The Great Killings in Indonesia through the Australian mass media

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The killings in the months after October 1965 were the foundation of Suharto's ensuing three decades of power, and in a sense, the foundation of “post-Vietnam” Southeast Asia. They were certainly the pre-condition for subsequent Australian (and US, and Japanese) support for the New Order. The killings can be regarded as the constitutive terror of the New Order state.¹

Throughout the three decades of Suharto’s New Order, these events were literally unspeakable: as if, in Germany, the Nazi crimes could not have been publicly discussed even in 1980. With the passing of Suharto there was some small shift, but essentially the mass trauma remains repressed. Until that trauma is directly and openly addressed, the much in the subjective life of Indonesian politics will remain literally explosive.

However, my topic is not the killings themselves, but rather the smaller and less central issue of one aspect of the foreign response and understandings of the killings: contemporary Australian representations of the killings. My starting point is the fact that in Australia - the country next door to Indonesia - there is very little awareness of these killings. This was demonstrated soon after the events. The political sociologist Rod Tiffen carried out a well designed public opinion survey in the early 1970s in Melbourne. Almost 60% of the sample did knew who Suharto was, and most approved of him and Indonesia under his rule. In their account of Suharto's rise to power, most of these knowledgables referred to the coup - as Tiffen remarks, “the best remembered aspect of contemporary Indonesia”. Yet, as Tiffen noted, “not one person referred to the post-coup massacres.”²

Little has changed since then.


Australian newspaper coverage of the Indonesian killings

What information about the killings in Indonesia was provided by the mainstream media of the time? In 1960s Australia, radio was significant, but newspapers were the most important source of information on foreign politics, and newspapers at that time were mainly regional in character.

Taking the case of Melbourne, the second largest and at the time wealthiest Australian city, I examined all issues of the daily morning newspapers, the tabloid Sun News-Pictorial and the “quality broadsheet” The Age, which together dominated the Melbourne market. Both newspapers were searched for the period October 1, 1965 -August 30th, 1966, looking for articles about Indonesian politics, and then, amongst that set, articles that in any way mentioned the killings of suspected communists.

In the eight months from November 1965, The Sun published 175 stories on Indonesian affairs: an average of 21 per month, or almost one for every day the paper published. Moreover, one-quarter of these stories were either on the front page of the paper, or on pages two or three. The great bulk of the stories appeared in the first six pages, which, in The Sun's tabloid form, made for a great impact. The Age had an even greater Indonesian coverage: in the same period there were 282 articles dealing with Indonesian politics alone: an average of 35 articles a month.

The Sun News-Pictorial: many stories, minimal coverage of the killings

In the first month after the coup, The Sun concentrated on the Army assault on the PKI: articles in October 1965 regularly reported a “purge”, or a “war on Reds” or an “anti-Red call”. In late October and early November Central Java was reported to be in a “state of civil war” according to Army sources, and on October 30 “the Communist reign of terror” in central Java was reported to have spread to Indonesian Borneo. iii

Over the period of the killings from October 1965 to June 1966, The Sun News-Pictorial published 175 articles on Indonesian politics. Yet despite these almost daily major reports on Indonesia, The Sun published only five articles that even mentioned the killings in the year following the coup. Not until August of 1966 would The Sun publish a report containing more than three sentences mentioning the killings.
In an article titled “Now it's children's hour in Jakarta”, The Sun’s veteran political commentator Douglas Wilkie took up the activities of the anti-Sukarnoist students who had just stormed Foreign Minister Subandrio's office. Towards the end of the column Wilkie then confided

“Many of the students are tools of the Moslem extremists who butchered some 300,000 of their Communist countrymen with kris and club after the September 30 revolt.”

Wilkie hurried on to explain, “this was in contrast to the Army's relatively humane mopping-up operations”.iv

The tone and placement of Wilkie's remark are telling, conveying a sense that this is old news, a matter that readers already know about, not something worthy of comment, other than to make the link to the present concern with rioting students. In March 1966, the columnist is referring to the mass killings in a way that suggests they are common knowledge already. He does not need to explain them to his readers. But the information certainly did not come from his own newspaper.

