Special Reports

Special Reports are longer, often more technical, documents consisting of entire articles, government statements, and other documents relevant to security and peace in Northeast Asia.

NAPSNet, Special Reports

Conventional Deterrence and Japan’s Security

Shinichi Ogawa explores the probability of Japan heightening its conventional deterrence capabilities and the possible ways in which it may do so. His report first evaluates how Japan might augment its defensive capabilities (and invest in offensive weapons) were it’s military relationship and security guarantees with the United States to dissolve. He then assesses possible changes to Japan’s conventional military capabilities were the United States to maintain its ‘nuclear umbrella’ over Japan–and whether or not this arrangement could be compatible with a Northeast Asian Nuclear Weapons Free Zone.

Shinichi Ogawa is a visiting professor at Ritsumeikan Asia Pacific University.

This report was originally presented at the East Asia Nuclear Security workshop held on November 11, 2011 in Tokyo, Japan.

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China and a Nuclear Weapons-Free Zone in Northeast Asia

Pan Zhenqiang states that both North Korea’s weapons program and US deterrence create an atmosphere of distrust and insecurity in Northeast Asia. Pan argues that establishing a regional NWFZ “has to be a multilateral, comprehensive, and cooperative process, aimed first and foremost at improving the security environment, and strengthening the political basis for a nuclear free arrangement that will take into consideration the security interests of all the countries concerned, and thus be acceptable to all of them.  There is no alternative to such a multilateral, comprehensive, and cooperative approach to resolving the DPRK nuclear crisis, and US [deterrence] as well, thereby effectively removing the two major obstacles to the NWFZ in Northeast Asia.”

Major General Pan Zhenqiang (retired) is deputy chairman of the China Foundation for International Studies, senior adviser to the China Reform Forum, and director of research at the Institute for Strategy and Management of the Central University of Finance and Economics in China.

This report was originally presented at the East Asia Nuclear Security workshop held on November 11, 2011 in Tokyo, Japan. All of the papers and presentations given at the workshop are available here, along with the full agenda, participant list and a workshop photo gallery.

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Extended Deterrence in the Japan-U.S. Alliance

Ken Jimbo assesses the dynamics of U.S. extended nuclear deterrence in Asia–especially on the Korean peninsula and in China–and how these relate to Japan’s “dynamic defense” policy adopted in the 2010 National Defense Program Guidelines. He states that “[s]ince the strategic landscape in Northeast Asia is increasingly complex in character, it is difficult to apply the concept of deterrence in a “one-size-fits-all” manner. For extended deterrence to succeed, the Japan-U.S. alliance needs continuous updates on the assessment of the distribution of powers and threats, then to apply tailored deterrence to the regional dynamic.”

Ken Jimbo is an Associate Professor at Keio University, Japan.

This report was originally presented at the East Asia Nuclear Security workshop held on November 11, 2011 in Tokyo, Japan. All of the papers and presentations given at the workshop are available here, along with the full agenda, participant list and a workshop photo gallery.

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NWFZS and Extended Nuclear Deterrence: Squaring the Circle?

Jayantha Dhanapala states that a Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (NWFZ) in Northeast Asia could prove to be a reasonable solution to the complex issues in the region, but that the exceptions and ambiguities that have been allowed during past negotiations of NWFZs must be avoided. Dhanapala argues that compromising on fundamental NWFZ principles—namely that all parties must verifiably dismantle any nuclear weapons and rescind extended nuclear deterrence agreements with Nuclear Weapons States (NWS)—will only exacerbate security concerns.

Jayantha Dhanapala is a former Ambassador of Sri Lanka and a former UN Under Secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs.

This report was originally presented at the East Asia Nuclear Security workshop held on November 11, 2011 in Tokyo, Japan. All of the papers and presentations given at the workshop are available here, along with the full agenda, participant list and a workshop photo gallery.

