The Status of US, Russian, And Chinese Nuclear Forces in Northeast Asia

NAPSNet Special Report

Recommended Citation

Dunbar Lockwood, "The Status of US, Russian, And Chinese Nuclear Forces in Northeast Asia", NAPSNet Special Reports, June 30, 1994, http://nautilus.org/napsnet/napsnet-special-reports/the-status-of-us-russian-and-chinese-nuclear-forces-in-northeast-asia/

THE STATUS OF U.S., RUSSIAN, AND CHINESE NUCLEAR FORCES IN 
NORTHEAST ASIA

by Dunbar Lockwood

Arms Control Association

June 30, 1994 

  

prepared for the Northeast Asia Peace and Security Network

managed by Nautilus Institute, Berkeley, California 


I. INTRODUCTION

 With the end of the Cold War, it has become difficult to 
envision a scenario in which any of the five declared nuclear 
weapons states would deliberately initiate the use of nuclear 
weapons against each other. On the other hand, the international 
community has become increasingly concerned about the spread of 
nuclear weapons to developing countries where they might be used 
in regional conflicts. Of these regional concerns, Northeast Asia 
has recently vaulted to the top due to a number of factors. The 
historical animosities, the territorial disputes, the potential 
power vacuum created by the disengagement of the superpowers, the 
region's growing importance as a trading partner, the general 
economic dynamism accompanied by increasing defense expenditures 
and acquisition of high tech weaponry, the imminent leadership 
changes, and the political isolation of North Korea combined with 
its development of new longer-range ballistic missiles and 
possibly nuclear weapons have all contributed to fears that 
Northeast Asia could become a nuclear powder keg.    

It is clear to the United States, Russia, and China--the three 
major nuclear powers with a military presence in Northeast Asia--
that it would not be in their respective interests for any 
additional state in the region to develop a nuclear weapons 
capability in the near or distant future. Although a consensus 
exists among the governments in Washington, Moscow, and Beijing 
that they should try to dissuade other states in Northeast Asia 
from "going nuclear" there is no consensus on the appropriate 
means for achieving that goal. 

North Korea's perceptions of U.S. nuclear capabilities and 
intentions as they pertain to the Korean Peninsula are certainly 
an important factor in Pyongyang's decision whether to continue 
to pursue nuclear weapons. Similarly, Japan's perceptions of 
North Korea's nuclear capabilities and intentions as well as 
those of Russia and China, will be an important factor in Tokyo's 
decision whether to remain a non-nuclear weapons state. 

With these perceptions in mind, this paper will look at: 1) the 
current status of U.S., Russian, and Chinese nuclear forces   
(e.g. numbers, types, locations, operational characteristics, 
targets, trends in force structure, the impact of recent arms 
control agreements and unilateral initiatives); 2) scenarios 
involving the use of nuclear weapons in Northeast Asia; and 3) 
new global, regional, and unilateral arms control measures that 
the three major nuclear powers could implement to help reduce the 
likelihood of nuclear proliferation in the region. 

 PART II: U.S. NUCLEAR FORCES 

New Policy Debate on Purpose of U.S. Nuclear Weapons   

Over the last four years, a number of important factors have 
changed the U.S. government's perspective regarding its nuclear 
weapons programs. The end of the confrontational relationship 
with Moscow, the lack of a clear and present security threat, 
progressively declining defense budgets, and the negotiation of 
the START treaties have compelled the United States to reduce the 
size of its nuclear arsenal, spend less on nuclear weapons, and 
curb modernization programs. Despite these developments, it is 
clear that the United States will continue to maintain thousands 
of nuclear weapons, with some limited modernization, for the 
foreseeable future. More broadly, there is no consensus in the 
United States on the purpose of these weapons in the post Cold 
War era and a new debate has begun in Washington. The outcome of 
this debate will likely have implications for "negative security 
assurances" for North Korea and Japan's support for the 
indefinite extension of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty 
(NPT). 

With the passing of the Cold War, two separate schools of thought 
on the future of U.S. nuclear weapons have emerged. First, there 
is the school that believes that: a) the role of nuclear weapons 
in international relations has diminished dramatically; b) the 
exclusive, or at least primary, purpose of U.S. nuclear weapons 
is to deter or respond to the use of nuclear weapons against the 
United States or its allies; and c) strict constraints on U.S. 
nuclear weapons (e.g. a ban on nuclear testing) could help the 
United States strengthen its efforts to curb proliferation of 
nuclear weapons in the developing world, as well as in the former 
Soviet Union. 

Second, there is the school of thought that believes that a) 
increased "instability and uncertainty" in the developing world, 
coupled with the spread of "weapons of mass destruction," 
necessitate an expansion of the role of U.S. nuclear weapons to 
deter or respond to chemical and biological weapons or even 
conventionally-armed ballistic missiles; and b) the development 
of "mini or micro" low yield nuclear weapons would be useful for 
attacks against "Third World tyrants like Saddam Hussein" who 
would take refuge along with their senior military officers in 
reinforced underground bunkers during a conflict with the United 
States.  

In addition, there is another group, which includes members in 
both of the first two schools of thought, that believes the 
United States must maintain its nuclear forces at their current 
number with a modest level of modernization as a "hedge" against 
retrograde leaders coming to power in the Kremlin. To add to the 
cacophony in the U.S. debate, there is frequent disagreement 
within the same schools of thought about the degree to which 
their policy formulations should be carried out. In an effort to 
reconcile some of these conflicting views, the Defense Department 
has begun to conduct a "Nuclear Posture Review," due to be 
released this fall. It remains to be seen, however, whether the 
government can arrive at a consensus about the future role of 
U.S. nuclear weapons.

Reductions in the number of U.S. strategic nuclear weapons

In the last four years, the United States has removed virtually 
all of its oldest strategic weapons from operational service, 
including Minuteman II ICBMs, Poseidon submarines, and B-52G 
bombers. Consequently, the number of deployed U.S. strategic 
nuclear warheads, has declined by about one-third since September 
1990--from 12,646 to 8,380 (1). (The current figure is 
approximately the number the United States had planned to deploy 
under START I.) If the START II treaty is ratified and 
implemented, that number will drop to 3,500--a 72 percent 
decrease from the September 1990 level. 

It should be noted, however, that START II cannot enter into 
force unless START I does- -a development that cannot happen 
until Ukraine accedes to the NPT. Furthermore, Russian 
ratification of START II is far from a foregone conclusion and 
the United States has said that it is not prepared to go down to 
START II levels unilaterally (2). 

Spending on U.S. Nuclear Weapons

With the end of the Cold War and the continuing economic burden 
of a large federal budget deficit, the U.S. government has found 
that it can not justify allocating scarce resources to its 
nuclear programs at the levels it maintained in the recent past. 
A decade ago, strategic nuclear programs accounted for 11 percent 
of the Department of Defense (DOD) budget when the Reagan 
Administration's strategic modernization program was being 
implemented. But today, strategic nuclear programs represent only 
3 to 4 percent of the DOD budget (3). Admiral Henry Chiles, 
commander-in-chief of the United States Strategic Command 
(STRATCOM) told Congress in April that spending on U.S. strategic 
forces over the last decade has declined far more rapidly than 
the U.S. defense budget as a whole in the same period. Chiles 
said that while the Defense Department's total obligating 
authority declined by over 33 percent (in constant FY93 dollars), 
"the portion of the overall defense budget dedicated to nuclear 
forces declined over 74 percent in FY93 dollars. (4)"

Status of U.S. Strategic Weapons Programs

In recent years, the United States has also curtailed the 
development, testing, and production of new nuclear systems. With 
respect to nuclear warheads, the United States has not conducted 
any underground nuclear tests since 1992 and, with the closing of 
Rocky Flats' plutonium pit fabrication unit in November 1989, has 
not produced any new warheads since the summer of 1990 (5). It 
has not produced any new plutonium since 1988 and has not 
enriched any uranium for weapons purposes since 1964.

Regarding nuclear delivery vehicles, Admiral Chiles told Congress 
in his April testimony that "There are no new...ballistic missile 
programs on the drawing boards to replace our current systems 
(6)" and the Defense Department has said that "development of a 
new intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) is not anticipated 
for at least 15 years. (7)"

Some strategic modernization, however, is proceeding. The United 
States continues to build B-2 bombers and Trident submarines--two 
programs for which Congress has already appropriated the vast 
majority of the funding. In addition, the Clinton administration 
is seeking funding to build additional Trident II (D-5) 
submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) and upgrade the 
accuracy and extend the life of the Minuteman III ICBM.

ICBMs

Although U.S. ICBMs have the range to hit targets in Northeast 
Asia, they are not particularly relevant to the region. In any 
case, U.S. ICBM plans are quite straightforward: all of the 
remaining Minuteman II missiles, which have already had their 
warheads removed, are scheduled to retired by fiscal year 1995;   
if START II is implemented, all of the 500 Minuteman III missiles 
will be downloaded from three warheads each to one, and all 50 of 
the ten-warhead MX missiles will be eliminated. 

 U.S. SSBNs and SLBMs

U.S. nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) are 
considered to be the heart of the U.S. strategic deterrent. The 
last three Poseidon submarines were removed from patrol status on 
April 1, 1994. Trident submarine production continues on 
schedule. The USS Rhode Island is scheduled to be commissioned in 
the summer of 1994. It will be the 15th Ohio-class submarine and 
seventh to carry the Trident II missile, all of which are based 
at King's Bay, Georgia. (The other eight operational Trident 
submarines, which are armed with the Trident I missile, are based 
in the Pacific Ocean at Bangor, Washington.) By 1997, the United 
States plans to have a total of 18 SSBNs--10 in the Atlantic 
carrying 24 Trident II missiles each and eight in the Pacific 
carrying 24 Trident I missiles each. To get under START II's 
limit of 1,750 SLBM warheads, the Navy plans to download its 432 
Trident SLBMs from 8 warheads each to 4, for a total of 1,728 
warheads (8). 

The Navy's decision on whether to backfit the eight Trident 
submarines that patrol in the Pacific with the Trident II missile 
will not be made until early 1995 (9). Even if the United States 
does decide to go forward with the backfit--a decision that seems 
unlikely for budgetary reasons--it would not be carried out until 
the first decade of the next century. 



U.S. Strategic Bombers

U.S. dual-capable strategic bombers have been used in the past to 
deliver conventional ordnance in regional conflicts. (For 
example, B-52 bombers were used in the Vietnam War and in the 
Gulf War against Iraq.) In addition, the United States has used 
the B-1B in the Team Spirit exercise (10) and the Air Force has 
touted the B-2 as an effective system for limited conflicts in 
developing states. 

The United States recently retired all of its B-52G bombers (11), 
including the B-52Gs that were once deployed at Andersen Air 
Force Base in Guam. The Department of Defense is now planning to 
retire up to half of its 95 B-52Hs pending the outcome of the 
Nuclear Posture Review.         

The Air Force has decided that all the B-1Bs will be "reoriented 
to a purely conventional role" by 1998 for regional missions. It 
also plans to put one quarter of the 96 B-1Bs in "attrition 
reserve," a new category in which the B-1Bs will continue to fly, 
but with reduced crew-to- aircraft ratios to save money.      

The first operational B-2 was delivered to Whiteman AFB, Missouri 
in December 1993. Four additional B-2s will be delivered in 1994 
(12) and by the late 1990s, the United States will have deployed 
all 20 operational B-2s. In addition, the Senate Armed Services 
Committee, along with the B-2's prime contractor Northrop, have 
recently called for keeping the production line open to maintain 
"the industrial base" and produce additional B-2s beyond the cap 
of 20 set by Congress last year.

 U.S. Tactical Nuclear Weapons Withdrawn From South Korea

Less than a month after President George Bush's September 27, 
1991 announcement that the United States would withdraw all of 
its ground- and sea-launched tactical nuclear weapons, press 
reports cited anonymous Bush administration officials saying that 
the United States planned to remove all U.S. nuclear weapons from 
South Korea, including air-delivered nuclear weapons (13). (At 
that time, Robert S. Norris, a Senior Analyst for the Natural 
Resources Defense Council, estimated that there were 
approximately 100 U.S. nuclear weapons based in South Korea--60 
B-61 gravity bombs available for delivery by several squadrons of 
nuclear-capable F- 16s located at Kunsan air base; plus 40 W-33 
nuclear artillery shells.) (14) 

On December 18, 1991, then-President of South Korea, Roh Tae Woo 
announced in a televised speech that "As I speak, there do not 
exist any nuclear weapons whatsoever, anywhere in the Republic of 
Korea (15). Subsequently, senior U.S. officials stated that "U.S. 
policy is consistent with" President Roh's statement (16). 

Nuclear Weapons Withdrawn From U.S. Ships in the Pacific    

Between September 1991 and June 1992, the United States withdrew 
all tactical nuclear warheads routinely deployed at sea on 
surface ships, attack submarines, and aircraft carriers, 
including those that patrol in the Western Pacific. These 
withdrawals consisted of: B-57 depth strike/bombs for S-3 jets 
and SH-3 helicopters and B-61 gravity bombs for A-6, A-7 and F/A-
18 planes deployed on aircraft carriers; and W-80 warheads for 
Tomahawk sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs) deployed on 
cruisers, destroyers, and attack submarines. In addition, the 
United States removed from service 350 B-57 depth bombs deployed 
with land- based naval anti-submarine warfare (ASW) aircraft, 
including B-57 depth bombs deployed in Alaska, California, Guam, 
and Hawaii (17). All of the B-57s are slated for dismantlement by 
April 1996 (18) and apparently all of the Navy's B-61s are 
scheduled for eventual dismantlement as well. But the W-80 
nuclear warheads for SLCMs will be stored rather than dismantled 
(19). 

 Current U.S. Operational Tactical Nuclear Weapons

Since 1984, the United States has reduced the number of 
operational tactical nuclear warheads in its arsenal by more than 
90 percent. The retired tactical nuclear weapons that have not 
been dismantled yet are either stored in depots in the United 
States or have been shipped to the Department of Energy's Pantex 
facility near Amarillo, Texas, where they are being dismantled at 
a rate of up to two thousand per year. 

The United States, however, plans to maintain a significant 
number of tactical nuclear weapons well into the future. In 
January 1992, General Colin Powell, then chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, announced that the United States planned to 
reduce its tactical nuclear weapons to 1,600. At the time, Powell 
made it clear that this number included B-61 gravity bombs for 
naval carrier based aircraft--apparently about 650. But in 
October 1993, the Pentagon stated that the Navy and Marine Corps 
"can prudently do away with the tactical nuclear mission of their 
air components (20)." Consequently, the number of tactical 
nuclear warheads estimated to remain in the active stockpile 
dropped to 950 (21).

Last year, the Clinton administration confirmed some earlier 
projections about the types of tactical nuclear weapons the 
United States plans to keep when it told Congress that the only 
tactical nuclear warheads the United States currently plans to 
maintain in its active stockpile after September 30, 1996 are 
three variants of the B-61 gravity bomb (mods 3/4/10) and the W-
80 warhead for Tomahawk SLCMs (22). Based on these developments, 
it now appears that the United States will maintain 600 B-61 
gravity bombs stored in the United States and Western Europe for 
the U.S. Air Force (and other NATO squadrons) and 350 W-80 
Tomahawk SLCM warheads stored in the United States for the Navy 
(23).  

