daylight patrol with C-47 aircraft. The US ocean surveillance patrols flew about 7 sorties per month in the Yellow Sea and daily flights in the Sea of Japan passed through patrol areas of the east coast of Korea. A Coast Watcher net was being developed. About 250 stations were manned by National Police.

~~(S)~~ Improvement could have been made in each of these operations. The ROKN had 74 ships-craft. It had not been able to fully occupy all of the surface patrol areas simultaneously. A peak effort of 19 areas at one time was achieved. The craft used for patrol were a mixed group of mostly 20 plus year-old ships. Most of these were slow and equipped with radar of doubtful effectiveness. They served as platforms for look-outs and could report contacts for subsequent prosecution by air. The ROKAF patrols could be improved by increasing their number. These

1. Point Paper, J3B12/J3B3, CINCPAC, 15 Sep 67, Subject: "Operations Directed Against North Korean Infiltration into South Korea and Against North Korean Agent/Guerrilla Activities in the ROK."

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aircraft did not have radar therefore they had no night or low visibility capability. US Ocean Surveillance Air Patrol (OSAP) flights were primarily targeted against submarines and did not always fly optimum tracks or with the frequency needed for best results in detecting agent boats. Radar stations helped to deny the use of the Han River Estuary to the infiltrators. More radar stations would enhance detection probability.

~~(S)~~ The Coast Watchers net needed to be expanded and suffered from communications problems in that many stations were in remote locations. Communications was a common problem through the counter infiltration effort. Patrol ships could only communicate with ROK Navy Headquarters on CW. ROKN Headquarters communicated with CINCUNC on an unprotected land line. ¹

Actions by CINCPAC

~~(S)~~ On 5 August 1967, CINCUNC-COMUSKorea notified CINCPAC that North Korea was embarked on a large scale effort to initiate subversive war against the ROK. ² Where infiltration objectives formerly tended toward espionage and sabotage, NK forays became openly aggressive. To counter this new threat COMUSKorea outlined priority requirements for counterinfiltration equipment for US and ROK forces. ³ On 19 August, Admiral Sharp supported COMUSKorea priority requirements and requested the JCS and PACOM Service Component Commanders to expedite delivery of the requested counterinfiltration equipment. ⁴ On 23 August, Ambassador Porter pointed out the gravity of the situation and fully supported the COMUSKorea request. ⁵ It should be noted that in February 1967, General Bonesteel, as CG Eighth Army, proposed that certain military equipment (armed helicopters with searchlights, flares for ROKAF C-46's, fast small boats) be provided to counter NK excursions into the DMZ and ROK areas. Both the US Ambassador to Korea Porter and CINCPAC supported General Bonesteel's proposal. ⁶

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1. Point Paper, J3B42, CINCPAC, 24 Nov 67, Subject: "ROK Seaborne Infiltration (C)" [sic].
 2. CINCUNC-COMUSKorea UK 59666/050830Z Aug 67.
 3. COMUSKorea UK 59745/140830Z Aug 67.
 4. CINCPAC 192209Z Aug 67.
 5. AMEMB SEOUL 912/230945Z Aug 67.
 6. J515A, CINCPAC, Command History Items, 22 Mar 67, on file in History Branch.

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(S) On 29 August, Admiral Sharp recommended to the JCS that they, with OSD and the military Services, take action to adjust world-wide equipment and personnel priorities and programs, including Program 4 as appropriate, to provide COMUSKorea with an immediate capability of ten UH-1D helicopters and associated personnel and equipment.¹

(S) In another message on the same day (29 August), Admiral Sharp reiterated for the JCS the NK threat and stated that in context with the overall situation in Asia, the NK activities may be timed deliberately at relieving Free World pressure against communist efforts in Southeast Asia by applying increasing pressure against the ROK and UNC. He continued, that, "...pursuit of such a course, if continued and expanded, could create a tense, volatile atmosphere in Korea, when either a particular North Korean provocation or a South Korean reaction could spark an explosion with attendant adverse impacts on our heavy commitments elsewhere. The taking of appropriate, considered actions now may serve to block further expanded NK aggressiveness and may prove to be a long term economy in the requirement for the use of US and allied resources."²

(S) Admiral Sharp told the JCS of the actions taken by him, or underway, to provide adequate and timely support to COMUSKorea priority requirements. He had recommended that the JCS and PACOM Service Component Commanders provide appropriate support to the priority COMUSKorea requirements; taken follow-up action on the equipment requested by COMUSKorea on 14 August; requested the earliest possible delivery dates on four 65 foot patrol boats; requested the JCS to take immediate action to provide COMUSKorea with an immediate capability of ten UH-1A helicopters (discussed above); requested expedited R&D efforts in the areas of sensors, anti-intrusion and surveillance devices with assignment of certain items to Korea for testing; approved the use of 150 US Special Forces personnel to provide advice and assistance to ROK SF units in ROK counter-agent exercise DOOKSORI; validated all COMUSKorea requirements for secure voice terminals; and provided equipment for an interim secure voice circuit between COMUSKorea and the American Embassy in Seoul. Admiral Sharp concluded his message by stating that, "The counterinfiltration situation in Korea must receive prompt attention and support. The situation likely can be handled now at relatively low cost, whereas delay may lead to a grave and costly situation. An adjustment must be made in the priority relative to Korea in keeping with the threat. Such a priority may lead to some equipment adjustment between SVN and Korea."³

1. CINCPAC 290215Z Aug 67

2. CINCPAC 290241Z Aug 67

3. Ibid.

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Proposed US-ROK Operational Planning Staff

~~(S)~~ Early in 1967, CINCUNC proposed a plan to establish a US-ROK planning staff. The plan was concurred in by CINCPAC. On 11 June 1966, the JCS informed CINCPAC that the plan was approved but the approval to enter into negotiations with the ROKG was withheld pending a formal proposal from the ROKG on the matter and a reply by the SECDEF regarding increased manpower space requirements.¹ On 14 September, CINCUNC requested approval to initiate negotiations with the ROKG to establish a US-ROK Operational Planning Staff and also requested prior assurance of the JCS that additional manpower spaces requirements would be supported.² CINCPAC concurred in both requests and recommended approval to the JCS. Both CINCPAC and CINCUNC stated that should the US enter into negotiations with the ROK for establishment of a US-ROK Operational Planning Staff, the desire on the part of the ROK to participate in planning for the security of South Korea would probably increase. It would therefore appear advantageous for CINCUNC to initiate discussions on the basis of an approved US position and well-developed US plan rather than to wait for what could be a less suitable ROK proposal.³ At the end of 1967, CINCUNC-COMUSKorea had not been granted authority to initiate negotiations with the ROKG.

~~(S)~~ On 29 September 1967, the JCS requested CINCPAC to comment and make recommendations on a series of questions relating to the adequacy of the US military posture Korea to fulfill the objectives of the US in view of increased tension and NK provocations.⁴ CINCPAC replied that approved logistics requirements for US forces in Korea should be met, to the maximum extent possible, and the allocation of resources between Southeast Asia and Korea should be determined on a case by case basis. The strength of US forces in Korea should be a matter of continuing review but that a major increase did not appear to be required unless there was a significant worsening of the situation. The JCS was also informed that specific measures to improve the US military position in Korea were being considered in a review of COMUSKorea's concept and requirement plan. A detailed statement of alternative courses within varying levels

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1. JCS 4179/111528Z Jun 66.
 2. CINCUNC 50140/140208Z Sep 67.
 3. CINCPAC 290507Z Sep 67.
 4. JCS 7705/292226Z Sep 67; Command History, J5121, CINCPAC, 10 Nov 67, entitled "Actions Designed to Improve US Mil Positions in Korea."

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of funding, manning priorities and equipment priorities would be forwarded.¹

Counter Infiltration - Counter Guerrilla Concept and Requirement Plan (CIGOREP)

(S) The CINCUNC-COMUSK "Counter Infiltration - Counter Guerrilla Concept and Requirement Plan (Short title CIGCOREP)" was promulgated on 3 October 1967. The CIGCOREP was not a fully developed operation plan but as the title implies, a conceptual and requirements plan. It contained a detailed listing of equipment and material requirements necessary to effectively counter NK infiltration.

(S) The concept for counterinfiltration activities set forth in the plan was designed to insure that North Korea would be unable to carry out with any significant success the subversive, guerrilla-type infiltration activities which would be imperative to any broader implementation of their strategy. The concept involved the following three interlinked courses of action:

- a. Increase US-ROK capabilities in the DMZ and in adjacent areas.
- b. Increase capabilities to protect the seaward approached and to thwart landings of agent teams or resupply missions on the shore.
- c. Improve ROK counteragent team capabilities in the interior to include better protection of possible key targets.

(S) The concept envisioned implementation in three phases:²

- a. Phase 1 - Prior to Winter 1967.
- b. Phase 2 - Prior to 1 April 1968.
- c. Phase 3 - Spring 1968 and beyond.

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1. CINCPAC 080728Z Oct 67; Command History, J5121, CINCPAC, 10 Nov 67, entitled, "Actions Designed to Improve US Military Position in Korea;" J5 Brief 285-67, 4 Oct 67, CS00566-67.
 2. CINCUNC-COMUSK CIGCOREP, 3 Oct 67.
 3. Ibid.

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~~(S)~~ Phase I (Prior to Winter 1967):¹

a. General: Phase I was to continue until adverse winter weather curtailed the North Korean infiltration and exfiltration efforts.

b. Objective: The objective of the phase was to improve US and ROK force capabilities to deny enemy infiltration and exfiltration through the DMZ or by sea or air to the maximum extent possible with forces, facilities, and supplies immediately on hand or readily available.

c. Operations: Military operations were to be conducted in accordance with CINCUNC current directives on Rules of Engagement. At no time would operations be conducted north of the Military Demarkation Line (MDL) or north of the seaward extension of the MDL.

(1) Ground: Initial emphasis placed on improving the DMZ barrier system with materials and manpower immediately or readily available and in increasing the capability of available forces actively engaged in manning the barrier.

(2) Sea: Joint, combined and coordinated operations to deny infiltration by sea were to be conducted. Emphasis was to be placed on increasing the scope and intensity of joint ROK Navy and ROK Air Force operations conducted in close coordination with ROK coastal and other internal security forces.

(3) Air: Air defense operations in close coordination with ground and sea forces were to assist in the denial of aerial and surface infiltration and resupply. Emphasis was to be placed on improved detection, identification, intercept and night attack capabilities along the sea frontier.

(4) Civil: Furnish advice and assist ROKG internal security agencies, as feasible. Emphasis was to be placed on improving coordination of military and civilian operations directed against infiltration, exfiltration, and elimination of North Korean agent-teams operating in the ROK.

~~(S)~~ Phase II (Prior to 1 April 1968):²

a. General: Phase II was to begin with the onset of adverse

1. CINCUNC-COMUSK CIGCOREP, 3 Oct 67.

2. Ibid.

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winter weather and continue until the weather moderated during the Spring of 1968. (Intensity of infiltration and exfiltration expected to be lower during this period.)

b. Objective: Phase II was designed to achieve a state of maximum feasible readiness by the beginning of possible North Korean greatly increased activity in the spring. Emphasis was to be placed on strengthening the barrier system, equipping UN forces with improved means to counter infiltration effectively, and on developing a responsive command and control system with related communication facilities.

c. Operations: Operations commenced in Phase I were to continue. Efforts were to be concentrated on developing the techniques, planning, and command and control arrangements necessary for joint, combined and coordinated operations in preparation for intensified NKPR operations anticipated to begin in the Spring of 1968.

~~(S)~~ Phase III (Spring 1968 and beyond):¹

a. General: Phase III was to begin with the onset of weather favorable for expanded North Korean infiltration and guerrilla activities. It was expected that the North Koreans would exert a major effort during this stage in an attempt to achieve significant success in their campaign of sabotage and subversion in the ROK.

b. Objective: The objective during Phase III was to detect and successfully deny infiltration and exfiltration by land, sea and air and to counter the agent and guerrilla activities to insure that North Korean objectives were not attained.

c. Operations:

(1) Ground: Counterinfiltration operations were to be conducted along the DMZ by US and ROK ground forces with concurrent efforts made to continue improvements to the barrier system. Sufficient ground forces were to be deployed to maintain surveillance of the barrier, and maintain a capability to react quickly to counter communist infiltration and exfiltration attempts.

(2) Sea: Infiltration was to be countered by joint, combined and coordinated operations. ROK Navy patrols were to be supplemented by increased AFK patrols and aerial surveillance provided by

1. CINCUNC-COMUSK CIGCOREP, 3 Oct 67.

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available CINCPAC forces. Sea barrier forces were to maintain close coordination and communications with coastal watch stations, maritime police, and other elements of the Korean National Police, to insure timely deployment of reaction forces to the vicinity of known or anticipated agent discharge points. Concurrently, work was to continue on improving sea surveillance, the coast watcher system, coastal radar detection capability, and the military-civil communications network.

(3) Air: Actions were to be aimed at support efforts to stop communist air and surface infiltration. Air defense forces were to maintain an alert capability to meet conventional surprise attack.

~~(S)~~ The material requirements developed to support the concept were tailored to the three phases and constituted an additional program cost for Korea totaling approximately \$44.8 million.

