Chapter 11
Theory and practice in intelligence and control operations:
(1) Terror

While information about the actual workings of the intelligence and security apparatus is not extensive, there are some important pieces of evidence which allow something of a view beyond the simple matter of institutional structure outlined in the previous three chapters. Four major types of evidence have become available in recent years. Firstly, there is the Indonesian Army Staff and Command College manual for the year 1982: *Vademecum: Pengetahuan Pertahanan Keamanan [Vademecum: Defence and Security Studies]*. Secondly there are a number of Indonesian Army intelligence reports and manuals which have come into the public domain, mainly by capture in East Timor and Irian Jaya. Third, there are comments on the operations of these agencies by their victims, some of whom have made incisive analyses. Finally, a number of detailed and reliable studies of violations of civil and political rights in Indonesia and East Timor have been carried out, by both Indonesian and foreign researchers.

This and the following chapter look at the theory and practice of intelligence and social-political operations in Indonesia, first concentrating on the uses of terror in this chapter, and surveillance in the next. This chapter opens with an examination of the Seskoad textbook model of intelligence operations, social-political operations and territorial operations. The intelligence bureaucracy's model of social, political and cultural threat assessment is also reviewed. The theory set out in this textbook approach is then compared with the evidence about such operations in Indonesian political life over the past two decades. Four examples of surveillance and terror by intelligence agencies are reviewed: East Timor, Irian Jaya, the Bais and police mass murder campaign against alleged criminals in 1983-84, and ongoing provocation and terror against students and Muslims.

While the accumulated information is greater than is often thought, it must be said at the outset that the following discussion of the workings of these state agencies is based on a limited range of evidence. Inevitably, this relatively small number of sources will provide a somewhat distorted view of the whole: at worst it is a matter of the five blind people each trying to describe the elephant they have never seen - one holding a trunk, another a tail, another an ear, and so on. However, there is no alternative to beginning with what is available, and hoping that more evidence will come into the public domain in due course to correct the inaccuracies. And that is the real point: the object of analysis is one which is more common than is commonly admitted in limp discussions of social research: one which has a great deal of information about its own history and activities; which actively monitors its own environment, including attempts at inquiry into itself; and which is in a position to evade or minimize or colour accurate discussions of it by outsiders. In short, this is a discussion of the workings of a part of the political community that has a good deal to say to and about itself, and very little to say to the outside world.

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1. Indonesia, Seskoad [Sekolah Staf dan Komando], *Vademecum: Pengetahuan Pertahanan Keamanan*, (Bandung: Markas Besar, TNI–AD, Sekolah Staf dan Komando, Cetakan Dua, 1982).
The textbook models

In 1982 the Headquarters of the Army Staff and Command College (Seskoad) issued the second edition of *Vademecum: Defence and Security Studies*, a 700 page basic manual for middle-ranking officers taking the one year Seskoad course. The manual was divided into seven sections, several of which are straightforward military science subjects as one would expect in a comparable western manual: Command and Communications, Operations (from Amphibious to Intelligence), Administration and Management, Military Science Studies, and Strategic Issues. Not all of these have the content that would be expected on a western model: Military Science Studies deals mainly with social analysis: three of its four chapters are: Social Research Methods, Survey Instrument Construction, and Territorial Development as a Development Approach. Some of the other parts would be unusual in a western military curriculum; for example: Struggle [Perjuangan], which discussed the Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution, the *dwifungsi* (dual function) of the Armed Forces, their Sacred Duty as Inheritors of the Values of 1945, the Foundation of the Armed Forces Leadership [of Indonesian Society], and the History of the Struggle of the Armed Forces. Most important of all was the part that typified the longstanding social and political preoccupations of Indonesian military thinking: Part 3 - Territorial. This discussion will be based principally on that Part of the manual.

Intelligence operations

The manual distinguished a number of different types of activities and operations in the social-political sphere: intelligence, territorial, social-political, internal security and defence operations and activities. The definition of intelligence operations was straightforward enough, distinguishing investigation or intelligence proper [*penyelidikan*], counter-intelligence [*pengamanan*], and supportive operations [*penggalangan*] - or more appropriately, covert action:

Intelligence operations are all overt or covert activities and measures which are planned and guided with the aim of collecting information or data, creating or ripening a situation or climate which is needed to achieve the desired objective, and to take action to oppose or frustrate the operational arrangements of enemy intelligence.


3. The general cautionary note sounded above is applicable to this reading of the Seskoad manual as well. It is only a manual, not a description of practice. Moreover it is not the only manual covering intelligence and social-political operations: more specific instruction and training manuals, and Established Procedures [*Prosedur Tetap*] would be issued - by departments at Seskoad, by the intelligence training schools, and by particular units, for both general and specific purposes. Yet, Seskoad is the most prestigious of Army colleges, and one of the key loci of Army integration. Moreover, senior intelligence officers (such as Sutopo Yuwono) have had a close association with the school. It is reasonable to believe that the manual sets down the officially sanctioned version of how such operations ought to be conducted, at least in theory if not practice.

4. There are difficulties in directly translating these three terms into English. *Penyelidikan* is literally "investigation", as in the Police Criminal Investigation Bureau; but in practice refers to the broadly analytical and research parts of intelligence work. *Pengamanan* is literally "the activity of securing" or "the rendering secure" of an object; as opposed to *keamanan* ("security"). It is the Indonesian term used for the English "counter-intelligence". *Penggalangan* is a difficult term, in practice used to cover black operations, psychological warfare, covert action and the euphemistic "dirty tricks. The literal meaning is "supportive operations", in the sense shown in the next paragraph. [PS/39]

5. *Indonesia, Seskoad*, op.cit., p.308.
The activist emphasis was clear in all three cases, especially, obviously enough, in counter-intelligence and covert action. The work of intelligence was fundamentally conceived to be very much more than just information gathering and security. The operational aims of counter-intelligence and supportive operations/covert action respectively were

2) creating and ripening an atmosphere or situation which furthers the interest and execution of defence and security in the political, economic and social fields, as well as in the psychological and other fields.

3) Securing, against the efforts and activities of enemy intelligence, all people and operations with ideological, political, economic, social and cultural [Ipolekososbud] potential necessary for the national security system.\(^6\)

Covert, supportive actions are specific operations to be carried out by special intelligence facilities...to support policy [kebijaksanaan] which is being attacked or is about to be attacked, and to remove obstructions

Such actions are always carried out on a covert basis, although this may be a matter of carrying out an ostensibly open activity in such a way that "the aim is always covert or kept secret".\(^7\)

Strategic intelligence, encompassing any and all issues of national interest, involves the continuous practice of all three types of operations and activities, varying intensity and mix according to need, but always under a single command and design.

Foreign targets are dealt with covertly. Domestic targets can be dealt with overtly or covertly.\(^8\)

In most respects this specification of the brief of intelligence operations is close to the normal range of western agencies. The acquisition of intelligence and its analysis is always in practice tied to covert action in support of state policy, whether in one agency or in several. The most distinctively Indonesian note is the term ipolekososbud, used here to refer to the range of concerns of covert/supportive action. It is a term which recurs throughout Indonesian military thinking. It is an acronym formed from the first syllables of ideologi, politik, ekonomi, sosial, budaya [culture].\(^9\) It is the standard term to cover the brief not only of intelligence work, but also territorial and social-political operations. While it is reasonable to expect any modern intelligence agency to be concerned with each of these elements, the unitary expression in the acronym (and as will be shown below, in the detailed tasks of operations) denotes a constant and politicised concern for social control against all sources of disturbances.\(^10\)

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6. Ibid., p.310.

