Chapter 4
Intelligence
and the
rationalization of domination

Of all of the organs of the state, the one most immediately and forcibly confronted with reality, the police force, has uniquely privileged access to knowledge which enables it to understand a multiplicity and diversity of socially deviant and anti-social forms of behaviour, structural defects in the society and the laws governing social mass behaviour.

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This chapter is concerned with intelligence agencies as a contemporary mode of state control, particularly domestic political intelligence agencies. By the late twentieth century virtually every nation-state had developed some type of surveillance bureaucracy for political purposes, in addition to those involved in externally-oriented activities, military or otherwise. The activities of such agencies are almost always adversarial, if not hostile; and may be either covert or open in form and aim, passive or disruptive and aggressive towards their targets. Domestic political intelligence agencies carry out a range of activities, which they may share with state and non-state-agencies. These activities include surveillance, political intervention (including terror), ideological propagation and maintenance, and political steering.

Virtually all nation-states have agencies of this type. Indeed the similarity in agency type and form around the world is striking. This chapter explores the activities of intelligence agencies within the state, the reasons for their striking isomorphism around the world, and offers some explanation for the differences that can be observed.

This structural isomorphism can be explained in terms of (a) common responses to common problems; (b) common internal pressures for agency proliferation; (c) international influence and cooperation; (d) opportunities afforded by advances in disciplines and technologies of power, or more precisely those of surveillance and repression.

Conversely, the variations amongst intelligence agencies can be explained by the following factors: (a) state structure and traditions; (b) strategic situation and alliance pattern; (c) source and level of perceived state security threat; (d) agency conception of mission; (e) organizational and socio-technical character; and (f) any extraneous responsibilities the agency may have, such as protection of political leaders of political parties positions of influence.

On the surface liberal democracies would appear to have an aversion to domestic surveillance activities. In fact however, all the major liberal states have such agencies,

and have had them for much of this century, usually established in conditions of emergency but maintained on a more or less permanent basis subsequently. One model of such internal security in liberal democracies was presented. Developed by Keller on the basis of the history of the US Federal Bureau of Investigation [FBI] between the 1940s and the 1970s, this model highlights the capacity of such agencies to become autonomous and insulated from effective control either by social groups or other parts of the state executive, the legislature or the judiciary. Increasing levels of agency autonomy permit, and by temptation encourage, a shift from more passive intelligence activities to aggressive counter-intelligence in domestic democratic politics. This model is followed by a case-study of West German domestic political surveillance activities, which are amongst the most comprehensive in the world, penetrating into German society to a great depth.

The development of such a widespread and increasingly widespread and deep global system of state surveillance of domestic populations is a logical development of the generalized place of surveillance discussed in the preceding chapter. The totalitarian variant is but the extreme of a more general pattern of the rationalization of domination.[1] This pattern is built upon the capacity for increased and more effective surveillance, but is also dependent on the subsequent development of further forms of state intervention based on information derived from systematic surveillance of the citizenry. Intelligence agencies vary in their precise role here, and clearly are deeply involved in the surveillance and intervention aspects. However on occasion they may become - or seek to become - more deeply involved still in this wider pattern of rationalization of domination through a claim to insight into structural understanding of the society, the direction of social change, and the means of rectifying what are deemed undesirable changes.

Intelligence agencies

The domestic political role of intelligence agencies is often neglected by mainstream political science, including some of those who have provided otherwise excellent studies of externally-oriented intelligence organizations. Richelson's important study of the United States "intelligence community" cites a standard U.S. military definition of intelligence as:

> the product resulting from the collection, evaluation, analysis, integration and interpretation of all available information which concerns one or more foreign nations or areas of operation which is immediately or potentially significant for planning.[2]

Richelson immediately qualifies this with the inclusion of counter-intelligence and covert action:

> Counter-intelligence is the acquisition of information or activity designed to neutralize hostile intelligence services...Covert action can be defined as any activity or operation designed to influence foreign governments, persons or events in support

1. "Rationalization" is used here in the sense developed by Weber, referring to the systematising of an activity, the removal of extraneous or inhibiting elements, and the development of the logic within a pattern.

2. Jeffrey Richelson, *The U.S. Intelligence Community*, (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger; second edition, 1989), p.2, citing the *Dictionary of United States Military Terms for Joint Usage*, (Washington D.C.: Departments of the Army, Navy and Air Force, May 1955), p.53.

of the sponsoring government's foreign policy objectives while keeping the sponsoring government's *support* of the operation a secret.[3]

The problem is not that Richelson is unaware of the fact of domestic political surveillance: he provides a short but useful account of some such U.S. activities. Rather, his work reflects the general presumption that intelligence is principally a matter of external relations between states.[4] Accordingly he categorizes types of intelligence as political, military, scientific, sociological, economic and environmental - but with an almost wholly external perspective.[5] This may on balance be an accurate depiction of the intelligence complexes of the major powers, but it is rather less accurate for Third World countries. And in any case such approaches tend to understate the role of domestic political surveillance in the advanced industrial countries.

Donner's account of domestic "adversarial intelligence systems" in the United States provides a more balanced and neutral definition:

"Intelligence" is best understood as a sequential process which embraces the selection of the subject (an organization or an individual) for surveillance, the techniques, both overt and clandestine, used in monitoring the subject or target, the processing and retention of the information collected (files and dossiers), and its evaluation in the light of a strategic purpose (the intelligence mission). Intelligence also includes an aggressive or activist aspect, specifically designed to damage or harass the target. But whether formally classified as passive data collection or aggressive intelligence, the intelligence function is dominated by a punitive or proscriptive purpose.[6]

At the activist end of the spectrum, domestic intelligence activity blurs into other forms of political and military intervention by states against segments of their citizenry. The

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3. Ibid., p.2. Note the qualification of these definitions of counter-intelligence and covert action below.

4. This international relations paradigm of intelligence is reflected in the organization of bibliographies and data bases as well. Calls for sources on "intelligence" and "intelligence agencies" almost wholly deliver material on foreign-oriented activities. The only important exception deals with the revelations of domestic political surveillance and intervention by civilian and military intelligence agencies in the United States during the late Vietnam period. On the other hand, such a narrowing of focus is not limited to mainstream analysts. One of the few systematic peace research approaches to intelligence is an early paper by Owen Wilkes and Nils Petter Gleditsch, "Research on intelligence or intelligence as research", (Oslo: International Peace Research Institute, Oslo (PRIO), S–16/79). This too has a resolutely external orientation.

5. Richelson, op.cit., pp.7-9.

6. Frank J. Donner, *The Age of Surveillance: The Aims and Methods of America's Political Intelligence System*, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1980), p.3. A study of U.S. police political intelligence surveillance units defined political surveillance as

those activities by any organization, either authorized by or in cooperation with the state, which are intended to monitor, record, disseminate, or process information upon the legitimate, legal political expressions or beliefs or actions of persons not otherwise engaged in criminal activity.

Jim Thomas, "Class, state and political surveillance: liberal democracy and structural contradictions", [publication details missing], pp.47–58. While this is an important and neglected study of local police surveillance in the United States between 1950 and 1974, this definition does not help all that much, since in many cases what many would define as legitimate political activity is defined as criminal by the state. Plate and Darvi's discussion of secret police centres on

units of the internal security police of the state with the mandate to suppress all serious threatening political opposition to the government in power and with the mission to control all political activity within (and sometimes beyond) the borders of the nation–state.

Thomas Plate and Andrea Darvi, *Secret Police: The Inside Story of a Network of Terror*, (London: Abacus, 1982) p.8. This shifts attention too far in the other direction, emphasising the goal of control without attending to the distinctive feature of the contemporary intelligence and security apparatus: information as the root of control.

distinction between police and domestic military activity is similarly ambiguous. Police normally resort to lethal force less rapidly than do the military, and are normally trained to use a variety of non-lethal forms of intervention. Yet the differences in many states have been eroded by para-military police units and practices, and by specialist military forces (as in Northern Ireland after some years) trained to raise the threshold of lethal response.[7] In a similar fashion, there is no clear division between intelligence operations and those of the remainder of forces of state repression or violence. All that can be said is that in general they are more closely related than are others to the requirements of surveillance and the sources of information and to the requirement of covert operation.

Political surveillance of the domestic population is mainly carried out by state agencies, military or civilian.[8] In recent years the benign-sounding term "intelligence community" has been used to refer to a common cluster of state agencies involved in all three elements of intelligence operations: information-gathering and evaluation, counter-intelligence and covert operations.[9] The more neutral collective name, intelligence agencies, also has problems. The general use of the term "intelligence" displays the military origins of the term in tactical and strategic intelligence, and when applied to

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7. Two common distinctions between police and military are probably not accurate. The first is that the military, as Enoch Powell said of the British Army in Northern Ireland, are there for only one purpose: to kill; whereas the police are there for other purposes. As the British Army itself discovered in Northern Ireland as elsewhere, that was not the case. Secondly, it is sometimes argued that the distinction has more to do with the legitimacy of their domestic role. One conservative British commentator was close to the mark when he said that the police must operate with a substantial measure of public acceptance for a more or less legitimate state. Sending in the Army, he said, was an announcement that legitimacy was irrelevant in a situation where the very basis of the rule of the state was in question. Such a view would be held by most state managers. Amy W. Knight, *The KGB: Police and Politics in the Soviet Union*, (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1988) treats the modern KGB as a policing agency in the broader sense, in much the same way Dr. Herold thought of the West German security agency he headed.

