by Saleem Janjua

16 May 2013

 I. Introduction

In light of a range of difficult domestic problems, including terrorism, poverty, poor governance, Saleem Janjua writes “climate change looks, at most, a less important issue in Pakistan to be dealt with. However, climate change – by re-sketching the maps of water availability, food security, disease occurrences, land use and coastal boundaries – may have severe implications for country’s overall security and stability.”

Saleem Janjua is the Climate Change Adaptation contributor for the NAPSNet Weekly report.

The views expressed in this report do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Nautilus Institute. Readers should note that Nautilus seeks a diversity of views and opinions on significant topics in order to identify common ground.

 II. Policy Forum by Saleem Janjua

Climate Adaptation Challenges and Urban Insecurity

In developing countries, climate change poses a serious challenge to social, environmental and economic development. The review of literature (Nguyen et al., 2013; Adger et al., 2003; Handmer, 2003; and Kates, 2000) indicates that adaptation to climate change is more relevant and crucial to the developing countries because their economies are more dependent on climate-sensitive natural resources, and because they are less able to tackle the impacts of climate change. Yamin et al. (2005) are of the view that the people who will be exposed to the worst of the impacts are the ones least able to cope with the associated risks. Populations in developing countries generally develop a number of coping mechanisms (e.g. diversification of crops, changing sources of income, migration and social networks of support) in order to live with climatic variations and uncertainty. Roy et al. (2006) consider that these adjustments or adaptations mostly take place in an informal way as people in developing countries have a very little access to formal support through public sector. Further, the rapid changes in the climate (e.g. extreme events) present an additional challenge to the development of adaptation mechanisms in developing countries. The people in Pakistan, one such developing country, are also considered among the most vulnerable to the impacts of climate change.

Reducing vulnerability to climate change in recent years has become an imperative issue and is at the forefront of any sustainable development policy agenda both in developed and developing countries. It is, therefore, important to find ways and means by which communities in Pakistan may be enabled to adapt to climate change. However, these days Pakistan is considered one the world’s most complex geopolitical areas – one struggling with terrorism, poverty, poor governance, and many other related issues. Pakistan’s domestic problems extend beyond its borders and have a widespread impact on regional and global security. Against this milieu, the increasing scientific evidence backing up the speed and scope of climate change looks, at most, a less important issue in Pakistan to be dealt with. However, climate change – by re-sketching the maps of water availability, food security, disease occurrences, land use and coastal boundaries – may have severe implications for country’s overall security and stability.

While the future of Pakistan’s security and economic conditions is still uncertain given terrorism, poverty, corruption and other issues, what is clear is that Pakistani local governments continue delivering services to their people under all such prevailing conditions. Also, changes in climate continue affecting the Pakistani local governments (urban, rural and coastal) by changing conditions of various types of infrastructure including; built systems (roads, bridges, water and sewage networks etc), natural systems (watersheds, forests etc.) and human systems (health, education, human welfare etc.).

Related to all the challenges (mentioned above) faced by Pakistan, I consider that actions taken to tackle climate change will, of course, only ever be a small portion of the overall efforts. However, there is much that Pakistani governments (federal, provincial, and/or local) can do along with various stakeholders to adapt to the impacts of climate change. With this in mind, I am of the view that best possible opportunities (learning dimension for climate adaptation) need to be explored for climate change adaptation at the local government level in Pakistan. The efforts should be made to bridge the gap between ‘theoretical’ and ‘practical’ aspects of organizational change for climate adaptation which could enable climate adaptation learning and action in any urban Pakistani local governments.

III. References

Adger, W.N., Huq, S., Brown, K., Conway, D., & Hulme, M. (2003). Adaptation to climate change in the developing world. Progress in Development Studies, 3(3), 179-195.

Handmer, J. (2003). Adaptive capacity: what does it mean in the context of natural hazards? In Smith, JB, Klein, RJT & Huq, S (eds.) Climate Change, Adaptive Capacity, and Development, Imperial College Press: London.

Kates, R.W. (2000). Cautionary tales: adaptation and the global poor. Climatic Change, 45(1), 5-17.

Nguyen, T.C., Robinson, J., Kaneko, S., Komatsu, S. (2013). Estimating the value of economic benefits associated with adaptation to climate change in a developing country: A case study of improvements in tropical cyclone warning services. Ecological Economics, 86(1), 117-128.

Retrieved May 13, 2013, from http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0921800912004508

Roy, J., Gosh, A., & Barua, G. (2006). The Economics of Climate Change: A Review of Studies in the Context of South Asia with a Special Focus on India, Report Submitted to the Stern Review on the Economics of Climate Change, Jadavpur University, Kolkata, India.

Yamin, F., Rahman, A., & Huq, S. (2005). Vulnerability, Adaptation and Climate Disasters: A Conceptual Overview, Institute of Development Studies (IDS) Bulletin, 36(4), 1-14, Retrieved May 13, 2013, from http://www.ids.ac.uk/idspublication/vulnerability-adaptation-and-climate-disasters

IV. NAUTILUS INVITES YOUR RESPONSES

The Nautilus Peace and Security Network invites your responses to this report. Please leave a comment below or send your response to: nautilus@nautilus.org. Comments will only be posted if they include the author’s name and affiliation.

• DETERRENCE: Globalizing Reagan’s INF treaty: easier done than said? 
  
• DPRK: Japanese prime minister’s adviser arrives in Pyongyang, a report says
  
• ENERGY SECURITY: In defense of carbon dioxide
• GOVERNANCE AND CIVIL SOCIETY: South Korean president to Congress: “No North Korea provocations can succeed”
• CLIMATE CHANGE ADAPTATION: Toward resilience: a guide to disaster risk reduction and climate change adaptation
  
• AUSTRAL PEACE AND SECURITY: Warship to join US fleet in hot zone: Japan base for frigate

DETERRENCE:  Globalizing Reagan’s INF treaty: easier done than said?  David Cooper (24 April 2013) [video]; The Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 20, No. 1 (2013) [subscription, PDF,  1.1MB]

The Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF-T) Treaty eliminated entire classes of US and FSU nuclear missiles.  INF-T should be broadened and converted into a global prohibition on ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles with 500-5500 km range.

• Kerry offers missile defense concession, seeks help from China in dealing with North Korea, Michael R. Gordon, New York Times (14 April 2013)
• Prospects for Russian-America missile defense cooperation: lessons from RAMOS and JDEC, Victoria Samson, Contemporary Security Policy, Vol. 28, No. 3 (2007) [Subscription, PDF, 0.2MB]
• Missile test launch rescheduled, Eloise Ogden, Minot Daily News (12 May 2013)

DPRK: Japanese prime minister’s adviser arrives in Pyongyang, a report says, PressTV (14 May 2013)

North Korea is significantly isolated and has only limited incentives to follow the rules; North Korea’s behavior increased policy deconfliction and even created nascent cooperation between the U.S, South Korea and China. An avian influenza outbreak has the potential to cut trade flows more thoroughly than any sanction and will raise the price of trade. North Korea de-politicized a hostage crisis by using an academic to say that an American held hostage was seeking amnesty.

• Japanese Media: North Korea hopes China will hire Kaesong Industrial Park workers who are now unemployed, China QQ News (10 May 2013) [Chinese language]
• Highly pathogenic avian influenza, Korea (Dem. People’s Rep), World Organization for Animal Health (13 May 2013)
• N. Korean academic says American is seeking amnesty, The Korea Herald (14 May 2013)

ENERGY SECURITY: In defense of carbon dioxide, Harrison H. Schmitt and William Happer, The Wall Street Journal (8 May 2013)

What is one to do with professors’ professing and prophecies? Is the sky not falling, or will it still remain sky high? Some say “The incredible list of supposed horrors that increasing carbon dioxide will bring the world is pure belief disguised as science.” Or are the sheep are racing toward the wolf? Some say reaching the 400 ppm daily average of carbon in the atmosphere “feels like we’re moving into another era.” And another, ““I feel like the time to do something was yesterday.” NYT reporter condemns us all: “Virtually every automobile ride, every plane trip and, in most places, every flip of a light switch adds carbon dioxide to the air…”  As if the sheep are running to the wolf.