~~(S)~~ General Bonesteel's concept for severely curtailing North Korean raids or infiltrations through the DMZ and sabotage activities in the forward areas involved in general the establishment of a DMZ security system comprised of five layers of defense in depth:¹

"First Layer. Within the UNC half of the DMZ itself, existing guard posts are being strengthened and hardened and made capable of supporting intensified patrol action. Additional day and night patrolling and ambushes will be conducted. Automatic weapons, night observation devices and anti-intrusion devices will be employed tactically in self-defense against North Korean violators of the Armistice Agreement. Armored personnel carriers will be used to insure higher safety for resupply missions to guard posts and to enable quick reaction forces to move rapidly into the DMZ as required in self-defense. Artillery and mortar concentrations have been registered for on-call missions within the UNC side of the DMZ under strict rules of engagement and only when sizeable enemy forces are encountered. Although many of these actions are technical violations of the Armistice Agreement, they are necessitated in terms of prudent self-defense in the face of increased North Korean destruction missions involving initial North Korean violation of the Armistice."

1. Letter, Hq UNC, 3 Oct 67, Subject: "CINCUNC-COMUSK Concept and Requirements Plan to meet North Korean Infiltration and Subversion (U)," from General C. H. Bonesteel III, CINCUNC-COMUSK to CINCPAC. Hereafter referred to as Ltr, Hq UNC, 3 Oct 67.

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"Second Layer. Just south of the DMZ south tape, a relatively simple physical barrier fence of chain link or woven barbed wire will be extended across the full 150 miles of the DMZ. This will supplement the current woven sapling fence now existent along most of the southern edge of the DMZ. Additional watch towers and bunkers will provide for better observation of the barrier. Numerous small field fortifications behind or in front of the barrier fence will provide alternate positions for stake out teams. Clearing of fields of fire along the barrier fence and access roads is currently being performed by manual labor and hopefully will be sustained by controlled defoliation next year. Night observation devices, anti-intrusion devices, Xenon searchlight, some mines, booby traps and flares are being integrated into the surveillance and active defense of the barrier. Fortified checkpoints along roads and ready availability of quick reaction forces are being further developed. On-call mortar or artillery support with illumination or HE rounds is provided for as feasible, for use under strict rules of engagement."

"Third Layer. A much less extensive but pronounced counter-infiltration/exfiltration system is being developed along natural barriers not far behind the principal barrier system, utilizing rivers or portions of the GOPL or FEBA terrain. This secondary system is manned by random patrols and observation posts. Quick reaction forces are used in tracking down confirmed penetrations."

"Fourth Layer: The counterinfiltration/exfiltration capabilities in division rear areas are being enhanced by increases in sweeps and patrols plus extensive arrangements for intelligence in cooperation with civilian inhabitants. Full coordination with Korean National Police and the utilization of ROK CIA and CIC intelligence capabilities will permit quick pursuit of suspected infiltrators or exfiltrators. Local security of military installations, key civilian targets, etc., is being enhanced."

"Fifth Layer: From division rear boundary to I Corps (Gp)-FROKA rear boundary arrangements are being perfected similar to those in division rear areas but with added emphasis on the local protection of military installations and key civilian facilities."

~~(S)~~ On 27 November 1967, CINCPAC sent a message to the JCS concurring in the CIGCOREP and supported the need for additional equipment and material requirements listed in the plan.¹

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1. CINCPAC 271850Z Nov 67; Command History, J511, CINCPAC, November 67, Subject: "CIGCOREP (Actions Designed to Improve Military Positions in Korea)."

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Personnel Augmentation

(S) On 11 February 1966, the JCS advised CINCPAC that the SECDEF directed the US Army strength in Korea¹ be reduced to 53,000 by 30 June 1966. As of that date the US Army strength was down to 47,736 military and 998 US civilians.² On 30 June 1967 the SECDEF made a decision to hold the line on the 53,000 ceiling.³

(S) On 8 October 1967 the CG, Eighth US Army requested an increase of 9,435 spaces in the authorized US Army, Korea troop ceiling. CINCUSARPAC did not concur in the requested increase but recommended to CINCPAC that the ceiling be increased by 5,161 spaces. Admiral Sharp supported CINCUSARPAC's position and told the JCS that he supported the personnel requirement at a priority less than Southeast Asia and related requirements. He added that any additional personnel above the 5,161 spaces he recommended and essential supporting units necessary to develop the US Eighth Army into a fully effective and rounded combat force was a desirable objective but of a lower priority than the 5,161 spaces.⁴

Establishing Priorities

(S) The situation in both Southeast Asia and Korea required the establishment of priorities for equipment as well as for personnel. A specific example arose when the requirement for 30-inch searchlights in Korea conflicted with the requirement in SVN.

(S) COMUSKOREA was notified on 1 September that phased deliveries from current contracts indicated delivery of seven 30-inch searchlights in March 1968. Prior to 2 August 1967, he requested five additional 30-inch searchlights from the same contract for delivery also in March 1968 - a total of 12. All 12 searchlights were scheduled for the First ROK Army. On 13 September, CINCPAC asked COMUSKorea if delivery of the 5 additional searchlights in April 1968 was acceptable. On 28 September COMUSKorea notified CINCPAC that the April delivery date was not acceptable since the historic increase in NK infiltration always began in the spring of each year. Therefore, the searchlights were

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1. JCS 3703/110011Z Feb 66.
 2. PACOM Command Digest, Vol 8 - Nr 3, Aug 66.
 3. JCS 9370/251841Z Oct 67; CINCUSARPAC GPOP-PL 39379/040424Z Nov 67.
 4. CINCPAC 250350Z Nov 67; CINCUSARPAC GPOP-PL 39379/040424Z Nov 67; USAEIGHT EA 84133 GO-T/080930Z Oct 67.

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urgently required for integration with other night vision equipment operated by ROKA. ¹

(S) On 30 September, CINCPAC asked DA if the searchlight supply could be rescheduled to meet ROKA needs. DA notified CINCPAC that the 1 March delivery date could only be met by diverting from Southeast Asia requirements. Seventy-seven 30-inch searchlights were scheduled for Southeast Asia. On 7 October, CINCPAC asked COMUSMACV and CINCUSARPAC for their comments and recommendations on the subject. CINCUSARPAC replied that in view of the relatively small diversion from the Southeast Asia delivery schedule and the urgency of the ROKA requirement, he recommended that the Southeast Asia schedule be slipped so as to provide twelve for ROKA not later than 1 March 1968. ²

(S) COMUSMACV replied on 21 October and recommended that "the shipment of 30-inch XENON searchlights to Vietnam not be diverted." COMUSMACV stated that the searchlights he had been provided were not sufficient to meet operational requirements of US forces in Vietnam. It was expected that his requirements for searchlights would be as urgent during the period of proposed deferment as they were at that time. ³

(S) On 8 November CINCPAC notified all concerned that he recognized "the urgency of the need to support ROK counterinfiltration plans, but in view of overriding Vietnam priority, the twelve 30-inch searchlights cannot be diverted from SEA to Korea." ⁴

(U) As the year ended preparations to counter the NK threat were continuing. In 1968 these preparations would be intensified and many more decisions on priorities would be made.

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1. COMUSKorea 021005Z Aug 67; CINCPAC 132329Z Sep 67; COMUSKorea 280440Z Sep 67.
 2. CINCUSARPAC GPOP-PL 37440/202142Z Oct 67; CINCPAC 300506Z Sep 67; DA 834848/041614Z Oct 67; CINCPAC 072352 Oct 67.
 3. COMUSMACV 34667/211235Z Oct 67.
 4. CINCPAC 080214Z Nov 67.

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APPENDIX I
ROLLING THUNDER CHRONOLOGY¹
1964

- 10 July CINCPAC proposed to JCS that USS MADDOX make a DESOTO Patrol to investigate NVN coastal activity.
- 22 July JCS approved MADDOX patrol and directed it start not later than 31 July.
- 2 August CINCPAC proposed and obtained JCS approval to send DESOTO Patrol back to Gulf of Tonkin in two destroyer strength. USS MADDOX attacked by 3 NVN torpedo boats in TONKIN GULF 30NM off coast of NVN. All boats were destroyed or damaged by MADDOX fire and aircraft from TICONDEROGA.
- 3 August MADDOX and C. TURNER JOY in TONKIN GULF took fast moving surface targets under fire by radar. Results unobserved though one was evaluated as sunk.
- 4 August CINCPAC recommended that JCS authorize him to order immediate punitive air strikes against the NVN, that U. S. ships be permitted to operate up to the three mile limit of NVN and that aircraft be allowed "hot pursuit" in NVN's airspace. JCS authorized reprisal strikes.
- 5 August 7th Fleet aircraft from TICONDEROGA and CONSTELLATION launched 64 sorties against NVN gunboat and torpedo boat bases, destroying or damaging 25, and VINH POL storage area.
- 14 August CINCPAC proposed to JCS another DESOTO Patrol for 19-21 August.
- 20 August JCS disapproved DESOTO Patrol request.
- 9 September CINCPAC proposed five day DESOTO Patrol in the Gulf of Tonkin to maintain 20 miles from NVN mainland and at least 12 miles from islands under communist control.

1. Appendix I, "ROLLING THUNDER Chronology: 10 July 1964 - 31 December 1967," was prepared by CDR T. Barkley Wood, USN, J3A52, Hq CINCPAC, 16 January 1968.

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10 September JCS approved DESOTO Patrol and set forth rules of engagement.

17 September MORTON and EDWARDS, while night steaming in GULF of TONKIN, made radar detections of fast closing surface contacts and took them under fire. Radar image interpretation indicated that several of the targets were hit.

18 September JCS directed CINCPAC to plan substantial air attacks on DRV in reprisal for 17 Sep NVN attack on DESOTO Patrol. CINCPAC issued Frag Order #2 for planning only, to be executed only when directed. Attack was not executed because Navy could not find positive evidence that the NVN attack of 17 Sep had occurred.

7 October JCS directed CINCPAC that, when future DESOTO Patrols were in GULF of TONKIN, PACOM forces would maintain a tactical readiness to execute immediate air strikes on preselected NVN targets in retaliation for an attack on a patrol.

28 October CINCPAC issued Frag Order #3 which provided two levels of response to clearly identifiable attacks against DESOTO Patrols.

23 November CINCPAC submitted to JCS a military campaign proposal against the NVN, in coordination with supporting diplomatic and psychological programs, to convince the communists that they must cease their support of the VC insurgency or accept a continuing and ever increasing level of destruction.

25 November CINCPAC and JCS recommended the resumption of DESOTO Patrols, which was not approved.

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- 4 February CINCPAC issued Operation Order, nicknamed FLAMING DART, outlining reprisal air strikes which might be executed if a DESOTO Patrol, scheduled for early February, was attacked by NVN. Operation Order had three target options.
- 7 February FLAMING DART 1 executed in retaliation for VC attack on U. S. forces at Pleiku. Navy aircraft struck military barracks at Dong Hoi. Strikes against three other targets were canceled due to weather. CINCPAC proposed to JCS that the targets which were not struck should be hit as soon as weather permitted. JCS authorized strike with VNAF resources against Vu Can Barracks, with Chap Le Barracks as a weather alternate.
- 8 February VNAF, with U. S. pathfinder, flak suppression, and other forces executed a successful strike against Chap Le Barracks.
- 10 February CINCPAC recommended a prompt and emphatic retaliation against NVN for VC bombing of U. S. enlisted billet at Qui Nhon. Retaliation would consist of all three FLAMING DART options. JCS issued a warning order to CINCPAC to be prepared to conduct coordinated attacks during daylight hours on 11 February. Two barracks and a bridge were to be primary targets with weather alternates specified.
- 11 February FLAMING DART 2 executed. VNAF/USAF struck Vit Thu Lu Barracks and Navy struck Chanh Hoa Barracks. CINCPAC recommended a program of continued and increasing application of military force against NVN.
- 18 February JCS authorized CINCPAC to use U. S. forces for an air strike against Quang Khe Naval Base and to employ VNAF to strike Dong Hoi airfield. These strikes, planned for 20 February, were given the unclassified nickname ROLLING THUNDER 1 (RT-1).
- 19 February RT-1 canceled because of a coup in Saigon.

20 - 28 February

RT-2, 3, 4 canceled for reasons of RVN politics, weather conditions, or constraints regarding the manner in which strikes were to be conducted.

2 March

RT-5 executed. This first mission was very limited with specific restrictions:

a. Two targets only, one for U.S. and one for VNAF, were selected in southern DRV.

b. The U.S. could not strike unless the VNAF were also able to strike.

c. Sortie numbers were specified.

d. Napalm was not allowed.

SAC B-52 night air strikes against an ammunition depot were included in the warning order, but SAC participation was not reflected in the execute message.

4 March

CINCPAC informed JCS that some of the restrictions were denying the full benefit that operations might achieve. Specifically, it was suggested that the situation could be improved if the following conditions applied:

a. U.S. and VNAF strikes could be conducted on a schedule other than the same day and hour.

b. Strikes could be conducted on more than one day when the character of the target or when weather considerations made it desirable to limit the size of the strike force.

c. Scheduling could be sufficiently flexible to take advantage of good weather conditions.

d. Napalm could be used when indicated by the nature of the target.