Moreover, the reference to killings by “kris and club” and “Moslem extremists” is characteristic of contemporary Australian (and US) references to the killings and to Indonesian politics as a whole. “Indonesia” is very much “the Other”, characterized by immaturity (“It's children's hour in Jakarta”), unknowable and irrational causation (“Moslem extremists”), with connotations of racially informed separateness (Indonesians kill with “kris and club”, unlike rational westerners).

Palmos: “So Indonesia counts its dead”, 5 August 1966

Finally, in early August 1966, with Sukarno tamed and when the flow of daily news from Jakarta was beginning to run to a trickle, The Sun did turn to the massacres. It published a powerful and detailed report from Frank Palmos titled “So Indonesia counts its dead”, which put the number who died at “more than one million”.v “At least 800,000” were killed in Central and East Java alone, where the killing was in continuing. Palmos summarized the main points of the report as:

“At least 800,000 were killed in the area investigated.
In the PKI “triangle stronghold” of Bojolali, Klaten and Solo, nearly ONE-THIRD of the population is dead or missing.
Farther east, in the 12-mile radius of Kediri, killing was ‘abnormally high’.
‘Startling tolls’ took place in the residency of Banjumas, geographical centre of Java.”

Palmos continued:

“Researchers added these points, believed to be contained in the various detailed but uncollated reports:

‘Most of the killing was by militant youth groups, often appointed by military or village authorities. Youths were armed and encouraged by these “authorities”, and in the “triangle” area, were given drill and weapons training. Once the killing started, the youths were uncontrollable. Scores of champion killers were found. One boy interviewed killed 135, then “lost count”. Beheading was the most common form of killing, but for large scale executions shooting was normal. Killing was invariably late at night, far away from villages where the victims lived. Although thousands of women were killed, “almost none” were raped or abused before being put to death.”

Palmos’ article was accompanied by “a report on the killings from a young army officer, who was stationed in the Banjumas residency, Central Java”, which spoke in horrifying detail of the nightly beheadings of truckloads of communists by gangs of Moslem young men in a state of “semi-amok”.

Despite the power and gravity of Palmos’ August 1966 report, there were no follow-ups, no commentaries, and no editorials. Daily news reports in the following months made no reference to the killings. Had you not read the paper the day of Palmos’ single detailed report in August, or the day of Wilkie’s remark in passing in March, it is very likely that even a diligent reader of The Sun would have known nothing of the Indonesian genocide taking place as he or she read.

In sum then, the largest newspaper in Melbourne barely mentioned the killings in the ten months while the killings were in full sway, and then allowed a single detailed report to be published. The limited information that did appear represented Indonesians as irrational and unknowable racial others. There were no follow-up articles after Palmos’ August report. Thereafter, The Sun News-Pictorial was silent on the holocaust next door.
The Age: seeing and not seeing

Until the end of December 1965, the pattern of reporting in The Age was similar to that of The Sun. From that point, however, a difference emerged. President Sukarno's speech reporting 87,000 killed since October 1 was the leading story in the paper in an AAP report of the monitoring of Sukarno's Bogor broadcast from Singapore. “Monitors said he lowered his voice and spoke almost in a whisper as he gave the figures - the first announcement of the death toll.” vii

In January 1966 The Age published the first of its three major articles on the killings: a detailed eye-witness account of the killings by one of its own reporters, Robert Macklin, headed “The killings go on ….” viii In 500 words Macklin provided a graphic and convincing account of mass murder that could have left no reader in doubt of the seriousness of what was happening in Indonesia.

Macklin with an account of a public killing he and his wife witnessed in Denpasar:

“The man's screaming and the gathering of a large crowd of school children from a nearby playing field attracted us to the army headquarters post. A Communist was being interrogated in Denpasar, the capital of Bali, Indonesia, on the ground floor verandah. We stood silently with the children as the man was bashed and dragged away. The children returned to their soccer and volley-ball and the passers-by resumed their normal routine. The man was one of many thousands of Communists who have been killed in Indonesia since the attempted coup on October 1, last year.”