• Record 400ppm CO2 milestone ‘feels like we’re moving into another era’ Fen Montaigne for Yale Environment 360, The Guardian (14 May 2013)
• Heat-trapping gas passes milestone, raising fears, Justin Gillis, The New York Times (10 May 2013)

GOVERNANCE AND CIVIL SOCIETY: South Korean president to Congress: “No North Korea provocations can succeed”, Dan Meria, CNN (9 May 2013)

ROK President Park addressed a joint session of the US Congress during her first visit to the US, stressing the importance of the US-ROK alliance and her commitment to deal strongly with the DPRK. Park’s “trustpolitik” approach to the DPRK appears to have been favorably received by the US. ROK-Japan relations, however, remain troubled, as issues of history continue to be a sticking point between the two countries.

• Park’s progress, The Economist (11 May 2013)
• Abe questions Japan’s WWII aggression again, Joongang Ilbo (9 May 2013)
• Osaka mayor says sex slaves were ‘necessary’, Chosun Ilbo (14 May 2013)

CLIMATE CHANGE ADAPTATION: Toward resilience: a guide to disaster risk reduction and climate change adaptation, Marilise Turnbull, Charlotte L. Sterrett, Amy Hilleboe, Practical Action Publishing Ltd, UK (2013)

Disaster risk can be significantly reduced through strategies that seek to decrease vulnerability and exposure to hazards within wider efforts to address poverty and inequality. Humanitarian responses to disasters and other crises can be designed and implemented in ways that protect the affected people’s right to life and other basic rights in the short and longer term.

• Disaster data: A balanced perspective, CRED CRUNCH, No. 27, Institute of Health and Society, CRED (2012) [519 KB, PDF]
• UNISDR terminology on disaster risk reduction, United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction-UNISDR (2009) [400 KB, PDF]

AUSTRAL PEACE AND SECURITY: Warship to join US fleet in hot zone: Japan base for frigate, Brendan Nicholson, The Australian (26 April 2013)

The guided-missile frigate HMAS Sydney is about to join the US Seventh Fleet in Japan at a time of heightened tensions on the Korean peninsula and in the South China Sea. The warship will be “embedded” with a US aircraft carrier strike group operating out of Yokosuka. The deployment comes as the Gillard government is working to manage Australia’s relationships with China and the US. “Australia has made it clear we stand shoulder to shoulder with the Republic of Korea, also with Japan.”

• Defence White Paper 2013, The Strategist, ASPI (May 2013)
• Marines lodging bill to hit $1.6bn, Brendan Nicholson, The Australian (22 April 2013)
• Australian is US Army general in Pacific, News.com.au (14 May 2013)

The Nautilus Peace and Security Weekly Report presents articles and full length reports each week in six categories: Austral security, nuclear deterrence, energy security, climate change and security, the DPRK, climate change adaptation and governance and civil society. Our team of contributors carefully select items that highlight the links between these themes and the three regions in which our offices are found—North America, Northeast Asia, and the Austral-Asia region. 

Subscribe to NAPSNet to receive free weekly email reports

Editor

• Arabella Imhoff

Contributors

• Deterrence: Peter Hayes
• Governance and Civil Society: Dyana Mardon, Yi Kiho
• Climate Change Adaptation: Saleem Janjua
• DPRK: Roger Cavazos
• Energy Security: Nikhil Desai
• Austral Peace and Security: Richard Tanter

May 14, 2013

This handbook was produced for of the Institute’s Resilience and Security of Spent Fuel in East Asia project with the support of the John T. and Catherine D. MacArthur Foundation.

I. Introduction

Commercial nuclear power plants around the world harness nuclear fission to produce electricity. At each plant, a fission reactor receives fresh nuclear fuel and discharges spent nuclear fuel (SNF). Although the SNF is “spent”, it contains a large amount of radioactive material. Some of that material could be released to the environment by an accident or an attack, causing harm to humans by exposing them to ionizing radiation. The potential for such harm is the “radiological risk” associated with SNF. Independent assessment of this risk could help societies to manage the risk. This report is designed as a handbook that could be used to support such independent assessment. The report has two main parts. The first part provides introductory material, and the second part sets forth a seven-step approach to assessing SNF radiological risk.

Gordon D. Thompson, Phil., is currently the executive director of Institute for Resource and Security Studies in Cambridge, MA. In addition, he serves as Research Professor, George Perkins Marsh Institute, Clark University, Worcester, Massachussetts.

The views expressed in this report do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Nautilus Institute. Readers should note that Nautilus seeks a diversity of views and opinions on significant topics in order to identify common ground.

II. Handbook by Gordon Thompson

Handbook to Support Assessment of Radiological Risk Arising From Management of Spent Nuclear Fuel

Download (PDF, 3.32MB)

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III. Nautilus Invites Your Responses

The Nautilus Peace and Security Network invites your responses to this report. Please leave a comment below or send your response to: nautilus@nautilus.org. Comments will only be posted if they include the author’s name and affiliation.

I. INTRODUCTION

Peter Hayes writes that automatic budget cuts in the US will result in the shrinking of the US strategic triad. He writes “each service will maintain its nuclear mission for political-bureaucratic and ideological reasons, and the triad itself will simply get smaller, remain militarily incoherent with warheads and missiles mismatched to military mission, with less funds available for conventional deterrent forces as a result. In turn, the deficit of conventional forces will justify continued funding of nuclear forces.”

Peter Hayes is director of Nautilus Institute and Professor of International Relations at RMIT University in Melbourne.

The views expressed in this report do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Nautilus Institute. Readers should note that Nautilus seeks a diversity of views and opinions on significant topics in order to identify common ground.

II. POLICY FORUM BY PETER HAYES

Nuclear Knock-On Effects

Automatic budget cuts in the United States have already cramped the operations of the US military in the Pacific.  However, the scale, capacity, and quality of US forces in the region today are so superior to any combination of adversaries that the cuts make little difference to its ability to conduct coercive diplomacy—today.

Nonetheless, the cuts are already visible and affect perceptions.[1]  Existing forces largely are taken for granted and increasing lethality of future forces at lower cost is discounted as over the horizon, even if almost certain to occur–as exemplified by the May 3, 2013 successful test of the X-51A hypersonic Waverider aircraft above the eastern Pacific.[2]

If US budget cuts continue on auto-pilot, then the knock-on effects will serious erode the foundations of American military leadership and hegemony in the region.   It will also force the US military to make some hard decisions about maintaining the Cold War strategic triad of naval, air-delivered, and land-based long range nuclear weapons systems.

The doctrinal basis for the US strategic nuclear triad is to ensure that no pre-emptive attack on the United States could possibly diminish its ability to fire back a devastating retaliatory strike, thereby “stabilizing” strategic deterrence.

However, the conceptual basis for the triad has almost disappeared today.  “Stable” deterrence between the United States and Russia is possible at far lower numbers of weapons than exist today in their respective arsenals.  China’s strategic arsenal is tiny compared with US nuclear firepower although the relationship is more one of mutually neutralized strategic compellence than of strategic deterrence.  Indeed, the United States does not refer to strategic deterrence in its pronouncements concerning China’s nuclear weapons.

Whatever the logic of “strategic deterrence,” there is no advantage to be gained in drawing fire onto land-based missiles in one’s homeland—indeed, doing so always seemed utterly absurd.  Who in their right minds offers up their homeland to be sacrificed for putative deterrence?