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- 14 - 15 March RT-6 executed. Fixed targets authorized for attack were one ammunition depot and one barracks. Napalm was authorized for the first time, but aircraft recycle was prohibited.
- 19 - 25 March RT-7 executed. Relaxed the mandatory one day strike execution and required only that the program be completed in a week's period. Six primary targets were designated: consisting of one ammunition depot, one port facility, one barracks, two supply depots, and one naval base. The requirement for concurrent timing of U.S. and VNAF strikes was removed. The first armed reconnaissance missions, one U.S. and two VNAF, were authorized during the seven day period. Specified route segments were selected in southern NVN, and authority was given to strike three fixed radar sites, one located on each route. The most northern area for armed reconnaissance attack was about 18-20 N.
- 26 March - RT-8 executed. Included nine radar sites for U.S. strike, and a barracks for VNAF. Three armed reconnaissance missions were again authorized against specified route segments, with U.S. armed reconnaissance conducted against NVN patrol craft along the coast from Tiger Island north to 20-00 N, and VNAF armed reconnaissance along Route 12 from Ha Tinh to two miles east of Mu Gia Pass.
- 1 April
- 2 - 8 April RT-9 executed. Inaugurated a planned LOC interdiction campaign against NVN, south of latitude 20-00 N. Armed recce concept expanded with more emphasis on rolling stock. Ile De Tigre authorized for unexpended ordnance; prior to this time unexpended ordnance was jettisoned in the sea. Likewise, aircraft returning from strike with unexpended ordnance could strike rolling stock.
- 4 April First MIG engagement and MIG loss (probable) to U.S. aircraft. Struck Thanh Hoa Power Plant.
- 9 - 15 April RT-10 executed. This was perhaps one of the most important from the viewpoint of authority granted:

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Armed recce upped to 24 sorties per day; night armed recce commenced; restrikes authorized provided CINCPAC had Washington approval.

Prior to ROLLING THUNDER 10, armed reconnaissance primary targets were locomotives, rolling stock, vehicles, and hostile NVN watercraft. In ROLLING THUNDER 10 through 12, the rules were changed to provide day and night armed reconnaissance missions in order to inflict a higher level of damage to military movement facilities, ferries, radar sites, secondary bridges, and railroad rolling stock. It also included interdiction of the LOCs by cratering, restriking, and seeding choke points as necessary.

- 16 - 22 April RT-11 executed. Authorized strike on military targets in the immediate vicinity of armed recce and fixed targets. This allowed for some initiative on the part of the tactical commander, but the "immediate vicinity" caused some questions. In one case the fleet hit a large bridge 10 miles from the authorized target.
- 22 April Damaged six PT boats near Vinh.
- 23 - 29 April RT-12 executed. Fifteen fixed targets were authorized, high for the program to date. Allowed for first time to go in waves against a particular target, but restrikes following day still required a JCS approval. Increased emphasis on night armed recce and CINCPAC was authorized to use extra armed recce beyond the 24 per day against trucks and RR rolling stock. Unexpended ordnance could now be used against any armed recce route as well as Ile De Tigre.
- 26 - 28 April Destroyed or damaged 8 PT boats.
- 30 April - RT-13 executed. For the first time armed recce routes
6 May were not spelled out, but given by area, and were authorized against all land LOCs south of 20-00 N. At the same time sorties going up to 40 per day but not over 200 a week. RT-13 through RT-18 continued U. S. and VNAF strikes against 52 fixed military targets

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(5 restrikes) as follows: 6 ammunition depots, 5 supply depots, 21 barracks, 2 airfields, 2 POL storages, 2 radio facilities, 7 bridges, 2 naval bases, 1 railroad yard, 2 thermal power plants, one port facility, and one ferry. Armed recce authorized against specified types of watercraft.

7 - 12 May RT-14 executed. Added authority for returning aircraft to use unexpended ordnance on Hon Nieu Island Radar Site, Hon Matt Island Radar Site, Dong Hoi Barracks, or rail and highway LOC targets, in addition to Ile De Tigre as previously authorized. Authorized armed recce along all land and water LOCs south of 20-00 N.

12 May Air strike and armed reconnaissance operations within NVN temporarily suspended to permit an evaluation of the results obtained. CINCPAC submitted a comprehensive recommendation on the future course of the air campaign. Recognizing that an assessment of achievements at this point must be inconclusive, it was suggested that there might be more danger in underestimating rather than overestimating results. It was pointed out that in the fourteenth week of the campaign it was apparent that there was a drastic change in the pattern of logistic support into Laos and that this was due to ROLLING THUNDER operations.

CINCPAC stated that in developing the future course of the campaign it was necessary to carefully weigh the capabilities and limitations of U.S. air power, operating within the existing political parameters, and the vulnerabilities of NVN within that framework. A ubiquitous demonstration of U.S. air power characterized by an around the clock program of immobilization, attrition, and harassment was proposed. The specific types of missions proposed for this purpose were:

a. Extensive day armed reconnaissance of land and inland waterway routes south of 20 degrees, and night blockade tactics.

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b. Increased route interdiction south of 20 degrees.

c. Repeated attacks, until no longer lucrative, of known military facilities south of 20 degrees which could be effectively attacked by a small strike force.

d. Seek out and destroy dispersed supplies, equipment and military personnel.

e. Attacks on port facilities and recognized NVN shipping. The concept of inflicting maximum feasible damage in a one-day strike was termed a stereotyped tactic which denied latitude in marginal weather. As a desirable alternative, incremental attacks on the larger targets over a period of days, and supported by bomb damage assessment, was recommended. This type of attack was to be against major targets south of 20 degrees with later extension northwest to Dien Bien Phu.

CINCPAC also recommended that, as the zone for strikes against major targets expanded to the north and west, the armed reconnaissance and small strike zone should be expanded accordingly.

A further recommendation was that the numerical limit on armed reconnaissance sorties be lifted and that only capability be considered in establishing the number of small controlled air operations.

16 May

CINCPAC suggested to the JCS that sufficient information had been collected to meet the assessment requirement. It was pointed out that continued effort would be repetitive and that further respite for NVN would serve to make future problems more difficult in South Vietnam, Laos, and NVN. On this basis early resumption of ROLLING THUNDER was recommended.

18 - 24 May

RT-15 executed. Extra armed recce strikes authorized for PT boats. First strike north of 20° authorized against Quang Suoi Barracks. Authorized one strike against a SAM site.

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- 25 May - RT-16 executed. Now authorized to run strikes in small
3 June elements over the entire period (this was a 10-day program). A new restriction appeared. Aircraft in immediate pursuit not authorized to strike bases to which they chase the MIGs. Raised armed recce sortie limit to 40/day and 285/10 days.
- 26 May - Destroyed or damaged 11 PT boats.
1 June
- 4 - 10 June RT-17 executed. Armed recce emphasis placed on roads emanating from VINH. SAM sites could no longer be struck. Armed recce sortie limit: 40/day and 200/week. Sixty additional sorties authorized.
- Ben Thuy and Co Dinh TPP's destroyed.
- 11 - 17 June RT-18 executed. Authorized day armed reconnaissance sorties could include small precise attacks against pre-briefed military targets not on the JCS target list, and thereafter continue armed route reconnaissance. Barges authorized as targets for armed recce.
- 17 June First confirmed MIG kill by U. S. aircraft and first loss of a U. S. aircraft to a MIG.
- 18 - 24 June RT-19 executed. Armed recce area expanded slightly north and northwest. Three fixed targets assigned north of 20°N. New railway construction authorized as target for armed recce. RT-19 through RT-21 scheduled U. S. and VNAF air strikes against a total of 24 fixed targets (seven restrikes) as follows: 11 barracks, three supply depots, three ammunition depots, two airfields, two radar sites, two bridges, and one POL. Son La Barracks and Dien Bien Phu Barracks were dispersed targets containing many separate structures and requiring several hundred sorties for a high level of destruction. Attacks were limited to 80 strike sorties against either of the above targets in any weekly period.
- 25 June - RT-20 executed. Included restrike of Dong Hoi and Vinh
1 July airfields, observed to be under construction. Armed

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reconnaissance was limited to 200 sorties per week for ROLLING THUNDERS 19 and 20 and the geographical area was expanded to about 20-10N. Armed recce area increased considerably, particularly to the NW. Also, could now strike pre-selected small military targets followed by residual armed recce. This opened up a host of new targets.

- 2 - 8 July RT-21 executed. The armed reconnaissance sortie limit was increased from 40 per day, 200 per week, to a maximum 250 sorties per week with weight of effort and timing to be at discretion of CINCPAC.
- It included extensions of the armed reconnaissance area toward the northwest and continued the previous pattern, in which the armed reconnaissance area followed the locations of the fixed targets authorized for strike during previous missions.
- Seven of 10 fixed targets were north of 20-00 N.
- Rules were incorporated prohibiting the attack of NVN SAM sites or MIG airfields.
- 2 July Initial strike on Dien Bien Phu airfield and barracks.
- 9 - 22 July RT-22/23 executed. First of the two week periods which were given two RT numbers to simplify continuing statistical information. Armed recce now included airfields and JCS numbered LOCs previously struck. Thanh Hoa bridge struck quite regularly from this time on.
- 23 July -
5 August RT-24/25 executed. Aircraft returning over Laos authorized to use unexpended ordnance against Laotian road segments that had been targeted. New restriction: Plan tactics so as not to approach closer than 15 miles to CHICOM border. New armed recce targets were: ferry approaches, fords, and pontoon bridges.
- 24 July First airborne SAM sighting and first U.S. aircraft loss to SAM. Long Chi Explosive plant struck. Nam Dinh TPP struck.

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27 July - Special strike against SAM sites 6 and 7, Operation
3 August "SPRING HIGH." Authority was granted to conduct low altitude photography over NVN to confirm or deny the existence of occupied SAM installations. Air strikes were authorized against sites confirmed as occupied by field readout of photography. The following areas were excluded: within 30 NM of the Chinese border, the five established sites around Hanoi and the areas within range (17 NM) of these sites, and area within 10 NM of Haiphong and Phuc Yen Airfield.

6 - 19 August RT-26/27 executed. 600 sorties authorized for armed recce. Naval craft berthing areas now included along with airfields and JCS numbered LOC targets for armed recce.

11 August The JCS moved the armed reconnaissance boundary for ROLLING THUNDER operations northward to 20-30N. CINCPAC was authorized, at his discretion, to destroy SAM sites tentatively identified by ELINT or other means in the area south of the new boundary. Sites outside the ROLLING THUNDER armed reconnaissance area, with exceptions noted below, could be struck if confirmed by field readout of photography. The exclusion areas specified were:

- a. Within thirty nautical miles of the CHICOM border.
- b. Five known established sites around Hanoi and the Hanoi area bordered by these sites.
- c. Within ten nautical miles of Haiphong.
- d. Phuc Yen Airfield

These missions against SAM sites were to be reported and counted under the nickname IRON HAND and were not to be charged against the authorized number of sorties for ROLLING THUNDER.

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20 August -
2 September

RT-28/29 executed. 1000 armed recce sorties authorized. SAM systems authorized for armed recce. Several new JCS targets authorized for unexpended ordnance: eight large barracks/headquarters complexes. "Naval craft berthing areas" now reads "Naval berthing areas and bases."

21 August

Ban Thach Hydro P. P. and locks struck with heavy damage.

24 August

The lack of success in IRON HAND operations prompted CINCPACFLT to suggest a strike against the Haiphong POL stores. CINCPAC supported the idea to the JCS, noting that this might be more meaningful in Hanoi's eyes than the ROLLING THUNDER and IRON HAND operations. This recommendation, however, was not favorably considered.

1 September

The restricted area in the vicinity of the CHICOM border was reduced from thirty to twenty-five nautical miles between 106° E. and the Gulf of Tonkin. At the same time the sanctuary area around Hanoi was reduced from fifteen to ten miles.

3 - 16 September

RT-30/31 executed. Armed recce area extended north and west along line from 20-30N to China "buffer" at 105-20E. Sorties up to 1200. Any JCS target could be hit, if previously struck, provided it appeared to be regaining its usefulness. BARREL ROLL and STEEL RIGER aircraft could use Rolling Thunder targets, including armed recce, as alternates.

17 - 30 September

R-T 32/33 executed. Authorized strikes against two bridges northeast of Hanoi; these targets were to be struck simultaneously and only once. This was the first time authorization to attack LOC targets in the northeast quadrant had been granted. Attacks on SAMs within 30 NM of Hanoi

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- were prohibited. Sixty additional sorties were authorized.
- 20 September Struck the two bridges on the NE railroad.
- 1 - 14 October RT-34/35 executed. Four ALFA targets, one was the first SAM support target authorized. Each target could be struck only once in a single coordinated effort. One hundred sorties added.
- 15 - 28 October RT-36/37 executed. Four ALFA targets, all bridges. Attacks prohibited within 30 NM of Hanoi, 10 NM of Haiphong, and 25 NM of China border in NE area.
- 17 October First successful IRON HAND strike against an occupied SAM site.
- 29 October -
11 November RT-38/39 executed. Seven ALFA targets, five bridges, a barracks, and a SAM support facility. Single coordinated strike effort on each target required. First strike within 10 NM of Haiphong. 32 sorties added.
- 12 - 25 November RT-40/41 executed. The authority to attack recognized military targets of opportunity in vicinity of target areas and craft which fire upon our aircraft enroute to or from missions was expanded to include "craft and units which fire upon our aircraft" The armed reconnaissance sortie level and operating area remained the same. Fixed targets included four bridges and one barracks.
- 15 November CINCPAC recommended target options designed to achieve gradual closure of the external supply lines, land and sea, through which NVN drew about 75 percent of its outside support. The destruction of basic POL, power and other resources which supported North Vietnam's aggression was also proposed.
- 25 November
9 December RT-42/43 executed. The restriction limiting suppression strikes against SAM units firing upon U. S. aircraft, to only those located outside the 30 NM radius circle around Hanoi, was removed. The

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armed reconnaissance sortie level and operating area remained the same. Fixed targets included four bridges, one barracks, and a SAM support facility.