Macklin gave a vivid picture of the reality behind much-used journalists' phrases like “the crunching of the PKI”:

“We do not know how many Communists were killed but it is plain that Communism as a political force in Indonesia is at least temporarily finished. The way of its going was a brutal one. We saw four villages where every adult male had been killed. We saw trucks of villagers returning to the hills after making trips to the compound where they were given a ration of Communists to kill. We saw mass graves in each of which up to 10 Communist men and women had been packed after being stabbed to death. We saw literally hundreds of houses which had been burned to the ground.”
Anyone who read Macklin's searing 500-word account of his personal witness would have had no doubt as to what was occurring in Indonesia, and would have been unable to avoid the moral implications of the gathering holocaust. Yet it is doubtful that many people read Macklin's piece, since it was buried in the later parts of the finance section, next to the prices from the cattle sale yards.

In journalistic terms Macklin - and The Age – had a world scoop. Yet the article was published deep in the newspaper. There was no follow-up by either by Macklin, or the paper’s Southeast Asian correspondent. Macklin himself wondered at the time whether the story had been effectively spiked by senior managers of The Age who he even then knew to have close relationships with the Australian security and intelligence world. While Macklin himself on balance declines to blame the fate of his scoop on the influence of Australian intelligence organizations, it seems at the very least a reasonable hypothesis.

This spiking of the most important contemporary eye-witness account of the Indonesian holocaust by an Australian would seem to have been one of those occasions when a respectable newspaper demonstrates its understanding of the fact that a commitment to national security overrides mere reportorial responsibility - even (or especially) in the case of holocaust.

The Age published two further feature articles on the killings in 1966, both edited reprints from the New York Times. The first, from the Times’ chief foreign correspondent, C.L. Sulzberger, was headed “Mass murders go on in Indonesia”, and appeared on April 14th.

Sulzberger first the tone from the night of September 30, “when specially trained squads of women slashed some of the officers while they were still alive. … Almost immediately Moslem youth organisations, many of whose members had been persecuted by the PKI, started to hunt down communist suspects, exterminating them, their wives and their children.”

Sulzberger described the still ongoing Indonesian murders as “one of history’s most vicious massacres”, rivalling those of Stalin and Hitler. Decapitation, Sulzberger suggested, was
“favoured because Indonesian animist tradition claims that if an enemy’s head and body are buried apart his spirit cannot return... Recently a traveller was told of a bullock cart loaded with human heads.”

This resort to cultural explanation of the manner of mass murder ignored the direct role of the army and its guns and bayonets in much of the country, but it was compatible with Sulzberger’s underlying civilizational assumptions. As he put it, “the killing attained a volume impressive even in violent Asia where life is cheap”. This fitted with the explanation that Sulzberger offered for the causes of “this grisly cataclysm” characterized by “such intense bestiality”.

Mentioning briefly the desire for revenge after the killings and reported mutilation of the generals, relief at the avoidance of an apparently inevitable communist political victory, and “the spirit of Moslem jihad”, Sulzberger stayed with the imagery of the exotic east:

“Indonesians are gentle and instinctively polite, but hidden behind their smiles, is that strange Malay streak, that inner, frenzied bloodlust which has given to other languages one of the few Malay words, “amok”. This time an entire nation ran amok.”

Of course, while this was tempting in so far as it matched the savagery of the reports Sulzberger provided, and tried to match the scale of his horror, the “nation gone amok” thesis owed more to western racial fantasies about a hypostatized “east” than to historical reality. Perhaps the dead ran amok en masse on their way to the pits, but there is no suggestion to that effect in other reports. Perhaps Suharto and Nasution and Sarwo Edhie were slavering at the mouth as they gave the orders to “sweep”, but it is implausible. Perhaps the thousands of army privates and n.c.o.'s who mainly carried out the actual shooting and bayoneting of the lines of men and women were filled by an “inner, frenzied bloodlust”, but it is unlikely.