U.S. Nuclear Weapons Employment Policy and North Korea

At least in theory, as it stands now, U.S. declaratory policy on 
the employment of nuclear weapons does not preclude the United 
States from initiating the use of nuclear weapons on the Korean 
peninsula. In 1978 the Carter administration announced U.S. 
policy on "negative security assurances," a policy that has been 
reaffirmed by all subsequent U.S. administrations, including the 
current one. On June 12, 1978, then-Secretary of State Cyrus 
Vance said: "The United States will not use nuclear weapons 
against any non-nuclear weapon state party to the NPT or any 
comparable internationally binding commitment not to acquire 
nuclear explosive devices, except in the case of an attack on the 
United States, or its territories or armed forces, or its allies, 
by such a state allied to a nuclear-weapon state or associated 
with a nuclear-weapon state in carrying out or sustaining the 
attack. (24)" 

Although the principal aim of the statement was to encourage  
countries to join the NPT as non-nuclear weapon states, the 
purpose of the qualifying clauses was to, inter alia, preserve 
the option of using nuclear weapons against non-Soviet Warsaw 
Pact countries or against North Korea which is "allied" with 
China. The Clinton administration, which has recently reaffirmed 
the 1978 policy, has promised that the Nuclear Posture Review 
will include an examination of U.S. negative security assurances 
and their implications for nuclear proliferation. Initial reports 
from anonymous U.S. government sources, however, indicate that 
this review will not result in any major substantive changes in 
U.S. policy (25).

Scenarios for U.S. nuclear weapons employment in Korea

The most likely scenario in which the United States would use 
nuclear weapons against North Korea is if Pyongyang--possibly in 
a response to a U.S. bombing attack against the nuclear 
facilities at Yongbyon--launched nuclear weapons against South 
Korea. (As in the Gulf War, Scud missiles armed with conventional 
warheads would not prompt a U.S. nuclear response; and it is only 
a remote possibility that the United States would respond with 
nuclear weapons if its troops were attacked with chemical or 
biological weapons.) A second, but even less likely, scenario 
that could trigger a U.S. nuclear response would involve a North 
Korean nuclear attack against Japan, especially one that resulted 
in numerous deaths of American troops stationed there.

Although the odds of a U.S. decision to use nuclear weapons on 
the Korean peninsula are near zero, some members of the U.S. 
Senate have advocated the reintroduction of tactical nuclear 
weapons into the region. On February 1, 1994, in response to 
North Korea's refusal to cooperate fully with the IAEA on the 
inspection of its nuclear facilities, the U.S. Senate passed by 
voice vote an amendment to the State Department Authorization 
Bill, sponsored Senator Charles Robb (D-VA), that called on the 
President to "enhance the defense capability of United States 
forces by preparing to reintroduce tactical nuclear weapons in 
South Korea (26)." After a conference with the House of 
Representatives, however, this language was dropped from the bill 
and apparently replaced with the following sentence: "While 
diplomacy is the preferable method of dealing with the North 
Korean nuclear challenge, all options, including the appropriate 
use of force, remain available (27)."

Although the likelihood of the United States ever reintroducing 
tactical nuclear weapons onto the Korean peninsula again is also 
extremely remote, the proposed legislation illustrates that it is 
not inconceivable. Furthermore, such proposals, regardless of 
their actual likelihood, are certain to raise concerns in 
Pyongyang. 

Because the United States is in the process of dismantling all of 
the Army's ground- launched tactical nuclear warheads, their 
reintroduction is not a realistic option. (The United States 
plans to dismantle the last Lance missile nuclear warhead by 
November 1994 and the last nuclear artillery shell by September 
1995 (28).) The Navy and the Air Force, however, could still 
deliver tactical nuclear weapons in the Korean theater. The Air 
Force maintains 72 nuclear capable F-16s in South Korea (29), 
which could be equipped to carry B-61 gravity bombs for use 
against targets in North Korea. In addition, as mentioned above, 
the nuclear-capable B-1B bomber was used in the Team Spirit 
exercise in March 1993, (which North Korea's Foreign Minister 
called "a nuclear war rehearsal") (30). 

The Navy's 7th fleet has at least one carrier battle group (and 
usually two) in the western Pacific and Indian Ocean with 
nuclear-capable surface ships and attack submarines. Normally, 
one of these is the USS Independence, which is based at Yokosuka, 
Japan. When the Independence is in dry dock, another aircraft 
carrier from San Diego, California, Alameda, California, or 
Bremerton, Washington, is forward deployed in the place of the 
Independence. Typically, during peacetime, a U.S. carrier battle 
group would include: one carrier, one to two Ticondergoga Aegis 
class cruisers, two or more destroyers (DDs); and up to three 
Sturgeon- or Los Angeles-class attack submarines (SSNs). Because 
the navy has now abandoned the tactical nuclear aviation mission, 
the only nuclear option remaining is the Tomahawk. Although U.S. 
surface ships and attack submarines no longer carry nuclear 
weapons during peacetime, the cruisers, detroyers, and attack 
submarines associated with the 7th fleet are all capable of 
carrying nuclear-armed Tomahawks (31).           

With respect to strategic weapons, the United States would 
probably rule out ICBMs because land-based missiles, deployed in 
the continental United States, would have to fly over the North 
Pole in the direction of Russia to strike targets in North Korea 
and might inadvertently provoke a nuclear response from Moscow. 
Bombers and SLBMs, however, have been considered by at least a 
few U.S. strategic planners for carrying out nuclear strikes 
against "Third World targets." On October 10, 1991, Thomas Reed, 
the chairman of an advisory group on strategic deterrence, gave a 
briefing to General Lee Butler then-the Director of the Strategic 
Target Planning Staff (JSTPS) and Commander-in-Chief of the 
Strategic Air Command (SAC). Reed recommended creating a new 
single integrated operational plan (SIOP) option in which the 
United States would establish an "expeditionary force: a handful 
of nuclear weapons on alert, day to day, or specifically 
generated for nuclear missions, primarily for use against China 
or Third World targets." Reed suggested that the new SIOP option 
"Echo" could be executed by B-2 bombers, nuclear-armed SLCMs, or 
SLBMs. Just last year, General Butler publicly expressed interest 
in developing SIOP options for the use of U.S. nuclear weapons in 
regional conflicts (32). Also in 1993, Rear Admiral John 
Mitchell, the director of the Navy's Strategic System Programs 
told Congress that the Navy was increasing its capability to 
retarget SLBMs quickly to prepare for "a world of more diffuse 
threats than those imagined even five years ago (33)"-- 
presumably a reference to potential conflicts outside the former 
Soviet Union.

Due to North Korea's densely deployed air defense systems, the 
United States would probably be reluctant to overfly targets in 
North Korea with aircraft and risk the lives of its pilots. 
Furthermore, the cost and small number of B-2 bombers would 
probably make the Air Force averse to its use in North Korea. 
SLCMs are more accurate than SLBMs and were used successfully in 
the Gulf War against Iraq. Therefore Tomahawk missiles appear to 
be the most likely option for nuclear use on the Korean 
peninsula.

U.S. Nuclear Weapons and China

Although the likelihood of the United States threatening to use 
nuclear weapons against China is extremely low, there are 
precedents for such threats--e.g. during the Korean War and again 
during the 1954-1955 and 1958 Taiwan-Formosa Straits crises--
which Beijing has surely not forgotten (see also p. xxx). 
Furthermore, the United States still earmarks some of its 
strategic forces for contingencies involving China. 

The most likely scenario in which the United States would use or 
threaten to use nuclear weapons against China would be if the 
United States became involved in a war with North Korea and China 
intervened militarily on Pyongyang's behalf. In the 1990s, 
however, this would be extremely unlikely, in large part because, 
unlike the 1950s, China now possess its own nuclear weapons. 
(Furthermore, the Chinese, who have declared economic 
modernization as their top priority, have very strong 
disincentives to intervene militarily in Korea.) 

According to Robert S. Norris and William A. Arkin, China was 
included in the U.S. SIOP until 1982 when a separate new plan was 
prepared for nuclear war with the PRC. Initially, that plan 
relied almost exclusively on B-52 bombers, but because of their 
removal from alert in September 1991, SSBNs took on a more 
central role vis-a- vis China. Apparently, U.S. war planners 
decided to rule out ICBMs for attacks against China for the same 
reason that they would not use ICBMs against North Korea--their 
flight paths over the North Pole could inadvertently provoke a 
response from Moscow (34). 

PART III: RUSSIAN NUCLEAR FORCES 

Introduction

The end of the Cold War, the virtual free fall in the Russian 
economy, the signing of strategic arms reduction agreements with 
the United States, and the unilateral initiatives taken by  
Mikhail Gorbachev and Boris Yeltsin have clearly had an enormous 
impact on the status of Russian nuclear forces.   

The production of nuclear weapons systems has ground almost to a 
halt. Russia has stopped producing ballistic missile submarines, 
strategic bombers, and all intercontinental ballistic missiles 
(ICBMs) except for the SS-25. Development of new nuclear weapons 
has also been curtailed. For example, in 1991, the United States 
estimated that Moscow had "five or six" new types of long-range 
ballistic missiles under development (35). But today, U.S. 
intelligence estimates that number is down to two or three--none 
of which has yet been flighted tested. Testing of nuclear weapon 
systems has also declined. Russia has not conducted an 
underground nuclear test since becoming the successor state to 
the former USSR (which conducted its last test on October 24, 
1990.) The flight testing of strategic ballistic missiles has 
also dropped precipitously in recent years (36). 

Although the retirement of older, Russian strategic nuclear 
weapons has thus far been carried out at a relatively slow pace, 
the operational readiness or alert levels of existing Russian 
strategic forces has dropped precipitously. 

Russia has made a commitment to dismantle a significant portion 
of its tactical nuclear warheads and asserts that this process is 
well underway.    

Russian ICBMs in 1990 (Numbers and locations)    

As of September 1, 1990 the Soviet Union deployed the following 
ICBMs (37):

--326 SS-11s: 60 at Bershet; 26 at Teykovo; 40 at Krasnoyarsk; 50 
at Drovyanaya; 90 at Yasnaya; and 60 at Svobodnyy. (All of these 
bases are in Russia.)

--40 SS-13s at Yoshkar-Ola, Russia.

--47 SS-17s at Vypolzovo, Russia.

--204 SS-18s in Russia: 64 at Dombarovskiy; 46 in Kartaly; 64 in 
Uzhur; and 30 in Aleysk.

--104 SS-18s in Kazakhstan: 52 in Derzhavinsk, (formerly referred 
to by the United States as Imeni Gastello); and 52 in Zhangiz-
Tobe.

--170 SS-19s deployed in Russia: 60 in Kozel'sk; and 110 in 
Tatishchevo.

--130 SS-19s in Ukraine: 40 in Pervomaysk; and 90 in 
Khmel'Nitskiy, (formerly referred to by the United States as 
Deraznya).

--234 SS-25s in Russia: 36 in Teykovo; 18 in Yoshkar-Ola; 45 in 
Yur'Ya; 45 in Nizhniy Tagil; 27 in Novosibirsk; 27 in Kansk; and 
36 in Irkutsk. 

--54 SS-25s in Belarus: 27 in Lida; and 27 in Mozyr.

--33 rail-based SS-24s in Russia: 12 in Kostroma; 12 in 
Krasnoyarsk; and 9 in Bershet (38). 

--10 silo-based SS-24s deployed at Tatishchevo, Russia.

--46 silo-based SS-24s deployed at Pervomaysk, Ukraine.

Russian ICBM Deactivations

In anticipation of the implementation of the START Treaty, Russia 
has begun retiring some older ICBMs. As of early May 1994, Russia 
had deactivated (i.e. removed the warheads from) all 326 of its 
SS-11s, 20 of its 40 SS-13s, 27 of its 47 SS-17s and 16 of its 
204 SS-18s, according to the U.S. Department of Defense (39). In 
addition, 12 of the 104 SS-18s in Kazakhstan have been 
deactivated (40); and all 46 of the SS-24s and at least 30 of the 
130 SS-19s in Ukraine have been deactivated (41). 

Based on their location, it seems likely that the 200 SS-11s 
based at Drovyanaya, Yasnaya, and Svobodnyy were targeted on 
China prior to their retirement (42). Most of the other ICBMs 
that have been deactivated were probably targeted on the United 
States.

Russian ICBMs in 1994 (numbers) and projections for START

After taking these deactivations into account, the Strategic 
Rocket Forces currently have 20 SS-13s, 20 SS-17s, 188 SS-18s, 
170 SS-19s, 10 silo-based SS-24s, 36 rail-based SS-24s and 351 
SS-25s in Russia plus 92 SS-18s in Kazakhstan, 100 SS-19s in 
Ukraine, and 54 SS-25s in Belarus--for a total of 1,041 ICBMs 
with 5,385 warheads. Since 1990, this represents a 26 percent cut 
in missiles and a 19 percent cut in warheads.

Under START I Russia is expected to retain some SS-19s, SS-24s, 
and SS-25s, and no more than 154 SS-18s. Under START II, Russia 
will be required to eliminate all of its SS-18 and SS-24 ICBMs 
and is expected to field no more than 105 SS-19s downloaded to 
one warhead each plus a total of 500-1,000 single-warhead SS-25 
type missiles, both in silo- and mobile-basing modes (43).

Russian ICBM Production

Russian ICBM production has continued to decline in the early 
1990s (44). In February 1993, the CIA's National Intelligence 
Officer for Strategic Programs, Dr. Lawrence Gershwin said, 
"today the only strategic missile in production at all is the SS-
25 road mobile ICBM, and that production is down from what it 
historically has been. We are really at a rather low point in 
missile production. (45)" Development of New Russian ICBMs 

The U.S. intelligence community now expects Russia will soon 
flight test a follow-on to the SS-25 and deploy it sometime 
"during this decade" both in silos and in a mobile basing mode 
(46). Gershwin testified in early 1993 that neither of these 
missiles had been flight tested (47) and as of early 1994, there 
were no new reports to the contrary. 

Russian SSBNs in 1990 (numbers and locations)

In the START I September 1, 1990 MOU, the Soviet Union declared a 
total of 62 SSBNs divided as follows: 38 in the northern Atlantic 
fleet on the Kola Peninsula; and 24 in the Pacific fleet (15 
based at Rybachiy some 15 kilometers southwest of Petropavlosk on 
the Kamchatka Peninsula; and 9 at Pavlovskoye some 65 kilometers 
southeast of Vladivostok.) 

Among other things, the START I MOU revealed that two-thirds of 
the most modern SSBNs were based in the northern Atlantic Fleet. 
The 38 on the Kola Peninsula included: 6 Typhoons; 7 Delta IVs; 5 
Delta IIIs; 4 Delta IIs; 9 Delta Is; 1 Yankee II; and 6 Yankee 
Is. The 15 at Ribachiy included: 9 Delta IIIs; 3 Delta Is; and 3 
Yankee Is. The 9 at Pavlovskoye included 6 Delta Is and 3 Yankee 
Is.

In 1988, Rear Admiral William Studeman, then-Director of U.S. 
Naval Intelligence, told Congress that Yankee-class SSBNs had 
stopped patrolling of the U.S. coast in late 1987 and were 
"conducting combat service patrols against theater targets," 
compensating for the projected loss of SS-20 missiles under the 
Intermediate-Range Nuclear forces (INF) Treaty. He added that the 
Yankee-Is, equipped with 16 3,000 kilometer range SS-N-6 missiles 
each "can reach...Asian targets while alongside their piers." 
(48) (Specifically, a Yankee-I based at Ribachiy could launch 
missiles from port and hit Japan, while a Yankee-I based at 
Pavlovskoye could hit China, North Korea, and Japan.)

Russian SSBNs in 1994 (numbers and locations)

Over the last four years, Russia has retired at least 20 percent 
of its SSBNs, including at least 5 submarines in the Pacific 
fleet. In response to a Freedom of Information Act request filed 
by Josh Handler of Greenpeace, the office of U.S. Naval 
Intelligence reported that Russia had removed 9 Yankee-Is, the 
single-unit Yankee II, and three Delta Is from operational 
service as of January 1, 1994 (49). Consequently, as of that 
date, Russia had 30 SSBNs on the Kola Peninsula and 19 in the 
Pacific fleet. The latter consisting of 8 Delta-Is, 9 Delta-IIIs, 
and 2 Yankee-Is.