26 November

CINCPAC stated to JCS that it was necessary to destroy the source targets in the northeast, including those in the Hanoi-Haiphong area. Disruption of major port facilities and subsequent increased armed reconnaissance directed at the road, rail and coastal lines of communication from China, and inland waterways was also recommended.

27 November

Hanoi SAM support facility successfully struck.

10 - 23 December

RT-44/45 executed. Authorized attack against four of seven bridges (four of which were re-strikes) and one barracks. The armed reconnaissance sortie level and operating area remained the same.

24 December 65 -
6 January 66

RT-46/47 executed. Authorized coastal armed reconnaissance, north of 20-30N, against positively identified NVN attack-type naval craft along the NVN coast and offshore islands within three NM of NVN territory and not closer than 24 NM from the Chinese border, and avoiding the center of Haiphong by 10 miles. The armed reconnaissance sortie level and operating area remained the same. Although ROLLING THUNDER 46/47 was approved for execution, none of the fixed targets were struck and only a limited number of armed reconnaissance sorties were flown prior to the Christmas stand-down.

25 December

Commenced stand-down.

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- 12 January CINCPAC submitted to JCS a detailed discussion of the relationship of military operations in NVN to the overall strategy of the war in SVN. Resumption of ROLLING THUNDER was recommended.
- 13 January CINCPAC directed components make a systematic armed recce campaign against logistic centers, LOC hubs, dispersed and isolated targets, segment objectives and selected interdiction points.
- 31 January -
28 February RT-48 executed. Resumed air strike operations against NVN. It consisted of armed reconnaissance strikes only, south and west of a line from the coast at a latitude 20-31N to longitude 105-20E, then due north to latitude 21 N, then due west to the Laos border. Armed recce sortie limit: 300/day. IRON HAND restricted to armed recce area.
- 1 - 31 March Extended the armed reconnaissance, including coastal armed reconnaissance. Limitations reverted to those in effect prior to the stand-down on 24 December 1965. It also authorized 8,100 attack sorties per month against NVN and Laos. Of the 8,100 sorties authorized it was considered desirable that 5,100 sorties be used in NVN and 3,000 sorties in Laos. However, daily sortie allocations could be varied between the two countries as weather and other operational factors dictated.
- 1 April -
8 July RT-50 executed. Four bridges were authorized as fixed targets, the armed reconnaissance area remained the same as the previous program, except that controlled armed reconnaissance along major Locs in the northeast quadrant was included. In addition, forces were to be prepared to attack seven major POL targets, a GCI site, a bridge, and a combination power plant and cement plant located in the northeast quadrant. The level of attack sorties for Laos and NVN was increased from 8,100 to 10,100.
- 1 April CINCPAC assigned COMUSMACV primary responsibility for armed photo recce and intelligence analysis in Route Package I in NVN.

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11 April First B-52 strike in NVN, vicinity of Mu Gia Pass.

16 April SECDEF directed that operations north of RP-1 would be conducted only when they could be performed without penalty to required operations in SVN, Laos and RP-1.

31 May Seven LOC-associated targets in the northeast (four dispersed POL sites, a POL tank plant, a truck park, and a motor repair facility) were authorized for attack.

7 June CINCPAC directed CINCPACFLT to maintain one CVA on DIXIE STATION to support SVN air effort.

9 June Phuc Yen POL storage authorized for attack.

25 June Viet Tri Railroad/Highway bridge authorized for attack.

30 June Seven major POL targets in the Hanoi-Haiphong area were struck with 95 percent damage.

9 July-
11 November RT-51 executed. The armed reconnaissance area was expanded to include all of NVN except the 30/25 mile buffer zone and the 30-and 10-mile circles around Hanoi and Haiphong respectively. In addition, controlled armed reconnaissance was authorized over small segments of major LOCs within the Hanoi circle near the periphery. Attacks against dispersed POL facilities were authorized except when located within the buffer zone and in populated areas. Coastal armed reconnaissance in the northeast against NVN attack-type naval craft and NVN cargo carrying craft was authorized from a point tangent to the 10-mile Haiphong circle northeast to an extension of the 25-mile China buffer zone. ALFA targets were four bridges. IRON HAND restricted to armed recce area.

24 July CINCPAC proposed to JCS a plan of action to accomplish the maximum feasible POL system destruction while assuring a balanced effort against other NVN elements.

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- 8 July CINCIPAC reiterated to JCS proposal of 24 July and in addition recommended other POL storage facilities, two locks, a dam, Haiphong bridges located away from populated area, and other selected targets that would encourage foreign reluctance to have their ships exposed to the carefully regulated hazards of air strikes.
- 14 - 19 September Air strikes against Ninh Binh complex resulted in both rail bridges down, 30 trucks destroyed, and 100 rail units destroyed or damaged.
- 21 - 25 September Air strikes against Thanh Hoa logistics center destroyed or damaged 80 rail units.
- 25 September - Interdiction effort against the northwest rail line
10 October closed the line for all of October and destroyed or damaged 62 rail cars.
- 16 October CINCIPAC tasked CINCIPACFLT to conduct surface ship operations to interdict NVN military and logistic waterborne traffic in coastal waters of NVN south of 17-30 N. No bombardment of targets ashore except in self defense. Code name: TRAFFIC COP.
- 25 October First day of TRAFFIC COP operations. Two destroyers on station.
- 26 October Serious fire on USS ORISKANY (CVA-34). Only two CVA's on YANKEE STATION until 31 October.
- 12 November 66 - RT-52 executed. Armed reconnaissance objectives
27 January 67 and operating areas remained the same as authorized in ROLLING THUNDER 51. The level of attack sorties for operations in Laos and NVN was raised from 10,100 to 13,200. Fixed strikes were authorized against one bridge, one railroad classification yard, two JCS targeted POL facilities, three SAM storage areas, one vehicle depot, one cement plant, two power plants, and selected elements of the only steel plant in NVN. However,

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the steel and cement plants and the two power plants were deferred from attack. On 15 December 1966, restrikes against the railroad classification yard and the vehicle depot were prohibited, and by 23 December 1966 the delivery of ordnance within 10 NM of Hanoi was prohibited. TRAFFIC COP area extended to 18-00 N.

- 30 November TRAFFIC COP changed to SEA DRAGON.
- 2 December-
14 December Yen Vien Rail Classification Yard and Van Dien Vehicle Depot attacked several times. These targets were closest to center of Hanoi to date. Yen Vien received major damage and Van Dien unusable.
- 16 December CINCPAC requested from JCS permission to strike a lucrative target consisting of an off-loading and storage area. Seventeen barges were sighted off-loading. Special authority required because area was in CHICOM buffer zone, 16 miles from the border near the Song Yen River at 21-17-23 N. 107-27-05 E. No authorization received.
- 23 December CINCPAC requested authority to strike three shipyards, two ship repair yards, the naval base, all at Haiphong. Also requested authority to strike Port Wallut Naval Base. Basis for this request was the capability of these yards to assemble prefabricated metal barges. No authorization received.
- 24 December In November ROLLING THUNDER 52 authorized a good selection of targets. Shortly after strikes against some of these targets in the Hanoi 10-mile circle were made, the 10-mile Hanoi prohibited area was established. CINCPAC strongly requested that we not back off, that authority to hit all RT-52 targets be reinstated. It was not until April and May (RT-55 and RT-56) that some of these targets were re-authorized. However, authority was again withdrawn on 23 May before they were adequately struck. Christmas stand-down began 240700H.
- 26 December Stand-down ended 260700H.

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27 December CINCPAC again requested strikes against the naval shipyards, repair facilities and Port Wallut. These were not been struck. Also requested strikes against the following JCS targets. Action taken as indicated:

| | |
|---------------------------|---------------------------|
| Vinh Yen Army Bks | Authorized 3 May |
| Vinh Yen Army Bks NE | Later determined inactive |
| Vinh Yen Ammo Depot | Authorized 24 Jan |
| Son Tay Army Bks | Authorized 27 Jul |
| Son Tay Supply Depot | Authorized 24 Jan |
| Son Dong Army Bks SSE | Authorized 27 Jul |
| Xgan Mai Bks and Hqs | Authorized 24 Jan |
| Xgan Mai Army Bks | Authorized 24 Jan |
| Chi Ne Army Bks | Authorized 24 Jan |
| Hanoi Transformer Station | Authorized 17 Aug |

31 December New Year's stand-down began 310700H.

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2 January New Year's stand-down ended 020700H. Operation BOLO resulted in seven MIG-21's destroyed in air-to-air engagements.

12 January CINCPAC presented evaluation of 1966 U.S. air operations in NVN to Chairman of the JCS at Camp Smith.

15 January SEA DRAGON area of operations extended to 19-00 N.

17 January Thai Nguyen Railroad Classification and Repair Yards received heavy damage.

18 January CINCPAC submitted a list by target systems which required JCS approval. Of the 89 targets recommended for strike, the following were authorized:

RT-52, Jan 24: 8 military
RT-54, Feb 23: 4 power; 1 industrial
RT-55, Apr 23: 1 power; 1 transport;
3 Haiphong
RT-56, May 3: 1 transport, 5 military
RT-57, Jul 20: 6 military

In summary, by target systems, the following were requested/approved:

| | |
|--------------------------|-------|
| Military Complex Targets | 26/19 |
| Thermal Power Targets | 7/5 |
| War Supporting Industry | 10/1 |
| Transportation Support | 13/2 |
| Haiphong Port Package | 22/3 |
| Other Ports | 3/0 |
| POL | 8/0 |

Total 89/30

It should be noted, however, that there were additional targets assigned not on CINCPAC list. Many of these were good targets.

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1967

21 January SEA DRAGON forces increased to three DD's.

28 January - RT-53 executed. Armed reconnaissance operating
22 February areas remained the same as ROLLING THUNDER 51 and 52. Strikes within 10 NM of Hanoi prohibited. Fixed strikes were authorized against two supply depots, three barracks, and four ammunition depots. The level of attack sorties for Laos and NVN remained at 13,200. SAM support facilities within the 10 NM to 30 NM belt of Hanoi and within the 10 NM radius of Haiphong were added to attack authorizations. Hanoi 10 NM radius prohibited area established. SEA DRAGON extended to 19-00 N.

2 February CINCPAC informed JCS that all targets in RT-53 were from one target system (Military Complexes), although message of 18 January had strongly recommended all systems be attacked.

4 - 5 February Thanh Hoa rail complex received major damage.

8 February TET stand-down commenced 080700H.

13 February TET stand-down ended 130700H.

23 February - RT-54 executed. Armed reconnaissance operating
21 April areas remained same as with previous programs. Fixed strikes were authorized against four power plants and the only steel plant in NVN. The level of attack sorties authorized for Laos and NVN increased to 14,500 per month. On 22 March 1967, two additional power plants were added to the program. Mining of certain inland waterways authorized south of 20-00N.

24 February First of several strikes against Hon Gai TPP.

26 February 7th Fleet began mining of selected river segments. Song Ca and Song Giang were the first to be mined. SEA DRAGON forces increased to one cruiser and four DD's and area of operations extended to 20-00 N.

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10 - 12 March Thai Nguyen Iron and Steel Mill, Viet Tri TPP, and Hon Gai Explosive Storage Area received heavy damage.

11 - 12 March 7th Fleet introduced WALLEYE air-to-surface guided bomb with seven direct hits out of seven releases against two highway bridges and an army barracks.

14 - 15 March CINCPAC again requested strikes against Haiphong Shipyard #4, the Haiphong Naval Base, and a re-strike on Haiphong POL. Authority for POL strike granted in April (RT-55).

23 March CINCPAC requested strikes against Kep and Hoa Lac Airfields. Authority granted in April (RT-55).

20 April Haiphong TPP East and West were struck for first time and received moderate damage.

22 April -
1 May RT-55 executed. Armed reconnaissance operating areas remained constant. Fixed targets included one power transformer station, a cement plant, three bridges, a rail repair shop, ammo depot, POL storage restrike (Tgt 48), and two MIG-capable airfields (Kep and Hoa Lac). Selected attacks were again permitted within the 10-NM Hanoi Prohibited Area.

24 - 26 April Kep Airfield, Hanoi Transformer Station, Hanoi RR Car and Repair Shops, Haiphong Cement Plant, Haiphong Ammo Depot, and Hanoi RR/Highway Bridge received initial strikes. All heavily damaged except Kep.

30 April CINCPAC requested strikes against remaining jet capable airfields: Phuc Yen, Vien An, Cat Bi. Authority granted against Vien An only in May (RT-56).

~~SECRET~~

1967

CINCPAC expressed concern at SECSTATE statement that "there are not many targets in NVN which have not been hit and thus the opportunities for applying more pressure through that means are not very great." Re-iterated that there was no shortage of targets in NVN.

2 May -
20 July

RT-56 executed. Armed reconnaissance operating areas remained constant. Fixed targets authorized for attack included three barracks areas, two supply and storage areas, a MIG-capable airfield, and re-strikes on two power plants, a vehicle depot, and a rail yard. Subsequently, a restrike on another power plant was permitted and two storage areas added to the target list. By 23 May 1967 strikes in the 10-NM Hanoi Prohibited Area were prohibited except on an individually approved basis. By 30 June 1967, a 4-NM-Prohibited Area was established around Haiphong, with strikes to be approved by Washington.

8 May

CINCPAC requested strikes against seven GCI sites, one at Hoa Lac, six in restricted-prohibited areas. Not authorized.

