Organized Crime, Terrorism and Non-State Actors

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Organized Crime and Terrorism: New vs. Old

• Once organized criminals, rooted in states, did not interact with terrorists

• New organized crime is often not state-based but is instead global, will do anything to make money and will interact with anyone to make money

• New Terrorism is also global and is increasingly dependent on their members and interaction with criminal groups to generate money and facilitate their activities
New Actors and New Objectives

• Impoverished scientists are no longer the key threat
• Criminals and corrupt officials know there is a market for even small amounts of materials
• Different groups of terrorists seek nuclear materials
• States may also seek to buy materials illicitly
• Even small amounts of materials have a demonstration effect
Non-state actors

- Non-state actors who may be involved in proliferation may be members of disbanded state security organizations.
- They may belong to sects, nationalist groups rather than to terrorist or organized crime groups.
- Sectarian and nationalist groups seem to be associated with more with the movement of biological than nuclear materials, i.e. Japan and United States.
Non-state vs. State Actors

- Must differentiate between individuals who are totally outside the state or were once part of the state apparatus (such as smugglers in Georgia) and officials in the state who are acting outside the interests of the state (Armenia and Pakistan)
How do these smuggling networks work?

- Personal linkages
- Through network organizations in which people do not know all those involved in the whole chain
- Individuals can be specialists in this activity (i.e. most recent Georgian case, repeat actors)
- Participants are more often opportunists (this is more the case in small and even spurious shipments)
Nuclear Smuggling Networks are they Different from other Crime Networks

• Some are not, know less about others
• Examination of over a decade of Turkish data on detection of nuclear smuggling from former USSR reveals a wide range of quantities (significant quantities in early 1990s)
• Found by police undercover techniques—reveals that co-exist with other forms of smuggling
• Arrests of perpetrators reveals that in most cases materials had already been handed over from someone in the source country
Who composes illicit networks?

• Illicit networks can consist of criminals and terrorists but can also include corporations that deliberately participate and sell commodities or services

• Facilitators can include officials of all levels

• Terrorists can be those of political, religious or sectarian kind

• Different elements can be incorporated into the same network
Where to linkages occur that can facilitate illicit trade?

• Proximity to source regions
• In conflict and conflicted border areas such as Georgia and Russia
• Areas where diverse and powerful crime groups interact, i.e. Turkey
• In prisons, where corrupt officials allow criminals and terrorists to operate
• Porous border areas, concerns in S.E. Asia as well as in Caucasus
Security Challenges

• U.S. protection policies based primarily on technical solutions –”Are brilliantly engineered but fatally flawed” as they do not address the crime and terrorism challenge
• Compartmentalization of the crime and terrorism problem, treat as separate phenomena, more resources devoted to terrorism, criminals often evade detection
• Locking up the materials is not a sufficient objective
• Threat comes from non-state actors but still developing security based on state systems
• Corruption can undermine best of technical security