Airborne nuclear weapons are nice because they a slow to deliver over long distances, and can be recalled up to point of dropping or firing cruise missiles from offshore.  However, they need lots of logistical support such as refueling tankers, and their airfields present tempting targets for pre-emptive strikes.

Many strategic analysts have concluded that the land-based and airborne strategic weapons are superfluous and that submarine-based strategic forces are all that is needed to achieve “strategic deterrence” in the minds of possible adversaries—by which is meant Russia and China.  Former CINCPAC Admiral Dennis Blair argues that only dedicated nuclear forces should be fielded (that is, strategic submarines, and long range Minutemen missileers) and that dual-use forces should be eliminated.[3]  Others, such as former vice chairman of the US Joint Chiefs General James Cartwright, have called for a dyad based only on strategic bombers and strategic submarines.[4]

Thus, the fight in Washington over the allocation of budget dollars to nuclear forces is intensifying on two fronts.  The first is the inter-service rivalry whereby each service strives to avoid losing its part of the triad.  The second is the ever-escalating demand for dollars to sustain US conventional military forces, first and foremost, to meet the high costs of pay, benefits, and support to enlisted personnel; and second, to invest in modernization and deployment of high technology forces that increase the lethality and reach of US forces and, to some extent, substitute for expensive enlisted personnel and forward-deployed logistic support systems, including bases.

Thus, the more that conventional high technology weapons systems substitute for missions formerly reserved to or uniquely fulfilled by nuclear weapons, the more dollars can be moved from the strategic nuclear budget into each service’s conventional forces budget.  This choice is becoming increasingly stark.  In this FY budget request, the Pentagon requested $12 billion for nuclear weapons out of a total request of $527 billion—already $52 billion above that allowed under the sequestration automatic limit on defense spending.[5]

The Navy is planning to keep the Ohio submarines, each armed with 24 Trident II D-5 missiles, in service until at least 2040.  According to Ronald O’Rourke, the first of the 14 Ohio-class SSBNs will leave service in 2027. “The remaining 13 will reach the ends of their service lives at a rate of roughly one ship per year thereafter, with the 14th reaching the end of its service life in 2040.”[6]

Thus, the Navy faces a tradeoff between being able to afford new strategic nuclear submarines versus reducing its blue water conventional navy.   William Burke, deputy chief of Naval Operations Warfare Systems, said in the Washington Post on May 2, that if the US Navy committed to forward funding 12 new replacement strategic submarines for these Ohio submarines, starting with its fiscal 2014 budget request for $1.2 billion in research, development, test, and evaluation funding, it would force the Navy to make do with only 250 instead of 300 ships for its global power projection mission.[7]

“At these numbers,” he stated, “our global presence will be reduced such that we’ll only be able to visit some areas of the world episodically.”[8]

The obvious solution to the conventional horn of this dilemma is to set priorities and to construct regional security architectures based on power sharing rather than military dominance.  This approach is not viewed with equanimity by the US Navy.

The way to tackle the nuclear horn of this dilemma is to reduce the funds committed to the other two legs of the strategic triad.  The latter is unlikely given inter-service rivalry for the strategic nuclear budget.  Alternately, the Navy can field fewer submarines to deploy the required number of warheads at sea rather than focus on the number of submarines.   The question becomes:  How many cities must be exterminated to assure “stability.”

Indeed, Hans Kristensen made exactly this argument, noting that the Ohio strategic submarines deploy today are at historically low operating tempo and that no more than eight submarines should suffice to provide guaranteed retaliatory annihilation on any country attacking the United States.[9]

Meanwhile, the sequester is affecting fleet readiness and actual operations in the Pacific.  Unsurprisingly, the Navy is spending assured dollars on ensuring that forces about to deploy are fully trained and equipped, and on overhauls of warships.  That has led to deferment of fleet maintenance wherever possible; and likely reductions in future procurement.[10]  Steaming time, exercises, and reduced non-deployed readiness levels for naval forces are the net result.[11]

The end result of this pincer movement of the budget squeeze, strategic nuclear imperatives, and conventional force demands, is that the strategic triad likely will shrink over time.  The mix of warheads and delivery systems in a smaller triad could be rationalized in order to make the forces far more reliable, flexible, and lethal.[12]  However, due to organizational rigidity, budget constraints, and political risks arising from adversarial perception of nuclear weapons modernization, such a reconstitution of the triad is unlikely.

Perhaps one leg of the triad will be defunded and eliminated; but more likely is that each service will maintain its nuclear mission for political-bureaucratic and ideological reasons, and the triad itself will simply get smaller, remain militarily incoherent with warheads and missiles mismatched to military mission, with less funds available for conventional deterrent forces as a result.  In turn, the deficit of conventional forces will justify continued funding of nuclear forces.  Perhaps this is why the Navy is planning to operate the next strategic submarine until 2080, well beyond the lifetime of readers of this essay.  Apparently nuclear abolition is budgetarily inconceivable.

III. REFERENCES

[1] Yuka Hayashi and Patrick Barta, “Pentagon Cuts Feared Tripping Up Pivot To Asia,” Wall Street Journal, May 4, 2013, Pg. 10 at: http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324582004578456683694045890.html

[2] W.J. Hennigan, “Experimental Aircraft Reaches Mach 5.1 In Historic Test Flight The unmanned X-51A WaveRider travels at more than 3,000 mph above the Pacific Ocean,” Los Angeles Times, May 3, 2013, at:http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-hypersonic-test-20130504,0,1579818.story

[3] D. Blair, “Integration and Separation of Nuclear and Non-nuclear Planning and Forces,” in T. Bolz, ed, In the Eyes of the Experts, Analysis and Comments on America’s Strategic Posture, United States Institute of Peace, 2009, pp. 75-79, at:http://www.usip.org/files/In%20the%20Eyes%20of%20the%20Experts%20full.pdf

[4] M. Thompson, “Triad And True: Nuclear-War War,” May 17, 2012, at: http://battleland.blogs.time.com/2012/05/17/triad-and-true-nuclear-war-war/

[5] Rachel Oswald, “Pentagon Seeks $12B For Nuclear Weapons in Next Budget,” Global Security Newswire, April 10, 2013 at:http://www.nti.rsvp1.com/gsn/article/dod-seeks-12b-nuclear-weapons-fy2014/?mgh=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.nti.org&mgf=1

[6] Ronald O’Rourke, Navy SSBN(X) Ballistic Missile Submarine Program: Background and Issues for Congress, Congressional Research Service, R41129, March 14, 2013, at:http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/R41129_20130314.pdf

[7] R. Oswald, “Building New Ballistic Missile Subs Could Demand Smaller Fleet, Navy Says,” Global Security Newswire, April 30, 2013, at: http://www.nti.rsvp1.com/gsn/article/vice-admiral-warns-renewing-ohio-fleet-will-impact-other-navy-procurement-projects/?mgh=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.nti.org&mgf=1

[8] W. Pincus, “Budget cuts could reshape the country’s ship supply, official says,” Washington Post, May 2, 2013, at: http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/financing-a-global-navy/2013/05/01/d3fda038-b1b0-11e2-baf7-5bc2a9dc6f44_story.html

[9] H. Kristensen, “Declining Deterrent Patrols Indicate Too Many SSBNs,” April 30, 2013, at: http://blogs.fas.org/security/2013/04/ssbnpatrols/

[10] Jeanette Steele, “Vice CNO Describes Sequester Impact On Navy Plans, Cuts realign priorities in operations, maintenance and new procurement,” United Tribune San Diego, April 28, 2013 at: http://www.utsandiego.com/news/2013/apr/28/tp-vice-cno-describes-sequester-impact-on-navy/

[11] S. Fellman, “Fleet Readiness To Plunge In ’14, Even full funding won’t restore sequestration effects, admirals warn,” Navy Times, Mary 6, 2013, at: http://ebird.osd.mil/ebird2/ebfiles/e20130429921456.html

[12] E. Colby outlines the case for such a rationalization of warheads across different delivery systems in “Defining Strategic Stability: Reconciling Stability and Deterrence,” pp. 65-70, in E. Colby, M. Gerson, eds, Strategic Stability. Contending Interpretations, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College Press February 2013, at: http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubid=1144

IV. NAUTILUS INVITES YOUR RESPONSES

The Nautilus Peace and Security Network invites your responses to this report. Please leave a comment below or send your response to: nautilus@nautilus.org. Comments will only be posted if they include the author’s name and affiliation.