8. However it is important to note the increasing importance of non-state intelligence work. There are five main variants. In countries such as the Philippines, Guatemala, and El Salvador, numerous "private" armies (usually allied to elements of ruling coalitions) and vigilantes conduct terror operations against other citizen groups, with varying degrees of prior surveillance. Secondly, para-state groups of nominally off-duty military personnel made up death-squads in Chile and Argentina, in addition to the large "official" activity. Thirdly, Japanese intelligence in the early part of this century was commonly conducted by nominally civilian associations such as the patriotic group the Kokuryukai [Black Dragon Society] or the Sakurakai [Society of the Cherry] formed in 1930 by the future head of the Kempeitai. According to Deacon, "membership of the Black Dragon eventually ranged from Cabinet Ministers and high-ranking army officers to professional secret agents, blackmailers, and hired killers." Richard Deacon, *A History of the Japanese Secret Service*, (London: Frederick Muller, 1982), p.44. Fourthly, there is the very considerable expansion of corporate information and security services in the capitalist democracies. See Donner, op.cit; and Nigel South, *Policing for Profit: The Private Security Sector*, (London: Sage, 1988). Fifthly, and most importantly, there has been a trend in the United States and to a lesser extent in Western Europe towards privatization of what were formerly exclusively state intelligence and intervention activities. There now seem to be regular cross-overs from the state sector to the private "security" industry, and back again, as well as regular "contracting out" of government intelligence and special operations work. See Jim Hougan, *Spooks: The Haunting of America - The Private Use of Secret Agents*, (New York: William Morrow, 1979); Jonathan Marshall, Peter Dale Scott, and Jane Hunter, *The Iran-Contra Connection: Secret Teams and Covert Action in the Reagan Era*, (Boston: South End Press, 1987), esp. pp.19-49, 194-198; Duncan Campbell, "Salesmen of the secret world", *New Statesman*, (22 February, 1980); and South, op.cit., pp.95-98.

9. The appropriation and distortion of language by and for state surveillance and terror has been remarked on by many from Orwell onwards. For contemporary usage in the U.S. sphere abroad see Noam Chomsky and Edward S. Herman, *The Political Economy of Human Rights, Volume I: The Washington Connection and Third World Fascism*, (Boston: South End Press, 1979); Edward S. Herman, *The Real Terror Network: Terrorism in Fact and Propaganda*, (Boston: South End Press), and "U.S. sponsorship of international terrorism: an overview", *Crime and Social Justice*, 27–28 (1987). See Donner, op.cit., for domestic U.S. usage. "Intelligence community" is a perfect example, connoting an inward-referring group, with benign intentions, keeping an esoteric knowledge to themselves like good, but slightly odd, neighbours. It is a term used by writers close to the state agencies about which they write, and may reflects use within these agencies. The term "anti-languages" has been coined by linguists to refer to exclusivist language strategies defining group boundaries and providing cohesion. See Gordon L. Clark and Michael Dear, *State Apparatus: Structures and Languages of Legitimacy*, (Boston: Allen and Unwin, 1984), p.91. The important point here is the colonization of wider linguistic communities by elements of particular anti-languages as a means of structuring political discourse and distorting communication.

domestic political affairs, provides a measure of displaced legitimacy to activities formerly known by less flattering terms such as "political police" or "secret police". "Internal security" is a common alternative, and in practice it is, as the Indonesian example will show, difficult to draw a distinct line between the information-gathering and evaluation activities and the operational ones, especially covert.[10]

Agencies may be roughly divided according to auspice (civilian or military); lines of responsibility (directly responsible to head of state or other official); area of responsibility (foreign or domestic; military, political or economic); or predominant mode of operation (information-gathering, evaluation, operations). In practice, most major agencies cross a number of these boundaries, at least over time. Thus the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) is an ostensibly civilian agency reporting directly to the President. In practice it has conducted minor wars. Although limited by legislation to foreign operations only, throughout the 1960s and early 1970s, the CIA was involved in substantial domestic intelligence-gathering and covert operations. What is described as an "intelligence community" is usually a complex of sometimes cooperating, sometimes autonomous, always competing state bodies, with varying degrees of specialization of role.

The functions of domestic intelligence agencies: surveillance, intervention, ideology and steering

Domestic intelligence organizations in contemporary states have at least four potential roles, sometimes carried out alone, at other times shared with other state agencies, or not carried out at all:

> (a) surveillance and the provision of information considered useful to state policy formation and execution;

> (b) political intervention, either in the form of overt repression or covert action;

> (c) generation and maintenance of normative or ideological systems; and

> (d) steering of the state and society towards specified system goals.

Surveillance
Surveillance is the fundamental activity of intelligence agencies, domestic or external. It may be carried out in secrecy, or by deception as to its purposes, or in much the same way as any other kind of open research. It may be a matter of directed questioning of or about target groups or individuals, or it may be more general surveillance on a preventive basis of large parts of a population. It may be carried out as "human intelligence" - unmediated by technology; or through various forms of targeted or general electronic surveillance[11]. The information may be provided voluntarily,

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10. Knight, op.cit. provides a fine discussion of the domestic activities of the KGB in terms of "political police" or "security police", based on Brian Chapman, *Police State*, (London: Macmillan, 1970).

11. That is, the difference between the bugging of the telephones of particular people, as opposed to general filters of all telexes or fax messages in which certain specified key words appear.

consciously or otherwise, or under extreme duress. Surveillance for political purposes grows out of and builds on less obviously political forms of state and corporate monitoring of populations.

The utility of surveillance in domestic political intelligence is obviously dependent on the quality of analysis. The "life cycle" of domestic political intelligence from policy formulation, targeting, execution of surveillance, data collection, data analysis, through to policy evaluation is as liable to break downs in effectiveness as in the better known examples of foreign intelligence. It would be foolish to presume from the sophistication of much of the collection procedures that the analysis is equally so. Yet certain types of contemporary intelligence agencies are, at least in intention, closer in their analytical approach to "social science" models of society than to simplistic caricatures of heavy handed fascists looking for "reds under the bed", though there is often much of that as well. At the extreme of such models, it is "society" that is under surveillance, not just suspected portions of it.[12] Therefore it becomes important to look at just how the fruits of surveillance are interpreted and analyzed - both in terms of institutions and intellectual frameworks, as well as looking at the actual quality of the data evaluation.

By comparison to surveillance, political intervention is less fundamental to intelligence agencies, but extremely common. Partly it is a matter of the official specification of organizational responsibilities: some agencies are purely engaged in collecting data. Others have various kinds of executive powers. Others still arrogate such powers to themselves. The types of political interventions that may be carried out are extremely diverse, ranging from the outright murderous through the illicit and dirty to open and legal participation in public life.

Political intervention

Political intervention here refers to domestic activities usually included under the heading of either counter-intelligence or covert action when dealing with external intelligence activities. Counter-intelligence has come to have a somewhat elastic meaning beyond the basic "defensive counter-intelligence" notion of detecting and neutralizing agents of enemy (or simply foreign) intelligence organizations in times of war or peace. The "positive" notion of counter-intelligence current official US government thinking

> stresses the "counter" aspect and lets the term "intelligence" represent activities below the conventional military level...Such a view essentially mixes traditional counter-intelligence with positive intelligence designed to counter any form of hostile activity short of conventional military operations (e.g. terrorist attacks, illegal acquisition of advanced technology, sabotage) with a framework of analysis (counter-deception) for the analysis of positive intelligence.[13]

Covert action operations by the United States in recent years have included

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12. See Duncan Campbell, "Society under surveillance", in Peter Hain (ed.), *Policing the Police*, (London: John Calder, 1980). "Society" may be under surveillance in a double sense. On the one hand, so many individuals and groups are targeted for surveillance that it adds up to the whole of society. Or surveillance agencies conceive of their task as the surveillance and analysis of the social body as a structural whole, in order to detect signs of unwelcome structural change. This is discussed further below in relation to the "steering role" of intelligence.

13. Richelson, op.cit. p.317.

(1) political advice and counsel;
(2) subsidies to an individual;
(3) financial support and technical assistance to political parties;
(4) support to private organizations, including labor unions and business firms;
(5) covert propaganda;
(6) training of individuals;
(7) economic operations;
(8) paramilitary or political action operations designed to overthrow or support a regime; and
(9) attempted assassination.[14]

Many if not all of these types of counter-intelligence and covert action activities have been carried out in domestic political action programmes conducted by domestic intelligence agencies in the US and Western Europe. Amongst the very few well-documented examples of domestic political counter-intelligence operations were those carried out by the US Federal Bureau of Investigation between 1960 and 1972. It is reasonable to assume that these operations are a good guide to the larger number of operations of this kind in liberal democracies (to say nothing of the other states) about which less information is available, or which remain secret.