In June 1994, Admiral Sheafer indicated that one additional 
Russian SSBN has been retired since January, bringing the total 
to 48. He did not, however, specify whether the class of that 
submarine or the fleet from which it was removed. It should also 
be noted that it is extremely unlikely that all 18-19 Russian 
SSBNs in the Pacific fleet (or all of the 29-30 in the Northern 
fleet for that matter) are fully operational given Russia's 
economic crisis and the numerous press reports that Moscow only 
maintains one or two SSBNs on patrol at any given time (50).  
Russian SSBN Production and Projections SSBN Reductions     
Admiral Felix Gromov, Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Navy, 
said in 1993 that "the construction of new strategic submarines 
is not planned for the near future, although designers continue 
to work in this field. (51)" Admiral Gromov added that by the 
year 2000, Russia would reduce the number of its SSBNs to 24 
(52), presumably six Typhoon, 7 Delta IV, and 11 Delta III class 
submarines. (If this is the case, it seems likely that Russia 
would decide to close down the Pavlovskoye base near Vladivostok 
since none of these submarines is based there (53).) U.S. 
intelligence officials echoed Admiral Gromov in their public 
statements to the U.S. Congress in 1993. CIA analyst Gershwin 
said in February 1993 that, for the first time since the 1960s, 
Russia has stopped producing ballistic missile submarines and the 
U.S. intelligence community does not "anticipate a resumption of 
the production of ballistic missile submarines until...sometime 
after the year 2000. (54)" In June 1994, Rear Admiral Edward 
Sheafer, Director of U.S. Naval Intelligence, said that under 
START II, the Russian SSBN force "will decrease by 50 percent 
from its current level of 48 submarines. (55)"    

Russian SLBMs under Development(56) 

Russia is developing a new SLBM for deployment on Typhoon-class 
submarines (57). This follow-on to the SS-N-20 missile had not 
been flight tested as of early 1994, but U.S. naval intelligence 
projected in May 1993 that "the missile should begin flight 
testing soon." According to an April 1993 Russian press report, 
the SS-N-20 follow-on development is slated to be complete by 
1996. U.S. Naval Intelligence expects that all six of the Typhoon 
SSBNs will be backfitted with the follow-on to the SS-N-20 by the 
late 1990s. It seems likely that the follow-on to the SS-N-20 
based on Typhoon submarines on the Kola Peninsula would be used 
for U.S. targets rather than Asian targets.   

Russian Bombers in 1990 (numbers and locations)   

In the September 1990 START MOU, the Soviet Union declared that 
it had the following strategic bombers:  

--46 Bear-G, all of which were based in Ukrainka, Russia--just 
north of the Chinese border.

--84 Bear-Hs deployed as follows: 21 in Uzin, Ukraine; 22 in 
Mozdok, Russia; 40 in Semipalatinsk, Kazakhstan; and one in 
Kubyshev, Russia where the Bear-H was produced. 

--21 Blackjacks: six test planes at the Zhukovsky flight test 
center just south of Moscow; two deployed in Kazan, Russia where 
the Blackjacks were produced; and 13 deployed at Priluki, 
Ukraine. Russian bombers in 1994 (numbers and locations)

Since the Soviet Union provided data for the START I treaty, 
little additional information on the number and locations of 
Soviet/Russian strategic bombers has surfaced. It is well 
documented, however, that the 40 Bear-H bombers based at 
Semipalatinsk, Kazakhstan had all been flown back to Russia as of 
early 1994 (58). In addition, some new data on the Blackjack are 
also available, indicating that there are now 19 or 20 Blackjacks 
based in Priluki, Ukraine, (59) and at least six in Russia which 
appear to divide their time between the Zhukovsky flight test 
center (60) and Engels air force base on the Volga river near 
Saratov (61).     

It now appears that the 46 Bear-G, located in the Far East 
Military District at Ukrainka, are the only START-accountable 
bombers based in the Asian part of Russia (i.e. east of the Ural 
mountains). These aircraft were apparently transferred from the 
Irkutsk Strategic Air Army (SAA) located in the Transbaykal 
Military District to Ukrainka sometime between 1988 and 1990 
(62). The Pentagon reported in 1988 that the Bear-G "have been 
reassigned to a theater role [in Asia] and have been observed 
conducting regular combat training exercises against naval and 
land targets in the Northern Pacific Ocean region. (63)" The 
Bear-G are armed with the nuclear-capable AS-4 missile, which has 
a range of 280-560 kilometers and can conduct both land-attack 
and anti-ship missions (64).   

Given Ukraine's control of 80 percent of the former Soviet 
Union's Blackjacks and 25 percent of its Bear-Hs, plus Russia's 
lack of aerial refueling capability, it seems unlikely that 
Moscow would be able to bring many of its most modern strategic 
bombers to bear in a conflict in Northeast Asia.

Projected Russian Strategic Bomber Forces    

Moscow's strategic bomber production declined sharply in the 
early 1990 (65)s and has now ceased altogether (66). The number 
of heavy bombers Russia will retain in the future will probably 
not depend on the numerical limits imposed by START I and START 
II on Russian strategic forces but rather on how many Blackjacks 
and Bear-Hs it can retrieve from Ukraine and how many aircraft it 
can afford to maintain.  

In addition, the role of Russian strategic bombers is expected to 
change dramatically in the future. Reportedly, the Russian air 
force has recently been restructured in order to conform with the 
new military doctrine which stresses preparation for tactical 
missions around Russia's periphery. Blackjack, Bear, and Backfire 
bomber crews have begun training as a "composite force" to 
deliver conventional weapons against targets near Russia's 
borders (67).

Soviet INF Treaty Implementation east of the Urals(68)

The INF Treaty, which was signed in December 1987 and entered 
into force on June 1, 1988, required the United Stated and the 
Soviet Union to dismantle all of their land-based missiles with a 
range of 500 to 5,500 kilometers within three years. In 
implementing this treaty, the Soviet Union dismantled a 
significant number of nuclear-armed missiles that were certainly 
targeted against China and a few that may have been targeted on 
North Korea.

These mobile missiles included the 5,000 kilometer range three-
warhead SS-20s, the 900 kilometer range SS-12 and the 500 
kilometer range SS-23. The SS-20s within range of China included 
45 at Novosibirk, 45 at Drovyanaya, 45 at Barnaul, and 36 at 
Kansk. The SS-12s within range of China included 36 at Gornyy, 9 
at Kattakurgan, and 40 at Novosyoyevka. (The Novosyoyevka base, 
just north of Vladivostok, put the 900 km SS-12 within range of 
Pyongyang as well as Northeastern China.) The SS-23s within range 
of China included 22 in Semipalatinsk, Kazakhstan.       

 Ground-Launched Nuclear Weapons with a Range Less than 500 Km    

On October 5, 1991, then-Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev 
declared that the Soviet Union would eliminate all of its 
existing nuclear artillery projectiles and warheads for tactical 
nuclear missiles (69). On January 29, 1992, Russian President 
Yeltsin said that Russia had stopped the production of nuclear 
warheads for nuclear land mines as well as for artillery and 
tactical missiles. He added that "stocks of such nuclear devices 
will be eliminated. (70)"  Russian officials have said that they 
plan to dismantle all of the nuclear land mines by 1998 and all 
the tactical warheads associated with its short-range missiles 
and artillery by the year 2000 (71).       Naval Tactical Nuclear 
Weapons and the Pacific Fleet

In his October 5, 1991 initiative, Gorbachev said that "all 
tactical nuclear weapons shall be removed from surface ships and 
multi-purpose submarines." (In February 1993, the Russian 
Ministry of Defense announced that this initiative, which had 
been reaffirmed by Yeltsin, had been carried out (72).) In his 
January 29, 1992 initiative Yeltsin said that Russia would 
dismantle one-third of its naval tactical weapons formerly 
deployed on ships, submarines and aircraft. Subsequently, Russian 
officials indicated that they plan to fulfil this pledge by 1996 
(73).

Presumably, the two thirds of Russia's naval tactical nuclear 
warheads that are not slated for dismantlement will remain in 
storage facilities near existing naval bases, including those in 
the Pacific Fleet. Although Russia has been reducing the number 
of nuclear-capable ships, submarines and aircraft in the Pacific 
Fleet, a significant residual nuclear capability remains and some 
modernization appears to be taking place. For example, in the 
early 1990s, Moscow began replacing obsolete Tu-16 Badger medium-
range bombers with the modern, supersonic Tu- 22M/Tu-26 Backfire 
strike aircraft (74). IISS estimated last year that 70 Tu-26s in 
two regiments are based at Alekseyevka naval airfield north of 
Vladivostok. Backfires can carry nuclear payloads of AS-4s, AS-
16s, or nuclear gravity bombs (75).

The Tu-26s are supported in the strike role by 15 Su-24 Fencers 
and 35 Su-17 Fitter fighter-bombers (76), both of which can carry 
nuclear gravity bombs (77).

Pacific Fleet surface combatants are also capable of nuclear 
surface strike operations. The Fleet has a single Slava-class 
cruiser and six Sovremenny-class destroyers (78). The Slava 
(Chervona Ukraina) can carry 16 SS-N-12 anti-ship missiles with 
an estimated range of more than 500 kilometers. The Sovremennys 
are capable of carrying eight 90-kilometer SS-N-22 anti- ship 
missiles each (79). 

The surface ships are augmented by about ten cruise missile 
submarines (SSGNs) including two Oscar II boats capable of 
fielding 24 SS-N-19 SLCMs (80). SS-N-19s are anti-ship cruise 
missiles with an estimated range of 550 kilometers. Additionally, 
the Sierra-I class and the Akula-class SSNs assigned to the 
Pacific Fleet are able to carry the 3,000 kilometer range SS-N-21 
SLCM for land attack missions (81). 

A host of Pacific Fleet units can conduct nuclear anti-submarine 
operations. Airborne ASW forces include 15 Il-38 May, 35 Be-12 
Seagull, and 20 Tu-142 Bear F aircraft. Sixty Ka-26 and Ka-27 
Hormone helicopters supplement this force. All of these units are 
able to carry nuclear torpedoes and depth charges (82).

At least 22 surface combatants can conduct nuclear ASW 
operations, although primary responsibility would fall to the two 
Kara-class cruisers and three Udaloy class destroyers that are 
dedicated to ASW. These ships can carry nuclear-tipped ASW 
torpedoes (83). Pacific Fleet attack submarines are also able to 
carry nuclear torpedoes. Additionally, Akula- and Sierra- class 
SSNs can carry the SS-N-15 nuclear depth charge and the SS-N-16 
ASW rocket (84).

Notwithstanding this extensive nuclear-capable force structure, 
the Pacific Fleet is a hollow force. The 1994 U.S. Director of 
Naval Intelligence Posture Statement reports that the Fleet is 
suffering severe supply and financial problems (85). Four Pacific 
Fleet conscripts reportedly starved to death last year in a 
scandal that prompted one of several Fleet command changes (86). 
In July, 1993 oil and lubricant shipments to Fleet bases were 
halted because it could not pay its bills (87). Many of the 
Pacific Fleet's ships are unfit to go to sea due to a lack of 
spare parts and maintenance (88). Finally, numerous reports 
indicate that operating tempo for all of Russia's major fleets, 
including the Pacific Fleet, has dropped precipitously.

Russian Nuclear-Armed SAMs in the Far East Military District

In 1990, the Pentagon said, "The Soviets are...substantially 
upgrading their Far East air defense capabilities with the rapid 
buildup of SA-10 Grumble surface-to-air missile sites." At that 
time, DOD projected that a total of 27 SA-10 battalions would 
eventually be deployed in the Far East (89). It is estimated that 
at least one out of every three SA-10 launchers has nuclear-armed 
interceptor missiles (90). (In 1993, IISS estimated that there 
were 570 SAMs in the Far East Military District, but did not 
provide a breakdown by type.)     

According to Russian officials, Moscow plans, in accordance with 
President Yeltsin's January 29, 1992 initiative, to dismantle one 
half of the warheads associated with anti-aircraft missiles by 
1996 or 1997 (91). Presumably, the warheads that will be 
dismantled will be those associated with the older SA-2 and SA-5 
SAMs rather than the SA-10s.    Air-Launched Tactical Nuclear 
Weapons

Russia has said that it plans to dismantle one-half of the 
nuclear munitions for tactical aircraft by 1996 (92). Presumably 
the other half will remain in storage depots near existing 
depots, including those at bases in the Asian part of Russia. 
Russian attack aircraft based in the Far Eastern TVD include the 
MiG-27 Flogger and the Su-24 Fencer E (93), both of which can 
carry nuclear gravity bombs (94). In 1988, the Pentagon said that 
the Soviet Union's Strategic Air Army (SAA) at Irkutsk, just 
north of the Mongolian border near Lake Baikal, was "arrayed 
against ... China/East Asia." At that time, nuclear-capable 
Backfire, Bear-G, Badger, and Blinder bombers were based at 
Irkutsk (95). Today, the status of the Irkutsk Air Army is 
unclear.  

Russian Brain Drain to China and North Korea   

The continued political and economic turmoil in Russia  has 
intensified international concerns about the prospect for a 
"brain drain" in which former nuclear weapons scientists and 
engineers sell their expertise to the highest bidder.

CIA Director James Woolsey told Congress in July 1993 that 
"delays in pay, deteriorating working conditions, and uncertain 
futures are apparently spurring Russian specialists to seek 
emigration despite official restrictions on such travel. (96)"  
Woolsey added that China has been "aggressively recruiting" 
weapons scientists from Russia and his aide Gordon Oehler said, 
"there is evidence the North Koreans would like to have them 
[too], but the Russians are unwilling to go. (97)"

In January 1993, Yevgeny Primakov, head of the Russian Foreign 
Intelligence Service (FIS) said that "as of the beginning of 
1993, the FIS had no data indicating that Russian specialists of 
this kind were working in Third World countries which are 
producing or starting up the production" of weapons of mass 
destruction. In February 1994, the Russian Security Ministry 
announced that North Korea had tried to recruited 60 engineers 
from Makeyev Design Bureau in Miass, which is responsible for 
Scud missiles and SLBMs. Russian police, however, prevented the 
group from boarding a plane in Moscow bound for Pyongyang in 
October 1992 (98).

In January 1994, the Japanese weekly Shukan Bunshun published 
what it claims is an official Russian government assessment of 
the brain drain to North Korea. According to this document, 160 
Russian specialists have participated in the North Korean nuclear 
weapons and ballistic missile programs and 9 nuclear weapon 
scientists and 17 missile engineers are currently taking part 
(99).

Russia: No-First-Use and Nuclear Use Scenarios

In a press conference on November 3, 1993, Russian Defence 
Minister Pavel Grachev made it clear that Russia's newly adopted 
military doctrine does not reaffirm the pledge made in 1982 by 
Leonid Brezhnev that the Soviet Union would not be the first to 
use nuclear weapons under any circumstances (100). Grachev said 
that "there is absolutely nothing in the doctrine about non-use 
of [nuclear] weapons. (101)" 

The change in Russia's declaratory policy on no-first-use may 
reflect, inter alia, a general sense in Moscow that because of 
the recent, sharp decline in its conventional forces and its 
overall economic and political situation, Russia must now rely 
more on nuclear weapons both for deterrence and for its status as 
a major world power (102). With respect to nuclear deterrence, 
Moscow may be particularly concerned that if its relations with 
Beijing take a dramatic turn for the worse in the next 10-20 
years, Russian conventional forces east of the Urals might not be 
able to counter those that China could bring to bear. Sergei 
Rogov, deputy director of the Institute for the Study of USA and 
Canada in Moscow, recently wrote: "While relations with China 
today are pretty good, a military conflict with China has been 
and will always be a nightmare for Russian military planners. 
Concerns about whether Russia is capable of fighting a 
conventional war with China lead to an emphasis in Russian 
military circles on the need to keep some tactical nuclear 
weapons. (103)" 

As mentioned above, Russia has already dismantled its land-based 
missiles with a range between 500 and 5,500 kilometers in 
compliance with the INF Treaty and is also committed to dismantle 
all of the warheads associated with land-based missiles with a 
range under 500 km, as well as its nuclear artillery and nuclear 
land-mines. Therefore, if a new border dispute were to erupt 
between Russia and China, the most likely Russian nuclear option 
would be tactical air- launched nuclear weapons, such as AS-4 and 
AS-16 missiles or gravity bombs, delivered by Bear-G, Backfire, 
Blinder, Fencer, Flogger, or Fitter attack aircraft.

