Special Reports

Special Reports are longer, often more technical, documents consisting of entire articles, government statements, and other documents relevant to security and peace in Northeast Asia.

NAPSNet, Special Reports

An Analysis of the United States Army Command and Control Organization in the Pacific Theater: World War II to 1983

This 1983 report by John L. Buckley “examines the need for reorganizing the United States Army command and control structure in the Pacific theater both to meet peacetime requirements and to ensure an effective transition to war. The investigation is focused on an analysis of historical experience, contemporary issues in the theater, and the results or the five most recent studies on the subject. The study postulates a detailed reorganization proposal, beginning with the establishment of a Northeast Asia Command.

Conclusions reveal that or the Army structure must be done in a joint context and must accommodate the sensitivities and complexities of both military and political requirements. The current structure, although workable, is not optimal to ensure a transition to regional, theater, or global war. Should an effective remedy not be applied before the outbreak of hostilities in the region, the price of transition will be expensive in both time and resources. That remedy should be in the form of a Northeast Asia Command.”

This report was released to the Nautilus Institute under the US Freedom of Information Act (FOIA).

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Far East Command Standing Operating Procedure No. 1 for Atomic Operations in the Far East Command

This 1956 report was “promulgated for the purpose of establishing normal procedures which will ensure the most efficient and expeditious employment of atomic weapons in accordance with JCS policy…Upon initiation of hostilities, on a scale warranting the use of atomic weapons, it is expected that Commander-in-Chief, Far East (CINCFE) will be authorized to employ atomic weapons, in the accomplishment of the theater mission…This standing operating Procedure (SOP) established the procedure to be used in the Far East Command (FEC) for the control and expenditure of atomic weapons. The procedures set forth herein shall be adhered to by all commands concerned with the planning for and execution of atomic strikes…”

This report was released to the Nautilus Institute under the US Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). 

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Extended Nuclear Deterrence in Northeast Asia

Jeffrey Lewis argues that US allies such as Japan have been mislead by the manner in which past administrations have sought to emphasize the strength of their extended deterrence commitments by reference to particular weapons systems in that role. Lewis writes that “there is no specific commitment to use any of those nuclear weapons in defense of Japan – or any other ally.”

Rather, Lewis states, “it is time to be honest that the primary source of nuclear deterrence for US allies comes from the strategic triad of intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine launched ballistic missiles and bombers.” He concludes that “US nuclear weapons continue to play role, albeit a declining one, in meeting US security commitments. The US is committed to defending Japan, but the use of nuclear weapons neither necessary nor desirable in the current strategic environment.”

Jeffrey Lewis is an Adjunct Professor and Director of the East Asia Non-Proliferation Program at the Monterey Institute of International Studies.

A version of this report was originally presented at the East Asia Nuclear Security workshop held on November 11, 2011 in Tokyo, Japan.

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Seconds Away From Midnight: U.S. Nuclear Missile Pioneers on Okinawa Break Fifty Year Silence on a Hidden Nuclear Crisis of 1962

Jon Mitchell states that “six months prior to the Cuban Missile Crisis…a parallel drama played out on the other side of the world as the U.S. secretly brought near-identical missiles to the ones the Russians stationed on Cuba to another small island — Okinawa. While the full facts of that deployment have never been officially disclosed, now for the first time three of the U.S. Air Force’s nuclear pioneers have broken the silence about Okinawa’s secret missiles, life within the bunkers and a military miscalculation of apocalyptic proportions — the targeting of unaligned China at a time when China-Soviet polemics were in full public view.”

Jon Mitchell is a Welsh-born writer based in Yokohama and represented by Curtis Brown Ltd., New York. He teaches at Tokyo Institute of Technology and is an Asia-Pacific Journal associate.

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MRBM’s in the Pacific

This 1965 report, commissioned by Secretary of Defense Robert MacNamara, was directed “to determine optimum characteristics and employment of MMRBM-type weapon systems for maximum effectiveness in the Pacific Theater… [and] define optimum and alternative weapon system characteristics, operational concepts, force sizes, deployment schemes and development schedules and costs.” The report concludes that “the Flexible Theater Missile provides the optimum capability to satisfy both the political and military requirements. If political considerations dictate an early deterrent and show of force, the A-1 missile system could be used as an interim capability.”

This report was released to the Nautilus Institute under the US Freedom of Information Act (FOIA).

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Wartime Interoperability Problems Posed by Differences in South Korean and United States Army Tactics

In this report, prepared for the United States Army Command and General Staff College in 1980, James M. Simpson analyzes the differences between South Korean and U.S. Army tactics. The report considers historical, social, psychological and physical influences on conventional attack operations, defense tactics, “special” operations and unconventional warfare tactics. The report also examines the degree to which differing tactics pose problems to combined operations and provides recommendations to resolve them.