DETERRENCE: Declining deterrent patrols indicate too many SSBNs, Hans Kristensen, FAS Strategic Security Blog (30 April 2013)

Since 1999, the number of US strategic submarines (SSBN) deterrent patrols per year has declined by more than 56 percent from 64 patrols in 1999 to 28 in 2012. The decline has reduced annual patrols to the lowest level since 1962. The navy could easily cut the SSBN fleet from 14 to 12 boats, reduce next-generation SSBN from 12 to 10, and save $ billions.

• Budget cuts could reshape the country’s ship supply, official says, Walter Pincus, Washington Post (2 May 2013)
• Building new ballistic missile subs could demand smaller fleet, Navy Says, Rachel Oswald, Global Security Newswire (30 April 2013)
• Navy SSBN(X) ballistic missile submarine program: background and issues for Congress, Ronald O’Rourke, Congressional Research Service (14 March 2013) [PDF, 05MB]

DPRK: N. Korea moves missile from coast, AFP-JIJI, The Japan Times (7 May 2013)

Tensions continue to decrease on the Korean peninsula and possibly indicate a new status quo in the inter-relationships in Northeast Asia. North Korea has taken a bold – but easily reversible step – by removing their untested missiles.  North Korea mildly toned down their rhetoric. China took two key actions likely to ensure President Park’s upcoming visit to China is smooth. Further reductions in tension will require more steps from all sides.

• China rejects North Korea as a nuke nation, Global Security Newswire (3 May 2013)
• China cut ties with key North Korean bank, Keith Bradsher and Nick Cumming-Bruce, The New York Times (7 May 2013)
• Obama: North Korea must replace threats with ‘meaningful steps’, Karen Parrish, American Forces Press Service (7 May 2013)

GOVERNANCE AND CIVIL SOCIETY: S. Korea rejects ‘incomprehensible’ North demands, AFP (6 May 2013)

The DPRK has said that the ROK must stop its military exercises and other hostile acts, such as anti-DPRK leaflets floated by ROK activists, before the Kaesong Industrial Complex can be reopened, which the ROK rejected. One US expert on the DPRK disputes the US narrative of the DPRK forcing concessions and then reneging on promises and advocates dialogue. The US intelligence world seems to know less and less about the reclusive DPRK.

• US expert Joel Wit disputes claims that N. Korea follows a predictable pattern, Park Hyun, Hankyoreh (7 May 2013)
• Intelligence on North Korea, and its new leader, remains elusive, David E. Sanger and Choe Sang-hun, New York Times (6 May 2013)

CLIMATE CHANGE ADAPTATION: Impact of the 2010-11 floods and the factors that inhibit and enable household adaptation strategies, Deanne Bird et al., Synthesis and Integrative Research Program, NCCARF (2013) [4.23 MB, PDF]

The study sought to uncover both adaptation enabling and inhibiting factors within the flood affected populations. While there is evidence of community resilience, the factors that inhibit adaptive change emerged more strongly than enabling factors. There are obvious policy implications in these findings that put greater responsibility on all levels of government to educate the community and to facilitate change.

• Managed retreat of coastal communities: understanding responses to projected sea level rise, Kim S. Alexander, Anthony Ryan and Thomas G. Measham, CSIRO (2011) [198 KB, PDF]
• The 2008 floods in Queensland: a case study of vulnerability, resilience and adaptive capacity, University of Southern Queensland and NCCARF (2010)

CLIMATE CHANGE AND SECURITY: White House warned on imminent Arctic ice death spiral, Nafeez Ahmed, Earth Insight, The Guardian (2 May 2013)

Senior US government officials are to be briefed on the danger of an ice-free Arctic in the summer within two years. “This situation has the momentum of a runaway train.” New research suggests that the Arctic summer sea ice loss is linked to extreme weather: “Arctic amplification”.

• Arctic Death Spiral – March 2013, Andy Lee Robinson, You Tube (11 April 2013)
• New report highlights the complexity of climate change across the Antarctic, Charlotte Porter, Cambridge Journals Blog (3 May 2013)
• Is Antarctica demilitarised? Sam Bateman, The Strategist, ASPI (23 April 2013)

The Nautilus Peace and Security Weekly Report presents articles and full length reports each week in six categories: Austral security, nuclear deterrence, energy security, climate change and security, the DPRK, climate change adaptation and governance and civil society. Our team of contributors carefully select items that highlight the links between these themes and the three regions in which our offices are found—North America, Northeast Asia, and the Austral-Asia region. 

Subscribe to NAPSNet to receive free weekly email reports

Editor

• Arabella Imhoff

Contributors

• Deterrence: Peter Hayes
• Governance and Civil Society: Dyana Mardon, Yi Kiho
• Climate Change Adaptation: Saleem Janjua
• DPRK: Roger Cavazos
• Energy Security: Nikhil Desai
• Climate Change and Security: Richard Tanter

1.                  Urban Water Supplies & Climate Change – Australia     

2.                  Building Urban Resilience: Principles, Tools, and Practice

3.                  The Climate Adaptation Frontier

4.                  Remote Sensing (RS) and GIS for Flood Hazard Management    

5.                  Climate Change Adaptation and the Rental Sector

6.                  International Workshop: Living in Low-income Urban Settlements

Urban Water Supplies & Climate Change – Australia          

NCCARF’s policy guidance briefs address key challenges to effectively adapting Australia to a variable and changing climate, providing high-level policy advice designed for use by policy makers at Commonwealth and State level. This policy guidance brief deals with the challenge of managing the urban water supply under climate change. The example location is south-west Western Australia (SWWA), which is experiencing a long-term drying trend linked to climate change that will likely persist. 

Planning, Ensuring Australia’s Urban Water Supplies under Climate Change, Policy Guidance Brief 2, National Climate Change Adaptation Research Facility (NCCARF), Gold Coast, Australia, 2013 [1.35 MB, PDF]

Building Urban Resilience: Principles, Tools, and Practice

This handbook is a resource for enhancing disaster resilience in urban areas. The objective is to demonstrate a scalable methodology and practical tools for risk assessment that can be used for city-level investment decisions. It offers open-source risk assessment tools that can be used by city-level institutions, other communities, private investors, and planners of infrastructure services. The handbook contains case studies and tables that provide further details and examples of good practice to enhance disaster resilience.

Building Urban Resilience: Principles, Tools, and Practice, Jha, Abhas K et al., Australian Agency for International Development (AusAID) and the World Bank, 2013 [14.63 MB, PDF]

The Climate Adaptation Frontier

The paper introduces the concept of an ‘adaptation frontier’, which is defined as a socio-ecological system’s transitional adaptive operating space between safe and unsafe domains. It explores the possible outcomes for systems that find themselves within frontier territory and how they might find their way back to more sustainable regions. The paper concludes with some discussion of the implications of the adaptation frontier for how adaptation researchers and practitioners frame the concept of adaptation and the extent to which more optimistic or pessimistic socio-ecological futures will prevail.