At least eight separate FBI counter-intelligence programs (Cointelpro in FBI jargon) were initiated between 1960 and 1972, when these unauthorized programmes were suspended. They were aimed at disrupting or neutralizing groups or individuals:

Communist Party of the U.S.A. Cointelpro (1960)
Socialist Workers Party Cointelpro (1961)
Puerto Rican Nationalist Counterintelligence (1962)
White Hate Groups Cointelpro (1964)
Operation Hoodwink Cointelpro (1964)
Black Nationalist-Hate Groups Cointelpro (1966)
New Left Cointelpro (1968)
Black Panther Cointelpro Intensification (1968)[15]

The intention of such Cointelpro operations was made perfectly clear by one of FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover's directives concerning "Counter-intelligence Program/Black Nationalist/Internal Security". Hoover directed FBI agents

to expose, disrupt, misdirect, discredit or otherwise neutralize the activities of black nationalist, hate-type organizations and groupings, their leadership, spokesmen, membership and supporters, and to counter their propensity for violence and civil disorder.[16]

The methods employed by the FBI in these campaigns were a model of the art of

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14. Ibid., p.333.

15. William W.Keller, *The Liberals and J. Edgar Hoover: the Rise and Fall of a Domestic Intelligence State*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989), pp.161-2. Operation Hoodwink was a counter-intelligence operation designed to create conflict between the CPUSA and organized crime. The operation was conceived by FBI administrators alone, and its existence known only to FBI personnel. Ibid., p.173.

16. Cited in ibid., pp.186-7.

domestic counter-intelligence:

> Standard Cointelpro operations included anonymous communications, use of fictitious organizations, forwarding financial data to the IRS [Internal Revenue Service], character assassination, confronting of friends, employers and relatives, electronic surveillance, providing confidential or fabricated information to reporters, constant interviewing of the subject, disinformation, innuendo, overwhelming and aggressive informant penetration, twenty-four hour stakeouts, and [in the words of an FBI Cointelpro director] "other methods too numerous to mention".[17]

Listed in summary form such methods of subversion of democratic politics sound dry, somewhat innocuous or faintly ludicrous. Ludicrous they may have been, but they were anything but innocuous in their effects on the fragile social and cultural networks that underpinned the social movements of the time. In concert with related large-scale political surveillance programmes, these counter-intelligence campaigns were effective in undermining the activities of a wide range of legal organizations which enjoyed considerable public support in a liberal democracy.

It is important to maintain the distinction between agencies involved in collection of information and those that have executive powers. While the provision and structuring of information to the rest of the executive is obviously a matter of considerable potential power, those agencies that have legal or de facto executive powers are much more likely to expand their mission, move out of the control of supervisory bodies, and undermine the foundations of democratic government.[18]

Ideological activity

The ideological role of intelligence agencies is often under-estimated, yet J.Edgar Hoover's "G-Men" provided (at Hoover's active behest) the material for half a century's Hollywood pulp. More actively, in the Soviet Union, campaigns against "ideological sabotage" were a major KGB responsibility throughout the 1970s and 1980s. Going further still, KGB officers are used in active propagandizing in many areas of Soviet domestic life.[19] In the Indonesian case since 1966 it will be seen that there has been a parallel and interlinked development of domestic surveillance apparatus and the state-propagated ideology of Pancasila.

Political steering

Finally, intelligence agencies have, in some cases, a role in steering the state. The former West German domestic intelligence chief Dr. Horst Herold presented a clear statement of such a role.

> Of all of the organs of the state, the one most immediately and forcibly

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17. Ibid., p.164. See also Christy Macy and Susan Kaplan, *Documents*, (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1988).

18. All governments must worry about the servant displacing the master in matters of intelligence agencies, not just democratic governments. But one of the most fascinating political interventions by an intelligence agency came in a recent statement by the KGB. According to a *Los Angeles Times* story (*The Age* (Melbourne), 3 March 1990), members of the KGB's Moscow headquarters staff sent a letter to President Gorbachev and to members of the Soviet Parliament warning that the leadership is responding to crises too slowly, and of the consequences of political division and opportunism in the Communist Party.

> Cheka collectives say they are perplexed because the leading organs of the country, while possessing the data that anticipated negative phenomena, clearly lagged with vitally important political decisions and are still too slow and indecisive.

On the KGB and the Soviet state and party control, see Amy W. Knight, op.cit., pp.79-113.

19. Knight, op.cit., pp.203-208.

confronted with reality, the police force, has uniquely privileged access to knowledge which enables it to understand a multiplicity and diversity of socially deviant and anti-social forms of behaviour, structural defects in the society and the laws governing social mass behaviour.[20]

As a result, Herold exhorted, the police must transform themselves

from a subordinate object with *merely executive functions into initiators of social change*, ...[which requires] a firm move away from the restrictions of their traditional functions, a radically new intellectual start, the acceptance of a quite different self-awareness:...as a sort of social hygiene.[21]

The intelligence agency (in this case, police intelligence) is seen as holding a unique position of *intellectual* privilege from which to discern, in a scientific manner, the "subliminal changes" at an early stage that belie the underlying direction of change in the society.

Criminality in this context is no longer his main opponent; he conceives of it rather as an indispensable indicator of a trend, the signals of which he has to "evaluate".[22]

On this basis such agencies are then able to either recommend to the state as a whole steps which should be taken (a social monitoring role), or actually take steps themselves to either redress the situation or encourage change in the direction of a preferred social model.

Such a steering role is particularly clear when such agencies operate with overtly cybernetic models of society or more simplistically with a model of the preferred society drawn from, say, an ideology such as the Indonesian state ideology Pancasila.

"The state", remarked Durkheim in a fascinating but misleading comment, "is society become conscious of itself." More accurately he wrote, the state is

a group of officials of a special kind, within which ideas and decisions are evolved which involve the whole of society without being the creation of society.[23]

Characteristically, Durkheim elides the question of power, but at the same time points to a certain kind of self-consciousness - or rather a self-consciousness of society which is also in practice a self-consciousness of the state itself. This is manifest in the activities of steering society by the state. Social steering can be carried out democratically, according to what Habermas terms discursive will-formation. Instead, Durkheim's remark describes precisely the activities, and increasingly the self-conception, of the more autonomous and ambitious intelligence agencies' understanding of their structural and steering responsibilities.

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20. Cobler, op.cit., p.148.

21. Ibid.

22. Hans Magnus Enzenberger, "A Determined Effort to explain to a New York audience the Secrets of German Democracy", *New Left Review*, 118 (Nov.-Dec. 1979), p. 12.

23. Cited in Steven Lukes, *Emile Durkheim - His Life and Work: A Critical Study*, (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1975) p.269. Durkheim's remark on the state and social self-consciousness is in his essay on *Socialism.*

The isomorphic structure of national intelligence agencies

Intelligence agencies are part of every contemporary national state. Not all nation-states have their equivalent of the U.S. National Security Agency which primarily collects and evaluates external electronic intelligence. Not all nation-states have political intelligence organizations as comprehensive and sophisticated as the West German Federal Criminal Investigation Bureau or Office for the Protection of the Constitution.[24] And assuredly, not all have domestic security agencies that use the techniques of terror and torture associated with Chile's DINA or South Africa's BOSS or the Korean Central Intelligence Agency.[25]

But equally, there are virtually no countries that do not have state agencies with some or all of these functions. In the isomorphic patterns of state formation induced by participation in the present world order, intelligence and security agencies are a remarkably uniform product. As Robin Luckham observed of military organizations more generally, the present world order renders them remarkably uniform and internationally comparable despite their ostensibly national orientation.[26] Although there are considerable variations for reasons that will be examined below, their similarities in structure, assigned task and even name are striking. They are intense in their pursuit of what their heads conceive to be the national interest. Of all of the repressive agencies of the state, it is the agencies oriented to domestic political surveillance that have repeatedly shown themselves to be carriers of an ideology under which they are conceived as the true protectors of the final interests of the state and nation, beyond the vicissitudes of electoral processes. On the other hand, like the military, their "national" orientation often leads them to substantial involvement with agencies of other states - as directing partners or junior clients or simply being cooperative.[27]

The US intelligence apparatus provides a guide to the possible range of formal organizations. In 1985 the combined budget of its domestic and external elements was $25 billion, reflecting a 3-fold increase in 10 years.[28] The main parts of that enormous apparatus have been usefully defined in a U.S. government regulation as follows:

> The Central Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, the Offices within the Department of Defense for the collection of specialized national foreign

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24. On the Federal Criminal Investigation Bureau and the Office for the protection of the Constitution see Cobler, op.cit.; also Richelson, *Foreign Intelligence Organizations*, (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger, 1988), pp.145-7.

25. This organization was re-named as the Agency for National Security Protection in 1980 but is still known commonly as the KCIA.

26. Robin Luckham, "Militarism: force, class and international conflict", *IDS Bulletin*, (August 1977).

27. The Australian security agencies provide an excellent example. An ASIS [Australian Secret Intelligence Service] officer was appointed to the Indonesian State Intelligence Coordinating Agency [Bakin] in 1977. See Jeffrey Richelson and Desmond Ball, *The Ties That Bind*, (Boston: Allen and Unwin, 1985), p.172. Information is regularly exchanged between Bakin and both the Australian Office of National Assessments [ONA] and the Australian Secret Intelligence Service [ASIS]. (Confidential interview, Jakarta, June 1988.) The primary domestic Australian security agency ASIO was set up by the Director of Britain's MI5. Even into the mid-1980s, it remained highly oriented to the needs of its major collaborator, the CIA, to the point where its former director, Harvey Barnett, testified that the agency's pursuit of an Australian Labor Party lobbyist and former secretary David Combe was initiated because of Combe's criticism of alleged CIA involvement in the dismissal of ALP Prime Minister Gough Whitlam in 1975. David Marr, *The Ivanov Trail*, (Melbourne: Thomas Nelson, 1984), pp.101ff.