The second edited New York Times reprint in The Age, titled “Indonesia haunted by mass killing” by Seymour Topping, appeared on August 24th. The opening sentence of Topping’s piece spoke of the “staggering mass slaughter” and a vengeance to come:

“From the terraced ricefields of central Java to the exquisite island of Bali, from the rubber plantations of Sumatra to the fishing villages of remote Timor, the Indonesian people are troubled by the heritage of violence bequeathed their society by the staggering mass slaughter of communists.”
By the third paragraph Topping was providing Australian readers with estimates of the dead that no Australian newspaper had provided to that point:

“The best-informed sources estimate from 150,000 to 400,000, but they concede that the total could be far more than half a million. The killings still go on in some places.”

In contrast to the evasions of The Age’s Southeast Asia correspondent, Topping made clear who was killing who:

“This reporter found on a tour of the former principal centres of communist political influence that executions were usually carried out by the military in central Java, while the population in east Java and Bali were incited by the army to do most of the killing. The military executed communists by shooting, but the population was left to do its killing in other ways often with ritual forms of extreme cruelty.”

Asked later about the intensity of the impact of the story of the killings, Topping replied that “I wasn’t thinking consciously in those terms, of the morality or the politics. I was just intent upon covering the story in great detail, and explaining what was happening and why.” The Indonesian politicians he interviewed were affected too: “they had a political point of view as well - to eradicate communist influence and so on - but they were deeply shocked too.”

When it was suggested to him that some Australian journalists had claimed it was difficult to travel outside Jakarta, Topping retorted that this was simply untrue. It wasn’t easy to get information, but it could be done. Granted, he said, the Times was unusual among US newspapers in its resources and coverage of foreign affairs, but it was possible to travel about: it was clear it had to be told from outside Jakarta.

**Australian radio coverage**

For Australians in the mid-1960s, radio was an important source of information. News reporting on radio was more substantial than later decades, particularly on the Australian Broadcasting Commission stations. Following the work of Karim Najjarine, there is clear evidence that at least some part of what was broadcast by the ABC to Indonesia on Radio
Australia in the period after the coup was disturbing to the Australian Department of External Affairs. Moreover, the Department worked systematically to ensure that Radio Australia (RA) coverage of events in Indonesia conformed to its guidelines. Remarkably, at the height of the killings, the Indonesian Army requested the assistance of the Department to ensure Radio Australia reported on Indonesian politics in the Army’s preferred manner.\textsuperscript{xiii}

Najjarine and Cottle document a series of cables and memos by the Australian ambassador in Indonesia, Keith (“Mick”) Shann; the Acting Secretary of the Department of External Affairs, Gordon Jockel; the First Assistant Secretary, D.O. Hay; Richard Woolcott, then Public Affairs Officer for the department; and the Minister for External Affairs, Paul Hasluck.

Immediately after the coup, Shann recommended that the department encourage Radio Australia to emphasize the following points (Najjarine and Cottle’s paraphrasing):

1. That reports of PKI involvement and Communist Chinese complicity in the coup be given prominent coverage whilst being careful not to directly accuse them.
2. That reports of divisions within the army specifically and armed services more generally be played down or simply not reported.
3. In the period immediately following the coup, Sukarno’s loss of authority should not be reported, but the possibility of his retaining power should be downplayed.
4. The complete neutrality and non-involvement of Australia in the events unfolding in Indonesia.”\textsuperscript{xiv}

On October 10, Shann cabled the Department to advise that Radio Australia “should do nothing to engender sympathy” for President Sukarno.\textsuperscript{ xv} When there were indications that the Radio Australia coverage from Jakarta was not following the Department’s line sufficiently closely, the Secretary of the Department indicated that it possessed sufficient influence within the ABC hierarchy to rectify the matter.\textsuperscript{xvi}

There are also indications that the Department exercised considerable influence on newspaper editors at the time. In a memorandum to Jockel in October or November 1965, Richard Woolcott reported that
“we are now in a position to influence the content of leaders in practically all major metropolitan newspapers.”