A second, but even less likely scenario, might involve a Russian 
nuclear attack against Japan if Tokyo tried to retake the Kuril 
islands by military force. Such a scenario might involve both 
air- and sea-launched tactical nuclear weapons.   PART IV: 
CHINESE NUCLEAR WEAPONS



China's nuclear weapons program remains shrouded in secrecy but 
it appears that Beijing is continuing to slowly upgrade and 
expand its forces with the development of new types of ballistic 
missiles and the acquisition of nuclear-capable aircraft from 
Russia.  

Unlike the United States and Russia, China has not yet agreed to 
subject its nuclear forces to legally binding limits in any  
international agreements. But China, of course, has a much 
smaller force--roughly 300 deployed nuclear warheads and possibly 
another 150 ground-launched tactical nuclear warheads in storage.        

The Rationale Behind Chinese Nuclear Forces

China began a program to develop nuclear weapons in the mid-1950s 
and exploded its first nuclear weapons device in 1964. Since then 
it has continued to give the maintenance and development of 
nuclear weapons a high priority. There appear to be four major 
reasons why Beijing continues to dedicate a substantial amount of 
resources to its nuclear weapons programs. First, China seeks to 
deter U.S. and Russian aggression or political intimidation. (Of 
course if deterrence failed and the United States or Russia  
initiated the use of nuclear weapons against China, Chinese 
nuclear forces would give Beijing the capability to retaliate and 
punish the aggressor and/or deny the aggressor victory.) China 
intends to make sure that it will never be subjected to what it 
calls "nuclear blackmail" again (104). This concern stems 
directly from Chinese experience in the 1950s and 1960s. China 
was subjected to nuclear threats by the United States during the 
Korean war and during the Taiwan-Formosa Strait Crises (Quemoy 
and Matsu) in 1954-1955 and 1958, and by the Soviet Union during 
the Sino-Soviet border clashes in 1969 (105).

Today, even if the United States and Russia ratify and implement 
the START II Treaty, they would still have approximately ten 
times more nuclear weapons each than China. Moreover, China knows 
that both Russia and the United States have targeted China in the 
past with nuclear weapons and could do so again in the future. In 
a sentence that seems representative of Beijing's view--a former 
member of the General Staff and the Ministry of National Defense 
of China's People's Liberation Army recently wrote: "Before the 
total elimination of the superpowers' nuclear arsenals, it would 
be suicidal and reckless for China to give up its own limited 
nuclear retaliatory capability. (106)"        

Second, China's robust nuclear weapons program also appears to be 
part of an effort to increase Beijing's international prestige 
and status, and influence over both regional and international 
security issues (107). Although China has the world's largest 
population and fastest growing economy, it is still a relatively 
poor country and would probably not be considered a major power 
with status comparable to the other permanent members of the UN 
Security Council without nuclear weapons.

In a related reason, over the last three decades, China--like 
France--has apparently seen its nuclear weapons as a way to 
remain politically autonomous from Washington and Moscow. By 
developing its own nuclear weapons, China--unlike Japan and 
Germany--has not had to join a security alliance and rely on 
another state's "nuclear umbrella. (108)" Thus, in some ways, 
China's nuclear forces serve a political purpose similar to 
France's "force de frappe."

China also probably seeks to maintain and upgrade its nuclear 
faces so that it can settle regional security issues, (e.g. 
border disputes with India and Vietnam, disputes over claims to 
the Spratly Islands, the status of Taiwan), on its own terms 
without concern that it could be politically coerced by any of 
its neighbors that currently have or may have nuclear weapons in 
the future (109). In addition to the United States and Russia, 
China must be concerned about many of its neighbors: India and 
Pakistan currently have the capability to assemble a relatively 
small number of nuclear weapons quickly; North Korea may have or 
may be pursuing nuclear weapons capability; and Japan, South 
Korea, and Taiwan, have the technology to develop nuclear weapons 
relatively quickly (110). Thus, as a hedge against nuclear 
proliferation in Asia, China has an incentive to maintain and 
upgrade its nuclear arsenal (111). 

Trends in Chinese Nuclear Forces

China has developed a nuclear "triad," but with far more emphasis 
on land-based ballistic missiles than on submarines or bombers. 
The technology of these systems lags far behind U.S. and Russian 
nuclear weapon systems. For example, China's ballistic missiles 
are believed to be far less accurate than U.S. and Russian 
ballistic missiles. In addition, Beijing has not yet developed 
missiles that can deliver warheads to separate targets.

As mentioned above, China's nuclear arsenal is far smaller than 
the U.S. and Russian arsenals and will not come anywhere near 
those levels for the foreseeable future. China's force structure 
and operations, as well as its declaratory policy, reflect a 
counter-value, "city busting," second strike strategy which can 
be fulfilled with a relatively small force.

Although it seems clear that China does not seek to field large 
numbers of nuclear weapons, the People's Liberation Army (PLA) 
continues to work on many different types of nuclear weapons--a 
guideline referred to as "small but all-inclusive. (112)" 
Consequently, Beijing appears to have numerous development 
programs underway to improve its nuclear forces in qualitative 
terms. The pace of Beijing's modernization programs, however, is 
extremely gradual and slow. For example, as a rule of thumb, many 
years pass between the first flight test of a new ballistic 
missile and the actual deployment of that missile. With China's 
growing economy, it will probably have sufficient resources to 
raise its defense budget, including increased expenditures for 
nuclear weapons for many years to come.

Improving Survivability  

In order to deter a U.S. or Russian nuclear attack against China, 
Beijing has focused its efforts on developing a secure strategic 
retaliatory capability. To increase the survivability of its 
nuclear forces, China has tried to make its ballistic missiles 
more difficult to locate and target by storing them in caves and 
tunnels, using camouflage, deploying them on mobile land-based 
launchers, and deploying them on submarines. Current 
modernization efforts, e.g. the development of solid fuel mobile 
ICBMs and lighter more compact warheads, seem geared to reduce 
the vulnerability of China's nuclear forces to a first strike.

Land-based ballistic missiles

Land-based ballistic missiles are the mainstay of China's nuclear 
forces. These systems vary in range from 1,000 km to 13,000 
kilometers. Between the mid-1960s and the early 1970s, China 
developed the Dong Feng or "East Wind" family of four land-based 
missiles: the DF-2; DF-3; DF-4; and DF-5. All four missiles were 
intended to have the capability of striking U.S. targets. The DF-
2, first successfully flight tested in 1964, has a range of 1,000 
to 2,000 kilometers and was designed with the intention of 
hitting Okinawa, Japan. (The DF-2 has now been removed from 
service.) The DF-3, first successfully flight tested in 1966, has 
a range of 2,600-2,800 kilometers and was designed with the 
intention of hitting the U.S. bases at Clark and Subic Bay in the 
Philippines. The DF-4, first successfully flight tested in 1970, 
has a range of 4,700  kilometers and was designed with the 
intention of hitting Andersen AFB on Guam. Finally, the DF-5, 
first successfully flight tested in 1971, has a range of 12,000-
13,000 kilometers and was designed with the intention of hitting 
the continental United States (113). 

After the Sino-Soviet border clashes in 1969, however, Beijing 
decided to retarget most of its nuclear forces on the Soviet 
Union. According to John Lewis and Xue Litai, Soviet cities 
became the designated targets of Chinese missiles in the early 
1970s (114). It is believed that most Chinese land-based missiles 
are deployed in the northwestern part of China from where they 
would only have the range to hit targets in Russia (115).  

The DF missile series have a slow response time, vulnerable 
basing modes, and poor accuracy (116). Consequently, the Chinese 
leadership has decided to develop new solid fuel, mobile, land-
based ballistic missiles, including the DF-21, DF-31, and the DF-
41.

 DF-3 (CSS-2)(117)

China currently deploys 40-80 DF-3 missiles (118). This road- 
mobile DF-3, which was the first Chinese missile to use storable 
liquid fuel, has a single warhead with an estimated yield of 1-3 
megatons. It was initially deployed in 1971. Reportedly, the DF-
5s are deployed at launch sites near Dalong, Liuchingkou, X'ian, 
Kunming, Jianshui, Liankengwang, Xuanhua, Fengrun, Itu and 
Tangdao with most of the missiles in the northwestern part of 
China near the Soviet (now Russian) border (119). Many of the D-
5s are stored in caves and valleys in order to conceal their 
locations and enhance their survivability. In a report published 
in 1976, the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) said that the 
DF-3 is "probably intended for relatively largely population 
targets in central and eastern Russia. (120)" According to a 1994 
report by the U.S. Congressional Research Service (CRS), the 
deployment of the DF-3 "provides the PRC with a capacity to hit 
static targets such as population and industrial centers in 
central and eastern Russia, for example, as well as similarly 
close targets elsewhere in East and South Asia. (121)" 

DF-4 (CSS-3)

Approximately 10-20 DF-4 missiles are now deployed in China 
(122). This liquid fuel missile, which is deployed in both silos 
and tunnels, was first deployed in 1980. The DF-4's warhead has 
an estimated yield of 1-3 megatons. The silo-based versions are 
reportedly located in China's central and southeast region near 
Sundian and Tongdao (123). The tunnel-based versions are based in 
the northwestern region on erector launchers in Qinghai (Xiao 
Qaidam, Da Qaidam and Delingha) where they were moved in 1971 
when they were retargeted against the Soviet Union (124). The DF-
4 is probably targeted against Russian military-industrial and 
population centers (125). According to the U.S. Air Force, it 
"can reach targets throughout European Russia, including Moscow. 
(126)"

DF-5 (CSS-4

Today China deploys 4-10 DF-5A missiles in silos (127). (These 
are deployed among a large number of fake silos to make them more 
survivable. (128)) China has the capacity to build many more DF-5 
as has been demonstrated by the production of CZ-2 and other 
space launch vehicles but appears content to demonstrate ICBM 
capability with a small number of missiles (129). This liquid 
fuel system, whose warheads have an estimated yield of 3-5 
megatons, first became operational in 1981 (130). Two of the DF-
5As are located near Luoning in Henan Province (131).  The DF-5A, 
with a range of up to 13,000 kilometers is China's only missile 
capable of hitting the continental United States. According to 
Jane's Strategic Weapons Systems, the DF-5 has a circular error 
probable (CEP) of 500 meters. (It seems unlikely, however, that 
the DF-5 could be that accurate given that China's nuclear 
weapons program as a whole is relatively backward.)  

DF-21

Reportedly, China deploys roughly 25-50 DF-21s (132). This mobile 
missile, which has a range of 1,800 kilometers, was first 
deployed in 1988. The DF-21, which has a warhead with an 
estimated yield of 200-300 kilotons, is China's first land-based 
intermediate-range ballistic missile with solid fuel (133). (The 
JL-1 SLBM, which is essentially the same missile as the DF- 21, 
was China's first ballistic missile with solid fuel. (134)) 

According to one press account, the DF-21s are deployed in the 
northwest province of Qinghai and the southwest province of 
Yunnan (135). Presumably those DF-21 based in Qunghai are 
targeted against urban industrial areas in Russia and those in 
Yunnan are targeted against northeastern India and south East 
Asian countries (136). Jane's Defence Weekly reported in January 
1994 that some of the DF-21s have recently been equipped with 
conventional warheads "so they can be more effectively employed 
in limited local wars. (137)" 

Chinese ICBMs under Development

In order to improve the reliability and survivability of its 
land-based nuclear forces, China is now trying to develop solid 
fuel, mobile ICBMs (138). Currently, all of China's land-based 
nuclear missiles except for the DF-21 have liquid fuel. These 
missiles are not only more difficult to maintain than solid fuel 
missiles, but they have slow reaction times as well. For example, 
in order to launch the DF-4 tunnel-based missiles, the PLA must 
roll the missiles out to the launch pad, place them on the launch 
stand and fuel them--a process that requires several hours (140). 
Furthermore, China has only a handful of ICBMs and these are all 
liquid fuel silo-based systems. In addition to the development of 
ICBMs with solid fuel and mobile basing modes, many analysts 
believe that China is also trying give its new land-based 
missiles increased range and the capability to carry multiple 
independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs). 

In order to develop solid fuel mobile ICBMs with greater range 
and MIRVs, it appears likely that China would have to decrease 
the size and weight of its current warheads. According to U.S. 
government officials and private analysts, China's 5 October 1993 
and June 10 1994 underground nuclear tests at Lop Nor were 
probably part of a series of tests to develop smaller, more 
compact warheads for its new mobile ICBMs (141), possibly for the 
single-warhead DF-31 ICBM or for the DF-41, which may carry MIRVs 
(142). (U.S. Senator Larry Pressler has compared the DF-31 and 
DF-41 to the Russian single-warhead SS-25 and ten-warhead SS-24 
ICBMs, respectively (143).) China's commitment to negotiate a 
comprehensive test ban (CTB) only by 1996--a commitment just 
undertaken in 1993--may represent Beijing's estimate of how long 
it will take China to complete the test program for the 
development of new warheads with higher "yield-to-weight rations" 
for these ICBMs. (Chinese officials, however, claim that the 
purpose of the planned tests is to incorporate safety features 
into their warheads, such as insensitive high explosives (144).)  

According to John Lewis and Hua Di, the new DF-31 and DF-41 solid 
fuel mobile ICBMs will have ranges of 8,000 and 12,000 kilometers 
and become operational in the mid- 1990s and late-1990s, 
respectively. They also assert that the warhead originally 
designed for the DF-31 and DF-41 has a yield of 200-300 kilotons, 
but the 660 kiloton underground blast at Lop Nor on May 21, 1992 
may indicate that the Chinese are trying to develop a higher 
yield warhead for these two missiles (145). On May 4, 1994, 
Senator Pressler, using the New Delhi-based Institute of Defense 
Studies and Analysis as his source, cited the same ranges and 
deployment dates for the DF-31 and DF-41 as Lewis and Hua, but 
estimated that they will have yields of 100 kilotons and one 
megaton, respectively (146). Pressler also said that these ICBMs 
will probably be MIRVed and "can be raised and launched in thirty 
minutes. (147)"

Russian Scientists Reportedly Help China Develop New ICBMs

It appears that, as part of its effort to develop solid fuel 
mobile ICBMs, Beijing has actively recruited former Soviet 
weapons scientists and engineers to come work in China. James 
Woolsey, director of U.S. Central Intelligence, told Congress on 
July 28, 1993 that China is "the country that is probably most 
aggressively recruiting CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States] 
scientists to help in a wide number of weapons programs." Woolsey 
added, "there is substantial movement along those lines. (148)" 
Subsequent to Woolsey's statements, a spate of press reports 
indicated that the flow of CIS weapons designers to China 
continued on a large-scale in late 1993 (149).

China seems interested in acquiring technology from the CIS, 
particularly from Russia, to improve the range and accuracy of 
its ballistic missiles, especially technology that would help 
Beijing design the DF-31 or a follow-on version so that it is 
similar to Russia's SS-25 mobile, solid fuel ICBM (150). China 
has also reportedly approached Ukraine seeking help to improve 
Beijing's ballistic missile technology (151).