28. Keller, op.cit., p.198.

intelligence through reconnaissance programmes [a euphemism for the National Reconnaissance Office], the Bureau of Intelligence and Research of the Department of State, the intelligence elements of the Military Services, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Department of the Treasury, the Department of Energy, the Drug Enforcement Administration and the staff elements of the Director of Central Intelligence constitute the intelligence community.[29]

Other countries, with the possible exception of the Soviet Union, have smaller and less complex intelligence apparatuses. The reasons why their structures vary are examined below, but the US example, allowing for differences in size, military-political situation, and historical accident, is a reasonable guide to similar apparatuses, with the exception of death squad-types of organization and organizations devoted to the protection of the personal and party interests of political leaders (including communist parties).

Such isomorphism is not only a matter of their existence and role, but equally of their internal organization. There are really only two principal organizational types of domestic intelligence agency: the relatively small number of personalistic, highly interventionist agencies typified by the Indonesian agency Opsus (and like Opsus, oriented to the illegal and violent end of the spectrum, often in association with death squads), or the more common and usually larger bureaucratic type (which may or may not be involved in killing). Bureaucratic intelligence organizations almost always have comparable internal structures, organized in line and staff form, with division according to social, political or geographical region of operation, technical function and administration.[30]

The United States Central Intelligence Agency provides one model of such an organization[31]. In very broad and formal terms, the CIA is headed by a Director chosen by the President, together with a Deputy Director and Executive Director. These senior officers are assisted by staff support offices dealing with matters such as legislation, public relations, legal affairs, financial affairs, and an inspectorate-general. The core activities of the organization are carried out by four divisions: Administration, Science and Technology, Operations, and Intelligence, each of which is headed by a Deputy Director.

The Directorate of Operations is organized by function and area. The Deputy Director (Operations) is assisted by a functionally organized staff dealing with Foreign Intelligence, Covert Action, Counter-intelligence, and Evaluation, Plans and Design. These staff offices monitor and cooperate with the activities of the area divisions. The Directorate of Intelligence has a similar organizational structure. The Deputy Director (Intelligence) is assisted by a set of staff offices: Management and Analytic Support,

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29. DIA [Defense Intelligence Agency] Regulation 50-17, "Release of Classified DOD Intelligence to Non-NFIB [National Foreign Intelligence Board] U.S. Government Agencies", July 26, 1978, cited by Richelson, *The U.S. Intelligence Community*, op.cit., p.9.

30. See, for example, the standard organizational charts in Richelson, *Foreign Intelligence Organizations*, op.cit., and *The U.S. Intelligence Community*, op.cit.; and Knight, op.cit., and the Indonesian examples in Chapters 8 and 9 below. To be sure, such charts may be reflections of organizational myth rather than practice, but at the very least demonstrate that these state agencies are isomorphic even in their daydreams.

31. The following paragraphs on the CIA are based on Richelson, *The U.S. Intelligence Community*, op.cit., pp.11-25.

Collection Requirements and Evaluation, Arms Control Intelligence, Nuclear Proliferation Intelligence, Community Assistants. There is also a Senior Review Panel. The bulk of the Directorate's work is carried out by two series of offices: one organized geographically, and the other problem-oriented or functionally-organized: Global Issues, Imagery Analysis, Scientific and Weapons Research, Leadership Analysis, Information Resources, and Current Production and Analytic Support.

Such organizational maps are of course always somewhat misleading. A more complex and less tidy mapping of informal networks of power and communication paying due regard to the internal political realities of large organizations would serve better as a guide to actual structure and practice.[32] But official organization charts reflect the preferred self-image of organizations, or at least their management, and it is models such as these which recommend themselves, or are recommended, to other agencies.

Causes of isomorphic intelligence and security complexes

The global isomorphic replication of organizational mission and structure of national security complexes has four main sources: (a) common responses to common problems; (b) common internal pressures for agency proliferation; (c) international influence and cooperation; (d) opportunities afforded by advances in disciplines and technologies of power, or more precisely those of surveillance and repression.

Common responses to common problems

The character of the international system causes states to face comparable needs at roughly the same time or stage of development. Common internal security problems breed common responses, as do the intrusions, real or imaginary, of other states or the external difficulties they generate. Hence a common need for information and evaluation and operational capacity. More importantly, the kinds of problems that are faced by states require the same sorts of resources that in other epochs have either been unnecessary or has been provided by other means.

The expansion of the state in advanced capitalist societies has been driven by the expanding requirements of capital and the consequent simultaneous needs for greater control over the populace (both extensively and intensively), *combined with* greater legitimacy to provide the resources (financial and social) for governability. Formal institutions of liberal democracy have been combined with effective centralization of administrative power under largely depoliticized circumstances in such a way that popular control over the state is seriously limited. The generation of structural contradictions to system reproduction invites the application of political technocracy by states engaged in perennial crisis management. The citizenry becomes another object of attempted strategic control by the state.[33]

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32. For one account of the politics lying over the CIA's neat organizational chart in the Reagan years see Bob Woodward, *Veil: The Secret Wars of the CIA*, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1987).

33. See, for example, Jurgen Habermas, *Legitimation Crisis*, (London: Heinemann, 1975). Habermas' distinction between strategic and communicative interaction is also helpful for understanding the characteristic pattern of thinking about social and political manipulation in intelligence agencies. Strategic interaction is essentially a matter of treating other people in the same way as objects in the natural world are treated. Communicative interaction by contrast permits "discursive will-formation" - a democratic and unhierarchical process of collective determination. See ibid, and Thomas McCarthy, *The Critical Theory of Jurgen Habermas*, (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1978).

A principal requirement of such technocracies of control is information on the citizenry at hitherto unprecedented levels, in part to control without violating the limits of legitimacy formation. This is an expression of what Shils called the "factual hunger", or more precisely, the "cognitive passion" of all government bodies.[34] Crucially, as Giddens argued, there is a dialectical relationship between the establishment of such systems of surveillance and other methods of internal pacification and the generation of new categories of deviance - and with them, new disciplines and specialists of control.[35]

Systems of surveillance - whether immediately political in character or otherwise - provide a secondary system of protection of system reproduction in the face of late capitalist states' simultaneous experience of crises of governability and a need to maintain institutions of formal democracy.[36]

In the United States, Donner argues, the key role of domestic political intelligence stems from the need to maintain the structural status quo whilst adhering to the forms of liberal democracy. This is a modification of a standard functionalist interpretation of institutional differentiation and reintegration whereby the state takes over tasks formerly carried out by non-state institutions. Hence,

> the need for political socialization within the confines of the economic system - a need once served by the media, the family, schools, and private associations - has become a major responsibility of government, and in particular its political intelligence organizations.[37]

In state socialist societies such as the Soviet Union, the major domestic intelligence agencies have had conflicting objectives in recent years. On the one hand, there is the primary objective of ensuring communist party rule. On the other hand, these same communist party rulers have been trying to reduce the level of arbitrary rule and establish a normative legal order in which police powers are somewhat limited. The contradiction leads to predictable simultaneous incompatible policies, and/or sudden, politically-determined shifts in the balance from one approach to the other. The steering role of such agencies has in practice always been subordinated to that of the ruling party.[38]

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34. Edward S. Shils, "Privacy and power" in his *Center and Periphery: Essays in Macrosociology*, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1975), p.329. Another comment by Shils nicely fits the standard intelligence outlook:

> The expansion, intensification, and enlivenment of the cognitive impulse entail an ambition to be in contemplative contact with all that is essential. But unlike the religious relationship to the essential, which is content in the contemplation of an exhaustively known or ultimately inscrutable essential power which has previously disclosed or `revealed' what is essential and therefore needs to be known, this phase in the new development of man's cognitive powers entails *a belief in the possibilities of continuously deeper and more revealing, more deeply reaching penetration* into the inexhaustible essential. At the same time it moves to the essential *through the active contemplation of the immediate and the particular*. More minds and greater efficiency in their organization and activity produce continuously deeper disclosures - or revelations - in ever greater quantities.

Ibid., pp.317-318, my emphasis.

35. Giddens, op.cit., p.183. Shils, op.cit., pp.325 ff. provides a brief but acute summary of the corporate and state audiences applied psychology and sociology found for themselves in the early twentieth century.

36. Donner is speaking of the United States, and the argument could be equally applied to Britain and West Germany. But Knight stresses that the same is true of the KGB in the Soviet Union. The attempt to rationalize the leadership's desire to maintain power without use of terror has lead to the KGB's coercive and prophylactic tasks being supplemented by a considerable ideological one - both negative (in campaigns against "ideological sabotage") and positive (propaganda for all sorts of Soviet community groups including children. See Knight, op.cit., pp.203-9.