10 - 19 May

Kien An Airfield, Ha Dong, Vinh Yen, and Kep Barracks, Van Dien Supply Depot, and Hanoi TPP received initial strikes. Hanoi TPP and Ha Dong Barracks heavily damaged others moderate to none.

13 May

CINCPAC again requested strikes against Phuc Yen and Cat Bi Airfields. Not authorized.

29 May

CINCPAC made strong plea to JCS to maintain momentum in NE quadrant by authorizing additional strikes and re-strikes on targets withdrawn. Specific targets requested were:

Hanoi TPP:

Requested WALLEYE restrike. This authority granted on 8 August.

Hanoi RR/Hwy Bridge:

Authority granted on 8 August.

~~TOP SECRET~~

1967

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|-----------------------------|---------------------------------|
| Bridge Bypass (JCS 13): | Authority granted on 8 August. |
| Yen Vien RR CLSF Yd: | Authority granted on 8 August. |
| Hanoi RR Repair Shops: | Authority granted on 10 August. |
| Van Diem Sup/SAM Depot: | No authority granted. |
| Hai Dong Supply Depot: | No authority granted. |
| Hanoi North Supply: | No authority granted. |
| Hanoi South Supply: | No authority granted. |
| Hanoi Port: | No authority granted. |
| Hanoi Machine Tool & Eng: | No authority granted. |
| Hanoi RR CLSF Yd: | No authority granted. |
| Hanoi Motor Vehicle Repair: | No authority granted. |

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|---------|---|
| 1 June | CINCPAC message to JCS reiterated that there were plenty of targets remaining. Points out CINCPAC target list containing 244 targets of significance, only 69 of which were been hit. |
| 10 June | CINCPAC again requested strikes against Phu Ly TPP and the Haiphong Transformer Station. No action. |
| 11 June | CINCPAC requested authority to strike five fertilizer plants. Believed they were being used to produce explosives. No action. CINCPAC again requested strikes against those targets requested on 29 May. Targets were listed in order of priority. No action. |
| 14 June | CINCPAC summarized messages of 14 Mar, 8 May, 29 May, 10 Jun and 11 Jun. Again requested strikes be authorized against those targets. |

~~TOP SECRET~~

1967

- 20 June First seeding of DESTRUCTOR MK-36 (DST MK-36) weapon. Forty-four weapons delivered by TF-77 A6A aircraft in the Song Ca River near Ben Thuy.
- 28 June CINCPAC referred to nine separate messages requesting strike authority. Again requested strike authority and listed by priority 10 targets as follows:
- JCS 81, Hanoi TPP (WALLEYE) (~~restrike~~)
 - JCS 12, Hanoi RR/Hwy Br (and bypass)
 - JCS 13, Hanoi RR/Hwy Br (and bypasses) (~~restrike~~)
 - JCS 19, Yen Vien RR CLSF Yd (~~restrike~~)
 - JCS 31, Ha Dong Army Supply Depot (~~restrike~~)
 - JCS 62, Van Dien Army Supply (~~restrike~~)
 - JCS 7, Bai Mai Airfield
 - Haiphong RR Yds
 - Haiphong Transformer Station
 - JCS 82.19 Phu Ly TPP
- 29 June CINCPAC proposed strikes along NE rail line in the CHICOM Buffer Zone:
1. Lang Dang RR Yard.
 2. Luong Coc Railroad Spurs.
 3. Bridges, rail yards, sidings up to Lang Son.
- 20 July RT-57 executed. The 10-NM radius Hanoi and 4-NM radius Haiphong Prohibited Areas remained. Targets authorized for strike consisted of 5 barracks, 5 supply areas, 2 bridges, 1 transshipment point, 1 airfield, and 1 rail yard. LOC interdiction within the 30-NM radius

1967

Hanoi Restricted Area was expanded to include selected road, rail, and waterway segments. All other operating rules remained the same as the previous programs.

- 29 July Major fire on USS FORRESTAL (CVA-59); 133 personnel dead or missing, 21 aircraft destroyed, 30 aircraft damaged.
- 3 August CINCPAC requested 12 strikes in Buffer Zone of considerable importance, plus six additional targets of secondary importance. Targets by type were: 5 bridges, 6 railroad yards, siding, spurs and the Port Wallut Naval Base (first priority). Five bridges and railroad siding of secondary importance.
- 6 August CINCPAC submitted to JCS for strike approval 19 targets in the Hanoi area and 10 targets in the Haiphong area and recommended that the Hanoi and Haiphong restricted areas be eliminated and the prohibited areas be greatly reduced.
- 9 August Sixteen new RT-57 targets approved for strike which included RR bridges and facilities in the Buffer Zone, Port Wallut Naval Base, both Hanoi RR/Hwy Bridges and Hanoi TPP (restrike).
- 11 - 13 August Hanoi RR/Hwy River Bridge (Paul Doumer) and Hanoi RR/Hwy Canal Bridge had spans dropped in successful strikes. Strikes conducted in the CHICOM Buffer Zone against bridges and facilities on the northeast railway, excellent results.
- 19 August JCS prohibited any further strikes within Hanoi 10-NM prohibited area.
- 20 August CINCPAC strongly requested permission to strike Phuc Yen Airfield.
- 21 August Important rail facilities struck in Buffer Zone on NE railway and Hanoi area. Port Wallut Naval Base and Kep Ha Airfield received initial strikes. Hanoi TPP

1967

hit with 5 WALLEYEs on a restrike. Heavy to moderate damage on all targets.

23 August CINCPAC reiterated request of 20 August.

1 September JCS extended suspension of air strikes within Hanoi Prohibited Area until further notice.

2 September CINCPAC recommended JCS approve strikes on SAM support facilities at Cat Bi Airfield and Haiphong and rolling stock at Kinh No RR Yard.

5 September Eleven add-on targets from JCS. Included Cam Pha and Hon Gai Port Facilities, Haiphong Warehouse Area (W), Haiphong PPS, Hanoi Vehicle Depot (Bac Mai), Hanoi Storage Areas of Gia Thuong and Bac Mai.

8 September CINCPAC strongly recommended early removal of air strike suspension in Hanoi area.

10 - 11 September Cam Pha Port Facilities struck with moderate damage. Haiphong RR Yards (W) and RR/Hwy Bridge struck with light damage. Haiphong Warehouse Area (W) struck with moderate damage.

11 September Operation NEUTRALIZE commenced. It was a SLAM type operation just north of the DMZ intended to reduce the threat to Dong Ha, Gio Linh, Camp Carroll, and Con Thien areas.

20 September CINCPAC reiterated 8 September message to JCS.

21 September CINCPAC again requested authority to strike Phuc Yen Airfield.

25 September CINCPAC submitted to JCS concept for an air campaign against NVN for a 12-month period beginning November 1967.

26 September JCS authorized Phuc Yen Airfield for strike.

~~TOP SECRET~~

1967

27 September CINCPAC requested permission to strike coal treatment and RR repair facilities at Cam Pha.

29 September JCS withdrew strike authority for Phuc Yen Airfield.

8 October CINCPAC commented to JCS concerning affect on aircrew morale by withdrawal of strike authority for Phuc Yen.

12 October CINCPAC again requested lifting of restriction on strikes in Hanoi prohibited area and requested armed recce authority into Haiphong prohibited area along selected LOC's and strikes against stockpiled supplies on Haiphong peninsula.

24 October Phuc Yen Airfield authorized for strike. Targets in Hanoi prohibited area authorized for strike.

CINCPAC prohibited use of DST MK-36 weapons against land LOC's.

24 - 28 October Phuc Yen Airfield struck with moderate damage to facilities and the destruction or damage of 12 MIG's. Hanoi RR/Hwy River Bridge (Doumer), Hanoi RR/Hwy Canal Bridge and Bypass restruck with spans downed. Bac Mai Storage Area in Hanoi struck with moderate damage.

27 October CINCPAC requested authority to conduct interdiction strikes against lucrative targets along all LOC's up to city limits of Hanoi-Haiphong.

4 November CINCPAC requested authority to strike POL lighters and similar type WBLC inside Haiphong prohibited area.

5 - 7 November Phuc Yen restruck, several boat yards and storage area near Haiphong struck, moderate damage.

8 November JCS authorized 17 new targets, all in Hanoi-Haiphong prohibited areas.

~~TOP SECRET~~

1967

- 13 November CINCPAC authorized components to seed DST MK-36 weapons against all authorized JCS ALPHA targets and bypasses, including those within the Hanoi-Haiphong prohibited areas.
- 16 - 20 November Bac Mai NVN AF Headquarters area struck with heavy damage; Haiphong Shipyard #2 struck with heavy damage; Duc Noi POL Storage Site in Hanoi struck with heavy damage; Hanoi Concrete Products Plant struck successfully.
- 3 December CINCPAC submitted to JCS detailed analysis and mining plan for closure of NVN ports.
- 14 - 18 December Hanoi RR/Hwy Bridges (JCS-12, 13) and Haiphong and Kien An Hwy Bridges were restruck and rendered unserviceable.
- 19 December CINCPAC requested authority to strike 124 pieces of rolling stock trapped in Hanoi Prohibited Area. Permission granted. Weather precluded strike.
- 24 December Christmas stand-down commenced 241800H.
- 25 December Christmas stand-down ended 251800H.
- 30 December CINCPAC requested new authorities be granted for: use of MK-36 munitions against all water LOC's within Haiphong Prohibited Area, except where foreign shipping would be endangered; armed recce on all LOC's within Haiphong Restricted-Prohibited Areas up to the city limits; and strikes against warehouses and stockpiled materials on a peninsula within the Haiphong city limits.
- 31 December New Year stand-down commenced 311800H.

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GLOSSARY

A

| | |
|--------|---|
| AAA | Antiaircraft artillery; Army Audit Agency |
| AAFES | Army and Air Force Exchange Service |
| AAFWB | Army-Air Force Wage Board |
| AAFV | Australian Armed Forces, Vietnam |
| AAW | Antiaircraft Warfare |
| AB | Air Base |
| ABM | Anti-Ballistic Missile |
| Abn | Airborne |
| ABNCP | Airborne Command Post |
| ABWG | Air Base Wing |
| AC | When used jointly as a prefix in an aircraft designation, indicates a cargo/transport type aircraft modified to search out, attack and destroy enemy land or sea targets. |
| A/C | Aircraft |
| ACC | Alternate Command Center |
| ACCS | Airborne Command and Control Squadron |
| ACofS | Assistant Chief of Staff |
| ACP | Allied Communications Publication |
| ACS | Air Commando Squadron |
| Acq | Acquisition |
| AC&W | Aircraft Control and Warning |
| AD | Air Defense; Air Division |
| ADA | Air Defense Artillery |
| ADC | Air Defense Command |
| ADDC | Air Defense Direction Center |
| ADM | Admiral |
| ADMINO | Administrative Office |
| ADP | Automatic Data Processing |
| Adv | Advisor |
| AEW | Airborne Early Warning |

| | |
|------------|--|
| AEWC(ADC) | Airborne Early Warning and Control (Aerospace Defense Command) |
| AF | Air Force |
| AFAG | Air Force Advisory Group |
| AFAK | Armed Forces Assistance to Korea |
| AFB | Air Force Base |
| AFCS | Air Force Communications System |
| Aff | Affairs |
| AFK | Armed Forces of the Republic of Korea |
| AFLD | Airfield |
| AFP | Armed Forces of the Philippines |
| AFPSC | Armed Forces Philippines Supply Center |
| AFM | Air Force Manual |
| AFR | Air Force Regulation |
| AFRTS | Armed Forces Radio and Television Service |
| AFSC | Armed Forces Staff College; Air Force Systems Command |
| AFSS | Air Force Security Services |
| AGC | Amphibious Force Flagship |
| AGS | Surveying Ship |
| AGSC | Coastal Surveying Ship |
| AH | Attack Helicopter; Hospital Ship |
| AID | Agency for International Development |
| AIRA | Air Attache |
| AIRRES | Air Rescue |
| AJAX | A mobile or fixed site surface to air guided missile, designed to intercept and destroy manned bombers and air breathing missiles. |
| AK | Cargo Ship |
| AKL | Light Cargo Ship |
| Alft | Airlift |
| AMCONSUL | American counsel |
| AMEMB | American Embassy |
| Amphib | Amphibious |
| Amnt | Amount |
| ANZUS | Australia, New Zealand, United States |
| AN/TSQ-51J | Air Defense Fire Distribution System |

| | |
|-------------|--|
| AO | Oiler |
| AOG | Gasoline Tanker |
| AP | Transport Ship |
| APA | Attack Transport |
| APC | Armored Personnel Carrier |
| APD | High Speed Transport |
| APL | Barracks Craft (non-self-propelled) |
| AR | Army Regulation |
| AREFS | Air Refueling Squadron |
| ARL | Landing Craft Repair Ship |
| ARM | Armored |
| Armd | Armed |
| ARPA | Advance Research Projects Agency |
| ARRS | Air Rescue Squadron |
| Arty | Artillery |
| ARVN | Army of the Republic of Vietnam |
| ASAP | As Soon As Possible |
| ASDF | Air Staff Defense Force |
| ASD(I&L) | Assistant Secretary of Defense (Installations and Logistics) |
| ASD/ISA | Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs |
| ASD(M) | Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower |
| ASL | Authorized Stock Level |
| ASPB | Assault Support Patrol Boat |
| ASROC | Antisubmarine Rocket |
| Asst | Assistant |
| ASW | Antisubmarine Warfare |
| AT | Artillery |
| ATAC | Army Tank and Automotive Command |
| Atchd | Attached |
| ATF | Fleet Ocean Tug |
| AUG | Augment(ed); August |
| AUS | Australia |
| AUTODIN | Automatic Digital Network |
| AUTOSEVOCOM | Automatic Secure Voice Communications System |
| AUTOVON | Automatic Voice Network |
| AVGAS | Aviation Gasoline |
| Avn | Aviation |