The Climate Adaptation Frontier, Benjamin L. Preston, Kirstin Dow, and Frans Berkhout,Sustainability, vol. 5, no. 3, 2013 [1.08 MB, PDF]

Remote Sensing (RS) and GIS for Flood Hazard Management    

Floods are one of the most common hazards in the world, affecting people’s lives and livelihoods. Flood hazard mapping and flood shelters suitability analysis are vital elements in appropriate land use planning for flood-prone areas. This paper describes application of Remote Sensing (RS) and Geographical Information Systems (GIS) in identifying flood hazard zones and flood shelters. It describes a simple and efficient methodology to accurately delineate flood inundated areas, flood-hazard areas, and suitable areas for flood shelter to minimize flood impacts.

Application of Remote Sensing and GIS for Flood Hazard Management: A Case Study from Sindh Province, Pakistan, Kabir Uddin, Deo Raj Gurung, Amarnath Giriraj, Basanta Shrestha, American Journal of Geographic Information System, vol. 2, no. 1, pp. 1-5, 2013 [655 KB, PDF]

Climate Change Adaptation and the Rental Sector

The research employs an asset-based approach to understanding the capacities, assets and skills which tenants, landlords and housing managers bring to climate change adaptation. It focuses on the adaptive capacity of low-income renters in the public and private sectors, addressing the equity dimensions of vulnerability and adaptation. The research finds that the tenants are motivated by concern about the impact of human activity on the environment, and exercise this concern through everyday sustainable household practices, as well as through engagement with community or political organisations.

Climate Change Adaptation and the Rental Sector, Lesley Instone, Kathleen Mee, Jane Palmer, Miriam Williams, and Nicola Vaughan, The University of Newcastle Australia and the National Climate Change Adaptation Research Facility (NCCARF), Gold Coast, Australia, 2013 [1.23 MB, PDF]

International Workshop: Living in Low-income Urban Settlements

This international workshop (living in low-income urban settlements in an era of climate change: processes, practices, policies and politics) will be held on 9-10 September 2013 in University of Manchester, UK. The workshop aims: to deepen the understanding of the broader processes that shape and mediate the responses to climate change of poor urban households and communities in Asia, Africa and Latin America; and to contribute to the evolution of more effective pro-poor climate change policies by local governments, national governments and international organisations. For more details, please visit the website given below.

Living in Low-income Urban Settlements in an Era of Climate Change: Processes, Practices, Policies and Politics, International Workshop, University of Manchester, UK, 9-10 September 2013 [132 KB, PDF]

For further information, please contact the editor, Saleem Janjua: daptnet@rmit.edu.au

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Professor Darryn McEvoy, Program Leader, RMIT University Climate Change Adaptation Programme

Professor Peter Hayes, Co-founder and Executive Director of Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainability

Dr. Saleem Janjua, Editor AdaptNet

AdaptNet is a free fortnightly report produced by RMIT University Global Cities Research Institute’s Climate Change Adaptation Programme, Melbourne, Australia. It is published in partnership with the Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainability.

Cấp nước đô thị và biến đổi khí hậu – Ốt-xtrây-li-a

Bản tóm tắt về hướng dẫn chính sách của NCCARF đã góp phần giúp giải quyết những thách thức chính hiện nay để giúp Ốt-xtrây-li-a thích ứng một cách hiệu quả với biến đổi khí hậu, đồng thời đưa ra những tư vấn chính sách cấp cao do các nhà hoạch định chính sách của Khối Thịnh Vượng Chung Châu Âu và ở cấp chính phủ Ốt-xtrây-li-a đề xuất áp dụng. Bên cạnh đó, bản tóm tắt hướng dẫn này còn giúp giải quyết những thách thức của vấn đề quản lý cấp nước đô thị trong bối cảnh biến đổi khí hậu. Khu vực được lấy ra làm ví dụ là phía Tây Nam miền Tây Ốt-xtrây-li-a (SWWA), hiện đang phải hứng chịu các đợt hạn hán kéo dài do hậu quả của biến đổi khí hậu có khả năng vẫn còn tiếp diễn.

Quy hoạch, Đảm bảo Cấp nước Đô thị Ốt-xtrây-li-a trong bối cảnh Biến đổi Khí hậu, Bản tóm tắt Hướng dẫn Chính sách 2, Cơ quan Quốc gia Nghiên cứu Thích ứng với Biến đổi Khí hậu (NCCARF), Gold Coast, Ốt-xtrây-li-a, 2013 [1.35 MB, PDF].

Xây dựng khả năng chống chịu với thiên tai cho các đô thị: Nguyên tắc, Công cụ và Thực tiễn

Cuốn sổ tay này là một nguồn tài liệu giúp tăng cường khả năng chống chịu thiên tai trong khu vực đô thị. Mục đích của cuốn sổ tay là để cho thấy một phương pháp linh hoạt và công cụ thực tiễn đánh giá rủi ro có thể được áp dụng khi đưa ra quyết định đầu tư ở cấp thành phố. Đồng thời, đưa ra các công cụ đánh giá rủi ro mã nguồn mở dùng cho các tổ chức cấp thành phố, các cộng đồng, các nhà đầu tư tư nhân, và các nhà hoạch định cho dịch vụ cơ sở hạ tầng. Trong cuốn sổ tay này còn trình bày về các trường hợp nghiên cứu tình huống và bảng số liệu với đầy đủ thông tin chi tiết và các ví dụ về các phương pháp áp dụng thành công giúp nâng cao khả năng chống chịu với thiên tai.

Xây dựng khả năng phục hồi của các đô thị: Nguyên tắc, Công cụ và Thực tiễn, Jha, Abhas K và cộng sự, Cơ quan Phát triển Quốc tế Ốt-xtrây-li-a (AusAID) và Ngân hàng Thế giới, năm 2013 [14.63 MB, PDF]

Biên giới thích ứng khí hậu

Báo cáo này giới thiệu khái niệm “biên giới thích ứng”, được định nghĩa là một không gian giúp thích ứng chuyển tiếp giữa các vùng an toàn và không an toàn của một hệ sinh thái – xã hội. Đồng thời bản báo cáo này còn khám phá những kết quả có thể cho các hệ thống tìm thấy chính mình trong lãnh thổ biên giới và làm thế nào họ có thể tìm đường trở lại cho các khu vực bền vững hơn. Bài viết kết luận với một số cuộc thảo luận về những tác động của vùng biên giới thích ứng cho các nhà nghiên cứu thích ứng và học viên khung khái niệm thích ứng và mức độ lạc quan hay bi quan tương lai sinh thái xã hội sẽ thắng thế.

Biên giới thích ứng khí hậu, Benjamin L. Preston, Kirstin Dow, và Frans Berkhout, bền vững, vol. 5, không. 3, 2013 [1,08 MB, PDF]

Viễn thám (RS) và GIS trong quản lý nguy cơ lũ lụt

Lũ lụt là một trong những mối nguy hiểm phổ biến nhất trên thế giới, ảnh hưởng đến cuộc sống và sinh kế của người dân. Lập bản đồ nguy cơ lũ lụt và phân tích sự phù hợp của những vùng lũ lụt “thường xuyên ghé thăm” là yếu tố quan trọng trong quy hoạch sử dụng đất phù hợp cho các khu vực bị lũ lụt. Bài viết này mô tả ứng dụng của Viễn thám (RS) và Hệ thống Thông tin địa lý (GIS) trong việc xác định các khu vực có nguy cơ bị lũ lụt và những nơi trú ẩn lũ. Nó mô tả một phương pháp đơn giản và hiệu quả để phân định chính xác vùng bị ngập lũ, khu vực lũ lụt nguy hiểm, và các khu vực thích hợp cho nơi trú ẩn lũ để giảm thiểu ảnh hưởng của lũ.