7. Ibid., p.309.

8. Ibid., pp.311-312.

9. In places it becomes Ipolekososbudmil, to include military matters, or worse still (reportedly) Ipolekososbudmilroh, to assert a temporal rendering of spiritual [rohaniah] affairs.

10. Against the integralist tenor of the term Ipolekososbudmil, it is worth noting that all but one of the words contributing to it have a western derivation.
Territorial Operations

Indonesian military doctrine has been characterised by its emphasis on territorial warfare, an integration of military, militia and civilian components of defence, and on the peace-time preparation of a social and technical base for guerilla warfare as a necessary stage of defence against invasion. In the Seskoad manual, more than a hundred of the seven hundred pages was devoted to various aspects of territorial management and defence. This vital part of the manual commenced with an important distinction between what can be taken as a broad understanding of territorial affairs - Regional Management [Pembinaan Wilayah]; and a narrow, more clearly defence and security understanding - Territorial Management [Pembinaan Teritorial].

The meaning of Territorial Management can be distinguished from Regional Management because the scope of Territorial Management emphasises the organisation of the defence and security potential, whereas Regional Management is aimed at welfare and its usefulness for defence and security.

The pursuit of the two together has
the aim of creating maximum and effective National defence through Security and Welfare in order to attain National Goals.

The place of intelligence and social inquiry more broadly understood is set down at the outset:
Three factors influence territorial issues: geography as the framework, within which is demography as the content, and social conditions [Ipolekososbudmil] as the factor of social life that results from the synthesis of the other two elements. In accord with this, and the reality of the whole way of life, these three factors also change and develop continuously.

For that reason, territorial issues are always influenced by changes in these factors, and must be followed and analyzed continuously, so that we can always obtain the latest and most appropriate data in reply to every challenge, at each time and place, and provide as many resources as possible for potential use by territorial elements.\(^1\)

The actual practice of territorial operations, and the internal organisation of staffing and authority has varied over more than thirty years.\(^2\) In 1982, the Army Territorial Staff, through the Assistant for Territorial Affairs to the Army Chief of Staff, held responsibility for Territorial Activities and Operations, which were understood as being generally "to uphold and protect the authority of the Government". A distinction was made between Territorial Operations in two modes, corresponding to the degree and type of threat and, consequently, the level and complexity of operations to regain control of the situation.

The less common form dealt with cases of physical threat, whether violent or otherwise, in which Territorial Operations would be carried out in the context of a State of Emergency or of War, as either Internal Security Operations [Ops Kamdagri] or Defence Operations [Perata], and in this case would be termed Territorial Resistance Operations [Ops (Wan) Ter]. The more common, and ongoing form was termed Territorial

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1. Indonesia, Seskoad, op.cit., p.315.
2. Ibid., pp.321-322.
Management Operations [Ops (Bin) Ter], with the aim of improving territorial development activities for re-stabilising slack Social Conditions.\(^\text{13}\)

This last mandate could be exercised at any time, as a result of general coordination, or through the Regional Leaders Conference [Muspidia] or under Kopkamtib auspices, as well as in States of Emergency or of War.

*Social and political operations*

Under the doctrine current in 1982\(^\text{14}\), social and political operations cast a potentially wide net:

Social and political operations are intended to carry out, or to create a situation where it is possible to carry out, the vital tasks of the Armed Forces as a social force...; ensuring the security and success of each Government program in the field of development.

As elsewhere, the stabilisation of social conditions (Ipolekososbudmil conditions in fact) was to generate the basis for national development and security.

The purpose of making society the object is to direct public opinion towards a situation favourable to us.\(^\text{15}\)

Prosperity and success were to be the goal of social and political operations. The usual form of social-political operations is to be overt, emphasising education and persuasion by giving understanding, guidance, direction, support and stimulus in the face of a point of view which is not yet able to accept [particular] concepts, thoughts or ideological, political, economic, social or cultural conditions as desired.

But in special circumstances, such operations could be covert. Either way, social-political operations can be carried out on a strategic or tactical basis, and in either a preventive or repressive way.

The implementation of social and political operations is not only a matter for the Armed Forces: the burden falls as much on organisations of the Wives of the Armed Forces (which shares the same "foundation and principle of struggle" as ABRI), Defence and Security Civil Servants (who have "a greater durability [daya tahan] and capacity in the fields of ideology, economics, politics, society and culture" - as does the Wives organisation); and the members of the Indonesian Armed Forces Retired Officers Association [Pepabri] and their families who are spread in every corner of Indonesia and are established in all areas of social life, ensuring great capacity in aiding the execution of social and political operations.\(^\text{16}\)

\(^{13}\) Ibid., p.324.


\(^{15}\) Ibid., p.396.

\(^{16}\) Ibid., p.400.
Threat levels and the framework of intervention: Regional Security Management

Beyond the types of operations set out above, there are the full-blown strategies of Internal Security Operations under a State of Emergency or full Defence Operations under a State of War. For most of the New Order period, internal pacification has not been attempted through states of emergency; rather it has been through the militarised intelligence, territorial and social-political structure just outlined. But the effective deployment of these options requires a framework of understanding the level and character of threat and a guide to the selection of appropriate response. This has been provided through the doctrine of Regional Security Management [Pembinaan Keamanan Kewilayahan - Binkanwil]. In the 1982 manual, Regional Security Management referred to all activities and efforts connected with planning, organisation, development, direction and control in the context of realising a situation which is secure and calm in a given region, which is carried out in a coordinated and integrated manner by Community Guidance authorities [aim of which is] to give a feeling of security and comfort to the community so that the government apparatus is able to fulfil its obligations in peace.17

Here as elsewhere, operational definitions of the political-military situations in which the territorial apparatus was to act in specified ways were provided. Within the general framework of territorial operations all military jurisdictions were assessed as to their level of security, on a scale from "Secure" [Aman], through "Disturbed" [Rawan], "Dangerous" [Gawat], "Critical" [Kritis], to "Alarming" [Bahaya]. These administrative distinctions between "Situation Levels" were tied to observable social phenomena, as follows18:

1. Secure
a. Secure is the condition where all of society is free from danger and fear so that life and livelihood can be carried out in an ordered and calm way.

b. Several indications of a secure condition are:

1)Government polices and programs can be carried out in an effective and efficient way by each level of the government apparatus.

2)The wellbeing of the community in its life and livelihood is protected and guaranteed.

3)In the community there is an ambition to work which stimulates creativity, critical attitudes and advances a feeling of mutual responsibility.

2. Disturbed
Disturbed refers to a situation where there are interest conflicts [Eng.] between community groups or between community groups and the government so that order and calm are disturbed.

17. Ibid., p.412.

18. Ibid., p.330, citing "Meaning of Situation Levels": (Hankam Combined Operations Doctrine NS 02/76).
3. Dangerous

Dangerous refers to a condition where interest conflicts take the form of tension or social tension between community groups or political tensions occur between government apparatuses, or between community groups and government apparatus as a result of the growth of subversive elements. A dangerous situation generally disturbs the stability of order and security.

4. Critical

Critical refers to a level of situation where social and political conflicts have grown to become conflicts using physical force, taking the form of sabotage, strikes and boycott actions, accusations as well as killings happening between community groups or between community groups and the government. Crisis usually threatens national security.

5. Alarming

An alarming situation occurs when the life of the nation and the state is threatened with destruction because of violent efforts to change the Constitution and philosophy of the Government by force.

Under the Regional Security Management regime, disturbances to community security were classified according to three sets of criteria: whether physical or non-physical in form; whether criminal or subversive; and whether "motivated from an ideological, political, economic, socio-cultural or security background", and by degree: light, moderate or heavy. The resulting classification of security disturbances is sufficiently illuminating to quote at length in Table 11.1.