Three days after Jockel’s request to Shann, Hay wrote to the Minister for Information, suggesting that Radio Australia

“should, by careful selection of its news items, not do anything that would be helpful to the PKI, and should highlight reports tending to discredit the PKI and show its involvement in the losing cause of the 30th September movement.”

The most remarkable (and also indicative of Radio Australia’s perceived influence in Indonesia) of Shann’s recommendations in the effort to control Radio Australia was the way in which in March 1966 he recommended adopting a set of requests concerning Radio Australia passed on to him from the Indonesian Army. In general, the Army asked that “we should not concentrate on them too much”, and that RA should not describe the Army as “Western” or “rightist”. Shann concluded his cablegram to External Affairs by remarking “I can live with most of this, even if we have to be a bit dishonest for a while”.

Prime Minister Harold Holt: Remarks offstage

In thinking about the absence of public commentary on what were by then the known facts of the mass killings, let us consider one statement by the Liberal Party Prime Minister of the time, Harold Holt, who with his colleagues, made little secret of his delight at the destruction of the PKI. Speaking to the Australian-American Association at the River Club in New York in July 1966, Holt expressed his satisfaction with the pro-Western shift of Indonesian foreign policy and economic policy in the second quarter of 1966.

This was hardly surprising for a conservative politician, but the language that Holt chose to employ was startling:

“With 500,000 to 1 million Communist sympathizers knocked off, I think it is safe to assume a reorientation has taken place”. 

The remarks were reported in the New York Times, but not, so far as I can discover, in any Australian newspaper, though there were very likely Australian correspondents
present. As a representation of holocaust, the casual brutality of the first part of the sentence (a million humans “knocked off”) is stunning. Surely this is Robert Lifton’s “psychological numbing” at work: an adjustment to the normality of holocaust. Yet the brutality is matched, and enhanced by the smug and complacent joke in the second part of the sentence: “I think it’s safe to assume a reorientation has taken place”. It is not hard to picture the smug knowing smiles of the audience. Whether by their own decision or on instruction or by decision of their editors, any Australian reporters touring with the Prime Minister protected their readers from reality.

Influences on media behaviour: the systematic, the crude and the subtle

Amongst a number of other important studies of news production, Edward Herman and Noam Chomsky produced a powerful predictive model of western mass media. The key features of the “Propaganda Model” derive from the setting of the mainstream media in a free market system. Five factors “work as ‘filters’ through which information must pass, and that individually and often in additive fashion they greatly influence media choices”: private ownership, dependence on advertising, reliance on access to government and business for sources, the public relations industry, and the prevailing anticommunist ideology. The Indonesian holocaust is a prime example of what they discuss as “constructive” terror, which will be received in these media with a degree of satisfaction. Where details are provided, they serve to explain the reason why the slaughter is acceptable. Where commentary and reporting does emerge, it will be characterized to a large degree by the “blaming the victim” syndrome directed as singularly “unworthy” victims.

Models like Herman and Chomsky’s emphasize the effects of the more or less unconscious default settings of individuals working within large corporate and professional systems. They make no claim that their model includes all important processes, or completely explains the end results. Yet in the Australian case their acid summary of the media as “the vigilant guardians protecting privilege from the threat of public understanding” is hard to fault.

Yet sometimes the preferences of the powerful are ensured in quite crude and simple ways. The spiking of Macklin's article provides one example of a mechanism of suppression even more crude than those more sophisticated methods Chomsky and Herman consider - direct collaboration between media managers and intelligence
services to determine the content of the product. Similarly, great bureaucratic pressure was applied on Radio Australia journalists and senior editors. The most astonishing and direct intervention in the Australian media did not originate from Australian sources, but came from the Indonesian army less than a month after the coup. The much admired Australian ambassador in Jakarta passed on to Canberra the Army requests for censorship of Radio Australia with a *faux* world weary “I can live with this...”