Ứng dụng Viễn thám và GIS trong quản lý nguy cơ lũ lụt: Một nghiên cứu ở tỉnh Sindh, Pakistan, Kabir Uddin, Deo Raj Gurung, Amarnath Giriraj, Basanta Shrestha, Tạp chí Hệ thống Thông tin Địa lý Hoa Kỳ, Tập 2, số 1, trang 1-5, 2013 [655 KB, PDF]

Thích ứng biến đổi khí hậu và ngành nghề cho thuê

Bản nghiên cứu vận dụng phương pháp tiếp cận về tài sản để tìm hiểu rõ năng lực,mức tài sản và các kỹ năng mà người thuê nhà, chủ nhà và chủ quản lý cho thuê có thể đóng góp vào công tác thích ứng biến đổi khí hậu. Bên cạnh việc chú trọng vào khả năng thích ứng của người thuê nhà có thu nhập thấp trong khu vực công và tư nhân, bản nghiên cứu này còn giải quyết các khía cạnh cân bằng giữa khả năng tổn thương và thích ứng. Nghiên cứu còn cho thấy một yếu tố có ảnh hưởng đến những người thuê nhà là mối quan tâm đến các tác động từ hoạt động của con người tới môi trường và được biết đến thông qua các hoạt động bảo vệ môi trường thường ngày của các hộ gia đình, cũng như sự tham gia tích cực cùng cộng đồng, và các tổ chức chính trị.

Thích ứng Biến đổi Khí hậu và Ngành nghề Cho thuê, Lesley Instone, Kathleen Mee, Jane Palmer, Miriam Williams, và Nicola Vaughan, Đại học Newcastle Ốt-xtrây-li-a và Cơ quan Quốc gia Nghiên cứu Thích ứng Biến đổi Khí hậu, Gold Coast, Ốt-xtrây-li-a, 2013 [1.23 MB, PDF]

Hội thảo quốc tế: Định cư ở khu đô thị cho người có thu nhập thấp

Hội thảo quốc tế với chủ đề định cư ở khu đô thị cho người có thu nhập thấp trong thời đại biến đổi khí hậu: các quá trình, hoạt động, chính sách và các vấn đề chính trị) sẽ được tổ chức vào ngày 9-10 tháng 9 năm 2013 tại Đại học Manchester, Vương quốc Anh. Hội thảo hướng đến mục tiêu: làm nâng cao hiểu biết về các quá trình mang nghĩa rộng hơn có khả năng định hình và điều chỉnh khả năng thích ứng với biến đổi khí hậu của các hộ gia đình và cộng đồng người dân nghèo sống ở khu vực châu Á, châu Phi và châu Mỹ La Tinh, đồng thời cũng góp phần vào quá trình xây dựng các chính sách biến đổi khí hậu vì người nghèo một hiệu quả hơn của chính quyền địa phương, các chính phủ và tổ chức quốc tế. Để biết thêm thông tin chi tiết, vui lòng truy cập trang web dưới đây.

Định cư ở khu đô thị cho người có thu nhập thấp trong thời đại biến đổi khí hậu: Quá trình, Thực tiễn, Chính sách và Chính trị, Hội thảo Quốc tế, Đại học Manchester, Vương quốc Anh, 9-10 tháng Chín 2013 [132 KB, PDF]

——-
Để biết thêm thông tin, vui lòng liên hệ Saleem Janjua:
adaptnet@rmit.edu.au

Để đăng ký nhận bản tin và để thông báo ngừng nhận bản tin:
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Giáo sư Darryn McEvoy, Giám đốc Chương trình, Chương trình Thích ứng với Biến đổi Khí hậu, Đại học RMIT
http://www.global-cities.info/climatechange

Giáo sư Peter Hayes, Đồng sáng lập kiêm Giám đốc Điều hành, Viện An ninh và Bền vững Nautilus
http://www.nautilus.org/about/staff

Tiến sĩ Saleem Janjua, Chủ biên Bản tin AdaptNet
http://www.rmit.edu.au/browse;ID=05ouzsj7ehxu1
http://www.nautilus.org/about/associates/saleem-janjua/

AdaptNet là bản tin miễn phí xuất bản hai tuần một lần được biên soạn bởi Chương trình Thích ứng với Biến đổi Khí hậu thuộc Viện Nghiên cứu các Thành phố Toàn cầu, Đại học RMIT, Melbourne, Úc. Bản tin được xuất bản với sự hợp tác của Viện An ninh và Bền vững Nautilus.

7 May 2013

I. Introduction

In this Policy Forum Mark Valenica sets out the kind of statement China could issue in order to ‘clarify its position regarding its maritime claims and actions in the South China Sea.’ Valenica writes ‘For China such a statement would indicate it has “risen” and is ready to challenge the existing world system and contemporary interpretations of international law—if necessary to protect its interests.’

Mark J. Valencia is a Visiting Senior Scholar at the National Institute for South China Sea Studies, Haikou, China

The views expressed in this report do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Nautilus Institute. Readers should note that Nautilus seeks a diversity of views and opinions on significant topics in order to identify common ground.

II. Policy Forum by Mark Valencia

The South China Sea: What China Could Say

China’s claims in the South China Sea have been criticized as ambiguous. China has also been accused of having claims that are inconsistent with international law and the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea which it has ratified. More specifically China has been accused of threatening freedom of navigation and “stretching” international law. The United States and several ASEAN nations have repeatedly asked China to clarify its position regarding its maritime claims and actions in the South China Sea. China could oblige them by issuing a statement along the following lines.

*As stated in its Law on the Exclusive Economic Zone and the Continental Shelf, China claims historic rights in much of the South China Sea. This claim is symbolized by its nine-dashed line map. This claim includes sovereignty over all the islands, rocks, reefs and banks within this nine-dashed line. It also includes sovereign rights over the living and non-living resources as well as the quality of the marine environment. The extent of its claim, the sharing of resources within it, and the details of the regime itself are subject to negotiation.

*The 1982 UNCLOS does not define historic title, historic rights or historic waters. China’s claim of historic rights is distinct from the concept of historic waters in that the latter is commonly considered to imply a regime of internal waters that does not permit freedom of navigation and over flight. China has not and will not impede the freedom of navigation for commercial and normal peaceful purposes.

*China also reserves its rights under the 1982 UNCLOS to claim territorial waters, continental shelf, extended continental shelf, and EEZs from its sovereign territory within the nine-dashed line.

*Since maritime boundaries within the nine-dashed line area have not been agreed and the area is in dispute, there should be no unilateral drilling for hydrocarbons. The claimants should enter into interim arrangements of a practical nature such as joint development of resources in disputed areas.

*China has been consistent in its policy of being willing to negotiate these issues. China has proven its sincerity in negotiating and abiding by conflict management agreements in similar situations such as with Vietnam in the Beibuwan, with Japan in the East China Sea regarding oil and gas, fisheries and scientific research, and with the Republic of Korea in the Yellow Sea regarding fisheries. China has also offered to fund cooperative activities in the South China Sea without prejudice to any state’s claims to the area.

*China believes that the United States, despite its claims to the contrary, is not neutral in this matter. The U.S. insists that China must base its claims solely on the 1982 UNCLOS although the U.S. itself has not ratified it. The U.S. insists that any claims to maritime jurisdiction in the South China Sea must be from land implying that China’s claim to historic rights within the nine-dashed line is invalid. The U.S. also insists that China negotiate these issues multilaterally with a bloc of claimants and non-claimants. China believes that settlement of the disputes should be negotiated by ‘sovereign states directly concerned’ as stipulated in the 2002 ASEAN-China agreed Declaration of Conduct in the South China Sea (DoC) and that non-regional parties should not be involved. China also urges the ASEAN claimants to resolve relevant outstanding issues between themselves first.