This classification yielded an alternative brief classification of levels of security threat: secure; disturbed (based on imminent socio-economic/cultural threats); and dangerous (based on political/security motives for disturbances). Intervention by the Territorial Apparatus was to be dependent on the level and type of threat: light and moderate socially motivated disturbances required territorial monitoring only, while moderate ideological or politically-motivated disturbances called the apparatus to a higher state of readiness to intervene. Any of the more serious forms of disturbance were immediately within the jurisdiction of the Territorial Apparatus, either in its own right or under Kopkmamtib auspices.

The role of the different types of operations that have been discussed was then schematically set down in relation to the situation guidelines:

1) Investigative intelligence and counter-intelligence operations are vital to disclose the background to a specific problem/issue and the main actors behind it, as with strength, motivation and distribution in the area.

19. Ibid., p.413.
20. Ibid., pp.414-415.
2) Supportive/psychological warfare intelligence operations are vital whenever a large part of the community or specific group is influenced an extreme group or a subversive/dissatisfied group so
# Table 11.1
Levels of security disturbance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Socio-economic/ socio-cultural motives</th>
<th>Light: in the form of tension or dissatisfaction because of lack of knowledge or misunderstanding.</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Moderate: Socio-economic and Socio-cultural issues where the situation has not yet sharpened.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Heavy: as in Social Economic and Social Cultural issues which have already moved to open opposition, e.g. because of ethnic motives, racialism, the alarm of minority groups, and so on.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NON-PHYSICAL</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Ideological and/or political motives</td>
<td>Moderate: political issues, propaganda and such like.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Heavy: political issues which have already been broadened or exacerbated, for instance by the distribution of underground [gelap] pamphlets or other measures that raise the political temperature or stir up mud or manipulate the dissatisfaction or opposition in the community.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Light: such as the results of urbanisation trends - including increasing homelessness, unemployment, and prostitution.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Light: such low-level criminality, (theft, misdemeanours, gambling) and various forms of juvenile delinquency.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Heavy: such as Tribal, Race and Interest Group [SARA] opposition and serious criminal activities.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Socio-economic/ socio-cultural motives</td>
<td>Moderate: such as labour disputes/strikes, demonstrations, and so on.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Heavy: such as labour disputes which escalate to demonstrations, putting up posters/graffiti, and other forms of violence.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Moderate: labour disputes which escalate with demonstrations in all their implications where there is or already has been a tendency to violence and is already relatively widespread.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Heavy: as in terror, sabotage, or other subversive trends which already have used armed violence to achieve their goals.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

that they are already clearly supporting such a group, and in an a priori way are opposed to the government.

3) Territorial Operations are vital whenever enemy forces are still relatively limited to cell-form and have not yet been successful in influencing the community in a general way.

4) Public Order and Security Operations are vital whenever the disturbing essence takes more the form of organised crime or is alarming the community but does not yet have political strength or a Defence and Security quality.

5) Combat operations are vital whenever the threatening body has either political or armed strength, and is already an organised force endangering the continuity of life as well as authority of the government and the national well-being.

**Intelligence and security operations in practice: Timor and Irian**

Just how this model of the integration of surveillance, evaluation and intervention arrangements works in practice is difficult to evaluate: secrecy is characteristic of even this relatively overt portion of the intelligence-security apparatus. Documents captured from Indonesian military forces on operational duty in Irian Jaya and East Timor bring us closer to the daily practice of military territorially-based activities. This section examines applications of the Seskoad model in East Timor and Irian Jaya, and evidence of the practice intelligence and security operations from more central parts of Indonesian society. What is striking from this analysis is the level of instrumental rationality, systematic surveillance of the population and general continuity with the interventionist approach recommended at Seskoad, combined with an administrative acceptance of torture and ill-treatment of prisoners. In practice, surveillance and intervention following the Seskoad model are used to generate varying levels of terror in specific populations.

**Surveillance and terror in East Timor intelligence and security operations**

Since the Indonesian invasion of the former Portuguese colony, East Timor has been the site of an assault on the Timorese population by Indonesian forces of holocaust proportions, in which up to one-fifth of the 1975 population is thought to have died. The resilience of Timorese resistance for more than a decade in the face of superior numbers, logistics, and military technology has meant that the territory has also been the site of the Indonesian Armed Forces most concerted application of the intelligence and security model set out in the Seskoad manual.

In 1985 Amnesty International published a series of captured Indonesian Army documents emanating from Military Resort Command [Korem] 164/Wira Darma based in Dili. All appear to have been written around 1982, and appeared over the signatures of the Korem Commander, Colonel Adolf Sahala Rajagukguk, and his Intelligence “Chief”, Major Williem da Costa. Those appearing over da Costa's name were either Instruction

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22. All of the above deals with the operations of the standard military bureaucratised part of the apparatus. It says nothing about the operating procedures of Bakin, particularly its penggalangan activities in the heyday of Ali Moertopo; Opsus; or, after 1983, different parts of Bais. One part of Bais' work would draw on exactly the organisational techniques set out in the Seskoad manual model; on the other hand, there would be another layer of less standardised activities.
Manuals or a training plan. Rajagukguk's name appeared over three sets of Established Procedures [Prosedur Tetap - Protap].

Two of Rajagukguk's Established Procedures are most important for the present purpose: one (Established Procedure on Intelligence No.01/IV/1982) sets out instructions for Territorial Intelligence activities in East Timor. After seven years of occupation, it is a fact that the GPK's [Gerakan Pengacau Keamanan - Security Threatening Elements] underground networks have not yet been finished off. Although it is known that these networks are closely related to customs and to the family system, it is clear that special treatment is required if they are to be broken up. In order to be able more speedily to crush the GPK remnants to their roots and to prevent their re-emergence, it is necessary to develop Territorial Intelligence in East Timor.

The character of the prevailing intelligence regime in place prior to this Protap is not clear, or the effective distinction in the East Timor campaign of the Territorial Apparatus [Apter] and Combat Units [Satpur]. This Protap was intended to ensure a new level of integration of intelligence and intervention between combat and territorial activities:

Territorial intelligence activities to back-up anti-guerilla operations in East Timor require that special emphasis be placed on extraordinary support procedures so that all efforts and activities are well and truly coordinated. This instruction is intended for every section of the apparatus which is directly connected with the life of the community.

The "intelligence function" included "investigation, consolidation and security", and dealt with "the field of operations, the weather, and the GPK and the community which is the object of the contest between the GPK and ABRI units". The object of the exercise was total:

Control over all aspects of the life of the community is the key to efforts to separate the GPK from the people.

Success was to be assessed both by the degree in which the people held the occupying forces and the state's total penetration of the life of the people:

The apparatus is working well if:

1. Every change occurring within the community is known. To achieve this, every official must be sensitive to his environment.

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24. All references to this document in the following paragraphs are from Budiardjo and Liem, op.cit., pp.193-210.

25. This is a major problem, given the extent to which the early years of the war were regarded as under the control of the intelligence-security axis of the Army - see above, [coordination section...]. In an Instruction Manual (JUKNIS/01-4/1982) on Village Guidance, da Costa says: "There may be a variety of officers in the village, e.g. Babinsa [Village Guidance NCO] and Binpolda [Area Police NCO]; members of battalion 745 charged with guiding the Ratih; a Territorial NCO [Bater] from another unit; and intelligence NCO [Ba Intel] from the Satgas Intel or other units, and the Team Pembina Desa". Budiardjo and Liem, op.cit., p.214.
ii) Every time an inhabitant goes out of the area, the direction, destination, time and reason are known.

iii) Any time that goods that could be used as logistics for the guerillas are shifted to or from the area to places suspected as GPK areas, information of this is speedily available and preventive action is taken.

iv) No inhabitant's home is being used as a hideout for the GPK, with periodic check's being made.

v) In all fields of life, it is possible to discover efforts to set up GPK support networks and detect the existence of such networks, and to keep informed of the relationship between these two aspects of life.