37. Donner, op.cit., p.3.

38. See, for example, Knight, op.cit. on the KGB.

Of course, in the present world order, similar intelligence and security complexes are found in countries of quite different political or socio-economic character. There is in general little difference between the range of organizations found in capitalist and communist states at various economic stages: the technocratic information-gathering agency and the death-squad, the para-military security force and the intellectually-sophisticated intelligence thinktank can equally be found in left and right versions. There may well be longterm or subtle differences between capitalist and communist systems in terms of surveillance and terror, but they are generally subordinate to the commonalities of a logic of attempted state-superordination over the populace.[39]

Common internal pressures

Within state structures, there have been common pressures for proliferation and diversification: a preference amongst state-managers for multiple sources of advice and minimal concentration of possible centralization of adversary power; an ever-widening array of potential threats which require surveillance, assessment and forms of political intervention best carried out covertly; internal inter-bureaucratic competition; and, as the Indonesian example will show, a repeated need to counter these centrifugal tendencies by attempts at integration of control and function. The bureaucratic tendency to continuous expansion, to seek autonomy from control, and the elevation of means to ends follows the patterns outlined by Michels and Merton:

> This seems true of surveilling organizations and personnel who, in our own society, have tended to integrate the means of surveillance into routine organizational activity, and then create continual justification for the tasks by expanding the mandate, scope, powers and duties of their particular form of information gathering.[40]

The cognitive appetite, as Shils perceptively remarked, is anomic and insatiable, and the process of institutional expansion is driven hard by career motives:

> The key to promotion is a good record - and a good record is almost invariably measured by quantifiable achievements: how many surveillance targets, reports,

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39. This is not to deny the particular horrors of the Stalinist or Kampuchean holocausts, or that in an arithmetic sense more of the twentieth century murdered died from "red" bullets, than from, say, German or Indonesian or Timorese ones. Rather, it is to question the simpler versions of some formulations of the relationship between the rationalization of domination that characterises most contemporary industrial societies and the underlying motive force of change. For example, Steven Spitzer amalgamates changes in relations of production and in relations of state domination:

> While slavery-based, feudal and monarchic structures of domination were dependent on *extensive*, *indirect*, and *ceremonial* forms of coercive regulation, capitalism was able to transform relations of production and domination in such a way that controls could become far more *intensive*, *direct*, and *banal*.

Spitzer, "The rationalization of crime control in capitalist society" in Stanley Cohen and Andrew Scull (eds.) *Social Control and the State: Historical and Comparative Essays*, (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1985), p.315. While the changes in capitalist production are, in general, clearly related to changes in the forms of social control by the state, the question is more complicated. Firstly, as is being increasingly noticed, the classical automatic association of capitalism with free labour is being questioned as the global organization of capitalist servile and various forms of gender- and ethnically-defined unfree labour are being documented. Secondly, these same forms of social control are found, mutatis mutandis, in communist industrial societies. Labelling such societies as state- capitalist simply postpones the issue. Giddens' formulation of a number of inter-related but finally independent institutional axes with different patterns or even logics of development is helpful here. A political movement addressing class-relations will then necessarily have a different agenda from one addressing the relation of the state to the populace. The late Peter Sedgwick made the same point about the emergence of the "medical attitude" amongst psychiatrists: such an approach was correlated with the growth of class relations, but finally has its own autonomous base, "a separate instance of the domination of mental over manual labour, undertaken as part of the conditions of any society's reproduction". Op.cit. p.138.

40. Thomas, op.cit., p.55.

informers, photographs, file entries.[41]

Intelligence organizations also have an inbuilt tendency to proliferate and to increase in size because of the expansive but untestable character of their claims to effectiveness. As Cohen said of the welfare sector:

> The social problems industry is organized, staffed and financed on the assumptions of *permanence* and *longterm growth*. Every problem has to be seen simultaneously as more or less intractable, yet more or less under control... Insolubility is built into the language of social problem definition.[42]

While the establishment of such systems of control is, from the state's point of view, an attempt at crisis-management and, on occasion, structural political transformation, it should often more properly be seen as the social phenomenon Illich labelled *iatrogenesis* - the medical term for disease caused by medical intervention itself. The crises these agencies are set to manage are oftentimes either the consequence of structural contradictions of the social system whose structural reproduction is to be maintained, or the unforeseen consequences of earlier political actions by state agencies.[43] This is particularly the case in most peripheral capitalist states within the western alliance where the structural problems the intelligence agencies are established to address are profound and the methods of surveillance and intervention often conditional on the maintenance of a subordinate relationship to the sponsoring power.

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41. Donner, op.cit., p.289. Donner was discussing the huge, secret and illegal US Army political intelligence programme during the Vietnam years until its ostensible halting in 1970.

> The system as a whole is marked by a quality of excess reflected most notably in its gargantuan coverage. Individuals from every area of dissent, leaders and followers, were surveilled and dossiered; literally every organization of a liberal or a radical hue was similarly covered. This same passion for excess was reflected in the Army's intelligence resources. An intelligence unit may have impressive operational capability, but only limited authority and resources for planning; manpower to collect information, but meager technical equipment to process it; reasonably efficient overt surveillance facilities, but no clandestine capability; its own information input, but no access to other systems (liaison intelligence) or opportunities for operational collaboration with other units; extensive files, but no resources to evaluate their content...But few, if any, shortcomings marred Army intelligence structures. Unlimited funds, ample field manpower, specialized command personnel, planning and training resources, and the most sophisticated communications and data-processing capability ensured a unique versatility."

Ibid, pp.287-288.

42. Stanley Cohen, *Visions of Social Control*, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1985), p.171. Cohen's discussion of the profession-alization of the "helping professions" is, as one would expect after Foucault's work, appallingly apt. Cohen's comment on the unpublished work of John Seeley has echoes of the Indonesian intelligence discussion of that country's "threats to order and calm":

> "Seeley has well described the functional necessity to define social problems as vaguely as possible. `Poverty', `health', and `crime' become shifting ambiguous terms. There are hints about vast numbers of undiscovered deviants - dark figures. We are told to watch out for early warning signs, latent problems, potential and at-risk populations. These groups must be brought into the net. And the hardest group to do anything about will always be the `5 percent' (or whatever amount can be absorbed at the lower tail of whatever distribution curve we are talking about). These are the hardcore, the dangerous, the sickest (the ones who really need their tonsils removed). Here is Seeley's macabre example: `If we were to attempt a radical solution by simply shooting those now held to be mentally retarded, it is unthinkable that anything would happen to the problem except that psychologists would need to rescore present intelligence tests so that they again found mean, median and mode at 100.'"

43. See Cohen, op.cit., p.169. The claim to iatrogenesis for intelligence and security agencies raises the issue of their effectiveness in achieving the goals the state hopes for them. The unquestioning acceptance of their own claims to potency are, of course, part of their power: a reputation for omniscience discourages even the thought of resistance. I will return to this issue below. For the present, however, it is simply worth noting Ignatieff's comment on his own early work on prisons and that of Foucault as embodying "the assumption of society as a functionally efficient totality of institutions. When applied to prison history, this model implies that prisons `work', whereas the prison is perhaps *the* classic example of an institution which works badly and which none the less survives in the face of recurrent scepticism as to its deterrent or reformative capacity." Michael Ignatieff, "State, civil society and total institutions: a critique of recent social histories of punishment" in Stanley Cohen and Andrew Scull (eds.), *Social Control and the State: Historical and Comparative Essays*, (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1985), p.96.

International influences

Global alliance structures have been one of the principal means by which large centre countries have cloned comparable intelligence agencies around the world. The organization of global alignment means that states at low levels of industrial development are able to acquire intelligence and security complexes comparable to those of industrially more advanced states (and sponsored by them) which have not grown out of the state's social base.

Within the predominant alignments of the existing global order there is an increasing trend towards integration, change and mutual learning. The well-documented patterns of military training by the major powers are the prime example of this. Military intelligence training is a particularly important and influential component, as is police training.

For example, the Iraqi *Amn* or State Internal Security was established by the then Minister for Internal Security, Saddam Hussein, on the basis of an agreement in 1973 with the then Head of the KGB, Yuri Andropov, which provided for

(a) re-organization of all aspects of internal security on the recommendations of the KGB;

(b) supply of sophisticated surveillance and interrogation equipment;

(c) training for Iraqi personnel in KGB and GRU [Military Intelligence] schools in the Soviet Union;

(d) exchange of intelligence information; and

(e) provision of assistance by Iraqi embassy personnel to Soviet agents operating in countries where the Soviet Union has no diplomatic relations.[44]

International intelligence cooperation is significant, even outside the superpower-client relationship.[45] Joint operations are not common, but certainly occur.[46] Personal networks between security managers appear to be important for the exchange opportunities they provides - for example, the influence Moerdani's time in South Korea is alleged to have had on the subsequent expansion of the Indonesian intelligence and security apparatus. Not the least important of these international influences is the growth of ideologies and intellectual techniques to assist the intelligence and security complexes. The broad ideology of national security and the aid to the diffusion of one version of it through U.S. military and police training has often been documented.

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44. Samir al-Khalil, *Republic of Fear: The Politics of Modern Iraq*, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989), pp.12-13. There are two other important Iraqi intelligence agencies. In addition to normal military duties, *Estikhbarat* [Military Intelligence] deals with foreign operations in general, including those against Iraqi nationals abroad, which have included a number of assassinations. *Mukhabarat* [Party Intelligence],

> the most powerful and feared agency among the three, is a meta-intelligence organization designed to watch over the other policing networks and control the activities of state and corporate institutions like the army, government departments, and the mass organizations (youth, women, and labour)...Unlike other policing agencies, the *Mukhabarat* is a distinctly *political* body, not merely a professional organ of the state charged with safeguarding national security.

Ibid, p.15.