In addition to the unsanctioned help from Russia, there appears 
to be a fair amount of sanctioned help as well. Reportedly, 
Russia's Atomic Energy Minister Viktor Mikhailov visited China in 
November 1992 as part of an initiative to broaden nuclear 
cooperation between Moscow and Beijing (152). Reportedly, China 
has also contracted with Russia to buy three diesel-powered Kilo-
class submarines (153) and purchased a "sizeable force of SA-10 
SAMs. (154)"    

Chinese SSBNs and SLBMs

China has built two Xia-class SSBNs which can carry 12 Julang-1 
(JL-1) SLBMs each (155). Although Beijing has declared both of 
these submarines to be operational, some in the West continue to 
question whether both SSBNs have actually conducted patrols with 
their missiles (156). According to the 1994 CRS report, "It is 
uncertain if the second Xia-class submarine can be considered 
fully operational. (156)" Furthermore, in his June 1994 Posture 
Statement, the Director of U.S. Naval Intelligence said China had 
"commissioned" only one SSBN (157). The SSBNs are believed to be 
deployed in the North Sea Fleet, possibly at Quingdao or Ningbo 
on the Yellow Sea (158). 

The JL-1, which was developed and tested during the 1980s (159), 
was China's first ballistic missile to use solid fuel. 
Reportedly, the JL-1 has not been flight tested since 1988 (160). 
With a range of only 1,700 kilometers, the JL-1 could only strike 
Moscow from the Baltic Sea--an unlikely location for a Chinese 
submarine. Presumably, the JL-1 is designed to be deployed on 
submarines patrolling in the western Pacific from where it could 
target urban industrial areas in the eastern part of Russia 
(161).

SSBNs and SLBMs Under Development

The U.S. intelligence community apparently now believes that 
China has, at least for the near future, halted or slowed SSBN 
production. In May 1993, Rear Admiral Edward Sheafer told 
Congress that China's "nuclear-powered submarine construction 
program effort has probably at least temporarily ended at the 
current half dozen ballistic missile and attack units (162)" 
("the current half dozen" apparently refers to one operational 
Xia-class SSBN and five Han-class SSNs (163).) But in his June 
1994 posture statement, Admiral Sheafer said, "China is believed 
to be working on an indigenous design for a second generation 
nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine to carry a new SLBM 
also in development; the new SSBN may be launched by the turn of 
the century." The "new SLBM..in development" that Sheafer 
referred to is the JL-2, which is a variant of the DF-31 ICBM 
(164). Like the DF-31 it is expected to use solid fuel and have a 
range of 8,000 kilometers.  

The relatively slow pace of SSBN development and production may 
be due, inter alia, to technical difficulties China has 
experienced in developing nuclear reactors for its submarines and 
solid fuel for its SLBMs (165). Robert S. Norris, Richard 
Fieldhouse, and Andrew Burrows, authors of Nuclear Weapons 
Databook Volume V: British, French, and Chinese Nuclear Weapons 
project that China will eventually build "perhaps four to six" 
SSBNs (166).  

 Current Chinese Bombers

There is a considerable amount of uncertainty about the number 
and types of Chinese aircraft that are equipped to carry nuclear 
weapons. Norris, Burrows, and Fieldhouse estimate that China 
currently fields approximately 180 nuclear-capable aircraft: 120 
Hong-6; 30 Hong-5; and 30 Qian-5. They estimate that a total of 
approximately 150 nuclear gravity bombs are available to arm 
these aircraft (167). CRS, on the other hand, estimates that the 
Chinese nuclear bomber forces consists of 30 Hong-6 while IISS 
says only that "some [H-6] may be nuclear- capable."

These planes are based on Soviet technology from the 1950s and 
1960s. (Specifically, the design of the H-6, H-5, and Q-5 were 
based on the Soviet TU-16 Badger, the IL-28 Beagle, and the Mig-
19, respectively (168).) The Hong-6 and Qian-5, however, are 
still under production (169). In the last two decades, bombers 
have received less emphasis in China's nuclear forces than 
ballistic missiles, presumably because of their limited range and 
vulnerability to Soviet/Russian air defense (170). According to 
CRS, "it is often claimed that these obsolescent aircraft would 
have great difficulty penetrating sophisticated air defenses. At 
least some observers speculate that it is improbable that China's 
air force has a nuclear delivery mission against either Russia or 
U.S. forces in Asia. (171)" Little is publicly known in the West 
about the locations of Chinese bomber bases. The Hong-6 may be 
based at Datong (Qinghai) (172).  

Chinese Bombers Under Development  

The Hong-7 bomber, which is China's only modern bomber, was first 
flight tested in 1988. In 1992, the aircraft entered series 
production at the Xian Aircraft Factory (173). In a development 
that suggests that the Hong-7 may finally be nearing operational 
status, it was reported in March 1994, that, as part of a 
marketing effort to sell the aircraft to Teheran, Xian Aircraft 
would fly the Hong-7 to Iran for a series of flight 
demonstrations (174).  

China, however, may have decided that it is cheaper and faster to 
purchase nuclear- capable aircraft from Russia and other foreign 
countries than to develop new planes indigenously. Beijing has 
recently purchased a number of Su-27 "Flanker" fighters from 
Moscow. The first of these were initially delivered in January 
1992 (175). Jane's Defence Weekly reported in early 1994 that 
China was operating a squadron of 26 Su-27s at Wuhu, a base near 
Shanghai (176). According to U.S. intelligence and press 
accounts, Beijing will probably exercise its option to purchase 
one or two more squadrons, eventually giving China a total of 50 
to 75 Su-27s (177). (According to a May 1993 report from the 
Director of U.S. Naval Intelligence, "the Chinese Air Force has 
experienced training and maintenance problems in integrating the 
Flanker into its technologically obsolescent aircraft order-of-
battle. (178)") Reportedly, China is also interested in buying 
four or more nuclear capable Tu-22M Backfire bombers from Russia 
(179). China has also demonstrated interest in purchasing Soviet-
built Su-24 Fencers and Mig-29 Fulcrums from Iran (180).   

Chinese Land-Based Tactical Nuclear Weapons  

There is some controversy over whether China has any tactical 
nuclear weapons. Norris, Burrows, and Fieldhouse, assert that 
China introduced approximately 150 tactical nuclear weapons into 
its arsenal in the late 1970s, possibly including atomic 
demolition munitions, nuclear artillery, or Multiple-Rocket 
System (MRS) shells or tactical missiles. They base their 
conclusion in part on the fact that China has conducted several 
nuclear tests with yields well below 20 kilotons and conducted 
military exercises in which Beijing reportedly simulated the use 
of tactical nuclear weapons. Norris, Fieldhouse and Burrows note 
that the worsening relations between China and the Soviet Union 
in the late 1960s and early 1970s may have spurred Beijing's 
tactical nuclear weapons program. They also suggest, however, 
that recent improvements in the relationship between China and 
Russia could lead China to retire its tactical nuclear weapons 
(181). Jonathan Pollock of the Rand Corporation has written, 
"Given that the prospect of a Soviet attack diminished 
appreciably during the mid- and late-1980s, it is possible that 
the Chinese have already begun to quietly dismantle [their 
tactical nuclear weapons] which they have been loath to even 
acknowledge or confirm in the first place. (182)" 

Nuclear Weapons Scenarios

Although Chinese military planners will continue to be concerned 
about the United States, Russia, and Japan, it seems very 
unlikely that it would get involved in a nuclear conflict with 
any of these three countries. In June of this year, Admiral 
Sheafer gave, what seems to be an accurate assessment when he 
said China "does not perceive any large-scale threat from either 
global or major regional powers through the next decade. Intra-
regional conflicts--mainly in southern Asia--are seen as more 
likely, largely revolving around disputed claims in the South 
China Sea (such as those to the Spratly Islands)." Another 
plausible regional scenario might involve a military conflict 
between China and Taiwan if Taipei declared independence. But 
neither seizing the Spratly Islands nor preventing Taiwan's 
independence, would justify the political, economic and 
environmental costs China would bear if it used nuclear weapons. 
Furthermore, Beijing would have no reason to use or threaten to 
use nuclear weapons in these scenarios because it could 
ultimately prevail in both cases with conventional forces.

In four extreme cases, however, it is plausible that China could 
contemplate the use of nuclear weapons, especially if the 
adversary's ground troops appeared to be driving toward Chinese 
territory or if the adversary initiated the use of nuclear 
weapons: 1) the United States attacks North Korea with ground 
forces and starts to drive north beyond Pyongyang; 2) the United 
States launches a nuclear-armed Tomahawk cruise missile against 
Yongbyon or Pyongyang which accidentally strays into Chinese 
territory; 3) China becomes involved in another serious border 
dispute with Russia; or 4) China becomes involved in a border 
dispute with India. In all cases China would presumably use its 
land-based mobile missiles, such as the DF-21, or its ground-
launched tactical nuclear weapons against foreign troops.

V. RECOMMENDATIONS

REGIONAL BILATERAL INITIATIVES

 It is difficult to identify viable proposals to limit U.S., 
Russian, and Chinese nuclear forces that would directly affect 
North Korea, Japan or other Northeast Asian countries. For 
example, a "zonal" approach--prohibiting the deployment of U.S., 
Russian, and Chinese nuclear weapons in a designated area--would 
be problematic for a number of reasons. To begin with, such an 
arrangement would be extremely difficult to negotiate and 
implement due to the geographical and numerical asymmetries. With 
the implementation of then-U.S. President George Bush's September 
27, 1991 initiative, the United States no longer deploys any 
tactical nuclear weapons in or near North East Asia (see p. xxx) 
nor does the United States have any strategic nuclear weapons 
based in Asia (unless one counts Trident submarines that patrol 
in the Pacific Ocean), but this is irrelevant because strategic 
weapons could hit targets in the region, regardless of where they 
are based. This latter point applies to Russia as well. In 
China's case, all of its nuclear weapons are based in Northeast 
Asia. Furthermore, Beijing does not appear to be willing to limit 
the number and types of its nuclear weapons until the United 
States and Russia make reductions to or near China's level--a 
development that is not in the offing. 

Although a far-reaching nuclear free zone in Northeast Asia 
covering U.S., Russian, and Chinese nuclear weapons deployments 
in any meaningful way is probably not viable, some regional 
initiatives targeted on individual states could make a positive 
impact, especially in the short term. The following is a list of 
proposals for bilateral measures intended to help prevent nuclear 
proliferation in Northeast Asia.

 A) BILATERAL INITIATIVES THE UNITED STATES COULD TAKE WITH NORTH 
KOREA

The United States should:

1) Offer North Korea a package of economic, political, and 
security incentives--similar to the deal worked out in the 
January 14 trilateral statement with Ukraine. In exchange for a 
commitment from Pyongyang to:

 a) comply with the NPT treaty (including full cooperation with   
the IAEA); b) implement the January 1992 Joint Declaration of   
the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula (i.a. dismantle      
its plutonium reprocessing facilities); c) not refuel the 5-
megawatt reactor at Yongbyon; and d) terminate work on the two   
more powerful nuclear reactors under construction.

the United States would make a commitment: 

 a) not to deploy nuclear weapons in South Korea and not to  
initiate the use of nuclear weapons on the Korean Peninsula    
and; b) normalize diplomatic relations with North Korea; c)

support general financial and technical assistance, including    
loans from international institutions such as the World Bank     
and the IMF; d) provide specific financial and technical           
assistance for the construction of alternative energy sources    
in North Korea; and e) cancellation of Team Spirit.     

B) BILATERAL INITIATIVES THE UNITED STATES COULD TAKE WITH JAPAN 

The United States should: 

1. Encourage Japan to abandon its breeder reactor program and 
stockpile low-enriched uranium (LEU) for fueling existing light 
water reactors. 

2. Abandon the U.S. Navy's policy neither to confirm nor deny the 
presence of nuclear weapons on specific ships and attack 
submarines and naval aircraft; and explicitly assure Tokyo that 
no nuclear-armed ships or submarines will conduct port calls in 
Japan; (this is essentially already a de facto policy since the 
United States no longer deploys nuclear weapons on these 
platforms).

3. Encourage Japan to support indefinite and unconditional 
extension of the NPT at the 1995 conference.

4. Reassure Japan that strains in the U.S.-Japanese relation over 
trade issues and the dissolution of the Soviet Union will not 
reduce the U.S. commitment to Japan's security.

C) BILATERAL INITIATIVES THE UNITED STATES COULD TAKE WITH RUSSIA

1. Continue to help Russia improve security and accounting for 
nuclear material through the Nunn-Lugar program and weapons lab-
to-weapons lab cooperation. (If reprocessed plutonium can be 
easily diverted from Russia, North Korea does not need to 
maintain any of its nuclear facilities to build a bomb.)

2. Amend the U.S. proposal to "clarify" the Anti-Ballistic 
Missile (ABM) Treaty (183). The current U.S. proposal to 
establish a demarcation line between ABMs, which are limited by 
the treaty, and anti-tactical ballistic missiles (ATBMs), which 
are not, would allow the United States and Russia to develop and 
deploy ATBMs with significant capability against strategic 
ballistic missiles. Since there are no numerical, geographical, 
or transfer limits on ATBMs, this proposal, if implemented, could 
reduce the likelihood of carrying out deep cuts in U.S. and 
Russian strategic offensive forces. Furthermore, the ATBMs that 
would be permitted under the current U.S. proposal could 
intercept almost all of China's existing ballistic missiles. 
Consequently, the prospect of unlimited deployment of such ATBMs 
would undermine prospects for Beijing ever agreeing to subject 
its nuclear forces to legally binding limits in an international 
agreement.

D) BILATERAL INITIATIVES RUSSIA COULD TAKE WITH NORTH KOREA

Russia should: 

1. Stop Russian weapons scientists and engineers from emigrating 
to North Korea by creating expanded opportunities to apply their 
expertise to peaceful purposes.  

E) BILATERAL INITIATIVES RUSSIA COULD TAKE WITH JAPAN

Russia should:

1. Return the Kuril islands to Japan.

2. Encourage Japan to establish a regular government-funded 
program, similar to the Nunn-Lugar program, to help Russia 
control and account for its nuclear materials. (Japan, which has 
significant expertise in this area, has already committed $17 
million for the International Science and Technology Center in 
Moscow, and pledged an additional $80 million for other 
denuclearization activities (184), including funding to help 
build a storage facility for plutonium from dismantled warheads.)

3. Seek financial assistance from Japan to dismantle Russian 
nuclear submarines (SSBNs, SSNs, and SSGNs) in the Pacific fleet. 
This would include assistance to: a) dispose of spent fuel from 
naval nuclear reactors; b) dispose of solid radioactive waste, 
including defueled reactor compartments from decommissioned 
submarines; and c) cut up the submarines themselves. (Russia and 
Japan are currently holding negotiations for an agreement in 
which Moscow would make a commitment not to dump liquid nuclear 
waste from decommissioned submarines in the Sea of Japan in 
exchange for assistance from Tokyo in building a new sea-based 
facility to store and dispose of that waste. (185))

3. Sell Japan low-enriched uranium blended down from HEU 
recovered from dismantled warheads--similar to the agreement with 
the United States (186). Tokyo could use the LEU to fuel its 
existing light water reactors.

F) BILATERAL INITIATIVES THAT CAN BE TAKEN BY CHINA WITH NORTH 
KOREA

China should:

1. Make it clear to North Korea that if it agrees to abandon its 
nuclear weapons program, Beijing will push Western countries hard 
to normalize economic and political relations with Pyongyang.

GENERAL, GLOBAL COMMITMENTS THAT CAN BE MADE BY THE UNITED 
STATES, RUSSIA, AND CHINA

 While bilateral regional measures and initiatives are worth 
pursuing, some of them have the potential danger of appearing, at 
least implicitly, discriminatory by singling out a nation, e.g. 
North Korea, or Japan, as unfit to possess nuclear weapons. Arms 
control measures will be more enduring if they help promote a 
world in which it is univerally recognized that nuclear weapons 
have very limited political and military utility and that the 
political, economic, and environmental costs of developing 
nuclear weapons will almost certainly exceed the benefits.