The document is divided into two main sections: one providing an analysis of Fretilin's community basis and its political and military tactics; the other sets down mandatory Army procedures for countering this approach. The analysis of Fretilin is acute and well-researched. It is dispassionate and clear, setting forward Fretilin's immediate and long-term goals and use of resources without disparagement, despite the terminology of "GPK". It is difficult to imagine substantial Fretilin disagreement about this antagonistic assessment. In several places it acknowledges Indonesian weaknesses; e.g.:

- Organisation of people's support [by Fretilin] also takes account of cultural factors so that:
  i. It is difficult for ABRI units to take action because of their stupidity or naivety.
  ii. If ABRI units do decide to take firm action, this will only arouse people's antipathy because people will help them according to traditions based on values acceptable to the community.

The instructions for dealing with this formidable enemy are directed at the Military District Commands [Koramil] and the Village Guidance Teams [Tim Pembina Desa] and Village Guidance NCOs [Babinsa]. The instructions begin with the standard territorial intelligence task as in the Seskoad manual: "establishing the level of trouble-someness [kerawanan] of the village" by reference to specified criteria. The Protap then sets out techniques for exposing Fretilin networks, implementing village security, and interrogation. Combat unit instructions for village patrolling are then tied back to the analysis of Fretilin tactics. Throughout, the emphasis is on the integration of all the arms of the state apparatus, and basing operations on thorough intelligence penetration of the target community and field of operation.

The two most important recommended methods of obtaining the required information are direct surveillance (overt and covert) and interrogation of East Timorese people - villagers, suspects and prisoners. One of the manuals is an Established Procedure for the Interrogation of Prisoners\(^\text{26}\). As in other parts of the captured documents, the recommended procedure is to avoid violence, to stress the interrogator's understanding of

\(^{26}\) PROTAP/01/-B/VII/1982, reproduced whole as Document 4 in ibid., pp.233-237. In fact interrogation procedures are dealt with in several of the documents.
the prisoner's situation and awareness of Fretilin threats in the event the prisoner aids the Indonesian cause, and the futility of inducing the prisoner to confess to anything and everything the interrogator proposes.

At the start of the interrogation, the person must be given a guarantee of his/her safety and survival so as to eliminate any idea that they will be killed regardless of whether they tell the truth or not.

Give them the freedom to talk about anything they know. Once people feel assured of their personal safety, the next step is to give them the opportunity to speak or give accounts about everything they knew while they were in the bush.27

This tone of the rational abjuring of violence and threat gives way in the following paragraphs to a "realistic" acceptance of torture:

It is hoped that interrogation with the use of force will not be implemented except in those situations where the person examined tells the truth with difficulty (is evasive). However, if the use of force is required a member of the local population (TBOs28), members of the civilian militia, ordinary people, should not be present to witness it, in order to avoid arousing the antipathy of the people.

The use of force often has the consequence that the person being interrogated under duress confesses falsely because he is afraid, and, as a consequence, agrees to everything the interrogator wishes.29

Almost, but not quite, unbelievably, this administrative sanction of torture continues:

Avoid taking photographs showing torture (of someone being given electric shocks, stripped naked and so on). Remember that such documentation should not be printed freely outside/in Denpasar [Bali, where regional command headquarters is located] and obtained by irresponsible members of the society.30

Amnesty went on to comment that

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27. Ibid., pp.235-6.


29. Amnesty International 1985:53-54. In all of this the Indonesian manual for East Timor operations is remarkably similar to Japanese Imperial Army practises. In August 1943, the Hayashi Division in Burma issued a manual entitled Notes for the Interrogation of Prisoners of War, which included the following:

Care must be taken when making use of rebukes, invectives or torture as it will result in his telling falsehoods and making a fool out of you.

The following are the methods normally to be adopted:

(a) Torture. This includes kicking, beating, and anything connected with physical suffering. This method is only to be used when everything else fails as it is the most clumsy. Change the interrogating officer after using violent torture, and good results can be obtained if the new officer questions in a sympathetic manner.


30. Amnesty International, East Timor..., op.cit., p.54. The manual is reproduced whole in Budiardjo and Liem op.cit. The instruction continues:

"It is better to take photographs, such as shots taken while eating together with the prisoner, or shaking hands with those who have just come down from the bush, showing them in front of a house, and so on. If such photos are circulated in the bush, this is a classic way of undermining their morale and fighting spirits. And if such photos are shown to the priests, this can draw the church into supporting operations to restore security." (Budiardjo and Liem, op.cit., p.237)

What is surprising is just how many photographs of Indonesian military reach the outside, one way or another. The Budiardjo and Liem translation makes clear that the local militia referred to are TBO, Hansip and Ratih personnel.
Many of the reports of torture and ill-treatment received by Amnesty International concern people in precisely those circumstances described in the passage above, namely prisoners being interrogated after surrender or capture. A Timorese who had worked with Indonesian intelligence described the procedure in these circumstances:

"The normal procedure was to interrogate the captives or those that surrendered. People who surrendered and who were not soldiers who had engaged in battle with Fretilin would be permitted to go free after the interrogation but only after approval from intelligence headquarters in Dili.

"During the interrogation they were normally tortured, especially if the interrogators thought they were Fretilin soldiers or leaders. They were tortured by hitting them with a blunt instrument, by jabbing lighted cigarettes in their faces around the mouth, or by giving them electric shocks, sometimes on the genitals.

"The senior authorities would decide who was to be killed after the interrogation. Most of the leaders or more educated ones, those who were talented, were killed."31

These accounts could be extended, case by case, with the swelling and falling wave of lists of the dead, the abused and the disappeared in East Timor. That task has been undertaken elsewhere; the purpose here is less honourable, more distancing - the analysis and explanation of what happened. Suffice to make one final set of connections between the bureaucratic rationality and impersonal generalities of the manuals and standard operating procedures. "Intelligence officers" are regularly mentioned as perpetrators of torture, disappearances and extra-judicial executions in Timor. One final, recent example:

...Domingos de Castro, an official of the Economic and Development Services in Aileu, disappeared after meeting with intelligence officers in early December 1987. Before his disappearance, de Castro said that he was approached in late November 1987 by a major of the intelligence division of the Special Forces, and was questioned about his support for Fretilin. According to de Castro, He admitted that he supported a proposal for a negotiated settlement of the East Timor conflict set forth by Fretilin leader Xanana Gusmao. In a second meeting, de Castro was urged to write to Xanana, urging him to surrender. Shortly before his disappearance, he reportedly drafted a letter that the intelligence officers considered unsatisfactory.32

What these sources make clear is not the fact of torture in interrogation - that is abundantly clear from survivors' and witnesses' testimony over more than fifteen years of war - but rather the official sanction and normalizing of torture, and the control over torture and extra-judicial execution by senior officers. These sources rule out the possibility that these patterns of behaviour are "only" the result of unsanctioned "excesses" carried out by the lower orders of the military.33 What becomes abundantly


33. This is exactly as would be expected from the evidence in those few cases where torturers have been brought to trial in proper judicial circumstances. See, for example, Amnesty International, Torture in Greece: The First Torturers' Trial, 1975, (London: Amnesty International, 1977).
clear is that for the Indonesian military operating in East Timor surveillance, interrogation, intelligence and terror are inextricably and instrumentally linked. It is true, as Amnesty notes, that the manuals were issued for use in East Timor alone, and are not necessarily applicable to Indonesia as a whole. Yet, as will be shown, the East Timor application of the Seskoad model resulted only in the most extreme and sustained application of organised terror - but it was by no means the only one. The same alternation of instrumentally rational bureaucratic assessment, systematic surveillance of the population, and the most brutal and sadistic forms of interrogation and killing is found in Irian Jaya.