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The Six Party Talks and Implications for a Northeast Asia Nuclear Weapons Free Zone

Chung-in Moon asserts that the Six Party Talks (SPTs) mechanism and the idea of a Northeast Asia Weapons Free Zone (NEA NWFZ) are mutually complementary and should be pursued in parallel. While the SPTs are designed to deal with the North Korean nuclear problem, they cannot address the other nuclear-related challenges the Northeast Asian region is currently facing, including enrichment, spent fuel management, waste disposal, reactor safety and emergency management. Likewise, without addressing the North Korean nuclear program, regional cooperation on these issues is unlikely.

Chung-in Moon is a professor of political science at Yonsei University and a former Ambassador for International Security Affairs at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Republic of Korea

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The Politics of a Korea-Japan NWFZ

Leon V. Sigal provides an overview of political prospects for establishing a bilateral Korea-Japan Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (NWFZ). He notes that such an agreement necessarily raises the question of Japanese and South Korean reliance on US extended nuclear deterrence and “the outcome of any reconsideration thus depends critically on Japanese and South Korean views of North Korea’s nuclear arming, China’s rise, and their historical differences with each other.” Sigal concludes that, while an unbounded North Korean nuclear program could strengthen the nuclear radicals in Tokyo and Seoul who favor nuclear arming, nuclear conservatives in both countries might see heightened advantages in negotiating a NWFZ to help forestall a regional nuclear arms race and improve bilateral relations.

Leon V. Sigal is director of the Northeast Asia Cooperative Security Project at the Social Science Research Council in New York.

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Domestic Debates and Assessment of Extended Deterrence in South Korea: A South Korean Perspective

In the following report Jong Kun Choi reviews domestic opinions concerning US extended deterrence to the ROK—including recent debates on South Korea’s nuclear sovereignty— and the diverging perspectives on the issue in South Korean society. Choi argues that the ROK and the US must shift from extended deterrence to tailored deterrence. He concludes, however, that military deterrence (extended and tailored) is not sufficient for resolving North Korea’s nuclear program and weapons. Instead, South Korea and the United States should revive traditional postures of engagement towards the DPRK and exercise strategic patience in order to induce change from within.

Jong Kun Choi is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science and International Studies at Yonsei University.

This report was originally presented at the East Asia Nuclear Security workshop held on November 11, 2011 in Tokyo, Japan. All of the papers and presentations given at the workshop are available here, along with the full agenda, participant list and a workshop photo gallery.

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Nuclear Security at the Seoul Summit

Coming in the wake of the Fukushima nuclear accident, which starkly reminded the world of the perils posed by nuclear materials, the Seoul Nuclear Security Summit faces a host of challenges. Sharon Squassoni lays out what is at stake, what outcomes can be expected and those that, unfortunately, cannot.

Sharon Squassoni is Director and Senior Fellow at the Proliferation Prevention Program of the Center for Strategic and International Studies.

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Nuclear Safety and Security After 3-11

The earthquake and tsunami of March 11, 2011 did more than just devastate Japan and unleash a local nuclear disaster. Peter Hayes notes that the events at the Fukushima nuclear plant exposed a host of design flaws in current nuclear technology whose solutions are linked to dramatically unsettling security issues.

Peter Hayes is Executive Director of the Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainability.

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A Northeast Asia Nuclear Weapon Free Zone with a Three-plus-Three Arrangement

Hiromichi Umebayashi, President of the Peace Depot, assesses the prospects for a Northeast Asian Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (NEA-NWFZ) and the applicability of lessons learned during the establishment of similar treaties in other regions of the world. He writes, “there are specific wisdoms to be found in the existing NWFZ treaties . . . One is related to the provision for the entry-into-force of the treaty. If one or more state parties have concern about others’ possible noncompliance with a hard-woven NEA-NWFZ treaty, one could invent a . . . certain kind of waiving system such as the one adopted in the Tlatelolco Treaty. Also, learning from the precedent of ABACC, it seems worthwhile to re-examine the possibility of South-North (North-South) Joint Nuclear Control Commission, which is stipulated by the 1992 Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, or its modification, as the first step of confidence building measures in the region.”

This report is from the East Asia Nuclear Security workshop held on November 11, 2011 in Tokyo, Japan.
Papers and presentations given at the East Asia Nuclear Workshop are available here, along with the full agenda, participant list and a workshop photo gallery.

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