Therefore, the arms control steps that the United States, Russia, 
and China can take that will have the greatest impact in the 
long-run will probably be steps that will strengthen the 
international nuclear non-proliferation regime as a whole. In 
this context, it is crucial that the United States, Russia, and 
China take concrete initiatives between now and April 1995 to 
ensure the indefinite extension of the NPT. Even if North Korea 
has already built one or two nuclear weapons, a strong NPT regime 
could still have a positive influence on Pyongyang. By helping 
create an international environment in which nuclear weapons are 
seen as more of a liability than an asset and their acquisition a 
violation of an international norm, an NPT supported by almost 
all of the world's nations indefinitely would make it easier for 
a post Kim Il Sung/Kim Jong Il regime (or a united Korea with 
nuclear weapons) to follow the precedent set by South Africa by 
dismantling its nuclear weapons and becoming a non-nuclear 
weapons state. In Japan's case, if the NPT is extended 
indefinitely at the 1995 conference, it will strengthen the hands 
of those in Tokyo who believe that Japan should never develop 
nuclear weapons.

 The United States, Russia, and China should:

1) Strengthen longstanding negative security assurances by 
pledging not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against 
any non-nuclear weapons state, regardless of its alliances. (This 
pledge could initially be made in the form of a UN Security 
Council Resolution and eventually in the form of a treaty to be 
signed and ratified by all five of the declared nuclear powers.)

(STATUS: The U.S. policy on negative security assurances is being 
discussed in the Nuclear Posture Review. Proposals by some DOD 
officials to weaken the assurances so that the United States 
could reserve the option to use or threaten to use nuclear 
weapons against countries possessing or seeking to possess 
chemical or biological weapons, have been opposed by State 
Department and Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) 
officials (187). The probable result will be the status quo. 
Russia, for its part, recently dropped the Soviet no-first-use 
pledge and endorsed a position similar to the current U.S. 
position. China, on the other hand, is a strong advocate of no-
first-use, which is, of course, more sweeping than the negative 
security assurances proposed above.)

2) Stop nuclear testing and negotiate, sign and ratify a CTB; 

(STATUS: The United States and Russia have stopped nuclear 
testing (188) and are committed to conclude a CTB "as soon as 
possible." China is continuing to conduct underground nuclear 
tests at Lop Nor, but is committed to seek a CTB by "no later 
than 1996." At the CD, China has proposed allowing "peaceful 
nuclear explosions" under a CTB--a move that seems calculated to 
stall the negotiations.) 

3) Stop the production of fissile material for weapons, and 
negotiate and sign a cutoff treaty, placing--at a minimum--all 
plutonium reprocessing and uranium enrichment facilities under 
full- scope IAEA safeguards; 

(STATUS: The United States has stopped the production of fissile 
material for weapons. Russia has stopped the production of HEU 
for weapons, but it continues to operate three dual purpose 
reactors at Tomsk-7 and Krasnoyarsk-26, which in the past have 
produced plutonium for weapons. On June 23, however, Russia 
signed an agreement with the United States, making a commitment 
to shut down those three reactors no later than the year 2000 and 
in the interim not to use any of the plutonium produced by those 
reactors for weapons purposes. The two nations also made a 
commitment to seek a new bilateral agreement banning the 
production of any plutonium for weapons purposes. This agreement 
would include verification of civilian plutonium reprocessing 
facilities. 

China is apparently opposed to transparency measures at the 
moment. Given China's relatively small stockpile and statements 
from U.S. officials, there is good reason to believe China has 
ceased production of fissile material for weapons (189). None of 
the three major nuclear powers opposed the U.N. General Assembly 
December 1993 resolution calling for a cutoff. China opposed the 
establishment of a mandate for negotiations at the Conference on 
Disarmament in March but then dropped its objections in June. 
While negotiations for a cutoff treaty could begin at the CD this 
year or in early 1995, there is no prospect that the pact would 
be finished before the NPT extension conference convenes.)   

4) Cease all reprocessing of plutonium, including reprocessing 
for civilian purposes.  

(STATUS: The United States has stopped reprocessing plutonium; 
Russia continues to reprocess plutonium and MINATOM plans to 
build three or four new "breeder reactors" after the turn of the 
century as part of a plutonium fuel cycle; China's position is 
unclear.)

5) Declare the number of nuclear weapons in their stockpiles 
(including non-deployed strategic and all tactical warheads) and 
their fissile material inventories and arrange for measures to 
verify these declarations. (This agreement could also include an 
exchange of data on warhead assembly and dismantlement rates.)  

(STATUS: While there has been little movement on these issues, a 
number of transparency proposals have surfaced in the last two 
years. As a condition to its approval of START-I in October 1992, 
the U.S. Senate called for the U.S. executive branch to make a 
good faith effort to agree to a similar measure "in connection 
with any further agreement reducing strategic arms." But the 
United States and Russia did not pursue such an agreement in 
connection with START II. In December 1993, the U.S. DOE released 
data on total U.S. production of weapons grade plutonium. The 
data, however, did not provide plutonium levels for the Pantex 
dismantlement facility or for existing weapons. The United States 
has also agreed to place its "excess" fissile material under IAEA 
safeguards, but has not yet announced publicly what amount will 
be deemed excess.

In February 1992 at the CD, the Russian Foreign Minister Andrei 
Kozyrev proposed "developing a reciprocal exchange of data 
between all nuclear powers on the number and types of existing 
nuclear weapons, the amount of fissionable materials and on 
nuclear weapons production, storage, and elimination facilities." 
In May 23-26 meetings in Moscow between U.S. and Russian 
technical working groups, some transparency measures for fissile 
material were discussed. At these meetings, the U.S. reiterated 
its proposal to declare all stocks of plutonium and HEU.

 6) Allow some international monitoring of warhead dismantlement. 
(in practice, this would probably be a bilateral agreement 
between the United States and Russia.)

(Status: Thus far, the United States and Russia have generally 
argued that direct monitoring of warhead dismantlement could give 
away warhead design secrets and would be too costly. It is not 
clear whether China dismantles warheads on a regular basis and 
seems unlikely that China would permit such openness in its 
nuclear weapons programs.)

7) Make a commitment to dismantle all naval nuclear warheads 
carried on attack submarines, surface ships, and aircraft (i.e. 
all naval nuclear warheads except for those that arm SLBMs).

(STATUS: The United States apparently plans to dismantle all of 
its naval nuclear weapons except for the 350 W-80 warheads 
intended to arm Tomahawk SLCMs; Boris Yeltsin made a commitment 
in January 1992 to dismantle one-third of Russia's naval tactical 
nuclear weapons; China is not believed to have any naval tactical 
nuclear weapons.)  8) Make a commitment to dismantle all ground-
launched tactical nuclear warheads.

(STATUS: The United States and Russia have already made this 
commitment and begun to carry it out, but China has not publicly 
acknowledged whether it has any tactical nuclear weapons.)

9) Establish and institutionalize a multilateral forum, including 
the United States, Russia, China, Japan, and South and North 
Korea, to discuss nuclear security issues in Northeast Asia.

*************************************************************

The author would like to thank Adam Grissom, Stan Norris, Jack 
Mendelsohn, and Jon Wolfsthal for their generous assistance in 
helping prepare this paper. Any errors, of course, are solely the 
responsibility of the author.

ENDNOTES

1. September 1, 1990 is the date that corresponds to the data the 
United States provided in the START I Memorandum of Understanding 
(MOU). For a breakdown of the 12,646 warhead number by weapon 
system, see Factfile: Past and Projected Strategic Nuclear 
Forces, Arms Control Today, July/August 1992  pp. 35-36; and 
Department of Defense Fact Sheet, "U.S. Strategic Nuclear 
Forces," Office of the Secretary of Defense, Public Affairs, June 
1992. 

2. On March 14, 1994 at George Washington University, U.S. 
Secretary of Defense William Perry said that although the United 
States has come down to the START-I level unilaterally, "as a 
hedge," it has "not begun implementing the START II reductions 
and will not do so until Russia undertakes comparable 
reductions." 

3. Les Aspin, Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to the 
President and the Congress, January 1994, p. 150.

4. Admiral Henry G. Chiles, Jr., US Navy, Commander-in-Chief, 
United States Strategic Command, written statement submitted to 
the Senate Armed Services Committee, April 20, 1994, p. 3.

5. "Nuclear Notebook: U.S. Nuclear Weapons Stockpile," 
July/August 1994, p. 61. 

6. Admiral Henry G. Chiles, Jr.,  written statement submitted to 
the Senate Armed Services Committee, April 20, 1994, p. 3.

7. Les Aspin, Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to the 
President and the Congress, p. 148.

8. David Mosher, "Rethinking the Trident Force," (Congressional 
Budget Office: Washington, DC, July 1993), p. xii.

9. Department of Defense Appropriations for 1994, Hearing before 
the Subcommittee on the Department of Defense, House 
Appropriations Committee, (US Government Printing Office: 
Washington, DC, 1993) Part 4, p. 179; Les Aspin, US Secretary of 
Defense, Annual Report to the President and the Congress, January 
1994, (US Government Printing Office: Washington, DC, 1994), p. 
149. 

10. Jon B. Wolfsthal, "North Korea Threatens Withdrawal From Non-
Proliferation Treaty," Arms Control Today, April 1993, p. 22.

11. The last B-52G in the active inventory flew from Castle AFB, 
California on May 5, 1994 to Davis Monthan, AFB, Arizona where it 
will be dismantled. 

12. Department of Defense Appropriations for 1994, Hearing before 
the Subcommittee on the Department of Defense, House 
Appropriations Committee, (US Government Printing Office: 
Washington, DC, 1993) Part 4, p. 324.

13. Don Oberdorfer, "U.S. Decides to Withdraw A-Weapons From S. 
Korea," Washington Post, October 19, 1991, p. A1; David 
Rosenbaum, "U.S. to Pull A-Bombs From South Korea," New York 
Times, October 20, 1991, p. 3.

14. Don Oberdorfer, "Airborne U.S. A-Arms To Stay in South 
Korea," Washington Post, October 12, 1991, p. A20; Robert S. 
Norris, personal communication with the author, June 21, 1994.

15. Robin Bulman, "No A-Arms In S. Korea, Roh Says," Washington 
Post, December 19, 1991, p. A38; James Sterngold, "Seoul Says It 
Now Has No Nuclear Arms," New York Times, December 19, 1991, p. 
A3.

16. See for example, Pete Williams, Assistant Secretary of 
Defense for Public Affairs, DOD News Briefing, July 2, 1992.

17. United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), 
Annual Report to the Congress, p. 37; William M. Arkin and Robert 
S. Norris, "Taking Stock: US Nuclear Deployments at the End of 
the Cold War," (Greenpeace/Natural Resources Defense Council: 
Washington, DC, August 1992), p. 4.

18. Energy and Water Development Appropriations for 1994, Hearing 
before the House Appropriations Committee subcommittee on Energy 
and Water Development, Part 6, (US Government Printing Office: 
Washington, DC, 1993), p. 1305.

19. For a breakdown of B-61 bomb and W-80 SLCM warhead storage 
facilities, see: William Arkin and Robert Norris "Taking Stock: 
U.S. Nuclear Deployments at the End of the Cold War," August 
1992.

20. U.S. Department of Defense, "The Bottom Up Review," October 
1993, p. 88; see also "Nuclear Notebook: U.S. Nuclear Weapons 
Stockpile, July 1994," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 
July/August 1994, p. 63.

21. "Nuclear Notebook: U.S. Nuclear Weapons Stockpile, July 
1994," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, July/August 1994, p. 61 
and p. 63.

22. Report to the Committees on Armed Services and Appropriations 
of the Senate and the House of Representatives on Nuclear Weapons 
Testing, Required by Section 507 of the FY 1993 Energy and Water 
Development Appropriations Act [The "Hatfield Amendment"], July 
1993, p. 7.

23. "Nuclear Notebook: U.S. Nuclear Weapons Stockpile, July 
1994," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, July/August 1994, p. 
61.

24. Documents on Disarmament 1978, United States Arms Control and 
Disarmament Agency, (US Government Printing Office: Washington, 
DC, 1980), p. 384. 

25. See for example, William M. Arkin, "Bad Posture," The 
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, July/August 1994, p. 64.

26. The Congressional Record, February 1, 1994, p. 533; Jon B. 
Wolfsthal, "IAEA Team Arrives in North Korea For Inspection of 
Nuclear Facilities," Arms Control Today, March 1994, p. 33. 

27. State Department Authorization Bill for fiscal year 1995, 
Conference Report, p. 101.

28. Energy and Water Development Appropriations for 1994, House 
Appropriations Committee subcommittee on Energy and Water 
Development, Part 6, (US Government Printing Office: Washington, 
DC, 1993), p. 1304.

29. The Military Balance 1993-1994, International Institute for 
Strategic Studies (IISS), (Brassey: London, October 1993), p. 28.

30. Jon B. Wolfsthal, "North Korea Threatens Withdrawal From Non-
Proliferation Treaty," Arms Control Today, April 1993, p. 22.

31. Ticonderoga-class cruisers outfitted with vertical launching 
systems (VLS) could carry up to 46 Tomahawks; Spruance-class 
destroyers equipped with VLS could carry up to 45; Sturgeon- and 
Los Angeles-class attack submarines could carry up to 8 
internally and Los Angeles-class equipped with VLS could carry an 
additional 12. Source: Joshua Handler and William M. Arkin, 
"Nuclear Warships and Naval Nuclear Weapons 1990: A Complete 
Inventory," Neptune Paper, No. 5, September 1990, pp. 18-20.  

32. "Targeting rethink may lead to non-nuclear STRATCOM role," 
Jane's Defence Weekly, May 22, 1993, p. 19; Eric Schmitt, "Head 
of Nuclear Forces Plans for a New World," New York Times, 
February 25, 1993, p. B7.

33. Statement of Rear Admiral John T. Mitchell, U.S. Navy, 
Director, Strategic Systems Programs, before the Subcommittee on 
Nuclear Deterrence, Arms Control and Defense Intelligence of the 
Senate Armed Services Committee, May 11, 1993, printed in 
"Department of Defense Authorization For Appropriations for 
Fiscal Year 1994 and the Future Years Defense Program," Senate 
Hearing 103-303, Part 7, (US Government Printing Office: 
Washington, DC, 1993) p. 17.

34. William M. Arkin and Robert S. Norris, "Nuclear Alert After 
The Cold War," Nuclear Weapons Databook, Working Papers, NWD 93-
4, October 18, 1993, p. 11,, Footnote 38.

35. Dick Cheney, US Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to the 
President and the Congress, January 1991, p. viii.

36. Robert Gates, Director, US Central Intelligence, testimony 
before the Senate Armed Services Committee, January 22, 1992 as 
cited in Threat Assessment, Military Strategy, and Defense 
Planning," (US Government Printing Office: Washington, DC, 1992), 
p. 60.

37. The START treaty's Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), which 
provides numbers and locations of accountable Soviet strategic 
weapon systems is published in 1991 by the United States Arms 
Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) in "Arms Control and 
Disarmament Agreements," pp. 120-245.

38. There are now 12 rail-based SS-24s at Bershet, giving Russia 
a total of 36 rail-based SS-24s.

39. Major Robert Potter, Office of the Secretary of Defense, 
Public Affairs, personal conversation with the author, May 20, 
1994; see also, Harold Smith, Assistant to the Secretary of 
Defense for Atomic Energy, Written Statement submitted to the 
House Armed Services Committee, April 28, 1994, p. 7.  

40. Ashton Carter, Assistant Secretary of Defense for 
International Security Policy, written testimony submitted to the 
Senate Armed Services Committee, April 28, 1994, p. 18.

41. Rostislav Khotin, Reuters, Kiev, "Ukraine Deactivates Most 
SS-24 Nuclear Missiles," May 4, 1994; Ashton Carter, Assistant 
Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy, written 
statement submitted to the Senate Armed Services Committee, April 
28, 1994, p. 17.