Irian intelligence and security operations

In the quarter century since the effective incorporation of Irian Jaya into Indonesia, the province has seen a constant stream of accounts of abuse of state power against the indigenous population. These accounts have been by no means regular, varying with both the varying intensity of resistance and repression, and the effectiveness of the Indonesian state's ability to restrict the flow of information. An Asia Watch report on Human Rights in Indonesia and East Timor based largely on interviews in the province summarised the difficulties acutely:

restrictions on access to information in Irian Jaya, including limitations on communications within the province, make it difficult to verify such reports. Indeed, it is probable that the vast majority of incidents of serious abuse are not reported at all. Residents of Irian Jaya who would be expected to be aware of human rights violations repeatedly stressed in discussions with Asia Watch representatives that they have no way of learning about most incidents of abuse, particularly those taking place in remote villages.34

But over the years, a surprising amount of information has emerged. In 1980 the Free Papua Movement [Organisasi Papua Merdeka - OPM] captured a report on the security situation in the province from the Irian Jaya Kopkamtib headquarters, authorised by the then Kodam commander (and Laksusda), Brigadier-General Santosa. One of the 50 copies of the document was captured from the provincial police chief during a road ambush. It was produced as a briefing prior to an operation to clear "wild terrorist gangs" (the Indonesian term for the Papuan resistance - Gerakan Pengacau Liar - GPL) from the districts of Jayapura, Merauke and Sorong. The report, as summarised by Osborne, includes brief, but rational bureaucratic assessments of the political and military position amongst the various OPM factions and fighting groups, including estimates of numbers of fighters, supporters and weapons. Despite a racist view of the "extremely low" cultural level of the indigenous people, the report displayed a careful instrumentalist rationality about the enemy's strengths and weaknesses, and the areas of Indonesian intelligence ignorance. For example:

Merauke: From Sawaerma and Agats, activities extend as far as the highlands and Fak Fak, and along the border in the south. Strength - core of about 10, with local mass support. Leader - "Silas". Weapons - not yet clear. Actions - inciting the local people; disrupting security and transmigrant settlers; laying barriers and traps along tracks.

Sorong: GPL separatist activity along the border has spread and encouraged a re-emergence in this area. Their activities are very covert. Areas of concern - inland

34. Asia Watch, op.cit., p236.
Ayamaru, the interior of the northern part of the Bird's Head and the industrial and mining areas. Strength - unclear, but because of strong tribal fanaticism and traditional ties it is thought that within a relatively short time they will get widespread support from among the population of Irian Jaya origin. This will be accompanied by a development of their networks. Weapons - unclear. As Sorong is an industrial/mining area, the tendency will be for them to engage in theft of explosives in these vital installations, the aim being for sabotage.  

Political and military intelligence summaries of this kind are produced by bureaucrats for other bureaucrats. The language, leaving aside the terminology of "GPL", etc., shows a familiar restraint of affect and concern for accuracy and moderation of claims. It is the traditional language of the military talking to itself - as a classic bureaucracy worried about achieving its goal.

What is important to remember is that this is the language of participants in a broader organisation of political repression. The same Kopkamtib organisation, operating through Kodam XVII troops, military police, Kopassandha/Kopassus troops, and police, carried out a policy of repression in brutal terms - against the OPM, its real and alleged supporters, and against the Papuan population at large.

Osborne reports on another batch of Kopkamtib documents showing the familiar schizoid mentality of intelligence bureaucracies, which fuse ordered surveillance and terror:

These records, typed on A4-sized sheets bearing Kopkamtib's stamp, start by seeking family information, as well as detainees' own histories. A question-and-answer format then begins; often, interviews occupy 30 pages at a sitting.

During a long interrogation in 1981, another captive told the officer that he no longer believed in the freedom movement. He "fully realised" his mistakes and promised not to repeat them.

This outcome was found in numerous other secret transcripts, as was a negative answer to the final question: "Did you feel there was any force or pressure applied by the interrogator? Records of interview were signed by the detainees."  

Precisely who is supposed to be impressed by signed demurrers of coercion in such circumstances is not clear: but the importance of such legalistic "fetishes" (Southwood and Flanagan) for the interrogators' psychic survival cannot be underestimated.

Some of the detainees in this episode were held at the notorious Ifargunung prison, near Sentani Airport in Jayapura. This prison is known to have a number of 4x4x4 metre underground concrete bunkers, used as cells, which can be turned into drowning pools. According to Free West Papua (January 1982)...many West Papuan nationalists have met their end in these 64,000 litre water traps. Prisoners are put into the bunkers naked as the water level is raised; in some


36. Ibid., pp.142-143.
cases they are left there as long as 72 hours, or the bunker is completely filled, giving
the prisoner no chance of survival.37

The fate of these detainees is not known. But that of individuals named in the transcripts
as OPM members or sympathisers is:

Wayne was questioned in connection with the large-scale attack that OPM mounted on
the Abepura military prison. During interrogation, he implicated a Papuan named
Willem Joku as one of the raid's leaders. The Kopamitib officer accused Wayne of
trying to shift the blame onto other OPM members, a suggestion he denied. Apparently
Kopamitib believed him. In 1982 the body of Willem Joku, along with that of Jonas Tu,
was found decomposed inside sacks on a beach. Five days earlier, Papuans believed,
they had been bound up in the sacks and thrown in the ocean near Jayapura.38

In 1983, Kopassus (then known as Kopassandha) red-beret elite shock troops were
transferred to Irian Jaya, after being involved in East Timor offensives against Fretilin and
in the "Petrus" death squads in Java and elsewhere in 1983-84. During this period,
Kopassandha troops were apparently used as much in police-type security operations
leading to arrest and detention (and/or disappearance), as much as "conventional"
counter-insurgency field operations. Repeated testimony has been given alleging
Kopassus involvement in disappearances, extra-judicial executions, kidnapping, torture,
and imprisonment under inhumane conditions. The most famous, and politically
significant case was the killing of the Jayapura anthropologist and Papuan nationalist
Arnold Ap. As Asia Watch remarked,

Whether intended or not, Ap's killing sent a powerful message to residents of the
province: "Provide information about conditions in Irian Jaya at your own risk."39

37. West Papua: The Obliteration of a People (London: Tapol, 1983), p.76. While there is no corroboration of this source, the
technique is remarkably similar to that reportedly used in Jalan Gandhi Prison in Medan about the same time: "It is a secret underground
room, 10 m x 10m x 20m., and filled with water about 1 1/4 m. deep. Prisoners are forced through a small hole 1m. x 1m., the only way
into the room, and made to stand in the water where rats, leeches, lizards and larvae swim around. Most of the prisoners placed there

38. Osborne, op.cit., p.144.

39. Asia Watch, op.cit., p.236. This source also reports in detail on continued physical abuse of prisoners and politically-motivated
killings in Irian as recent as 1988 and 1986 respectively. For an account of Ap's death see Robin Osborne, "The killing of Irian Jaya
nationalist Arnold Ap: new evidence comes to light", Inside Asia, (June–August 1985), pp.144 ff. The height of cynicism (or is it
psychological warfare?) was the arrest of Ap by plain-clothes Kopassandha troops the night after he performed with his Papuan cultural
troupe Mebesak to an audience of Indonesian dignitaries, including the wife of Benny Murdani.
Extra-judicial killings of criminals, 1983-84