UNCLASSIFIED

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|-----|--------------------------------|
| AW | Automatic Weapons; All Weather |
| AWR | Ammunition War Reserve |
| AWX | All Weather |

B

| | |
|----------|------------------------------|
| BCT | Battalion Combat Team |
| BDA | Bomb Damage Assessment |
| Bde | Brigade |
| BDL | Beach Discharge Lighter |
| BDP | Base Development Planning |
| BG | Brigadier General |
| BLT | Battalion Landing Team |
| BMR | Bomber |
| Bn | Battalion |
| BOB | Bureau of the Budget |
| BOD | Beneficial Occupany Date |
| Bomb | Bomber |
| BOPD | Bataan Ocean Petroleum Depot |
| Br | Branch |
| BR | Barrell Roll |
| Brig Gen | Brigadier General |

C

| | |
|-------|---|
| C-47 | A Twin Engine, Low Wing, Monoplane |
| C-54 | Four Engine, Low Wing, Monoplane, with Retractable Landing Gear. Utilized for Transport, Electronic Countermeasure, Search and Rescue, and Training Purposes. |
| C-121 | High Speed, Low Wing Monoplane, Transportation of Personnel Over Land or Water. Also configured as a Special Search Airplane with Bottom and Top Radar Antenna. |
| C | Confidential |
| CA | Chinese Army |
| CA | Civil Affairs; Heavy Cruiser |
| CAF | Chinese Air Force |
| CAG | Civic Action Group; Guided Missile Heavy Cruiser |
| CANT | Cantonment |
| CAP | Combat Air Patrol |
| CAPT | Captain |

UNCLASSIFIED

| | |
|-----------------|--|
| Car | Carrier |
| CAS | Controlled American Source; Close Air Support |
| Cav | Cavalry |
| CBMU | Construction Battalion Maintenance Unit |
| CBR | Chemical, Biological and Radiological Warfare |
| CBU | Cluster Bomb Unit |
| CCF | Corps Contingency Force |
| CCK | Ching Chuan Kang (Taiwan) |
| CCRSFF | Chairman, Central Region SEATO Field Forces |
| CDR | Commander |
| C-E | Communications-Electronics |
| C-E 10M | Tenth SEATO Communications-Electronics |
| | Committee Meeting |
| CENTO | Central Treaty Organization |
| CFS | Contract Field Service |
| CG | Commanding General |
| CGM | When Used Jointly as a Prefix, Indicates a Guided Missile Designed to Destroy Enemy Land or Sea Targets that is Stored Horizontally or at Less than a 45 Degree Angle in a Protective Enclosure. |
| CGUSARF TAIWAN | Commanding General, United States Army Forces, Taiwan |
| CH | When Used Jointly as a Prefix in an Aircraft Designation, Indicates a Helicopter that has been Modified for Carrying Cargo and/or Passengers. |
| CH | Chief |
| CHAFSEC | Chief Air Force Section |
| CHDLG | Chief Defense Liaison Group |
| CHDLG INDONESIA | Chief, Defense Liaison Group, Indonesia |
| CHICOM | Chinese Communists |
| CHJUSMAGPHIL | Chief, Joint United States Military Advisory Group, Philippines |
| CHJUSMAGTHAI | Chief, Joint United States Military Advisory Group, Thailand |
| CHMAAG | Chief Military Assistance Advisory Group |
| CHMAAG JAPAN | Chief, Military Assistance Advisory Group, Japan |
| CHMEDT BURMA | Chief, Military Equipment Delivery Team, Burma |
| CHNAVSEC | Chief Navy Section |
| CHPROVMAAGK | Chief, Military Assistance Advisory Group, Korea (Provisional) |
| CHWTO | Chief, Western Pacific Transportation Office |
| CI | Counter Insurgency |

UNCLASSIFIED

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|-------------------|--|
| CIA | Central Intelligence Agency |
| CIC | Combat Information Center |
| CIDG | Civilian Irregular Defense Group |
| CIGCOREP | Counter Infiltration - Counter Guerrilla Concept and Requirement Plan |
| CINC | Commander in Chief |
| CINCLANTFLT | Commander in Chief, United States Atlantic Fleet |
| CINCPAC | Commander in Chief Pacific |
| CINCPACFLT | Commander in Chief, United States Pacific Fleet |
| CINCPACREP | Representative of the Commander in Chief Pacific |
| CINCPACSTAFFINSTR | Commander in Chief Pacific Staff Instruction |
| CINCUSARPAC | Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific |
| CIVACTGP | Civic Action Group |
| CJCS | Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff |
| CJOEP | Coordinated Joint Outline Emergency Plan |
| CL | Light Cruiser |
| Cmbt | Combat |
| Cmd | Command |
| Cmdo | Commando |
| CMPO | Chief, SEATO Military Planning Office |
| CMSO | Chief Japanese Maritime Staff Office |
| CN | Chinese Navy |
| CNO | Chief of Naval Operations |
| CO | Commanding Officer |
| COACT | Combat Activity Reports |
| COC | Combat Operations Center |
| CofS | Chief of Staff |
| COIN | Counter Insurgency |
| Col | Colonel |
| COM | Commander |
| Combt | Combat |
| Comd | Command |
| Comm/Elect | Communications/Electronics |
| COMNAVFORJAP | Commander, U. S. Naval Forces, Japan |
| COMNAVMARIANAS | Commander, U. S. Naval Forces, Marianas |
| Comp | Composite |
| Compt | Comptroller |
| COMSAT | Communications Satellite |
| COMSEC | Communications Security |

UNCLASSIFIED

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|-----------------|--|
| COMSTS | Commander Military Sea Transportation Service |
| COMSTSFE | Commander, Military Sea Transportation Service, Far East |
| COMSTSSEA | Commander, Military Sea Transportation Service, Southeast Asia |
| COMTAIWANPATFOR | Commander, Taiwan Patrol Force |
| COMUS | Commander, United States Forces |
| COMUSARJAPAN | Commander, United States Army, Japan |
| COMUS JAPAN | Commander, United States Forces, Japan |
| COMUSKOREA | Commander, United States Forces, Korea |
| COMUSMACTHAI | Commander, United States Military Assistance Command, Thailand |
| COMUSMACV | Commander, United States Military Assistance Command, Vietnam |
| COMUSNAVSO | Commander, U. S. Naval Forces, South |
| COMUSSEASIA | Commander, United States Forces, Southeast Asia |
| COMUSTDC | Commander, United States Forces, Taiwan Defense Command |
| Const | Construction |
| CONUS | Continental United States |
| COS | Chief of Staff |
| COSTAR | Combat Service to the Army |
| CP | Command Post |
| CPRS | CINCPAC Route Slip |
| CRA | Continuing Resolution Authority |
| CRB | Cam Ranh Bay |
| CRP | Coordinated Reconnaissance Plan |
| CRSFF | Central Region SEATO Field Forces |
| CS | A Riot Control Agent |
| CS | Control Slip Used on the CINCPAC Staff to Control Correspondence |
| CSA | Chief of Staff, Army |
| CSAF | Chief of Staff, Air Force |
| CSMAM | CINCPAC Supplement to the Military Assistance Manual |
| CTF | Commander Task Force |
| CTF 77 | Commander, Attack Carrier Striking Force, Seventh Fleet |
| CTG | Commander Task Group |
| CTG 31.7 | Commander Panama Section, Western Sea Frontier |

UNCLASSIFIED

| | |
|--------|--|
| Ctrl | Control |
| CTSP | Contract Technical Service Personnel |
| CTZ | Corps Tactical Zone |
| CULT | Common User Land Transportation |
| CURTS | Common-User Radio Transmission Sounding |
| CVA | Attack Aircraft Carrier |
| CVA(N) | Attack Aircraft Carrier (Nuclear Propulsion) |
| CVS | Antisubmarine Support Aircraft Carrier |
| CVW | Carrier Air Wing |
| CW | Continuous Wave |
| CY | Calendar Year |

D

| | |
|-----------------|--|
| DA | Department of the Army; Damaged |
| DAN | Deployment Adjustment Notification |
| DAO | Defense Attache Office |
| DAR | Deployment Adjustment Request |
| DATAFAX | Secure Data Facsimile System |
| DAVY CROCKETT | A Mobile Launcher Designed to Provide Firepower with a Nuclear Warhead. |
| DCA | Defense Communications Agency |
| DC of S | Deputy Chief of Staff |
| DC/GCI | Direction Center-Ground Controlled Intercept |
| DCGSLOG | Deputy Chief, General Staff, Logistics (ROC) |
| DCPG | Defense Communications Planning Group |
| DCS | Defense Communication System |
| DD | Destroyer |
| DE | Escort Ship |
| Def | Defense |
| DEFENSE | Department of Defense |
| Defol | Defoliation |
| Dep | Deputy |
| DEPUTY CHJUSMAG | Deputy Chief, Joint United States Military Advisory Group |
| DER | Radar Picket Escort Ship |
| Det | Detachment |
| DF | When Used Jointly as a Prefix in an Aircraft Designation, Indicates a Fighter Type Aircraft Whose Mission has been Modified to a Director Type Aircraft, Capable of Controlling a Drone Aircraft or a Missile. |
| DF | Diverted Force |

UNCLASSIFIED

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| DFSC | Defense Fuel Supply Center |
| DIA | Defense Intelligence Agency |
| DICS | Taiwan Down-Island Communications System |
| DINS | Directorate for Inspection Services (Assistant Secretary of Defense for Administration) |
| Dir | Director |
| DIRNSA | Director, National Security Agency |
| DIV | Division |
| DLG | Defense Liaison Group |
| DM | Those Memorandums Prepared by the Director, Joint Staff (JCS) for Submission to the JCS. |
| DMZ | Demilitarized Zone |
| DNC | Directorate of National Coordination; Director of Naval Communications |
| DOB STATUS | Dispersed Operating Base Status |
| DOD | Department of Defense |
| DODPRO | Department of Defense, Pacific Research Office |
| DSA | Defense Supply Agency |
| DTS | Diplomatic Telecommunications System |

E

| | |
|-------|---|
| ECB | Engineer Construction Battalion |
| ECCM | Electronic Counter Countermeasures |
| ECM | Electronic Countermeasures |
| Elec | Electronics |
| Elem | Element |
| ELINT | Electronics Intelligence |
| EMATS | Emergency Message Automatic Transmission System |
| Encl | Enclosure |
| Eng | Engineer |
| Engr | Engineer |
| ETA | Estimated Time of Arrival |
| Evac | Evacuation |
| EW | Electronic Warfare |
| Exec | Executive |

F

| | |
|-----|--------------------------------|
| FA | Field Artillery; Forces Armees |
| FAA | Federal Aviation Agency |

UNCLASSIFIED

| | |
|---------|---|
| FAC | Forward Air Control; Facility(ies) |
| FAE | Field Advisory Element |
| FALCON | An Air to Air Guided Missile |
| FAN | Forces Armees Neutralist |
| FAR | Forces Armees du Royaume (Royal Armed Forces of Laos) |
| FEBA | Forward Edge of the Battle Area |
| FEPI | Filipino Employment Policy Instruction |
| FFV | Field Force Vietnam |
| FIS | Fighter Intercept Squadron |
| FLT | Fleet; Flight |
| FMAW | First Marine Air Wing |
| FMFPAC | Fleet Marine Force Pacific |
| FMS | Foreign Military Sales |
| FOB | Forward Operating Base |
| FOUO | For Official Use Only |
| FROKA | First Republic of Korea Army |
| FOEU | Foreign Organizational Employee Union |
| FOIC | Flag Officer in Charge |
| FORSTAT | Force Status Report |
| FSR | Force Service Regiment |
| Ftr | Fighter |
| FTS | Field Training Service |
| Fwd | Forward |
| FWMA | Free World Military Assistance |
| FY | Fiscal Year |

G

| | |
|--------|--|
| G-2 | In the Army, the Intelligence Division |
| GAO | General Accounting Office |
| GCI | Ground Controlled Intercept |
| GDF | Ground Diverted Force |
| GEMINI | Modified Titan II Used as a Launch Vehicle for NASA two-man Orbital Rendezvous |
| Gen | General |
| GENIE | An Air to Air Unguided Rocket Equipped with Nuclear Warhead |
| GHQ | General Headquarters |
| GM | Group Mobile |
| GNP | Gross National Product |
| GOA | Government of Australia |
| GOB | Government of Burma |

UNCLASSIFIED

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|------|-------------------------------------|
| GOJ | Government of Japan |
| GOM | Government of Malaysia |
| GOP | Government of the Philippines |
| GOPL | General Outpost Line |
| GOS | Government of Singapore |
| Gp | Group |
| GRC | Government of the Republic of China |
| GSA | General Services Administration |
| GSDF | Ground Self Defense Force |

H

| | |
|---------------|---------------------------------------|
| H&MS | Headquarters and Maintenance Squadron |
| HA(L) | Helicopter Attack Squadron (Light) |
| HANG | Hawaii Air National Guard |
| HARNG | Hawaii Army National Guard |
| HAWK | A Low Altitude Air Defense Weapon |
| HC | Helicopter Combat Support Squadron |
| HE | High Explosive |
| Helo | Helicopter |
| HES | Hamlet Evaluation System |
| HIGH HEELS VI | Worldwide Command Post Exercise |
| HIRAN | High Range Navigation |
| Hist | History |
| HMH | Marine Helicopter Squadron, Heavy |
| HMM | Marine Helicopter Squadron Medium |
| Hon | Honorable |
| How | Howitzer |
| Hq | Headquarters |
| HS | Helicopter Squadron |
| HUMINT | Human Resources Intelligence |
| Hwy | Highway |