42. Soviet Military Power, 1984, US Department of Defense, p. 21 
and p. 23; Robert P. Berman and John C. Baker, Soviet Strategic 
Forces: Requirements and Responses, (Brookings, Washington, DC, 
1982), p. 111.

43. See Dunbar Lockwood, "Strategic Nuclear Forces Under START 
II," Arms Control Today, December 1992, pp. 10-14; Alexei 
Arbatov, Editor, "Implications of the START II Treaty for U.S.-
Russian Relations," (The Henry L. Stimson Center: Washington, DC, 
October 1993), Report no. 9, p. 6.

44. William Grundmann, Director for Combat Support, Defense 
Intelligence Agency, Written Statement submitted to the Joint 
Economic Committee, June 11, 1993, p. 18; see also Evgeni 
Shaposhnikov, "The Armed Forces: To a New Quality," in Russian 
Security After the Cold War, Editors, Teresa Pelton Johnson and 
Steven E. Miller, (Brassey: Washington, DC, 1994), p. 192.

45. Dr. Lawrence Gershwin, Hearing before the Senate Armed 
Services Committee, February 3, 1993, as cited in Current 
Developments in the Former Soviet Union, Senate Hearing 103-242, 
(US Government Printing Office: Washington, DC, 1993), p. 30.

46. Lawrence Gershwin, Hearing before the Senate Governmental 
Affairs Committee, February 24, 1993, as cited in, Proliferation 
Threats of the 1990s, Senate hearing 103-208, (Government 
Printing Office: Washington, DC, 1993), p. 41; Gershwin, Hearing 
before the Senate Armed Services Committee, February 3, 1993, as 
cited in Current Developments in the Former Soviet Union,...p. 8; 
"CIA expects Russia to deploy three new ballistic missiles by 
2000," Aerospace Daily, February 4, 1993, p. 195; Lt. General 
James Clapper, Director, US Defense Intelligence Agency, as cited 
in The START Treaty, Hearings before the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee, Part 2, Senate Hearing 102-607, Pt. 2, (US Government 
Printing Office: Washington, DC, 1992,) p. 163.  

47. Current Developments in the Former Soviet Union, ... p. 30; 
Proliferation Threats of the 1990s,... pp. 40-41.

48. Rear Admiral William Studeman, Director, US Naval 
Intelligence, Written Statement submitted to the House Armed 
Services Committee, Subcommittee on Seapower and Strategic and 
Critical Materials, p. 22.

49. Josh Handler provided the author with copies of the April 18, 
1994 letter from the Office of Naval Intelligence and a table 
breaking down the Russian SSBN "order of battle" for 1992- 1994; 
see also, International Institute for Strategic  Studies, The 
Military Balance 1993-1994, (Brassey's: London, October 1993), p. 
96; Joshua Handler, "Russia's Pacific Fleet--Submarine Bases and 
Facilities," Jane's Intelligence Review, April 1994, p. 167.  

50. Rear Admiral Edward Sheafer, Director, US Naval Intelligence, 
Posture Statement, May 3, 1993,  p. 46; John H. Cushman, Jr., 
"U.S. navy's periscopes still follow Soviet fleet," New York 
Times, 23 February 1992, p. A14; Bruce Blair, The Logic of 
Accidental Nuclear War (Brookings: Washington, D.C., 1993), p. 
103; see also "No new subs," Aviation Week & Space Technology, 
November 23, 1992, p. 25.

51. Admiral Felix Gromov, commander-in-chief of the Russian Navy, 
'Reforming the Russian navy', Naval Forces, Vol. 14, No. 4, 1993, 
p. 6.

52. Admiral Felix Gromov,... p. 10.

53. See, Joshua Handler, "Russia's Pacific Fleet--Submarine Bases 
and Facilities," Jane's Intelligence Review, April 1994, p. 167.

54. Current Developments in the Former Soviet Union, ... p. 31.

55. Rear Admiral Edward Sheafer, Director, US Naval Intelligence, 
Posture Statement, June 1994. (In May 1993, Admiral Sheafer, said 
that "the Russians will still retain nearly two dozen SSBNs... 
after the year 2000," see Sheafer's Posture Statement, May 3, 
1993, p. 40.) 

56. Unless otherwise indicated, all the information in this 
section comes from Admiral Sheafer...May 3, 1993, p. 44.

57. Current Developments in the Former Soviet Union, p. 8; Lt. 
General James Clapper, Director, US Defense Intelligence Agency, 
as cited in The START Treaty, Hearings before the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee, Part 2, Senate Hearing 102-607, Pt. 2, (US 
Government Printing Office: Washington, DC, 1992,) p. 163.

58. See for example, Stephen Foye, "All Strategic Bombers out of 
Kazkahstan; Talks on those in Ukraine," Radio Free Europe/Radio 
Liberty Daily Report No. 37, February 23. 1994; "Last Strategic 
Bombers Leave Kazakhstan," Radio Moscow, March 1, 1994, in 
Federal Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report, Central 
Eurasia (hereafter FBIS-SOV), FBIS-SOV-94-041, March 2, 1994, p. 
49.

59. See for example, IISS, Military Balance 1993-1994, p. 99; 
Barbara Starr, "U.S. cuts could slow if Russia shirks reform," 
Jane's Defence Weekly, March 27, 1993, p. 7.

60. Craig Covault, "Russian Zhukovsky facility shows flight test 
diversity," Aviation Week & Space Technology, 14 June 1993, p. 
67.

61. Craig Covault, "Russian Bomber Force Seeks Tactical Role," 
Aviation Week & Space Technology, November 15, 1993, p. 49; Craig 
Covault, "Russia launches exercise of composite strike force," 
Aviation Week & Space Technology, November 15, 1993, p. 51; New 
long-range cruise missile launched from Tu-160, Moscow Russian 
Television Network, 31 October 1992, in FBIS-SOV-92-216, November 
6, 1992, p. 2.

62. In 1988, the Defense Department reported that 45 Bear-G were 
based at Irkutsk (see, Soviet Military Power, 1988, Department of 
Defense, p. 79); but in the September 1990 START MOU, the Soviet 
Union declared that all 46 of its Bear-G were deployed at 
Ukrainka; see also "Nuclear Notebook: Estimated Soviet Nuclear 
Stockpile (July 1991)," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 
July/August 1991, p. 48.

63. Soviet Military Power, 1988, U.S. Department of Defense, p. 
79.

64. Thomas B. Cochran, William M. Arkin, Robert S. Norris, and 
Jeffrey I. Sands, Nuclear Weapons Databook, Volume IV: Soviet 
Nuclear Weapons, (Ballinger: New York, 1989), p. 157 and p. 165.

65. William Grundmann, Director for Combat Support, Defense 
Intelligence Agency, Written Statement submitted to the Joint 
Economic Committee, June 11, 1993, p. 18.

66. "Production of TU-160 Strategic Aircraft Discontinued," 
Moscow Television, June 3, 1994, as cited in FBIS-SOV-94-107, 
June 3, 1994, p. 23; Velovich, A., "Kazan produces final batch of 
Blackjacks," Flight International, 12-18 August 1992, p. 22. 

67. Craig Covault, "Russian Bomber Force Seeks Tactical Role," 
Aviation Week & Space Technology, Nov. 15, 1993, p. 44.

68. The source for the numbers and locations of the INF missiles 
listed in this section is the INF Treaty's June 1, 1988 
Memorandum of Understanding.

69. Mikhail Gorbachev, televised statement, October 5, 1991, as 
cited in SIPRI Yearbook 1992, p. 87; see also Arms Control Today, 
October 1991, p. 6.

70. Boris Yeltsin, televised statement, January 29, 1992, as 
cited in SIPRI Yearbook 1992, p. 90. 

71. Management and Disposition of Excess Weapons Plutonium, 
National Academy of Sciences, (National Academy Press: 
Washington, DC, 1994), p. 40, footnote 1; Bruce G. Blair, The 
Logic of Accidental Nuclear War, (Brookings: Washington, DC, 
1993), pp. 105-106.

72. Margaret Shapiro, "Russian Navy rids itself of tactical 
nuclear arms," Washington Post, February 5, 1993, p. A31; 
"Tactical nuclear arms removed from vessels," ITAR-TASS, February 
4, 1993; in FBIS-SOV-93-022, Feb. 4, 1993, p. 1.

73. Management and Disposition of Excess Weapons Plutonium, 
National Academy of Sciences, (National Academy Press: 
Washington, DC, 1994), p. 40, footnote 1; Bruce G. Blair, The 
Logic of Accidental Nuclear War, (Brookings: Washington, DC, 
1993), pp. 105-106.

74. Soviet Military Power 1990, U.S. Department of Defense, p. 
98.

75. Backfires can carry two AS-4 anti-ship missiles with a 560 
kilometer range or nuclear gravity bombs. Alternatively, they     
can carry up to 10 AS-16s--6 in a rotary launcher plus another 4 
under their wings. Source: Cochran et al. Nuclear Weapons 
Databook Volume IV: "Soviet Nuclear Weapons". 1989 p. 164, p. 
243; see also "Nuclear Notebook: Estimated Russian (CIS) Nuclear 
Stockpile (July 1993)," Bulletin of Atomic Scientists 
July/August, 1993. p. 57.

 76. Handler, Joshua and Arkin, William. Nuclear Warships and 
Naval Nuclear Weapons 1990: A Complete Inventory. Neptune Paper 
#5. 1990, p.32.

 77. numbers of Su-24s and Su-17s come from IISS, Military 
Balance 1993-1994, p. 103; nuclear armaments for Su-24s and Su-
17s come from Cochran et al, Nuclear Weapons Data Book, Volume 
IV: "Soviet Nuclear Weapons," 1989. p. 251, p. 258. 

 78. Ship types and classes come from John Jordan, "The Russian 
Navy in Transition," Jane's Intelligence Review, April 1994. p. 
159; see also Joshua Handler, William M. Arkin, Nuclear Warships 
and Naval Nuclear Weapons 1990: A Complete Inventor, Neptune 
Paper #5, 1990, Appendix B.



79. Norman Polmar, The Naval Institute Guide to the Soviet Navy, 
5th edition, 1991, p. 155, p. 168.

80. In 1990, DOD projected that "by the late 1990s," the Soviet 
Union/Russia would reduce the number of SSGNs in the Pacific to 
eight; in 1993, IISS estimated there were nine SSGNs in the 
Pacific Fleet. source for Oscar-II nuclear armaments, Polmar, 
Naval Institute Guide. p. 107; source for two Oscar-IIs in the 
Pacific Fleet, John Jordan, "The Russian Navy in Transition," 
Jane's Intelligence Review, April 1994, p. 159.

81. Soviet Military Power 1990. p. 53. See also, Cochran et al, 
Nuclear Weapons Data Book, Volume IV..., p. 180. According to 
John Jordan, there are four Akula-class SSNs in the Pacific 
fleet.

 82. Aircraft numbers and types from Military Balance 1993-1994 
p. 103. Nuclear payloads from Nuclear Weapons Data Book v.4 
p.264-9.

83. Joshua Handler, and William M. Arkin, Nuclear Warships and 
Naval Nuclear Weapons 1990: A Complete Inventory, Neptune Paper 
#5, 1990, pp. 30-31.

84. Joshua Handler and William M. Arkin,... p. 29.

85. Rear Admiral Edward Sheafer,...June 1994.

 86. Rear Admiral Edward Sheafer...June 1994; see also Aleksandr 
Maltsev, "Third Serious Fire This Year at Pacific Fleet." 
Kommersant-Daily 24 May 1994. p. 14, in FBIS-SOV-94-101, May 25, 
1994, p. 35.

 87. John Jordan, "Russian Navy In Transition," Janes 
Intelligence Review, April 1994, p. 154.

 88. IISS, The Military Balance 1993-1994, p. 97.

89. Soviet Military Power, 1990, p. 98. According to Steven 
Zaloga's "Soviet Air Defense Missiles," a regiment of SA-10s has 
two battalions; each battalion has three batteries; each battery 
has three launchers; and each and launcher has four missile 
canisters.  

90. Cochran et al, Nuclear Weapons Databook, Volume IV,...p. 32; 
John Pike, personal communication with the author, June 28, 1994.

91. Management and Disposition of Excess Weapons Plutonium, 
National Academy of Sciences, (National Academy Press: 
Washington, DC, 1994), p. 40, footnote 1; Bruce G. Blair, The 
Logic of Accidental Nuclear War, (Brookings: Washington, DC, 
1993), pp. 105-106.

92. Management and Disposition of Excess Weapons Plutonium, 
National Academy of Sciences,...p. 40, footnote 1.

93. IISS, The Military Balance 1993-1994, p. 104.

94. Cochran, et al, Nuclear Weapons Data Book Volume IV,... p. 
251 and p. 253.

95. Soviet Military Power, 1988, U.S. Department of Defense, p. 
79.

96. James Woolsey, Director, US Central Intelligence, Written 
Statement submitted to the House Foreign Affairs Committee, 
Subcommittee on International Security, International 
Organizations and Human Rights, July 28, 1993, as cited in "U.S. 
Security Policy Toward Rogue Regimes," (US Government Printing 
Office: Washington, DC, 1994), p. 79.

97. James Woolsey, "U.S. Security Policy Toward Rogue Regimes," 
p. 33.   

98. "DPRK Reportedly Sought Russian Scientists To Modernize 
Missiles," ITAR-TASS, February 10, 1993, in FBIS-SOV-93-026, 
February 10, 1993, p. 11; Steven Zaloga, "Russian Reports," Armed 
Forces Journal International, April 1993, p. 17.

99. Steven Zaloga, "Russian Military Readiness Nosedives," Armed 
Forces Journal International, May 1994, p. 55.

100. for a discussion of the Soviet Union's no-first-use policy 
see Raymond L. Garthoff, Deterrence and Revolution in Soviet 
Military Doctrine, (Brookings: Washington, DC, 1990), pp. 80-88.

101. Fred Hiatt, "Russia shifts doctrine on military use," 
Washington Post, November 4, 1993, p. A33.

102. Lt. General James. R. Clapper, Jr., Director, U.S. Defense 
Intelligence Agency (DIA), statement before the Senate Select 
Intelligence Committee, January 25 1994, Federal News transcript, 
pp. 40-41; Fred Hiatt, "Russians favoring retention of nuclear 
deterrent," Washington Post, November 25, 1992, p. A1.

103. Sergei Rogov, "Russian Views of Nuclear Weapons," in Toward 
a Nuclear Peace, Edited by Michael J. Mazarr and Alexander T. 
Lennon, (St. Martin's Press: New York, 1994), p. 208.

104. Paul Godwin and John Shulz, "Arming the Dragon for the 21st 
Century: China's Defense Modernization Program," Arms Control 
Today, December 1993, p. 6; Zhai Zhihai, "The Future of Nuclear 
Weapons: A Chinese Perspective," Editors, Patrick J. Garrity and 
Steven A. Maaranen, Nuclear Weapons in the Changing World: 
Perspectives from Europe, Asia, and North America, (Plenum Press: 
New York, 1992), p. 170; Song Jiuguang, "START and China's Policy 
on Nuclear Weapons and Disarmament in the 1990s," Stanford 
University, Center for International Security and Arms Control, 
May 1991, p. 8 and p. 10.

105. Richard K. Betts, "Nuclear Blackmail and Nuclear Balance," 
(Brookings: Washington, DC, 1987). For the Korean War see pp. 32-
33, and p. 42; for the Taiwan-Formosa Straits see p. 59 and p. 
68, and for the 1969 Sino-Soviet border clash, see pp. 79-81; See 
also  Godwin and Shulz, p. 6; Robert S. Norris, Andrew S. 
Burrows, and Richard Fieldhouse, Nuclear Weapons Databook Volume 
V: British, French, and Chinese Nuclear Weapons," (Westview: 
Boulder, Colorado, 1994), p. 324; Zhai Zhihai, p. 170.

