Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515
August 29, 1979

Honorable Cyrus Vance
Secretary
Department of State
2201 C Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20520

Dear Mr. Secretary:

As you know, I have been a strong supporter of the President's anti-proliferation and conventional arms restraint policies, and I write with regard to an issue related to United States security interests in North Asia that could have severe implications for these policies.

It has come to my attention that certain U.S. firms in the Los Angeles area are exporting technologies to the Republic of Korea that might be employed by the Korean government for the purpose of developing intermediate, or long range, ballistic missiles.

It is my understanding that the firms in question are authorized by the appropriate licenses to continue to export these technologies, while it is possible that upon receipt, the Korean government could be circumventing their intended civilian purpose and using them for military purposes.

I have been told that the Korean government now has in its possession the specifications, engineering drawings, instructions and designs, blueprints and certain assembly equipment employed in the United States Atlas Centaur program. Further, I am told that nose cone materials, alloys and certain guidance systems have also been acquired. In this area, total sales to date are reported to exceed $500,000 and, according to my information, the Republic of Korea is now engaged in the procurement of associated computer equipment and software packages that would substantially upgrade and complement their current abilities to continue in this endeavor.

Although by our own standards, the Atlas might best be described as an "archaic design," I am sure that you would share my concerns over the destabilizing effects that such developments would have in this already tension-laden region.

[Signature]
area of the world. A missile of this capability could reach targets as far as 5,000 miles away, while a scaled down version of this missile would be more than sufficient to threaten any military target north of the thirty-eighth parallel.

I am writing to inquire whether the Administration is aware of any such effort on the part of the Republic of Korea? Is the Department of Commerce aware of these developments so that they might better monitor such exports? Has the Department of Commerce "flagged" high technology exporting licenses to the Republic of Korea so that we might better forecast ongoing developments there?

Obviously, this represents a development that may have a serious effect upon the security of the United States and its allies, as well as our ability to continue our leadership for world peace. I appreciate your help in this highly sensitive matter and look forward to hearing from you soon.

Sincerely,

Anthony Beilenson

ANTHONY C. BEILENSON
Member of Congress

ACB/bkl
PAO

Mr. Peter Hayes
NAUTILUS
Pacific Action Research
Box 309
Leverett, Massachusetts 01054

Dear Mr. Hayes:

This is in final response to your Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), case number 87-70. You requested a copy of a report entitled, "Report of on Operation Blowdown, the non-nuclear explosion test conducted at the Iron Range Test Site, North Queensland, Australia," which was published with a limited distribution statement. We have completed a review of the document and determined that there is no objection to rescinding the limited distribution statement and making this document available in the public domain.

A copy of the document is enclosed. Processing fees assessable under the FOIA are waived in this instance. If you need further assistance, please feel free to contact Ms. Nell Hayes, telephone number (703) 325-7095.

Sincerely,

[Signature]
SAMUEL D. MCKINNEY
LTC, USA
Freedom of Information Officer

Enclosure: as stated