I

| | |
|-------|---|
| IBM | International Business Machine Company |
| ICBM | Intercontinental Ballistic Missile |
| ICC | International Control Commission |
| IDCSS | Initial Defense Communications Satellite System |
| IDF | Inflight Diverted Force |
| IDHS | Intelligence Data Handling System |
| IFF | Identification, Friend or Foe |
| IFS | Inshore Fire Support |

UNCLASSIFIED

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|-------------|---|
| IJBS | Integrated Joint Broadband System |
| IL-28 | A Twin Jet Tactical Bomber Manufactured by the Soviet Union |
| ILN | International Logistics and Negotiations |
| IMHQ | International Military Headquarters |
| Ind | Indorsement |
| Inf | Infantry |
| INT | Interceptor |
| INT 13M | Thirteenth Meeting of the SEATO Intelligence Committee |
| Intcp | Interceptor |
| Intel | Intelligence |
| INTELSAT II | Intelligence Satellite |
| Intv | Interview |
| IOC | Initial Operating Capability |
| IPIR | Immediate Photo Interpretation Reports |
| IR | Infra-Red |
| IROL | Imagery Reconnaissance Objectives List |
| ISC | Infiltration Surveillance Center |
| ISSA | Interservice Support Agreement |
| IWCS | Integrated Wideband Communications System |

J

| | |
|-----|---|
| J1 | Staff Code of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Personnel |
| J2 | Staff Code of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence |
| J3 | Staff Code of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations |
| J4 | Staff Code of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Logistics |
| J5 | Staff Code of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Plans |
| J6 | Staff Code of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Communications and Electronics |
| J71 | Staff Code of the Performance Evaluation Group, Pacific Command |
| J72 | Staff Code of the Comptroller, Pacific Command |
| J73 | Staff Code of the Legal Affairs Officer, Pacific Command |
| J74 | Staff Code of the Public Affairs Officer, Pacific Command |

UNCLASSIFIED

| | |
|------------|--|
| J75 | Staff Code of the Pacific Command Director of Protocol |
| J76 | Staff Code of the Pacific Command Medical Officer |
| J02C | Staff Code of the PACOM Command and Control System Group |
| JASDF | Japanese Air Self Defense Force |
| JATF | Joint Amphibious Task Force |
| JCEAG | Joint Civilian Employee Advisory Group |
| JCS | Joint Chiefs of Staff |
| JCS J6 | Communications-Electronics Directorate of the Joint Staff (JCS) |
| JCSM | Joint Chiefs of Staff Memorandum |
| JDA | Japan Defense Agency |
| JEIT | Joint Equipment Identification Team |
| JFY | Japanese Fiscal Year |
| JMP | Joint Manpower Program |
| JMSDF | Japanese Maritime Self Defense Force |
| JNR | Japanese National Railroad |
| Jnt | Joint |
| JOREP | Joint Operational Reporting |
| JP | Joint Pacific |
| JP4 | Jet Fuel |
| JP5 | Jet Fuel |
| JPO | Joint Petroleum Office |
| JS | Joint Staff |
| JSCP | Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan |
| JSOP | Joint Strategic Objectives Plan |
| JSTPS | Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff |
| JTB | PACOM Joint Transportation Board |
| JTD | Joint Table of Distribution |
| JTMB | Joint Transportation Movements Board |
| JUSMAG | Joint United States Military Advisory Group |
| JUSMAGPHIL | Joint United States Military Advisory Group, Philippines |
| JUSPAO | Joint United States Public Affairs Office |
| JWGA | Joint War Games Agency |

K

| | |
|--------|--|
| KANZUS | Korea, Australia, New Zealand and the United States |
| KBA | Killed by Air |

UNCLASSIFIED

| | |
|------|--------------------------------|
| KCAC | Korean Civil Action Corps |
| KIA | Killed in Action |
| KLSC | Korean Logistic Service Corps |
| KMAG | Military Advisory Group, Korea |
| KOCO | Korea Oil Corporation |

L

| | |
|------------|--|
| LAAM | Light Antiaircraft Missile |
| LAMP | Laos Ammunition Procedures |
| LANSHIPRON | Landing Ship Squadron |
| LANTFLT | U. S. Atlantic Fleet |
| LARC | Lighter, Amphibious, Resupply, Cargo (Amphibious Craft) |
| LAW | Light Antitank Weapon |
| LCM | Landing Craft Medium |
| LCPL | Landing Craft |
| LCU | Landing Craft Utility |
| LCVP | Landing Craft, Vehicle and Personnel |
| LFS | Landing Force Support |
| LFT | Light Fire Team |
| LOC | Lines of Communication |
| LOG | Logistics |
| LOG 7M | SEATO Logistics Committee Seventh Meeting |
| LOGAIR | Logistical Air |
| LORAN | Long Range Navigation |
| LOTS | Logistics Over the Shore |
| LPLA | Lao Peoples Liberation Army |
| LSD | Dock Landing Ship |
| LSIL | Landing Ship |
| LSM | Medium Landing Ship |
| LSMR | Landing Ship Medium Rocket |
| LSSL | Support Landing Ship (large) |
| LST | Tank Landing Ship |
| Lt | Light |
| LTC | Lieutenant Colonel |
| Lt Col | Lieutenant Colonel |
| LTG | Lieutenant General |
| Lt Gen | Lieutenant General |
| Ltr | Letter |
| LVT | Landing Vehicle Track |

UNCLASSIFIED

M

| | |
|-----------|---|
| MA | Military Assistance |
| MA26C | SEATO Military Advisers Conference 26 |
| MA27C | SEATO Military Advisers Conference 27 |
| MAAG | Military Assistance Advisory Group |
| MAB | Marine Amphibious Brigade |
| MABS | Marine Air Base Squadron |
| MAC | Military Airlift Command; Military Assistance Command |
| MACCORDS | Staff Code of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam |
| MACSOG | Military Assistance Command Studies and Observation Group |
| MACV | Military Assistance Command, Vietnam |
| MAF | Marine Amphibious Force |
| MAG | Marine Air Group |
| MAI | Military Assistance Institute |
| MAJCOM | Major Commands |
| Maj Gen | Major General |
| MAM | Military Assistance Manual |
| MAP | Military Assistance Program (Plan) |
| MAPETT | Military Assistance Program Evaluation Team, Thailand |
| MAPT | Military Assistance Program Training; Military Assistance Program Transfer |
| MAR | U. S. Marine Corps |
| Mar Corps | Marine Corps |
| MAS | Military Airlift Squadron |
| MASF | Military Assistance Service Funded |
| MAW | Marine Air Wing; Military Airlift Wing |
| Mbr | Member |
| MDAA | Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement |
| M-Day | A Term Used to Designate the Day on which Mobilization is to Begin |
| MDL | Military Demarcation Line |
| MDRAF | Mekong Delta Riverine Assault Force |
| MECH | Mechanized |
| MED | Medium |
| MEDT | Military Equipment Delivery Team |
| MEECN | Minimum Essential Emergency Communications Net |

UNCLASSIFIED

| | |
|-----------|---|
| MEF | Minimum Essential Force |
| Memo | Memorandum |
| MG | Major General |
| MGD | Military Geographic Documentation |
| MI | Missile |
| MIG | High Performance Fighter Aircraft Manufactured by the Soviet Union |
| MIL | Military |
| MILAD | Military Advisor (SEATO or ANZUS Council) |
| MILCON | Military Construction |
| MILSTRIP | Military Standard Requisitioning and Issue Procedures |
| MINIMIZE | A Term Used to Control Message Communica- tions when a State of Emergency Exists |
| MINUTEMAN | A Three Stage Solid Propellant, Second Genera- tion Intercontinental Ballistic Missile Equipped with a Nuclear Warhead Designed for Deploy- ment in a Hardened and Dispersed Configura- tion and in a Mobile Mode on Railroad Tracks. |
| MMC | Minelayer, Coastal |
| MND | Ministry of National Defense |
| MOD | Ministry of Defense |
| MOGAS | Gasoline, Automotive |
| MOVECAP | Movement Capabilities |
| MP | Military Police |
| MPC | Military Payment Certificate |
| MPO | Military Planning Office |
| M/R | Memorandum for the Record |
| MSDF | Maritime Staff Defense Force |
| MSB | Mine Sweeping Boat |
| MSC | Minesweeper, Coastal (non-magnetic) |
| MSF | Minesweeper, Fleet (steel hull) |
| MSI | Minesweeper |
| Msl | Missile |
| MSTS | Military Sea Transportation Service |
| MT | Mountain |
| MTB | Motor Torpedo Boat |
| MTMTS | Military Traffic Management and Terminal Service |
| MTT | Mobile Training Team |
| MWHG | Marine Wing Headquarters Group |
| MWSG | Marine Wing Service Group |

UNCLASSIFIED

N

| | |
|------------|--|
| NADAC | Pacific Command North Vietnam Air Defense Analysis and Coordinating Group |
| NAG | Naval Advisory Group |
| NAS | Naval Air Station |
| NASA | National Aeronautics and Space Administration |
| Nat | National |
| Natl | National |
| NATO | North Atlantic Treaty Organization |
| NAVCOSSACT | Naval Command Systems Support Activity |
| NAVFOR | Naval Forces |
| NAVFORV | Naval Forces, Vietnam |
| NBC | National Broadcasting Company |
| NCO | Noncommissioned Officer |
| NCR | National Constabulary Study |
| NEA | Northeast Asia |
| NGF | Naval Gunfire |
| NHM | Non-Hostile Missing |
| NIPS | National Military Command System Information Processing System |
| NK | North Korea |
| NKA | North Korean Army |
| NLF | National Liberation Front |
| NM | Nautical Mile |
| NMCB | Navy Mobile Construction Battalion |
| NOA | New Obligation Authority |
| NOFORN | A Security Special Handling Provision Meaning the Document is not Releasable to Foreign Nationals. |
| n. s. | No Subject |
| NSA | National Security Agency |
| NSC | Naval Supply Center |
| NSFO | Navy Special Fuel Oil |
| NUCAP | Nuclear Capability Report |
| NVA | North Vietnamese Army |
| NVN | North Vietnam |
| NWC | Navy War College |
| NZ | New Zealand |

UNCLASSIFIED

O

| | |
|----------|--|
| OASD | Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense |
| OASD(SA) | Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Systems Analysis) |
| OB | Order of Battle |
| OCMM | Office of Civilian Manpower Management |
| OCS | Officer Candidate School |
| ODMA | Office of the Director of Military Assistance |
| OEM | On Equipment Materiel |
| Off | Officer |
| OJT | On the Job Training |
| O&M | Operations and Maintenance |
| OP | Operational |
| OPians | Operation Plans |
| Opns | Operations |
| OPREP | Operational Reporting |
| OSAP | Ocean Surveillance Air Patrol |
| OSD | Office of the Secretary of Defense |
| OSP | Off-shore Procurement |
| OUSAIRA | Office of the United States Air Attache |
| OUSARMA | Office of the U. S. Army Attache |
| OVM | On Vehicle Material |

P

| | |
|--------------------|---|
| PA | Philippines Army |
| PACAF | Pacific Air Forces |
| PACEX | Pacific Exchange System |
| PACGEEIA | Pacific Area Ground Environment Electronic Installation Agency |
| ✓ 92-13H PACNUC | A Study of the Role and Requirements for Theater Nuclear Weapons in the PACOM for FY 68-72. |
| PACOM | Pacific Command |
| PACOM ELINT Center | Pacific Command Electronics Intelligence Center |
| PACOMINTS | Pacific Command Intelligence School |
| PACSCAT | Pacific Ionospheric Scatter |
| PACV | Patrol Air Cushion Vehicle |
| PADAF | Pacific Command Air Defense Analysis Facility |
| PAF | Philippine Air Force |

UNCLASSIFIED

| | |
|------------|---|
| PAL | Permissive Action Link |
| PARRC | Pacific Air Rescue Center |
| PAT | Peoples Action Teams |
| PAX | Passenger |
| PBR | River Patrol Boat |
| PC | Philippine Constabulary; Submarine Chaser Ship |
| PCE | Patrol Craft Escort |
| PCF | Patrol Craft Coastal (fast) |
| PCH&T | Packing, Crating, Handling and Transportation |
| PCS | Permanent Change of Station |
| PDO | Property Disposal Office |
| PEG | Performance Evaluation Group |
| PERSHING | A Mobile, Solid Propellant, Surface to Surface Guided Missile, with a Nuclear Warhead Capability Designed to Support the Field Army by the Attack of Long Range Ground Targets. |
| PF | Patrol Escort Ship |
| PFF | Police Field Force |
| PGM | Motor Gunboat |
| PHIL | Philippines |
| PHILCAGV | Philippine Civic Action Group Vietnam |
| PL | Public Law |
| PLL | Prescribed Load List |
| PMDC | Pacific Command, Military Assistance Program Data Center |
| PMDL | Provisional Military Demarcation Line |
| PMEL | Precision Measuring Equipment Laboratory |
| PN | Philippine Navy |
| POL | Petroleum, Oils, and Lubricants |
| POLARIS | An Underwater Surface Launched, Surface to Surface, Solid Propellant Ballistic Missile with Inertial Guidance and Nuclear Warhead. |
| POSEIDON | An Underwater Surface Launched, Surface to Surface, Solid Propellant Ballistic Missile with Inertial Guidance and Nuclear Warhead. |
| POW | Prisoner of War |
| PREREC PAC | Preplanned Reconnaissance Pacific |
| Prod | Product |
| Prog | Program(s) |
| PROVMAAG-K | Military Assistance Advisory Group, Korea (Provisional) |
| PS | Patrol Ship |