At first sight, the wave of state-orchestrated extra-judicial killings between April 1983 and late 1984 in cities of Java, Sumatra and some other parts of Indonesia does not seem to be relevant to the theme of intelligence and security agencies and their operations. Yet few other events have so singularly revealed the character of the intelligence state in Indonesia in its internally-directed operations. In March 1983, the commander of the Jogjakarta military garrison launched an Army operation on the orders of the Military Area Commander which led to the killing of some 600 alleged gangsters in the first half of 1983. From this local base, killings began in other parts of Java and Madura, in North Sumatra, and in East and West Kalimantan. Bourchier summarises the usual mode of killing:

One of the most striking aspects of the killings was the similarity in the way they were carried out all over Indonesia. Criminals, gang members or ex-prisoners, frequently tattooed and almost always young and male, would be met in their houses or in the street by a group of four or five heavily built men. In many cases they would shoot their victim where they found him. More often they would bundle him (or them) into a jeep or Toyota Hardtop and drive off into the night. The victim would be taken to a quiet place and shot up to 12 times at close range with .45 or .38 calibre pistols. The body would then either be tossed into a river or left in some public place 'to increase the impact', in the words of a police source quoted in Tempo. Others, 'who were not regarded as useful, or whose deaths had to be kept quiet, were disposed of in secret places which would not be discovered'. The bodies which were found frequently had their hands bound, and often bore the marks of torture. The following day there would be a short report about the finding of a mayat bertato (tattooed corpse) in the local paper, usually accompanied by grisly pictures.

There was no serious attempt to avoid government responsibility for the killings after some initial prevarication. The killers were usually Armed Forces personnel: on some occasions police; but most commonly Army Special Forces troops [Kopassandha]. The campaign began in an atmosphere of public approval - certainly from middle class urban people who felt themselves the victims of a crime wave from which the police forces and judiciary were failing to protect them. Over time, however, that approval wained, and the voices of critics, both domestic and foreign, outside the government and even within, began to be heard more clearly. By the end of the campaign in late 1984, there was a distinct counter-sympathy for the victims of the killings and their families. By the time the killings had run their course, the estimated number of murdered ranged from 4,000 to ten thousand.

The origins of the campaign are not completely clear. As already mentioned, there was considerable public dissatisfaction with the failure of the police to protect the public and with allegedly lenient and ineffective sentencing practices by the judiciary. There was also dissatisfaction, some of it public, within the Armed Forces. Armed Forces

40. The following sketch relies heavily on interviews conducted in Indonesia in April-June 1988, and on David Bourchier's excellent "Crime, law and authority in Indonesia", in Arief Budiman, (ed.) State and Society in Contemporary Indonesia, (Clayton, Victoria: Centre of Southeast Asian Studies, Monash University, forthcoming).

41. Ibid., p.9. (Page references to manuscript.)
Commander Yusuf and Kopkamtib Commander Sudomo were publicly critical of police failings. In 1981 Yusuf criticised police for relying on "violence, force, and sadism to extract confessions". Sudomo, according to Bourchier, warned them that bashings, violence and extortion and the lending of arms for criminal purposes was 'no longer tolerable'.

This last comment carried the implication that there had been a time when police involvement in criminal activity was tolerated. In any case, there was throughout the subsequent campaign, an atmosphere of the military over-riding the police. The campaign was preceded by increased military involvement in urban anti-crime activity.

Two sources close to both the military and the police hierarchies at the time independently claimed that the operation was in fact a centralised military campaign under the control of the then new Armed Forces and Kopkamtib Commander, Moerdani. The operation resulted from a specific plan generated in the newly created Strategic Intelligence Agency [Bais] in response to Moerdani's request for action. Both sources maintained that the usual practice was for lists of potential targets to be drawn up locally by police intelligence [Intelpampol]. Action against nominated targets - "terminations" in the words of one source - would then only proceed on the basis of a signed authorisation from the Area Police Commander [Kadapol].

The common name given to the whole affair is "Petrus" - an acronym formed from the Indonesian term *penembak misterius* [mysterious killers]. It may be that the use of the term was even part of the campaign itself. For the most part I try to avoid the term since it tends to pre-empt inquiry, accepting a term that contributes to a discourse that was acceptable to the perpetrators. There was never anything mysterious about the killings - and that was precisely the point. The campaign was a classic case of an intelligence-based state terror campaign. Part of the potency of such terror is always the mysterious, and an equally essential part of a counter-discourse is a demystification of what Walter Benjamin termed "the mysterious side of the mysterious". The state was not uniformly in favour of the campaign, and the campaign was eventually stopped, in part due to public pressure, but not before the thousands of murders and disappearances had had an effect on both criminal groups and the wider society.

More importantly, the campaign fits into the Seskoad conception of socially-based threat and state response outlined in earlier in this chapter: a physically-based threat, from socio-economic motives, rated as heavy. The model recommends intervention by the Territorial Apparatus in its own right or under Kopkamtib auspices. The Seskoad model was posited on an elaborated sociological model of Indonesian society, concentrating on the issue of stability as a system goal, and the generation of disturbances from various kinds of social change, including rapid urbanisation, unemployment and inadequate

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42. See sources cited in ibid., p.5.

43. PS/30, PS/36. Bourchier cites an article from *Kedaulatan Rakyat* in early April 1983 describing the Jogjakarta operation in these terms. Ibid.


housing. To repeat an earlier quotation:

Investigative intelligence and counter-intelligence operations are vital to disclose the background to a specific problem/issue and the main actors behind it, as with strength, motivation and distribution in the area.

Public Order and Security Operations are vital whenever the disturbing essence takes more the form of organised crime or is alarming the community but does not yet have political strength or a Defence and Security character.46

While there is no direct evidence of the internal Bais or Polri reasoning behind the plans for the killings, there were clear indications that the social consequences of economic recession were beginning to concern the security apparatus. In his final year as Kopkamtib commander, Sudomo announced that security attention would be concentrated on the issues of urban crime and over-crowding, poverty and overall population pressure.47 His transfer the following year to the Ministry of Labour Power and Transmigration was consistent with these concerns.

Just why his successor Moerdani adopted such a murderous and precipitate approach to the problem of the galis [gangsters] is not clear. On what basis did Moerdani and Bais believe that the killings would significantly affect urban crime beyond the short term? The English terms "shock therapy" or "shock treatment" were often used by those involved48 - but to date no evidence of a more sustained rationale has come to light. Given that there is evidence of conflict amongst state elites over the campaign as a whole (Ali Said and Ismail Saleh were both retires generals, albeit military lawyers), there may well have been substantial policy conflict within the security and intelligence apparatus about the policy. Certainly in his last months in office before handing over to Moerdani, Armed Forces Commander Mohammed Yusuf responded to the increasing pressure for a "security" approach by calling for a restricted and legal military role and an attack on the causes of crime rather than its symptoms. Yusuf called on the state apparatus not to treat crime in a way that will further upset the situation...The military must set an example as the protectors of society, not as the opposite...If we only go about bashing this and bashing that and using rough language we will only succeed in offending people's feelings rather than encouraging them to become better human beings!...If the state apparatus acts like this towards those who do wrong it will failing its duty as the pengayom masyarakat [protectors of society]).49

Yusuf's critique was quite right. The killing campaign failed in terms of its stated goal: within two or three years, overt criminality in the major cities has returned to pre-1983

47. van der Kroef, op.cit., p.747.
48. PS/30 spoke of "shock therapy" and "ABRI against the outlaws".
49. Sinar Harapan, 21 January 1983, cited and translated in Bourchier, op.cit., p.6. Yusuf's courageous stand on the killings should promote a closer examination of the dimensions of the well-known splits in the military at the time. Yusuf, it should be remembered, was the military commander responsible for the major advances the Indonesian occupying forces made in East Timor after 1978, at enormous cost to the Timorese population. But this should also be compared to the extreme brutality associated with Operasi Sapu Bersih [Operation Clean Sweep] under his successor as Armed Forces Commander, Moerdani, in 1983-84, at the same time as the campaign against the galis in Indonesia itself.
levels. While intelligence and territorial and *kamtibmas* operations were always conceived in the Seskoad model in both "preventive" and "repressive" terms, there is little that leads directly to the pre-meditated mass murder of 1983-84. On the contrary, there were signs of a recognition of the origins of the problems of criminality in the very social changes unleashed by the state icon *pembangunan* [development]. Certainly, the very target - young men - ensured that substantial older figures were never greatly affected by the campaign.

