Policy Forum

Colin McAskill asserts that “to continue to link economic engagement with the nuclear issue [in the DPRK] proved to be not only counter-productive but foolhardy. Instead the US must continue the bi-lateral approach, announce publicly that the international banking system is open to the DPRK to use and encourage investors to participate directly in its economic development so they don’t have to do so indirectly or clandestinely through China.”

Colin McAskill’s experience, dealing with as well as for-and-on-behalf-of the DPRK at the highest level, spans more than three decades. He has a deep-seated knowledge, understanding and first-hand experience of the DPRK, its strategies and tactics. He acted as an advisor for a decade during the period of the ‘Bullion Shipments’ into London; arranged training schedules for DPRK delegations in the UK; acted as the mandated representative for the DPRK during the ‘Defaulted Debt’ negotiations with the DPRK’s ‘London Club’ creditors; acted as a mandated representative for the DPRK during the Banco Delta Asia banking crisis in Macau, as well as many other individual assignments. He made his first visit to the DPRK in 1979 and has been a regular visitor to the country over the years.

James Goodby and Markku Heiskanen write “that the time for a more active diplomacy in the Korean Peninsula is approaching. And that refers not only to solving the North Korean nuclear issue but also to several legacies dating from World War II and the Korean War. The ultimate goal should be to sign a peace treaty to end formally the Korean War, which concluded only with an armistice agreement in 1953, and to reunify Korea in one way or another. There is some well-founded hope that the year 2012 could open a new era in multilateral efforts to finally construct a new post-Cold War political and security architecture in Northeast Asia.”

James Goodby is former US Ambassador to Finland. He does not speak for the current administration. He is a member of the American Academy of Diplomacy.

Markku Heiskanen is former senior Finnish diplomat, and currently Senior Associate and Program Director of The Asia Institute at the Kyung Hee University in Seoul.

Roger Cavazos writes, “Zhang Dejiang’s ascension as Party Chief in Chongqing is modeled on a proven formula for putting in a steady, consistent leader. Given Zhang’s DPRK connections and a PRC preference for stability Sino-DPRK relations will plod along in a more or less positive small steps, but they likely won’t deteriorate, either. The DPRK also has another channel for improved relations and communications with China since Zhang is a known quantity to the DPRK leadership.”

Roger Cavazos is a Nautilus Institute Associate.

Colin McAskill acted as an advisor for a decade during the period of the ‘Bullion Shipments’ into London and acted as a mandated representative for the DPRK during the Banco Delta Asia banking crisis in Macau. In this article Colin writes, “The stability established by a smooth transition of power has created a window of opportunity to put the past behind and re-open a new phase of negotiations to put in place a lasting agreement that would launch a nuclear free Korean Peninsula, and usher in a new era of peaceful coexistence. Given KJ-U’s young age, this opportunity may not reoccur for a very long time.

Shen Dingli, Professor and Executive Dean at Fudan University, writes that the new leadership in Pyongyang has to continue to strengthen Kim Jong-un’s power base, which doesn’t allow it to be either too hostile or receptive to the outside world. It also has to be politically correct and follow Kim Jong-il and Kim Il-sung’s Juche ideology, demonstrating self-reliance. Therefore, to quit the nuclear weapons program is a non-starter. While the DPRK has signaled its intent to return to the Six-Party Talks, this is, in Shen Dingli’s opinion, a tactical move, not a strategic commitment to denuclearization. “All parties involved in the talks should combine their legitimate needs with a realistic approach … Unless other parties would relinquish their nuclear weapons or the benefit of a nuclear umbrella, demanding Pyongyang to rid its nuclear program without prior trust-building is wishful thinking.” In the meantime, in order to manage its shortage of resources, the DPRK has to keep bargaining with others and develop its economy—and this could bode well for engagement and stability.

Nak-chung Paik, Editor of The Quarterly Changbi and Professor Emeritus of English Literature at Seoul National University, asks  “Which will be the greater variable, the leadership change in North Korea or the 2013 regime change in South Korea?” Paik asserts that since the North Korean succession does not show signs of sparking an imminent political or social upheaval, South Korea, with upcoming elections, has the opportunity to engage North Korea, establish a peace agreement and perhaps eventually an inter-Korean confederation. The key, Paik writes, is the 2013 South Korean regime: “Will we content ourselves with the same old ruling forces who have changed face and succeeded in “differentiation from Lee Myung-bak,” or will we make the historic transition to a new epoch not only in the South but possibly shared by South and North?”

John Delury, Assistant Professor of East Asian Studies at Yonsei University and Chung-in Moon, Professor of Political Science at Yonsei University state that a near-term crisis in North Korea is unlikely for the simple reason that the country’s political system is unified around the new face of North Korea, Kim Jong-un. However, in the medium to longer term, the new leadership is likely to face a dilemma: whether Kim Jong-un can enhance North Korea’s prosperity without undermining the source of its strength — its nuclear weapons program. Delury and Moon argue that “[t]he most prudent course for key regional players is to re-open or expand channels with Pyongyang. The better we know the new leadership, the better we can respond to events as they unfold.”

Victor Hsu, a Visiting Professor at the Korea Development Institute School of Public Policy and Management, argues that the post funeral interregnum in the DPRK should be seen as a window of opportunity for moving North Korea’s relationships in a constructive direction. To do this, Hsu suggests that the international community network and create a coordinated engagement plan that avoids duplication, maximizes the increasingly scarce resources among traditional donors and gathers lessons learned for future engagement. Donors could facilitate this work by supporting civil society knowledge-sharing efforts with the DPRK, which is more sustainable and less susceptible to the vicissitudes of inter-state relations.

Roger Cavazos, a Nautilus Institute Associate and consultant on North-East Asia, writes, “The breathtakingly short timeline of announcement of Kim Jong-Il’s death, DPRK announcing Kim Jong-Un as the successor, China affirming and also providing their guidance to ‘maintain stability on the peninsula’ and the DPRK to responding via Chinese-language press on KCNA indicates that while the specific timing may have been a surprise, the basic outline of the leadership transition had been worked out long ago…For the sake of the Korean people on both sides of the DMZ and regional stability, all sides should use the early indicators of a relatively calm environment to engage in discussions, clarify intentions, and plan basic outlines of responses if things do not continue on a positive trend beyond the short term.”

Ruediger Frank, a Professor of East Asian Economy and Society, University of Vienna and Adjunct Professor, Korea University and the University of North Korean Studies, writes, “The big question now is will the North Korean elite and population accept the Central Committee’s decision, and will they welcome Kim Jong Un as the new leader? History teaches us that things do not always proceed according to plan or conventional wisdom. We cannot exclude the possibility of ambitious individuals testing the opportunities…There are powerful individuals like Choe Yong Rim, Prime Minister; Kim Young Nam, Head of State; Jang Song Thaek, Kim Jong Il’s brother-in-law and alternate member of the Politburo, and his wife and Kim Jong Il’s sister Kim Kyong Hui who is a regular Politburo member and a General…Will they back up Kim Jong Un, or try to manipulate and sideline him?”