*Regarding creation, evolution and interpretations of international law, it should be borne in mind that the U.S. itself unilaterally initiated the concept of “extended maritime jurisdiction” via the 1945 Truman Proclamation on the Continental Shelf. It justified doing so by “the long range world-wide need for new sources of petroleum and other minerals”; that “efforts to discover and make available new supplies of these resources should be encouraged”; and that “ recognized jurisdiction over these resources is required in the interest of their conservation and prudent utilization when and as development is undertaken.”

* China maintains that other claimants are violating the 2002 DoC by conducting ‘activities that would complicate or escalate disputes and affect peace and stability’ such as occupying or building structures on disputed features, unilaterally exploring for petroleum, internationalizing the issues, conducting military exercises with outside powers, and violating China’s fisheries laws. China urges other claimants to abide by the DoC and refrain from such activities.

*China is hopeful that a mutually agreeable Code of Conduct (CoC) can be negotiated with ASEAN. However, the CoC should contain guidelines for peaceful cooperative behavior and a crisis management mechanism–not a dispute settlement mechanism.

*China looks forward to peaceful settlement of the disputes and cooperative use of the South China Sea.

Issuing an official statement along these lines would clarify China’s position without fundamentally sacrificing its claims or interests. More important it would bring the debate within the realm of international comity and parlance. Further, it should help mollify the naval powers regarding the ‘freedom of navigation’.

Of course the legal purists who think international law is absolute and unchanging and are wedded to the status quo –which favors Western powers—will criticize this position. But the reality is that ‘international law is the arms of geopolitics’  and its evolution and interpretation will be influenced by rising nations –just as they have been influenced by today’s ‘global leaders’. For China such a statement would indicate it has “risen” and is ready to challenge the existing world system and contemporary interpretations of international law—if necessary to protect its interests.

III. NAUTILUS INVITES YOUR RESPONSES

The Nautilus Peace and Security Network invites your responses to this report. Please leave a comment below or send your response to: nautilus@nautilus.org. Comments will only be posted if they include the author’s name and affiliation.

2 May 2013

 I. Introduction

In his piece on the insanity of pursuing nuclear power, Nikhil Desai asks “How many billions of dollars have to be bet, and how many lives put at risk, in order to learn, and re-learn lessons of nuclear power?”

Nikhil Desai is the Energy Security contributor for the NAPSNet Weekly report.

The views expressed in this report do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Nautilus Institute. Readers should note that Nautilus seeks a diversity of views and opinions on significant topics in order to identify common ground.

II. Policy Forum by Nikhil Desai

Insanity – playing with fire 

Some sage – not me – is said to have said that insanity is doing the same thing over and over again and expect a different result.

Nuclear advocates learnt early on that the promise of “forever energy” was so great, so intoxicating and potentially addictive, that to not be seen as insane and indeed to perpetuate an aura of sanity, rationalism, care for the collective good, all they had to do was assure the public, whenever necessary, that “this time it is different.”

Yes, a different reactor type. A different supplier. A safety upgrade. Or new protections against fires, earthquakes, airliner crashes, tsunami, operator error.

This duplicity in service of insanity had three elements.

First, rely on changing reactor and power plant technologies and learn-as-you-go (or protect-the-reputation betting-other-people’s money) designs and regulatory regimes[i].

Second, keep people excited enough about reactor safety, even while fighting the industry opponents (in some countries) and claiming absolute safety – or at least, “acceptable risk” of loss-of-coolant probability of x in a million reactor-years, something that lay people would find it difficult to grasp – ignore or hide the risks to workers and general public from the fuel-cycle risks, from uranium mining to waste management to disposal.

And third, of course, titillate people about the glory of nuclear technology, bearing nuclear power as a badge of technological prowess and acquiring nuclear weapons capability as a defense necessity.

Of course, all this required double-speak. Some things could not be said publicly and it was necessary to ensure that some such things were not said at all, even privately.

“What if not nuclear (power or weapons)?”  The necessity borne of certainty.  If there was no God, at least there was the Atom. One way of playing dice with God’s creation.

After TMI and Chernobyl (27 years ago this past week), the industry found a “forever” problem – climate change – perfectly matching the “forever” of the atom.  As Nick Stern said HIV/Aids was not a priority while facing “existential risks” of climate change, nuclear reactor or fuel cycle accidents, or nuclear weapon discharges by accident or design, were not to be bothered with when facing up to the risk of mother of all catastrophies – climate change.

But, just as people had begun to forget that a candle caused the devastating fire at Browns Ferry 1 power reactor, they were shown that in repairing Fukushima, just so as to get it ready for permanent retirement, “a rat caused a blackout and subsequent work to prevent a recurrence led to another system failure”.

Ah. So we may have an earthquake-proof technology that is not rat-proof.

And we are told again that Fukushima was due to “outdated nuclear reactors, overuse of the generators and overall bad maintenance.” No reactor will remain forever fresh and ready, but no, next time it will be different.

In TMI-1 we learnt that operator error combined with a slight equipment dysfunction forced evacuation of a city. And now we learn that a Russian supplier has been held for delivering “shoddy parts” to an Indian nuclear reactor.

We also learnt in the US that incomplete designs and open-ended regulatory or technical issues led to long construction delays and cost escalation. Now we learn that India’s siting reports are shoddy or warn against nuclear plant construction (at least according to the parameters provided).

How many billions of dollars have to be bet, and how many lives put at risk, in order to learn, and re-learn lessons of nuclear power?

Or need we accept, howsoever painfully, that while in some countries some power reactors have operated reasonably well, and may also have reduced air pollution and CO₂ loadings in the atmosphere – claims of dubious value, depending on the baseline – we have been defrauded, deluded, fooled, taken for a ride, and our lives and monies are at risk?

The entire apparatus of “peaceful uses of nuclear energy” needs re-examination, to say the least. If weapons of mass destruction – and the threat of mutual assured destruction – are seen as morally abhorrent, nuclear power must be seen as financially abhorrent. In poor countries with limited land, water, infrastructure and institutional capacity or research, planning and emergency response, nuclear power and weapon power must be accepted as a nightmare to get over.

As governments struggle with nuclear issues in Iran or North/South Korea, or contemplate response to potential chemical weapons use in Syria, nuclear power exit remains by far the more tractable problem than nuclear disarmament. Nuclear power remains a potent chemical weapon, not intentionally used against own people but in search of the nuclear weapons of mass destruction to threaten other countries with. Governments may also end up risking their own populations and terrorizing them to boot if they refuse to go along.

Indications are, that terrorizing face of nuclear power is coming to the fore now. And the intoxication of “forever energy” may be so high, India may well teach the world how “peaceful” uses of nuclear energy can be anything but.

III. Background material for further reading:

Three Mile Island’s lessons for Japan, Winifred Bird, The Japan Times [21 August 2011]

US nuclear exit? Special issue (March/April 2013), the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, available free online, 1 March 2013 version of record.

A)    How to close the US nuclear industry: Do nothing, Peter A. Bradford;

B)    Nuclear policy responses to Fukushima: Exit, voice, and loyalty

Egyptian professors discuss benefits of nuclear and solar energy to fight blackouts, Louise Sarant, Egypt Independent, [4 April 2013]

INSIGHT: Problems at Fukushima plant stem from TEPCO’s rickety equipment, Ryuta Koike and Jin Nishikawa, The Asahi Shimbun [8 April 2013]

Ex-regulator says reactors are flawed, Matthew L. Wald, The New York Times [8 April 2013], as cited in “Former Chairman of Nuclear Regulatory Commission: Reactors should be phased out” [9 April 2013]

Kudankulam N-plant in danger? Supplier held for shoddy parts, Kuman Chellappan, The Daily Pioneer (Chennai) [8 April 2013]

The Experts: What’s the Best Way Forward on Nuclear Power? The Wall Street Journal [17 April 2013] 

What marriage can teach us about the nuclear waste problem, Suzanne Baker, The Energy Collective (online). [17 April 2013]

MPs point to 2.3 bn annual nuclear subsidy, Sylvia Pfeifer, Financial Times [24 April 2013]

Fukushima nuclear plant cleanup may take more than 40 years: IAEA, AP Japan Times [24 April 2013]

Centre’s report indicates N-plant not safe for Jaitapur, Dilnaz Boga, DNA (Daily News and Analysis, Mumbai), [28 April 2013]

• DETERRENCE: UN Sanctions on the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea: prospects and problems
• DPRK: Why do U.S. senior officials visit China in succession?
  