This raises the question of whether the eradication of criminality was ever the real goal. Bourchier mentions one possibility: that the galis were associated with the state in ways that Moerdani (and by implication, Soeharto) wanted finished off. In both the Old Order and New Order period, every major political party used strong-arm men for protection, and against their opponents. Ali Moertopo had specialised in such activities in the 1971 elections, and subsequently. In the 1982 elections galis had been associated with a number of parties, especially youth organizations. There were suggestions that the government may have been losing control over its sometime servants, and wanted to put matters right once and for all.50

A more substantial answer will require closer knowledge of the relationships between the victims and those who ordered the killings. The electoral role of the gangsters is one part of that answer. But there is much that is not known about the role of "criminals" in kampung life in the great cities of Java, and the state's acceptance of limits on its project of internal pacification of Indonesian society. The campaign was considered necessary despite an expanded police force and a decade and a half of *kamtibmas* operations. The police (as well as some parts of the intelligence apparatus) were notoriously corrupt, and as a result one of the aims of the campaign's secrecy was to prevent police in the pay of the galis warning them off.51

**Provocation and terror against students, Timorese, and Muslims**

In his trial speech after arrest on subversion charges in 1984, the Islamic preacher and activist Haji A.M.Fatwa wrote that Indonesia is properly regarded as a *negara intel*, an intelligence state. The general principles of intelligence which come to the fore in such circumstances, he suggested were four-fold:

Don't take any risks; strike only from behind.

If pushed (relatively speaking), use all possible means to achieve the objective (the end justifies the means).

The work of intelligence is oriented to the edges of the law - or equally, beyond the law.

Much prejudice, prying and lying in wait, and finding fault (which in Islam is called eating the dead - see *The Koran* 49:12).52

50. Bourchier, op.cit.


These principles are most clear in the domestic operations of intelligence in the heartland of Indonesian society: Irian and Timor are sufficiently far away from the centre of Indonesian politics for the military to leave aside some of the limited restraints and the many masks that characterise intelligence operations at the centre. In his own remarkable defence plea, entitled *Indonesia Dibawah Sepatu Lars* [Indonesia Under the Jackboot], Bandung Institute of Technology Student Council Chairman Sukmadji Indro Tjahjono made much the same point in his summary of the standard intelligence operating methods at the height of Ali Moertopo's influence in 1978, when the galis in Ali's "zoo" were turned loose on the enemies of the regime.

Political terrorism is part of the 'anything goes' system so widespread in Indonesia, and is sometimes carried on on a mercenary basis (special operations). The methods include: having the houses of people disliked by the regime stoned; sending anonymous letters; intimidation with weapons or less direct means; organising hooligans and mafia-type people to frighten those disliked by those in power; night-time operations to plant leaflets on people's doorsteps; sending transvestites in to cause chaos among demonstrators, and then arresting those transvestites, but also demonstrators; hiring professional killers to commit murders with watertight alibis; sending in apparent madmen or idiots to disrupt student meetings or any activity the regime distrusts; hiring prostitutes to trail political notables; hiring 'masseuses' to hang around the lobbies of political conferences; installing bugs in meeting rooms; infiltrating informants into 'suspicious' meetings of Islamic scholars; making ammonia bombs to be exploded during dramatic performances critical of the government; hiring people pretending to be reporters taking pictures; ordering military men to pose as rickshaw drivers, roadside food vendors, etc., in the context of 'total intelligence operations'.

It is precisely the almost incoherent mixing in the testimony of the trivial and the murderous that renders the result so profoundly totalitarian: the incoherence of the normal world of politics and morality is exactly the result sought after. There is no certainty that the activities listed by Indro Tjahjono were the result of Opsus work, but Opsus was famous for exactly that kind of subversion.

There have been important changes in the operational style of the intelligence and security agencies since Moertopo's day, as has already been pointed out, including a degree of professionalisation and centralisation of control. But, as the 1983-84 killings campaign itself showed, the use of terror is still prevalent. The same point is made by a number of other sources.

There have been claims that Indonesian secret police have murdered East Timorese students in Indonesia. The most recent is the death of Jose Antonio Moniz da Silva, a 41 year-old student in Jogja. Da Silva allegedly died in a traffic accident in the city, but in circumstances that are extremely suspicious.

On the morning of 15 December 1987, Jose went with his wife and daughter as far as

Believers, avoid immoderate suspicion, for in some cases suspicion is a crime. Do not spy on one another, nor backbite one another. Would any of you like to eat the flesh of his dead brother? Surely you would loathe it. Have fear of Allah. He is forgiving and merciful.


the kindergarten, then continued alone on his motorcycle. According to the Sleman (Borobudur) police, he had an accident at 0730 hours, running over a child. Apart from the police, no-one knew anything about the accident; no child was admitted to a hospital or treated at an emergency medical post in the area; the motorcycle was undamaged and showed no sign of having been involved in an accident; the only injury Jose had sustained was to the back of his head.54

Suspicion was heightened because da Silva had been the subject of an intelligence agency scrutiny:

In July 1987, in answer to an appeal from East Timor's governor, Mario Carrascalao, asking for the scientific input of East Timorese students to Timor's development, Jose had written a 30-page analysis criticising the political aspects of the so-called "progress of East Timor". The document was sent through the post to the Governor, but intercepted and handed over to the Dili KOPSCAM55 (secret services).

The most important change in the late 1970s and 1980s was a shift in the target of provocation and terror: whereas the remains of the communist movement and political parties and students were the main targets of the late 1960s and 1970s, in the 1980s, by far the most important targets for intelligence and security apparatus activities have been the Islamic community and labour.

The deep Indonesian military mistrust of Islam revived in the late 1970s as Islamic organisations came to represent the part of Indonesian civil society least amenable to subordination and incorporation. The "problem" of Islam as a whole returned to the political agenda of the state-managers, in terms of the "fanaticism" and "extremism" of certain groups and their leaders. Some of the social distress resulting from the New Order chase for growth underpinned a flourishing of Islamic critiques of the New Order.