45. See, for example, the discussion of the worldwide network of international cooperation that makes up the UK-USA agreement for electronic intelligence gathering. See Richelson and Ball, op.cit.; and James Bamford, *The Puzzle Palace*, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1982). Australia has formal liaison arrangements with almost all of the ASEAN states. See Richelson and Ball, op.cit., p.172. Intelligence liaison between the ASEAN states is sometimes mentioned as one of the few concrete achievements of the association, but there is as yet little hard evidence on the nature of the cooperation.

46. E.g. Israel's Mossad cooperating with Pahlevi's Iranian Savak. See Plate and Darvi, op.cit., pp.54,68.

Disciplines and technologies of power

More specifically, domestic political surveillance, evaluation and covert operations of various kinds have been greatly assisted by the development and diffusion of particular types of modes of social inquiry and explanation.[47] At the very least, as Cohen says of criminology, social sciences in the service of security act as

> alibis which allow the functionaries of the system to work with a semblance of good conscience, humanitarianism, even scientific status.[48]

These intellectual techniques (or disciplinary technologies of power as Foucault regarded them) overwhelmingly originate from the advanced industrial capitalist countries, and carry with them the legitimating aura of (western) modernity.[49] In the history of European state-formation, Giddens notes:

> Social science...has from its early origins in the modern period been a constitutive aspect of that vast expansion of the reflexive monitoring of social reproduction that is an integral feature of the state.[50]

The intellectual practices underpinning the broad spectrum of information-gathering and evaluation, as well as many of the techniques of covert (and open) political intervention[51] rely on a wide repertoire of advanced social sciences - as well as the most elementary and base types of political state-reasoning. The character of the "reflexive monitoring of social reproduction" undertaken by such agencies may be epiphenomenal or structural in character, competent or otherwise. For Perry Anderson, the intellectual underpinnings of such expanded but conservative notions of agency run even deeper in western political philosophy.

> Modern political thought in the West owes its origins to these brittle guide-books of domination: what else is the form of Machiavelli's *The Prince*?

Optimistically, he continues

> Bismark, Cavour, and Ito were the supreme exemplars of this major enlargement of the pattern of conscious super-ordination. But their lucidity remained operational rather than structural.[52]

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47. This will be seen in the example of the uses to which social survey research and psychology have been put by Indonesian intelligence and security bodies. See Chapter 11 below.

48. Cohen, op.cit., p.176.

49. Foucault's phrase bears on the old notion of "knowledge is power", but in a particular way which is relevant here:
> For Nietzsche and Foucault the "is" connecting knowledge and power does not indicate that the relation betwen knowledge and power is one of predication such that knowledge leads to power. Rather, the relation is such that knowledge is not gained prior to and independently of the use to which it will be put in order to achieve power (whether over nature or over other people), but is already a function of human interests and power relations.

Douglas Couzens Hoy, "Power, repression, progress: Foucault, Lukes, and the Frankfurt School", in his *Foucault: A Critical reader*, (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986), p.129. This formulation echoes that of Habermas, *Knowledge and Human Interests*, (London: Heinemann, 1972).

50. Giddens, *Nation-State and Violence*, op.cit., p.180.

51. See Peter Watson, *War On the Mind*, (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1978), part 5.

52. Perry Anderson, *Arguments Within English Marxism*, (London: Verso, 1980), p.24.

Why this should necessarily be so is not clear. On occasion, contemporary intelligence and security analysts have seen their agencies' goals in structural terms, lucidly and accurately or otherwise. Whether the type of structural analysis is adequate to the set purpose of state reproduction is another matter. But certainly there is a degree of reinforcement provided to the operations of these agencies of conscious superordination and rationalized domination by certain strands of social science theory and methods. This may account for a degree of common orientation and cross-fertilization of techniques of domination.

Finally, changes in technologies of surveillance and torture create common possibilities and organizational pressures. This is most obvious at the level of electronic intelligence. While it is true that it is political pressure that generates the applied research to expand say, capacity for visual or audio surveillance at great distances as with satellites, the fundamental developments in electronics, computing and satellites created the possibilities for entirely new modes of surveillance: witness the development of very large electronic intelligence agencies, exemplified by the US National Security Agency [NSA].[53]

Domestically, electronic information storage made possible by computing combined with electronic surveillance created the possibility of enormous expansion of data-collecting bodies. The application of medical and scientific knowledge to practices of torture has similarly created new bureaucracies in security agencies where these disciplines are refined.[54] More generally what is involved is the relationship between the forbidden and the techniques of control available:

> Surveillance activity thus reflects not simply the activity of "capitalist agents" or the interests of a "ruling class", although this is certainly part of its content. It reflects especially *social relations* between techniques for social control and the thoughts and activities that are perceived to require controlling; it reflects as well the manner in which control systems function in this type of society.[55]

Speaking of the US Army domestic political intelligence programme during the Vietnam War, Donner makes a more cynical though relevant point:

> The wheel of excess is spun faster by the Army's passion for redundancy, duplication of bureaucratic structures, and gadgetry. The fact that an activity lends itself to both elaborate bureaucratization *and* technology would seem to make it almost self-justifying in the military mind.[56]

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53. See Bamford, op.cit.

54. There is as yet little knowledge of the internal the practice of scientifically infliction of pain. Particular instances will be dealt with below in Chapter 5. However, a certain amount is known about the organization of one instance: the use of psychiatric and psychopharmacological knowledge for the purpose of in the Soviet Union. See Sidney Bloch and Peter Reddaway, *Soviet Psychiatric Abuse: the Shadow Over World Psychiatry*, (London: Gollancz, 1984).

55. Thomas, op.cit., p.55.

56. Donner, op.cit., p.289.

Sources of variation

The great majority of Third World militarized and authoritarian states came into existence within the framework of U.S. support; most remain in existence only because of external support. Many of the rest came into existence as part of a somewhat parallel structure of Soviet support. More to the point, the global presence or absence of terror and/or heightened domestic political surveillance as an element of rule is generally not explicable by primarily domestic factors. This is as true for relatively peaceful (but in most cases, substantially militarized) First World states in Western Europe, North America and the Pacific as of the endemic low-level terror in the Third World militarized state. As the earlier example of Japanese imperialism pre-saged, relative

Table 4.1
Sources of variation in intelligence agencies

(1) State structure and traditions
      e.g. Need to combine surveillance and selective repression with formal democracy.
      e.g. Degree of internal autonomy of intelligence agencies from sources of control within the state and the society.
      e.g. Variations in state robustness and infrastructural capacity

(2) Strategic situation and alliance pattern
      e.g. Location within an alliance with resultant intelligence-sharing and/or military training agreements.
      e.g. Generalised war or notional peace.

(3) Source and level of perceived security threat
      e.g. External or internal threat?
      e.g. Small or large number of domestic target groups?

(4) Agency conception of mission
      e.g. Primarily external or internal?
      e.g. military or political?
      e.g. Primarily information-gathering, intervention, and/or planning/steering?

(5) organisational and socio-technical character
      e.g. Bureaucratic or personalistic
      e.g. technology/capital intensive, or highly reliant on informer sources?
      e.g. Variations in the technical capacities of the state as a whole, and the social relations prevailing in surrounding society.

(6) Extra responsibilities
      e.g. KGB border guards.
      e.g. Political protection lf leader, party or ideology.

calm under surveillance at home can be coupled with extreme repression in the closely-related periphery. The major sources of variation in intelligence regime types in general are summarized in Table 4.1.

Variations amongst intelligence agencies can be explained by the following factors: (a) state structure and traditions; (b) strategic situation and alliance pattern; (c) source and level of perceived state security threat; (d) agency conception of mission; (e) organizational and socio-technical character; and (f) any extraneous responsibilities the agency may have, such as protection of political leaders of political parties positions of influence.

Clearly state structure has a great influence, especially the degree of autonomy the state as a whole has from domestic political opinion, and the extent that an intelligence agency can diminish the control exercised by other parts of the state over its activities. Most communist and Third World dictatorships have little need to consider questions of legitimacy, and there is correspondingly less inhibition on autonomy. The most common result is extreme aggression in political intervention, and varying levels of terror.

The position of the state in the international system may produce the same result: the need for legitimacy may be diminished by external financial and/or political support. Moreover membership of an alliance structure provides an avenue for intelligence agency cloning according to the character of the dominant partner of the alliance. Differences in intelligence agency type and structure according to imperial origins are not clear, except in so far as Soviet-derived versions are much more likely to be linked to surveillance by and of members of governing parties holding a monopoly of political power. For example, the North Korean Ministry of Public Security overlaps in its activities with a political cadre structure within and beyond the ministry itself.[57] Needless to say, the North Korean domestic intelligence system takes its character both from the high-Stalinism of the Soviet influence at the time of the system's establishment in the late 1940s, and the predispositions of the leadership of the Korean Workers Party, which has kept the system under close party control.

The source of the perceived threat clearly influences the agency's mission. Thus agencies may be primarily domestic in concerns, or primarily external; military in organization and concerns, or civilian and political. They may be by charter or practice concerned only with information-gathering, or primarily political interventionist or quasi-military special forces. The source of the perceived threat will be the main determinant, although countervailing factors are also relevant. Thus, for example, the US offensive intelligence/special forces capacity was diminished during the late 1970s more because of public response to the crimes of intelligence agencies revealed in the mid-1970s by Congressional investigations, than because of a perceived lack of need for such forces.