• ENERGY SECURITY: World has stalled on clean energy
  
• GOVERNANCE AND CIVIL SOCIETY: Official: China positive on talks with South Korea, U.S. on N. Korea
  
• CLIMATE CHANGE ADAPTATION: Adaptation or development? exploring the distinctions (or lack thereof) through case studies in Bangladesh and Vietnam
  
• AUSTRAL PEACE AND SECURITY: Japan stirs Campbell’s US ‘pivot’ soup
  

DETERRENCE: UN Sanctions on the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea: prospects and problems, IISS Workshop with UN Panel of Experts, Johannesburg (19 March 2013)

DPRK Sanctions UNSCR 2094 clarifies that the term ‘luxury goods’ includes, but is not limited to, jewellery, yachts, automobiles and racing cars. It was noted that the EU considers malt whisky aged 18 years to be a luxury, by which one might infer that 12-year malt whisky is considered essential.

• No crude exports to DPRK from China in February 2013 data, only small amount of diesel, Zhongguo Haishi Fuwu Wang (China National Shipping Service Net) (22 March 2013) [Chinese Language]
• Penglai Port inspects 11 DPRK ships for radioactivity, Jinan Penglai Entry-Exit Inspection and Quarantine Bureau (18 March 2013) [Chinese Language]
• Trade will expand, China is DPRK’s only destination country of import and export, Dandong Chinese Merchants Overseas Investment Company website (20 February 2013) [Chinese Language]

DPRK: Why do U.S. senior officials visit China in succession? Liang Jun, People’s Daily Online (27 April 2013)

The steady stream of U.S. visitors to China continues.  China stepped up customs checks on shipments to and from North Korea.  A former United States Forces Korea Commander advocates re-considering Operational Control transfer due to North Korea’s threats.  North Korea will harshly sentence Kenneth Bae.  He will likely be allowed to leave after that as a goodwill gesture.  The formal rapprochement likely starts shortly thereafter.

• China steps up customs checks, but North Korea trade robust, Ben Blanchard, Reuters News Agency (30 April 2013)
• Former USFK commander speaks out against giving S. Korea operational control, Ashley Rowland, Stars and Stripes (29 April 2011)
• North Korea to put American Tour operator Kenneth Bae on trial for ‘trying to overthrow the government’, James Legge, The Independent (UK) (27 April 2013)

ENERGY SECURITY: World has stalled on clean energy, World Nuclear News (17 April 2013)

When it comes to nuclear power, everybody resorts to exceptionalism. Each country believes – at least, argues in public, that it is different. Whatever happens anywhere, “It Will Not Happen Here”. Or at least, “Not again.” The IEA, transformed from a policy coordination think-tank to an advocacy shop for special interests, now recommends a nuclear build rate of at least 16 GW per year to 2020 and 20 GW per year after that, essentially an investment plan of a couple of trillion dollars over the next ten years. For an industry with a record of excellence interspersed by shoddiness, secrecy, roguish and criminal elements and risks of catastrophic failures whose price tab is given to the taxpayers, and whose outputs are weapons of mass destruction.

• Looming clash between Seoul and Washington over nuclear technology, Audrey Yoo, Time (30 April 2013)
• Britain looks to tackle deadly legacy of nuclear power plants, Sylvia Pfeifer, Financial times (29 April 2013)
• Flow of tainted water is latest crisis at Japan nuclear plant, Martin Fackler, The New York Times (29 April 2013)

GOVERNANCE AND CIVIL SOCIETY: Official: China positive on talks with South Korea, U.S. on N. Korea, UPI (25 April 2013)

As dialogue on the Korean peninsula appears more likely with the ending of US-ROK military exercises, the US and ROK are seeking joint policy coordination with China on DPRK issues. A 24-hour hotline was established between Seoul and Beijing to facilitate this coordination. The closure of the Kaesong complex remains troublesome, with the US and China holding opposite viewpoints on the ROK’s decision to withdraw all workers from the complex.

• China, U.S. at odds over South’s Kaesong stance, Sarah Kim and Choi Hyung-kyu, Joongang Ilbo (30 April 2013)
• The risk of a permanent shutdown at Kaesong, Gil Yun-hyung, Hankyoreh (29 April 2013)
• Hurdles to talks high after North Korea threats, Eric Talmadge, Associated Press (29 April 2013)

CLIMATE CHANGE ADAPTATION: Adaptation or development? exploring the distinctions (or lack thereof) through case studies in Bangladesh and Vietnam, Partner report series No 8, Stockholm Environment Institute and Regional Climate Change Adaptation Knowledge Platform (2013)

Development is considered a ‘safer’ objective than adaptation, due to the lack of tools to assess success in achieving adaptation through projects. Differentiating between adaptation and development may be an artificial exercise. In theory, there is a difference between adaptation and development. In project implementation, that difference is mostly considered insignificant. In practice, the actions taken to achieve adaptation can hardly be distinguished from those required to achieve sustainable development.

• Successful adaptation to climate change across scales, W. Neil Adger, Nigel W Arnell and Emma L. Tompkins, Global Environmental Change, vol. 15, no. 2 (2005) [subscription required]
• Portfolio screening to support the mainstreaming of adaptation to climate change into development assistance, Richard J.T. Klein et al., working paper 102, Tyndall Centre for Climate Change (2007) [PDF, 539.5 KB]

AUSTRAL PEACE AND SECURITY: Japan stirs Campbell’s US ‘pivot’ soup, Peter Lee, Asia Times (26 April 2013)

The less-than-desirable by-product has been the tendency of the pivot’s designated junior partners to tug at the dragon’s whiskers. In the case of Japan, adventurism has gotten out of hand, and the US is responding with anxiety. Japan cutting all sorts of anti-China deals on its own raises the specter of an independent Japanese security policy and, with it, the kind of destabilization that the US pivot to Asia was meant to pre-empt.

• Japan under neonationalist, neoliberal rule: moving toward an abyss? Herbert Bix, Asia-Pacific Journal, Vol 11, Issue 15, No. 2 (15 April 2013)
• Kerry offers missile defense concession, seeks help from China in dealing with North Korea, Michael R. Gordon, Boston Globe (14 April 2013)
• Warship to join US fleet in hot zone: Japan base for frigate, Brendan Nicholson, The Australian (26 April 2013) *Subscription required

The Nautilus Peace and Security Weekly Report presents articles and full length reports each week in six categories: Austral security, nuclear deterrence, energy security, climate change and security, the DPRK, climate change adaptation and governance and civil society. Our team of contributors carefully select items that highlight the links between these themes and the three regions in which our offices are found—North America, Northeast Asia, and the Austral-Asia region. 

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Editor

• Arabella Imhoff

Contributors

• Deterrence: Peter Hayes
• Governance and Civil Society: Dyana Mardon, Yi Kiho
• Climate Change Adaptation: Saleem Janjua
• DPRK: Roger Cavazos
• Energy Security: Nikhil Desai
• Austral Peace and Security: Richard Tanter