 106. Zhai Zhihai, p. 170.

107. Robert G. Sutter, "Chinese Nuclear Weapons and Arms Control 
Policies: Implications and Options for the United States," 
Congressional Research Service (CRS), 94-422 S, March 25, 1994, 
p. CRS-6; Shen Dingli, "Toward a nuclear-weapon-free world: a 
Chinese perspective," The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 
March/April 1994, pp. 53-54; Zhai Zhilai, pp. 169-170.

108. Jonathan D. Pollack, "The Future of China's Nuclear Weapons 
Policy," in Editors, John C. Hopkins and Weixing Hu, Strategic 
Views from the Second Tier: The Nuclear Weapons Policies of 
France, Britain, and China, (Institute on Global Conflict and 
Cooperation: San Diego, 1994), p. 157.

109. Godwin, P. and Schulz, J. J., "Arming the Dragon for the 
21st Century: China's Defense modernization program," Arms 
Control Today, December 1993, pp. 6-7; Desmond Ball, MacNeil 
Lehrer News Hour, WNET New York, NY, show #4800, Nov. 17, 1993.

110. Robert G. Sutter, "Chinese Nuclear Weapons and Arms Control 
Policies: Implications and Options for the United States," 
Congressional Research Service (CRS), 94-422 S, March 25, 1994, 
p. CRS-6; Zhai Zhihai, p. 170.

111. Jonathan D. Pollack, p. 161 and p. 165; Song Jiuguang, 
"START and China's Policy on Nuclear Weapons and Disarmament in 
the 1990s," p. 10.

112. Song, p. 12; Xue Litai, "Evolution of China's Nuclear 
Strategy," in Editors, John C. Hopkins and Weixing Hu, Strategic 
Views from the Second Tier: The Nuclear Weapons Policies of 
France, Britain, and China, (Institute on Global Conflict and 
Cooperation: San Diego, 1994),p. 178. 

113. John Lewis and Xue Litai, "China Builds the Bomb," p. 212; 
Robert S. Norris, Andrew S. Burrows, Richard W. Fieldhouse, 
Nuclear Weapons Databook Volume V: British, French, and Chinese 
Nuclear Weapons, (Westview: Boulder, Colorado, 1994), pp. 361-
362; Prepared Statement by Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., submitted to 
the Subcommittee on International Security, International 
Organization and Human Rights of the House Committee on Foreign 
Affairs, July 28, 1993, in "U.S. Security Policy Toward Rogue 
Regimes," (U.S. Government Printing Office: Washington, DC, 1994) 
p. 104. 

114. Lewis and Xue, China Builds the Bomb, p. 213, Norris et al, 
p. 324. p. 362.

115. See for example, Robert G. Sutter, CRS, passim.

116. Xue Litai, "Evolution of China's Nuclear Strategy," p. 175; 
Robert G. Sutter, p. CRS-6, and pp. CRS-12-CRS-13.

117. The DF-1 was renamed the DF-3 and the DF-2 has been retired.

118. Norris, et al, p. 363, p. 381; Ministry of Defence, 
Statement on Defence Estimates 1992, (HMSO:London, 1992), p. 21; 
Robert G. Sutter, p. CRS-9; International Institute for Strategic 
Studies (IISS), Military Balance 1993-1994, (Brassey: London, 
October 1993), p. 152. Norris estimates 50-80; CRS estimates 40-
50; and IISS estimates 60+.

119. Clare Hollingworth, "China's Growing Missile Might," Defense 
& Foreign Affairs, March 1985, pp. 28-29, as cited in Norris, et 
al, p. 363 and p. 380; "Chinese Flight Test New Missile Version," 
Aviation Week & Space Technology, 30 June 1986, p. 16, as cited 
in Norris et al, p. 380.

120. DIA, Handbook on the Chinese Armed Forces, DDI-2682-32-76, 
Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1976), p. 8-2, as 
cited in Norris et al, p. 363.

121. Robert G. Sutter, p. CRS-8.

122. Norris et al, p. 363 and p. 382; Robert G. Sutter, p. CRS-9; 
IISS, p. 152. Norris estimates "not more than 15-20"; CRS 
estimates "less than 20"; and IISS estimates 10+.

123. Clare Hollingworth,...pp. 28-29, as cited in Norris et al, 
p. 382; Norris et al, p. 340.

124. Lewis and Hua, "Chinese Ballistic Missile Programs: 
Technologies, Strategies, Goals," International Security, Vol. 
17, no. 2, (fall 1992), p. 10, as cited in Norris et al, p. 363 
and p. 382.

125. Norris et al, p. 382.

126. U.S. Air Force, Tactical Air Command, TAC Intelligence 
Briefing 79-3, "People's Repbulic of China Armed Forces," 8 
February 1979, p. 5, as cited in Norris et al, p. 382.

127. Lewis and Hua, "China's Ballistic Missile Programs," p. 19, 
as cited in Norris et al, p. 385; CRS, p. CRS-9; IISS, p. 152. 
Lewis, Hua, Norris, and IISS all estimate 4; CRS estimates "about 
10."

128. Lewis and Hua, "China's Ballistic Missile Programs," p. 19, 
as cited in Norris et al, p. 385.

129. Norris et al, p. 364.

130. Norris et al, p. 363 and p. 385.

131. Norris, et al, p. 347 and p. 364.

132. Norris et al, p. 388; CRS, p. CRS-9; IISS, p. 152. Norris 
estimates 25-50; CRS estimates 30.

133. Norris et al, p. 388.

134. Norris et al, p. 396.

135. "China switches IRBMs to conventional role," Jane's Defence 
Weekly, January 29, 1994, p. 1.

136. "China Switches IRBMs to conventional role," Jane's Defence 
Weekly, January 29, 1994, p. 1; Norris et al, p. 388; see also 
David Shambaugh, "Growing Strong: China's Challenge to Asian 
Security," Survival, Summer 1994, Volume 36/No 2, p. 56.

137. "China switches IRBMs to conventional role," Jane's Defence 
Weekly, January 29, 1994, p. 1. 

138. Lewis and Hua, pp. 28-29; Yan, K. and McCarthy T., "China's 
missile bureaucracy," Jane's Intelligence Review, January 1993, 
p. 41; Jim Mann, "China upgrading nuclear arms, experts say," Los 
Angeles Times, 9 November 1993, p. 2; Paul Godwin and John Shulz, 
Arms Control Today, December 1993, p. 7; Dr. Lawrence Gershwin, 
National Intelligence Officer for Strategic Programs, Central 
Intelligence Agency, "Threats to U.S. Interests from Weapons of 
Mass Destruction over the next Ten to Twenty Years," September 
23, 1992; Robert Gates, Director, US Central Intelligence, spoken 
testimony before the House Armed Services Committee Defense 
Policy Panel, December 10, 1991, Federal News Service Transcript, 
p. 11-1. 

139. Norris et al, p. 363.

140. Patrick E. Tyler, "China Explodes H-Bomb Underground as 
Test," New York Times, June 11, 1994, p. 7; Jim Mann, "China 
upgrading nuclear arms, experts say," Los Angeles Times, Nov. 9, 
1993, p. 2C; Taylor, R.A., "Test ban flouted by China," 
Washington Times, 6 November 1993, p. A1; Sun, L.H., "China 
resumes nuclear tests; U.S. prepares to follow suit," Washington 
Post, 6 October 1993, p. A23; Gupta, V., 'Assessment of the 
Chinese nuclear test site near Lop Nor', Jane's Intelligence 
Review, August 1993, p. 379; Lewis and Hua,... p. 30; Godwin, P. 
and Shulz, J.J.,... p. 7. 

141. Lewis and Hua, p. 11 and p. 30; 'Nuclear notebook', Bulletin 
of the Atomic Scientists, November 1993, p. 57. 

142. Senator Larry Pressler, Congressional Record, Nov. 20, 1993, 
p. S16655.

143. The Comprehensive Test Ban: Views from the Chinese Nuclear 
Weapons Laboratories, (Natural Resources Defense Council: 
Washington, DC, 1993), p. ii, 26; see also Shen Dingli, "Toward a 
nuclear-weapon-free world: a Chinese Perspective," Bulletin of 
the Atomic Scientists, March/April, pp. 52-53.

144. Lewis and Hua, p. 30.

145. Larry Pressler, US Senator, "Pressler Charges New Chinese 
Weapons Threaten United States," Press Release, May 4, 1994. It 
should be noted that the range and deployment date estimates are 
very similar to those published by John Lewis and Hua Di, 
"China's Ballistic Missile Programs," International Security, 
Fall 1992, (Vol. 17, No. 2), p. 11.

146. see previous footnote.

147. Woolsey, "U.S. Policy Toward Rogue Regimes," p. 33. (see 
section on Russian "brain drain" above.)

148. see for example: Fialka, J.J., 'U.S. fears China's success 
in skimming cream of weapons experts from Russia', Wall Street 
Journal, 14 October 1993, p. 12; Atlas, T., 'Russia's brain drain 
has fallout', Chicago Tribune, 24 october 1993, p. 7; Tyler, P., 
'Russia and China sign a military agreement', New York Times, 10 
November 1993, p. A15; Alfred D. Wilhelm, Jr., "China and the 
Region: Facing a Decade of Challenges," Arms Control Today, 
December 1993, p. 12. In addition to the apparently unsanctioned 
transfer of expertise to China, Moscow has sanctioned the sale of 
Su-27 fighter planes and SA-10 SAMs to China, and is reportedly 
negotiating the sale of Kilo-class diesel powered submarines, and 
marine gas turbine engines.



149. Fialka, J.F., p. 12; Sieff, M., "Missile buildup in China 
could threaten U.S.', Washington Times, 12 November 1993, p. A16;  
Atlas, T., 'Russia's brain drain has fallout', Chicago Tribune, 
24 October 1993, Section 1 p. 7; Mann, J., p. 2C; Tyler, P.E., 
'Russia and China sign a military agreement', New York Times, 10 
November 1993, p. A13; Rear Admiral Edward Sheafer, Director, US 
Naval Intelligence, Posture Statement, May 3, 1993, p. 30.    

 150. de Selding, P.B., 'China seeks Ukraine's expertise', Space 
News, 29 November-5 December 1993, p. 1.

151. Rear Admiral Edward Sheafer, Director, US Naval 
Intelligence, Posture Statement, May 3, 1994, p. 30.

152. Admiral Edward Sheafer, June 1994 Posture Statement.

153. Sheafer, May 1993, p. 30

154. Norris et al, p. 369, p. 396; Robert G. Sutter, p. CRS-13.

155. Norris et al, 369. In its most recent edition of the 
Military Balance, the International Institute for Strategic 
Studies (IISS) lists only one Xia-class SSBN; see IISS, "The 
Military Balance 1993-1994," (Brassey's:London, Oct. 1993), p. 
152.

156.  Robert G. Sutter, p. CRS-13.

157. Rear Admiral Edward Sheafer, Director, U.S. Naval 
Intelligence, Posture Statement, June 1994.

158. Norris et al, p. 396.

159. Norris et al, p. 359, p. 396; Lewis and Hua, "China's 
Ballistic Missile Programs," p. 30.

160. John Jordan, "The People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN)," 
Janes's Intelligence Review, June 1994, p. 279 and p. 282.

161. Norris et al, p. 364 and p. 396.

162. Admiral Sheafer,... May 3, 1993, p. 30.

163. International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military 
Balance 1993-1994, p. 15

164. Lewis and Hua, "Chinese Ballistic Missile Programs...," pp. 
28-29.

165. "Nuclear notebook," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 
November 1993 p. 57; Lewis and Hua, pp. 26-27; John Jordan, "The 
People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN)," Jane's Intelligence 
Review, June 1994, p. 282.

166. Norris et al, p. 373; see also Jane's Strategic Weapon 
Systems, China: Offensive Weapons, Issue 04; which says "up to 
four modified "Xia" class boats may be planned." 

167. Norris et al, p. 359.

168. Norris et al, p. 365, pp. 366-367, p. 394.

169. Norris et al, p. 390, p. 394.

170. Norris et al, p. 365.

171. Robert G. Sutter, p. CRS-7.

172. Norris et al, p. 392

173. Prasun Sengupta, "China Expands Air Forces," Military 
Technology, August 1992, p. 51.

174. David Boey, "Chinese Firm Seeks Bomber Sale in Iran," 
Defense News, March 28-April 3, 1994, p. 38.

175. Prasun Sengupta, op. cit., p. 49.

176. 'First picture of Chinese "Flanker"', Jane's Defence Weekly, 
12 February 1994, p. 6.

177. Rear Admiral Edward Sheafer, Director, US Naval 
Intelligence, Posture Statement, May 3, 1993, p. 29; Ackerman, J. 
A. and Dunn, M.C., 'Chinese airpower revs up', Air Force 
Magazine,  July 1993, p. 59.

178. Rear Admiral Edward Sheafer, Director, US Naval 
Intelligence, Posture Statement, May 3, 1993, p. 29. 

179. Ackerman, J. A. and Dunn, M.C., 'Chinese airpower revs up', 
Air Force Magazine, July 1993, p. 59; 'Chasing the 20th Century,' 
Jane's Defence Weekly, Feb. 19, 1994, p. 26.  

180. The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, "Nuclear notebook," 
November 1993, p. 57.

181. Norris et al, pp. 370-371; see also Jonathan D. Pollack, pp. 
159-160.

182. Jonathan D. Pollock, "The Future of China's Nuclear Weapons 
Policy," in Strategic Views From the Second Tier: The Nuclear 
Weapons Policies of France, Britain, and China," Editors John C. 
Hopkins, and Weixing Hu, (University of California Institute on 
Global Conflict and Cooperation: Sand Diego, January 1994), p. 
160.

183. For details of the U.S. proposal and its implications, see 
Lisbeth Gronlund et al, "Highly Capable Theater Missile Defenses 
And the ABM Treaty," Arms Control Today, April 1994, pp. 3-8; 
Spurgeon M. Keeny, Jr., "Inventing an Enemy," New York Times, 
June 18, 1994, p. 21A; "A New Threat to the ABM Treaty: The 
Administration's TMD Proposal," Arms Control Today, Jan./Feb. 
1994, pp. 11-16.

184. Japan has reportedly earmarkedd $80 million for Russia and 
$20 million for Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus combined. 
Defense News, April 11-17, 1994, p. 2; "Nuclear Successor States 
of the Soviet Union," The Carnegie Endowment for International 
Peace/The Monterey Institute of International Studies, Number 1, 
May 1994, p. 21.

185. According to Greenpeace, the Japanese newspaper Yomiuri 
reported on June 3 that Japan and Russia had agreed to build a 
floating facility to store and dispose of liquid radioactive 
waste. This facility would be funded by part of the $100 million 
that Japan has pledged to the former Soviet Union in 
denuclearization assistance. The states hoped to begin 
construction this summer and complete the facility 6 months after 
that.

186. The United States has agreed to purchase 500 metric tons of 
HEU from Russia. In September 1993, Viktor Mikhailov, the head of 
MINATOM, stated that "500 metric tons of HEU  represents [only] 
about 40 percent of Russia's total reserves." See Elizabeth 
Martin, "A Conversation with Viktor Mikhailov," NUKEM Market 
Report, October 1993,   

187. see for example, William M. Arkin, "Bad Posture," The 
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, July/August, 1994, p. 64.

188. In March, President Clinton extended the U.S. moratorium 
through September 1995. It is extremely unlikely that the United 
States will resume nuclear testing after that. In any case, U.S. 
law prohibits testing after September 30, 1996 unless another 
country tests after that date. Russia,for its part, has not 
conducted a single nuclear test since becoming an independent 
state. (The last Soviet test took place in 1990.)

189. Norris et al, p. 350; Energy and Water Development 
Appropriations for 1994, Hearing before the Subcommittee on 
Energy and Water Development, House Appropriations Committee, (US 
Government Printing Office: Washington, DC, 1993), Part 6, p. 
1313.


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