UNCLASSIFIED

| | |
|--------|--------------------------|
| PSY | Psychological |
| PSYOPS | Psychological Operations |
| PT | Fast Patrol Boat |
| PVMT | Pavement |
| PW | Prisoner of War |
| PX | Post Exchange |

Q

| | |
|-----|---------------------------|
| QRA | Quick Reaction Alert |
| QRC | Quick Reaction Capability |
| QRF | Quick Reaction Force |

R

| | |
|-------------|---|
| RADM | Rear Admiral |
| RAG | River Assault Group |
| RCN Listing | Record Control Number Listing |
| RCT | Regimental Combat Team |
| RD | Revolutionary Development |
| RDT&E | Research, Development, Test and Engineering |
| Recce | Reconnaissance |
| Recon | Reconnaissance |
| REDOPS | Operational Status Reports |
| Ref | Reference |
| Regt | Regiment |
| Reinf | Reinforced |
| Res | Reserve |
| Ret | Retired |
| RF/PF | Regional and Popular Forces |
| RISOP | Red Integrated Strategic Offensive Plan |
| RKG | Royal Cambodian Government |
| RLAF | Royal Laotian Air Force |
| RLG | Royal Laotian Government |
| RLT | Regimental Landing Team |
| ROC | Republic of China |
| ROCAF | Republic of China Air Force |
| ROK | Republic of Korea |
| ROKA | Republic of Korea Army |
| ROKAF | Republic of Korea Air Force |
| ROKFFV | Republic of Korea Forces in Vietnam |
| ROKG | Government of the Republic of Korea |
| ROKMC | Republic of Korea Marine Corps |

UNCLASSIFIED

| | |
|-------------|--|
| ROKN | Republic of Korea Navy |
| RON | Squadron; Remain Over Night |
| ROP | Republic of the Philippines |
| RO/RO | Roll On/Roll Off |
| ROT ABCCC | Rotational Airborne Command and Control Center |
| ROTE AREFS | Rotating Air Refueling Squadron |
| ROT AWS | Rotational Air Weather Squadron |
| ROT BS | Rotational Bomb Squadron |
| ROT FIS | Rotating Fighter Interceptor Squadron |
| ROT FIS DET | Rotating Fighter Interceptor Squadron Detachment |
| ROT RCS | Rotational Radar Calibration Squadron |
| ROT TAS | Rotational Tactical Assault Squadron |
| ROT TBS | Rotational Tactical Bomber Squadron |
| ROT TCS | Rotational Troop Carrier Squadron |
| RP | Route Package |
| RPC | River Patrol Craft |
| RR | Railroad |
| R&R | Rest and Recuperation |
| RSSZ | Rung Sat Special Zone |
| RTA | Royal Thailand Army |
| RTAF | Royal Thailand Air Force |
| RTARF | Royal Thailand Armed Forces |
| RT | Rolling Thunder |
| RTA | Royal Thailand Army |
| RTAF | Royal Thailand Air Force |
| RTAFB | Royal Thailand Air Force Base |
| RTAV | Royal Thailand Army in Vietnam |
| RTEG | River Transport Escort Group |
| RTMC | Royal Thailand Marine Corps |
| RTN | Royal Thailand Navy |
| RTG | Royal Thai Government |
| RTTL | Rolling Thunder Target List |
| RTVAR | Royal Thailand Army Volunteer Regiment |
| RVNAF | Republic of Vietnam Air Force |

S

| | |
|----------|---|
| S | Secret |
| SAC | Strategic Air Command |
| SAC XRAY | A Detachment of the Strategic Air Command |
| SAG | Scientific Advisory Group |

UNCLASSIFIED

| | |
|----------|--|
| SAM | Surface to Air Missile; Space Available Mail |
| SAR | Search and Rescue |
| SATM | Supply and Training Mission, Laos |
| SC | Submarine Chaser (110') |
| SCC SC | Security Consultative Committee Sub-Committee |
| SCH | School |
| SEA | Southeast Asia |
| SEA-EX | Sealift Express |
| SEAITACS | Southeast Asia Integrated Tactical Air Control System |
| SEAL | Sea, Air and Land (Team) |
| SEAMARF | Southeast Asia Military Air Reservation Facility |
| SEAP | SEATO Military Publication |
| SEASIA | Southeast Asia |
| SEASTAG | SEATO Standardization Agreement |
| SEATO | Southeast Asia Treaty Organization |
| Sec | Section(s) |
| SECDEF | Secretary of Defense |
| Secy | Secretary |
| SF | Special Forces |
| SFCO | Special Forces Company |
| SFF | SEATO Field Forces |
| SHEDS | Ship Helicopter Extended Delivery System |
| SHRIKE | Air to Surface Tactical Missile Used for Destruction of Radiation Targets. |
| SICR | Specific Intelligence Collection Requirements |
| SIF | Selective Identification Feature |
| SIOP | Single Integrated Operational Plan |
| SITREP | Situation Report |
| SJS | Secretary Joint Staff |
| SL | STEEL TIGER |
| S&L | Systems and Logistics |
| SLAR | Side Looking Airborne Radar |
| SLAT | Special Logistics Actions Thailand |
| SLF | Special Landing Force |
| SM | A Memorandum Prepared by the Secretary, Joint Chief of Staff for Submission to the Joint Chiefs of Staff |
| SMPO | SEATO Military Planning Office |
| SOFA | Status of Forces Agreement |
| SOG | Studies and Observation Group |

UNCLASSIFIED

| | |
|---------|--|
| SOSUS | Sound Surveillance Underwater System |
| Spec | Special |
| SPOS | Strong Point Obstacle System |
| Spt | Support |
| Sq | Squadron |
| Sq. Mi. | Square Mile |
| Sqn(s) | Squadron(s) |
| Sr | Senior |
| SRY | Ship Repair Yard |
| SS | U. S. Navy Submarine |
| SSG | Special Support Group |
| SSODIA | Special Security Office, Defense Intelligence Agency |
| STATE | Department of State |
| STR | Strength |
| Subj | Subject |
| SUBS | Submarines |
| Supt | Support |
| SVN | South Vietnam |
| SYNCOM | Synchronous Communication Satellite System |

T

| | |
|---------|--|
| TA | Table of Allowances |
| Tac | Tactical |
| TACAMO | Nickname for Airborne Very Low Frequency Radio Broadcasting |
| TAF | Stores Ship (MSTS) |
| TAK | Cargo Ship (MSTS) |
| TAKV | Cargo Ship and Aircraft Ferry (MSTS) |
| TANGO | A Message Released by the Commander in Chief Pacific, while from the Headquarters. |
| TANWERE | Tactical Nuclear Weapons Requirements |
| TAOG | Gasoline Tanker (MSTS) |
| TAP | Transport Ship (MSTS) |
| TAS | Troop Airlift Squadron |
| TASC | Tactical Air Support Center |
| TASS | Tactical Air Support Squadron |
| TAW | Troop Airlift Wing |
| TCTO | Time Compliance Technical Order |
| TCW | Troop Carrier Wing |
| TD | Table of Distribution |
| TDY | Temporary Duty |

UNCLASSIFIED

| | |
|-----------|--|
| TE | Table of Equipment |
| TEWS | Tactical Electronic Warfare Squadron |
| TFS | Tactical Fighter Squadron |
| TFW | Tactical Fighter Wing |
| Tgt | Target |
| TH | TIGER HOUND |
| THAI | Thailand |
| TNG | Training |
| Tnk | Tank |
| TNSP | Transportation |
| TO | Technical Order; Table of Organization |
| TO&E | Table of Organization and Equipment |
| TOT | Telephone Organization of Thailand |
| TPP | Thermal Power Plant |
| Trans | Transport |
| TRANS-PAC | A Commercial Trans-Pacific Cable |
| TRPCAR | Troop Carrier |
| TRPCAR(M) | Troop Carrier (Medium) |
| TRS | Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron |
| TRW | Tactical Reconnaissance Wing |
| TS | Top Secret |
| TV | Television |

U

| | |
|----------|---|
| U | Unclassified |
| UDU | Underwater Demolition Unit |
| UE | Unit Equipment Allowance |
| UK | United Kingdom |
| UN | United Nations |
| UNC | United Nations Command |
| UNCMAC | United Nations Command, Military Armistice Commission |
| US | United States |
| USADCJ | U. S. Army Depot Command, Japan |
| USAEIGHT | Eighth United States Army |
| USAF | United States Air Force |
| USAMC | United States Army Material Command |
| USAMICOM | U. S. Army Missile Command |
| USARJ | United States Army, Japan |
| USARV | United States Army, Vietnam |
| USARYIS | United States Army, Ryukyus Islands |
| USASA | United States Army Security Agency |

UNCLASSIFIED

| | |
|----------------|---|
| USASF | United States Army Special Forces |
| USCINCSO | Commander in Chief, United States Southern Command |
| USDAO | United States Defense Attache Officer |
| USF | United States Forces |
| USG | United States Government |
| USIA | United States Information Agency |
| USIS | United States Information Service |
| USFJ | United States Forces, Japan |
| USNS | U. S. Naval Ship |
| USMC | United States Marine Corps |
| USMCP | United States Military Construction Program |
| USMILADREPSMPO | United States Military Adviser's Representative, Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, Military Planning Office |
| USN | United States Navy |
| USS | United States Ship |
| USSOUTHCOM | United States Southern Command |
| USSR | Union of Soviet Socialist Republics |
| USTDC | United States Forces, Taiwan Defense Command |
| UTM | Universal Transverse Mercator |

V

| | |
|---------|--|
| VADM | Vice Admiral |
| VAP | Heavy Photographic Squadron |
| VAW | Carrier Airborne Early Warning Squadron (USN) |
| VC | Viet Cong |
| VC | U. S. Navy Composite Squadron |
| VDC | Volunteer Defense Corps |
| VFP | Light Photographic Squadron |
| VFR | Visual Flight Rule |
| VMA(AW) | Marine Corps Attack Squadron (All Weather) |
| VMCJ | Marine Corps Composite Reconnaissance Squadron |
| VMFA | Marine Fighter/Attack Squadron |
| VMF(AW) | Marine Corps Fighter Squadron (All Weather) |
| VMGR | Marine Transport Refueling Squadron |
| VMO | Marine Corps Observation Squadron |
| VN | Vietnam |
| VNN | Republic of Vietnam Navy |
| VNRS | Vietnamese National Railway System |
| VOCOM | Voice Communications |

UNCLASSIFIED

VP
VP(L)
VP(S)
VPRON
VQ
VRC
VUNC
VW

U. S. Navy Patrol Squadron
U. S. Navy Patrol Squadron (Land)
U. S. Navy Patrol Squadron (Sea based)
U. S. Navy Patrol Squadron
Fleet Air Reconnaissance Squadron
Fleet Tactical Support Squadron
Voice of the United Nations Command
U. S. Navy Airborne Early Warning Squadron

W

WALLEYE
WAPG

WAR
WAVP

WBLC
WEA RCN
WESTPACNORTH
WETWASH A
Wg
WIA
WO
WRA
WRS
WTO
WX

Television Guided Air to Surface Bomb
High Endurance Coast Guard Cutter Now Known
as WHEC
Warfare
High Endurance Coast Guard Cutter Now Known
as WHEC
Waterborne Logistic Craft
Weather Reconnaissance
Western Pacific North
A Military Cable from the Philippines to Vietnam
Wing
Wounded in Action
Warrant Officer
War Reserve Allowance
Weather Reconnaissance Squadron
WESTPAC Transportation Office
Weather

X

Xerox Copy

Black on White, Dry Processed Copy of an
Original Document Reproduced on a Xerox
Copy Machine

Y

YAG
YF
YFD
YP
YTB
YTL
YW

Miscellaneous Auxiliary (Service Craft)
Covered Lighter (self-propelled)
Yard Floating Dry Dock
Patrol Craft (Service Craft)
Large Harbor Tug
Small Harbor Tug
Water Barge (self-propelled)

UNCLASSIFIED

INDEX

(U) The intent of the indexer in preparing this index was to integrate Volumes I and II of CINCPAC Command History 1967, published by the Historical Branch, Joint Secretary, Hq CINCPAC. Unlike last year, there is no need for including the indexing of Annexes "A" and "B," published by COMUSMACV and COMUSMACTHAI respectively, since these annual histories of the two subordinate joint commands contain their own indexes this year.

(U) With a minimum of cross referencing, first priorities for entries are:

Military function -- personnel, intelligence, operations, logistics, plans, communications-electronics, medical, etc.
Command -- PACOM, MACV, MACTHAI, etc.
Country -- Japan, Indonesia, South Vietnam, etc.

Second priorities for entries are:

Major program -- Military Assistance, etc.
Politico-military -- agreements, negotiations, etc.
Regional defense organization -- SEATO
Ship -- by name under "ships"
Program, plan, or project with name -- CORMORANT.
Military service -- Army, Navy, Marines, Air Force
System -- HAWK, etc.

(U) Pagination of Volumes I and II is 1-483 and 485-960 respectively.

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
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