Islamic prisoners seem to be persistently subjected to the most extreme forms of torture and harassment. One of numerous examples is that of Bambang Supriyanto, a 21 year-old university student accused of subversion through involvement in the Negara Islam Indonesia, a movement which the government claims seeks an Indonesian Islamic state. Supriyanto was convicted despite the fact that he denied membership of the NII and in court withdrew his signed interrogation statement, which he said had been extracted under torture. This torture consisted of severe beatings, electric shocks, having his toes crushed repeatedly by chairs, and being kept in a totally darkened room - all carried out over a period of a month.56

Islamic militants in the Sumatran province of Aceh suspected of involvement in the activities of the Aceh Freedom Movement were repeatedly subject to torture in the late 1970s and 1980s. One who survived to escape abroad was Anwar Amin. He reported the torture of many of his friends and associates in detail, and named a number of intelligence officers regularly involved in torture in Banda Aceh in the late 1970s. Of his own treatment over three years in Kedah Military Prison he wrote of the following special

54. Informacoes Timor-Leste/East Timor News (Lisbon), Urgent Communique No.1 (15 February 1988).
55. It is not clear which organisation is referred to as KOPSCAM.
56. Asia Watch, op.cit., p.234.
treatment, apart from general ill-treatment en masse:
My group of prisoners - known as the flag-raisers - were given special treatment on August 20, 1978, the eve of the 18th of Ramadan, the Muslim fasting month. On that night we were beaten by a group of Javanese Indonesian military police. For reasons unknown to me, Harun Mahmud and I were singled out for the harshest treatment. In addition to being beaten, we were forced to drink alcohol. We refused as drinking alcohol is forbidden by our Muslim religion. So they struck our heads with the bottles until they were broken, cutting our heads and faces and making the blood pour down. Then they grabbed hold of our necks, pried our mouths open and poured the alcohol down our throats. When they released us we vomited uncontrollably. Then they forced us to lick our own vomit. We refused. Then they held us and they banged our heads together like rams fighting, beat us and knocked us down until we lost consciousness. When we regained consciousness they burned our bodies with cigarettes. After that Harun and I were put in separate cells nearby. A piece of wood the size of a man's arms and about one meter long was put under my knees while they forced me to kneel down. It caused pressure on my knee joints and was very painful. But that was not all. To increase the pain, my tormentor climbed on my shoulders to add his weight, so creating greater pressure on my knee joints...for a good half hour...As a result of that night's torture, my skull was damaged and my brain was affected. The tissues of my eyes were damaged and I could not see anything for over a month...We have not recovered completely until today. They gave us no medical treatment.57

A.M.Fatwa, whose views on the negara intel have already been quoted, was himself arrested in 1984 following his defence of those arrested in the Tanjung Priok affair. A former assistant for religious affairs to the Mayor of Jakarta, Ali Sadikin, and a prominent Islamic preacher, Fatwa was one of the key members of the Petition of 50 group that made up the most visible part of a broad though small group of constitutional oppositionists in Jakarta58. At the trial for subversion, Fatwa was sentenced to eighteen years in prison.

In most respects Fatwa's treatment, his prominence and the length of the sentence apart, is unremarkable in contemporary Indonesia. He was arrested by personnel from the Kopkamtib Intelligence Task Force for the Jakarta region, on the orders of the colonel in charge. He was interrogated at first by police personnel, who were relaxed and respectful. He was then taken to a military police lockup, where he heard accounts from prisoners of the torture of others, and was himself interrogated, and then terrorised.59


58. A small irony is that Fatwa's formal position from 1971-1979 was head of Sub-Directorate VII/Special - Sub-Directorate for Community Guidance, in the Jakarta Special Regional Government's Directorate of Social and Political Affairs. Whereas the equivalent position at the centre would have been an unequivocal social control unit in the service of the intelligence state, under Sadikin there was, at least to a degree, a negotiated truce between Islam and the state on certain issues. See A.M.Fatwa, Dakwaan Subversi - Dulu Untuk Darurat Revolusi, Kini Untuk Darurat Pembangunan - Eksepsi Des. H.A.M.Fatwa, (Jakarta: Yayasan Lembaga Bantuan Hukum Indonesia, 1985), p.xi; Susan Abeyasekere, Jakarta: A History, (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1986); and "Interview with Ali Sadikin", Inside Indonesia, 16 (1988).

59. The degradation rituals are typical. Fatwa was dragged from his cell, and his head roughly chopped "as though the rats had eaten it". He was then beaten, thrown into cell, only to be dragged out to a mock firing squad. He was then bound, gagged, and thrown into a car with six intel men, who muttered about getting rid of him. See Fatwa, op.cit., pp.15-16, and Asia Watch, op.cit., pp.140-141. The objective of such rituals is rarely the instrumentally rational goal of acquiring information - but the obliteration of the identity of the individual, and the maintenance of the identity of the torturers.
It became clear that Fatwa had been the target of intelligence manipulation, and possibly attempted assassination. In his trial statement, Fatwa claimed that on one occasion a "recidivist" of his acquaintance from Tanjung Priok came to his home to tell him he had accepted hundreds of thousands of rupiah (i.e. several hundred dollars) to kill Fatwa, but in an attempt in a Jakarta street, "he suddenly stepped back, losing heart", and fled to Surabaya. Fatwa also claimed that a pensioned ABRI NCO came to his house to ask Fatwa's pardon: for over a year had felt awful because he had at one time agreed to be part of a plan to kill Fatwa.51

Fatwa then gave the court his account of a more important incident which occurred when he was in Salemba prison in Jakarta. There he met, by his account for the first time, a man named Tasrif Tausikal, later convicted for participation in bombings in Jakarta in October 1984.

Tausikal suddenly begged my forgiveness without my understanding what he had done wrong. Something weighed heavily on his mind because he had been forced to make a confession about me, to confirm that he had received $2,000 from me to purchase bombs...I was shocked and angry to hear about this malicious slander. But he asked for my understanding and showed me bayonet wounds in his chest. He told me he had been bound night and day with his hands and feet bound.62

In these respects, Fatwa's allegations are not unusual: the Indonesian record of testimony and corroboration of wrongful arrest, intimidation, extortion, torture and unexplained deaths in custody in legal proceedings, whether "criminal" or political in motivation, is depressingly regular. What marks out Fatwa's case are his observations on the intelligence apparatus noted above, and in particular the insight he offers into the mix of direct terrorism and sadism on the one hand, and a "social science" approach on the other. This will be discussed in the next chapter, together with other examples of techniques of mass surveillance in a scientized manner.

**Conclusion**

The Seskoad textbook model of intelligence, social-political and territorial operations set out recommended procedures for surveillance-based political intervention in Indonesian society. When these models were applied in practice in Timor, Irian Jaya, Acheh, and in Java, surveillance and terror became rather more closely tied together than the textbook suggest. It might be suggested that this was an unintended, unnecessary and illegal excess by particular officers or units, in situations of combat stress. It is true that the killings of alleged criminals were themselves completely criminal acts by the military and police, as were many of the other terrorist activities discussed above. But the evidence is clear that there was nothing accidental or unintended, or, in the eyes of military men, unnecessary about the use of terror against Indonesian civilians. On the

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60. A common term for the galis killed in the 1983-84 campaign.

61. Fatwa, op.cit., p.70. Fatwa also told the court of an incident where a gali from Ali Moertopo's "zoo" had come to the office of Fatwa's staff when he was working at Ali Sadikin's house. From the dialogue, it became clear that the gali was involved in a plan to kill Fatwa in a car accident. Ibid., p.77. Of course, in this last possibility there is the possibility that the "confession" was part of the early stages of the planned terror.

62. Asia Watch, op.cit., p.141, citing Fatwa's eksepsi (demurrer).
contrary, this was a matter of military policy, spelled out in standing orders on occasion, even if not military school textbooks.

Moreover it is also clear that terror and surveillance were closely tied together in these instances. In Timor and Irian it is clear that the recommended form of counter-insurgency planning is based on detailed intelligence work. The murder campaigns against alleged criminals could only hope to be effective in its own terms if it was based on extensive prior and ongoing surveillance of potential targets.

\[63\] This is exactly what would be recommended by counter-insurgency specialists from other countries. see, for example, Frank Kitson, *Low Intensity Operations: Subversion, Insurgency, Peace–keeping*, (London: Faber and Faber, 1971).