The report states that “one weakness in the American forces’ relations with the Republic of Korea (R.O.K.) Army over the past several decades has been an assumption that the Koreans have patterned themselves after the Americans. Although the Korean Army has patterned many of its tactical concepts after the American tactics … they are independent thinkers and have developed a form of fighting which is consistent with the Korean personality, terrain and perceived threat.”

This report was released to the Nautilus Institute under the US Freedom of Information Act (FOIA).

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Mind the Gap Between Rhetoric and Reality

Roger Cavazos considers two bounded cases of an artillery attack on Seoul. The question is pertinent since it bears on whether there is conventional stability on the Korean Peninsula. If there is a conventional military stability, that is neither South Korea nor North Korea have the military capacity to successfully invade then both parties have an interest in cutting the Gordian knot of present relations. Legal frameworks such as a Korea Japan Nuclear Weapon Free Zone are far cheaper, less resource intensive yet still confrontational enough to relieve some pressure of an antagonistic relationship. The conclusion is that there is a conventional military stability which allows for the time and effort to seek alternative resolutions such as a Korea Japan Nuclear Weapon Free Zone which allows the DPRK to trade almost no cost legal framework for a tangible security guarantee.

Roger Cavazos consults on Northeast Asia security. He is recently retired from a 22 year career in the United States Army with assignments at tactical, operational, and strategic levels.

This report was originally presented at the East Asia Nuclear Security workshop held on November 11, 2011 in Tokyo, Japan. 

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Plutonium and Japan’s Nuclear Waste Problem: International Scientists Call for an End to Plutonium Reprocessing and Closing the Rokkasho Plant

Piers Williamson offers this summary of the lectures given May 31st, 2012 by Professors Frank von Hippel (Princeton University) and Gordon MacKerron (University of Sussex) on the problems associated with reprocessing nuclear spent fuel. Williamson states that two things were made clear at the event: first, spent fuel reprocessing originates from the production of weapons materials and the initial move nations made towards reprocessing was spurred by wishes to gain nuclear weapons capabilities. Although Japan does not possess nuclear weapons, its large plutonium ‘stockpile’, combined with its advanced technological base, means that it could establish a nuclear weapons program very easily. Second, there has been a global move away from using plutonium for nuclear fuel and also from civilian reprocessing (plutonium separation). Japan’s persistence in reprocessing thus bucks an international trend. Arguments that it is impossible to stop appear flimsy when the global experience and the UK case are taken into account…Put simply, reprocessing is defunct and should be buried with the waste it cannot handle.

Piers Williamson is a research assistant to Professor Andrew DeWit at Rikkyo University.

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Regions That Say No: Precedents and Precursors for Denuclearizing Northeast Asia

In the following report Michael Hamel-Green reviews the historical and institutional precedents supporting recent proposals to establish a nuclear weapons free zone both on the Korean Peninsula and in the wider Northeast Asian region. “Despite the fact that the Northeast Asia…has not yet progressed to government-to-government negotiations on a regional nuclear free zone concept, or even agreement in principle on such a concept…the negotiation history and background of the six currently established [Nuclear Weapons Free] zones suggest that there is often a quite lengthy pre-negotiation phase in which civil society campaigns, Track 2 negotiations and proposals…and catalysing changes or crises …can serve to concentrate the minds of regional governments and the wider international community.”

Michael Hamel-Green is the Dean of and Professor in the Faculty of Arts, Education and Human Development at Victoria University, Melbourne.

This report was originally presented at the East Asia Nuclear Security workshop held on November 11, 2011 in Tokyo, Japan.

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Achieving an International Environment to Enable a Reduced Role for Nuclear Weapons

Abe Nobuyasu assess the possibility of creating an environment in Northeast Asia that could facilitate the withdrawal of U.S. extended nuclear deterrence to Japan and South Korea. Achieving such a goal mandates that several outstanding regional issues are addressed. These include: the territorial disputes over the Takeshima/Dokdo and Senkaku islands, the long-standing tensions across the Taiwan Strait, and North Korea’s continued nuclear weapons program. Were these issues to be addressed, Abe asserts that a regional security framework—such as a Nuclear Weapons Free Zone—may be possible. He warns, however, “for this Nuclear Weapons Free Zone to materialize, North Korea has to give up its nuclear program…the chances of its realization are equal to that of denuclearizing North Korea.”

Ambassador Nobuyasu Abe is currently the Director of the Center for the Promotion of Disarmament and Non-Proliferation at the Japan Institute of International Affairs. Ambassador Abe has served as Consul-General in Boston, as Ambassador to Austria and Saudi Arabia, and as a diplomat for the Japanese government, the U.N., and other international organizations in Washington, D.C., Geneva, Tel Aviv, New York, Manila, and Bern.

This report was originally presented at the East Asia Nuclear Security workshop held on November 11, 2011 in Tokyo, Japan.

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