Finally, the organizational and socio-technical character of the agency can vary a great deal. The most important organizational distinction is between those based on personalalistic or patronage relations on the one hand, and those which are bureaucratically organized. In the Third World today, and in other societies in the past, intelligence bodies have often been loosely organized groups formed around a particular person, and operating through more or less informal networks and procedures, often

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57. Robert A. Scalapino and Chong-sik Lee, *Communism in Korea: Part II - The Society*, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972), pp.818-844.

dependent on patronage relations for both their existence and operations. Ali Moertopo's Opsus is a good example of this type of organization.[58] Some, but by no means all, Third World death squads and vigilantes seem to have such bases, although others come from the planning of large bureaucracies.[59]

Patronage relations are obviously important in many if not all Third World states - although with the increasing economic differentiation of the Third World with the impact of closer integration into global capitalist relations, this is becoming less true. However, where the state's infrastructural capacity is relatively weak, and where neither market relations nor kinship are completely dominant, then patronage systems are important within the state.[60] Not surprisingly, Opsus flourished at a transitional point in the development of the Indonesian state - from the period of following the violent establishment of the New Order to the rise of the more firmly bureaucratic and rationally organized apparatus of Moertopo's sometime protege, Moerdani.[61]

The more normal form is bureaucracy, military or civilian. Both forms may coexist, but it is likely that bureaucratic forms are associated with increasing age of the intelligence system, deepening influence of a major alliance partner, and increasing technical requirements. Indeed one line of variation is the question of technological sophistication, which is itself affected by alliance position, general socio-technical sophistication of the remainder of the state and the society, and the particular type of activity undertaken. Thus Third World countries deemed of critical importance by senior alliance partners are likely to have more sophisticated equipment, as are agencies in advanced industrial countries in any case, and as are organizations specifically concerned with electronic intelligence, especially foreign-oriented.

A model of internal security in a liberal state

Looking at the domestic intelligence activities of the FBI William Keller has sketched three models of internal security in liberal states: a domestic intelligence bureau, a political police, and an independent security state.

A domestic intelligence bureau is an agency based on powers specified and limited by legislation, following policies publicly known and subject to effective ministerial control, and acting in a manner that is consistent with established constitutional norms and other legal requirements. Such an agency does not use aggressive or disruptive intelligence methods, and is restricted to carrying out information-gathering activities only.

Its primary function is to gather information related to criminal prosecution of

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58. See Chapter 9 below.

59. On the latter, see, for example, the discussion in Chapter 11 below of the Indonesian military death-squads employed in a campaign against criminals by the Armed Forces Strategic Intelligence Centre [Bais ABRI] in 1983-84.

60. On patronage and surveillance, see Christopher Dandeker, *Surveillance, Power and Modernity*, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1990), pp.43-49. Dandeker adds a more subtle note here:

> Under arrangements of patronage, surveillance activities and the reproduction of systems of rule are tenuous social processes characterized by personalism as well as the anonymous or impersonal features prevalent in modern societies. At the same time, surveillance activities are performed by specialist intermediaries who are autonomous from both the controls of the subject population and of the discipline normally imposed by modern bureaucratic systems.

Ibid., p.46.

61. See Chapter 8 below.

persons and groups that pose a threat to internal security. It is responsive to the legislative process, to higher executive authority, and to the decisions of the courts interpreting a body of security law.[62]

A political police carries out intelligence activities beyond a minimum necessary to protect the state. Such an agency is more autonomous from legislative and judicial control, although it may often be highly responsive to executive requirements. Specific legislation or even executive direction may be loose or absent. Most importantly, intell‐igence activities against adversaries of the government of the day will be pursued aggressively. Despite this relative insularity from review by other parts of the state, Kirchheimer suggests that under a constitutional government

> where the political police's action is limited by normal life satisfactions, public opinion and access to the courts for the government's foes...the police keep a measure of similarity with a normal governmental bureaucracy.[63]

An independent security state is defined by the absence of external controls of any kind, and is accordingly incompatible with constitutional or democratic state forms.

> [The independent security state] is distinguished from the political police, because its goals and methods may not coincide with those of political elites and central decision-makers. Its administrators exercise discretionary authority over its programs and methods. The primary function of the independent security state is to investigate and neutralize ideological enemies of the parent state, as identified by administrators within the agency itself.[64]

Keller distinguishes these three models using two principal variables: the relation of the intelligence agency to the state, and the mode of intelligence activity. (See Figure 4.1.) The fourth cell of Keller's figure, referring to an agency characterized by use of passive intelligence methods while having autonomy from the rest of the state and other forms of control, is, he suggests, a transitory and unstable case. Once an agency gains a degree of autonomy it is unlikely to remain satisfied with simply supplying information: it will tend to employ more and more aggressive and disruptive techniques.

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62. Keller, op.cit., p.13.

63. Otto Kirchheimer, *Political Justice: The Use of Legal Procedure for Political Ends*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961), p.204, cited in Keller, op.cit., p.15.

64. Ibid., p.15.

Figure 4.1
Three Models of Internal Security in a Liberal State

Relation to the state

Ministerial   *Discretionary*

	Ministerial	*Discretionary*
Passive *intelligence*	1. Domestic intelligence bureau	4. Unstable/ transitory
Aggressive/ *counter* *intelligence*	2. Political police	3. Independent security state

Mode of
intelligence
activity

Source: William W. Keller, *The Liberals and J. Edgar Hoover: the Rise and Fall of a Domestic Intelligence State*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989), p.17.

Keller's model, derived from his study of the FBI, is a linear one: a political police could carry out the activities of a domestic intelligence bureau, but not vice-versa; and that political police's activities could be carried out by an independent security state, but not vice-versa. Keller's study shows the development of the FBI through each of these stages, although always with shades of grey. The middle 1960s marked the turning point in this pattern:

> It consisted of the addition of new programs that designated an increasing number of persons for intensive investigation, and potential summary detention, and involved the infiltration and disruption of their political and organizational activities.[65]

Keller's model is a useful guide to the understanding of domestic political intelligence agencies in liberal states. More work is needed to extend the model to other state forms, especially militarized Third World countries where constitutional powers are weak. Part 2 of this thesis attempts to provide a basis for such modelling.

The West German model

Of all of the examples of domestic political intelligence in the advanced capitalist countries, the West German system of state surveillance is the most comprehensive and penetrates most deeply into the society.[66] A brief examination of the two main organizations responsible for domestic political intelligence and security, the Federal Criminal Investigation Bureau [*Bundeskriminalamt - BKA*] and the Office for the Protection of the Constitution [*Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz - BfV*] brings together some of the themes of this chapter.[67]

The BKA and BfV were set up in 1950 and 1951 in a climate of intense Cold War antagonisms imported into West German domestic politics.[68] Both organizations had substantial limitations on their powers imposed both by positive restrictions and by the federal structure of the administration. Throughout the 1950s and 1960s there were proposals to expand the size and mission of both organizations. However it was not until the intense domestic political pressures of the late 1960s that these plans were realized in a rapid series of legislative and administrative changes, leading up to the Radical Decree passed in January 1972.

The budget of the BKA expanded from DM16 mn. in 1966 to DM149 mn. a decade later, with its core staff jumping from 832 to 2,424. The BfV expanded from 832 core

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65. Ibid., p.155.

66. A possible exception is the British intelligence apparatus for Northern Ireland.

67. The following paragraphs are based largely on Cobler op.cit., Richelson, *Foreign Intelligence Organizations*, op.cit.; Enzenberger, op. cit.; Duncan Campbell, op.cit.; and Campaign Against the Model West Germany , *Under Observation: The Computer and Political Control*, (Bochum, FRG; n.d.).

68. Another organization, the Federal Intelligence Service *[Bundesnacrichtendienst - BND]* is responsible for both external political intelligence and domestic counter-intelligence. However it also is involved in domestic political surveillance. The BND grew out of the intelligence organization established after 1945 by the former Nazi intelligence officer, Gehlen. On the Bundesnacrichtendienst see Richelson, *Foreign Intelligence Organizations*, op.cit., pp.145-7. There is, in addition, the Military Intelligence Service [MAD]. Ibid., p.141.

posts in 1966 to 1,628 in 1976, and the budget jumped from DM 22.2 to 80.8.[69] One of the principal activities of the BfV is to determine the political character of all applicants for positions with the Federal civil service. Under the so-called *Berufsverbote* legislation, no-one may be employed in the civil service - including as a teacher - if they are or have been a member of a proscribed organization, principally the German Communist Party and a shifting list of other left (and some fascist) organizations. In carrying out such assessments the security services conducted 1.5 million checks on applicants between 1973 and mid-1975. In only 3,000 cases were previous activities considered sufficient to bar the application. But in finding those 3,000 another 1,497,000 security files were opened, investigations conducted in lesser or greater depth, and the concept of a private sphere of life that much further eroded.[70]

Such investigations were carried out for the BfV by its Background Investigations section. Seven other principal sections (in the late 1980s) included Administration, Right-Wing Radicals, Left-Wing Radicals, Counterespionage, Secrets Protection, and Terrorism.[71]

The West German agencies expanded the use of computing developed for domestic political intelligence data handling in the United States at the height of the Vietnam War by US Army Intelligence and the FBI. All of the West German agencies, together with Military Intelligence (which retains information on all conscripts) have substantial interlinked computer systems. The BfV computer system acquired files on some 2 million citizens in its first three years of operation to 1975. Such systems produce extraordinary expansion of centralization of information while at the same time facilitating rapid decentralized usage:

> With the filing card system of storing information used until now, the time lapse between question and answer or registration of new data and distribution to further departments was considerable. For example, in 1972, it still took 10 to 25 days for notification that a particular person was wanted to go from the local police station to the state criminal investigation department; another 15 to 25 days went by before the wanted person was registered in the 80 West German wanted persons catalogues; yet another 4 to 6 weeks were necessary before the name of the wanted person appeared in the wanted persons registers issued to the border authorities and police departments throughout the country. The use of computers reduces this time lapse to a matter of 4 - 6 seconds.[72]

Technological changes of this kind exemplify the capacity for a "focussing of surveillance" that underlies the potential for totalitarian rule.