Yet these crude interventions apart, there were also further layers of influence in the structure of media discourse, more subtle processes framing the content and language of stories. In both Australian media and bureaucratic accounts of Indonesia and Indonesians in relation to the killings, the dichotomy of irrational Indonesians and rational Australians emerges in a number of places. *The Age* editorial on April 14, buttressed by Sulzberger’s authoritative account of a nation gone amok, branded Indonesians as “experts at double-talk”, for whom “it is too much to hope that the new Indonesian regime will be logical; our best hope is that it will be practical.”. xxiii

The editorial, revealed the basic structure of Australian assumptions, at once paternalist and racist, as with the pronouncements about the two-faced and childish character of Indonesians in the Australian ambassador’s concerns of the likelihood of

> “the general laziness, deviousness, and capacity for self-delusion of any Indonesian regime.”xxiv

*Tropes of genocide: murder in the passive voice*

The Southeast Asian correspondent of *The Age*, a senior journalist and academic political scientist named Creighton Burnsxxv, published a great many articles on Indonesian politics in this period, but only one sentence in thousands actually mentioned the killings, on March 19:

> “Djakarta virtually escaped the violence which swept Indonesia in the wake of the October coup, and which resulted in the death of thousands, perhaps hundreds of thousands, mostly Communist supporters and sympathizers.”xxvi

Burns here provides an early example of a formulation that was to become widely employed in the years to come in western writing on the killings. The key is in the grammar: there is no agent of violent death here. Abstract, disembodied violence
“sweeps Indonesia”, resulting in Communist death. In other versions, the phrasing is even more telling: “X number of Communists died in the wave of violence...”. 

The agent-less, passive voice is appropriate for what was needed here. Because of the reports by Macklin, Sulzberger, Topping, and other sources, it was impossible to deny the existence of the holocaust directly. Equally, it was politically highly undesirable that the agency of the army and its instigation of Islamic groups be emphasized.

The discussion of mass murder in the passive voice provides, very neatly, a form of words that allows both knowledge and denial of holocaust at the same time. \textsuperscript{xxvii} Denial - in the psychoanalytic sense - is necessarily a central category in the analysis of responses to the Indonesian killings. And denial always involves a process of actively repressing knowledge. \textsuperscript{xxviii}

\texttt{http://www.nautilus.org/about/staff/richard-tanter/richard-papers/indonesian-intelligence/thesis/thesis-toc}
\textsuperscript{iii} “Java strife shifts to Borneo”, \textit{Sun News-Pictorial}, October 30, 1965, p.2.
\textsuperscript{v} Frank Palms, “So Indonesia counts its dead”, \textit{Sun New-Pictorial}, August 5, 1966, p.2.
\textsuperscript{vi} Shortly afterwards, Palms, like many other foreign correspondents in Jakarta, was transferred to Saigon. Personal communication from Frank Palms.
\textsuperscript{vii} “87,000 killed in Indonesia since coup bid”, \textit{The Age}, January 17, 1966, p.1.
\textsuperscript{viii} Robert Macklin, “The killings go on ..... Troubled times in Indonesia”, \textit{The Age}, January 20\textsuperscript{th}, 1966, p.10.
\textsuperscript{ix} Robert Macklin, interview with the author, Canberra, December 9\textsuperscript{th}, 1996.
\textsuperscript{xii} Seymour Topping, interview with the author, New York, June 23, 1999.
\textsuperscript{xiv} Najjarine and Cottle, \textit{op. cit.}, p.51.
\textsuperscript{xv} “Radio caught in the crossfire”, \textit{Sydney Morning Herald}, July 12, 1999.
\textsuperscript{xvi} Cited by Najjarine and Cottle, \textit{op. cit.} p. 54.}


Cited by Najjarine and Cottle, *op. cit.*, p.54.

Herb Feith remarked that “Creighton never really got a feel for Indonesia”. Herb Feith, interview with the author, Melbourne, March 1996.


One telling example appeared in *The Age* on August 4 of the same year: “Communist terror strikes Bali”, p.1. While the head and lead stressed Communist guerilla resistance, the subtext was that they thereby brought “fresh terror [my emphasis] to the beautiful but bloodstained island of Bali” after “a nightmare of killing and torture” after the coup. “...[a]t least 5,000 Communists were slaughtered... Even women and children were hacked to death in the bloodbath...”.