While the legislation that resulted in the explosion of the two agencies activities was

69. Cobler, op.cit., pp.171-2.

70. Private firms are also able to consult the BfV computer. See Campaign Against the Model West Germany, op.cit., pp. 8,14. The organizations which were considered suspect in due course became extremely broad. After Amnesty International began to criticize the West German government's action, civil service candidates whose security file showed an Amnesty involvement were labelled, in a phrase reminiscent of earlier German governments, as being involved in activities "prejudicial to the State". Cobler, op.cit., pp.64-66.

71. Richelson, *Foreign Intelligence Organizations*, op.cit., pp.144-7.

72. Campaign Against the Model West Germany, op.cit., p.11.

not enacted until 1972, such measures had long been under consideration and were, as Cobler puts it, "tailored to allow for growth". In the late 1960s, the crisis of legitimacy in West Germany was as great as that in the United States, and was fueled by the US alliance connection at the height of the Vietnam War. The rapid growth of the German economy was highly dependent on the exploitation of "guest workers" from peripheral European and Africa and the Middle East. The core legitimacy of the state was corroded by the still unreconstructed elements from the Nazi past.

The eruption of armed insurgency from a small number of left groups, most notably the Red Army Faction, aiming at both the US presence and the German corporate elite, provided the stimulus (or excuse) for the avalanche of repressive and pre-emptive legislation that followed.[73] The most important measures were those that moved the operational basis of the two agencies from predominantly *target surveillance* to *preventive surveillance*. The expansion of the *Berufsverbote* provisions accomplished part of this. However the most characteristic piece of legislation came in 1976 with the Law for the Protection of Communal Peace. The intent of the law, according to its preamble, was to "to curb violence and its verbal preliminaries". Penalties would be incurred by anyone who

> displays, suggests, presents or otherwise makes accessible, produces, procures, supplies, stocks, offers, announces, or recommends, seeks to introduce into the area covered by this law or to export from it...matter likely to disrupt the peace...[in order] to use it or enable another to use it [with an intention hostile to the state].[74]

The "peace" that was to be protected by this law was defined as follows:

> It means the "internal security" of the community. It has to do with the stabilization of collective arrangements, reliability and confidence in the existing social order, a generalized attitude of confidence among people in the formally existing situation, and with the prevention of a general lack of confidence.[75]

These changes did not mark any kind of return to fascism, since the open terror of the Nazi past was missing, so much as a constitutionally-orchestrated removal of constitutional limits on state power in the direction of a police state. Although a certain amount of intelligence illegality accompanied these legislative changes, the main thrust was the maintenance of the legally-based legitimacy of the state while at the same time expanding state powers. In the acute words of the Justice Minister of the time:

> The constitutional state is being tuned to the actual situation.[76]

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73. Cobler, op.cit., pp.38-50 describes the atmosphere of state-stimulated moral panic used to justify the measures. His chapter headings in Part 2 ["Channeling Emotions"] summarize the process: "Public Enemies", "Permanent Horror", and "Call to a Witch-hunt".

74. The meaning of the intention to criminalize *advocacy* of actions deemed harmful to the state was adumbrated by a Federal judge :
> First, there is advocacy in the form of an indirect appeal, second advocacy in the form of an apparent distancing of oneself, thirdly the description of criminal actions which invite imitation, fourthly advocacy in the form of giving approval to an historical event with the intention of presenting a model to be imitated, fifthly advocacy in the form of an announcement or prediction of acts of violence that invite imitation, and sixthly advocacy of violence in the form of reproduction of the opinions of others in which the author identifies himself with that opinion in order to produce a particular impression.

Ibid., pp.92,97.

75. *Neue Juristische Wochenschrift*, 1972, p.1791, cited in ibid., p.196.

76. H.J.Vogel, 1975, in ibid., p.143.

The model that came to prevail in West Germany in the 1970s was very much what Duncan Campbell described in the parallel case of preventive surveillance by British police as "society under suspicion".[77] The key, however, was not so much the particular powers of the intelligence agencies as the organizational climate and attitudes of the domestic intelligence managers. In part this was a matter of organizational tone and style. "Gestapo" images of black-coated goons were misplaced in an era of cool social-science informed security technocrats. This was related to the shift in the basis of consent in the establishment of "the progressive system of social control" described ironically by Enzenberger:

> Delusions of the kind traditionally indispensable for German politics -like antisemitism or the consciousness of a national mission - recede and give way to egotistical calculation. Everyone who gets onto a plane has an immediate interest that the machine should not be hijacked or blown up; he will therefore accept the security checks and even welcome them. The gurus of the progressive police generalize this model. They place little store by the mobilization of the masses, such as Fascism needed; they merely urge us to be "sensible". The civilization on which our continued existence depends, they say, is extremely complicated and very vulnerable. Its success is bought at the price of risks that increase daily: crimes, crises of scarcity, sabotage, wildcat strikes, psychological disturbances, environmental pollution, radioactive poisoning, drug addiction, economic crises, terrorism, and so forth...The loss of a sacrosanct private sphere is accepted and the surveillance agency can, without encountering massive public resistance, prepare and store data on an entire population which "after all, has nothing to hide".[78]

But more important is the shift in self-conception of the intelligence managers. The archetypal intelligence chief of the period, the long-serving head of the Federal Criminal Investigation Bureau, Dr. Herold staked the claim of the intelligence agencies to steer the state on the basis of objective and privileged social scientific knowledge.[79]

This is not necessarily a matter of the intelligence agencies seeking autonomy from the rest of the state in an illicit manner, though it may turn out that way. Rather it is a matter of shifts in the character of the state itself as a result of the requirement to simultaneously secure control over actual or projected sources of political (or perhaps even more importantly "non-political"-political) opposition generated by the contradictions of the social system it is designed to protect, while at the same time maintaining the aura of legally-based democratic legitimation.

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77. Campbell, op.cit.

78. Enzenberger. op.cit., p.13. Shils, op.cit., provides a subtle account of the flux of privacy and intrusion, transparency and opacity in social relations in the modern period.

79. See the quotation from Herold already cited at the head of this chapter; Cobler, op.cit., p.148.

The rationalization of domination

The type of political surveillance demonstrated in the West German example represents a new level in the rationalization of political domination. "Rationalization" is used here in the sense developed by Weber, referring to the systematising of an activity, the removal of extraneous or inhibiting or functionally irrational elements, and the development of the logic within a pattern. Domination in and through a state will always be based on a shifting balance between outright coercion, ideology, and increasingly, what Foucault called the "disciplinary technologies of power". Domestically-oriented intelligence agencies are involved in all three activities, but especially the last.

While spying on enemies, watching the subjects of the sovereign, and listening to the mood of political gossip in the market are ancient arts of the state, late twentieth century efforts have changed these arts into sciences. Surveillance by nation-states is now more deliberate, more comprehensive, more intense (albeit uneven, even in the most highly surveilled states), more scientifically-based, and technologically-mediated than ever before. Bureaucratic application of scientific approaches in the technology and organization of surveillance has substantially amplified the state's capacity to watch and listen to an ever-larger proportion of its citizens.

This rationalization of one mode of domination has shifted the balance of power between state and citizen towards the state, yielding images of a New Leviathan, liberal or otherwise. Yet it would be wrong to conclude from this development that such shifts are not contested by citizens or that the balance does always or will forever more lie with the state. As Weber often pointed out, neither formal nor substantive rationalization ever proceeds in a straight line or is unimpeded or uncontested. Giddens is helpful when he notes that each of the four institutional clusters of modernity he identifies is the site of a set of political - and, one should say, cultural - contests. Thus the transformation of nature is contested by ecological critique; class and private property by labour; militarization by peace movements; and, most importantly for the present concern, surveillance and bureaucratic power by democratic movements. The particular character of such democratic resistance will obviously vary and its strengths wax and wane. But there is no inherent reason to maintain that the rationalization of one mode of domination will not in time be met by effective forms of resistance. Were it otherwise we would have been living constantly - rather than intermittently - in the belly of Leviathan for a very long time. What is needed is study of the rationalization of such democratic resistance in the face of new challenges. That study could well begin by recalling Raymond Williams:

> However dominant a social system may be, the very meaning of its domination involves a limitation or selection of the activities it covers, so that by definition it cannot exhaust all social experience, which therefore always potentially contains space for alternative acts and alternative intentions which are not yet articulated as a social institution or even project.[80]

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80. Raymond Williams, *Politics and Letters: Interview with New Left Review*, (London: Verso, 1979), p.252.